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INDEX

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RETAIN Yellow Index 1680
INSERT This Index

A

ARAB LEAGUE

Yemens
☐ North-South conflict, Arab League mediation efforts, resolution (Mar 1979), 30197 A (30197-98)

ATOMIC ENERGY AND RESEARCH
☐ See main hdg. **Nuclear Energy**

B

BARBADOS

St Vincent and the Grenadines, Relations with
☐ Military assistance by Barbados during post-election unrest in St Vincent (Dec 1979), 30178 A

C

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Paracel and Spratly Islands
☐ See subhdg. **Philippines, Relations with**

Philippines, Relations with
☐ Paracel and Spratly Islands, sovereignty dispute, publication of decree unilaterally declaring Spratly Islands to be part of Philippine territory (Sep 1979), 30193 A
☐ Trade agt., provisions, signature (Jul 1979), 30193 A
☐ Visit, Mrs Marcos (Jul 1979), 30193 A

COMMONWEALTH, THE

Membership
☐ Kiribati, Republic of, admission (Jul 1979), 30187 A (30187)
☐ St Vincent and the Grenadines, accession as special member (Oct 1979), 30178 A

CUBA

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, Relations with
☐ Defence relations, reports of increased Cuban military presence in South Yemen (1979), 30197 A (30198, 30199)
☐ Scientific and technical co-operation agt., signature (early 1979), 30197 A (30199)

CYPRUS

Cabinet
☐ Kyprianou Cabinet, new Finance Minister (Nov 1979), 30186 B

D

DISARMAMENT

Nuclear Weapon Tests
☐ See under main hdg. **Nuclear Energy**

United Nations Organization
☐ See separate main hdg.

DISASTERS

St Vincent and the Grenadines
☐ Volcanic eruptions, damage, relief aid (1979), 30178 A

E

ECONOMIC ZONES
☐ See under main hdg. **Kiribati, Republic of**

ETHIOPIA

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, Relations with
☐ Treaty of friendship and co-operation, provisions, signature (Dec 1979), 30197 A (30199)
☐ Visits, Lt.-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, co-operation and trade agts. (Nov-Dec 1979), Lt.-Col. A. N. Antar (Jan 1980), 30197 A (30199)

F

FIJI

Kiribati, Republic of, Relations with
☐ Fiji Govt.'s role in pre-independence discussions on status of Banabans (Mar-Jun 1979), 30187 A (30189-90)

Rabi Island
☐ Banaban community, election of Rev. T. Tawaka *vice* R. Tito as chairman of Rabi Ccl. of Leaders (1978); British Govt.'s 1977 offer of ex gratia payment to secure economic future of Banabans, negs. and eventual acceptance by Ccl. of Leaders; British aid offer for development projects on Rabi Island (1978-Jul 1979), 30187 A

United Kingdom, Relations with
☐ Fiji Govt.'s involvement in discussions leading to independence of Kiribati, British minister's talks with Fiji PM (Mar-Jun 1979), 30187 A (30189-90)

FRANCE

Spain, Relations with
☐ French abolition of political refugee status for Spaniards in Jan 1979, continuing protest campaign by Basque nationalists (1979), 30181 A (30183)

G

GILBERT ISLANDS
☐ See main hdg. **Kiribati, Republic of**

I

INDIA

Pakistan, Relations with
☐ Nuclear energy, Indian apprehension over Pakistani development programme, Indian rejection of Pakistani proposal to declare South Asia a nuclear-free zone (Aug-Dec 1979), 30202 A

INDONESIA

Papua New Guinea, Relations with
☐ Border administration agt., signature (Dec 1979), 30180 A

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO)

Membership
☐ United States, decision to resume membership (Feb 1980), 30177 A
☐ Vietnam, Socialist Republic of, admission (Jan 1980), 30177 A

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

Membership
☐ St Vincent and the Grenadines, admission, quota (Dec 1979), 30178 A

Pakistan
☐ Drawing, approval (Dec 1979), 30202 A

Sierra Leone
☐ Standby arrangement, approval (Nov 1979), 30196 A

IRAQ

Yemen Arab Republic, Relations with
☐ Visit, T. Y. Ramadhan, loan and co-operation agts. (Sep 1979), 30197 A (30200)

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, Relations with
☐ State of, sharp deterioration, incidents (mid-1979), 30197 A (30200)

J

JAPAN

Philippines, Relations with
☐ Revised treaty of friendship, trade and navigation, signature (May 1979), 30193 A

K

KIRIBATI, REPUBLIC OF

Banaba
☐ Economy, British Govt.'s 1977 offer of ex gratia payment to secure economic future of Banabans, negs. and eventual acceptance by Rabi Ccl. of Leaders; settlement by British Phosphate Commission of Banaban claims for replanting of mined-out areas of Banaba; British Govt.'s agt. to undertake resources study of Banaba (1978-Jul 1979), 30187 A (30188, 30190-91)
☐ Rabi Ccl. of Leaders, election of Rev. T. Tawaka *vice* R. Tito as chairman (1978), 30187 A (30188)
☐ Status, Banaban separatist aspirations, continuing discussions, British decision to include Banaba within an independent Kiribati under special constitutional arrangements, provisions of independence constitution (1978-Jul 1979), 30187 A

Cabinet
☐ Tabai Cabinet, reorganization, composition (Jul 1979), 30187 A (30192)

Commonwealth, The
☐ Membership, accession (Jul 1979), 30187 A (30187)

Constitution
☐ Pre-independence developments, Banaban separatist aspirations, constitutional conf. in London, proposals, Banaban opposition, agt. on basic constitutional framework between Gilbertese and British delegations, subsequent developments, attitude of Fiji Govt., passage and enactment of UK legislation providing for independence as Republic of Kiribati w.e.f. 12 Jul 1979, principal provisions (including special arrangements for Banaba) of independence constitution (1978-Jul 1979), 30187 A

Economic Policy
☐ Post-independence, UK aid undertakings, development aims, 30187 A (30192)
☐ Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, estimated value (late 1978), 30187 A (30188)

Economic Zone
☐ 200-mile exclusive zone, proclamation (Apr 1978), 30187 A (30192)

Fiji, Relations with
☐ Fiji Govt.'s role in pre-independence discussions on status of Banabans, Suva mtg. between Banaban and Gilbertese leaders (May 1979), 30187 A (30189-90)

Internal Security
☐ Banaba, petrol bomb attacks on British Phosphate Commission installations, arrests, increased security measures (Feb 1979), 30187 A (30188)

KIRIBATI, REPUBLIC OF (cont.)

Maps
☐ Geographic/political, 30187
☐ Tarawa, 30187

Ocean Island
☐ See subhdg. **Banaba**

Population
☐ Estimated fig. (1979), 30187 A (30187)

President
☐ Tabai, I., first post-independence executive Pres. (Jul 1979), 30187 A (30187)

United Kingdom, Relations with
☐ Independence, attainment as Republic of Kiribati w.e.f. 12 Jul 1979, political background (1978-Jul 1979), 30187 A

United States, Relations with
☐ Treaty of friendship, territorial provisions, signature (Sep 1979), 30187 A (30192)

M

MAPS

Kiribati, Republic of
☐ Geographic/political, 30187
☐ Tarawa, 30187

Pacific Ocean
☐ Territories, political, 30187

Philippines
☐ Political, 30194

St Vincent and the Grenadines
☐ Political/geographic, 30179

Yemens
☐ North/South Yemen, 30197

MOZAMBIQUE

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Relations with
☐ Sanctions, termination by Mozambique (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)

N

NEW ZEALAND

Political Parties
☐ Socialist Unity Party (SUP), alleged financial dealings with Soviet ambassador to New Zealand (Jan 1980), 30192 A

Soviet Union, Relations with
☐ Diplomatic relations, expulsion of Soviet ambassador to New Zealand, Soviet retaliation (Jan 1980), 30192 A

NEWLY INDEPENDENT AND AUTONOMOUS STATES
☐ See main hdgs. **Kiribati, Republic of** and **St Vincent and the Grenadines**

NUCLEAR ENERGY
☐ (See also subhdg. **Nuclear Energy** under individual countries)

Nuclear Weapon Tests
☐ Speculation on possibility of South African or Israeli nuclear test (Sep-Oct 1979), further investigations and reports (Jan-Feb 1980), 30195 A
☐ Summary of tests carried out by US, Soviet Union, France, China, UK and India (1970-79), total number of tests (1945-79), 30195 A
☐ Tripartite Soviet-US-UK negs. on comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, sessions, obstacles to progress (Oct 1977 to end-1979), 30195 A

P

PAKISTAN

Cabinet
☐ Zia ul-Haq Cabinet, resig. of Minister of Culture and Tourism (Jun 1979), 30202 A

Economic Policy
☐ Economic situation, economic survey for 1978-79; 1979-80 budget, provisions, anct. (Jun 1979); State Bank of Pakistan's annual report (Dec 1979), 30202 A

Elections
☐ General elections, indefinite postponement of elections scheduled for Nov 1979, background (Jul-Oct 1979), subsequent stmts. by Pres. Zia on possibility of future elections (Oct 1979-Jan 1980), 30202 A
☐ Municipal and district elections (Sep 1979), 30202 A

Financial and Monetary Policy
☐ Foreign aid, debt rescheduling, further approaches by Pakistan Govt. to Aid to Pakistan Consortium (mid-1979), 30202 A

PAKISTAN (cont.)
☐ Foreign exchange holdings, decline, figs. (Oct 1979), 30202 A
☐ IMF, approval of drawing (Dec 1979), 30202 A

India, Relations with
☐ Nuclear energy, Indian apprehension over Pakistani development programme, Indian rejection of Pakistani proposal to declare South Asia a nuclear-free zone (Aug-Dec 1979), 30202 A

Internal Political Affairs
☐ Political activities, anct. of complete ban by military Govt. (Oct 1979), 30202 A

Internal Security
☐ Internal unrest, campaign by leaders of Pakistan People's Party agnst. Pres. Zia's military regime, execution of four Federal Security Force members convicted with former Prime Minister Bhutto; arrest of political leaders and other measures following Govt.'s ban on all political activities (May 1979-Jan 1980), 30202 A
☐ Martial law, continuation, extension of jurisdiction of military courts to cover civil offences (Oct 1979), 30202 A

Islamic Code of Laws
☐ Extension of ban on sale and possession of drugs (Aug 1979), 30202 A

Nuclear Energy
☐ Nuclear development programme, security measures, Indian and US apprehension, Indian rejection of Pakistani proposal to declare South Asia a nuclear-free zone (Aug-Dec 1979), 30202 A

Political Parties
☐ Dissolution of all political parties, anct. by Pres. Zia (Oct 1979), 30202 A
☐ Pakistan National Party, formation (Jun 1979), 30202 A
☐ Political Parties Act (1962), amdts., opposition (Aug-Sep 1979), 30202 A

Press and Other Media
☐ Govt. restrictions, lifting of censorship on Pakistan People's Party newspaper (Jun 1979), subsequent banning of all opposition papers and imposition of censorship on mass media (Oct-Dec 1979), 30202 A

United States, Relations with
☐ Nuclear energy, US apprehension over Pakistani development programme (Aug-Oct 1979), 30202 A
☐ Visit, A. Shahi (Oct 1979), 30202 A

PALESTINIAN QUESTION

Palestine Liberation Organization
☐ Spanish-PLO relations, raising of status of PLO representation in Madrid to that of diplomatic mission (1978); visit to Spain by PLO leader (Sep 1979), 30181 A (30185)

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Indonesia, Relations with
☐ Border administration agt., signature (Dec 1979), 30180 A

PETROLEUM
☐ See subhdg. **Petroleum** under individual countries

PHILIPPINES

Cabinet
☐ Marcos Cabinet, reorganization, list (Jul 1979), 30193 A

China, People's Republic of, Relations with
☐ Paracel and Spratly Islands, sovereignty dispute, publication of decree unilaterally declaring Spratly Islands to be part of Philippine territory (Sep 1979), 30193 A
☐ Trade agt., provisions, signature (Jul 1979), 30193 A
☐ Visit, Mrs Marcos (Jul 1979), 30193 A

Church-State Relations
☐ Martial law regime, increasing opposition by Roman Catholic Church (1979), 30193 A

Elections
☐ Regional assemblies for Southern and Western Mindanao (May 1979), 30193 A

Energy
☐ (See also subhdgs. **Nuclear Energy** and **Petroleum**)
☐ 10-yr. energy programme (1978-88), designed to reduce dependence on imported oil, setbacks, acceleration of geothermal and other local energy development programmes, energy-saving measures (1978-79), 30193 A

PHILIPPINES (cont.)

Internal Security
☐ Internal unrest, continued hostilities by Moslem rebels in southern provinces and by (Maoist) New People's Army (NPA), casualties, govt. measures (1979), 30193 A
☐ Martial law regime, protests over continuation, increasing criticism by Roman Catholic Church (1979), 30193 A
☐ Political detainees, releases (Sep-Nov 1979), 30193 A

Japan, Relations with
☐ Revised treaty of friendship, trade and navigation, signature (May 1979), 30193 A

Map
☐ Political, 30194

Nuclear Energy
☐ Nuclear programme, suspension of construction of country's first nuclear power plant, opening of inquiry into safety standards (Jun-Jul 1979), 30193 A

Paracel and Spratly Islands
☐ See subhdg. **China, People's Republic of, Relations with**

Petroleum
☐ Palawan offshore fields, production rate (mid-1979), 30193 A

Political Parties
☐ Union for Democracy and Liberty, formation (1979), 30193 A

United States, Relations with
☐ Defence relations, agt. on US bases in Philippines, provisions (Jan 1979), 30193 A

POPULATION
☐ See under main hdg. **Kiribati, Republic of**

R

RELIGION

World Council of Churches (WCC)
☐ Racism, Special Fund to Combat, WCC grant to Zimbabwe Patriotic Front (Sep 1979), 30165 A (30165)

RHODESIA
☐ See main hdg. **Zimbabwe/Rhodesia**

S

ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Barbados, Relations with
☐ Military assistance by Barbados during post-election unrest in St Vincent (Dec 1979), 30178 A

Cabinet
☐ Cato Cabinet, new formation following general election (Dec 1979), 30178 A

Commonwealth, The
☐ Membership, accession as special member (Oct 1979), 30178 A

Constitution
☐ Termination of association with UK, political background, principal provisions of independence constitution (early 1978-Oct 1979), 30178 A

Disasters
☐ Volcanic eruptions, damage, relief aid (1979), 30178 A

Economic Policy
☐ Economic situation, growth rate figs. (1976-78), adverse effects of volcanic activity on island's economy, UK's post-independence aid programme (1979), 30178 A

Elections
☐ General election, results (Dec 1979), 30178 A

Foreign Policy
☐ Post-independence, policy stmt. by PM (Oct 1979), 30178 A

Internal Security
☐ Post-election unrest, declaration of state of emergency, arrests (Dec 1979), 30178 A

International Monetary Fund (IMF)
☐ Membership, admission, quota (Dec 1979), 30178 A

Map
☐ Political/geographic, 30179

Political Parties
☐ New Democratic Party (NDP), formation (Dec 1975), 30178 A
☐ People's Political Party (PPP), virtual elimination as political force following general election (Dec 1979), 30178 A

ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES (cont.)

☐ United People's Movement (UPM), formation as "new left" alliance (Aug 1979), 30178 A

☐ Youlou United Liberation Movement (Yulimo), formation (1974), 30178 A

United Kingdom, Relations with

☐ Termination of association, political background (early 1978-Oct 1979), post-independence aid programme, 30178 A

SAUDI ARABIA

Taiwan, Relations with

☐ Oil, reported Saudi guarantee of low-priced supplies to Taiwan (early 1979), 30197 A (30198)

Yemen Arab Republic, Relations with

☐ Saudi reaction to hostilities between North and South Yemen, Saudi financing of arms supplies to North Yemen, reported agt. on provision of military training personnel (1979-early 1980), 30197 A (30197-99)

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, Relations with

☐ Saudi reaction to hostilities between North and South Yemen (Feb-Mar 1979), 30197 A (30197-99)

☐ Visit, M. S. Muti (Feb 1979), 30197 A (30197)

SIERRA LEONE

Cabinet

☐ Stevens Cabinet, changes (Feb 1980), 30196 A

Economic Policy

☐ Economic situation, IMF review (Nov 1979), 30196 A

Financial and Monetary Policy

☐ IMF, approval of standby arrangement in support of Govt.'s financial programme (Nov 1979), 30196 A

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

United Kingdom, Relations with

☐ Visit, R. F. Botha (Nov 1979), 30165 A (30173)

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Relations with

☐ South African military involvement in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, allegations, reports and stmts. (Nov-Dec 1979), 30165 A (30173-74)

SOVIET UNION

New Zealand, Relations with

☐ Diplomatic relations, expulsion of Soviet ambassador to New Zealand, Soviet retaliation (Jan 1980), 30192 A

Yemen Arab Republic, Relations with

☐ Arms, reported Soviet supplies (1979), 30197 A (30199)

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, Relations with

☐ Defence relations, reports of increased Soviet military presence in South Yemen (1979), 30197 A (30198, 30199)

☐ Treaty of friendship and co-operation, provisions, signature (Oct 1979), 30197 A (30199)

☐ Visits, A. Kosygin (Sep 1979), Pres. Ismail (Oct 1979), 30197 A (30199)

SPAIN

Basque Provinces

☐ Autonomy, preparation and neg. of statute providing for regional autonomy, main provisions, position of Navarra, approval in referendum, ratification by *Cortes* and entry into force; elections to Basque Parliament to take place Mar 1980, anct.; withdrawal of Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) reps. from *Cortes* in protest over Govt.'s regional policy (Jun 1979-Jan 1980), 30181 A (30181-83)

☐ Basque Govt.-in-exile, formal dissolution (Dec 1979), 30181 A (30181)

☐ ETA, terrorist activities, continuation, casualties, bombings, kidnapping of UCD deputy, actions agnst. French targets in Spain, arrests and trials of suspected activists (1979), 30181 A (30183-84)

☐ Internal disorders, general strike, violent incidents (Sep 1979), 30181 A (30183)

Cabinet

☐ Suárez González Cabinet, resig. of Minister of Culture and Social Welfare, replacement, other changes (Jan 1980), 30181 A (30182-83)

Catalonia

☐ Autonomy, preparation and neg. of statute providing for regional autonomy, main provisions, approval in referendum, ratification by *Cortes* and entry into force; elections to Catalan Parliament to take place Mar 1980, anct. (Jul 1979-Jan 1980), 30181 A (30181-82)

Divorce

☐ Decree empowering civil courts to grant legal separation (Dec 1979), 30181 A (30186)

SPAIN (cont.)

Economic Policy

☐ Economic situation, anti-inflation measures (Apr 1979); anct. of Govt.'s economic plan for 1979-82, provisions; trade union opposition to ceiling on wage increases for second half of 1979 (Aug 1979), 30181 A (30185)

Energy

☐ (See also subhdgs. **Nuclear Energy** and **Petroleum**)

☐ Conservation, introduction of energy-saving measures, price increases (1979), 30181 A (30184-85)

☐ Long-term energy programme for 1977-87, approval by *Cortes* (Jul 1979), 30181 A (30185)

Financial and Monetary Policy

☐ Peseta, appreciation agnst. US dollar (Apr 1979), 30181 A (30185)

France, Relations with

☐ French abolition of political refugee status for Spaniards in Jan 1979, continuing protest campaign by Basque nationalists (1979), 30181 A (30183)

Internal Disorders

☐ Basque provinces, see separate subhdg.

Internal Security

☐ Political violence, continuation, casualties, bombings, kidnapping of UCD deputy, actions agnst. French targets in Spain, arrests and trials of suspected activists (1979-Jan 1980), 30181 A (30183-84)

Labour Relations

☐ Agt. between (Socialist) General Workers' Union (UGT) and Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organization (CEOE) on labour relations (Jul 1979), subsequent agt. on negotiation of 1980-81 individual collective settlements (Jan 1980), 30181 A (30185-86)

☐ Legislation, Workers' Statute, provisions, opposition, approval by Congress of Deputies (Dec 1979), 30181 A (30185)

Nuclear Energy

☐ Nuclear capacity, development plans, opposition (1979), 30181 A (30185)

Palestinian-Spanish Relations

☐ Raising of status of PLO representation in Madrid to that of diplomatic mission (1978); visit by PLO leader to Spain (Sep 1979), 30181 A (30185)

Petroleum

☐ Imports, assurances on continued supplies by Algeria, Libya and Iraq (late 1979), 30181 A (30185)

Political Parties

☐ Carlist Party, abolition of post of pres. following resig. of Prince Carlos Hugo, election of M. Zufia as sec.-gen. (Dec 1979), 30181 A (30184)

☐ Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), 28th national congress, resig. of sec.-gen. (May 1979), subsequent re-election, dropping of party's Marxist definition (Sep 1979), 30181 A (30184)

☐ Workers' Party of Spain (PTE), formation through merger of Revolutionary Workers' Party (ORT) and Spanish Party of Labour (PTE) (Jun-Jul 1979), 30181 A (30184)

Regions

☐ (See also subhdgs. **Basque Provinces** and **Catalonia**)

☐ Regional policy, new UCD directives on attainment of autonomy, opposition (Jan 1980), 30181 A (30182-83)

Vatican City State, Relations with

☐ Agts. replacing 1953 Concordat, exchange of ratification instruments and entry into force (Dec 1979-Jan 1980), 30181 A (30186)

T

TAIWAN

Saudi Arabia, Relations with

☐ Oil, reported Saudi guarantee of low-priced supplies to Taiwan (early 1979), 30197 A (30198)

TANZANIA

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Relations with

☐ Sanctions, termination by Tanzania (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)

U

UNITED KINGDOM

Currency

☐ Decimal currency, demonetization of 2½p coin w.e.f. 30 Jun 1980, anct. (Feb 1980), 30192 B

Fiji, Relations with

☐ Fiji Govt.'s involvement in discussions leading to independence of Kiribati, British minister's talks with Fiji PM (Mar-Jun 1979), 30187 A (30189-90)

UNITED KINGDOM (cont.)

Kiribati, Republic of, Relations with

☐ Independence, attainment as Republic of Kiribati w.e.f. 12 Jul 1979, political background (1978-Jul 1979), 30187 A

Legislation

☐ Kiribati Bill, enactment (Jun 1979), 30187 A (30190)

☐ Southern Rhodesia Bill, provisions, passage and enactment (Nov 1979), 30165 A (30175)

☐ Zimbabwe Bill, provisions, passage and enactment (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30176)

St Vincent and the Grenadines, Relations with

☐ Termination of association, political background (early 1978-Oct 1979), post-independence aid programme, 30178 A

South Africa, Republic of, Relations with

☐ Visit, R. F. Botha (Nov 1979), 30165 A (30173)

Yemen Arab Republic, Relations with

☐ State of, dispute over impounding of Yemen Airways aircraft in London as result of debt claim, retaliation by North Yemen Govt., subsequent improvement in relations (late 1979-early 1980), 30197 A (30200)

☐ Visit, Maj. A. A. A. Ghani (Dec 1979), 30197 A (30200)

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Relations with

☐ (See also main hdg. **Zimbabwe/Rhodesia,** subhdg. "Constitution")

☐ Sanctions, lapsing of annual sanctions order (Nov 1979), lifting of remaining sanctions, decision by UK Govt. not to take any actions in connexion with findings of Bingham report (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30175, 30177)

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

Disarmament

☐ Gen. Ass., 33rd session, resolutions concerning activities of Geneva Cttee. on Disarmament (Dec 1978), 30195 A

☐ Geneva Cttee. on Disarmament, membership, inauguration, sessions, consideration of US-Soviet draft convention on prohibition of radiological weapons (Jan 1979-Feb 1980), 30195 A

Economic and Social Council

☐ Membership, partial elections (Oct 1979), 30186 A

Security Council

☐ Membership, election of E. Germany, Niger, Philippines and Tunisia as new non-permanent members w.e.f. 1 Jan 1980 (Oct 1979), election of Mexico as fifth new member following eventual withdrawal of candidatures of Colombia and Cuba (Jan 1980); deferment of proposal to expand Sec. Ccl. membership (Dec 1979), 30186 A

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

☐ Gen. Ass., resolution on sanctions issue and Lancaster House agts. (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)

☐ Sec. Ccl., resolution calling on UN members to terminate sanctions (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)

UNITED STATES

International Labour Organization (ILO)

☐ Membership, US decision to rejoin (Feb 1980), 30177 A

Kiribati, Republic of, Relations with

☐ Treaty of friendship, territorial provisions, signature (Sep 1979), 30187 A (30192)

Pakistan, Relations with

☐ Nuclear energy, US apprehension over Pakistani development programme (Aug-Oct 1979), 30202 A

☐ Visit, A. Shahi (Oct 1979), 30202 A

Philippines, Relations with

☐ Defence relations, agt. on US bases in Philippines, provisions (Jan 1979), 30193 A

Yemen Arab Republic, Relations with

☐ Defence relations, agt. on additional US arms supplies, further support measures (Feb-Mar 1979), subsequent slowing down of US deliveries (mid-1979), 30197 A (30197-99)

☐ Visit, A. al Asnag (Jun 1979), 30197 A (30199)

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Relations with

☐ Sanctions, lifting by US Govt. after delay under presidential waiver (Nov-Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)

V

VATICAN CITY STATE

Spain, Relations with

☐ Agts. replacing 1953 Concordat, exchange of ratification instruments and entry into force (Dec 1979-Jan 1980), 30181 A (30186)

VIETNAM, SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
International Labour Organization (ILO)
☐ Membership, admission (Jan 1980), 30177 A

Y

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (NORTH YEMEN)
Cabinet
☐ Ghani Cabinet, changes (Mar, Jul 1979), 30197 A (30201)
Internal Political Affairs
☐ Constituent People's Ass., composition and functions, changes (May 1979), 30197 A (30201)
☐ Consultative ccl. on domestic and foreign issues, formation, membership (May 1979), new appts. (Sep 1979), 30197 A (30201)
☐ Political co-operation agt. between North Yemeni Govt. and National Democratic Front (NDF), provisions, signature (Feb 1980), 30197 A (30199)
Internal Security
☐ Political detainees, amnesties (Feb-Mar, Aug 1979), 30197 A (30201)
Iraq, Relations with
☐ Visit, T. Y. Ramadhan, loan and co-operation agts. (Sep 1979), 30197 A (30200)
Map
☐ North/South Yemen, 30197
Saudi Arabia, Relations with
☐ Saudi reaction to hostilities between North and South Yemen, Saudi financing of arms supplies to North Yemen, reported agt. on provision of military training personnel (1979-early 1980), 30197 A (30197-99)
Soviet Union, Relations with
☐ Arms, reported Soviet supplies (1979), 30197 A (30199)
United Kingdom, Relations with
☐ State of, dispute over impounding of Yemen Airways aircraft in London as result of debt claim, retaliation by North Yemen Govt., subsequent improvement in relations (late 1979-early 1980), 30197 A (30200)
☐ Visit, Maj. A. A. A. Ghani (Dec 1979), 30197 A (30200)
United States, Relations with
☐ Defence relations, agt. on additional US arms supplies, further support measures (Feb-Mar 1979), subsequent slowing down of US deliveries (mid-1979), 30197 A (30197-99)
☐ Visit, A. al Asnag (Jun 1979), 30197 A (30199)
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, Relations with
☐ State of, border fighting, S. Yemeni advances, Saudi Arabian reaction, mediation efforts by Arab League countries, US attitude, enforcement of ceasefire and withdrawal of trps., provisional agt. to unite North and South Yemen, progress of unity talks (Feb 1979-Feb 1980), 30197 A (30197-99)

YEMEN, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH YEMEN)
Cabinet
☐ Mohammed Cabinet, changes (Jun, Aug 1979, Mar 1980), 30197 A (30200-01)
Cuba, Relations with
☐ Defence relations, reports of increased Cuban military presence in South Yemen (1979), 30197 A (30198, 30199)
☐ Scientific and technical co-operation agt., signature (early 1979), 30197 A (30199)
Ethiopia, Relations with
☐ Treaty of friendship and co-operation, provisions, signature (Dec 1979), 30197 A (30199)
☐ Visits, Lt.-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, co-operation and trade agts. (Nov-Dec 1979), Lt.-Col. A. N. Antar (Jan 1980), 30197 A (30199)
Iraq, Relations with
☐ State of, sharp deterioration, incidents (mid-1979), 30197 A (30200)
Map
☐ North/South Yemen, 30197
People's Supreme Assembly (PSA)
☐ Presidium, election of members (Aug 1979), 30197 A (30201)
Saudi Arabia, Relations with
☐ Saudi reaction to hostilities between North and South Yemen (Feb-Mar 1979), 30197 A (30197-99)
☐ Visit, M. S. Muti (Feb 1979), 30197 A (30197)
Soviet Union, Relations with
☐ Defence relations, reports of increased Soviet military presence in South Yemen (1979), 30197 A (30198, 30199)
☐ Treaty of friendship and co-operation, provisions, signature (Oct 1979), 30197 A (30199)
☐ Visits, A. Kosygin (Sep 1979), Pres. Ismail (Oct 1979), 30197 A (30199)
Yemen Arab Republic, Relations with
☐ State of, border fighting, South Yemeni advances, Saudi Arabian reaction, mediation efforts by Arab League countries, US attitude, enforcement of ceasefire and withdrawal of trps., provisional agt. to unite North and South Yemen, progress of unity talks (Feb 1979-Feb 1980), 30197 A (30197-99)
Yemen Socialist Party (YSP)
☐ Cent. cttee., secretariat appts. (Aug 1979), 30197 A (30200)

Z

ZAMBIA
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Relations with
☐ Sanctions, termination by Zambia and reopening of border (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30176)
☐ Suspension of transport of maize supplies through Zimbabwe/Rhodesia to Zambia, lifting by newly-installed Governor of Rhodesia (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30176)

ZIMBABWE/RHODESIA
Constitution
☐ Lancaster House constitutional conf. in London, participation by Muzorewa Govt., Patriotic Front and British delegations, proposals and negs. on terms of independence constitution, on arrangements for pre-independence period and on ceasefire framework, attitude of front-line and other states, signature of final agt., UK legislative measures to implement agt., appt. and installation of British Governor and interim administration, return to legality as (Southern) Rhodesia (Sep-Dec 1979), 30165 A
Internal Security
☐ Guerrilla war, negs. and agt. on ceasefire framework at Lancaster House constitutional conf. in London, provisions, issue of South African military involvement (Nov-Dec 1979), 30165 A (30172-75)
Mozambique, Relations with
☐ Sanctions, termination by Mozambique (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)
Patriotic Front
☐ ZAPU-ZANU (Mugabe), negs. and agt. at Lancaster House constitutional conf. on independence constitution, transitional arrangements and ceasefire, lifting of banning orders on Patriotic Front by newly-installed British Governor of Rhodesia (Sep-Dec 1979), 30165 A
Sanctions
☐ Termination of sanctions by UK, US, front-line states and others, UN resolutions, decision by UK Govt. not to take any actions in connexion with findings of Bingham report (Nov-Dec 1979), 30165 A (30175, 30177)
South Africa, Republic of, Relations with
☐ South African military involvement in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, allegations, reports and stmts. (Nov-Dec 1979), 30165 A (30173-74)
Tanzania, Relations with
☐ Sanctions, termination by Tanzania (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)
United Kingdom, Relations with
☐ (See also subhdg. **Constitution**)
☐ Sanctions, lapsing of annual sanctions order (Nov 1979), lifting of remaining sanctions, decision by UK Govt. not to take any actions in connexion with findings of Bingham report (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30175, 30177)
United Nations Organization
☐ See separate main hdg.
United States, Relations with
☐ Sanctions, lifting by US Govt. after delay under presidential waiver (Nov-Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)
Zambia, Relations with
☐ Sanctions, termination by Zambia and reopening of border (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30177)
☐ Suspension of transport of maize supplies through Zimbabwe/Rhodesia to Zambia, lifting by newly-installed British Governor of Rhodesia (Dec 1979), 30165 A (30176)

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A. IRAN — The US-Iranian Crisis - Continued Detention of US Hostages in Tehran - US Endeavours to apply Sanctions against Iran - Transfer of Former Shah to Panama - Constitutional Referendum and Presidential Election in Iran - Other Internal Developments

The group of militant Iranian "students", who had occupied the US embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, 1979, and seized its staff as hostages against the extradition from the United States of the former Shah [see page 30150] and who accused the hostages of espionage for the United States, claimed on the same day that their action had been approved by Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran. On Nov. 5 the students declared further that they would negotiate only with the Revolutionary Council and not with the then provisional Government of Dr Mehdi Bazargan. [For description of the Revolutionary Council and the provisional Government, see pages 30141 and 30142.]

The US Government did not issue a list of the hostages held, but they were said to number 62 US citizens and 36 non-Americans, mainly Indian and Pakistani employees. [On Nov. 6 two further US citizens—Miss Kathryn Koob, director of the Iran-America Society, a cultural and educational institution in Tehran, and Mr William Royer, the institute's director of studies—had been seized and taken to the US embassy to join the hostages held there.] The non-Americans were released at an early stage, and on Nov. 17 Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the release and expulsion of 13 of the US hostages—five White women and eight Black men—on the grounds that Islam respected women and that Blacks had been "oppressed" in the United States; the released US hostages were given an official welcome in Washington on Nov. 22.

In Canada it was disclosed in the Montreal daily *La Presse* on Jan. 29 that Mr Jean Pelletier (the newspaper's Washington correspondent and a son of the Canadian ambassador to France) had been aware since Dec. 10, 1979, of a plan to enable six US diplomats to leave Iran secretly with Canadian help. Miss Flora MacDonald, then Canada's Minister of External Affairs, revealed on the same day that on Nov. 5 six US citizens (four diplomats and the wives of two of them) had obtained refuge at the Canadian embassy in Tehran and that on Jan. 26-27 they had left Iran with false Canadian passports, whereafter the Canadian embassy staff, including Mr Kenneth Taylor (the ambassador), were withdrawn and all Canadian embassy activities temporarily suspended.

Miss MacDonald's disclosures were confirmed by US officials on Jan. 29, and Mr Hodding Carter, State Department spokesman, expressed "deep appreciation" by the United States to the Government of Canada.

Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, then charged with supervision of Iran's Foreign Ministry, denounced Canada on Jan. 30 and accused it of violating the international laws which it claimed to defend, and he threatened to make Canada pay for its action in smuggling out the six US citizens.

(The latter were later named as Mr Mark Lijek, a consular officer, and his wife Cora, a consular assistant; Mr Robert Anders, a consular officer; Mr Henry Schatz, an agricultural attaché; and Mr Joseph Stafford, a consular officer, and his wife Kathleen, a consular assistant.)

Ayatollah Khomeini declared on Nov. 18 that the 49 US hostages remaining in the embassy would be tried as spies by revolutionary courts unless the USA extradited the Shah to Iran.

On several occasions the captors of the US hostages published documents purporting to show that several of the US citizens held by them had been agents of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

According to documents produced on Dec. 1 Mr L. Bruce Laingen (the US chargé d'affaires in Tehran) had agreed to the appointment of a second and third secretary—Mr Malcolm Kalp and Mr William Daugherty respectively—of whom the latter was said to have confessed to being a CIA agent.

On Dec. 6 papers were produced to show that Mr Leo Ahern jr. (a political officer and narcotics co-ordinator at the US embassy) had worked as an undercover agent for the CIA and had used a Belgian passport for this purpose.

On Jan. 4, 1980, students at the US embassy said that they would put on trial one of the hostages, Lt.-Col. David Roeder of the US Air Force, whom they accused of having flown combat missions over Vietnam.

Open support was given to the students' action not only by the office of Ayatollah Khomeini and by other leading ayatollahs (regilious leaders), but also by the Constituent Council of Experts [see page 30144], the (Islamic) *Mujaheddin Khalq* movement [see page 30143], the (pro-Moscow Communist) *Tudeh* party and many other organizations. [On the other hand the Revolutionary Council announced on Nov. 19 that all future taking of hostages—as also strikes in factories—would be regarded as "counter-revolutionary activities", against which the Council would take action.]

At the same time, the US Government stated on Nov. 4 that the Iranian Government had informed Mr Laingen, the US chargé d'affaires, that it would "do its best" to free the hostages. Mr Laingen, however, and two other members of the US embassy staff—Mr Michael Howland (his adviser) and Mr Victor Tomseth (a political officer)—were held at the Iranian Foreign Ministry from Nov. 4 onwards on the ground that government officials could not guarantee their safety if they left the ministry.

For the US State Department Mr Hodding Carter said in Washington on Nov. 5 that the Shah would not be handed over to Iran, as demanded by the militant occupiers of the embassy, because it was "well understood that the Shah is here for medical treatment and not for permanent residence". He added: "What we are concerned about is the safety of American citizens. We are not concerned about making a political show." (The Shah had flown from Mexico on Oct. 22 for treatment in a New York hospital—see page 30149.)

The British embassy in Tehran was temporarily occupied on Nov. 5 by demonstrators who were dislodged from it by Revolutionary Guards (for description of which see page 30141). The demonstrators demanded that the British Government should extradite Dr Shapour Bakhtiar (Dr Bazargan's predecessor as Prime Minister in January-February 1979—see pages 29740-44); however, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office denied that Dr Bakhtiar was living in Britain or had received political asylum there, and Dr Bakhtiar himself said in Paris on the same day that he was resident in France.

Attempts to secure Release of Hostages or to improve their Situation

Attempts to obtain the release of the US hostages were made during November 1979 by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), by envoys of the US Government and by an emissary of the Pope, but all were unsuccessful.

Mr Hassan Rahman, spokesman for the PLO at the United Nations, stated on Nov. 6 that the PLO would on the following day send a delegation to Tehran to seek the release of the hostages. However, a spokesman for the occupiers of the US embassy said on Nov. 8 that they did not wish the PLO to negotiate, and at the PLO office in Tehran it was stated on the same day that there could be no negotiation because Ayatollah Khomeini had announced on Nov. 7 that, unless the USA delivered the Shah to Iran, there could be no release of the hostages. The PLO acknowledged on Nov. 12 that it had abandoned its efforts on behalf of the hostages. (For PLO-Iran relations, see page 30148.)

Also on Nov. 7 Ayatollah Khomeini announced that he would not receive a US deputation led by Mr Ramsey Clark (who had been Attorney General in 1967-69 under President Lyndon Johnson) and Mr William G. Miller (staff director of the Senate select committee on intelligence and an expert on Iran). The deputation spent some time in Istanbul (Turkey) but as it was not granted the right to enter Iran it eventually returned to the United States on Nov. 15.

(Mr Clark was on Nov. 21, 1979, reported to have, since early 1979 and out of concern for human rights, urged the new Government in Iran to seek damages for criminal and wrongful acts committed by the former Shah and to recover properties which the Shah, his family and his confederates had unlawfully taken from the Iranian people, and that he had on Oct. 12 written to Dr Ibrahim Yazdi, then Iran's Foreign Minister, outlining the reasons supporting legal action and procedures to be followed.)

Mgr Annibale Bugnini, an envoy of the Vatican, arrived in Tehran on Nov. 8 with a personal message from Pope John Paul II to Ayatollah Khomeini, appealing for the release of the hostages. The Ayatollah was reported to have told the papal envoy that according to all available documents and data the staff of the US embassy had "conducted acts of espionage against our people and against the regime". In a speech on Nov. 10 the Ayatollah brushed aside all offers of negotiation and in particular accused the Vatican of not having protested against "50 years of massacres and imprisonment under the most inhuman conditions" during the reign of the deposed Shah and his father. Mgr Bugnini was nevertheless allowed to pay a visit to the hostages on Nov. 11.

Private efforts to seek a way which might lead to the release of the hostages were also made by several Western personalities in November and December 1979.

Mr James Abourezk, former US (Democrat) senator for South Dakota, and Mr George Hansen, (Republican) member of the House of Representatives from Idaho, arrived in Tehran on Nov. 22. In talks with Mr Abolhassan Bani-Sadr (then supervisor of the Iranian Foreign Ministry and also responsible for economic and financial affairs), Mr Hansen was told that the Revolutionary Council had no objection to his proposal that the US Congress might investigate the "crimes" of the Shah and his "protectors", but it was not mentioned whether this would lessen the tension between the two countries or lead to a dialogue on the release of the hostages. Mr Bani-Sadr also said that Iran did not want war; that in the event of US aggression the Moslem peoples would rise in support of Iran; that the upheaval which a US attack would cause would jeopardize the West's oil supplies and would shatter the dollar; and that it would also induce the Soviet Union to offer support which Iran was ready to accept. He added that the USA appeared to understand nothing about Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic convictions and his people's aspirations.

Mr Séan MacBride, the former Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists and later chairman of Amnesty International and UN Commissioner for Namibia, who came as the representative of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and at the invitation of the Iranian Government, had strictly confidential talks with Mr Sani-Badr in Tehran on Nov. 22 and said afterwards that "the way could be open for discussions".

Mr Hansen also visited the US hostages on Nov. 25 and described their condition as "relatively comfortable". Returning to Washington on Nov. 29 he rejected criticism by the White House and many congressmen who called his visit to Tehran "misguided", and he said that he would report his findings to the State Department and the White House. During a second visit to Tehran Mr Hansen explained on Dec. 28 that he was collecting evidence for a congressional hearing on the Shah's alleged crimes.

The captors of the hostages allowed the latter, on several occasions, to write letters to their families or to telephone them and also to be interviewed by US journalists. While some of the hostages deplored the conditions under which they were held, other expressed sympathy with their captors and criticism of the US authorities.

Mr William Gallegos, a Marine corporal, said on Dec. 11, when he answered questions by two US correspondents, that the hostages were not being mistreated and indicated that he and several others of them tended to support the students' principal demand, which was for the extradition of the Shah by the United States.

The US House of Representatives decided on Dec. 19 by 369 votes to four that the hostages should receive financial compensation for their sufferings.

Two groups of US clergymen visited Iran at Christmas 1979.

The first of these, consisting of the Rev. Jimmy Allen (a Baptist from San Antonio, Texas), the Rev. Dale Whit (a Methodist bishop from New Jersey), Mr Charles Caesaitti (an assistant to the presiding bishop of the Episcopalian Church of America) and Chaplains John Walsh and William Kirby (from Princeton University), had talks with Iranian leaders on the possible release of the hostages.

The second group, comprising the Rev. William Howard jr., the (Black) president of the National Council of Churches, the (Protestant) Rev. William Sloane Coffin (of New York) and the (Roman Catholic) Bishop Thomas Gumbleton (of Detroit), were allowed to visit the hostages held at the US embassy and said afterwards that they had seen 43 (of the 49) hostages and that they were in good health. (The six others were said to have declined to see the clerics.) Mr Howard, Mr Coffin and Bishop Gumbleton called at the Foreign Ministry on Dec. 26, when they saw Mr Qotbzadeh and also Mr Laingen and his two companions.

Cardinal Léon-Etienne Duval (76), the (Roman Catholic) Archbishop of Algiers, who had for 35 years been a worker for understanding between Christians and Moslems and who had been invited by the Iranian Government, also saw 43 of the US hostages on Dec. 25.

The hostages were allowed to receive their Christmas mail, including several hundred thousand Christmas cards from the United States.

In a letter received by *The Washington Post* on Jan. 16, 1980 (but written in mid-December 1979), one of the hostages, Mr Robert Ode (64), urged "the responsible leaders in our Government to take prompt action to free us from this terrible situation". He wrote that the hostages were "being kept in semi-darkened rooms", with their hands tied day and night, bright lights burning all night and constant noise making it "almost impossible to sleep", and with insufficient exercise and a monotonous diet.

Of further foreign visitors to Tehran, some were allowed to see the hostages during February 1980.

On Feb. 7-11 a group of Americans invited to Iran by the occupiers of the US embassy and led by Prof. Norman Forer (of the University of Kansas) had talks with their hosts, after which Prof. Forer called for solidarity between the ordinary people of the United States and of Iran in order to "begin work that will lead to a peaceful world, a civil world". The group did not see the detained hostages.

On the other hand persons allowed to see the hostages were Mgr Hilarion Capucci (former Greek Catholic Archbishop of Jerusalem, known for his pro-Palestinian views—see pages 26879-80 and 29647-48) and Mgr John Nolan (papal secretary to the Holy Land), both on Feb. 8, as well as Mr John Thomas, an American Indian activist, who saw the hostages on Feb. 9 and brought with him, on his return to the USA on Feb. 11, a total of 136 letters written by some of the hostages. In one of these letters, dated Feb. 7 and received by *The Washington Post* on Feb. 12, Mr Bruce German (a State Department budget officer) strongly criticized the US authorities for allowing the Shah to come to the USA and stated that the Moslem students firmly believed that the Shah was "a tyrant and guilty of despicable crimes", of which "some of us have seen overwhelming evidence".

US Measures to bring Pressure to bear on Iranian Authorities - International Reactions

It was disclosed in Washington on Nov. 8, 1979, that the US Government had ordered a halt to the shipment of $300,000,000 worth of military spare parts (already paid for) to Iran until the problem of the hostages was resolved.

On Nov. 5 the Iranian Government had announced that it had abrogated (i) a 1959 defence agreement between Iran and the United States [see 16748 A and 16769 A] and (ii) Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty between Iran and the Soviet Union, under which the latter was authorized to send troops into Iran in the event of anti-Soviet forces using Iranian territory in an attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime [see page 16770].

At the request of the United States, the UN Security Council met in closed session on Nov. 9 and issued a statement (supported by all Council member states, including the Soviet Union), declaring that the Council did "not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of any country" but that normal international behaviour provided for the inviolability of diplomats, and urging the Iranian Government "in the strongest terms" to release the US hostages without delay. [For subsequent consideration of the US-Iranian situation by the UN Security Council, see pages 30209-11 below.]

On Nov. 10 President Carter ordered the expulsion from the United States of all Iranian students who had previous convictions, or were without valid visas or not registered as students.

This decision was, however, overturned on Dec. 11 by Mrs Joyce Green, a federal judge in Washington, as being unconstitutional and contrary to the rules of "fair play and equality which are the essence of the American way of life". This ruling was in turn reversed on Dec. 27 by a federal appeals court which ruled that the Administration had the right to conduct special immigration checks and to initiate deportation proceedings against those Iranian students who were in the USA illegally or who did not report to immigration officials.

By the end of 1979 more than 54,000 Iranian students had been interviewed by immigration officials; 6,510 of them were found to have out-of-date visas but only 11 had been deported; and 477 had asked for political asylum on the grounds that their return to Iran would result in death or imprisonment by the Islamic revolutionaries.

US Ban on Imports of Oil from Iran

On Nov. 12 President Carter ordered an end to US oil imports from Iran as part of an international effort to secure the release of the hostages.

The President declared inter alia: "It is vital to the United States and every other nation that the lives of diplomatic personnel and other citizens should be protected and that we refuse to permit the use of terrorism and the seizure and the holding of hostages to impose political demands. . . . The lives of our people in Iran are at stake. No one should underestimate the resolve of the American Government and the American people in this matter."

(Mr Bani-Sadr said in a television interview on Nov. 11 that nobody intended to maltreat the hostages or to kill them, "even in the event of US military aggression".)

In Iran, the US decision to cease Iranian oil imports was welcomed by Mr Ali Akbar Moinfar, the Minister of Petroleum, who said on Nov. 12: "We had decided to cut exports to the United States as from tomorrow. We have many clients. We can sell it with no problem. We shall sell some at normal prices and some at spot prices." (For current spot prices, see page

29994. In the United States it was estimated that the loss of direct or indirect oil imports from Iran would amount to between 7 and 8 per cent of total US oil imports.)

On Nov. 13, US and British warships began manoeuvres in the Arabian Sea south of Iran (these manoeuvres being officially described as having been "long scheduled"), with ships taking part including the aircraft carrier *Midway* with about 75 aircraft (sent to the area from Yokusuka, Japan) and nine other US vessels (among them a guided-missile cruiser) and 10 British warships led by the guided-missile destroyer *Norfolk*.

US Freezing of Iranian Assets

On Nov. 14 President Carter issued an executive order, inter alia under an International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, blocking "all property and interests in the property of the Government of Iran . . . and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States".

In the order the President, finding that "the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security", declared a national emergency to deal with that threat. According to a White House statement issued on the same day, the assets blocked included Iranian official deposits in US banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. US officials estimated the assets thus blocked as worth up to $6,000 million.

The order did not cover privately-owned assets, such as those of the Shah and his family.

President Carter's order had been preceded by reports that Iran intended to withdraw all its funds (which it estimated at about $1,000 million) from US banks and to transfer them to banks in friendlier countries.

In Tehran Mr Bani-Sadr welcomed the US decision to freeze Iran's assets as "an unexpected gift", saying on Nov. 14: "We shall use this crisis to free Iran from the economic, financial, cultural and psychological grip of the USA. . . . We have today sold oil at a price which beats all records and against foreign currency other than the dollar." He warned the United States that the new oil crisis now appearing in outline would be quite different from that of 1973 [see 26224 A; 26355 A] which had caused a decline in the US dollar. "If they [the Americans]," he said "push the trial of strength further, the other crude oil producers will, whether they like it or not, follow our example, and that will mean the collapse of the dollar in favour of other currencies and an economic catastrophe in America."

Mr Bani-Sadr also announced that Iran would on Nov. 15 restore its diplomatic relations with Libya [see also page 30148], and that President Carter should reflect on this rapprochement between two oil producers. He also disclosed that, in anticipation of a possible economic blockade and on orders by Ayatollah Khomeini, the growing of grain had been intensified and that the next grain crop would be excellent.

However, in a letter addressed to M. Jacques de la Rosière de Champfeu, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and not released to the press until Dec. 9, 1979, Mr Ali Reza Nowbari, governor of the Bank Markazi Iran (the country's central bank) described the US action as a violation of all accepted principles of international financial relations. The IMF rejected Iran's complaint on Dec. 27 and refused to condemn or reverse the US order to freeze Iran's financial assets under US control.

Ayatollah Khomeini reacted to the US decision by declaring in a broadcast on Nov. 16: "They seize Iranian money like thieves. They confiscate it." He accused the US Government of trying to "protect an obvious murderer" and he also attacked the UN Security Council for refusing Iran's request for a debate on the issue, saying: "These organizations which they have set up are for themselves [i.e. the states of the West]. They are not for the oppressed. Those who want to know what is going on in the West should know that nothing is going on there except crime and treachery."

At an Arab League ministerial meeting held in Tunis the US blocking of Iran's assets was criticized on Nov. 15 by the representatives of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, who said that they would "think twice" before investing in the United States. A Libyan attempt to condemn the US action was, however, rebuffed by Iraq, which described the Khomeini administration in Iran as being "even worse than the deposed Shah's". The meeting, which ended on Nov. 22, refused to hear an Iranian delegation sent from Tehran to obtain a gesture of solidarity with the Iranian revolution, in particular by supporting this delegation's proposals for financial reprisals against the USA. (Libya had, at the United Nations, declared its solidarity with the Ayatollah's "anti-imperialist" aims but had called for the release of the US hostages.)

Mr Bani-Sadr said on Nov. 16 that Iran would no longer accept the US dollar as a means of payment for oil exports, that he had taken this decision in his capacity as the person responsible for the country's economy and finance and that payment would in future have to be made by means of a basket of European currencies. (Mr Moinfar, however, denied on the same day that such a decision had been taken, and Dr Mohammed Hossein Beheshti, the secretary of the Revolutionary Council, stated on Nov. 18 that the Council had made no such decision.)

Shaikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, stated in Amman (Jordan) on Nov. 17 that "no money in the world can replace the dollar in settling oil bills" because the dollar remained "the best currency capable of standing up to the fluctuations of the world's economic market". However, major oil companies—including Shell and the Compagnie française des pétroles—were told by the Iranian Government not to go on paying for Iranian crude oil through US banks, and on Nov. 19 Iran was reported to have called on member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to ban oil payments in dollars.

Mr Bani-Sadr announced on Nov. 23 that Iran would not pay its foreign debts (estimated at $15,000 million) as they had been incurred as the result of the activities of "looters and their foreign collaborators" who had borrowed this money.

He also said that the action taken at the US embassy was aimed not only at taking the hostages but also in order "to start fundamental changes in international relations" which would help end US domination of the Third World and "the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed".

US and International Reactions to US Measures

In Western Europe the US decision to freeze Iran's assets met with a mixed reception.

It was reported from Paris on Dec. 9 that economic experts—among them M. René J. Larre (General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements), Signor Paolo Baffi (until recently governor of the Bank of Italy) and Dr Hans Herbert Weber (of the West German Ministry of Finance)—agreed that the US action severely diminished the US dollar's international role as other members of OPEC would be encouraged to diversify their holdings out of dollars into other currencies. It was also pointed out that a British High Court decision to freeze disputed Iranian assets in London [see below] made OPEC dollars appear to be unsafe in the West (except perhaps in Switzerland). The conclusion was drawn that the oil-exporting countries would have less incentive to produce the oil needed in the industrialized countries if good investment outlets could not be found for the oil producers' earnings; that the resultant shortage of energy supplies would hamper economic recovery; and that, if OPEC member countries sought payment in national currencies other than the dollar, there would be increased exchange rate turbulence.

The Swiss Government declared on Dec. 10 that it would not freeze the former Shah's assets in Switzerland and that it would not countenance a general freeze on Iranian holdings. It also issued a warning that the crisis could threaten the world monetary system, in which the dollar played a prime role.

At their monthly meeting in Basle on the same day the governors of the central banks of West European countries similarly criticized the US decision to block Iran's assets in US banks, including their branches in other countries.

In the United States the President's order was criticized in the Senate on Dec. 12, and in response Mr Anthony Solomon, then US Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, admitted that the United States would have to wait for French and British court decisions before its right to freeze deposits in US banks abroad was "fully tested".

President Carter's handling of the crisis was also (on Dec. 2) severely criticized by Senator Edward Kennedy (who had earlier announced his decision to stand as a candidate for nomination by the Democratic Party for the 1980 presidential elections).

Senator Kennedy said inter alia (in San Francisco) that the former Shah had headed "one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind, in the form of terrorism and the basic fundamental violations of human rights in the most crucial circumstances to his own people", and he asked: "How do we justify the United States on the one hand accepting that individual because he would like to come here and stay here with his umpteen billions of dollars that he has stolen from Iran, and at the same time say to Hispanics who are here illegally that they have to wait nine years to bring their children to this country?"

The Senator's remarks were widely criticized in the United States, and his critics included Mr George Bush (a candidate for the Republican nomination for the presidency) who said that the Senator's statement might "endanger the lives of the hostages" and raised serious questions about his (the Senator's) judgment of foreign policy.

At the same time the occupation of the US embassy was strongly condemned by numerous governments and also by the European Community and by the Organization of African Unity (through President William Tolbert of Liberia, currently the organization's President).

On the other hand the Iranian action was defended by *Zeri i Popullit*, the organ of the Albanian Party of Labour, which stated on Nov. 12 that the taking of the hostages corresponded to a "just and legitimate demand by the Iranian people". In *Borba*, the organ of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, it was stated on Nov. 11 that the Iranians were right in demanding the extradition of the Shah.

Calls for the release of the US hostages held in Tehran were also made (i) by the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Nov. 16 in a resolution supported by all parties except the French Communists; (ii) by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which on Nov. 22 called the Iranian action "a flagrant violation of the most elementary rules of international law" (a similar call being made on Nov. 26 by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly); (iii) by the overwhelming majority of representatives of Commonwealth countries, meeting in London on Nov. 27 (but with India dissociating itself from their statement on the ground that any collective disapproval might at that stage prove counter-productive and harden Iran's position, and with Bangladesh and Malaysia expressing reservations); and (iv) by the heads of government of the member states of the European Community, meeting in the framework of the European Council in Dublin on Nov. 30.

The Government of China did not express support for the US position on the hostages until Nov. 26, when it called for the rejection of "interference in the internal affairs of other countries" and "an appropriate solution" by means of "peaceful consultations in accordance with the principles of international law and diplomatic practice". Chairman Hua Guofeng stated on Nov. 24 that the crisis was a threat to the stability of Saudi Arabia and, he implied, also to that of Pakistan.

In the meantime the USA was making arrangements to reinforce its fleet led by the aircraft carrier *Midway* [see above] by a further fleet from Subic Bay (Philippines), led by the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* (carrying about 87 aircraft) accompanied by a guided-missile cruiser, a guided-missile destroyer and three other ships, and to be joined by a dozen combat helicopters from the US east coast. In addition the aircraft carrier *Forrestal* left Mayport (Florida) for the Mediterranean on Nov. 28.

"Severe punishment" of Iran by military means was called for by Americans representing a wide spectrum of public opinion, ranging from (the Republican) Senator Barry Goldwater to (the Democrat) Senator George McGovern (who had been among senators most opposed to US armed intervention in Vietnam).

In the US House of Representatives 54 members called on President Carter on Nov. 29 to issue an ultimatum to Iran for the release of the hostages, failing which he should "initiate specified military operations against Iran". (The President had, however, rejected this idea on the previous day.)

Calls to prepare for war were also made in Iran. Thus the *Tudeh* party on Nov. 22 called for the formation of a national front of anti-imperialist forces allied with the non-aligned and socialist states headed by "our big wealthy northern neighbour, the Soviet Union", while on Nov. 26 Ayatollah Khomeini urged the Revolutionary Guards to raise an army of 20,000,000 young men and women to confront the Americans in the event of an invasion.

Well-disciplined demonstrations by millions of people, including women and children, were held on Nov. 21 throughout the country in support of Ayatollah Khomeini's policy in the US-Iranian crisis, which was not opposed by any of the political parties which had previously criticized his regime.

In addition to its own measures designed to bring pressure to bear on Iran, the US Government also appealed to its allies and other friendly states to assist it with economic and, if necessary, military action against Iran.

Dr Harold Brown, the US Defence Secretary, said on Dec. 11, at a press conference in Brussels, where he was attending the winter meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers: "It is now appropriate for the Allies, our friends and the world community to reflect their disapproval [of the holding of the US hostages in Iran] through concrete diplomatic and economic steps."

Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the UK Prime Minister, said during a visit to President Carter in Washington on Dec. 14 that Britain would be "the first to support" the United States if it sought United Nations approval of sanctions against Iran (but she also said that Britain could not undertake an economic blockade of Iran without UN Security Council approval).

Mr Robert Murray, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Near Eastern Affairs, was on Dec. 18 sent, as the leader of a US team, to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia and Kenya in order to ask for advance permission for the USA to use their military bases and ports in any future crisis. In addition to maintaining its enlarged fleet in the Arabian Sea [see above], the US Government decided on Dec. 21 to send the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Nimitz*, accompanied by two nuclear-powered cruisers, to the Gulf of Oman (in order to "demonstrate the will to maintain an important naval presence in this region during the Iranian crisis"). Riyadh radio declared, however, on Dec. 19 that any suggestion of Saudi Arabia being ready to discuss "the possibility of furnishing military facilities to American forces in the Middle East" was totally unfounded.

The US-Iranian dispute continued to have repercussions in various international bodies.

A meeting of representatives of the seven member states of the Western European Union (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) on Dec. 4 adopted a resolution (proposed in a report on the Middle East situation prepared by Sir Frederic Bennett, a Conservative member of the UK House of Commons) calling for a world ban on arms supplies for Iran as long as internal strife and armed repression continued in that country.

At a meeting of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in Kuwait on Dec. 4, a proposal by Libya and Syria to support the Iranian revolutionaries in their conflict with the United States was opposed by the other OAPEC members on the ground that OAPEC was "an economic and not a political organization".

M. Claude Cheysson, the member of the European Commission responsible for Development and Co-operation policy, said at the United Nations on Dec. 7 that the taking of the US hostages was "an utterly unacceptable act of barbarism by this dangerous madman, Ayatollah Khomeini". Dr Kurt Waldheim (the UN Secretary-General), however, strongly deplored this remark "at a moment when serious efforts are being made to reach an acceptable solution of the Tehran crisis".

At a meeting in Brussels on Dec. 13, the Foreign Ministers and representatives of the 15 NATO member countries reviewed the "grave situation" caused by the occupation of the US embassy. They reaffirmed that their countries fully respected the independence of other states and recognized the right of all people to chart their own political, economic and social course; stated that they had no desire to intervene in Iran's internal affairs; but emphasized that "any taking of hostages, for any motive whatsoever, is totally unacceptable and must be firmly opposed by the international community as a whole"; and urgently called upon the Iranian authorities immediately to release all the hostages unharmed.

Steps in support of the US measures against Iran were taken in Britain and West Germany.

In Britain all assets of the Government of Iran and the Bank Markazi Iran were frozen by High Court order on Dec. 4. The West German Government announced on Dec. 7 that it had ceased guaranteeing new credits to Iran and would refuse permission for any exports of weapons or weapon parts to that country until the hostages were released.

Mr Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State, had talks with West European leaders in London, Paris, Rome and Bonn on Dec. 10-11, and all Western leaders whom he met were said to have agreed to participate in any diplomatic action aimed at freeing the US hostages held in Tehran. It was, however, later stated in Washington that they had not committed themselves to any measures for a boycott of Iran.

In Paris Mr Vance also met Dr Saburo Okita, the Foreign Minister of Japan, and it was said that the Secretary of State had strongly criticized Japan for buying large quantities of Iranian oil on the spot market.

From Tokyo it was reported that during November-December 1979 Japan had bought 3,000,000 kilolitres of oil (i.e. over 18,000,000 barrels) made available by the US embargo and representing about 40 per cent of normal Iranian exports to the USA. Iran was said to have insisted on these purchases as a precondition for negotiations on the renewal of direct purchase contracts due to expire in December 1979.

Dr Okita said after his return to Tokyo on Dec. 12 that he strongly hoped that the United States would understand that Japanese petroleum firms had no choice but to use boycotted Iranian oil to make up for a sharp decrease in supplies by the major US oil companies to them, which had within a year dropped from 1,400,000 to 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) [see also page 29988].

On Dec. 13 five US senators called on the Japanese Government to prohibit the oil companies from buying oil at inflated prices, and Senator Robert Byrd (the Democratic leader in the Senate) accused Japanese interests of condoning, if not actually rewarding, illegal action taken against US citizens, while Mr Thomas P. O'Neill (Speaker of the House of Representatives) accused Japan of "consorting with the enemies of the United States".

The Japanese Government, on the other hand, was on Dec. 14 reported to have restricted imports of Iranian oil to an upper limit of 620,000 bpd (said to be the level of pre-November 1979 imports), including 460,000 bpd imported under direct deals with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), until the US hostages were released.

During a visit to Tokyo by Mr Robert Carswell, US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, who was seeking help from the United States' allies to make economic sanctions against Iran an effective means of obtaining the release of the hostages, Mr Masayoshi Ohira, the Japanese Prime Minister, and Mr Noboru Takeshita, the Minister of Finance, were quoted as saying on Dec. 17 that, while supporting US demands for the release of the hostages and "trying to avoid embarrassing the USA", Japan regarded the question of Japanese loans to, and other economic ties with, Iran as "a private affair".

On Jan. 14, 1980, Mr Moinfar (the Iranian Minister of Petroleum) warned Mr Tsutomu Wada (Japan's ambassador in Tehran) that Iran would stop its oil supply to Japan if the latter decided to participate in US-sponsored economic sanctions against Iran. An official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry said on Jan. 16 that Japan was ready to keep step with the USA and Western countries over the hostages issue but that it wanted the construction of a planned joint petrochemical complex in Iran to be excluded from any sanctions.

Mr Robert Muldoon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, said on Dec. 22 that his Government was unlikely to support any trading embargo against Iran, especially in view of a proposal to export lamb worth £45,000,000 to Iran. On Jan. 15, 1980, he confirmed that New Zealand would not join the US boycott, while a spokesman for the New Zealand Farmers' Association said that it would be "economic suicide" if New Zealand adopted the US course. On Jan. 22 Mr Muldoon said that his Government had turned down the US request because it was best to try to "de-escalate the situation rather than take action which might exacerbate it".

On Nov. 27 the US State Department decided to withdraw dependants and non-essential workers from its diplomatic missions in 11 Moslem countries—Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and North Yemen.

On Dec. 12 the US Government asked Mr Ali Ashgar Agah, the Iranian chargé d'affaires in Washington, to reduce the staff of the Iranian embassy from 57 to 15 and that of the four Iranian consulates in the USA (in New York, San Francisco, Chicago and Houston) from a total of 161 to five each.

On Dec. 20 the US Senate unanimously approved a resolution condemning any judicial action against, or show trial of, the hostages as "a provocation of the gravest character" and appealing to all nations to place "strict limits" on their economic, diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran.

On Dec. 27 the US Treasury prohibited the granting and the renewal of credits (after Nov. 14) by lenders under US jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the Bank Markazi Iran notified all US banks operating in Iran on Jan. 29 that their licences had been cancelled. (The US staff of these banks had already been evacuated in November 1979, and the banks had been handling only letters of credit and the recovery of previous debts.)

Appeal to Iran by International Court of Justice

On Nov. 29, 1979, the US Government requested the International Court of Justice at The Hague to condemn Iran's "multiple violations of the immunity of diplomats and the embassy in Tehran" and to issue an interim injunction calling on the Government of Iran to release the hostages, to restore the embassy premises to US control and to afford protection to all US embassy and consulate staff.

In Iran, however, Mr Qotbzadeh, then supervisor of the Foreign Ministry, informed the Court on Dec. 10 that Iran rejected its jurisdiction over the hostages case and added that this case was "marginal and secondary" to the problem of investigating US and CIA support for the Shah's regime since 1953 [i.e. since the overthrow of the Government of Dr Mohammed Mossadeq—see 13093 A].

On Dec. 15 the International Court unanimously issued an order for provisional measures requiring the Government of Iran to surrender the embassy to the US authorities immediately, to release the hostages held there or elsewhere, and to afford all diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States full protection, privileges and immunity. The order also contained a request to the Government of the United States and Iran not to take any action which might aggravate the tension between the two countries.

This ruling by the Court was dismissed by Ayatollah Khomeini on Dec. 16.

On Jan. 21, 1980, the United States filed with the Court a brief of 82 pages (with 165 pages of annexes) applying again for the release of the hostages and the restoration of the Tehran embassy to US control, and also for payment of damages by Iran. According to Mr C. Poux, first secretary of the Court, Iran would have to reply to this move by Feb. 18, 1980, failing which public hearings would begin with the US representatives only.

UN Security Council Deliberations and Decisions

Earlier Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, had on Nov. 6 sent a message to Ayatollah Khomeini, expressing "great anxiety" at the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, and he later proposed that he might himself visit Iran in order to find a solution to the crisis.

On Nov. 13 Tehran radio broadcast the text of a letter to Dr Waldheim in which Mr Bani-Sadr (then supervisor of Iran's Foreign Ministry) requested a meeting of the UN Security Council to consider "US threats of war".

In his letter Mr Bani-Sadr wrote that the United States was trying to keep the world ignorant of the fact that Iran had, since the "coup d'état" of 1953, "gone a long way towards political, economic, social and cultural decline". He accused the US Government of "trying very hard, in connexion with a crisis which it has itself precipitated, to create war hysteria in the United States and in all the West". He claimed that there were hundreds of documents and pieces of evidence "proving the continued administration of the country by the United States under cover of the former Shah's reign". Mr Bani-Sadr stated his Government's "simple and very practical" proposal as follows: "The US Government should at least accept the investigation of the guilt of the former Shah of Iran and its consequences. The US Government should return to the Iranian Government the wealth and property which the Shah, his family and the leaders of the former regime have transferred to the United States." He concluded that the Iranian Government saw "its own peace and the peace of the region and of the whole world endangered" and therefore requested the convening of a Security Council session.

The UN Security Council's members, however, on Nov. 14 unanimously rejected the Iranian request for a meeting on the ground that no response had been received from Iran to the Council's appeal of Nov. 9 [see page 30206 above].

Saying that the Iranian crisis was "the greatest threat to world peace since the 1962 Cuban missiles affair" [see 19057 A], Dr Waldheim on Nov. 25 called for a UN Security Council session, and President Carter agreed on the same day that the Council should issue a call for the release of the hostages.

It was also reported that President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan had stated that his Government was "deeply disturbed over the possibility of the use of force against Iran" and "gravely concerned by the rising tension" between the United States and Iran, that he had called on Ayatollah Khomeini to release the US hostages, and that he had requested a session of the UN Security Council.

The Council met for 16 minutes on Nov. 27, when Dr Waldheim appealed to the USA and Iran "to avoid any action which could inflame" the situation, and Dr Sergio Palacios de

Vizzio (Bolivia), the Council's President, repeated the Nov. 9 appeal for the release of the hostages. The Iranian Government had, on Nov. 26, asked for the meeting to be postponed to allow Mr Bani-Sadr to attend.

However, in Iran Ayatollah Khomeini told Mr Bani-Sadr that he would not be authorized to travel to New York to attend the Security Council meeting because Iran would no doubt be condemned by the Council, which was "dominated by the USA", and President Carter had succeeded in arousing the international community against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr Bani-Sadr was said to have replied that he had himself asked the Security Council to meet in order to examine Iran's complaint against the United States; he denied that Iran was facing defeat in the Council; and he insisted that he would have obtained a hearing for Iran's grievances against the Shah.

On Nov. 28 Mr Bani-Sadr's Foreign Affairs functions were transferred to Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh (a member of the Revolutionary Council and until then director of radio and television services—see page 30142) but it was officially stated that Mr Bani-Sadr retained his responsibilities for Economy and Finance.

Mr Qotbzadeh (43) had twice been imprisoned in Iran for his anti-Shah activities; had in 1958 left the country for the United States, from which he was expelled in 1962 after he had been active against the Shah's regime; had later become a roving envoy for Ayatollah Khomeini; and had joined the latter in France in 1978, returning with him to Iran in 1979.

The Security Council met again on Dec. 1-2 (without Mr Qotbzadeh attending).

Mr Donald McHenry, the US permanent representative at the United Nations, speaking on Dec. 2, emphasized President Carter's pledge to find a peaceful solution to the dispute but pointed out that Americans felt "a seething anger" as they witnessed "new threats and outrages against their fellow citizens in Tehran". As for the Shah's alleged crimes, he said: "None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out against past wrongs and that ask for our understanding. There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum."

On Dec. 4 the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling urgently (i) on the Government of Iran to release immediately the hostages held in Tehran, to grant them protection and to allow them to leave the country, and (ii) on Iran and the United States to "resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them" and to "exercise the utmost restraint in the prevailing situation".

During the debate all 15 members of the Council and also 19 non-members had called for the release of the hostages, while some speakers had suggested that Iran's grievances might be taken up after the release of the hostages. Iran itself was not represented at the Council's meetings.

Mr Qotbzadeh said on Dec. 4 that he had spoken to Dr Waldheim by telephone to express Iran's hopes that the Security Council would discuss the origins of the crisis and not merely its effects, and that he had added that, if the Council adopted a balanced resolution, Iran would be more inclined to envisage a solution sponsored by the United Nations.

A spokesman for the militants holding the hostages said on Dec. 5 that they rejected the Security Council's call and that they would act only on the basis of instructions from Ayatollah Khomeini.

Mr Bani-Sadr had visited the US embassy on Dec. 3 and had told the "students" that the hostages held by them should not be tried because, even if the hostages were spies, they could only be expelled and could not be tried; that the embassy enjoyed diplomatic immunity; that this convention must be observed; and that "as the Koran teaches us" agreements are sacred, "even if concluded with infidels". He also said: "We must appeal to the new international morality which is sought by the Americans (and the Europeans) who have condemned the inhuman moral system of their predecessors. By taking the hostages you have weakened the justness of our cause, you have helped to stifle our voice in the United States and in the whole world."

The UN General Assembly subsequently, on Dec. 17, approved by consensus a resolution (34/146) adopting an International Convention on the Taking of Hostages which inter alia defined hostage-taking and obliged participating states (i) to make such an offence a crime punishable by "appropriate penalties", (ii) where relevant to prosecute and/or extradite offenders and (iii) to take all appropriate measures to secure the release of the hostages.

President Carter announced on Dec. 19 that at the request of Dr Waldheim he was suspending his efforts to obtain UN sanctions against Iran in order to enable the UN Secretary-General to complete his negotiations with the Iranian authorities. Two days later, however, the President announced that he was proceeding with his appeal to the UN Security Council.

The President said that the world community had four times (through the Security Council and the International Court of Justice) called on Iran to release the hostages, and he declared that in a "ruthless attempt at blackmail", to which the USA would not yield, kidnappers and terrorists supported by Iranian authorities continued to hold "our people" under inhuman conditions; that the USA preferred a peaceful solution to the application of "other means"; and that concrete steps would now have to be taken by the international community. He had, he said, therefore called for a meeting of the UN Security Council to decide on economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression).

Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, had earlier stated that a veto against sanctions, or the prevention of a Security Council session (i.e. by the Soviet Union), would be regarded as "a very hostile act". It was said that President Carter had, through diplomatic channels, warned the Soviet leadership at least twice that a Soviet veto would affect US-Soviet relations (and this warning was thought to imply that US ratification of the SALT II agreement—see 30117 A—would be impossible if the Soviet Union opposed the imposition of sanctions against Iran).

The official Soviet attitude to the conflict was most clearly stated in an article published in *Pravda* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) on Dec. 5 and signed by Alexei Petrov. Material passages in this article read as follows:

"A dangerous and alarming situation is taking shape. The United States, which is a permanent member of the Security Council and which, under the UN Charter, shares with other members of the Security Council the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace, is actually resorting to blackmail against another sovereign state. Instead of setting an example of restraint, responsibility and composure in the existing situation, instead of redoubling efforts to find a reasonable way out of the situation, without giving rein to emotion, certain circles in the USA are gambling on force to an ever greater extent.

"It is claimed that this is happening in answer to the fact that members of the staff of the US embassy in Teheran are being held as hostages, which is contrary to the standards of international law. The seizure of the American embassy is undoubtedly not in keeping with the international convention on respect for diplomatic privileges and immunity. This act, however, cannot be taken out of the overall context of American-Iranian relations. Actions by the United States with regard to Iran that by no means accord with the standards of law and morality must not be overlooked. . . .

"The present attempts by the United States to blackmail Iran by massing armed forces on her frontiers and to dictate a line of conduct to her by force are a gross violation of the standards of international law.

"It is inadmissible that the incident with regard to the American embassy, which must certainly be solved on a basis acceptable to both countries, should become a prologue to a dangerous military provocation threatening international peace."

At the request of the United States, made on Dec. 22, the UN Security Council met in closed session on Dec. 28 to consider the US call that economic sanctions should be taken against Iran.

A draft resolution circulated by Mr McHenry called for an embargo on all Iranian exports carried in Iranian ships, on all imports except medicine and food, and for prohibiting UN member states from allowing Iranian ships and aircraft into their territory and from granting Iran credits or shipping spare parts for military equipment (though it would not block Iranian exports carried by other ships).

Mr Agha Shahi, the Foreign Affairs Adviser to the President of Pakistan, said on the same day (after he had paid a two-day visit to Iran, during which he had met Ayatollah Khomeini) that a visit to Tehran by Dr Waldheim would be "not only desirable but advisable". (He also disclosed that he had handed to the Ayatollah a personal message from President Zia, expressing "the full solidarity of the people and Government of Pakistan with the Islamic revolution".)

Dr Waldheim himself said on Dec. 29 that he was ready to travel to Iran in an effort to obtain the release of the US hostages. In Iran it was announced that the Revolutionary Council was permitting the UN Secretary-General to enter the country, but both the students holding the hostages and Ayatollah Khomeini declared that they would not see him, while Mr Qotbzadeh stated that Dr Waldheim was welcome to inform himself.

On Dec. 31 the UN Security Council adopted, by 11 votes to none with four abstentions (Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait and the Soviet Union), a resolution deploring the continued detention of the hostages in defiance of the Council's previous resolution and the interim decision of the International Court of Justice, and stating that the Council would adopt "effective measures" against Iran if the hostages were not released by Jan. 7, 1980.

Among those voting for the resolution China and Zambia expressed reservations, declaring that they were not bound by the resolution's call for sanctions.

Mr Oleg Troyanovsky (USSR) said that he supported the call for the release of the hostages but insisted that Iran's attitude did not constitute a threat to peace and that sanctions were therefore inappropriate under the UN Charter.

Dr Waldheim's Visit to Iran

After consultations with the then members of the UN Security Council, the US Secretary of State had proposed on Dec. 29 that Dr Waldheim should travel to Iran to seek the release of the hostages and that, if he returned empty-handed, the Council should meet again on Jan. 7, 1980, to consider the imposition of sanctions.

Dr Waldheim announced on the following day that the Iranian Government had, through Mr Mansour Farhang (its newly-appointed permanent representative at the United Nations), accepted the offer which he had made to visit Iran. He was reported to be anxious to make the visit before the Council took any vote because he did not wish to appear to the Iranians to be an emissary of the United States.

Dr Waldheim accordingly visited Tehran on Jan. 1-4, 1980, his declared object being to exchange views with the Iranian authorities on three aspects—the US-Iranian crisis, the personnel at the US embassy and "the grievances of the Iranian people in relation to the previous regime".

On Jan. 2 he had talks with Mr Qotbzadeh, who said afterwards that Dr Waldheim had realized for the first time that Iran's stand was "very firm". On the same day the authorities announced that they had foiled a plot to kill the UN Secretary-General, and changes were made in the engagements planned for him. On Jan. 3 he was nevertheless exposed to hostile demonstrations and in front of the US embassy a resolution was read to crowds asking Dr Waldheim to go to Panama (where the Shah had been since Dec. 15—see below) to obtain the extradition of the Shah as the only way of ending his problem. On the same day he faced some 500 people said to have been disabled and mutilated by the Shah's secret police; visibly shaken, he declared: "I have seen what your people have suffered under the former regime. I shall carry the message of suffering to the United Nations. We shall inquire into the violation of human rights [under the Shah]." Later on Jan. 3 Dr Waldheim met members of the Revolutionary Council.

Dr Waldheim returned to the United States on Jan. 4 without having met Ayatollah Khomeini or the occupiers of the US embassy, and he stated that the situation in Iran was "much graver and more serious" than people believed and that he did not think that a solution would be found soon. He proposed that an international inquiry should be held into Iran's allegations of US involvement in the Shah's regime, with such an inquiry being organized by himself or sponsored by the UN Security Council or the General Assembly.

President Carter, however, rejected Dr Waldheim's proposal on Jan. 7, when he insisted that there could be no preconditions for the release of the hostages and that immediate sanctions should be imposed by the UN Security Council (even though Dr Waldheim had stated that in his view such sanctions would have no effect).

At a briefing of some 80 members of Congress the President said on Jan. 8: "The most powerful single political entity in Iran consists of the international terrorists or the kidnappers who are holding our hostages. Whenever there has been a showdown concerning the hostages between Khomeini or the Revolutionary Council versus the terrorists, the terrorists have always prevailed. This small group of people . . . has achieved with the holding of the American hostages a great and significant political influence in Iran. They don't necessarily have as one of their prime interests the integrity of Iran as a nation or the well-being of the Iranian people or even the security of the country in which they live."

It was claimed in Washington on Jan. 9 that the United States had succeeded in obtaining agreement from major Western countries on a four-point programme (i) barring increases in Iranian deposits in currencies other than the US dollar; (ii) preventing Iran from opening new deposit accounts; (iii) granting no new loans to Iran; and (iv) encouraging foreign banks to declare Iranian loans in default wherever possible and to accelerate demands for payment.

In Moscow, however, Tass (the official news agency) stated on Jan. 10 that the Soviet Union would not allow outside interference in Iran's internal affairs; that, like other states, the USSR had repeatedly pointed out that the US-Iranian conflict could be solved only by peaceful means; that the USA did not seem to appreciate the consequences of an attempted economic boycott against Iran; and that the Soviet Union would block such a boycott.

In Iran, Mr Bani-Sadr said on Jan. 11 that the chances of success of economic sanctions were "next to zero"; that Austria had stated that it would not join an embargo; that several East European countries, notably Yugoslavia and Romania, had promised Iran additional economic aid; and that Latin American governments had offered to offset the effects of a boycott of Iran-bound ships by some US dockworkers.

Mr Vance, the US Secretary of State, on the other hand, stated on the same day that, even if the Soviet Union vetoed a UN Security Council sanctions resolution, the United States would mount a full economic embargo of Iran, and he added that he did not rule out a naval blockade to enforce such sanctions.

Mr Bani-Sadr said in response that if the American fleet blocked the mouth of the Persian Gulf there would be war.

Soviet Veto of US Resolution

A US draft resolution submitted to the Security Council envisaged drastic measures against Iran.

They included a ban on all sales and direct or indirect shipments to Iran of goods other than food and medical supplies; a ban on all credits, loans or payment facilities to persons or enterprises working with the Iranian Government; a boycott of all vessels and aircraft registered in Iran; and a prohibition on the signing of any new service contracts with Iran except in the field of medical supplies. The resolution also sought the reduction to a minimum of the staff at Iran's diplomatic missions.

The Security Council adjourned its deliberations on Jan. 11 and 12 to enable Dr Waldheim to pursue his negotiations with the Iranian authorities, who were said to have agreed to the release of the hostages on three conditions: (i) recognition by the USA of the legitimacy of the Iranian demand for the extradition of the Shah; (ii) confirmation by the United Nations of Iran's claim to the Shah's assets; and (iii) the formation, under UN auspices, of an international body to hear and clarify Iran's grievances relating to the Shah and his "accomplice", the United States.

On Jan. 13, however, the resolution was put to the vote and obtained 10 votes in favour (France, Jamaica, Niger, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zambia) with two votes being cast against it (the Soviet Union and East Germany) and with two abstentions (Bangladesh and Mexico), while China did not participate in the vote. [For election of new members of Security Council, see 30186 A.] The resolution was thus vetoed by the USSR.

Defending his use of the veto, Mr Troyanovsky (USSR) said that it was not right to assert that Iran's actions created a threat to international peace and security; that the matter was a bilateral issue between the United States and Iran; and that the use of sanctions or some other physical actions with regard to Iran could only worsen the situation and create a threat to peace.

Dr Waldheim said after the vote that it had demonstrated the need to make further efforts to obtain a negotiated solution, and that he would continue to work in this direction, being encouraged by a large number of the Security Council's member states.

In Iran Mr Qotbzadeh announced on Jan. 14 that Iran had notified the UN Secretary-General as follows: "The verdict of the Security Council and [of] any organs of the United Nations which are not in line with the justified demands of the Iranian people is not accepted by us and is considered null and void."

President Carter, on the other hand, stated in a television interview on Jan. 21: "Sanctions against Iran will be pursued by ourselves unilaterally and joined by as many of our allies as will agree." At the same time he said: "There has been obviously a new element introduced into the Iranian hostage crisis in recent weeks with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan [in the last week of December 1979]. . . . Many of the responsible officials in Iran now see that this major threat to Iran's security, and the peace of Iran, is becoming paramount, and there will be an additional effort on their part to secure the release of the hostages and remove the isolation of Iran from the rest of the civilized world."

On Jan. 28, however, the US State Department announced that, following the election of Mr Bani-Sadr as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran [see below], the US Government had delayed plans to impose unilateral economic sanctions on Iran.

On the same day Mr Vance was reported to have offered to supply Iran with economic and military aid if it released the US hostages. President Bani-Sadr, however, rejected any such offer on Jan. 29, saying that, although Iran wished to oppose Soviet "expansionism", it was not prepared to give the Americans a pretext under which they could re-establish themselves in Iran. He repeated that, before the hostages could be released, the USA would have to admit the crimes which it had committed in Iran and to concede the right of the revolutionary Government to institute proceedings against the former Shah and his supporters.

On Feb. 7 the US State Department announced that the United States would withhold formal application of economic sanctions against Iran while diplomatic activities were continuing for the release of the US hostages.

Charges brought against Former Shah - Grant of Refuge in Panama

A revolutionary court in Tehran ordered on Nov. 8, 1979, that a warrant of arrest should be served on the Shah in New York, requiring him to report for trial immediately on charges of "killing, torturing and imprisoning innocent people, plundering public property and funds, suppression and hundreds of other crimes".

The Shah himself stated on the same day that in order to help ease the crisis he was ready to return to Mexico (to which he had originally gone in June 1979 with a six-month tourist visa—see page 30149). President Carter, however, said on Nov. 9 that the US Government would not ask the Shah to leave the country.

The US President, speaking at his first press conference on the US-Iranian conflict on Nov. 28, reaffirmed his resolve not to give in to blackmail but declared at the same time that "any excessive threat . . . could cause the death of the hostages".

He pointed out that the US Government had notified the Government of Iran that the Shah would be admitted to the USA; that the Iranian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had assured him that the US embassy would be protected; that this had been done for several days [i.e. after the arrival of the Shah in New York]; and that this protection had been withdrawn by Ayatollah Khomeini, whereupon the embassy had been attacked successfully.

The President also said that Dr Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, had played no role in his decision to permit the Shah to come to the United States for medical treatment. (Dr Kissinger, however, said later the same day that he had approached the Carter Administration five times about admitting the Shah to the USA—see also below and page 30150.)

Sr Jorge Castañeda, the Foreign Secretary of Mexico, announced on Nov. 29, 1979, that his Government was unable to extend the Shah's visa beyond Dec. 9 of that year because such a return "would not help him". He added that the situation had changed radically as the world was faced with a true crisis, which Dr Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, had characterized as "a threat to international peace and security". (Mexico had closed its embassy in Tehran "temporarily" on Nov. 13, 1979—see below.)

President López Portillo of Mexico defended his Government's refusal to renew the Shah's visa, saying on Dec. 3 that Mexico did not wish to be involved in "a conflict which is not ours". He deplored the United Nations' inability to resolve the controversy peacefully and criticized President Carter's "precipitate decision" to freeze Iran's assets in the USA, which (President López said) would seriously damage the international monetary system. He issued a warning that oil producers would "think twice before exchanging a real resource in the depth of the earth for foreign currency that not only devalues but can also be frozen".

On Dec. 2 the Shah was taken to a US Air Force hospital near San Antonio (Texas). Subsequently, on Dec. 15, the former Shah left the United States for Panama, the Government of which had invited him "on humanitarian grounds" for a stay of initially three months on the island of Contadora (off Panama's Pacific coast).

The Shah's move to Panama was said to have been negotiated by Mr Hamilton Jordan, chief of staff at the White House and a personal friend of Brig.-Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera (the Commander of Panama's National Guard and former head of government), on Nov. 11 when Mr Jordan obtained a renewal of an earlier Panamanian invitation to the Shah made in April 1979. The Shah had finally accepted the invitation on Dec. 14. According to Senator Frank Church, this service rendered to the USA by Panama was "the first great friendship dividend" earned by the US transfer of the Panama Canal Zone to Panama [see 30047 A].

President Carter personally thanked President Arístides Royo of Panama for granting asylum to the Shah and expressed the hope that this would ease US-Iranian relations. In Iran Mr Qotbzadeh welcomed the transfer of the Shah to Panama as "a positive step" and added that "the possibility of defusing the crisis" had presented itself, especially if "other positive steps by the USA" were to follow.

However, a spokesman for the Iranian students holding the hostages said on Dec. 16: "No hostage will be released before the trial [of these hostages for alleged espionage]. There is no discussion about releasing anyone before Christmas or because of it. We have not changed our stand."

On Dec. 16 the Iranian Revolutionary Council called on the Government of Panama to extradite the Shah "as soon as possible", as it was "an accomplice of the Shah and of the crimes of the USA". On the following day the Iranian Government suspended the supply of oil to Panama and discontinued discussions on a possible contract for such supplies to that country.

On Dec. 28 President Royo disclosed that Iran had notified the Panamanian Government that it would request extradition of the deposed Shah, but the President added that in his view Iran would not be able to fulfil the legal requirements (consisting of the submission, within 60 days, of a warrant of arrest, a copy of a court sentence against the Shah and a legal description of him).

In Iran an order for the arrest of the former Shah was issued early in January 1980 by the Prosecutor-General, and on Jan. 12 it was announced in Tehran that Mr Qotbzadeh had sent President Royo an English translation of the warrant of arrest, with a formal request to order the immediate arrest of the Shah, to be followed by an official Iranian request for his extradition within 60 days of his arrest.

After President Royo had stated on Jan. 22 (in response to a claim made by Mr Qotbzadeh that the Shah had been detained) that the deposed Shah was "under the care of the Panamanian Government", Dr Carlos Ozores, the Foreign Minister of Panama, said on Feb. 6: "For practical purposes the ex-Shah can move about freely within Panamanian territory but continually under the custody of the National Guard."

In extracts from his memoirs published in the Paris weekly *L'Express* on Dec. 7, the Shah confirmed that Gen. Robert Huyser (then deputy commander of the US Air Command in Europe) had paid an unannounced visit to Tehran of which he (the Shah) had been informed early in January 1979 (several days after the General's arrival). The purpose of the General's visit, the Shah wrote, was "to neutralize the Iranian Army", and during a visit to the Shah, together with Mr William Sullivan (then US ambassador in Tehran), "the only thing that was on their minds was what day and at what time I would be leaving" [see page 30149]. The Shah also stated that General Huyser had asked to see Dr Mehdi Bazargan, who was subsequently appointed Prime Minister by Ayatollah Khomeini [see page 29743].

In a letter sent to Dr Waldheim in December 1979, an Association of Iranian Jurists (of Tehran) outlined the case for the extradition of the former Shah under a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1973, covering crimes against humanity which, according to the statutes of the Nuremberg

Tribunal [see 7461 A], included "assassination, extermination, deportation and any other inhuman acts committed against the civilian population".

The UN General Assembly's Resolution 3074 (XXVIII), adopted on Dec. 3, 1973, by 94 votes to none with 29 abstentions (by Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and a number of third-world countries), laid down "principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity". It stated inter alia that, in accordance with the Declaration on Territorial Asylum contained in the UN General Assembly's Resolution 2312 (XXII) of Dec. 14, 1967 [see page 22545], states should not grant asylum to any person with respect to whom there were serious reasons for considering that he had committed a crime against the peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity. The jurists' letter also included quotations from international legal conventions in support of the argument for judgment of men like the former Shah, ex-President Amin of Uganda and ex-Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire (restored to Republic since his deposition).

The letter adduced as evidence of the former Shah's crimes a count of "martyrs" buried in cemeteries in Tehran and elsewhere and of those buried in common graves, reports of foreign journalists and photographs of mass killings in clashes between the Army and peaceful demonstrators. Reference was also made to documents on cases in which the Shah had personally ordered his secret police (Savak—see page 30145) to commit murder, as confessed to by Savak agents in recent trials, and on the setting on fire of a cinema in Abadan in August 1978, when over 400 people were burnt to death [see page 29385].

On Nov. 28 Mr Thomas Hughes, a US lawyer, filed with the New York Supreme Court a writ by the Iranian Government for the sum of $56,000 million (said to be the largest sum to be claimed in legal history) alleged to have been stolen from Iran by the deposed Shah.

The writ stated in particular that the Shah had "misappropriated, embezzled or otherwise diverted to his own use assets or bonds having an approximate value of $20,000 million" and that a further $36,600 million was claimed for "compensatory damages". Copies of the writ were also posted to the Shah and fixed to the door of the hospital where he was undergoing treatment.

Iran's claims against the Shah were the subject of statements made both by high-ranking Iranian officials and by Mr Ali Akbar Moinfar, the Iranian Minister of Petroleum.

The officials were quoted in a report by Mr Mohammed Hassanein Heikal (who had been editor of the Cairo daily *Al Ahram* for 18 years until dismissed by President Sadat in 1974—see page 26582) published in *The Sunday Times* (of London) on Dec. 23 (after he had had an interview with Ayatollah Khomeini). The officials claimed to have proof of regular gifts ranging from between $20,000 and $500,000 having been made by the Shah to political leaders and other dignitaries in many parts of the world. In particular Bishop Abel Muzorewa (the leader of the United African National Council and Prime Minister of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia from May to December 1979) was said to have received three separate gifts of $200,000 each; the Iranian embassy in Washington had told the Shah early in 1965 that President Nixon was so grateful for the Shah's generosity towards his election campaign that the contributions would no doubt be rewarded; and in 1976 the NIOC had made over to the Shah $1,000 million (out of the company's profits) to be used for promoting "the security, prestige and greatness of Iran".

Mr Moinfar stated in Paris on Dec. 23 that the American people had been "knowingly deceived" by Mr David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and by Dr Henry Kissinger. [For reported role of Mr Rockefeller and Dr Kissinger in securing the Shah's admission to the United States, see page 30149.] Mr Moinfar alleged that the Shah had deposited a large part of official Iranian assets with the Chase Manhattan Bank; that Mr Rockefeller and Dr Kissinger had feared that the new Islamic Government of Iran would withdraw these funds and would ask questions about their use; and that in order to prevent such a withdrawal the two men had asked President Carter to receive the Shah in the United States, knowing full well that this would result in action by Ayatollah Khomeini's supporters and that one of the first reprisals by the Carter Administration would be to block Iranian assets, in particular those deposited with the Chase Manhattan Bank. Mr Moinfar claimed that this information had been given to him by particularly well-informed US journalists.

Assassination of Shah's Nephew

Capt. Chahryar Moustapha Chafik (34), a nephew of the former Shah, was killed in Paris on Dec. 7 near the house of his mother, Princess Ashraf (the Shah's twin sister). Responsibility for the killing was claimed on the same day by a Moslem Liberation Front and by Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, who had repeatedly called for the killing of the Shah and his family [see page 30149] and who said that the assassination had been carried out by the *Fedayeen Islam* (an armed group of extreme Moslem integrationists) which, he added, was continuing its activities in Europe and in the United States against relatives and associates of the former Shah.

Capt. Chafik's sister, Princess Azzadeh, who was editor of the Paris journal *L'Iran libre* and leader of an Armed Movement for the Liberation of Iran (representing the monarchist opposition to the Tehran regime) strongly criticized the French authorities for failing to protect her brother. However, on Dec. 10 the French Ministry of the Interior and the Paris Prefecture of Police stated that Capt. Chafik had never applied for permission to carry arms or asked for protection "because he lived in France under a false identity" and had never disclosed his true identity.

Princess Ashraf, in an open letter to Dr Waldheim published in an advertisement in *The New York Times* and the *Daily News* on Dec. 23, accused Ayatollah Khomeini of executing more than 700 people whose only crime, she claimed, was "to have co-operated with the old regime". In addition, she stated, "many thousands" had been "deliberately butchered and lynched in all corners of Iran" and their deaths had not been reported anywhere. She expressed amazement and sadness at Dr Waldheim having joined those who alleged that Iranians were denied human rights and subjected to injustices under the Shah.

Approval of Constitution in Referendum

A referendum on the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was held on Dec. 2-3, 1979, when voters (i.e. all citizens above the age of 16 years) were asked to answer the question: "Do you agree with the fundamentals of the Constitution drafted by the Council of Experts?" [See also pages 30143 and 30144-45.]

The ballot papers consisted of two halves, one being printed in green letters for voting "yes" and the other in red letters for voting "no".

The referendum was reported to have been widely boycotted in the national minority regions of Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Azerbaijan.

In Kurdistan (in the west) the three main Kurdish groups rejected the draft Constitution because their representatives had not taken part in the work of the Council of Experts and no provision was made in the draft for Kurdish autonomy. In Baluchistan (in the south-east) the Moslem Union Party claimed that the Constitution discriminated against the minority Sunni sect—the majority of Iranians being Shi'ite (Shia) Moslems [see page 29733]. In Azerbaijan the Moslem People's Republican Party (which supported Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari—see page 30143) had called for a boycott of the referendum (Ayatollah Shariatmadari having originally expressed support for the draft Constitution—see page 30144), and Mr Qotbzadeh (then director of radio and television services) was accused of trying to deceive the voters by broadcasting a picture of Ayatollah Shariatmadari with the voice of his son Sadeq (whom a leader of the Ayatollah's party described as "a village idiot") calling on voters to approve the Constitution. Serious unrest followed, not only in Azerbaijan but also in the holy city of Qom, where at least two persons were killed on Dec. 5 in clashes in front of Ayatollah Shariatmadari's house. On Dec. 6, however, the two leaders—Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Shariatmadari—in a joint public appeal condemned any attempts to divide the people of Iran.

The official result of the referendum was not announced until Jan. 1, 1980, when it was stated that 15,680,329 votes had been cast in favour of the Constitution and 78,516 against it. No figure was given for the percentage poll, but on Dec. 6 it had been estimated that about 65 per cent of the electorate had taken part in the referendum.

Even after the referendum criticism of the Constitution continued to be expressed, in particular by Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who was on Dec. 16 reported to have said that the sweeping powers given to Ayatollah Khomeini under Article 110 of the Constitution [see pages 30144-45] were "against national sovereignty" and that the nation had wanted the Constituent Council of Experts to exercise its own powers and not to evict itself from power and give it to someone else.

It was reported on Jan. 20, 1980, that on representations made by leading Sunni Moslems Article 12 of the Constitution was to be amended so as to give non-Sh'ite Moslems certain rights in those parts of the country where they were the majority. Under this amendment the regulations of their respective denominations would be valid in judicial and penal courts. Ayatollah Khomeini was said to have agreed to this amendment, which was to be put to a referendum.

Election of Mr Bani-Sadr as President of the Republic

In presidential elections held on Jan. 25, 1980, Mr Abolhassan Bani-Sadr was elected as first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran after gaining more than 75 per cent of the votes cast. Over 100 persons had sought nomination as presidential candidates but only eight were finally allowed to stand.

Those eliminated during the first three weeks of January included Dr Mehdi Bazargan (Prime Minister from February to November 1979); Dr Abbas Amir Entezam (who had been a Deputy Prime Minister under Dr Bazargan and subsequently ambassador to Sweden —see page 30142—and whom the students occupying the US embassy had accused of spying for the United States); Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali (the former head of the revolutionary courts, who withdrew his candidature on Jan. 13 at the request of Ayatollah Khomeini and who urged his followers to vote for Mr Bani-Sadr); Mr Jalaleddin Farsi (an extreme right-wing integrationist Moslem nominated as the candidate of the Islamic Republican Party—IRP, the party of Ayatollah Khomeini—but disqualified because he was the son of naturalized Afghan parents and not Iranian by birth as required under the Constitution); Mr Massoud Rajavi (the leader of the *Mujaheddin Khalq* movement, disqualified after Ayatollah Khomeini had ruled that only persons who had endorsed the Constitution at the referendum could be presidential candidates); and Dr Ramatullah Moghaddam (the leader of the Radical Party, who had also been accused of "connexions with the enemy" and who had gone underground).

The election campaign was marked by unprecedented freedom of expression, with each of the eight final candidates being given equal time on television. (The radio and television services refused, however, to broadcast a statement by the students occupying the US embassy, accusing one of the candidates, Rear-Adm. Ahmad Madani, of "counter-revolutionary activities" and "complicity with the US enemy".)

In the ballot voters had to write down the name of the candidate of their choice, illiterate voters being helped by those able to write.

Ayatollah Khomeini did not indicate his preference for any one candidate but appealed to voters on Jan. 24 to give their unanimous support to the victor in the elections, to cast aside regional rivalries and to treat each other as Moslem brothers.

Two of the principal Kurdish organizations—the Sunnite movement of Shaikh Ezzedin Hosseini and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran [see page 30143]—had on Jan. 22 announced that they would boycott the elections; they objected in particular to the disqualification of Mr Rajavi [see above].

The final figures for the votes gained by the first four candidates were officially announced on Feb. 3 as follows:

Mr Abolhassan Bani-Sadr	10,747,345
Rear-Adm. Ahmad Madani	2,240,160
Dr Hassan Ebrahim Habibi	676,120
Mr Dariush Foruhar	134,132

Rear-Adm. Madani, former Commander of the Iranian Navy and a former Governor of Khuzistan (and Minister of Defence in February-March 1979), was supported mainly by the educated and Westernized middle class. Dr Habibi, the candidate of the IRP, was a member of the Revolutionary Council [see page 30142] and was Minister of Culture and Higher Education in Dr Bazargan's last Government and in the provisional Government set up in November 1979 [see pages 30142-43]; he was said to have the support of Ayatollah Khomeini's followers in Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, Khuzistan, Khorassan, Baluchistan and Sistan. Mr Foruhar, a former leader of the National Front [see page 30144], was a Minister of State and had previously been Minister of Labour and Social Affairs under Dr Bazargan.

The other four candidates were Mr Sadeq Tabatabai (a former Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman—see page 30142 —and the son-in-law of Ayatollah Khomeini); Dr Kazem Sami (former Minister of Health and leader of the JAMA party), Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh (supervisor of the Foreign Ministry) and Mr Mohammad Mokri (ambassador in Moscow). Each of these four candidates obtained less than 1 per cent of the vote, and Mr Qotbzadeh only about 0.3 per cent.

Mr Bani-Sadr had said during his election campaign that Iran's economy would have to be changed so that it was no longer dependent on oil revenues, and he had advocated the development of agriculture and of small industries in rural areas. Agricultural land, he had said, should be doubled in order that Iran would no longer need to import food, and priority should be given to the allocation of agricultural credits.

Mr Ali Reza Nowbari, the governor of the Bank Markazi Iran, said after the elections that President Bani-Sadr was not going to depend upon a party system (because parties were "an alienating force") but would look to "structures where people can take a direct part in decision making" through the support of some 1,800 small groups, mainly "Islamic societies" in factories, villages and offices (which had helped to organize the elections).

Ayatollah Khomeini expressed his unconditional support for the newly-elected President on Jan. 29 when he called on the population and on the unsuccessful candidates to "collaborate with the winner".

For the *Tudeh* party, Mr Nureddin Kianouri, its secretary-general, said on the same day: "If he [the President] takes the line of Ayatollah Khomeini we shall support him, but if he aligns his policy on that of the conciliatory forces we shall fight against him."

On Feb. 4 Mr Bani-Sadr was sworn in as President by Ayatollah Khomeini in the presence of members of the Revolutionary Council and of the Government.

Shortly before the ceremony Mr Bani-Sadr had declared: "Our revolution will not win if it is not exported. We are going to create a new order in which deprived people will not always be deprived and oppressors will not always be oppressors."

With regard to the US-Iranian dispute over the hostages, President Bani-Sadr said in an interview (published in *Le Monde* on Feb. 11): "The United States has understood nothing of our revolution. Americans have attributed the taking of the hostages to the 'savagery' and 'fanaticism' of the Iranians. Then they interpreted my move into the presidency as a victory over the clergy by a pro-Western individual shaped by French liberalism. They were wrong in both instances. They have not yet understood that the occupation of the American embassy and my election make up two sides of the same coin: our people's desire for independence. If the Americans would admit this, it would be easy to free the hostages shortly, maybe even in the next few days."

In a message of congratulation to the newly-appointed President from President Brezhnev, it was stated that "the struggle of the Iranian people against the continuous plots of imperialism and the achievement of their unquestionable right to decide their own destiny" were "understandable to the Soviet people" and that relations between the two countries would continue to be based on "respect for sovereign rights, non-intervention and good-neighbourliness for the benefit of world peace".

On Feb. 8 it was announced that, with the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini, President Bani-Sadr had been appointed head of the Revolutionary Council.

Dr Habibi, spokesman for the Council, explained that it had been decided that the Council would continue its activities under the chairmanship of President Bani-Sadr until the formation of a Parliament (the *Majlis*, to be elected in March 1980); that, in view of the fact that the head of the Revolutionary Council had both legislative and executive powers and that executive power also was part of the duties of the ministers who were not members of the Revolutionary Council, the President would attend the sessions of the Council and also hold sessions with ministers in order to harmonize procedures; and that any ministerial changes would be subject to the Revolutionary Council's approval.

In accordance with the Constitution, the President was (on Feb. 19) appointed C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces.

The start of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, originally fixed for March 7, 1980, had on Feb. 12 been postponed to March 14 by the Revolutionary Council.

Foreign Relations

Among the Governments of other Moslem countries, the Iranian authorities regarded as particularly hostile those of Iraq and Morocco.

The ruling *Baath* Party of Iraq accused Iran on Dec. 3 of conspiracy against Arab countries by providing the United States with an excuse for military intervention in the Middle East.

After King Hassan II of Morocco had been reported to have remarked that the US-Iranian crisis could be ended by the United States only by military intervention in Iran, the Foreign Ministry in Tehran announced on Dec. 20 that it had recalled its diplomatic personnel from Morocco as a result of the King's hostile attitude towards the Iranian revolution.

With Libya, however, Iran restored its diplomatic relations at the level of chargés d'affaires, as announced on Nov. 16 [see above and also page 30148].

The Mexican Government closed its embassy in Tehran on Nov. 13 [see above].

While the staff of the British embassy in Tehran was on Dec. 27 reduced from 20 to eight members, the Government of Norway withdrew its ambassador from Tehran on the same day.

The New Zealand embassy in Tehran was closed on Feb. 7, 1980, and all its personnel evacuated "for security reasons" after documents had been stolen from it during a burglary on Feb. 4. Mr Muldoon, the New Zealand Prime Minister, admitted later that the embassy staff had played "a small part" in the Canadian action on behalf of the six US citizens [see above].

In France it was announced on Feb. 6 that Iran had ordered a halt to all oil sales to France (normally constituting about 10 per cent of French consumption) on Jan. 1, 1980, after a dispute had arisen over Iran's withdrawal from participation in the costs of the Eurodif nuclear fuel enrichment plant at Tricastin (southern France) [see 27171 A], which had led to French suspension of payments on a $1,000 million loan from Iran, and after France had frozen some Iranian bank assets following a court ruling that Iran had defaulted on a contract involving the purchase of French-built nuclear power stations by Iran [see page 29746].

The number of foreigners still resident in Iran was on Jan. 17, 1980, reported to include 250 French nationals (against 7,000 a year earlier), 800 West Germans (against 14,000), less than 1,000 Japanese (against 7,000), about 1,000 Italians (15,000 a year earlier), 300 British subjects (formerly 14,000) and less than 300 US citizens (against nearly 45,000).

Internal Security Developments

In connexion with the activities of foreign journalists accredited in Iran, Mr Nasser Minachi, the Minister of National Guidance, issued on Nov. 22 a code of conduct for such journalists, requiring them to swear an oath to write only the truth and to avoid spreading false news which could create feelings hostile to the Iranian revolution in the world or discord among the country's peoples.

Between February 1979 and Dec. 17 of that year the Iranian Government had expelled 23 Western journalists, mainly for "distorted reporting", and on Jan. 14, 1980, the authorities ordered the immediate expulsion of about 100 US journalists and the closing down of all US news agencies' operations.

Two leading clerics were assassinated by Moslem extremists during December 1979.

Dr Mohammed Mofateh, a former member of the Revolutionary Council and of the IRP central committee, was shot dead on Dec. 18 by two men who escaped on a motor cycle, while two Revolutionary Guards were killed at the same time. Responsibility for the assassinations was claimed on Dec. 23 by the extremist Moslem Forqan group, which accused Dr Mofateh of having intended to set up a new secret service. On Jan. 8, 1980, a group of 16 Forqan members, among them Mr Akbar Goudarzi, Forqan's reputed leader, were arrested after a clash with Revolutionary Guards. Two Forqan members—Mr Mohammed Ali Basiri and Mr Hamid Niknam—convicted of murdering Ayatollah Morteza Motahari and Gen. Mohammed Vali Qarani in April-May 1979 [see page 30146] were executed on Jan. 25.

On Dec. 28 Mr Sarkar Agha Abdolreza Ebrahim, head of the Sh'ite Sheikhiyen sect, was killed with his driver at Kerman (the capital of the province of the same name).

In addition to the executions which had taken place earlier in 1979 of former office-bearers under the Shah's regime, further executions were carried out in December 1979 and January and February 1980.

Mr Mehdi Mir Ashrafi, a former politician, was reported to have been executed in Isfahan after a three-day trial for having killed at least one person during the Shah's regime. (He had been the first to announce by radio the overthrow of Dr Mossadeq's Government in 1953.)

Among four army officers executed on Jan. 13 were Col. Ali Akbar Mehri (former commander of a tank division), who was said to have ordered the firing of 8,200 bullets at crowds during a massacre in Tehran on Sept. 8, 1978 [see pages 29386-87], and Col. Faraki-Sarabi (a former Guards Battalion commander), said to have ordered tanks to attack a hospital.

On Jan. 20 it was announced that four former army officers had been executed, among them Gen. (rtd.) Hassan Belzadi and Col. (rtd.) Houshang Kaviani, found guilty of taking part in the "massacre" of June 5, 1963, in connexion with the rising against the land reform [see 19564 A], leading to the death of up to 10,000 people and to the exiling of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Gen. Jamshid Fathi Moq-Addam was on Feb. 3 condemned to death by a revolutionary court in Tehran for having, as commander of the Guards, killed "innocent freedom fighters" and led soldiers and officers under his command in the struggle against the Iranian nation.

From Kuwait it had been reported on Jan. 16 that an attempted coup by army officers against Ayatollah Khomeini had been uncovered and that those responsible for the attempt had already been executed.

The International Committee of the Red Cross announced in Geneva on Feb. 6 that its delegates had seen about 800 political detainees when they visited a prison in Tehran in January 1980.

Iranian Islamic Activists' Efforts to aid Palestinian and other Moslem Liberation Movements

Shaikh Abbas Mohammad Montazeri (the son of the chief ayatollah of Tehran) announced on Dec. 5 that he proposed to send 1,700 "volunteers" to fight for the Palestinian cause in southern Lebanon and that the first contingent would enter Lebanon on Dec. 8, if necessary by force. On Dec. 10, however, Ayatollah Khomeini was reported to have cancelled these plans, and the Lebanese Government closed its country's airspace to Iranian aircraft in order to prevent Iranian volunteers from entering Lebanon.

Followers of Shaikh Montazeri assembled at Tehran airport were not allowed to leave it by air. Some 400 of them temporarily occupied the Foreign Ministry in Tehran on Dec. 13 while a delegation put their case to Mr Qotbzadeh. Of the volunteers, 40 were said to have reached Damascus on Dec. 18 and another 80 on the following day. After reaching Beirut the Shaikh, whom the Lebanese police prevented from holding a press conference, said on Jan. 2, 1980, that he would still send "thousands upon thousands" of volunteers to Lebanon to fight against Israel.

On Jan. 11 Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, a leading member of the Revolutionary Council and father of Shaikh Montazeri, asked a group of representatives of "liberation movements" from 17 Islamic countries (whose meeting in Tehran had been organized by the occupiers of the US embassy) to "combine in revolutionary unity" in order to export the Iranian revolution to other parts of the world.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - New York Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - UN Information Centre, London - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - US International Communication Agency) (*Prev. rep. 30141 A*)

Note. Developments concerning Iran's ethnic minorities, and also subsequent political events, will be dealt with in separate articles.—(Ed. KCA)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Life Peerages

The New Year honours list, published on Dec. 31, 1979, contained the names of six new life peers, as follows:

Mrs Jean Barker, a former Mayor of Cambridge.

Mr George (Lord) Emslie, Lord Justice-General of Scotland and Lord President of the Court of Session.

Sir John Hunt, Secretary to the Cabinet, 1973-79 [see 25862 C; 29855 A].

Sir Kenneth Keith, chairman of Rolls-Royce Ltd, 1972-79 [see page 26010].

Sir Robert McAlpine, partner in Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons.

Sir Marcus Sieff, chairman of Marks and Spencer Ltd.

The new life peers took the following titles: Mrs Jean Barker—Baroness Trumpington; Mr George Emslie—Baron Emslie; Sir John Hunt—Baron Hunt of Tanworth; Sir Kenneth Keith—Baron Keith of Castleacre; Sir Robert McAlpine—Baron McAlpine of Moffat; Sir Marcus Sieff—Baron Sieff of Brimston.

The following titles were taken by eight of the 14 life peers created in the Birthday honours of June 1979 [see 29818 A]:

Miss Betty Harvie Anderson—Baroness Skrimshire of Quarter; Mr Emlyn Hooson—Baron Hooson; Professor Jean McFarlane—Baroness McFarlane of Llandaff; Mr Oscar Murton—Baron Murton of Lindisfarne; Mrs Diana Neave—Baroness Airey of Abingdon; Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper—Baron Dacre of Glanton; Mr David Gibson-Watt—Baron Gibson-Watt; Mr Richard Wood—Baron Holderness. Baroness Skrimshire of Quarter, who had taken her seat in the House of Lords on Oct. 31, 1979, died on Nov. 5.

A life peerage conferred on Dr Donald Coggan on his retirement as Archbishop of Canterbury [see 29924 A] was gazetted on Jan. 29, 1980, as Baron Coggan.—(Times - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. 29818 A*)

A. SOUTH KOREA — Assassination of President Park Chung Hee - Mr Choi Kyu Hah elected President - Cabinet formed by Mr Shin Hyon Hwack - Other Internal Developments, August 1979 to March 1980

The President of South Korea, Mr Park Chung Hee, was assassinated on Oct. 26, 1979, by the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Mr Kim Jae Kyu, who was subsequently sentenced to death. The Prime Minister, Mr Choi Kyu Hah, temporarily assumed the presidency, to which he was elected unopposed by the National Conference for Unification on Dec. 6. Mr Shin Hyon Hwack, previously Deputy Premier, formed a Cabinet on Dec. 14. Details of these and related developments are given below.

Mr Kim Young Sam expelled from National Assembly - Resignation of Opposition Members - Riots in Pusan and Masan

A major political crisis developed in August 1979, after the Government had launched an offensive against the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) and Christian dissidents.

The NDP had received more votes in the elections of December 1978 [see 29795 A] than the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP), although the latter retained an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, as under the 1972 Constitution [see 25607 A] one-third of the members were nominated by President Park. Mr Kim Young Sam, who had been elected president of the NDP at the party convention in May 1979 [see 29795 A], called for President Park's resignation, the restoration of democracy and the extension of human rights in a speech in the Assembly in July. Copies of the NDP newspaper *Democratic Front* containing the text of the speech were seized by the police on July 31, and its editor, Mr Mun Pu Shik, was arrested.

Another cause of concern to the Government was the influence of Christian movements among industrial and agricultural workers, and especially among the poorly-paid female textile workers. The Korean Catholic bishops' conference protested on April 10, 1979, against persecution of workers involved in Christian labour movements. Seven teachers at the Christian Academy in Seoul, an adult educational institution, were arrested on March 9, 1979, on a charge of "pro-communist" activities, and at court hearings on Aug. 6-10 alleged that they had been tortured to extort confessions from them. The Rev. Cho Hwa Soon, a woman Methodist minister and a member of the staff of the Urban Industrial Mission (an international Protestant organization working among lower-paid workers in South-East Asia, South Korea and Japan), was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in May.

Following the closure of a textile factory on Aug. 6 the police expelled 170 of its female employees from the company dormitory where they had been living, whereupon the women took refuge in the NDP headquarters in Seoul where they conducted a protest "sit-in". On Aug. 11, however, about 1,000 police stormed the building, one woman being killed and many people seriously injured, including members of the Assembly, NDP officials and journalists. Mr Kim Young Sam's secretary was arrested on Sept. 7 for distributing copies of a report on the raid which questioned the finding of the police that the woman had committed suicide by jumping from a window.

An official report on the incident which was submitted to President Park on Sept. 14 alleged that members of the Urban Industrial Mission had infiltrated into enterprises where wages were low and instigated workers to engage in illegal struggles against their employers. It also criticized members of the Catholic Farmers' Movement, who, it said, had sought to create class consciousness among farmers.

Three NDP members on Aug. 13 filed a suit disputing Mr Kim Young Sam's narrow election as party president, on the ground that 22 unqualified delegates had voted at the convention in May. The Seoul district civil court on Sept. 8 issued a temporary injunction suspending Mr Kim and the four vice-presidents of the party from office and appointing Mr Chung Woon Kap, who had been chairman of the convention, to act as interim president. Mr Kim, however, described the court's decision as "a conspiracy to abolish the opposition party", and declared that he would not accept it. When the Assembly session opened on Sept. 20 it appeared probable that the NDP would split, as Mr Kim and Mr Chung both claimed the leadership.

Meanwhile, in an interview with *The New York Times*, Mr Kim said on Sept. 15: "The time has come for the United States to make a clear choice between a basically dictatorial regime, increasingly alienated from the people, and the majority who aspire to democracy. . . . [President] Carter gave a big present to [President] Park by coming here [on June 29-July 1—see page 29799]. He gave Park the courage to wipe out the opposition by boosting his prestige here. We asked him not to come, precisely because it would encourage Park to strengthen oppression, and all this came true. . . . Iran was America's supreme diplomatic disaster. I want the US embassy to avoid following the same track here. . . ."

The DRP members of the Assembly on Sept. 22 submitted a motion calling for disciplinary action against Mr Kim, on the ground that in his *New York Times* interview he had advocated US interference in South Korean affairs. When the motion came up for discussion on Oct. 4 the NDP members occupied the Assembly chamber; the DRP members, however, met in a committee room and quickly passed a resolution expelling Mr Kim from the Assembly, the opposition members being forcibly excluded from the room by the police.

A US State Department spokesman described Mr Kim's expulsion on Oct. 4 as "inconsistent with the principles of democratic government", and the US ambassador (Mr William Gleysteen) was recalled to Washington for consultations on the following day. All the opposition members of the Assembly—the 66 NDP members, the three Democratic Unification Party members and Mr Son Joo Hang, an independent member who had been imprisoned in 1978 on charges of having called President Park a dictator and had been elected from prison—tendered their resignation on Oct. 13 as a protest. The effect of Mr Kim's expulsion was thus to reunite the NDP, as pressure from their constituents had compelled even his opponents inside the party to support him. [Most of the independent deputies elected in December 1978 had subsequently adhered to the DRP, though some had joined the NDP.]

Student demonstrations on Oct. 16 in Pusan (South Korea's second largest city and Mr Kim's constituency) demanding President Park's resignation were joined by many workers, and developed into riots in which the demonstrators fought the police and attacked official buildings. As the rioting continued on the following day martial law was proclaimed and the city's two universities were closed. The number of casualties was officially given as 73 policemen, two students and three others injured, but according to Japanese press reports at least five people were killed, many others seriously injured and about 4,000 arrested.

Rioting also broke out on Oct. 18 in the industrial city of Masan after students had demonstrated in protest against the closing of colleges in the city; it continued on the following day, police posts and the local DRP offices being attacked. The Army took over responsibility for public order in Masan and the adjoining city of Changwon from the police on Oct. 20. An anti-government demonstration by students in Taegu on Oct. 25 ended peacefully, after the police had prevented the students from leaving the university grounds.

The US Defence Secretary, Dr Harold Brown, who was visiting Seoul for talks on military questions, handed President Park a letter from President Carter on Oct. 18, in which the latter expressed concern at recent developments in South Korea.

A report published by the International Commission of Jurists on Nov. 6 accused President Park's regime of persecuting lawyers who defended dissidents. Some who had persisted in doing so, it stated, had themselves been accused of anti-state activities, imprisoned and forbidden to practise law, with the result that out of about 850 practising lawyers in South Korea only 20 were prepared to defend political prisoners. The report also stated that defence counsel were excluded from interrogations, during which prisoners were frequently tortured, were not allowed to see the charges until the last minute, and in some cases were even forbidden to call defence witnesses.

The Assassination of President Park

President Park and his chief bodyguard, Mr Cha Ji Chul, were shot dead by Mr Kim Jae Kyu at a dinner party in Seoul on Oct. 26.

President Park Chung Hee (61), the son of a farmer, entered a Japanese officers' school in 1940 and served in the Japanese Army during the war. When Korea became independent in 1945 he was commissioned in the Korean Army, and fought in the war with North Korea in 1950-53. He headed a military coup in May 1961, assumed the post of acting President in March 1962 and was elected President in October 1963 [see page 18212; 19642 A; 19822 A], being re-elected in 1967, 1971, 1972 and 1978 [for most recent re-election see 29795 A].

President Park's foreign policy was based on close co-operation with the United States and Japan, and in 1965 he sent troops to support the US forces in Vietnam [see page 21223] and concluded a treaty normalizing relations with Japan [see 20662 A]. His economic policy was aimed at increasing exports by developing light industries and attracting foreign (mainly American and Japanese) investment by keeping down wage rates. This policy resulted in a high growth rate and a massive increase in exports, but heavy industry and agriculture did not expand in proportion to light industry, and the growth of the towns at the expense of the countryside created grave social problems [see page 28972].

The rapprochement between the United States and China which began in 1971 obliged President Park to modify his policies, and in the following year talks were held between North and South Korea on possible unification [see 25488 A]; taking advantage of this situation he introduced a new Constitution in 1972 which gave him virtually absolute power [see 25607 A]. The kidnapping in Tokyo in 1973 of the then NDP leader and 1971 presidential candidate Mr Kim Dae Jung, which was attributed to the KCIA, however, led to the breakdown of the negotiations with the North and the growth of a strong protest movement at home, and subjected relations with Japan to a severe strain [see 26285 A]. An attempt on President Park's life in 1974 by a Korean resident in Japan, in which his wife was killed, was followed by a period of tension between the two countries [see 26696 A; 26938 D]. Relations with the United States were also strained during his later years, in part because of the discovery that the KCIA was engaged in the systematic bribery of US congressmen and intimidation of Koreans in the United States, and in part because of US reactions to the repression of Christian and other opposition elements in South Korea [see page 28036; 29555 C].

An announcement broadcast early on Oct. 27 stated that an emergency cabinet meeting held at 11 p.m. on the previous evening (local time) had decided that in accordance with the Constitution the Prime Minister, Mr Choi Kyu Hah, should take over as acting President; that martial law had been imposed throughout the country, except in the southern island of Cheju, because of "trouble with the President"; and that Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, the Army Chief of Staff, had been appointed martial law administrator.

The first announcement of President Park's death, issued 2½ hours later by the then Minister of Culture and Information, Mr Kim Seong Jin, said that he had been accidentally killed in an "abrupt conflict" between Mr Kim Jae Kyu and Mr Cha Ji Chul, who had also been killed, together with three of the President's bodyguards. On Oct. 28, however, it was announced that President Park and Mr Cha had been deliberately shot by Mr Kim, and that the President's five bodyguards had been shot by KCIA agents. Fuller details were given in a report presented to a press conference on Nov. 6 by Maj.-Gen. Chun Doo Hwan, head of the Army Security Command, who was in charge of the investigation into the assassination.

Gen. Chun stated that Mr Kim had formed the plan of killing President Park in June 1979, after he had been reprimanded by him because of his failure to deal with the domestic situation and also because of his "involvement in matters of rights and interests". He had resented the fact that the President trusted only Mr Cha, not himself, and that Mr Cha, although his junior in age and rank, had insulted him and meddled in his business, and he had feared that he might be relieved of his post because of the Pusan and Masan riots. Believing that "important people currently in office and military leaders" were under his influence, he had hoped after killing President Park to control the situation through "the immense power granted to him as KCIA director and the vast organizational power of the KCIA" and to make himself President.

At 4 p.m. on Oct. 26, Gen. Chun continued, Mr Cha had informed Mr Kim that President Park would have dinner at the KCIA dining hall, whereupon Mr Kim had decided to carry out his plan that night. "Aiming to embroil others in a revolt after killing President Park", he had invited Gen. Chung Seung Hwa and Mr Kim Jong Sop, second assistant director of the KCIA, to dine at an annex about 50 metres from the dining hall. Mr Kim Kae Won, the President's chief secretary, had arrived at about 5.40, and had complained to Mr Kim about Mr Cha's "arrogance". Mr Kim had replied "I shall finish him off tonight", whereupon Mr Kim Kae Won had "nodded in agreement".

At the dinner, which started soon after President Park and Mr Cha arrived about 6.05, only the President, Mr Cha, Mr Kim Jae Kyn, Mr Kim Kae Won and two women who acted as waitresses had been present. During the meal both President Park and Mr Cha had criticized Mr Kim for his handling of the situation in Pusan. Mr Kim had left the room at about 7.10 and gone to the annex, where he had asked Gen. Chung and Mr Kim Jong Sop to wait for him until he returned. After collecting a pistol from his office, he had told Mr Park Son Ho, head of the KCIA protocol section, and his secretary, Col. Park Hung Ju, to "dispose of the bodyguards when you hear gunshots in the dining room", whereupon Mr Park had asked for 30 minutes in which to make his preparations.

At about 7.35 Mr Kim had again left the dining room, and had been assured by Mr Park that his preparations were completed. On returning to the dining room he had shot first Mr Cha and then President Park, whereupon Mr Kim Kae Won had fled. Hearing the shots, Mr Park had shot dead two of the President's guards, while Col. Park and three other KCIA men, Mr Lee Ki Ju, Mr Yu Song Ok and Mr Kim Tae Won, had shot dead two others and wounded a third.

After the shooting, Gen. Chun went on, Mr Kim had hurried to Gen. Chung, who had heard the shots, told him that "a serious thing" had happened and asked him to accompany him to the KCIA headquarters. When Mr Kim informed him in the car that the President was dead, however, Gen. Chung had insisted that they go to the army headquarters instead, and had summoned the Defence Minister (Gen. Ro Jae Hyun) and the Chiefs of Staff there. Mr Kim Kae Won meanwhile had taken the President's body to a hospital, and had then asked the Prime Minister, the Home Affairs Minister (Mr Koo Ja Choon) and the Minister of Justice (Mr Kim Chi Yol) to come to the presidential palace, where he told them that the President had had "an accident". On receiving a telephone call from Mr Kim Jae Kyu all four—together with the Foreign Minister, Mr Park Tong Jin—had gone to the army headquarters. When they arrived there at about 9.30 Mr Kim had said that the President was "in trouble", and had suggested that absolute secrecy should be ensured for two or three days and that martial law should be declared.

At about 11.30 Mr Kim Kae Won, knowing that Mr Kim's plot to seize power could not succeed, had told Gen. Chung and the Defence Minister that Mr Kim was "a criminal". They had thereupon lured him on a pretext into a waiting car, where he was arrested. The Cabinet had meanwhile met at the Defence Ministry, and after confirming that President Park was dead had promulgated martial law.

"His [Mr Kim's] vicious scheme," Gen. Chun declared, "was that immediately after the killing a cabinet meeting would be convened and martial law declared. To consolidate his position, the fact of His Excellency's accident would be kept secret for three days. The members of the KCIA would investigate and deal with the case on the pretext that the scene of the killing was inside the KCIA's own building. The fact that the killing was committed by himself would be either disclosed or concealed, according to the degree of the people's mourning. The military would perform only the mission of national defence, while the KCIA would perform the missions of keeping the political situation under control and of implementing political policies. . . . The conclusion of the investigation is that there is no connexion between the military or other organizations and the case, or participation of or manipulation by any foreign power in the case at all, and that the case was a homicide aimed at a rebellion committed by a megalomaniac whose dream it was to become President." Gen. Chun added that besides Mr Kim, Mr Kim Kae Won, the five KCIA men involved in the shooting and another KCIA man who had destroyed evidence, 111 people had been interrogated, of whom 33 had been designated as witnesses and the other 78 had been released.

It had previously been announced on Oct. 30 that Mr Kim Kae Won had been taken to investigation headquarters on Oct. 27, and was being intensively questioned to check whether he was involved in the crime.

Mr Choi Kyu Hah on Oct. 30 appointed Lt.-Gen. Lee Hee Song, Deputy Chief of Army Staff, as acting director of the KCIA. The appointment of Gen. Lee, who retained his military rank, to this post was regarded as an indication that the Army would maintain control over the KCIA, which had developed into a "state within the state", with 15,000 members and 300,000 "correspondents".

The KCIA was founded in 1961 shortly after President Park's seizure of power, and was headed until 1963 by Mr Kim Chong Pil, [see page 19643] who later became Prime Minister (from 1971 to 1975). Under a successor, Mr Kim Hyung Wook, the kidnapping of South Korean students from Western Germany by the KCIA severely strained relations between the two countries [see 23434 A]. Mr Kim was dismissed in 1969, and fled to the United States in 1973. The next director, Mr Lee Hu Rak, was dismissed in 1973 because of the scandal caused by the kidnapping of Mr Kim Dae Jung [see 26285 A]. His successor, Mr Shin Jik Soo, was forced to resign in 1976 as a result of revelations of KCIA activities in the United States, and was replaced by Mr Kim Jae Kyu, a former lieutenant-general and Construction Minister [see page 28971]. Since the murder of President Park's wife in 1974 the KCIA's power was believed to have been limited by the increasing influence of the presidential bodyguard headed by Mr Cha Ji Chul.

The KCIA was divided into eight bureaus, the first being responsible for administration and training, the second for internal propaganda and censorship, the third for combating communist infiltration, the fourth for internal security, the fifth for examining applications for passports, the sixth for assassinations, abductions and sabotage, the seventh for collecting political information from abroad, and the eighth for psychological warfare against North Korea. Mr Kim Hyung Wook said in testimony before a committee of the US Congress in 1977 [see also 29555 C; 29795 A]: "I had extensive powers at my disposal—more power than you can imagine—covering virtually every aspect of my country. My power extended into political, economic, cultural, religious and even foreign propaganda activities."

President Park was given a state funeral, the first since the establishment of the republic, on Nov. 3, and was buried beside his wife in the national cemetery in Seoul. An official funeral service for Mr Cha Ji Chul and the other four bodyguards killed with the President, which had been arranged for Oct. 30, was cancelled just before it was due to be held, no explanation being given, and they were buried privately.

US Reactions to President Park's Assassination

When the news of President Park's death became known in Washington in the afternoon of Oct. 26 (local time), the Defence Department placed the US forces in South Korea on a state of alert, officially described as "defence readiness condition 3" (i.e. one level higher than the usual state of readiness, but not equivalent to emergency status). The alert did not extend to other US forces in the Pacific.

A State Department statement said: "We have been advised of the developments in the Republic of [South] Korea. The United States regards the matter as an internal one for the Republic of Korea, and urges restraint on the part of all. The US Government also wishes to make clear that it will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to the Republic of Korea to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea."

Dr Harold Brown stated on Oct. 28 that two airborne warning and control (AWACS) aircraft were on their way to South Korea, and an aircraft carrier had been ordered closer to Korean waters. No unusual activities by the North Korean forces were reported, however.

Proposals for Revision of Constitution

Martial law regulations announced early on Oct. 27 required 24 hours' notice to be given to the police of all indoor or outdoor assemblies; banned all political demonstrations and the spreading of rumours; placed newspapers, periodicals and news broadcasts under censorship; imposed a curfew from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m.; and closed the universities and colleges. As the situation remained calm, however, these restrictions were gradually relaxed. From Oct. 31 religious services and funerals were permitted without previous notice being given; the curfew period was shortened in rural areas from Oct. 31 and in urban areas from Nov. 8; and postgraduate schools and teacher training and technical colleges were reopened on Nov. 12 and the universities on Nov. 19. Gen. Chung Seung Hwa gave a warning on Nov. 8, however, that unlawful demonstrations and "political stirring up of social uncertainty and turmoil" would not be tolerated.

In the unsettled situation after President Park's death the parties observed a political truce. The martial law authorities nominated on Oct. 31 a committee of 660 members to make the arrangements for his funeral, including the 69 opposition members of the Assembly and Mr Yun Po Sun (President Park's predecessor as President in 1960-62, who was then under house arrest but was released on Nov. 6), whilst Mr Kim Young Sam was appointed an adviser to the committee. When the Assembly met on Nov. 5, for the first time since President Park's death, it voted (before adjourning until Nov. 14) not to accept the opposition members' resignation tendered on Oct. 13 [see above], and the NDP members decided on Nov. 9 to return to the Assembly.

President Park's death immediately gave rise to demands for the revision of the 1972 Constitution and the abolition of the emergency decrees restricting civil liberties. Mr Kim Dae Jung, the NDP candidate in the 1971 presidential election [see 24660 B], who was under house arrest, issued a statement on Nov. 2 calling for the direct election of the President and the Assembly, and appealed to the United States to "do all it can to assure the neutrality of the military". Mr Kim Young Sam said on Nov. 4 that the Constitution should be revised either by the Assembly or by the acting President within the next three months, and that a new President and Assembly should then be elected a month or two later.

Mr Choi Kyu Hah said in a statement issued on Nov. 10 that "parallel with our economic and social growth, we ought to promote progress in the political field". (This sentence closely echoed President Carter's words as quoted in the joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit to South Korea—see page 29800.) To prevent any disruption of constitutional government, however, questions concerning the Constitution and political development should be handled in accordance with constitutional procedures. The Government had therefore decided to hold a presidential election within the time prescribed by the Constitution and according to the relevant laws. "I believe," he continued, "that the new President to be elected should not serve the remaining tenure of office stipulated in the current Constitution, but as soon as is realistically possible should sound out a wide spectrum of opinion of all sectors and layers of society, amend the Constitution and conduct elections in compliance with the amended Constitution. . . ."

The 1972 Constitution provided that if the presidency became vacant the Prime Minister should temporarily assume the office, and the National Conference for Unification, an electoral college elected for six years, should elect a new President within three months to serve the remainder of his predecessor's term. Under these provisions a new President would have to be elected by Jan. 26, 1980, and would hold office until Dec. 26, 1984.

Mr Choi's announcement was strongly criticized by Mr Kim Young Sam, who accused the Government of "making unilateral decisions and then ordering the people to follow them". A statement issued on Nov. 12 by Mr Yun Po Sun, Mr Kim Dae Jung and Mr Ham Suk Hun (a Quaker and a leading dissident) demanded that Mr Choi should resign immediately in favour of an interim government representing all democratic forces and that general elections should be held under a new constitution.

Mr Kim Chong Pil (the former KCIA director and Prime Minister—see above) was elected leader of the DRP in succession to President Park on Nov. 12. He stated on the following day that he would try to initiate a dialogue with the NDP, although he would not support radical changes in the political system. On Nov. 18 he met Mr Kim Young Sam at the NDP headquarters, and after talks they issued a joint statement calling for bipartisan co-operation to revise the Constitution. His visit was regarded as signifying that the DRP, despite the court's ruling, was now prepared to recognize Mr Kim Young Sam as leader of the NDP.

The NDP on Nov. 22 criticized Mr Choi's proposals to hold the presidential election under the 1972 Constitution, and threatened to put up an opposition candidate unless he established a broad-based advisory board to work out details of constitutional amendments, the release of political prisoners and other key issues. Mr Choi on the same day expressed the opinion that the proposed board was unnecessary, but undertook to consult personally with "people from all walks of life".

The National Assembly, to which the opposition members had returned on Nov. 15, unanimously decided on Nov. 26 to set up a special committee to revise the Constitution on which the government and opposition parties would be equally represented. The committee consisted of seven members each from the DRP and the *Yujonghoe* (the "Fraternity for Political Reform", i.e. the 77 members nominated by President Park), 13 from the NDP and one from the Democratic Unification Party. The NDP proposed on Dec. 6 that the President should be elected by universal suffrage; that his powers should be restricted and his term of office reduced from six to four years; that freedom of expression and of assembly should be guaranteed; and that the President should be empowered to rule by decree only in the event of a major calamity or a threat to national security [see also below].

On Dec. 1 the Assembly unanimously approved a resolution recommending that Mr Choi should repeal Emergency Decree No. 9, which made it a punishable offence to criticize the Constitution or to advocate its revision or repeal [see page 27238]. Mr Paik Too Chin, the Speaker of the Assembly, who had presided at the session on Oct. 4 when Mr Kim Young Sam was expelled and against whom the NDP had filed a no-confidence motion, tendered his resignation on Dec. 3.

The Minister of Culture and Information, Mr Kim Seong Jin, announced on Nov. 15 that Mr Choi had asked the Ministries of Justice and Education to consider arrangements for the release of prisoners detained under the emergency decrees and the readmission to the universities of students who had been expelled, and stated that the Government was considering the repeal of Emergency Decree No. 9. Opposition sources estimated the number of political prisoners to be at least 249, of whom about 60 were detained under the anti-communist law and the remainder under the emergency decrees, in addition to an unknown number arrested in connexion with the riots in Pusan and Masan.

Mr Mun Pu Shik, the editor of *Democratic Front* [see above], was released on Nov. 24, and the National Assembly was informed on Dec. 3 that the imprisoned deputy Mr Son Joo Hang had been freed. Mr Kim Chi Ha, the poet, who was serving a life sentence under the anti-communist law [see 26696 A] and was suffering from tuberculosis, was reported on Dec. 1 to have recently been moved from prison to hospital.

Despite these measures, the martial law authorities continued to suppress opposition activities. Riot police on Nov. 24 raided a hall in Seoul where dissidents were holding a meeting and made 96 arrests [see also below]. Nearly 100 more dissidents, most of them students, were arrested at a meeting in Seoul on Nov. 27, and 18 in Kwangju on the following day, although most of those detained were quickly released.

Mr Choi Kyu Hah elected President - Release of Political Prisoners

Mr Choi Kyu Hah, the only candidate, was elected President by the National Conference for Unification on Dec. 6.

President Choi (60), a career diplomat, was educated in Japan, entered the Foreign Ministry in 1951, and served for seven years at the South Korean mission in Tokyo as consul-general, counsellor and finally minister. He was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister in 1959; adviser on foreign affairs to President Park in 1961 and ambassador to Malaysia in 1964. He became Foreign Minister in 1967 and special presidential assistant on foreign affairs in 1971, and formed a Government following Mr Kim Chong Pil's resignation in 1975 [see 27629 A].

In a statement on Dec. 6 after President Choi's election the NDP demanded that a new President should be elected by popular vote before Aug. 15, 1980, the anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule in 1945. It also called for the early ending of martial law, freedom of the press and the immediate release of all political prisoners. [For the NDP's broader proposals on Dec. 6 for constitutional reform, see above.]

As his first official action President Choi on Dec. 7 rescinded Emergency Decree No. 9, and announced that all prisoners held under the decree would be released and that suspended sentences on persons convicted under it would be revoked. Mr Kim Dae Jung was released from house arrest on the following day, and 68 people were released from prison, including 33 students, three Catholic priests, four Protestant ministers, two journalists and a leader of the Catholic Farmers' Movement. Legal proceedings against 222 people who were on trial or under investigation were dropped, and the president of Seoul National University announced that 296 students who had been expelled since 1974 would be allowed to return. Nine out of 20 persons convicted in connexion with the Pusan riots were also released. The amnesty, however, did not cover prisoners convicted under the anti-communist law, such as Mr Kim Chi Ha.

President Choi nominated Mr Shin Hyon Hwack (59), the Deputy Premier and Minister of Economic Planning, as acting Prime Minister on Dec. 10. Mr Shin asked Mr Kim Young Sam for his co-operation on the following day, stating that he would form a caretaker government and would pursue a "strictly neutral" policy. When the National Assembly approved his appointment on Dec. 12, however, the NDP boycotted the session as a protest against the nomination of a Prime Minister who had held office under President Park's regime.

Arrest of Gen. Chung Seung Hwa

Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, the Army Chief of Staff and (since Oct. 27) martial law administrator, was arrested on Dec. 12 on suspicion of complicity in President Park's assassination, together with a number of other generals. A Defence Ministry statement issued on Dec. 24 said that the team in charge of the investigation into the assassination had carried out the arrest with President Choi's approval. According to unofficial reports, however, when Maj.-Gen. Chun Doo Hwan, head of the Army Security Command (and generally regarded as a "hard-liner"), submitted the evidence against Gen. Chung to the President the latter said that he was not satisfied, but Gen. Chun proceeded to carry out the arrest without his permission.

When troops arrived at Gen. Chung's official residence at 7 p.m. to arrest him his guards resisted them, and an exchange of fire took place which caused some casualties. Maj.-Gen. Chang Tae Wan, commander of the Seoul garrison, then mobilized armoured units in support of Gen. Chung, which occupied positions at key points in the city. Several army units, including an armoured battalion of the 9th division stationed near the demilitarized zone, thereupon advanced on Seoul without the authority of the combined forces command headed by Gen. John Wickham, the US commander in South Korea. These forces took up positions around the President's residence and the main government offices and seized control of the army headquarters and the Defence Ministry, the Seoul garrison troops being withdrawn to barracks. The only resistance occurred at the Defence Ministry, where sharp fighting took place at around 2 a.m. on Dec. 13. The statement of Dec. 24 said that a major and two NCOs had been killed and 20 men wounded in the fighting at Gen. Chung's residence and the Defence Ministry. In addition to Gen. Chung several high-ranking officers were arrested.

A cabinet meeting on Dec. 13 appointed Lt.-Gen. Lee Hee Song Army Chief of Staff and martial law administrator, and promoted him to the rank of full general. (Gen. Lee had been Deputy Chief of Army Staff and acting director of the KCIA—see above.) The forces which had moved into Seoul on Dec. 12 withdrew two days later, with the exception of the armoured battalion of the 9th division, which was reported to have refused on Dec. 16 to obey orders from Gen. Wickham to return to its position on the demilitarized zone.

A US State Department spokesman said on Dec. 12 (local time) that "any forces outside South Korea which might seek to exploit the current situation in Seoul should bear in mind our warning of Oct. 27" [see above]. No unusual military activities were reported from North Korea, however. A US Administration spokesman also said on Dec. 13 that any attempt by the Army to disrupt South Korea's new moves towards democracy would have an adverse effect on Washington's relations with Seoul.

The coup of Dec. 12-13 was carried out by a group of officers headed by Gen. Chun Doo Hwan who were junior in age and rank to the group surrounding Gen. Chung, and were believed to be opposed to any major changes in President Park's system of government. In a statement issued on Dec. 18 Gen. Lee Hee Song, whilst declaring that "the armed forces should not interfere in politics", denounced "flunkeyism, which sacrifices the pride of the country and the nation to emphasize assertions of individuals or groups", and gave a warning that the martial law forces would not tolerate violations of law and order. His attack on "flunkeyism" was interpreted as a veiled reference to Mr Kim Young Sam's *New York Times* interview of Sept. 15.

A Defence Ministry report of Dec. 24 stated that, in addition to Gen. Chung, Lt.-Gen. Lee Kon Yong, commander of the 3rd Army, Maj.-Gen. Chung Byung Joo, commander of the Special Forces, Lt.-Gen. Mun Hong Gu, Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Maj.-Gen. Chang Tae Wan were under investigation. The only new evidence against Gen. Chung given in the report was an allegation that in October he had received "a huge amount of money from Kim Jae Kyu without any justifiable reason". Gen. Lee Kon Yong and Gen. Chung Byung Joo were also alleged to have received large sums from Mr Kim shortly before President Park's assassination, and Gen. Mun Hong Gu to have frequently received money from him. The only charge against Gen. Chang Tae Wan was that he had been closely associated with Gen. Chung in the past and had attempted to rescue him on Dec. 12. According to unofficial reports, the other officers arrested on Dec. 12-13 had been placed under house arrest or released.

The Defence Ministry announced on Jan. 20, 1980, that Gen. Chung had been provisionally charged with aiding an attempted insurrection. The statement made no mention of the other four generals. Gen. Chung's trial before a court martial opened on March 5, when he was charged with abetting a "criminal act" by deliberately delaying investigations following the assassination of President Park. On March 13 he was sentenced to a 10-year term of imprisonment.

Cabinet formed by Mr Shin Hyon Hwack

Mr Shin Hyon Hwack announced the membership of his Cabinet on Dec. 14, 1979, as follows:

†Mr Shin Hyon Hwack	Prime Minister
Mr Lee Hahn Been	Deputy Premier and Economic Planning
*Mr Park Tong Jin	Foreign Affairs
Gen. Kim Chong Hwan	Home Affairs
*Mr Kim Woun Gie	Finance
Mr Paek Sang Gi	Justice
Gen. Choo Young Bok	Defence
Dr Kim Ok Gil	Education
†Mr Lee Jae Sul	Agriculture and Fisheries
Mr Chung Jae Suk	Commerce and Industry
Mr Yang Yoon Sae	Energy and Resources
†Mr Choi Chong Wan	Construction
Mr Chin Eui Chong	Health and Social Affairs
Mr Yoo Yang Soo	Transport
Mr Pae Sang Wook	Communications
Mr Lee Kyu Hyun	Culture and Information
Mr Kim Yong Hyu	Government Administration
Mr Sung Chwa Kyung	Science and Technology
Mr Rhee Kyu Ho	National Unification
Mr Kim Do Chang	Director of Office of Legislation
Mr Kim Jae Myung	Director of the Office of Veterans' Administration

* No change. † Took new portfolio.

President Choi was reported to have appointed Gen. Kim Chong Hwan (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Mr Paek Sang Gi (a former government prosecutor and a close associate of President Park) and Gen. Choo Young Bok (the Air Force Chief of Staff) to the key ministries of Home Affairs, Justice and Defence in place of his original nominees at the demand of the officers who had carried out the coup of Dec. 12-13. He made a concession to the opposition, however, by giving cabinet posts to Mr Chin Eui Chong, a former NDP member of the Assembly, and Dr Kim Ok Gil, the former president of Ewha Women's University and the first woman to be appointed a minister since 1960, who had links with the opposition. Gen. Lew Byong Hion (deputy commander of the joint US-South Korean combined forces) was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff *vice* Gen. Kim Chong Hwan on Dec. 18 and Lt.-Gen. Hwang Yong Si Deputy Chief of Army Staff *vice* Gen. Lee Hee Song.

Mr Shin said on Dec. 14 that his Government would respect the undertakings which had been given to carry out a progressive liberalization of the regime and a revision of the Constitution providing for a new method of election of the President. He also stated that "the situation involving the shooting incident of the night of Dec. 12" had already been brought under control and would not affect future political developments.

In his speech at his official inauguration on Dec. 21 President Choi repeated his assurance of Nov. 10 that he would not serve for the remainder of President Park's term, and that new elections would be held under an amended constitution [see above]. He then laid down the following principles for the amendment of the Constitution: "(i) The new constitution must be one which can preserve national continuity and solidify national security against an artificial territorial division which pits South and North Korea against each other. (ii) There must be a provision to prevent corruption and misuse of political power. (iii) The new constitution must not give rise to unrest or extreme schisms in the national consensus. (iv) While the embodiment of social justice and equity may well be a value which we all must pursue, we cannot allow it to challenge the free economic system itself." He added: "I think that a constitution which the majority of the people will approve can be prepared in about a year's time, unless any special circumstances occur. . . . It is my hope that subsequent necessary steps will then be taken and fair elections held as early as possible. . . ."

In a letter congratulating President Choi on his inauguration President Carter welcomed the repeal of Emergency Decree No. 9, and added: "The efforts to bring about political reconciliation and orderly progress while also conserving the great achievements of the past will have the support of all friends of your great nation."

To celebrate the inauguration 1,646 prisoners were released on Dec. 23, but only nine of these had been imprisoned for political offences.

A military court sentenced 18 people on Jan. 25, 1980, to terms of imprisonment ranging from one to four years for taking part in the unauthorized meeting on Nov. 24 [see above]. Sentences of two years' and a year's imprisonment passed on Mr Yun Po Sun (82) and Mr Ham Suk Hun (77) respectively were suspended on Jan. 29, however, because of their age.

On Feb. 29, civil and political rights were restored to nearly 700 people, including 22 politicians, 42 religious leaders, 24 professors, nine journalists and more than 350 students.

Among those whose rights were restored were Mr Kim Dae Jung (who had been released from house arrest on Dec. 8—see above), Mr Yun Po Sun and Mr Ham Suk Hun, Mgr Daniel Chi Hak Soon (the former Catholic Bishop of Wonju—see 26696 A; 27629 A), and a number who had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment on various charges in 1976 [see 28035 A]—notably Mr Kim Chul (adviser to the Unified Socialist Party), Mr Chung Il Hyung and Mr Kim Dok Yong (both of the NDP); Father Ham Se Ung; the Rev. Moon Ik Hwan and the Rev. Moon Tong Hwan (both Presbyterian ministers); Professor Lee Moon Yung; and Dr Lee Tae Young. However, Mr Kim Chi Ha [see above] was not among those affected by the measure.

Mr Kim Jae Kyu sentenced to Death

The trial of Mr Kim Jae Kyu, Mr Kim Kae Won and five KCIA officials (Mr Park Son Ho, Col. Park Hung Ju, Mr Lee Ki Ju, Mr Yu Song Ok and Mr Kim Tae Won) on charges of murder and attempted rebellion opened in Seoul on Dec. 4, 1979, before a military court consisting of Lt.-Gen. Kim Yong Son, three major-generals and a colonel. Another KCIA man, Mr Yu Sok Sul, was tried with them on a charge of destroying evidence.

At the opening session defence counsel challenged the competence of the court to try civilians for an offence committed before martial law came into force. The court referred the objection to the Supreme Court, which ruled on Dec. 7 that as proclamation of martial law was reserved for the President its legality could be dealt with only by the National Assembly, not by the judiciary, and that in areas under martial law military courts could try civilians for crimes committed before it came into force.

When the trial was resumed on Dec. 8 Mr Kim Jae Kyu claimed under cross-examination to have assassinated President Park in order to end one-man rule and restore democracy. He had become disenchanted with the President in 1972 after the announcement of the new Constitution, he said, and had considered taking him prisoner and forcing him to sign a statement that he would resign. On two occasions, in 1974 and 1975, he had carried a revolver during meetings with the President, intending to kill him, but each time his resolution had wavered because they were old friends. The danger that there would be riots in Seoul after the demonstrations in Pusan and Masan had finally convinced him that it was necessary to act in order to prevent a blood-bath. He emphasized that he had acted on his own initiative throughout, and denied that he had had any confederates. In particular, he denied that he had acted in collusion with Gen. Chung Seung Hwa.

He had hoped, he continued, to keep the assassination secret for 72 hours, and had planned that during this period a revolutionary committee consisting of military leaders and members of the Cabinet should be formed under his chairmanship and that it should set up a committee to revise the Constitution. He denied, however, that he had had any ambition to become President. "Had it not been for my Oct. 26 revolution," he declared, "democracy would not have been restored in this country. . . . I failed to complete a revolution, but I achieved my aim. I can now die in peace. . . ."

The court on Dec. 20 sentenced all the accused to death, except Mr Yu Sok Sul, who was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The judges rejected Mr Kim Jae Kyu's claim to have acted from patriotic motives, and accused him of having been motivated by personal ambition. In his last words to the court Mr Kim, who declared that he was "happy to have found a just cause to die for", appealed to the judges for clemency for his co-defendants.

The death sentences were upheld by Gen. Lee Hee Song on Dec. 26 and by the military appeal court on Jan. 28, 1980. The charge of murder with attempted rebellion against Mr Kim Kae Won was withdrawn, however, being replaced by one of complicity in the murder of Mr Cha Ji Chul, and his sentence was commuted on Jan. 30 to life imprisonment. Col. Park Hung Ju was executed by firing squad on March 6.—(Newsreview, Seoul - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29795 A*)

A. UNITED NATIONS — 34th Regular Session of General Assembly

The 34th regular session of the UN General Assembly was held in New York between Sept. 18, 1979, and Jan. 7, 1980. [For opening of session, election of President of the Assembly, and admission of St Lucia as the 152nd UN member, see 29998 A. For the election by the Assembly of five new non-permanent Security Council members and 18 members of the Economic and Social Council—ECOSOC—see 30186 A.]

Following a lengthy debate on the representation of Kampuchea (Cambodia), the Assembly decided on Sept. 21 that the country should continue to be represented at the UN by the delegation of the *Khmer Rouge* regime of "Democratic Kampuchea". (This regime, led by Mr Pol Pot, had been overthrown in January 1979—see 29613 A—and replaced by the Vietnamese-backed People's Revolutionary Council of the "People's Republic of Kampuchea", led by Mr Heng Samrin.)

This decision had been recommended by the Assembly's nine-member Credentials Committee on Sept. 19 by a majority of six to three, those in favour being Belgium, China, Ecuador, Pakistan, Senegal and the United States, while those against were Congo, Panama and the Soviet Union.

After rejecting an Indian amendment proposing that the Kampuchean seat be left empty (and declining to give this proposal priority as an alternative motion), the Assembly approved (by 71 votes to 35 with 34 abstentions) Resolution 34/2 A to allow the *Khmer Rouge* delegation (led by Mr Ieng Sary, the regime's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) to remain seated. Opponents of the resolution were Albania, Mongolia and the Warsaw Pact countries (including Byelorussia and Ukraine but excluding Romania which voted in favour) as well as 25 member countries of the non-aligned movement including Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Laos, Vietnam and South Yemen; those abstaining included Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, while those voting in favour included China, the United States and other Western countries as well as the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN—see page 29615) and 35 other non-aligned countries.

In deciding on Sept. 21 to approve the agenda recommended by the Steering Committee [see 29998 A], the Assembly agreed inter alia to discuss a resolution on "the situation in Kampuchea" [see below]. The 125-item agenda was subsequently expanded by the inclusion of four additional items during the course of the session.

General Debate

During the general debate, which began on Sept. 24, statements were made by representatives of the majority of the UN member countries.

Mr Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State, said on Sept. 24 that East-West relations could deteriorate rapidly if one side did not recognize the security interests of the other. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, he expressed satisfaction with progress in agreements between Egypt and Israel [see 29646 A; 29941 A], but he added that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be taken into account and that he hoped that their representatives, and the Governments of Jordan and Syria, would join in the quest for peace. Although Mr Vance said that the North-South dialogue [see 27585 B; 28541 A] had achieved much more than had been acknowledged, he referred to the persistence of a global economic imbalance which, he said, resulted in regional conflicts which in turn were increasingly dangerous because of the proliferation of modern weapons. This was one reason, he said, why East and West should ratify what he called the most comprehensive arms control agreement ever concluded (i.e. the Strategic Arms Limitation —SALT II—agreement; see 30117 A), and he added that strategic stability would be further enhanced by agreement between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (see below and also 29261 A; 30195 A) and by further ratifications of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty [see 22787 A; 23965 A]. Mr Vance also pledged US efforts to help prevent a global food crisis, and he announced that the USA was setting up an Institute for Scientific and Technological Co-operation.

Mr Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, speaking on Sept. 25, said that the 1970s had been marked by a broadening process of détente, and he cited the Helsinki Final Act (of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—see 27301 A) and the SALT II treaty on strategic arms limitation [see 30117 A] as examples of major achievements. However, he added, "fictitious stories about the source of a threat to peace" persisted, one example being "the falsehoods piled up concerning the policies of Cuba and the Soviet Union"; he insisted that this entire question should be recognized as artificial and the matter closed. Mr Gromyko called for initiatives which would contribute to détente, and referred in particular to (i) the proposed relaunching of interrupted negotiations on limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean [see page 30124], and (ii) the Soviet Union's willingness to discuss nuclear arms limitations with "all nuclear powers without exception". With regard to the situation in Indo-China, he said that attention should not focus on artificial anti-Vietnamese propaganda about refugees, but should concentrate instead on those whom everyone knew to be responsible for imposing and sustaining the bloody Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. He concluded by proposing the addition to the Assembly's agenda of an item on the inadmissibility of hegemonism in international relations [see below].

Mr Han Nianlong, a Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, speaking on Sept. 27, welcomed what he described as the growing weight in world politics of the peoples struggling against imperialism and hegemonism, and also the greater vigilance of Western Europe, Japan and other developed countries in face of the hegemonist threat; these factors, he said, were making it impossible for one or two big powers to manipulate the destiny of the world. Nevertheless, he continued, "the late-coming super-power" was increasingly inclined towards aggression and adventure, and towards the use of mercenaries to invade other countries or to organize subversion, and this represented the main source of the threat towards world peace and security; he described as "effrontery" the proposal by this same super-power that the Assembly should condemn hegemonism in international relations. With regard to Kampuchea, he called on the UN to insist on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from the country, and he accused Vietnam of preparing a fresh offensive "to destroy the patriotic forces of Kampuchea before turning against the rest of South-East Asia"; the Soviet Union, he added, was exploiting Vietnamese ambitions in order to be able to use Indo-China as a strategic base in the region.

President Fidel Castro of Cuba addressed the Assembly on Oct. 12 in his capacity as president of the non-aligned movement, and he presented the declarations and resolutions passed at the sixth summit meeting of heads of state or government of the non-aligned countries (held in Havana in September—see 30037 A). President Castro concentrated primarily on economic themes, warning that the future would be apocalyptic if present injustices and inequalities were not peacefully and wisely solved. After describing the wide disparities between the world's rich and poor, he demanded the establishment of "a new world order based on justice, on equity, on peace", and called for the mobilization of an additional $300,000 million in investment funds from rich countries in the coming decade, to provide necessary resources for development in the poorer countries. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, he said that "the dispossession, persecution and genocide which imperialism and Zionism are currently practising against the Palestinian people" was closely parallel to the Nazi persecution of Jews; he also criticized, inter alia, United States policies in the Middle East, southern Africa and Puerto Rico [see 29498 A], and the maintenance of the US base at Guantánamo in Cuba [see 30085 A]. (Despite speculation that his visit might be cancelled due to the tension over the reported presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba—ibid.—President Castro had arrived on Oct. 11 in New York, this being his first visit to the United States since 1960—see 17870 A. Surrounded by strict security precautions, he stayed at the Cuban UN mission and left the building only for his appearance at the General Assembly; he returned to Cuba on Oct. 14, reportedly without meeting US Government representatives and having held only one publicized meeting, at which he met Puerto Rican nationalist leaders recently released from prison in the United States—see 29915 A.)

Resolutions Adopted by General Assembly

Major resolutions approved by the General Assembly during its 34th session are described below under cross-headings.

Disarmament

The Assembly decided, in Resolution 34/71 adopted without a vote on Dec. 11, to invite France and the United States to ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

This treaty had been signed by the United States in May 1977 [see 28604 B] and by France in early 1979 [see 29562 A and also page 29605, where this French signature was incorrectly referred to as a ratification].

Details are given below of the other principal resolutions dealing with various aspects of armaments and disarmament, which were approved likewise on Dec. 11.

(1) The Assembly adopted without a vote Resolution 34/72, reiterating calls for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and further calling for the destruction of existing such weapons.

(2) Resolution 34/73 (passed by 137 votes to none with China and France abstaining and with Albania being among those countries which were absent) reiterated a call for the three nuclear-weapon states negotiating on the cessation of nuclear-weapons testing (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—see page 29263 and 30195 A) to expedite their negotiations. The resolution "noted with dissatisfaction" that no full report on the status of the negotiations between these three countries had been submitted (as requested in Resolution 33/60 of December 1978—see page 29606), and called on these countries "to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament".

(3) With regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity), the Assembly on Oct. 26 requested the Secretary-General to make an immediate inquiry into reports that a nuclear device had been exploded by South Africa in September 1979 [see 30195 A]; this matter was then dealt with in Resolutions 34/76 A-B on Dec. 11.

Resolution 34/76 A, passed by 128 votes to none with 11 abstentions (Canada, Greece, Israel, the USA and the nine members of the European Community, except Denmark and Ireland which voted in favour), vigorously condemned the reported explosion, and condemned nuclear collaboration with South Africa by any state, corporation, institution or individual [see also below under section heading "Southern Africa"]. Resolution 34/76 B, adopted without a vote, requested the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report on South Africa's nuclear plans and capability [see 27865 A], for submission to the Assembly at its 35th session in 1980, and also appealed to all member states to provide him with all relevant information at their disposal.

(4) The Assembly passed resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East (34/77, on which Israel abstained) and South Asia (34/78, passed by 96 votes to two—India and Bhutan—with 40 abstentions including France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) as well as two resolutions on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (34/80 A-B, passed without opposition but with 23 and 14 abstentions respectively, including in the first case the Warsaw Pact countries except Romania, together with Mongolia, and in both cases Canada, Israel, Norway, Portugal, the United States and the member countries of the European Community).

(5) In Resolution 34/82, adopted without a vote, the Assembly noted the progress made at the UN conference on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, held in Geneva from Sept. 10 to 28, 1979, and endorsed the conference decision to hold a further four-week session in Geneva in September-October 1980 with a view to completing negotiations.

(6) Also passed on the same day were reaffirmations of a number of resolutions passed the preceding year, and a Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament (Resolution 34/88, passed by 116 votes to none with 27 abstentions including the Western countries and Japan and also Israel, Mexico, Morocco and Zaïre), which called for implementation of the goals defined by the Assembly's special session on disarmament in May-June 1978 [see 29261 A].

(7) A resolution on Israeli nuclear armament (34/89, passed by 97 votes to 10—Belgium, Denmark, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and the United States—with 38 abstentions) condemned any attempt by Israel to manufacture, acquire, store or test nuclear weapons, or to introduce them into the Middle East, and recalled the Assembly's repeated "condemnation" of military and nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa. The resolution also (i) called on Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, (ii) called on all states to prevent the transfer to Israel of material and technology which could be used for nuclear arms and (iii) requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament, for submission to the Assembly at its 36th session. [Israel and South Africa were among those states which had neither signed nor ratified the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.]

The Assembly passed on Dec. 14 (by 111 votes to four with 26 abstentions) Resolution 34/103 on the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations.

Noting that hegemonism was "a manifestation of the policy of a state, or a group of states, to control, dominate and subjugate, politically, economically, ideologically or militarily, other states, peoples or regions of the world", and further noting that different manifestations of hegemonism were "imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism including Zionism and apartheid", the resolution "resolutely condemned" these manifestations and also "all other forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination and interference" as well as "the growing practice of interference and intervention, overt or covert, in the internal affairs of states", and called for "the withdrawal of all occupation forces back to their own territories". Those opposing the resolution were Australia, Canada, Israel and the United States, while the other Western countries (except Greece) and Japan were among the 26 countries abstaining.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

As in previous years, the Assembly again passed numerous resolutions on matters arising out of the Arab-Israeli conflict, several of which effectively reiterated decisions made in previous years. With regard to the Camp David agreements [see 29646 A], the Assembly in Resolution 34/65 B—passed on Nov. 29 by 75 votes to 33 (including Israel and most Western countries) with 37 abstentions (including France, Greece, Japan and Spain)—declared that "the Camp David accords and other agreements have no validity in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967".

This resolution strongly condemned "all partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, the principles of the [UN] Charter and the resolutions adopted in the various international forums on the Palestinian issue". The Assembly noted with concern "that the Camp David accords have been concluded outside the framework of the UN and without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people".

The Assembly also took decisions on the financing of the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan front (UNDOF—see page 29955) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL—see 30093 A).

For UNDOF the Assembly appropriated (i) $8,034,170 gross for the period from June 1 to Oct. 24, 1979, (ii) $2,062,827 gross for the period from Oct. 25 to Nov. 30, 1979, and (iii) $12,578,000 gross for the period from Dec. 1, 1979, to May 31, 1980, and also authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNDOF at the rate of not more than $2,096,333 gross per month for the period from June 1 to Nov. 30, 1980, if the Security Council decided to continue the force beyond May 31, 1980. These decisions were incorporated in Resolution 34/7 C, passed on Dec. 3 by 97 votes to three with 17 abstentions. The Assembly also decided, in Resolution 34/7 B, passed on the same day by 98 votes to 12 with seven abstentions, to appropriate $18,202,000 for the purpose of liquidating the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai with effect from July 25, 1979 [see pages 29955-56]. Albania, Iraq and Syria opposed both resolutions, while Cuba, Mongolia and the Warsaw Pact countries opposed 34/7 B and abstained on 34/7 C (except for Poland and Romania which voted in favour of both resolutions); China was in both cases among those absent for the vote.

For UNIFIL the Assembly similarly appropriated $44,756,800 for the period from June 19 to Oct. 31, 1979, and $16,275,200 for the period from Nov. 1 to Dec. 18, 1979, and authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments not exceeding $10,767,166 per month during the period from Dec. 19, 1979, to Dec. 18, 1980, should the Security Council decide to continue the force beyond Dec. 18, 1979. [For this decision see page 30098.] The resolution (34/9 B) was passed on Dec. 17 by 111 votes to 13 (Albania, Cuba, Iraq, Mongolia, Syria and the Warsaw Pact countries except Romania, which voted in favour) with two abstentions and with China again absent.

Kampuchea

The Assembly passed on Nov. 14 (by 91 votes to 21 with 29 abstentions) a resolution (34/22) "deeply regretting the armed intervention by outside forces in the internal affairs of Kampuchea", calling for an immediate end to all hostilities and "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces" and calling on all states to refrain from interference in, and acts of aggression against, Kampuchea and other states in South-East Asia. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to explore the possibility of holding an international conference on Kampuchea, and appealed for humanitarian relief and assistance to the civilian population of Kampuchea, including those who had sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

Those opposing the resolution were the member countries of the Warsaw Pact (except Romania which was absent) and Mongolia as well as 12 member countries of the non-aligned movement (Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Laos, Mozambique, Nicaragua, São Tomé and Príncipe, Vietnam and South Yemen). The resolution was supported by inter alia China, Western countries and Japan, the member countries of ASEAN, and 43 other non-aligned countries. [For resolution on Kampuchean representation at the General Assembly, see above.]

Cyprus

In Resolution 34/30, passed on Nov. 20 by 99 votes to five (including Turkey and Saudi Arabia) with 35 abstentions (including the Western countries except Greece, which voted in favour), the Assembly recalled its previous resolutions regarding Cyprus and reiterated the demand for the withdrawal of all foreign military presence from the island; it expressed deep concern over the prolongation of the crisis and the lack of progress in inter-communal talks, but called for the urgent resumption of the latter on the basis of the 10-point agreement of May 19, 1979 [see 29812 A]. The Assembly welcomed this agreement and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly by March 31, 1980, on the progress of further negotiations; in the event of his then being unable to report satisfactory progress, the Assembly authorized the appointment of an ad hoc committee of up to seven member states to facilitate the successful conclusion of the talks.

Southern Africa

As in previous years, the Assembly again passed a number of resolutions condemning not only "the colonial and racist regimes in southern Africa" but also "certain Western and other states" as well as multinational corporations for maintaining economic interests in southern Africa and collaborating with its regimes. [For resolution on Southern Rhodesia, see page 30177.]

Foreign Economic and Other Interests. In a resolution on the activities of foreign economic and other interests (34/41, passed on Nov. 21 by 88 votes to 15 with 33 abstentions) the Assembly condemned inter alia (i) South Africa's "continued exploitation and plundering of the natural resources of Namibia" and continued collaboration with "the illegal racist minority regime of Southern Rhodesia", (ii) the support for, and investment in, racist southern African regimes by foreign economic interests, in particular concerning uranium production in Namibia, and (iii) the collusion of France, West Germany, Israel and the United States with South Africa in the nuclear field. [See also above, under the heading "Disarmament", for Resolutions 34/76 A-B concerning South Africa's reported explosion of a nuclear device in September 1979.] This resolution, which recalled those passed in previous years [see page 29606], also demanded that all states should cease oil exports to South Africa, and commended the new Government of Iran for severing links with South Africa and implementing an oil embargo against that regime [pages 29740 and 30148]. In addition, the resolution condemned all violations of UN mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and especially the supply of petroleum to Southern Rhodesia by United Kingdom oil companies, and deplored "the complicity of successive Governments of the United Kingdom" in this connexion, as exposed in the Bingham Report [see pages 29440 and 30177]. Countries opposing the resolution were Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, with other Western countries and 15 African countries among those abstaining.

Namibia. The Assembly passed a series of resolutions (34/92 A-G) on Dec. 12 relating to Namibia (South West Africa). Resolutions 34/92 A-C, passed without opposition but with five, nine and seven abstentions respectively, decided inter alia on a programme of work for the UN Council for Namibia, on an increase in the latter's funding to finance the representation of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) at the United Nations in New York, and on the admission of Namibia (represented by the UN Council for Namibia) as a full member of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD—see 29887 A) and of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III—see 30062 B). Resolutions 34/92 D-E, adopted without a vote, provided inter alia for an allocation of $500,000 from the 1980 regular UN budget to the UN Fund for Namibia, the purpose of which included implementation of the UN Nationhood Programme for Namibia (established in 1976 under UN General Assembly Resolution 31/153). Resolutions 34/92 F-G, passed without opposition but with five and 17 abstentions respectively, reiterated strong condemnation of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, condemned the South African decision to annex Walvis Bay [see page 29462], and renewed the call for the UN Security Council to convene and to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa, in view of the latter's policies concerning Namibia. Those abstaining on Resolutions 34/92 A-C and F-G included on each occasion Canada, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States—i.e. the five members of the Western "contact group" [see page 29461]—together with other Western countries, Japan on one occasion, and Malawi on two occasions. The Assembly also decided on Dec. 20 to reappoint Mr Martti Ahtissaari (Finland) for a further one-year term (beginning on Jan. 1, 1980) as UN Commissioner for Namibia.

South Africa. In addition to reaffirming condemnation of the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa, the Assembly in a series of resolutions (34/93 A-Q) on Dec. 12 adopted without a vote a Declaration on South Africa (34/93 O), and decided inter alia to organize, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), an international conference on sanctions against South Africa (Resolution 34/93 C, opposed by seven Western countries, with other Western countries and Botswana, Guatemala, Honduras and Swaziland among 12 countries abstaining). The Assembly reiterated requests to the Security Council to take mandatory measures "to end all military and nuclear collaboration with the apartheid regime and all supplies of materials or technology to or from South Africa which may be used for military purposes or for the development of nuclear-weapon capability" [see also above] as well as to ensure full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa (this resolution, 34/93 D, being opposed by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with nine abstentions including seven other Western countries, the Central African Republic and Guatemala). The Assembly also called for Security Council consideration of a mandatory embargo on supplies of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa (34/93 F, opposed by seven Western countries, with 13 abstentions including Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland). A further resolution (34/93 R), passed on Dec. 17 with no opposition but with six abstentions (by Western countries), approved the programme of work of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, making a special annual allocation of $150,000 to the Committee from the UN 1980-81 budget for projects to promote international mobilization against apartheid.

The Declaration on South Africa stated inter alia that all states should recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial society; should recognize the right of the oppressed people of South Africa to choose their means of struggle; should solemnly pledge to refrain from overt or covert military intervention in support or defence of the Pretoria regime; should take firm action to prevent the recruitment, financing, training or passage of mercenaries in support of the apartheid regime of South Africa or the Bantustans created by it in South Africa; should take appropriate measures to discourage and counteract propaganda in favour of apartheid; should respect the desire of African states for the denuclearization of Africa and refrain from any co-operation with the South African regime in its plans to become a nuclear power; and should "demonstrate international solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa and with the independent African states subjected to threats or acts of aggression and subversion by the South African regime".

Decolonization

On the subject of dependent territories, and the objective of leading them to eventual independence, the Assembly again, as in previous years, approved a number of resolutions relating to specific territories.

New Hebrides. In Resolution 34/10, adopted without a vote on Nov. 2, the Assembly welcomed the joint commitment of the two administering powers (Britain and France) to bring the territory to independence by 1980 [see 29793 A], and noted their invitation to the UN Secretary-General to send a mission to observe forthcoming elections, in response to which Australia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Fiji were appointed to this mission.

Western Sahara. Reaffirming the "inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence", the Assembly in Resolution 34/37 on Nov. 21 described the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (the Polisario Front—see 29565 A; 29917 A) as "the representative of the people of Western Sahara" and recommended that it should participate fully in any search for a definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara. [For the Assembly's previous resolutions in December 1978, see 29565 A.] Noting with satisfaction the positions adopted on this question by the Organization of African Unity (at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State or Government in Monrovia in July—see 29840 A) and the non-aligned movement (at its sixth summit conference in Havana in September—see 30037 A), the Assembly welcomed the peace agreement concluded in August 1979 between Mauritania and the Polisario Front [see 29917 A], but deeply deplored "the continuing occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania" [ibid.] and urged Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate this occupation. The resolution was passed by 85 votes to six (Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Morocco and Saudi Arabia) with 41 abstentions (including Spain, the United States and the member countries of the European Community, as well as Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Tunisia and also Zaïre, which later informed the UN Secretariat that it had intended to vote against the resolution, as did Senegal which was absent for the vote).

Belize. With regard to Belize, Resolution 34/38, which referred also to the inviolability and territorial integrity of Belize, was passed on Nov. 21 by 134 votes to none with eight abstentions (Chile, El Salvador, Israel, Morocco, Paraguay, Spain, United States and Uruguay), and with Guatemala announcing that it was not participating in the vote.

East Timor. Resolution 34/40 on the question of East Timor, in addition to reaffirming the right of its people to self-determination and independence, also expressed deep concern at the suffering of the people as a result of the situation prevailing in the territory [see pages 29074-75], and called upon all parties concerned to facilitate the entry of international relief aid into East Timor. This resolution was passed (on Nov. 21) by 62 votes to 31 (including Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States) with 45 abstentions (including other Western countries but not Greece, Iceland, Portugal and Sweden which voted in favour).

Indian Ocean Islands. With regard to the islands of Glorieuses (Glorioso), Juan de Nova, Europa and Bassas da India, currently administered by France [see 29120 B], the Assembly noted the claim of Madagascar that these islands be reintegrated into its territory, requested the Government of France to repeal measures "which infringe the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Madagascar", and called on France to initiate negotiations with Madagascar on the reintegration of these islands. This resolution (34/91) was passed on Dec. 12 by 93 votes to seven (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Senegal, the United Kingdom and the United States) with 36 abstentions (including other Western countries).

Mayotte. The Assembly also reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Comoros over the island of Mayotte (currently administered by France —see 28204 A), in Resolution 34/69 passed on Dec. 6 by 112 votes (including Finland, Sweden and Turkey) to one (France) with 23 abstentions (mainly Western countries).

Other Territories. Other resolutions (adopted without a vote on Nov. 21) reaffirmed the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of the people of Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands (Resolution 34/34), of American Samoa [see 29288 A] (34/35), of the United States Virgin Islands (34/36) and of Guam (34/39).

Expansion of Special Committee. The Assembly also decided to expand the membership of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [originally set up in 1961—see page 18724 and also 24558 A]; with effect from Jan. 1, 1980, the committee's membership was increased from 24 to 25 by the appointment of Venezuela (in addition to which Denmark joined the committee to fill a vacancy caused by the withdrawal of Sweden—a member since 1977, see page 28839). Resolution 34/94 on implementation of the above-mentioned declaration, passed on Dec. 13 by 125 votes to seven (Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States) with seven abstentions (Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liberia—which later indicated that it had intended to vote in favour—Netherlands, New Zealand and Portugal), reaffirmed the Assembly's determination to take all necessary steps for the complete and speedy eradication of colonialism; this resolution, besides repeating condemnation of racist minority regimes in southern Africa and of all co-operation with such regimes, also included a call for "the colonial powers" immediately and unconditionally to withdraw their military bases and installations from colonial territories, and to refrain from establishing new ones.

Economic Matters

Resolutions on economic questions adopted by the Assembly included the following:

Multilateral Trade Negotiations. In its Resolution 34/199, passed on Dec. 19 by 112 votes to one (the United States) with 22 abstentions (Western countries excluding Turkey, together with Japan and Israel) the Assembly "noted with deep concern that developed countries which are contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] did not take fully into account in all areas of negotiations of the multilateral trade negotiations [MTNs] the interests and concerns of the developing countries, especially the least developed countries [LDCs]". [For "Tokyo Round" of MTNs concluded earlier in 1979, see 29781 A; 30109 A.] The resolution regretted in particular the "disappointing results" of negotiations on making the legal framework for international trade more responsive to developing country needs and aspirations; urged that negotiations on a safeguards code should be speedily concluded; and reiterated the need for systematic negotiations on eliminating quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff as well as tariff barriers against developing country exports, pending achievement of the objectives and commitments (notably regarding preferential treatment for developing countries) of the Tokyo Declaration of 1973 [see page 26395]. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to prepare a comprehensive report on the MTNs for submission to the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board at its forthcoming 20th session, for the purpose of undertaking a global evaluation of these negotiations and with a view to identifying possible courses of action for the attainment of the objectives pursued by developing countries.

(In its Decision 34/321 on Dec. 19 the Assembly confirmed the appointment of Mr Gamani Corea for a further three-year term as UNCTAD Secretary-General, with effect from April 1, 1980; Mr Corea had first been appointed effective April 1, 1974, in succession to Sr Manuel Perez-Guerrero.)

Least Developed Countries. Resolution 34/203 (adopted without a vote on Dec. 19), responding to the invitation by UNCTAD (see page 29891) that the Assembly should convene a UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, decided that this conference should be held in 1981 and that its objective should be to finalize, adopt and support the Programme of Action for the LDCs outlined in June 1979 at UNCTAD V [ibid.]. The Assembly also decided to designate as the preparatory committee for this conference the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group on the LDCs (which would for this purpose be open to all UNCTAD member countries), and requested the UN Secretary-General to designate Mr Corea as the secretary-general of the proposed conference. A further resolution (34/210, also adopted without a vote on the same day) endorsed the UNCTAD Programme of Action for the LDCs and called on donor countries urgently to implement aid commitments undertaken in this connexion (recommending in addition that official development assistance to the LDCs should be generally in grant form, with any loan elements offered on highly concessional terms).

Transport and Communications Decade in Africa. With regard to the Transport and Communications Decade in Africa (originally proclaimed for 1978-88 by the UN General Assembly on Dec. 19, 1977 in Resolution 32/160), the Assembly requested (in Resolution 34/15, adopted without a vote on Nov. 9) that the UN Secretary-General should proceed with organizing a pledging conference of donors "as soon as possible" to mobilize resources, and that he should report on the outcome of this pledging conference at the second 1980 regular session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). (In Resolution 33/197 adopted on Jan. 29, 1979, the General Assembly had called for the convening of a pledging conference in the first half of 1979.) It was noted in this connexion that a Conference of African Ministers of Transport, Communications and Planning, held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in May 1979, had approved a programme for the first phase of the decade (now scheduled for 1980-83), the cost of which was estimated at $8,000 million.

Disaster Relief and Development Assistance. A number of resolutions, adopted without a vote, called for international assistance for, respectively, the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of Nicaragua (34/8), Uganda (34/122) and Equatorial Guinea (34/123), the reconstruction and development of Lebanon (34/135), the recovery and rehabilitation programme and the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification in the Sudano-Sahelian region (34/16 and 34/187), rehabilitation, reconstruction and development following hurricanes "David" and "Frederic" in the Dominican Republic (34/18) and in Dominica (34/19), assistance to drought-stricken areas of Ethiopia (34/54) and measures following the earthquake in Montenegro, Yugoslavia (34/56). Other resolutions also adopted without a vote called for assistance to Grenada, Cape Verde, Chad and Guinea-Bissau (34/118-34/121), to Djibouti, Botswana, Seychelles, Comoros, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Tonga (34/124-132) and to Antigua, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St Lucia and St Vincent (34/194). Resolution 34/133, on assistance to the Palestinian people, was passed on Dec. 14 by 112 votes to three (Canada, Israel and the United States) with 21 abstentions (most Western countries and Burma, Guatemala, Honduras and Nepal).

In the context of the resolutions on Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Djibouti, São Tomé and Príncipe and Tonga, the Economic and Social Council was invited to request the Committee for Development Planning (CDP) to give consideration to these countries' inclusion in the list of LDCs in the Third UN Development Decade [see below]. For existing list of LDCs, see page 29051; in 1978 the CDP had recommended that the list be "frozen" until the end of the Second UN Development Decade [see page 29608]. For UNCTAD recommendation that Djibouti and Tonga be included in the LDC list, see page 29891. In view of Mozambique's difficult economic situation, states were requested to grant that country the same treatment as was enjoyed by LDCs.

Special Session of the General Assembly on Development. In Resolution 34/207, adopted without a vote on Dec. 19, the Assembly reaffirmed its decision (in Resolution 32/174 of Dec. 19, 1977—see page 28842) to hold a special session of the Assembly in 1980, and reaffirmed that the special session would "take appropriate action for the promotion of the development of developing countries and international economic co-operation, including inter alia for the adoption of the new international development strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade [see below] and for the launching of global negotiations relating to international economic co-operation for development''. The Assembly decided to hold the special session at a high political level in August-September 1980, and subsequently (in Decision 34/448, adopted without objection on the same day) decided to set the dates Aug. 25 to Sept. 25, 1980, for the session and, if necessary, to extend the session for a few days.

Third UN Development Decade. In Resolution 34/211 adopted on Dec. 19 by 118 votes to six with 16 abstentions, the Assembly recalled its Resolution 33/193 of Jan. 29, 1979, on preparations for an international development strategy for the Third UN Development Decade, and referred to the preparatory committee set up under that resolution consideration of all aspects of the proposal presented in this connexion to the General Assembly at its 34th session concerning the transfer to developing countries of an additional amount of $300,000 million in the form of financial resources, material resources and technical assistance during the 1980s as a contribution to development, of which yearly commitments of at least $25,000 million should be made during the early years of the Third UN Development Decade. (For launching of Second UN Development Decade, 1971-80, see pages 24418-19.) The six countries voting against this resolution were Belgium, France, West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States; those abstaining were other Western industrialized countries and Israel, while the Netherlands and Turkey were among those voting for the resolution.

Human Rights

The Assembly again adopted a number of resolutions on human rights questions.

Chile. In its Resolution 34/179 (passed on Dec. 17 by 96 votes to six with 33 abstentions), the Assembly (i) regretted that the Chilean authorities had refused to co-operate with a special rapporteur and experts, appointed by the UN Human Rights Commission in March 1979 to report on human rights and missing persons in Chile, (ii) noted that the rapporteur and experts had found no improvement (and even a deterioration in a number of areas), (iii) urged continuing close attention by the Human Rights Commission to the situation in Chile, and (iv) called on the Chilean authorities to co-operate with the Commission. The resolution, which also urged the Chilean authorities to respect and promote human rights (including, inter alia, by ceasing the state of emergency), to clarify the fate of missing persons and to punish those found responsible for their unlawful disappearance, was opposed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Lebanon, Paraguay and Uruguay; those voting in favour included the Western countries and the Warsaw Pact countries, while Israel and Japan were among those abstaining. [For earlier reports on Chile by the ad hoc working group of the UN Human Rights Commission, see 29601 A; 28803 A; and page 28274.]

Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The Assembly on Dec. 18 passed Resolution 34/180 (by 130 votes to none, with 10 abstentions—Bangladesh, Brazil, Comoros, Haiti, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Senegal) adopting and opening for signature, ratification and accession a Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, under which states parties would commit themselves to measures to eliminate political, social, economic, legal and cultural discrimination against women. The Convention would enter into force following ratification or accession by 20 states; a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women would then be set up, its members being elected by states parties, to monitor progress in implementing the Convention.

Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. The Assembly adopted without a vote on Dec. 17 a resolution (34/169) establishing a code of conduct for law enforcement officials, which provided inter alia that such officials should respect and protect human dignity and human rights, and should use force only when strictly necessary. The code also stated that law enforcement officials should not commit any act of corruption, nor ''inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'', nor might they invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances as a justification for so doing.

International Youth Year. The Assembly decided (in Resolution 34/151, adopted without a vote on Dec. 17) to designate 1985 as ''International Youth Year: Participation, Development, Peace'', and to establish an advisory committee of 23 member states which would meet three times in the period 1980-1985 to formulate a programme for the Year; the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to convene the first session of this committee in 1980, and to submit the report of the session to the General Assembly at its 35th (1980) regular session.

Miscellaneous Resolutions

Among resolutions passed by the Assembly on other matters were the following:

Outer Space. The Assembly adopted without a vote on Dec. 5 two resolutions (34/66 and 34/67) endorsing recommendations made by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, including inter alia a proposal to hold a second UN conference on outer space in the latter half of 1982. A third resolution (34/68, also adopted without a vote on the same day) commended the Committee's work in completing during 1979 a draft Agreement governing the activities of states on the moon and other celestial bodies. The Agreement, which was opened for signature and ratification and which required ratification by five states before it would become effective, affirmed that the moon and its natural resources were the common heritage of mankind, and that use of the moon should be exclusively for peaceful purposes. [For text of this Agreement, see 30226 A.]

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. The Assembly adopted (in Resolution 34/146, passed by consensus on Dec. 17) an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages as prepared by the ad hoc committee set up in December 1976 (pursuant to Resolution 31/103—see page 28251). This convention, which was opened for signature and ratification (and which required ratification by 22 states before it would become effective), covered inter alia the definition of the offence of hostage-taking, the requirement that states should make this a punishable offence, and procedures for extradition where relevant. Under Article 9, states should not grant requests for extradition if there were ''substantial grounds for believing'' that the alleged offender would be punished ''on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion''; the inclusion of this Article was reportedly opposed by the Soviet Union but approved by 125 votes to 10 with three abstentions (Botswana, Cuba and Romania).

University for Peace. A proposal submitted to the Assembly the previous year by Costa Rica, envisaging the establishment in Costa Rica of a University for Peace within the UN University system, was approved by the Assembly on Dec. 14 (in Resolution 34/111, adopted without a vote) following the Secretary-General's report that his consultations with governments and UN bodies had shown general support for the idea. The Assembly decided to establish an 11-member Commission on the University for Peace, to prepare the organization and structure of this proposed new institution, which was to be international in character and financed by voluntary contributions, and which would be designed to avoid duplication of efforts with other similar international institutions.

Energy. Having previously resolved that an international conference on new and renewable energy sources should be convened in 1981 (Resolution 33/148 of Dec. 20, 1978—see page 29608), the Assembly decided (in Resolution 34/190, adopted without a vote on Dec. 18) to hold this conference in August 1981 in Nairobi, and also (i) to designate the Committee for Natural Resources as the preparatory committee for the conference and (ii) to open the committee's membership to all states for this purpose; two meetings of the committee should be held during 1980.

Budgetary Decisions

In its Resolution 34/6A, passed on Oct. 25 by 111 votes to four (Iceland, Iran, Iraq and Syria) with 12 abstentions (Australia, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Libya, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Venezuela), the Assembly established a new scale of assessments for the contributions of member states to the UN budget in the financial years 1980, 1981 and 1982.

The percentage quotas ranged from a minimum of 0.01 (applicable to 69 member states) to 25 for the United States, with 17 other countries liable to contribute percentages of 1.0 or more—Australia 1.83, Belgium 1.22, Brazil 1.27, Canada 3.28, China 1.62, France 6.26, East Germany 1.39, West Germany 8.31, Italy 3.45, Japan 9.58, the Netherlands 1.63, Poland 1.24, the Soviet Union 11.10, Spain 1.70, Sweden 1.31, the Ukraine 1.46 and the United Kingdom 4.46. The new quotas represented increases for 39 countries (notably including Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, West Germany, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands and Saudi Arabia) and decreases for 15 countries (notably including China, whose quota was reduced from 5.5 to 1.62 per cent, and the Soviet Union). [For assessments covering the 1978 and 1979 financial years, see page 28843.]

The Assembly voted on Dec. 20 to appropriate $1,247,793,200 for the UN programme budget for the 1980-81 biennium, the resolution (34/230 A) being passed by 119 votes to nine (Mongolia and the Warsaw Pact countries except for Romania, which was among nine countries abstaining, the others being China, France, West Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States). On the same day the budget for the previous biennium (i.e. the 1978-79 appropriation of $1,090,113,500, as appoved in Resolution 33/205 A on Jan. 29, 1979—see pages 28843-44) was decreased by $5,927,300, the resolution (34/223 A) being passed by 116 votes to nine (the opponents being as for 34/230 A above) with 11 abstentions (including Romania, the United States, and Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) while China was absent for the vote. (UN Department of Public Information, New York - UN Information Centre, London - International Herald Tribune - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Cape Times - Review of International Affairs, Belgrade - US International Communication Agency - Beijing Review - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London) (*Prev. rep. UN General Assembly, 33rd Session, Resolutions 29605 A; Resumed Session pages 29776-77; 34th Session, Opening 29998 A; Elections of Non-Permanent Members of Security Council and of Members of Economic and Social Council 30186 A*)

A. UNITED NATIONS — Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies - Opening for Signature

The United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 5, 1979, in Resolution 34/68 [see page 30225], commended and requested the UN Secretary-General to open for signature and ratification an Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote.

The General Assembly had on Nov. 29, 1971, in Resolution 2779 (XXVI) requested the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its legal subcommittee to consider the question of the elaboration of a draft international treaty concerning the moon, and in each of the following years resolutions had been adopted encouraging the elaboration of such a draft treaty.

The 1979 Agreement declared in particular that all activities on the moon should be carried out in accordance with international law, that the moon and its natural resources were the common heritage of mankind and that there should be freedom of scientific investigation on the moon, and provided that states which were party to the Agreement would establish an "international regime" to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation was about to become feasible.

The Agreement comprised a Preamble and 21 Articles, the text of which is given below.

"The states parties to this Agreement,

"Noting the achievements of states in the exploration and use of the moon and other celestial bodies,

"Recognizing that the moon, as a natural satellite of the earth, has an important role to play in the exploration of outer space,

"Determined to promote on the basis of equality the further development of co-operation among states in the exploration and use of the moon and other celestial bodies,

"Desiring to prevent the moon from becoming an area of international conflict,

"Bearing in mind the benefits which may be derived from the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies,

"Recalling the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [of 1966—see 21791 A; 22360 A], the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space [of 1967—see 22539 A; 23192 A], the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects [of 1971—see 25192 A], and the Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space [of 1974—see page 26949],

"Taking into account the need to define and develop the provisions of these international instruments in relation to the moon and other celestial bodies, having regard to further progress in the exploration and use of outer space,

"Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

"(1) The provisions of this Agreement relating to the moon shall also apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the earth, except in so far as specific legal norms enter into force with respect to any of these celestial bodies.

"(2) For the purposes of this Agreement reference to the moon shall include orbits around or other trajectories to or around it.

"(3) This Agreement does not apply to extraterrestrial materials which reach the surface of the earth by natural means.

Article 2

"All activities on the moon, including its exploration and use, shall be carried out in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, and taking into account the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on Oct. 24, 1970, in the interests of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding, and with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other states parties. [For the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law, see page 24418.]

Article 3

"(1) The moon shall be used by all states parties exclusively for peaceful purposes.

"(2) Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the moon in order to commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made space objects.

"(3) States parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the moon.

"(4) The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on the moon shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration and use of the moon shall also not be prohibited.

Article 4

"(1) The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be paid to the interests of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

"(2) States parties shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance in all their activities concerning the exploration and use of the moon. International co-operation in pursuance of this Agreement should be as wide as possible and may take place on a multilateral basis, on a bilateral basis or through international intergovernmental organizations.

Article 5

"(1) States parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of their activities concerned with the exploration and use of the moon. Information on the time, purposes, locations, orbital parameters and duration shall be given in respect of each mission to the moon as soon as possible after launching, while information on the results of each mission, including scientific results, shall be furnished upon completion of the mission. In the case of a mission lasting more than 60 days, information on conduct of the mission, including any scientific results, shall be given periodically at 30-day intervals. For missions lasting more than six months, only significant additions to such information need be reported thereafter.

"(2) If a state party becomes aware that another state party plans to operate simultaneously in the same area of or in the same orbit around or trajectory to or around the moon, it shall promptly inform the other state of the timing of and plans for its own operations.

"(3) In carrying out activities under this Agreement, states parties shall promptly inform the Secretary-General, as well as the public and the international scientific community, of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon, which could endanger human life or health, as well as of any indication of organic life.

Article 6

"(1) There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the moon by all states parties without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law.

"(2) In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the provisions of this Agreement, the states parties shall have the right to collect on and remove from the moon samples of its mineral and other substances. Such samples shall remain at the disposal of those states parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by them for scientific purposes. States parties shall have regard to the desirability of making a portion of such samples available to other interested states parties and the international scientific community for scientific investigation. States parties may in the course of scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances of the moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions.

"(3) States parties agree on the desirability of exchanging scientific and other personnel on expeditions to or installations on the moon to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.

Article 7

"(1) In exploring and using the moon, states parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. States parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the environment of the earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial matter or otherwise.

"(2) States parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the measures being adopted by them in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article and shall also, to the maximum extent feasible, notify him in advance of all placements by them of radioactive materials on the moon and of the purposes of such placements.

"(3) States parties shall report to other states parties and to the Secretary-General concerning areas of the moon having special scientific interest in order that, without prejudice to the rights of other states parties, consideration may be given to the designation of such areas as international scientific preserves for which special protective arrangements are to be agreed upon in consultation with the competent bodies of the United Nations.

Article 8

"(1) States parties may pursue their activities in the exploration and use of the moon anywhere on or below its surface, subject to the provisions of this Agreement.

"(2) For these purposes states parties may, in particular:

"(*a*) Land their space objects on the moon and launch them from the moon;

"(*b*) Place their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations anywhere on or below the surface of the moon.

"Personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations may move or be moved freely over or below the surface of the moon.

"(3) Activities of states parties in accordance with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not interfere with the activities of other states parties on the moon. Where such interference may occur, the states parties concerned shall undertake consultations in accordance with Article 15, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Agreement.

Article 9

"(1) States parties may establish manned and unmanned stations on the moon. A state party establishing a station shall use only that area which is required for the needs of the station and shall immediately inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the location and purposes of that station. Subsequently, at annual intervals that state shall likewise inform the Secretary-General whether the station continues in use and whether its purposes have changed.

"(2) Stations shall be installed in such a manner that they do not impede the free access to all areas of the moon by personnel, vehicles and equipment of other states parties conducting activities on the moon in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement or of Article 1 of the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

Article 10

"(1) States parties shall adopt all practicable measures to safeguard the life and health of persons on the moon. For this purpose they shall regard any person on the moon as an astronaut within the meaning of Article V of the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and as part of the personnel of a spacecraft within the meaning of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space.

"(2) States parties shall offer shelter in their stations, installations, vehicles and other facilities to persons in distress on the moon.

Article 11

"(1) The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement, in particular in Paragraph 5 of this Article.

"(2) The moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

"(3) Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any state, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person. The placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the surface of the moon, including structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the moon or any areas thereof. The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the international regime referred to in Paragraph 5 of this Article.

"(4) States parties have the right to exploration and use of the moon without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law and the provisions of this Agreement.

"(5) States parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible. This provision shall be implemented in accordance with Article 18 of this Agreement.

"(6) In order to facilitate the establishment of the international regime referred to in Paragraph 5 of this Article, states parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of any natural resources they may discover on the moon.

"(7) The main purposes of the international regime to be established shall include:

"(*a*) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the moon;

"(*b*) The rational management of those resources;

"(*c*) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;

"(*d*) An equitable sharing by all states parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given special consideration.

"(8) All the activities with respect to the natural resources of the moon shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the purposes specified in Paragraph 7 of this Article and the provisions of Article 6, Paragraph 2, of this Agreement.

Article 12

"(1) States parties shall retain jurisdiction and control over their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on the moon. The ownership of space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations shall not be affected by their presence on the moon.

"(2) Vehicles, installations and equipment or their component parts found in places other than their intended location shall be dealt with in accordance with Article 5 of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space.

"(3) In the event of an emergency involving a threat to human life, states parties may use the equipment, vehicles, installations, facilities or supplies of other states parties on the moon. Prompt notification of such use shall be made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the state party concerned.

Article 13

"A state party which learns of the crash-landing, forced landing or other unintended landing on the moon of a space object, or its component parts, that were not launched by it, shall promptly inform the launching state party and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 14

"(1) States parties to this Agreement shall bear international responsibility for national activities on the moon, whether such activities are carried out by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in this Agreement. States parties shall ensure that non-governmental entities under their jurisdiction shall engage in activities on the moon only under the authority and continuing supervision of the appropriate state party.

"(2) States parties recognize that detailed arrangements concerning liability for damage caused on the moon, in addition to the provisions of the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, may become necessary as a result of more extensive activities on the moon. Any such arrangements shall be elaborated in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 18 of this Agreement.

Article 15

"(1) Each state party may assure itself that the activities of other states parties in the exploration and use of the moon are compatible with the provisions of this Agreement. To this end, all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on the moon shall be open to other states parties. Such states parties shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited. In pursuance of this Article, any state party may act on its own behalf or with the full or partial assistance of any other state party or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter.

"(2) A state party which has reason to believe that another state party is not fulfilling the obligations incumbent upon it pursuant to this Agreement or that another state party is interfering with the rights which the former state has under this Agreement may request consultations with that state party. A state party receiving such a request shall enter into such consultations without delay. Any other state party which requests to do so shall be entitled to take part in the consultations. Each state party participating in such consultations shall seek a mutually acceptable resolution of any controversy and shall bear in mind the rights and interests of all states parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be informed of the results of the consultations and shall transmit the information received to all states parties concerned.

"(3) If the consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable settlement which has due regard for the rights and interests of all states parties, the parties concerned shall take all measures to settle the dispute by other peaceful means of their choice appropriate to the circumstances and the nature of the dispute. If difficulties arise in connexion with the opening of consultations or if consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable settlement, any state party may seek the assistance of the Secretary-General, without seeking the consent of any other state party concerned, in order to resolve the controversy. A state party which does not maintain diplomatic relations with another state party concerned shall participate in such consultations, at its choice, either itself or through another state party or the Secretary-General as intermediary.

Article 16

"With the exception of Articles 17 to 21, references in this Agreement to states shall be deemed to apply to any international intergovernmental organization which conducts space activities if the organization declares its acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in this Agreement and if a majority of the states members of the organization are states parties to this Agreement and to the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. States members of any such organization which are states parties to this Agreement shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the organization makes a declaration in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Article 17

"Any state party to this Agreement may propose amendments to the Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force for each state party to the Agreement accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the states parties to the Agreement and thereafter for each remaining state party to the Agreement on the date of acceptance by it.

Article 18

"Ten years after the entry into force of this Agreement, the question of the review of the Agreement shall be included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations in order to consider, in the light of past application of the Agreement, whether it requires revision. However, at any time after the Agreement has been in force for five years, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depository, shall, at the request of one-third of the states parties to the Agreement and with the concurrence of the majority of the states parties, convene a conference of the states parties to review this Agreement. A review conference shall also consider the question of the implementation of the provisions of Article 11, Paragraph 5, on the basis of the principle referred to in Paragraph 1 of that Article and taking into account in particular any relevant technological developments.

Article 19

"(1) This Agreement shall be open for signature by all states at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

"(2) This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. Any state which does not sign this Agreement before its entry into force in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"(3) This Agreement shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification.

"(4) For each state depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of any such instrument.

"(5) The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this Agreement, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

Article 20

"Any state party to this Agreement may give notice of its withdrawal from the Agreement one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

Article 21

"The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all signatory and acceding states."

The Agreement was opened for signature in New York on Dec. 18, 1979, and as stated in Article 19 would require ratification by five signatories to enter into force.—(UN Office of Public Information, New York) (*Prev. rep. page 30225; Lunar Research pages 28986, 28030-31, 25685 A; Outer Space Treaties, Agreements and Conventions 21791 A, 22539 A, 25192 A, page 26949*)

A. AUSTRALIA — Western Australia State Election - Liberal-National Country Party Government returned with Reduced Majority

The Liberal-National Country Party Government of Sir Charles Court, which had been first elected in March 1974 [see 26491 A], was returned for its third consecutive term of office with a reduced majority in the state election held on Feb. 23. The result was as follows (state of parties in the Legislative Assembly after the previous election in February 1977 in parentheses): Liberal-National Country Party coalition 29 (33); Australian Labour Party 23 (22); National Party 3 (0). The number of Assembly seats had been increased from 51 to 55 following the 1974 election. The National Party split from the National Country Party in October 1978.—(Australian Information Service - Agent-General for Western Australia, London) (*Prev. rep. 1974 Election 26491 A*)

B. OMAN — Cabinet Change

In accordance with a decision of Sultan Qaboos bin Said announced on Dec. 14, 1979, decrees were issued providing for (i) the abolition of the Ministry of Environmental Affairs (created in May 1979—see 29804 A) and (ii) the re-creation of the Ministry of Public Works (whose status had been reduced in June 1978 to that of a directorate-general—see 29109 B); the new portfolio was allocated to Dr Asim Al-Jamali, hitherto Minister of Environmental Affairs.

At the same time the formation was announced of the Council for the Protection of the Environment and the Eradication of Pollution under the chairmanship of Sultan Qaboos, the function of which was to "protect the environment and eradicate all forms of pollution".—(BBC Summary of World Affairs) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 29804 A, 29109 B*)

C. MALAWI — Cabinet Changes

President Hastings Kamuzu Banda announced in Lilongwe on Jan. 1, 1980, that Mr John Twaibu Sangala, the Minister of Local Government [see 30014 C], had been given the additional portfolio of Community Development. Further changes were announced on Feb. 29, as follows (with any previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

Mr Dun Chiphwanya	Youth and Culture
Mr Chaziya Phiri	Health
Mr Lewis Chimango (Health) . .	Finance
Mr Edward Bwinali (Finance) . .	Minister for the Southern Region

Mr Bwinali also became the southern regional chairman of the ruling Malawi Congress Party.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 30014 C, 29849 C*)

University of North Carolina

A. AFGHANISTAN — Entry of Soviet Troops - Overthrow of President Amin - Installation of Karmal Regime - Deployment of Soviet Troops throughout Country - The Internal and Military Situation - International Reactions - Imposition of Sanctions by United States and Other Countries - Moves to boycott Moscow Olympics

A new Soviet-backed regime was installed in Afghanistan at the end of December 1979 under Mr Babrak Karmal, a former Deputy Prime Minister, who was flown into Kabul on a Soviet aircraft from virtual exile in Eastern Europe to replace President Hafizullah Amin, who had himself taken power only in September 1979 [see 30031 A]. The change of regime—details of the course of which remained somewhat obscure—was accompanied by the entry into Afghanistan of several thousand Soviet combat troops, whose numbers had risen by the end of January 1980 to an estimated 85,000 and who were deployed throughout the country with hundreds of tanks, giving rise to fears for the security of Pakistan and Iran (respectively Afghanistan's eastern and western neighbours).

Internationally, the Soviet move was strongly deplored as an invasion of a sovereign country, but the Soviet Union maintained that the Afghan Government had invited it to send troops under a 1978 treaty of friendship in the face of provocation from Afghanistan's external enemies. One of the immediate reasons for the introduction of troops appeared to be to provide military support to the Afghan armed forces currently engaged against diverse Moslem insurgent groups which were opposed to the communist orientation of recent Afghan governments [see 29641 A; 29878 A; 30031 A] and which subsequently called for a holy war (*jihad*) to expel the Soviet troops from the country.

In Afghanistan, more than 90 per cent of the population of 15,500,000 are Moslems, the vast majority being Sunni Moslems, although there are some Shia (Shi'ite) Moslems among the Persian-speaking Hazaras and in the western city of Herat as well as in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan.

The Soviet invasion occurred at a time of instability in the region caused largely by events in Iran, where the attention of the United States was concentrated on securing the release of some 50 American citizens held hostage in the US embassy in Tehran [see 30205 A]. Internationally, relations between the Soviet Union and the West had worsened over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision to station new medium-range nuclear weapons in European countries [see 30159 A]. Following the events in Afghanistan, and the subsequent exiling within the USSR of the leading Soviet dissident and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Dr Andrei Sakharov [see 30243 B], serious concern was expressed in the West that the process of détente had been irretrievably damaged.

In response to the Soviet action the United States not only deferred consideration of the Senate ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty signed in Vienna in June 1979 (SALT II—see 30117 A) but also imposed and sought international support for a series of sanctions against the USSR, including a grain embargo. Furthermore, the USA was at the forefront of an initiative to boycott, cancel or move to another venue the Olympic Games which were due to take place in Moscow in June 1980.

These and related developments concerning the Afghan crisis are described below.

Airlift of Soviet Troops into Afghanistan - Overthrow of President Amin

In a massive airlift on Dec. 25-26, An-22 and An-12 transport aircraft brought into Kabul an estimated 4,000-5,000 Soviet combat troops and their equipment. The presence of five Soviet army divisions (which at full strength would number 50,000 men) was also reported along the Soviet-Afghan frontier.

Following immediately upon the airlift, a Kabul radio report monitored by the Iranian news agency Pars on Dec. 27 at 7.45 p.m. local time said that the "tyrannical, murderous, treacherous, dictatorial and fascist" regime of President Amin had been overthrown by Mr Babrak Karmal; this report was confirmed the same night by Moscow radio, which carried a speech by Mr Karmal denouncing Mr Amin as the head of a "bloody dynasty" and an "agent of US imperialism".

The following statement from the Government of Afghanistan (as reported by the Soviet news agency Tass) was broadcast on Dec. 28:

> "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, taking into account the continuing and broadening interference and provocations of external enemies of Afghanistan, and with a view to defending the gains of the April revolution [of 1978, which brought to power the left-wing Government of Mr Nur Mohammed Taraki—see 29037 A], territorial integrity and national independence, and maintaining peace and security, proceeding from the treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and co-operation of Dec. 5, 1978 [see 29459 A; 29641 A], has approached the USSR with the insistent request to give urgent political, moral and economic aid, including military aid, which the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan repeatedly requested from the Government of the Soviet Union previously. The Government of the Soviet Union has met the request of the Afghan side."

Another government statement broadcast on Dec. 31 maintained that the "anti-Afghan campaign" had been led by the USA, which had "taken a hostile attitude towards the April revolution and was now striving to divert world attention from its aggressive action towards Iran". As soon as "armed incursions and provocations from outside" ceased, there would be no more need for the aid which was being given, but in the meantime the Government was invoking the treaty of friendship and the UN Charter to underline the right of a sovereign country to self-defence.

Although the Soviet Communist Party organ *Pravda* referred on Dec. 30 to the "limited military contingent" in Afghanistan, which would be "fully recalled" as soon as its mission was completed, Western observers estimated that by early January 1980 some 50,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks had been sent into Afghanistan, either by airlift or across the Amu Darya river (Oxus) at Shir Khan Bandar/Qizil Qala and then via Kunduz through the Salang Pass and road tunnel [see 20454 D].

Fighting involving Soviet troops and tanks was reported in the capital on Dec. 27 and a curfew was imposed, telecommunications links were cut and Kabul airport was closed to international traffic. Refugees arriving in Pakistan claimed that over 3,000 Afghans had died in 48 hours of fighting between Afghan soldiers and Soviet troops, but Kabul radio said on Dec. 29 that there was complete calm in the country and that the Army was in control of the situation.

The groundwork for the introduction of combat troops into Afghanistan was believed to have been laid by a Soviet Deputy Defence Minister, Gen. Ivan G. Pavlovsky, during a lengthy stay in Afghanistan in August-October 1979 (in the course of which President Taraki was overthrown by Mr Amin—see 30031 A). During this visit Gen. Pavlovsky was thought to have made a pessimistic assessment of the military position of the regime vis-à-vis the activities of anti-government insurgents.

The United States, which claimed to have foreseen a large-scale Soviet intervention as early as October 1979, noted that the first real increase in Soviet troop activity occurred on Dec. 8-9. On this date a special brigade of Soviet airborne troops arrived at Bagram air base (north of Kabul), from where it moved out on Dec. 20 with tanks and armoured carriers to clear rebels from the Salang Pass (over which large contingents of Soviet ground forces later entered the country—see above).

Having already protested to the USSR on Dec. 4 that Soviet advisers (hitherto estimated to number about 1,500) had "increased their role in support of the Afghan military, especially in the area of command and control functions", the USA issued a further protest on Dec. 14 at the recent entry into Afghanistan in An-22 aircraft of 400-800 combat troops, and on Dec. 18 it expressed renewed concern at the continuing Soviet military build-up. On Dec. 21 the US Administration disclosed that the USSR had moved three army divisions to the Afghan border and claimed that at least 1,500 Soviet soldiers had entered the country in the past few weeks; the preparations showed, it said, "all the marks of a major military intervention" and were similar to those observed prior to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Soviet military build-up coincided with reports from Kabul in early December 1979 of a sharp increase in Soviet support operations against the internal Afghan insurgency. Soviet-piloted MiG aircraft and helicopter gunships were believed to have bombed rebel-held villages in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan after the rebels seized townships including Faizabad, the provincial capital. At the same time the Pakistani press reported that the Russians had captured Khanabad and Ishkashim (both in the north-east) after clashing with rebels, and claimed that 900 people had been killed or wounded.

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Following the Dec. 25-26 airlift the USA issued a strong protest to the Soviet Union on Dec. 26 at its "blatant military interference in the internal affairs of an independent sovereign state" and accused it of crossing a "new threshold" in military deployments and of causing a threat to a region of great instability.

The deposed President Amin was reported to have been executed immediately after the coup on Dec. 27 (some sources claiming that he was already dead by the time the coup was announced) together with members of his family including his brother, Mr Abdullah Amin (who as Chief of Intelligence headed the secret police—see page 30031); those executed were said to have been found guilty by a revolutionary tribunal of crimes against the Afghan people. However, there were conflicting reports of the events leading up to the coup and of Mr Amin's fate.

According to a report in *The Observer* of London on Feb. 17 attributed to "informed Russian sources in Moscow", Mr Amin was not executed but was killed by mistake. This account claimed that not only President Amin but also his predecessor, Mr Taraki, had brutally suppressed opposition to the Government and that both had requested Soviet assistance. Mr Amin's early requests had, it said, been turned down because of the prevailing international situation (particularly the then impending ratification of the SALT II treaty and the forthcoming decision by NATO on the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe), but a decision to intervene was finally taken by the USSR in early December at an enlarged Politburo meeting; the report maintained that one motive of the intervention was to improve the USSR's strategic position vis-à-vis China (which was reported to have missile sites near the Afghan border).

The report claimed that the Soviet Union envisaged the holding of elections after the intervention, the election of Mr Babrak Karmal to the presidency and the maintenance of Mr Amin in a lesser government position to legitimize the new regime. Apparently for his own safety, Mr Amin moved to the Darulaman Palace outside Kabul prior to the Soviet intervention, where he was guarded by Afghan soldiers and Soviet military advisers under the supervision of the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Lt.-Gen. Victor Paputin. On the arrival of Soviet troops on Dec. 27, however, fighting broke out in the palace during which, the report said, Mr Amin was killed but not at Soviet hands. In view of the embarrassment caused to the Soviet Union by the ensuing vacuum of power before the arrival of Mr Karmal in Kabul, Lt.-Gen. Paputin was recalled to Moscow but committed suicide on his arrival. (*Pravda* reported his "untimely death" on Jan. 3 without disclosing the circumstances. Mr Yuri Churbanov, the son-in-law of President Brezhnev, was appointed in March to replace him.)

The *Observer* report conflicted with other assessments in the Western press of events surrounding the coup, many of which indicated that the USSR had been taken by surprise when Mr Amin overthrew President Taraki in September 1979, that Mr Amin had been unpopular with the Soviet Union because of his policies, and that he had rejected Soviet proposals for the introduction of combat forces to assist the Afghan Army in suppressing Moslem rebel activity.

According to Soviet reports and accounts by political prisoners who were released by the Karmal Government, as quoted in Kabul's official newspapers towards the end of January, Mr Amin had planned a bloodbath for Dec. 29 in which many prisoners were to have been executed, including President Taraki's widow, Mrs Nurbibi Taraki. East European sources claimed that Mr Amin had planned for the same date an assault on the Soviet embassy compound in Kabul in which diplomats and their families were to have been killed, the intention then being to ask for US assistance to counter the expected Soviet retaliation.

The Pakistani Urdu-language daily *Morninger* claimed that Mr Amin had been the target of two assassination attempts in December 1979—the first on Dec. 3 at the presidential palace, in which it said 200 people had been killed and Mr Amin and his brother wounded, and the second on Dec. 19, after which he had moved to the Darulaman Palace.

Furthermore, it was reported after the latest coup that President Taraki had been smothered to death with a pillow on Oct. 8, 1979, after his overthrow and thus had not, as previously claimed, died of illness or in a shooting incident [see 30031 A].

Tass stated on Jan. 14 that investigations since the Karmal coup into President Taraki's death had shown that he was killed by Capt. Abdul Khadud (the former chief of communications in the Defence Ministry) and Lt.-Col. Mohammad Eqbal (commander of a guard unit at the presidential palace), together with a third man who escaped. The assassination was carried out, according to Capt. Khadud, on the orders of Mr Amin while ex-President Taraki was under house arrest following the September coup, and the body had been buried secretly.

Statements on New Government's Policy by Mr Karmal - Announcement of Appointments to Revolutionary Council, Cabinet and Party Bodies

In his first speech broadcast on Dec. 27 in the name of the central committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA or *Khalq* party), the Revolutionary Council and the Government of Afghanistan Mr Karmal undertook to release all political prisoners [see below], to respect the Islamic faith, to halt arbitrary arrests and to allow free political parties and a free press. He also said that Afghanistan would continue to follow a non-aligned foreign policy and would settle its differences with Pakistan [see page 29880].

Tass also quoted Mr Karmal as promising a political solution to the Moslem insurgency and the formation of a "broad front of all national and democratic forces under the PDPA"; he was further reported to have said that if "truly revolutionary and patriotic forces" had not taken an initiative, Afghanistan would have turned into "a slaughterhouse for millions of people" and that national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity would have been gravely imperilled. The new Revolutionary Council had to strengthen and develop progressive social and political foundations for the country, but the Government's immediate objective was not the "introduction of socialism".

Mr Karmal on Dec. 27 named the Presidium of the (57-member) Revolutionary Council and on Dec. 28 Kabul radio announced that he had appointed a new Cabinet and that he would be head of state, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (as well as general secretary of the PDPA—reported by Tass on the same day—and C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces). President Brezhnev on Dec. 28 sent a message to Mr Karmal congratulating him on his election to the above posts.

The membership of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council was as follows: Mr Karmal (Chairman), Mr Assadullah Sawari and Mr Soltan Ali Keshtmand (Vice-Chairmen), Mr Nur Ahmed Nur, Brig.-Gen. Abdul Qadir, Lt.-Col. Mohammad Aslam Watanyar and Lt.-Col. Gol Aqa. Most of the Presidium's members had played an active part in the 1978 revolution.

Kabul radio said on Jan. 10 that the PDPA general assembly had approved the composition of the politburo, most of whom belonged to the *Parcham* ("Flag") faction. Its seven members were Mr Karmal, Mr Sawari, Mr Keshtmand, Mr Nur, Dr Anahita Ratebzad (the Education Minister), Dr Saleh Mohammad Ziray and Mr Ghulam Dastagir Panjshiri. A 36-member central committee, eight candidate members of the central committee and a three-member secretariat were also named, Mr Karmal being a member of both the central committee and the secretariat.

The composition of the new Cabinet, many of whom had been supporters of President Taraki, was as follows:

Mr Babrak Karmal	Prime Minister
Mr Assadullah Sawari	Deputy Prime Minister
Mr Soltan Ali Keshtmand	Deputy Prime Minister and Planning
Lt.-Col. Mohammad Rafi	Defence
*Maj. Mohammad Ghulabzoi	Interior
*Mr Shah Mohammad Dost	Foreign Affairs
*Col. Sheryan Mazduryar	Transport
Dr Anahita Ratebzad	Education
Mr Mohammad Khan Jalalar	Commerce
Mr Faiz Mohammad	Border Affairs
Mr Abdul Wakil	Finance
Mr Mohammad Ismail Daneshwar	Mines and Industries
Lt.-Col. Mohammad Aslam Watanyar	Communications
Mr Abdol Majid	Information and Culture
Mr Abdorrashid Arian	Justice
Dr Raz Mohammad Paktin	Water and Power
Mr Gol Dad	Higher Education
Mr Nazar Mohammad	Public Works
Prof. Mohammad Ibrahim Azim	Public Health
Mr Fazl Rahim Mohmand	Agriculture and Land Reform

* Member of Taraki Cabinet.

Mr Karmal (50), a law graduate from Kabul University, served a five-year prison sentence in the 1950s for political activities. He worked in the Ministry of Planning from 1957 to 1965 and then was elected to Parliament for the PDPA, being head of the *Parcham* faction. (Parliament was dissolved in 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown by Gen. Mohammad Daud—see 26033 A.) Mr Karmal was installed as Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister in the first Taraki Government after the April 1978 revolution which overthrew President Daud [see 29037 A]; following differences with Mr Amin, then Prime Minister, he was appointed ambassador to Prague [see 29198 A] but was relieved of this post later in the year, remaining in exile in Czechoslovakia because he faced charges of treason in Afghanistan [see also 29264 B].

Lt.-Col. Watanyar had been Deputy Prime Minister, Communications Minister and Interior Minister under President Taraki [see 29037 A; 29198 A] and had sought refuge in the Soviet embassy in Kabul when Mr Amin took over (when he was reported to have been among those killed—see 30031 A—together with Mr Panjshiri and Col. Mazduryar). **Dr Ratebzad** had been Minister of Social Welfare under President Taraki and had, like Mr Karmal, been given a diplomatic posting (in Yugoslavia) [see 29198 A] of which she was later relieved. **Mr Daneshwar** had been a member of Mr Amin's Cabinet [see 30031 A]. **Dr Paktin** had been ambassador to Moscow.


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Multan
Sutlej
INDE
Dera Ghazi Khan
Lora

(*Le Monde*)

Deployment of Soviet Troops throughout Country - The Military Situation

It was reported at the beginning of January 1980 that Soviet troops were fanning out from Kabul into the provincial towns and that they had taken up positions near the Khyber Pass (Afghanistan's only land route eastwards into Pakistan except for the road from Kandahar to Quetta) and in Jalalabad (the main town on the Kabul-Khyber road). At the same time troops were being airlifted into or were moving towards the regional towns of Herat (in the west), Kandahar (south), Ghazni (south of Kabul), Mazar-i-Sharif (north), Gardez (south-east) and Faizabad, and subsequently were reported to be moving outwards from these towns to mount assaults on rebel-held areas in conjunction with the Afghan Army. Diplomatic sources said on Jan. 6 that Soviet supplies were being landed at the air bases at Shindand (south of Herat) and Bagram, and also at Jalalabad, and that Kabul airport had returned to normal.

The Soviet troops in Afghanistan, many of whom were Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turcomans from Soviet Central Asia, having ethnic links with the Afghans, were reported to be commanded by Maj.-Gen. Moussa Yevanov from Uzbekistan.

Fighting involving Soviet and Afghan troops against Moslem rebels was reported in the early part of January in several provinces (mostly in the north-east) including Paktia, Badakhshan, Kunduz, Konar, Logar, Takhar, Bamiyan and also Herat and Kadahar, and in towns including Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif. Unconfirmed reports on Jan. 10 said that the rebels had taken Faizabad and Taliq-an (the capital of Takhar), while Pakistani press reports said that 400 Russians had died in the Faizabad fighting, that two helicopters had been shot down and that the airport had been taken by rebels. There were also unconfirmed reports that as many as 40 per cent of the Afghan Army had gone over to the rebels.

(In an appeal to the Afghan Army on Jan. 16 President Karmal urged them to "defend the freedom, honour and security of their people" for the sake of national independence and sovereignty. He promised that increased attention would be paid to their material needs, that the lives of their families would be improved, and that their "spurned political, military and social rights" would be restored as soon as possible.)

By mid-January the activities of Soviet troops appeared to be restricted largely to patrolling the main roads and controlling vantage points in the towns, with much of the actual fighting being done by the Afghan Army; Soviet troops were keeping a low profile in Kabul itself during the daytime, although there was a heavy troop presence around the capital. Five complete Soviet Army divisions were said to be in Afghanistan at this time, a sixth division arriving later in the month and deploying south of Herat (between Shindand and Farah) not far from the Iranian border.

The other five divisions and their deployment were as follows: the 105th airborne division, a quick-strike force with units around Kabul, in Jalalabad and at the Shindand airbase; the 360th motorized rifle division centred in Kandahar with units around Herat; the 357th motorized rifle division based in Kabul with units possibly in Herat; the 66th motorized rifle division based in Herat with units deployed west of the city near the Iranian border; and the 16th motorized rifle division, based in Kunduz, near the Soviet border.

According to available information on the Soviet Army, each rifle division was supported by 350 tanks and 450 armoured cars.

It had been reported on Jan. 14 that soldiers of the 66th Soviet rifle division were massing along the Iranian border, and on Jan. 19 Iranian reinforcements were reported to have been moved to the Afghan border. On Jan. 18 Pakistan was reported by United News of India to have sent seven army divisions to the Afghan border, the report also stating that a large armoured force had been moved to the frontier region south of Peshawar, and that all air bases in the area were in a state of alert following reports on Jan. 9-10 that Soviet convoys were moving in the direction of the Pakistan frontier.

It was claimed by *Pravda* on Jan. 9 and by the Press Trust of India news agency on Jan. 18 that China was sending large supplies of weapons and ammunition into Pakistan over the all-weather Karakoram Highway (opened in June 1978—see page 29701).

By the end of January, when the number of Soviet troops was estimated to have reached 85,000, heavy snows were limiting military action, and the primary aim of the Soviet ground forces by this time appeared to be to keep open supply routes over the Salang Pass and to the main centres—an intensified airlift of supplies to Kabul having been carried out on Jan. 19-20 in anticipation of worsening weather conditions. Scattered rebel resistance was reported to be continuing in the north-east and the east as well as in Herat and other cities in the west and the south.

A US Administration official said on Jan. 11 that, according to "reliable information" (apparently partially based on a count of Soviet ambulances arriving at Kabul airport), between 900 and 1,200 Soviet soldiers had been killed and wounded in Afghanistan since the Soviet intervention began. However, Tass said on Jan. 18 that Soviet troops had suffered no losses in Afghanistan and were, moreover, not participating in the fighting.

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Internal Political and Security Developments - Expulsion of US Journalists

By the end of the second week in January the Government was claiming that 2,073 political prisoners (including Mrs Taraki) had been freed under an amnesty proclaimed by President Karmal on Jan. 4. On the other hand, diplomatic and Afghan sources believed that as many as 12,000-15,000 could still be held throughout the country and also alleged that secret executions of political prisoners were continuing and that the victims were being buried in mass graves.

On Jan. 11 the main Pol-i-Chakri prison in Kabul was stormed by hundreds of Afghans who, awaiting the release of their relatives and friends, became angry when only about 120 prisoners emerged from the building; believing that many more were inside, the Afghans forced their way into the inner prison compound and freed about 15 prisoners (journalists noting that there were more people inside) before being confronted by Soviet soldiers who prevented them from leaving, although journalists were allowed to depart.

On Jan. 11 the Government announced the disbanding of the secret police (known as KAM—Workers' Intelligence Organization), stating that it would be replaced by a new service which would defend "democratic freedoms, national independence and sovereignty" and would have the role of protecting "the interests of the revolution, the people and the state" and of "neutralizing plots by enemies of the country and of the PDPA leadership".

All US journalists were expelled from Afghanistan on Jan. 19 after being ordered to leave on Jan. 17 for "slanderous" and "biased" reporting. An Associated Broadcasting Corporation camera crew was later arrested on Jan. 24 and expelled on Jan. 26. Earlier, the Government had barred reporters from non-communist countries from entering Afghanistan but had then ordered visas to be granted to them.

At his first press conference for Western journalists Mr Karmal on Jan. 10 described reports that there were 85,000 Russian troops in Afghanistan as greatly exaggerated, but said that those in the country would not leave until the USA stopped its "aggressive policies". Asked by a British journalist whether he had been democratically elected, Mr Karmal called the questioner "a representative of British imperialism which has three times blatantly invaded Afghanistan" and affirmed that he had been elected by an "overwhelming majority" of the PDPA central committee.

At the end of January President Karmal said that he would guarantee the freedom of the Afghan people to follow their Islamic religion and that any religious leaders who had fled the country could return without fear of persecution provided that they took no action against "national or state interests". In what appeared to be a further concession to Moslems, it was announced on Jan. 21 by the Revolutionary Council and the PDPA central committee that the colours of the national flag would be changed (reportedly to include green—the colour of Islam).

The US Reaction - "Hot-line" Contact with Mr Brezhnev - Affirmation of US Commitment to aid Pakistan

The United States on Dec. 28 issued a formal protest to Moscow over the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. A State Department spokesman said that the coup had "serious implications" and that the United States saw no external threat to the security of Afghanistan which could have justified the Soviet military action.

Later the same day, President Carter, who on hearing of the latest developments cut short his end-of-year vacation at Camp David and returned to Washington for meetings with top military and foreign policy advisers, issued a televised statement from the White House describing the Soviet military action as "gross interference" and as a "blatant violation of accepted international rules of behaviour". This was, he said, the third time since World War II that the Soviet Union had moved militarily against one of its neighbours and the Soviet Union's first move against a Moslem country since the occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1940s. (Soviet and also British forces had entered Iran in 1941—see 4759 A; Soviet troops had not finally been removed from Azerbaijan until 1946—see 7952 A.)

Mr Carter said that he had talked by telephone that day with several other heads of state and government (of Britain, West Germany, France, Italy and Pakistan), that he was sending Mr Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, to Europe for consultations with NATO allies, and that any attempts by the USSR to justify its action on the basis of the UN Charter would be a "perversion" of the United Nations.

President Carter on Dec. 28 also used the Moscow-Washington "hot-line" [originally established in 1963 following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis—see pages 19554-55] to urge Mr Brezhnev to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan immediately and to warn him of the grave political consequences of a failure to do this. Disclosing details of his contact with Mr Brezhnev, President Carter said in an interview televised from the White House on Dec. 31 that the tone of Mr Brezhnev's reply had been "completely inadequate and completely misleading", and he admitted that the recent Soviet action in Afghanistan had made "a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviet Union's ultimate goals are than anything they have done in the previous time I have been in office".

President Carter said that "the magnitude of the action" undertaken by the Soviet Union in invading Afghanistan was "only now dawning on the world". Mr Brezhnev had claimed that he had been invited by the Afghan Government to "come in and protect Afghanistan from some outside third-nation threat"; this was "obviously false because the person that he claimed invited him in, President Amin, was murdered or assassinated after the Soviets pulled their coup". Furthermore, Mr Brezhnev had claimed that the Soviet Union would "remove its forces from Afghanistan as soon as the situation should be stabilized and the outside threat to Afghanistan eliminated".

President Carter went on to say: "This is a circumstance that I think is now causing even former friends and allies of the Soviet Union to re-examine their opinion of what the Soviets might have in mind. And I think that it is imperative that in the next few days, when we consult with one another, the leaders of the world make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot take this action to violate world peace, not only in that region but throughout the world, without paying severe political consequences."

Following the deployment of Soviet troops in the southern provinces of Afghanistan bordering on Pakistan, President Carter's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, on Dec. 30 publicly reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to use armed force if necessary to help Pakistan preserve its territorial integrity, as provided for in the 1959 bilateral defence agreement between Pakistan and the USA [see 16748 A]. At the same time President Carter indicated to reporters that the United States would increase its military aid to Pakistan [see also page 30239 below].

The USA had supplied no military assistance to Pakistan (except for minor training programmes) since the 1971 war with India. An embargo on military sales to both Pakistan and India was lifted in 1975, when the USA said that it would sell limited supplies to Pakistan on a case-by-case basis [see 27272 A]. In April 1979 all existing aid, which amounted only to economic assistance and a training mission, was cut off following reports that Pakistan was building a nuclear plant capable of producing material suitable for nuclear weapons [see page 29701].

Reaffirming the US commitment to Pakistan, Dr Brzezinski quoted the relevant section from the 1959 agreement, which stated: "In case of aggression against Pakistan the Government of the United States, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, will take such appropriate action including the use of armed force as may be mutually agreed and is envisaged in the joint resolution, to protect peace and stability in the Middle East."

On lessons to be drawn by Iran from the Soviet action in Afghanistan, Dr Brzezinski said in the same statement: "I think every sober-headed Iranian, even the most anti-American ones, ought to ask themselves what do the events in Kabul portend for Tehran. There have been Soviet troops in Tehran before [see 7376 B]; Tehran could be next. . . . Today, as a consequence of the irresponsible and illegal actions undertaken by some people in Tehran, Iran finds itself isolated internationally. . . . This is why it is very much in Iran's interest and in the region's own interest that the [US] hostages be promptly released and that Iran's security be promoted by stable relationships with those who are prepared to be Iran's friends." [For the US-Iranian hostage crisis, see page 30150; 30205 A.]

The then Indian Prime Minister, Mr Charan Singh, expressed concern on Dec. 31 over the US proposals to resume military aid to Pakistan and apprehension that these arms would be used against India. In response, it was pointed out to the Indian ambassador in Islamabad on Jan. 1 that Pakistan had consistently sought to improve relations with India and would continue such efforts; that India itself was engaged in acquiring sophisticated weapons and had said that the prosperity of a developing country was linked with a secure border; and that this consideration was equally valid in Pakistan's case. Pakistan hoped that India would fully reciprocate its desire for good-neighbourly relations and would "eschew negativism" in its attitude towards Pakistan.

Immediate World Reactions

A special meeting of the NATO Council took place in Brussels on Jan. 1, attended by Mr Warren Christopher for the United States, to consider a joint NATO response to the Soviet intervention. In a press statement at the conclusion of the meeting the NATO Secretary-General, Dr Josef Luns, described the Soviet intervention as "a flagrant violation of international law and a threat to peace", adding: "This is the first time that the Soviet Union has used its military power directly and massively in a country not belonging to the Soviet bloc. More than ever, solidarity and unity of aim and decision on the part of the Allies are of capital importance."

On the previous day Mr Christopher had met representatives of Britain, France, Canada, West Germany and Italy in London for talks on Afghanistan and subsequently said that he had found broad support for a number of measures including a review of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and individual NATO countries, and between these countries and other nations of the region, as well as a desire to refer the question of the Soviet intervention to the United Nations as a "flagrant violation of sovereignty".

At the same time the NATO countries were reported to be drawing up individual "reprisal lists" which would be pooled in an effort to work out common sanctions against the USSR.

Initial reactions from various individual countries condemning the Soviet intervention are summarized below.

In **Britain**, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Dec. 28 stated that it was Britain's belief that the people of Afghanistan had the right to choose their own government without outside interference, and on Dec. 29 the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, sent a letter to President Brezhnev expressing "profound disturbance" as well as puzzlement at the Soviet assertion that this action had been carried out at the invitation of the Afghan Government to counter external interference; the letter added that as far as Britain was concerned, the only country involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs was the Soviet Union. Mrs Thatcher also had what she described as a "tough talk" with the Soviet ambassador in London, Mr Nikolai Lunkov, on Jan. 3 when he delivered Mr Brezhnev's reply to her letter.

In **France**, the Foreign Ministry said on Dec. 28 that the new situation gave rise to "legitimate worries for the peace and stability of the region as well as for the fate of the Afghan people with which France is linked through traditional friendship". The French ambassador was recalled from Kabul for consultations on Jan. 4.

In **West Germany** the Government Spokesman, Herr Klaus Bölling, on Dec. 28 described the situation as "extremely momentous and grave" and as "raising basic questions of international relations". After a cabinet meeting on Jan. 2 chaired by the Foreign Minister, Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher (in the absence of the Federal Chancellor, Herr Helmut Schmidt, on vacation), a statement was issued condemning the Soviet intervention as "violating basic principles of the peaceful coexistence of peoples, the indivisibility of détente and the right to self-rule". The West German ambassador was also recalled from Kabul for consultations on Jan. 4.

The European Economic Community (EEC) on Jan. 3 announced its decision to suspend food aid to Afghanistan.

The Chinese Government on Dec. 29 called the Soviet move "another grave international incident following the Soviet armed occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968", the first large-scale Soviet military intervention in a third-world country, and a "threat to peace and security in Asia and the whole world". This time, the Soviet Union had "unmasked itself by trampling underfoot all international norms" and could no longer pass itself off as an "angel championing world peace". A formal note of protest was delivered to the Soviet Union on Dec. 31.

The Peking *People's Daily* on Jan. 1 accused the Soviet Union not only of gaining an "iron grip" on Afghanistan but also of seeking a "stepping stone for a southward thrust towards Pakistan and the whole subcontinent", adding that there would be "no peace from South Asia to the Horn of Africa with 45,000 Soviet soldiers in strategic Afghanistan".

The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, on Dec. 28 handed a note to the Soviet ambassador in Tehran strongly denouncing the Soviet intervention as a "hostile action against Iran and all Moslems of the world" and as another attempt by the super-powers to divide the world. These sentiments were echoed in a statement issued the same day by the Iranian Revolutionary Council, which also accused the USSR of taking advantage of the crisis between the USA and Iran to "interfere in the affairs of a weak country".

On Jan. 1 several thousand Afghans and Iranians demonstrated outside the Soviet embassy in Tehran, chanting "death to Brezhnev", and tore up the Soviet flag, causing the Soviet ambassador to fly to Qom on Jan. 2 for his second meeting in a week with Ayatollah Khomeini (the spiritual leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran). In another incident Afghan students occupied the Afghan embassy in Tehran for several hours on Jan. 6 in protest at the Soviet action.

President Karmal sent a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini on Jan. 15 in which he criticized the adverse reaction in Iran to the Afghan coup and stated: "My Government will never allow anybody to use our soil as a base against the Islamic revolution of Iran and against the interest of the fraternal Iranian people. We expect our Iranian brothers to take an identical stance." However, Mr Qotbzadeh said on Jan. 20 that Soviet troops were only 18 miles from Iran's border and were posing a serious threat to Baluchistan and Sistan (in the south-east). Iran was concerned that the USSR might one day invoke a 1921 treaty [see page 16770] whereby Moscow could intervene militarily if Iran was used as a base for military operations against the Soviet Union (even though Iran had revoked this treaty unilaterally in November 1979—see page 30206).

Calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry on Dec. 29 described the intervention as a grave violation of sovereignty which constituted a "serious aggravation" of the Afghan situation and "is bound to prolong the agony of the Afghan people, with whom Pakistan is linked by indissoluble ties of history".

The Indian Government on Dec. 31 also called on the USSR to withdraw its troops, recalling that the Soviet Union and India had agreed six months previously (during a visit to Moscow by the then Prime Minister, Mr Morarji Desai—see page 29880) that both sides "opposed any interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan". However, a Foreign Ministry spokesman on Jan. 1 said that India did not want to "sit in judgment" on the Soviet action and reiterated that the supply of US arms to Pakistan was of great concern to India.

Afghan students on Jan. 2 seized their country's embassy in New Delhi in protest at the Soviet invasion, holding several members of staff captive for some hours.

Protests against the Soviet action were also registered by Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

Among the Arab Islamic nations only Syria and South Yemen condoned the Soviet action, describing it as a countermove to CIA provocation and as a means to save the Afghan revolution. [For earlier Soviet-Syrian and Soviet-South Yemeni relations, see pages 30102 and 30199 respectively.] The Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mr Habib Chatty, on Jan. 1 urged all member-nations to do what they could to "put an end to foreign presence in a brother country".

Saudi Arabia described the Soviet move as "shameful interference" and as a "violation of international ethics", and on Jan. 6 it became the first country to announce that it would boycott the 1980 Olympic Games [see below].

In **Egypt**, the Government announced on Jan. 6 that the size of the Soviet embassy staff in Cairo would be reduced and that the severance of relations with Moscow would be considered (the Egyptian ambassador having been recalled in December 1977—see page 29164). [President Sadat subsequently told Parliament on Jan. 28 that the number of Soviet embassy staff must be reduced to seven, from a current figure of over 50; that all remaining Soviet experts must leave the country; that Egypt's own diplomatic staff in Moscow had been reduced to seven; and that a new ambassador to Moscow would not be sent as had been planned.] Mr Mansur Mohammed Mahmoud Hassan, Minister of State for the Presidency, said on Jan. 6 that Egypt was prepared to give military training to Afghans in Cairo and to send arms to Afghanistan.

On Jan. 8 Mr Hodding Carter (the US State Department spokesman) confirmed that for some weeks US military aircraft had been carrying out joint training manoeuvres in Egypt with the Egyptian Air Force. Mr Sadat added on Jan. 28 that Egypt would offer "full facilities" to any US forces aiding an Arab state in danger.

Sharp condemnations of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were expressed by the **Gulf states**, and by **Morocco**.

In **Turkey**, the Cabinet on Dec. 29 denounced the Soviet action as "subjugating the Islamic Afghan nation with which we have a historic and spiritual friendship". The Soviet consulate in Istanbul was attacked on Jan. 3 by youths in protest at the invasion, one person being killed by Turkish guards. In **Sudan** on the same day some 5,000 students marched on the Soviet embassy in Khartoum.

In Eastern Europe the Soviet action was openly supported by Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, while Hungary and Poland initially confined their press coverage to factual reports and reproductions of Soviet commentaries. However, a statement issued on Jan. 11 after a meeting of the Hungarian Council of Ministers said that Soviet military aid was "legal and just", and that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan when the rights of the Afghan people were "no longer endangered". Moreover, at the end of January the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Mr Edward Gierek, visited Prague (Czechoslovakia) where a joint declaration calling for an end to "imperialist" interference in Afghanistan and declaring solidarity with the Afghans in implementing the aims of the 1978 revolution was signed with President Gustáv Husák (General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party).

In Romania, President Ceausescu called in a new year broadcast at midnight on Dec. 31-Jan. 1 for the withdrawal of foreign troops from other countries, the systematic reduction of military expenditure, military effectives and armaments, the dismantling of military bases, the dissolution of military blocs and the building of a world without weapons and without wars.

President Ceausescu had already on Dec. 29 in a speech to the diplomatic corps in Bucharest denounced the "policy of spheres of influence", while on Jan. 4 an editorial in the Romanian Communist Party organ *Scinteia* condemned the "policy of force, of domination and of diktat" and warned that the international situation would be aggravated unless force and military means were renounced and the independence of peoples respected.

A communiqué from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry condemned as "inadmissible" foreign intervention in any form whatsoever, or the imposition of an alien will upon a sovereign state.

On Jan. 6 *Borba* (the organ of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia) said that any attempt to justify the Soviet action was "unacceptable, unjust, undemocratic and very dangerous to peace" as well as a "dangerous return to the Stalinist approach of trampling underfoot the sovereignty of other countries". In response, the Soviet daily *Pravda* rebuked Yugoslavia on Jan. 8 for repeating "imperialist propaganda".

The Albanian Government condemned the intervention on Dec. 30 as "fascist and aggressive", whereas the Cuban Government on Jan. 4 expressed approval for the "measures jointly taken by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan".

Reactions from Eurocommunist Parties

The "Eurocommunist" parties were divided in their reactions to the Soviet intervention, which was supported by the French and Portuguese Communist parties but criticized by the Italian and Spanish parties. The French Communist Party leader, M. Georges Marchais, paid a visit to Moscow from Jan. 8 to 12, marking a reconciliation between the French Communist Party and Moscow following their estrangement in 1976 when the party abandoned its commitment to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus turning towards the "'Eurocommunist" movement [see 27693 A].

The French Communist Party organ *L'Humanité* warned on Jan. 3 that events in Afghanistan must not be a pretext for a return to the "cold war" and that a deterioration in Franco-Soviet relations would only "favour US hopes for world hegemony without furthering the interests of France or of peace"; thus, the Government's failure to dissociate France from US threats to reconsider relations with the USSR would spoil "the prestige earned for France by the initiatives of General de Gaulle". In a further statement on Jan. 6 the French Communist Party justified the Soviet intervention on the grounds that the Afghan people had the right to demand help from their allies against a rebellion supported by "US imperialism".

The Portuguese Communist Party newspaper *Avante* on Jan. 3 said that the new Afghan Government had asked for military aid from the USSR to "defend the revolutionary state against an enemy succoured and armed outside the country", and described Afghanistan as "a new democracy geographically situated in a region which is the target of desperate provocations by US imperialists".

The Italian Communist Party organ *L'Unità* on Jan. 3 described the Soviet intervention as violating not only the fundamental principles which must regulate international coexistence but also "some of the best traditions of the workers' movements: the respect and defence of national independence and sovereignty, the non-exportability of revolutions and the determined search for peaceful and political solutions instead of military ones". The Soviet intervention was also unambiguously condemned by the secretary of the Italian Communist Party, Signor Enrico Berlinguer, during a debate in the European Parliament on Jan. 16.

The Spanish Communist Party observed in *Mundo Obrero* on Jan. 3 that "from a workers' and revolutionary class standpoint we say 'no' to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan". Speaking for the Spaniards as "people who have suffered" the party said that the "liberation of any people suffering under imperialism must be the work of the people themselves, or else it serves as a pretext for a conflict between the super-powers".

(The British Communist Party on Jan. 13 condemned the Soviet action as raising "important questions of political principle" and as having serious consequences for world peace.)

On Jan. 16 the official Soviet English-language *New Times* denounced the "biased concepts of some organs of the communist press" and accused them of using "bourgeois" arguments to contradict official statements from the Afghan Government.

Deferment of US Senate Consideration of SALT II Treaty - Announcement of Grain Embargo and Other Sanctions by United States

In retaliation for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan President Carter on Jan. 3 formally requested the Senate to delay its consideration of the ratification of the SALT II treaty, due to have commenced on Jan. 22 [see page 30130]. The previous day the US ambassador in Moscow, Mr Thomas Watson, had been recalled to Washington for consultations. (Mr Watson returned to Moscow on Jan. 19, one day after the Soviet ambassador, Mr Anatoly Dobrynin, who had left Washington before the Soviet intervention, returned to the United States.)

Subsequently, in a major policy speech on Jan. 4, President Carter announced a number of punitive measures against the Soviet Union, the most important of which was a curtailment of grain sales by 17,000,000 tonnes. The other measures were (i) the suspension of sales to the Soviet Union of high technology, including computers and oil drilling equipment, while licensing policy was being reviewed; (ii) the "severe curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in US waters" (which would, it was estimated, deprive the USSR of some 350,000 tonnes of fish per year); (iii) the indefinite postponement of the opening of new Soviet and US consular facilities; (iv) the deferral of new cultural and economic exchanges; and (v) consideration of a boycott of the Olympic Games (due to be held in Moscow in mid-1980) if the Soviet Union continued its "aggressive action". At the same time President Carter confirmed that the United States would give Pakistan military and other assistance (as foreshadowed on Dec. 28—see above).

Excerpts from President Carter's Jan. 4 speech are given below.

After referring to the crisis in Iran, President Carter said that the "invasion of the small non-aligned sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union", threatened both Iran and Pakistan and might lead to Soviet control over "much of the world's oil supplies". Accordingly, the President continued, he had decided to "halt or reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly important to them", adding that "these new policies will be co-ordinated with those of our allies".

He went on: "The 17,000,000 tonnes of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell under a five-year agreement [covering 1976-1981—see page 27641] will not be delivered. This grain was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds. I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. The undelivered grain will be removed from the market through storage and price support programmes and through purchases at market prices. We will also use increased amounts of grain to alleviate hunger in poor countries and for gasohol production here at home [i.e. production of grain-based alcohol for use as an additive to petrol for motor vehicles].

"After consultation with other principal grain exporting nations I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments to the Soviet Union.

"These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans but there is no doubt that [they] are in the interest of world peace and the security of our own nation, and are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and other nations who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability."

With reference to the Olympic Games, President Carter said: "Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic Games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic Games."

President Carter continued: "Along with other countries we will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north. The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways. Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined. I have consulted with the leaders of Congress and am confident that they will support legislation that may be required to carry out these measures.

"History teaches perhaps few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease. The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action. . . . The United States will meet its responsibilities."

[Statements carried by Tass on Jan. 5-6 described President Carter's measures as a "flagrant violation" of the US commitment to détente and said that "if the White House intended to exert some kind of influence on the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, this is a hopeless undertaking; such attempts flopped in the past and will flop again now". Tass added that "the leading circles of the Soviet Union would like to hope that a sane, farsighted approach to Soviet-US relations, including efforts to preserve peace, will finally prevail in the USA".]

In implementation of the sanctions announced on Jan. 4 the United States on Jan. 8 sent three Coast Guard cutters to the Bering Sea, off Alaska, to enforce the fishing limitations; on Jan. 9 it announced the immediate suspension of all exports of high technology and machinery to the Soviet Union, and of all existing export licences; and on Jan. 8 President Carter ordered the Soviet Union to call home "expeditiously" 17 Russians currently in New York setting up a consulate-general, and announced the recall of seven US diplomats engaged in a similar task in Kiev. At about the same time the Soviet airline Aeroflot was informed by the Civil Aeronautics Board that its flights to the United States must be cut from three to two per week, and it was announced that a general US-Soviet cultural agreement which had expired at the end of 1979 would not be renewed.

The International Longshoremen's Union (representing dockers in about 40 east and Gulf coast ports) announced on Jan. 9 that its members would boycott all Soviet ships and all Soviet-bound cargo until "the Russians get out of Afghanistan". President Carter on Jan. 19 ordered the federal Government to buy up most of the 2,500,000 tonnes of grain which dockers had refused to load and which was congesting ports. Some would be diverted to meet orders from other countries and the rest purchased by the Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation for use as part of a potential 4,000,000-tonne food security reserve.

In a move to offset the adverse effects of the grain embargo on US farmers, the Administration on Jan. 7 offered to buy up all contracts for sales of corn, wheat and soybeans purchased by the Soviet Union but not yet delivered (amounting to some 14,500,000 tonnes at a value of $2,600 million) and on Jan. 8 announced that it would offer grain farmers financial incentives to turn over crops to the Government for storage. Because of uncertainty over the effect of the grain embargo, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission on Jan. 7-8 suspended trading in grains for future delivery.

Mr Warren Christopher said on television on Jan. 6 that the United States hoped that its allies would respond to the US sanctions (i) by not supplying substitute grain to the USSR, (ii) by terminating existing aid programmes to Afghanistan, (iii) by cutting their diplomatic representation in Kabul, and possibly also in Moscow, and (iv) by taking parallel action in the economic sphere to that taken by the United States.

Support of Grain Embargo by Major Producers except Argentina

Representatives of the world's major grain exporters—Canada, the United States, Australia, Argentina and the EEC (with a likely aggregate total of 163,000,000 tonnes available for export in 1980)—met in Washington on Jan. 12 and agreed that they would not "directly or indirectly replace" the shortfall of 17,000,000 tonnes which would have been shipped to the USSR by the United States. The 13 nations involved also agreed to establish a group to "examine trade flows on a continuing basis in order to accomplish our common purposes".

Argentina, which on Jan. 10 had stated that it would not be "bound by measures and reprisals decided upon without consultation . . . or reached in centres of decision far from our country", was quoted in the official statement issued after the meeting as agreeing not to "take trade advantages from the present international situation" or to seek to "alter artificially the current demands of the different markets". However, the Argentinian Secretary of State for Agriculture, Sr Jorge Zorrequieta, denied on Jan. 14 that Argentina had agreed to support the US embargo and said that market forces alone would decide the final destination, either direct or indirect, of Argentinian grain shipments. Sr David Lacroze, the head of the Argentinian National Grain Board who had also headed the delegation to the Washington meeting, agreed that US statements did not "adequately reflect" the true situation.

The EEC, Canada and Australia had already indicated earlier in the week that they supported the US grain embargo in general terms. Announcing the Australian decision not to sell additional grain to the Soviet Union, Mr Malcolm Fraser, the Prime Minister, said on Jan. 9 that normal grain sales for 1980 (some 2,000,000 tonnes) would go ahead, but he also announced that all discussions and agreements with the Soviet Union on fishing would be indefinitely suspended, that the existing shipping agreement would be reviewed, and that scientific, cultural and other co-operation would be halted. Mr Fraser told the press that wool and beef sales to the Soviet Union would continue, but he added that Australia would forge closer links with the USA in patrolling the Indian Ocean.

Towards the end of January President Carter's special envoy, Gen. Andrew Jackson Goodpaster (the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1969-74), visited Argentina but failed to convince President Videla of the need to support the grain embargo. Although the Argentinian Government said publicly that it would not "pursue commercial advantages" from the embargo, a Soviet trade mission arrived in the country the following week and grain markets reopened on Jan. 29 (after a 22-day suspension) with no restrictions on the destinations of grain. The USSR was reported to have purchased 19 per cent of its grain requirements from Argentina in 1979.

A meeting had taken place in Washington on Jan. 21 between US, Brazilian and Argentinian representatives on the issue of the grain and also an oilseed embargo, following which the Brazilian Government officially informed the United States that it would place no artificial restraints on its soya sales but would not take specific steps to replace the embargoed grain.

Moves to extend US Military Presence in Indian Ocean Area - Plans for US Rapid Deployment Force

Administration officials said on Jan. 4 that the USA had decided to maintain a permanent US naval presence in the Indian Ocean as the result of the Afghanistan and Iran crises, and on Jan. 9 the USA announced that it would try to enhance its military presence in the Indian Ocean area by seeking the regular use of facilities in Oman, Kenya and Somalia, but not in Israel and Egypt as had previously been rumoured. The US Government also informed Britain on Jan. 12 of its intention to reinforce its military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia (part of the British Indian Ocean Territory), its only permanent military base in the area [see also 24400 D; 27323 A].

The decision to extend military facilities in the region had been taken at the beginning of the Iran hostages crisis in November 1979, and a joint Defence Department-State Department team had visited the area in December to investigate [see page 30208]. (Hitherto, the USA had use of the port and associated airfield at Mombasa, Kenya, and had shown interest in the Soviet-developed port of Berbera in Somalia, as well as in the former British base on Masirah Island, in Oman—see also 26988 A. For US-Somali relations, see 29706 A. For maps of the area see overleaf and page 30240.)

Among US warships which were sent to the Arabian Sea in January were the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Nimitz* [see also page 30208], which joined the conventionally powered carriers *Midway* (which took part in manoeuvres in the area south of Iran together with British warships in November) and the *Kitty Hawk* [ibid.]. It was learned on Jan. 17 that a British Royal Navy task force had been diverted from the Caribbean and the USA at short notice to the Mediterranean, and that the British assault vessel *Intrepid* had also been diverted from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

20.78
Black Sea
Istanbul
Ankara
TURKEY
U. S. S. R.
Baku
Tabriz
Tehran
CYPRUS
SYRIA
Mediterr. Sea
LEBANON
ISRAEL
Suez Canal
Baghdad
IRAN
JORDAN
IRAQ
Alexandria
Cairo
KUWAIT
Persian Gulf
Bandar Abbas
SAUDI
ARABIA
EGYPT
BAHRAIN
QATAR
Gulf of Oman
Aswan
Riyadh
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Red Sea
Mecca
Nile
Port Sudan
OMAN
YEMEN PDR
Massawa
Khartum
YEMEN AR
Arabian Sea
Asmara
ERITREA
Gulf of Aden
Aden
SUDAN
DJIBOUTI
SOCOTRA (Yemen PDR)
Berbera
Harar
Hargeisa
Addis Ababa
OGADEN
ETHIOPIA
Indian Ocean
SOMALIA
KENYA
Mogadishu
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(*Carpress*)

The USA was also in January 1980 moving forward with plans to form a rapid deployment force drawing on strategic ground, air and naval resources which could be used for limited contingencies in the Third World.

President Brezhnev's Statement on International Situation

In a statement published on the front page of *Pravda* on Jan. 12 President Brezhnev defended Soviet policies in Afghanistan, described the USA as an "absolutely unreliable partner" in international affairs, but assessed the future of détente in Western Europe optimistically.

Beginning with an evaluation of the world situation, President Brezhnev said that it had deteriorated at the beginning of the 1980s and that the USA was at fault. "The blame," he said, "lies with all those who see in the relaxation of tension an obstacle to their aggressive plans, to whipping up a militaristic psychosis, to interference in the internal affairs of other peoples. The blame lies with those who have a deeply ingrained habit of behaving in a cavalier manner with other states and acting in the international arena as though they were permitted to do anything." The SALT II treaty, which was supported by all the world, including the NATO allies of the United States, would have "opened the way for big steps in the field of disarmament"; instead, he said, "scarcely had the treaty been signed when people in the USA began discrediting it", while the opponents of the treaty "actually began using it—not without the connivance of government circles in the United States—to complicate the treaty's ratification to the utmost".

President Brezhnev continued: "Today the opponents of peace and détente are trying to speculate on the events in Afghanistan. Mountains of lies are being built up around these events and a shameless anti-Soviet campaign is being mounted." Elaborating on the course of events in Afghanistan, he said that from the first days of the 1978 revolution that country had encountered external aggression and "crude interference" from outside in its internal affairs; "tens of thousands of insurgents, armed and trained abroad, whole armed units in fact", were sent into Afghanistan and "in effect imperialism, together with its accomplices, launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan". The Soviet Union had warned those concerned that if the aggression was not stopped it would not abandon the Afghan people in their time of trial; "as is well known, we stand by what we say".

President Brezhnev went on: "The unceasing armed intervention, the well advanced plot by external forces of reaction, created a real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our country's southern border. In other words, the time came when we could not but respond to the request of the Government of friendly Afghanistan. To have acted otherwise would have meant leaving Afghanistan a prey to imperialism, allowing the aggressive forces to repeat in that country what they had succeeded in doing, for instance, in Chile, where the people's freedom was drowned in blood. To have acted otherwise would have meant to watch passively the origination on our southern border of a centre of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state."

Reiterating that Soviet troops would be withdrawn as soon as "the causes which made the Afghan leadership request their introduction" disappeared, President Brezhnev stressed that "the national security interests of the USA and other states are not affected in any way by the events in Afghanistan"; the "policy and psychology of colonialists" was alien to the USSR and it was "the colonialists who are attracted by the smell of oil".

Passing on to the US sanctions against the USSR, Mr Brezhnev said that the impression was being formed in the world that the USA was "an absolutely unreliable partner . . . whose leadership, prompted by some whim, caprice or emotional outburst . . . , is capable at any moment of violating its international obligations and cancelling treaties and agreements signed by it". However, he said, "we shall manage without these various ties with the USA"; the "cynical estimates concerning the 'worsening' of the food situation in the Soviet Union" as a result of the grain embargo was "based on nonsensical notions about our economic potential", and he could assure everyone that "plans for providing Soviet people with bread and bakery products will not be reduced by a single kilogramme". The unilateral measures taken by the USA were a serious political miscalculation and would, "like a boomerang, hit their initiators".

On détente, with which the fundamental interests of European peoples were "unbreakably linked", Mr Brezhnev said that "we are strongly in favour of consolidating and multiplying everything positive that has been created over the years on the European continent" and that "we shall continue to pursue a policy of peace and friendship between peoples".

Soviet Veto of UN Security Council Resolution on Afghanistan - Emergency Session of UN General Assembly

More than 50 nations on Jan. 3-4 signed a motion calling for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to "examine the situation in Afghanistan and its consequences for peace and international security". They included 10 Islamic nations, namely Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Turkey. France, which for January held the presidency of the Security Council, was the only Western country which did not sign the motion.

The Security Council accordingly met on Jan. 5, and after two days of debate voted on Jan. 7 [the day on which the final membership of the Council was determined—see 30186 A] on a resolution sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia, which "deeply deplored" the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces. After a debate in which Afghanistan and Vietnam expressed support for the Soviet position, the resolution was approved by the votes of 13 Security Council members (the six sponsors together with China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States as four of the five permanent members and also Mexico, Norway and Portugal) to two (East Germany and the Soviet Union); however, the negative vote of the Soviet Union (the fifth permanent member) represented a veto of the resolution.

During the debate Mr Dost, the Afghan Foreign Minister (who had visited Moscow for talks on Jan. 4 before flying to New York), told the Council that the "limited" Soviet troop contingent had been sent to his country in response to a request for help in repelling foreign aggression and had nothing to do with the events of Dec. 27 (i.e. the coup). When foreign interference ended, he said, the Soviet troops would withdraw.

The Afghan deputy permanent representative to the UN, Dr Abdul Hakim Tabibi, resigned on Jan. 4 in protest at "the violation of the sovereignty and independence of my country by our close neighbour, the Soviet Union".

Following the Jan. 7 vote the Security Council on Jan. 9 approved by 12 votes to two (Soviet Union and East Germany), with one abstention (Zambia), a procedural resolution (i.e. not subject to veto) to move the Afghanistan question to the General Assembly.

The General Assembly accordingly convened on Jan. 10 in emergency session (its sixth such session) and after several days of debate a resolution presented by 17 countries calling for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan" was overwhelmingly approved on Jan. 14 by 104 votes to 18, with 18 abstentions (including India) and 11 countries absent (including Romania).

Those voting against the resolution were Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, East Germany, Grenada, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Ukraine, USSR, Vietnam and South Yemen.

Those abstaining were Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, São Tomé and Príncipe, Syria, Uganda, North Yemen and Zambia.

Those absent were Bhutan, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dominica, Libya, Romania, Seychelles, Solomon Islands and Sudan.

The resolution (ES-6/2) expressed grave concern at the recent developments in Afghanistan and their implications for international peace and security; recalled the obligations of all states to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; recognized the urgent need for immediate termination of foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan so as to enable its people to determine their own destiny without outside interference or coercion; and noted with profound concern the large outflow of refugees from Afghanistan.

Expressing "deep concern at the dangerous escalation of tension, intensification of rivalry and increased recourse to military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states", the General Assembly (the resolution continued):

"(i) Reaffirms that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes;

"(ii) Strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle;

"(iii) Appeals to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country;

"(iv) Calls for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

"(v) Urges all parties concerned to assist in bringing about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees to their home;

"(vi) Appeals to all states and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees in co-ordination with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;

"(vii) Requests the Secretary-General to keep member states and the Security Council promptly and concurrently informed on the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution;

"(viii) Calls upon the Security Council to consider ways and means which could assist in the implementation of this resolution."

About 50 speakers took part in the emergency General Assembly debate, excerpts from which are given below.

Mr Brajesh Chandra Mishra (India) said that India could not remain indifferent to the efforts of certain foreign powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by "training and arming subversive elements and encouraging them to spread trouble in the country"; New Delhi had no reason to doubt assurances from the USSR, "with whom we have many close ties", that troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Sr Raul Roa-Kouri (Cuba) attacked the USA for launching a "formidable propaganda campaign for a new cold war accompanied by drum rolls and by brutal threats against another UN member". For Cuba the debate brought a "historic dilemma", and he recognized that among the nations in favour of the resolution were some "highly esteemed and unquestionably politically progressive friends of ours"; however, Cuba said "no" to that "sinister imperialism which brings death, oppression, underdevelopment, disease and ignorance to humanity".

Mr Alexander Yankov (Bulgaria) said that Pakistan, with US and Chinese help, had allowed the border area with Afghanistan to become "a stronghold for training, supplying with weaponry and sending back into Afghanistan anti-government troops"; the UN, he said, was the victim of "unsavoury efforts to use the events in Afghanistan to legitimize the growing collusion between Washington and Peking".

Mr Miljan Komatina (Yugoslavia) spoke of the necessity of "energetically combatting" the "rivalries which opposed the great powers to other blocs, the politics of force, the division and expansion of spheres of influence and all forms of hegemony and domination".

Tass said in a statement on Jan. 15 that the UN resolution on the "artificially concocted Afghanistan issue" was "an attempt to draw the international community into actions aimed at intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan". Not all the delegations, it said, could "grasp the essence of the developments which have taken place of late in Afghanistan".

The Danish Government, which together with the governments of Norway and Sweden had immediately condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, sent a letter to Mr Brezhnev in mid-January stating that the Soviet veto in the Security Council had had a "thought-provoking effect" in Denmark, where respect for the UN and for the legal basis of bilateral relations constituted a fundamental principle of Denmark's own national security. The Danish Government called on the Soviet Union accordingly to comply with the recent UN resolution and to withdraw its troops immediately and unconditionally from Afghanistan.

European Community Foreign Ministers' Declaration on Afghanistan - Parallel Meeting of NATO Council

Following a meeting in Brussels on Jan. 15 the Foreign Ministers of the nine European Community countries issued a declaration denouncing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a "serious violation of the principles of international relations enshrined in the UN Charter" and as "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a non-aligned country belonging to the Islamic world".

The Soviet intervention was, the statement said, a "threat to peace, security and stability in the region, including the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and the Arab world"; the explanation given by the USSR to justify its action was "unacceptable" and the Soviet Union should immediately withdraw its troops and allow the Afghan people "to determine their own future without foreign interference". The statement expressed the conviction of the Nine that "détente is indivisible and has a global dimension".

At the meeting the Nine confirmed (as already agreed on Jan. 12—see above) that the EEC would not make up the shortfall resulting from the US grain embargo; agreed that export subsidies on some agricultural products including butter should be suspended for the time being; cancelled food aid to Afghanistan consisting of 3,000 tonnes of cereals and 300 tonnes of powdered milk in the current year on the grounds that it could not be guaranteed to reach the needy sectors of the population; instructed the European Commission to investigate further measures for controlling butter and other agricultural exports "while respecting traditional trade flows"; and agreed to consider a request from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to provide some $55,000,000 in aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The European Commission had on Jan. 11 announced the cessation of all butter and butter-oil exports because of indications of heavy buying by the USSR and Eastern Europe, but claimed that this action was largely prompted by the desire to halt possible speculation in the markets. [For subsidized EEC butter sales to the Soviet Union and other third countries in 1977-78, see pages 29518-19.]

Parallel to the meeting of the European Community Foreign Ministers, the NATO Council met in Brussels on Jan. 15 with the participation of Mr Warren Christopher and Mr Douglas Hurd (UK Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office). While no programme of sanctions was adopted at the meeting (the participants agreeing only to take "appropriate individual measures"), it was reported that all the Allies apart from France had agreed to announce within the next few weeks steps to be taken against the Soviet Union.

A statement issued at the end of the meeting condemned the Soviet intervention as a severe blow to détente and called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. It must be made clear to the Soviet Union, said the statement, that in NATO's view détente was indivisible and must be reciprocal, and that as long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan efforts to maintain détente were endangered.

During his visit to Europe Mr Christopher also had talks with government officials in London, Bonn, Paris and Rome on Jan. 14-16 and said afterwards that the assessment of the Afghan situation by all these countries had been similar.

Evolution of French and West German Attitudes to Afghan Situation

Among individual NATO countries, France and West Germany, while publicly expressing support for President Carter's stand on Afghanistan, showed some reluctance to pursue policies which might damage détente.

Herr Schmidt was believed to be particularly concerned at the current threat to détente (regarded as one of the major achievements of the West German Government over the past 10 years) and the possible repercussions on West Berlin and on East-West relations.

According to official West German sources in mid-January, the Bonn Government felt that President Carter's decisions were linked to his 1980 re-election campaign and that moderation was called for rather than military measures whose effects might prove difficult to control. Herr Genscher (the Foreign Minister) flew to the United States on Jan. 18 for talks with President Carter in which West German reservations over US policy were reported to have been expressed.

The French Foreign Minister, M. Jean François-Poncet, said on Jan. 6 during a radio news programme that France was "deeply attached to détente, but without weakness or complacency", and that, before drawing pessimistic conclusions, France intended to "pursue a dialogue with the Soviet Union to stress its responsibility". He added that the move into Afghanistan violated the global nature of détente, that both sides profited from détente, and that it would be extremely foolish to sacrifice in a few days all the gains which had been made through détente.

M. François-Poncet's statements were immediately attacked by M. Bernard Pons, the secretary-general of the Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la république* (one of the two main components of the Government), who called them "timorous and vague"; he said that "preserving détente has never implied providing an umbrella for hegemonist enterprises", and that there was no better way for France to assert its independence than by being the first country to stand up for the fundamental right of nations to self-determination.

However, in what was regarded as a hardening of France's attitude towards the Soviet Union, the French Cabinet on Jan. 9 issued a statement demanding "positive gestures" from the Soviet Union if détente was to be maintained.

The statement said: "The events in Afghanistan are in contradiction to the fundamental principles which govern international life and French policy; this explains the French vote in the Security Council [see above]. These events have struck a blow to the policy of détente, to which France is sincerely but not unconditionally attached. France does not intend to abandon the search for détente, which is of reciprocal interest and the alternative to which is a return to the cold war, but the confidence necessary for its pursuit must be restored by positive gestures concerning, notably, the Afghan people's right to self-determination."

Later on Jan. 9 President Giscard d'Estaing had talks in Paris with Herr Schmidt, who was returning from a vacation in Majorca, an Elysée spokesman stating afterwards that there had been a "convergence of analysis" on current international problems. Herr Schmidt had also stopped over in Madrid on Jan. 8 to confer with the Spanish Prime Minister, Sr Adolfo Suárez González, and had stated at a press conference in Madrid that West Germany had no plans for sanctions against the USSR and that the West should maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Union.

After Herr Schmidt's return to Bonn the Federal Security Council met on Jan. 10 for consultations. A statement issued by the Council on Jan. 11 said that the West German Government intended to make its contribution to any concerted action undertaken by the Western Allies and would fulfil its defence commitment, but that it would at the same time continue to pursue its policy of détente.

The statement added that the Soviet intervention in a non-aligned country must make the Third World realize that Moscow did not shy from using power to force its will on a sovereign state; the Soviet move, it said, had damaged co-operation between East and West, which was based on mutual trust and the renunciation of force.

In a formal statement to the *Bundestag* (Lower House of the Federal Parliament) on Jan. 17 on the international situation and its domestic consequences, Herr Schmidt said that he intended to go ahead with plans to meet President Brezhnev and the East German leader, Herr Erich Honecker, over the next few months [see 30087 A]; at the same time the Government would intensify efforts for peace and détente and persist in moves to reduce and control arms. Herr Schmidt described the United States as an "absolutely reliable ally and friend".

Herr Schmidt said that West Germany would further increase its aid to countries such as India, Pakistan and Turkey and that ministers were already involved in talks on co-operation with the Gulf states. What was needed in the situation was "carefully thought out crisis management", which was not the same as the "pussyfooting" of which the opposition had accused the Government.

However, the East German Government later in the month called off the talks between Herr Schmidt and Herr Honecker planned for February 1980 in East Berlin. A number of other East-West contacts were also cancelled at the end of January by the countries concerned, the Czech Government informing the West German Foreign Minister that it would no longer be convenient for him to visit Prague in February and the Hungarian Foreign Minister postponing a visit to Bonn scheduled for Feb. 7. The Soviet Union had on Jan. 9 cancelled a meeting on joint economic development with West Germany which had been due to take place on Jan. 31.

Meanwhile, President Giscard d'Estaing on Jan. 15 sent President Brezhnev a letter again insisting on some positive sign that Moscow wished to pursue détente. In response to this a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Georgy Korniyenko (acting under a protocol of Oct. 13, 1970, according to which the two countries would consult each other in situations threatening world peace—see 24360 A), flew to Paris on Jan. 23 for talks. A communiqué issued by the French Government on Jan. 24 after several hours of talks between Mr Korniyenko and M. François-Poncet recalled that "the French Government considered the Soviet intervention unacceptable and that such an action constituted a serious threat to the achievements of détente".

Noting the expressed Soviet intention to withdraw from Afghanistan as soon as conditions allowed, M. François-Poncet said that the time and the means of carrying out this intention would be decisive in assessing whether it was possible to restore in Afghanistan a situation in which the rights of the people and the requirements of peace were respected.

Mr Korniyenko arrived in Paris at the same time as the president of the French National Assembly, M. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who had left Moscow prematurely (having arrived on Jan. 21 for a 10-day visit) on learning of the arrest of the Soviet dissident, Dr Andrei Sakharov [see 30243 B].

Proposed US Boycott of Olympic Games

In a television interview on Jan. 20 President Carter proposed that, in order to make the world realize "how serious a threat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is", the Moscow Olympic Games should either be moved to another country, postponed or cancelled unless the Soviet Union withdrew its troops within a month, i.e. by Feb. 20. President Carter also supported the establishment of a permanent home for the games and proposed Greece as an ideal site. [The winter Olympics took place as planned at Lake Placid, in New York state, from Feb. 13 to 24, 1980.]

In a letter sent on the same day (Jan. 20) to the president of the US Olympic Committee (USOC), Mr Robert J. Kane, Mr Carter stated inter alia:

"In the Soviet Union international sports competition is itself an aspect of Soviet Government policy, as is the decision to invade Afghanistan. The head of the Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee is a high Soviet Government official.

"The Soviet Government attaches enormous political importance to the holding of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, and if the Olympics are not held in Moscow because of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan, this powerful signal of world outrage cannot be hidden from the Soviet people, and will reverberate around the globe. Perhaps it will deter future aggression.

"I therefore urge the USOC, in co-operation with other national Olympic committees, to advise the International Olympic Committee that if Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will become an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and goodwill. Should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its troops within the time prescribed above, I urge the USOC to propose that the games either be transferred to another site such as Montreal [the site of the 1976 games—see 28004 C] or to multiple sites, or be cancelled for this year. If the International Olympic Committee rejects such a USOC proposal, I urge the USOC and the Olympic committees of other like-minded nations not to participate in the Moscow games. In this event, if suitable arrangements can be made, I urge that such nations conduct alternative games of their own this summer at some other appropriate site or sites. The United States Government is prepared to lend its full support to any and all such efforts. . . .

"I also urge that the IOC take a further step to eliminate future political competition among nations to serve as hosts for the Olympic Games. I call upon all nations to join in supporting a permanent site for the summer Olympics in Greece and to seek an appropriate permanent site for the Winter Olympics.

"The course I am urging is necessary to help secure the peace of the world at this critical time. The most important task of world leaders, public and private, is to deter aggression and prevent war. Aggression destroys the international amity and goodwill that the Olympic movement seeks to foster. If our response to aggression is to continue with international sports as usual in the capital of the aggressor, our other steps to deter aggression are undermined."

On the following day (Jan. 21) President Carter sent personal messages to more than 100 heads of government seeking their support for his proposals.

On Jan. 24 the House of Representatives approved by 386 votes to 12 a resolution urging the USOC to press for the transfer or cancellation of the games if the USSR did not withdraw its troops by Feb. 20 and asking the committee to boycott the games if they were not transferred or cancelled. A Senate resolution approved on Jan. 29 by 88 votes to four urged all US athletes and potential spectators to boycott the Olympics unless Soviet troops withdrew by Feb. 20.

In a commentary distributed by Tass on Jan. 21 the Soviet Union accused President Carter of using the Olympic Games as an electoral gambit and of trying to "disrupt détente and undermine peaceful co-operation among peoples". It added that "athletes and the sports movement are assigned, in his present adventure, the role of some kind of hostages, even though Carter of late has repeatedly denounced the use of hostages for the attainment of political ends" [i.e. in connexion with the seizure of US hostages in Tehran].

US and British Diplomatic Initiatives - Talks with Pakistan on US Military Assistance - Chinese Visit to Pakistan

Meanwhile, the United States and Britain began individual diplomatic initiatives in the countries of the South Asia region, as part of which the US Defence Secretary, Dr Harold Brown, paid visits to China and Japan, while the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, toured six countries to assess the situation in the region. At the same time the USA initiated talks with Pakistan on providing it with military assistance, and the Chinese Foreign Minister visited Pakistan.

Dr Brown's Visits to China and Japan

Dr Harold Brown paid a visit to China on Jan. 5-9, during which he had talks with his Chinese counterpart, Marshal Xu Xianqian, with two Deputy Premiers (Mr Deng Xiaoping and Mr Geng Biao) and with the Foreign Minister, Mr Huang Hua. Dr Brown said at a banquet on Jan. 6 that if Chinese and US interests were threatened "we can respond with complementary actions in the field of defence as well as diplomacy" and that he had come to China to "broaden the security dialogue" between the two Governments.

However, Dr Brown said at a press conference in Peking on Jan. 9 that, while the US and Chinese views on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan were "very closely parallel about the need to strengthen other nations in the region", each had said that they would "take appropriate steps in this way" and no joint steps were planned.

Dr Brown said that the USA had no plans to sell arms to China, but a high military delegation would visit the USA later in 1980 and the United States would be receptive to Chinese requests for the transfer of high technology equipment. The Afghan crisis "demonstrated the practical value of the new relationship" between the USA and China since the normalization of relations in 1979 [see 29533 A], and in the 1980s the two countries would "deepen and broaden bilateral relations and begin to discuss the areas in which both sides have common strategic objectives".

Dr Brown noted that China had expressed concern at the continued US troop presence in South Korea and at the US decision, announced on Jan. 3, to sell arms to Taiwan [in the form of anti-aircraft missiles and other defensive weapons, subject to congressional approval].

During his visit it was announced in Peking on Jan. 8 that the USA had agreed to sell China a ground receiving station for data transmitted by the US Landsat-D satellite system (which had possible military applications).

Dr Brown stopped over in Japan on Jan. 14 after visiting China and called on the Japanese Government to provide Pakistan with increased economic aid to contribute to the security of the region, adding that he hoped that Japan would also increase its own defence spending. The Foreign Minister, Dr Saburo Okita, said that Japan would make due efforts to extend economic and other non-military aid to Pakistan, while the then Director-General of the Defence Agency, Mr Enji Kubota, said that the Government had decided to appropriate for the fiscal year 1980 a sum for defence spending exceeding by 6.5 per cent that for fiscal 1979 (ending on March 31, 1980), and that this was awaiting the approval of the Diet.

The Japanese Diet had on Jan. 11 decided to postpone a visit by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister who had been due to negotiate a Japanese loan for Siberian development projects. Japan had also said that it would respect "scrupulously" the rules of the Inter-Allied Co-ordinating Committee for East-West Trade—Cocom (a Paris-based body, comprising Japan and all NATO countries except Iceland, which was responsible for the supervision of the sale of strategic materials to communist nations—see 21014 A and also 29502 A).

Japan decided on Jan. 24 to contribute some $4,000,000 to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to aid Afghans who had fled to Pakistan.

At the conclusion of a visit to Australia the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Masayoshi Ohira, issued a joint statement with the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, on Jan. 16 in which both countries deplored the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and called on Moscow to cease its military activity there. According to government officials in Australia, the security of the Pacific region in view of the prevailing world situation had been discussed and Mr Ohira had noted an Australian request for Japanese aid to the newly independent South Pacific nations.

Talks on US Military Aid to Pakistan - Chinese Foreign Minister's Visit to Pakistan

Following talks in Washington on Jan. 11-13 attended by President Carter, Mr Vance, Dr Brzezinski and a Pakistani delegation headed by Mr Agha Shahi (the Pakistan Foreign Affairs Adviser to the President), it was reported by US officials that the United States had offered Pakistan $400,000,000 in economic and military aid over the next two years, subject to congressional approval. It was stressed that the military equipment and arms provided would be of a defensive nature only, so that no threat would be posed to India.

However, President Zia on Jan. 17 dismissed the "unofficial" offer of $400,000,000 as "peanuts" and called for a new US-Pakistan defence treaty to replace the 1959 agreement [see above] in view of the Soviet threat. The US State Department spokesman, Mr Hodding Carter, said on Jan. 18 that he disagreed with this description of the US aid offered and that the amount was "both substantial and responsive to Pakistan's needs".

Mr Carter said that the USA had "reaffirmed" the 1959 agreement in strong terms, assuring Pakistan of "the seriousness with which we take our obligations under it", and felt that drafting a new treaty would delay talks on the first part of the proposed aid package (which would be supplementary to the current year's fiscal requests). The USA saw its aid as "part of a larger assistance effort" which was being discussed with "other friends of Pakistan".

It was reported on Jan. 23 that Pakistan intended to ask the United States for at least $2,600 million in military aid (half of this to be used to replace old equipment and the other half to redeploy forces along the Afghan border). Following talks in Islamabad on Feb. 2-3 between Dr Brzezinski, Mr Warren Christopher and President Zia, the United States shelved its plans to offer $400,000,000 pending further consultations.

The Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr Huang Hua, visited Pakistan from Jan. 18 to 23 on an official visit, stating on his arrival in Islamabad that developments in Afghanistan had added new significance to his visit. At the conclusion of the visit, during which he had consultations with Mr Shahi, Mr Hua told a press conference that his talks with the Pakistan Government had been mainly concerned with Afghanistan and he called on the world, "above all the USA, Western Europe and Japan", to give "real support to Afghanistan's neighbours in order to counter the Soviet power".

Mr Hua said that China felt that the Soviet invasion was another step towards the Gulf oilfields with the aim of isolating the United

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States and the West; the industrial powers and other peace-loving nations must work out a joint strategy over Afghanistan and must avoid a third world war by being aware of Soviet expansionism. Mr Hua supported the call for a change of venue for the Olympic Games.

According to the Lahore Urdu-language daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, China had offered to give Pakistan full military and economic support in the face of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. However, Mr Shahi told a press conference on Jan. 22 that no agreements on military aid had been concluded with China, nor had there been talk of military co-operation between the USA, Pakistan and China.

During his visit Mr Hua went to a refugee camp near Peshawar on Jan. 20, where he told the refugees that China would never allow the legitimization of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said in Peking on Jan. 19 that negotiations on the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union (the first phase of which had begun on Oct. 17, 1979, in Moscow and had ended on Nov. 30) had been suspended. [For earlier Sino-Soviet relations, see 28261 A.]

Lord Carrington's Tour

Lord Carrington began his tour in Turkey on Jan. 9-10 and continued through Oman, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (making a brief stopover in Bahrain), ending in India from Jan. 16 to 18.

In Turkey, he had two days of talks with the Foreign Minister, Senator Hayrettin Erkmen, where the two sides agreed on the hope that Afghanistan would regain its independence as soon as possible.



(*Carpress*)

In Oman (Jan. 11-13) Lord Carrington was received by Sultan Qaboos bin Said and had talks with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Qais Abdulmunim Al-Zawawi, who said that co-ordinated action should be taken by the countries of the area, with Western assistance, to deal with the situation confronting them. Oman wanted help from the West to defend itself, particularly military assistance and training for the Omani armed forces, but did not want foreign troops on its territory.

Mr Zawawi said that the USSR, with its "expansionist policy", used every opportunity when the West was "caught napping" or was lacking in resolve to take military action; Oman felt that the Soviet Union would try to "move further south to warm waters, into the Gulf of Oman", and that if it intervened in the area "we would expect a response by the Americans to redress the balance".

Lord Carrington on Jan. 12 made a helicopter flight over the strategic Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf, between Oman and Iran, through which much of the West's oil supplies are shipped, and afterwards praised the preparedness of Omani defence forces around the strait. (Since Nov. 25, 1979—i.e. three weeks after the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran—a Soviet naval surveillance ship had reportedly been stationed at the eastern end of the strait, in a narrow section of international waters between the Iranian and Omani territorial sectors.)

Lord Carrington arrived in Saudi Arabia on Jan. 14 for talks with King Khaled, Crown Prince Fahd and the Foreign Affairs and Defence ministers. Other recent visitors to Saudi Arabia had included President Zia of Pakistan, King Hussein of Jordan, and a US diplomatic team.

The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal, said on Jan. 14 in a statement on the talks that the international community had an obligation to respond to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but that the states of the region did not want foreign troops in the area, no matter what the reason.

Saudi Arabia was understood to have told Lord Carrington that it would be prepared to help finance the purchase of arms by Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was also calling for all Moslem nations to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions on the Soviet Union and to express their protests at the forthcoming Islamic conference [see below].

Lord Carrington arrived in Pakistan later on Jan. 14 and had talks the next day with Gen. Zia. Afterwards Gen. Zia told a press conference that Pakistan intended to move against any Soviet or Afghan troops who crossed the Pakistani border in hot pursuit of rebels, adding that "when a foreigner enters your territory with aggressive intent you do not go and kiss him on the cheek". However, he said, Pakistan could not ignore the presence of a super-power in the region and wanted to achieve good relations and greater understanding with the Soviet Union.

Lord Carrington told a press conference on Jan. 16 (after he had visited the Khyber Pass and a refugee camp) that he did not expect the USSR to embark quickly on another military adventure in South-West Asia because it needed time to "digest Afghanistan"; however, the West would be unwise not to prepare to defend its interests either from a "military or a subversive" Russian attack. Concerning Pakistan's relations with India, Lord Carrington said that the strengthening of the former's armed forces would, he had been assured, be in no way against Indian interests, and Britain and its allies would do their best to ensure that Pakistan remained an independent country as well as to safeguard Pakistan's security.

In India (Jan. 16-18) Lord Carrington met the new Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi (who had been sworn in on Jan. 14 after the electoral victory of her party earlier in the month) but the two sides failed to find a common stand on the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Lord Carrington stated at the conclusion of a 45-minute talk with Mrs Gandhi on Jan. 16 that there was scope for "differences of perspective"; Britain and India both wanted the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, he said, but neither side had a ready-made prescription on the best way to achieve this.

In what appeared to be a modification of the pro-Soviet position expressed by the Indian delegate at the emergency session of the UN General Assembly [see above], Mrs Gandhi said at a press conference after her talks with Lord Carrington that no country was justified in entering another country, and that India did not support the Soviet action in Afghanistan. She had agreed with Lord Carrington on the danger of the situation in the region due to the Soviet intervention, but had not entirely agreed with his assessment of the situation.

The Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, told the *Lok Sabha* (Lower House) of the Indian Parliament on Jan. 23 that the Government had expressed the hope that Soviet troops would withdraw from Afghanistan and expressed concern over the presence of foreign troops in other countries. India had, he said, also expressed concern that US arms supplies would "convert the South Asia region into a theatre of great-power confrontation and conflict".

Assessing his tour on his return to London, Lord Carrington said on Jan. 18 that "the danger point would be to have either the Soviet Union or a puppet of the Soviet Union in an area of such strategic importance in the middle of the Moslem world capable of fomenting unrest and subversion in that area".

It was reported from Beirut on Jan. 21 that Saudi Arabia had informed the USA and Britain that the USSR and Cuba had strongly reinforced their military presence in South Yemen in recent weeks, claiming that "hundreds" of Cuban troops and "dozens" of Soviet officers and experts had been airlifted into Aden since the military intervention in Afghanistan. [For earlier recent increase in Soviet and Cuban military aid to South Yemen see page 30199.]

British Measures in Response to Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

A week after his return from South-West Asia, Lord Carrington announced in a statement to the House of Lords on Jan. 24 a number of measures against the Soviet Union. These were

(i) the avoidance of high-level and ministerial contacts with the USSR; (ii) the cancellation of military exchanges; (iii) an increase in the BBC's external services broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; and (iv) the non-renewal of the 1975 credit agreement which was due to expire on Feb. 16, 1980 [see 27013 A].

Moreover, Lord Carrington continued, Britain was studying with other countries the "tighter application" of rules under Cocom for controlling the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union; the EEC had decided not to export any food to the Soviet Union to replace, directly or indirectly, the supplies denied by the USA; cultural and other events which "give an impression that nothing has changed and thus appear to condone Soviet aggression" would be avoided; and, Lord Carrington added, the Government believed that the Olympic Games should be moved away from Moscow.

The Foreign Secretary said in his statement: ". . . The Soviet action is a breach of all the conventions which have governed East-West relations for the last decade. It is a vivid demonstration of the Soviet drive to gain wider influence wherever possible, by propaganda, by subversion, and where necessary by force.

"Together with the arrest of the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Dr Sakharov, it reflects cynical disregard for world opinion. It is bound to affect our attitude in current and future negotiations between East and West, though we naturally want these to continue where they clearly serve our own interests as well as those of the Soviet Union. . . . One is bound to ask where the Russian drive is to stop. If the Russians are to be deterred, a sustained and significant response will be needed, not only from the West but from the countries which themselves feel threatened. . . .

"The West itself needs to find ways to make the Russians understand that they cannot break the rules of international behaviour with impunity, either now or in the future. This entails responses by individual countries, and by the West's collective organizations, above all by NATO and the European Community. . . ."

On the cancellation of the credit agreement Lord Carrington said: "The Government's view is that all trade should be pursued on a basis of mutual advantage. We shall apply that principle to British-Soviet trade. We do not propose to renew the credit agreement when it expires. Credit in future will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

"Assuming that other Western countries do likewise—which would be very much to our collective advantage—we shall not provide export credit to the Soviet Union at rates more favourable than those set by the international consensus on credit terms. . . ."

On the Olympic Games Lord Carrington stated: "As in 1936 for the Nazi government, so now for the Soviet Union the Olympic Games are a major political undertaking designed to impress the whole world with the prestige of the system.

"For the Games now to be held in Moscow would appear to condone Soviet aggression abroad and repression at home.

"But for the Games to be cancelled entirely would be a bitter blow to the athletes, in Britain and elsewhere, who have trained so hard for so many years.

"This is why the British Government believes that the summer games should be moved. That will not be easy, but it should not be beyond the capacity of the 104 countries which condemned the Soviet Union in the United Nations last week. If necessary the games could be held in more than one country.

"The Prime Minister has accordingly urged the British Olympic Association to approach the International Olympic Committee to propose that the summer games be moved from Moscow. The Government is fully prepared to help with arrangements for those parts of the games which might be held in this country. . . ."

In conclusion, Lord Carrington said: "It is right that the Russians should feel the strength of our disapproval. That should help them to avoid miscalculation in future. But it is also right that we should where possible continue to search for arms control agreements, commercially justified trade, and other arrangements of mutual benefit. In the long run both we and the Russians need a sound East-West relationship. But the Russians must understand that there can be no such relationship so long as they behave as outrageously as they have done in Afghanistan."

The British ambassador to Kabul had been recalled to London for consultations on Jan. 11.

On Jan. 21 the international committee of the Labour Party (represented by Mr Tony Benn, Mr Eric Heffer and Miss Joan Lestor) told the Soviet ambassador, Mr Lunkov, at a meeting that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had done untold damage to progressive forces throughout the world and demanded the early withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Canadian and New Zealand Sanctions against USSR - Canadian Expulsion of Soviet Embassy Staff as Spies

The then Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Joseph Clark, on Jan. 11 announced the following measures against the Soviet Union: (i) Canada would support the US grain embargo (compensating Canadian producers for loss of income) and the ban on high technology exports to the USSR; (ii) an existing Canadian credit line to the USSR had been stopped and would not be renewed; (iii) all forthcoming visits at ministerial or senior official level would be postponed or cancelled; (iv) scientific and cultural exchanges would be cancelled or restricted; (v) negotiations towards a consular agreement would be cancelled; and (vi) Aeroflot flights to Canada would be restricted.

The Canadian Government on Jan. 21 announced the expulsion of the Soviet military, naval and air attaché in Ottawa together with an assistant and a chauffeur on charges of spying. The then Minister of External Affairs, Miss Flora MacDonald, said at a press conference the same day that investigations had been in progress for 16 months and that she had summoned the Soviet ambassador to inform him of the Government's decision and to warn the USSR against taking reprisals against Canada. [For earlier expulsions of Soviet nationals by Canada in 1978, see 29284 A.]

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union subsequently expelled the Canadian defence and air attaché, Col. Harold Gold, from Moscow, claiming that he also was a spy. The Canadian Government accordingly announced on Feb. 3 the reduction of the number of Soviet embassy staff in Canada (currently numbering about 60, compared with about 38 Canadians in Moscow).

The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr Robert Muldoon, announced on Jan. 22 after the first cabinet meeting of the year that New Zealand intended to reduce the Soviet fishing quota in New Zealand waters for the season beginning April 1 as part of a package of reprisals. He also said that official contacts with Moscow would be curtailed, that dock facilities at Auckland would be denied to Soviet ships, and that the Government would support a change of venue for the Olympic Games.

On the same day a Novosti press agency journalist was ordered to leave the country within 72 hours as a protest against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. [The Soviet ambassador was subsequently expelled on Jan. 24 and the New Zealand ambassador on Jan. 29 ordered to leave Moscow—see 30192 A.]

Meeting of Islamic Foreign Ministers - Adoption of Resolution condemning Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

At the instigation of Saudi Arabia, an extraordinary meeting of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Islamabad on Jan. 27-29, primarily to discuss the Afghanistan issue but also, at the request of Iran, to consider the question of foreign pressures on Moslem countries. The opening of the conference was postponed by one day at the request of Iran on the grounds that the date originally scheduled for the opening, Jan. 26, coincided with the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel (following the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Western Sinai on Jan. 25—see also page 29955) and that attention would have been distracted from the Islamic Conference's decisions.

Those countries constituting the Arab "steadfastness front"—Syria, Libya, Algeria and South Yemen, together with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—had met in Damascus (Syria) on Jan. 17 and called for a change of date and venue (judging Pakistan to be involved in the conflict), and had also decided that the energies of the Moslem world should be devoted to the Egypt-Israeli issue. With the change of date, however, Algeria and Libya sent delegations to the conference, but Syria and South Yemen were absent and the PLO said that its delegation was attending merely as an observer (although it voted on the resolution). Nigeria attended as an observer.

Afghanistan boycotted the conference on the grounds that it constituted an "imperialist plot" against Afghanistan, an instrument of propaganda and an interference in internal affairs; any "decisions directed against the interests of the Afghan people" would be regarded as "invalid and jeopardizing Islamic solidarity". Egypt had been suspended from membership of the Conference in May 1979 [see page 29953].

The 36 members represented at the meeting (out of a potential 40 countries) were Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,

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Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, PLO, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, North Yemen.

Representatives of six Afghan rebel organizations which on Jan. 27 announced their decision to join forces as the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan attended the conference and asked to be granted observer status as well as calling for military and economic assistance.

The six organizations were (i) the Islamic Afghan Association (*Jamaat-i-Islami Afghanistan*) led by Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani; (ii) the Movement for the Islamic Revolution (*Harkat-i-Inkalab-i-Islami*); (iii) the National Liberation Front led by the Imam Seghbatullah Mujjaddedi; (iv) the Afghan Islamic and Nationalist Revolutionary Council led by Sayed Ahmed Gailani; (v) a faction of the Islamic Party (*Hizb-i-Islami*) led by Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and (vi) another faction of the Islamic Party led by Maulavi Mohammad Yunus Khales. (For further information on rebel formations, see 29878 A and 29641 A.)

In the course of the meeting all 36 members present approved a resolution which strongly condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, suspended the latter's membership of the Islamic Conference, and urged a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games.

The resolution (i) condemned the "Soviet military aggression against the Afghan people", denounced and deplored it as a flagrant violation of international laws, primarily the UN and Islamic Conference charters, and called upon the world to persist in condemning it as "an aggression against human rights and a violation of the freedoms of people which cannot be ignored"; (ii) demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, reiterated that Soviet troops should refrain from "acts of oppression and tyranny against the Afghan people and their struggling sons until the departure of the last Soviet soldier from Afghanistan", and urged all countries and peoples to "secure the Soviet withdrawal through all possible means"; (iii) decided to suspend Afghanistan's membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference; (iv) invited member states to withhold recognition from the "illegal regime" and to sever diplomatic relations until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops [nine countries lodging reservations against this section]; (v) called for the withholding of all forms of assistance from the Afghan regime; (vi) urged support for the Afghan people and aid for Afghan refugees; (vii) recommended that member states should affirm their solidarity with the Afghans in safeguarding their faith, independence, territorial integrity and the recovery of the right to determine their destiny; (viii) declared complete solidarity with the Islamic countries neighbouring Afghanistan against any threat to their security and wellbeing; (ix) authorized contributions to be received and disbursed on the recommendations of a three-member committee to be established; (x) called upon all members to consider boycotting the Moscow Olympics unless the USSR withdrew its troops [11 members, however, registering objections to this call]; and (xi) mandated the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of these resolutions and to report on them to the next meeting.

In another resolution the Conference condemned "the efforts of certain great powers to exert various forms of pressures on the Islamic states, threatening the use of force against them to interfere in their internal affairs and to establish military bases on their territories to protect the interests of those great powers and their strategic plans in the context of the struggle raging between them".

Drawing attention to "the current attempts by certain Western powers to exploit the new situation created by Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan for reintroducing imperialist intervention in the Islamic world, particularly in the region near Afghanistan", the resolution (i) strongly condemned pressures of all kinds and warned these countries of the "dire consequences" which would constitute a threat to world peace and security; (ii) warned member states of the dangers of being drawn into the plans and strategies of the superpowers and of turning the area into an arena for their conflict; and (iii) invited all the Islamic states to "consolidate their efforts and stand steadfast in the face of the dangers which threaten their destiny "and to co-operate with the Third World as a whole to face up to "the dangers which threaten us all".

Furthermore, the conference passed a resolution on the "increasing tension" between the USA and Iran and reaffirmed the right of all states to exercise "permanent, total and effective sovereignty over their natural and other resources and over the control of their economic assets and activities". Eight African Moslem countries which had opposed the mention by name of the United States registered reservations against the resolution.

The resolution (i) affirmed "the vital stake of the Islamic Conference in the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" of Iran; (ii) expressed the sincere wish that Iran and the USA should "resolve the outstanding problems between themselves by peaceful means"; (iii) declared "firm opposition to any threat or use of force or any kind of intimidation or interference or imposition of economic sanctions" against Iran or any Islamic country; and (iv) declared "solidarity with the Moslem people of Iran in choosing whatever system it prefers based on the tenets of Islam as a system of social and political life".

(It was reported by diplomatic sources that during the closed debate several countries led by Saudi Arabia and Iraq and including Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, Tunisia and Niger had urged Iran to release the US hostages.)

Among other resolutions passed at the conference was one condemning Soviet military involvement in the Horn of Africa.

The resolution (i) condemned "the armed aggression against the Democratic Republic of Somalia" and denounced the presence of "the military forces of the Soviet Union and some of its allies" in the Horn of Africa [see 30015 A]; (ii) called for the total and unconditional withdrawal of these foreign troops; (iii) called for the liquidation of foreign bases in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, and the removal of these areas from conflict between the great powers; and (iv) urged the material and moral strengthening of the Islamic peoples in the Horn of Africa and the provision of assistance to refugees in the area, particularly the Eritrean people.

A resolution on the Egypt-Israeli conflict called upon all Moslem countries to consider joining in the Arab boycott of Egypt.

The Soviet Union, which had denounced the Islamic Conference meeting before its commencement as an attempt to split the Moslem world and divert attention from the real issues of US pressure on Iran and the Israeli-occupied territories, said on Jan. 29 without reporting the Afghan resolution that the USA was trying to "isolate Arab countries from their tested friends".

Mr Gromyko's Visits to Syria and Romania

Mr Andrei Gromyko (the Soviet Foreign Minister) paid a three-day visit to Syria on Jan. 27-29 during which he had talks with President Hafez Assad and the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr Abdel Halim Khaddam, and also met the PLO leader, Mr Yassir Arafat. In speeches during his visit Mr Gromyko praised Syria for standing "in the forefront of those states resolutely opposed to the revival of the cold war" and promised that the Soviet Union would "support Syria and other Arab states seeking to eliminate the traces of Israeli aggression by every possible means".

Mr Gromyko described the United States as being "the worst enemy of Islam and the third-world countries" and said that it was using the overthrow by the Afghans themselves of "the traitor Amin" to try to convince the Islamic world that it needed protection against "so-called Soviet ambitions". The United States was also, he said, spreading lies about the Soviet Union's alleged aim of attaining a warm-water port in the Indian Ocean.

Mr Khaddam said in a speech that Syria refused to place the Soviet Union "in the same rank as any state which aids Israel" and accused "imperialists" of trying to drive a wedge between the Arabs and their "close friend the Soviet Union".

The PLO foreign affairs spokesman, Mr Faruk Kaddumi, had said in mid-January in an interview with a Beirut weekly that the PLO was in agreement with Syria on trying to attain "a position of positive neutrality" over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Like Syria, the PLO was against this intervention "in principle" but did not want to become involved in an internal conflict.

After returning from Syria Mr Gromyko flew to Romania on Jan. 31 for a three-day visit, at the same time as the Romanian Foreign Minister, Mr Stefan Andrei, had talks in Moscow (from Jan. 29 to Feb. 2). After Mr Gromyko's visit Tass reported that he and President Ceausescu had discussed "questions relating to the activities of the defence organization" of the socialist countries of Europe in anticipation of the 25th anniversary of the signature of the Warsaw Pact.

The Romanian agency Agerpres said that talks had been "warm and friendly" and that ways of reducing tension had been examined, it being established that "the efforts undertaken were necessary in view of the pursuit of a policy of co-operation based on . . . respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs".

However, it was reported from unofficial sources in Bucharest that during his visit Mr Gromyko had called on Romania to use its good contacts in the West to obtain the goods embargoed by the United States; to abandon its co-operation with Yugoslavia in the development of a fighter aircraft; to refuse political, military or diplomatic support to any country which was in dispute with the Soviet Union; to take its armed forces off the state of alert (in which they had been for over a year, since Soviet troops had been stationed in Moldavia, near the Romanian border); and to co-ordinate its international actions with the "socialist community of states". Romania had also again been requested to provide a transit corridor over its territory to Bulgaria and other Balkan states.

President Ceausescu had on Jan. 17 told a congress of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front (embracing the Communist Party and the various mass organizations) in Bucharest that the current international situation was "the most tense since World War II" and had condemned "military adventures". Romania would, he said, "defend its national independence and sovereignty" by re-equipping the Army and intensifying the training of workers' militias and paramilitary youth groups, and he called on Romanians to "make every effort to strengthen the unity and might of our nation and to defend its revolutionary achievements".

Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr Poul Hartling, appealed on Jan. 16 for international aid amounting to $55,000,000 for some 500,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan whose numbers, it was reported from other sources, were expected to reach 1,000,000 by March 1980. The UNHCR's initial assistance budget for Afghan refugees had called for an expenditure of only $10,000,000 for the year beginning Oct. 1, 1979, but these figures had been based on a refugee figure of only 185,000.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Financial Times - Economist - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Japan Times - The Statesman, Calcutta - Embassy of Pakistan, London - US International Communication Agency - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. Developments in Afghanistan 30031 A, 29878 A, 29641 A; SALT II Treaty 30117 A; NATO Decisions on Nuclear Weapons 30159 A; Iran 30141 A, 30205 A*)

A. AFRICA — West Africa - Proposed Guinean Accession to Mano River Union

At a summit meeting held in Sierra Leone on Jan. 31, 1980, between President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, President William Tolbert of Liberia and President Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea, the last-named announced his country's intention to submit a formal application for membership of the Mano River Union formed by Sierra Leone and Liberia in 1973 to foster economic co-operation [see page 29071]. The summit conference was held in the small town of Conakry Dee ("Little Conakry"), this venue having been selected by President Stevens as "a clear example of the arbitrary division by the colonialists of countries and peoples sharing a common history, heritage and destiny" (the capital of Guinea being similarly named Conakry).

The three heads of state reviewed a report prepared on the previous day at an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Mano River Union, held in the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, and attended by a ministerial delegation from Guinea, at which it had been agreed that Guinea should join the Union as a full member. The report proposed that there should be a six-month period of consultation and negotiation between Guinea and the Union's secretariat following the submission of a formal membership application, during which Guinea would participate in the Union's activities as an observer while the terms of its accession were finalized; that the secretariat should report to the Council of Ministers on the outcome of these negotiations in August 1980; and that Guinea should formally accede to membership on Oct. 3, 1980 (the seventh anniversary of the foundation of the Union).

President Stevens said that Guinea's admission to the Union would enable the three countries "to make the best use of their fundamental identity of interests", would facilitate a more efficient use of resources by taking advantage of economies of scale (particularly by creating a market large enough to support industrial projects which would not otherwise be viable), and would "provide a better bargaining position in international negotiations". President Tolbert said that the Union had been recognized in Africa and abroad as "the most effective instrument of translating regional plans and programmes into practical action at the sub-regional level". President Sekou Touré said that Guinea unreservedly supported the aims and objectives of the Union, and stood ready to make its contribution towards their fulfilment.—(West Africa) (*Prev. rep. page 29071*)

B. SOVIET UNION — Internal Exile of Dr Sakharov following Statements on Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan

Dr Andrei Sakharov, a prominent Soviet nuclear scientist, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975 and the most important spokesman of the civil rights movement in the Soviet Union, was on Jan. 22, 1980, stripped of all state awards and other official honours and removed from his home in Moscow to internal exile in the industrial city of Gorky which is permanently closed to all foreigners. Dr Sakharov's wife, Mrs Yelena Bonner Sakharova, while not officially exiled, travelled with him to Gorky, which is about 250 miles east of Moscow.

Dr Sakharov was arrested on Jan. 22 by Soviet police while travelling to a meeting of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, of which he was a member but from which he was subsequently effectively excluded [see below]. An administrative decree was issued on Jan. 22 ordering his exile, and he was transferred to Gorky later the same day. No charges were brought against him, and hence no trial was required before his removal.

The removal of Dr Sakharov from Moscow followed his signature on Jan. 21 of a statement published on Jan. 24 by an unofficial committee formed to monitor Soviet adherence to the terms of the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE—see 27301 A). The statement protested at the recent involvement of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in late December 1979 [see 30229 A], and alleged that the Soviet Government had no popular support at home for such a move.

"A mighty super-power with a population of 260,000,000 is suppressing the independence of Afghanistan, a nation of 17,000,000, while the Soviet mass media claim that our people unanimously approve", said the statement, adding that "in reality the people of the Soviet Union have neither truthful information nor the right to express their attitude even to such arbitrary governmental actions as the launching of another unjust war."

Dr Sakharov added on Jan. 24 in a telephone call from Gorky that he wished the statement to be addressed not merely to workers, scientists, artists and social and political leaders as originally drafted, but also to athletes and sports supporters. The amendment was generally interpreted by Western sources as an expression of support for recent proposals made by several governments for the cancellation of their countries' participation in the 1980 Olympic Games, which were due to be held in Moscow, in protest at the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

Dr Sakharov had already on Jan. 2 issued an earlier statement in which he had called on the United Nations and the Soviet Union to work out an arrangement for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, speaking of "the danger of a chain reaction" whose consequences would, in an age of nuclear weapons, be unpredictable, and adding that he had found "no evidence that the action took place at the request of the legal Government of Afghanistan, that is, the Government in office at the beginning of December".

Dr Sakharov (58) had been a major contributor to the development of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb, receiving the order of "Hero of Socialist Labour" three times for his work in this sphere, and on several occasions representing the Soviet Union at scientific conferences abroad. In 1968, however, he published an essay entitled *Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* [see 23004 A], in which he spoke of the dangers of nuclear armament and supported inter alia the rapprochement of the Soviet Union with the United States and the relaxation of intellectual controls in the Soviet Union. In November 1970 he was a co-founder of a committee for human rights [see page 24375], and became involved in a number of campaigns for the release of political prisoners and for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in the Soviet Union [see 24443 A; 24834 C; 25556 A; 26850 A; 27549 A; 27733 A; 28253 A; 29229 A; 29725 A], receiving several official warnings in connexion with his work in this field [see 26127 A; 28253 A; and also 29110 A]. He was the author of a book entitled *My Country and the World*, published outside the Soviet Union in 1975 and calling for the introduction in the Soviet Union of a mixed economy and a social democracy [see 27549 A], and was subjected to intense criticism for his support for the dissident writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn on the latter's expulsion from the Soviet Union in February 1974 [see 26401 A]. Following his receipt in 1975 of the Nobel Peace Prize for his "personal and fearless effort in the cause of peace among mankind" [see 27442 A], Dr Sakharov assisted in the formation in May 1976 of a "Public Group to Assist the Fulfilment of the Helsinki Accords in the Soviet Union" [see 28137 A], and in January 1977 appealed to President Carter, shortly after the latter's election to presidential office, for a United States intervention on behalf of political prisoners in the

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Soviet Union, receiving subsequently statements of support from the US State Department [see 28253 A] and from President Carter [see 28773 A].

The Communist Party newspaper *Izvestia* accused Dr Sakharov on Jan. 23 of "subversive activities against the state" and of treason, alleging that he had given away to foreign agents important state secrets, including defence information, and had allowed himself to be used by the foreign mass media as a "Trojan horse" with which to undermine Soviet socialism. A similar, more strongly worded article published by the youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on Feb. 15 alleged his involvement in black market dealings and in the propagation of Nazi ideas.

Mrs Bonner Sakharova travelled to Moscow on Jan. 28 in order to present to Western journalists a statement from Dr Sakharov, in which he described the *Izvestia* article as "slander", adding a list of what he felt to be current examples of Soviet aggression. He described his living quarters as a shared modern flat opposite a police station whose officers interrogated all visitors, and said that he was banned from making telephone calls. A second statement brought by Mrs Bonner Sakharova on Feb. 4 claimed that Dr Sakharov had received death threats and suggestions that he would be removed to a psychiatric institution. Mrs Bonner Sakharova was disciplined by Soviet police on Jan. 31 for the allegedly slanderous nature of the first statement, and friends claimed on Feb. 18 that the couple had also been violently mishandled by police while protesting at the detention of a visitor to the flat.

Although Mrs Bonner Sakharova called on Feb. 9 on the Academy of Sciences to defend her husband, he received no invitation to its conference on March 4 despite having sent a written request, and was thus effectively excluded from the body.

International Reactions to the Exile of Dr Sakharov - Announcement of Investigation by United Nations Commission on Human Rights

The removal of Dr Sakharov to Gorky provoked strong reactions from many parts of the world, leading to the curtailment of a visit to the Soviet Union by the president of the French National Assembly and former French Prime Minister, M. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and to the temporary suspension of co-operation between the United States Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Union. Motions concerning the affair were also tabled in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

M. Chaban-Delmas on Jan. 23 cut short an official visit to the Soviet Union, returning to Paris immediately upon hearing of the measures taken against Dr Sakharov. The French Government issued on the same day a statement describing the measures as "a disturbing sign in the current evolution of international affairs" which contravened the principles of the Helsinki agreement. Similar statements were made by the British Government, which on Jan. 22 called the Soviet ambassador in London, Mr Nikolai Lunkov, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to express its concern; by the US State Department in Washington, which on Jan. 22 described Dr Sakharov's wellbeing as a matter of "grave concern"; and by the West German, Italian, Spanish, Belgian, Norwegian, Israeli and Australian Governments, all of which protested at the measures. The US House of Representatives on Feb. 6 also unanimously adopted a motion condemning the exile; the Vatican expressed on Jan. 23 its "deep concern" in an article published in the *Osservatore Romano*; while Amnesty International on Jan. 29 sent a letter of protest to the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Mr Vladimir Semyonov, alleging "a clear breach of the Helsinki agreement". The Italian ambassador in Moscow, Signor Guiseppe Maccotta, presented on Jan. 25 a formal protest at the measures on behalf of the European Community (of which Italy then held the presidency), while the Italian, Spanish, Norwegian and French Communist parties (despite the French party's approval of the Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan) also condemned the action against Dr Sakharov.

Protest at the action was also registered by a number of scientific organizations. The French Academy of Sciences protested on Jan. 29 to its Soviet counterpart at what it described as a damaging development; a group of 220 scientists at the European Centre for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva addressed on Jan. 29 a telegram to President Brezhnev expressing "profound shock" at the Soviet Union's "flagrant disregard for human rights"; while the United States Academy of Sciences announced on Feb. 25 a six-month suspension of all scientific co-operation with the Soviet Union.

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted on March 12 a joint proposal made by the British, West German, Dutch, Portuguese, Panamanian and Costa Rican delegates expressing concern at the treatment of Dr Sakharov and resolving to examine the case in detail during 1981. This would be the first time that an individual case had been examined by the Commission in this way, and previous objections that the Commission was competent only to discuss general violations of human rights had led on Feb. 5 to the rejection by 15 votes to 13, with 12 abstentions, of a French proposal for an immediate intervention in the case.

The "Social Self-Defence Committee", an oppositional group in Poland [see 28713 A], protested on Jan. 26 at Dr Sakharov's exile, while a group of 19 Soviet writers and artists, including several not hitherto regarded as dissidents, presented to foreign journalists on Jan. 29 a statement calling for his return to Moscow.

Following the United States Government's call, made on Jan. 23, for Dr Sakharov to be allowed to leave the Soviet Union, it was announced on Jan. 28 that he had been offered a post at Columbia University. Harvard University made a similar offer on Feb. 15, while the Danish "Sakharov Committee" also invited him on March 4 to settle in Denmark.

Mrs Bonner Sakharova said on March 1 that her husband was unable to continue his scientific or his other work in Gorky, and that he would now prefer emigration to a continuation of his exile.—(Guardian - Sunday Times - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - New York Times - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London) (*Prev. rep. Internal Security 29725 A; Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan 30229 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Southend, East By-election

Polling took place on March 13 in a by-election at Southend, East, caused by the death on Dec. 26, 1979, of the Conservative member, Sir Stephen McAdden (72). The Conservatives retained the seat with a greatly reduced majority, the result of the by-election being as follows:

Taylor, Edward (Conservative)	13,117
George, Colin (Labour)	12,687
Evans, David (Liberal)	8,939
*Robertson, Terence (New Britain Party)	532
*Smedley, Oliver (Anti-Common Market and Free Trade Party)	207
*Curry, James (Independent Liberal)	132
*Boaks, William (Public Safety, Democratic Monarchist, White Resident)	23
No change. Conservative majority	430

* Forfeited deposit.

Figures at the general election in May 1979 [see page 29721] were: Sir Stephen McAdden (Conservative) 22,413; Mr T. N. Wright (Labour) 11,639; Mr J. Hugill (Liberal) 5,244; Mr P. Twomey (National Front) 676—Conservative majority 10,774. Sir Stephen McAdden had represented the constituency since 1950.

The Conservative candidate polled 36.8 per cent of the votes in the by-election against 56.1 per cent at the general election; the Labour candidate 35.6 per cent against 29.1 per cent; and the Liberal candidate 25.1 per cent against 13.1 per cent. The other four candidates polled an aggregate of 2.5 per cent, while in May 1979 Mr Twomey polled 1.7 per cent. There was a 62.5 per cent poll, compared with 70.1 per cent at the general election, and a swing to Labour from the Conservatives of 12.9 per cent.

Mr Taylor (42), a former junior minister and chief opposition spokesman on Scottish affairs in 1977-79, was MP for Glasgow, Cathcart from 1964 to 1979, when he was defeated by the Labour candidate [see page 29716].—(Times - Daily Telegraph) (*Prev. rep. By-election 30068 B*)

B. PANAMA — Cabinet Change - Proposed Opposition Boycott of Elections

Sr Adolfo Ahumada resigned in January 1980 as Minister of the Interior and Justice and was replaced by Sr Ricardo Alonso Rodríguez.

The National Opposition Front (Freno), grouping 10 political parties, announced in January that it intended to boycott legislative elections planned for mid-1980 "unless legislative and other institutions are given more powers and independence". Freno had also on similar grounds boycotted celebrations on Oct. 1, 1979, for the entry into force of the new Panama Canal treaties [see 30047 A].—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Times - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet and Internal Developments 29327 A*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. UNITED STATES — President Carter's State of the Union Address

President Carter on Jan. 23 delivered his annual State of the Union address to Congress, devoting his address principally to the implications of the holding by Iranian students of some 50 American citizens as hostages in the US embassy in Tehran [see 30205 A]; repercussions of the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan [see 30229 A]; the maintenance of international security and the defence of US interests, including in particular US oil supplies from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; and the need to conserve oil and other energy resources.

In addition, the President announced that he would be submitting to Congress legislation and budget proposals for the reintroduction of registration for compulsory military service (the draft), and said that a new charter was urgently needed to define clearly the legal authority and accountability of the US intelligence agencies.

The State of the Union address was worded as follows (cross-headings inserted):

". . . As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of the American union.

"The 1980s have been born in turmoil and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values, a time that tests our wisdom and our will.

"At this moment in Iran 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy.

"Also at this moment, massive Soviet invading forces are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan.

"These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression—present a serious challenge to the United States and to the other nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

"I am determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any country or the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is.

"Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the industrial democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the pressure of social, religious, economic and political change in many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

"Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All three are now focused on one troubled area of the world. All must be faced together squarely and courageously.

"We will face these challenges. We will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

Situation in Iran. "In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our nation has been aroused and unified as never before in peacetime. Our position is clear. We will never yield to blackmail.

"We continue to pursue these specific goals: to protect the present and future interests of the United States; to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to seek in every possible way their safe release; if possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow Americans; to enlist the help of other nations to end this criminal violation of the moral and legal standards of a civilized world; and to persuade Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies to the north from Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with us hampers their response to this greater danger.

"If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the victims is released.

US-Soviet Relations. "We now face a broader, more fundamental challenge in the region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union.

"Now, as during the last 3½ decades, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

"Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or static relationship. Between us there has been co-operation—there has been competition—and there have been times of confrontation.

"In the 1940s, we took the lead in creating the Atlantic Alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat to Western Europe.

"In the 1950s, we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and the Middle East, and we rearmed, to assure that containment.

"In the 1960s, we met Soviet challenges in the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, and then we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.

"And in the 1970s, three American Presidents [i.e. Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter] negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt the growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behaviour that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of co-operation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive—not only for the sake of our two nations, but for the security and peace of the world.

"In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power, and to develop ways to resolve disputes and keep the peace.

"Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two super-powers. That is why we negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—SALT I [see pages 25311-12] and SALT II [see 30117 A]. Especially now in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries—and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult closely with the Congress as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort will not be abandoned.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. "We super-powers also have a responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of military power. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and aggressive new step. It is using its great military power against a relatively defenceless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.

"The vast majority of the nations of the world have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned.

"But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression. While the invasion continues, we and other countries cannot continue business as usual with the Soviet Union.

"That is why the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union. I will not permit Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States. I have cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and agricultural products. I have limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and have asked our allies and friends not to replace these embargoed items. I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

"The Soviet Union must answer some basic questions. Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, using that power for colonial conquest?

"The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

Security of Persian Gulf Region. "The region now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Strait of Hormuz [i.e. at the mouth of the Gulf, between Iran and Oman]—a waterway through which much of the free world's oil must flow. The [USSR] is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

"This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves and resolute action—not only for this year, but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and South-West Asia. It demands the participation of those who rely on oil from the Middle East and are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close co-operation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

"Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice and, of course, military capa-

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bility. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force.

US Defence and International Security Policies. "During the last three years we have acted to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf region but around the world.

"We have increased annually our real commitment for defence, and we will sustain this increased effort throughout our five-year defence programme. It is imperative that the Congress approve this strong defence budget without any reduction.

"We are improving our capability to deploy US military forces rapidly to distant areas.

"We have helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances. We and our NATO allies have decided to develop and deploy modernized intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increasing threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union [see 30159 A].

"We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel [see 29941 A] is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel.

"We have expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China [see 29533 A] will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the Western Pacific.

"We have increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean [see pages 30207-08], and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of North-East Africa and the Persian Gulf [see page 30208].

"We have reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and integrity [see page 30232]. The United States will take action—consistent with our own laws—to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. I am asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this commitment. I am also working, along with other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan.

"In the weeks ahead we will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region.

"We believe that there are no irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic people. We respect the faith of Islam, and are ready to co-operate with all Moslem countries.

"Finally, we are prepared to work with other nations in the region to shape a co-operative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet enhances the independence, security and prosperity of all.

"All these efforts emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of our nation and those of our allies, not only in Europe and the Pacific but also in the part of the world which has such great strategic importance to us, stretching through the Middle East to South-West Asia.

"I will pursue these efforts with vigour and determination, and I will act as necessary to preserve our nation's security.

Proposed Reintroduction of Registration for the Draft. "The men and women of America's armed forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I am proud of the job they are doing, and I know you share that pride. I am convinced that our volunteer forces are adequate for our current defence needs. I hope that it will not become necessary to reimpose the draft [i.e. conscription for compulsory military service, discontinued in 1973—see 25820 A].

"However, we must be prepared for that possibility. For this reason, I have determined that the Selective Service System must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.

Intelligence Capability. "We also need quick passage of a new charter to define clearly the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. While guaranteeing that abuses will not recur, we need to remove unwarranted restraints on our ability to collect intelligence and to tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information. An effective intelligence capability is vital to our nation's security.

Foreign Policy Objectives. "The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear—we can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engaged in promoting world peace.

"We will continue to work as we have in the Middle East and southern Africa to resolve regional disputes. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen the national independence they have struggled to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and human rights.

"In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and enduring.

"That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our national interest as well as part of our national character.

"Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal. In the coming years as a mighty nation, we will continue to pursue peace.

"But to be strong abroad we must remain strong at home. In order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

Energy Policy. "The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our national security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy programme for our country.

"I have been working with Congress in a concentrated and persistent way over the past three years to meet this urgent need.

"We have made progress. But Congress must act promptly now to complete final action on this vital energy legislation.

"Our nation will then have a major conservation effort, important initiatives to develop solar power, realistic pricing based on the true value of oil, strong incentives for the production of coal and other fossil fuels in America, and our nation's most massive peacetime investment in the development of synthetic fuels.

"The American people are making progress in energy conservation. Last year we reduced overall petroleum consumption by 8 per cent and gasoline consumption by 5 per cent below that of the previous year.

"Now we must do more. After consultation with the governors we will set gasoline conservation goals for each of the 50 states, and I will make them mandatory if these goals are not met.

"I have established an import ceiling for 1980 of 8,200,000 barrels a day [see page 29993]—well below the level of oil imports during 1977. I expect our imports to be much lower than this, but the ceiling will be enforced with an import fee if necessary. I am prepared to lower our imports still further if other oil consuming countries will join us in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to impose mandatory gasoline rationing.

"The biggest single factor in the inflation rate increase last year was from one cause: the skyrocketing world oil prices [see 29981 A]. We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil—and to reduce inflation.

"As individuals and as families, few of us can produce energy by ourselves. But we can all conserve energy—every one of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I call on you, on all the people of America, to help our nation. Save energy. Eliminate waste. Let us make 1980 the year of energy conservation.

Economic Goals. "We must take other actions to strengthen our nation's economy.

"First, we will continue to reduce the deficit and then to balance the federal budget.

"Second, as we continue to work with business to hold down prices, we will build also on the historic national accord with organized labour to restrain pay increases in a fair fight against inflation.

"Third, we will continue our successful efforts to cut paperwork and to dismantle unnecessary government regulation.

"Fourth, we will continue our progress in providing jobs for America, concentrating on a major new programme to provide training and work for our young people, especially minority youth. It has been said that 'a mind is a terrible thing to waste'. We will give our young people new hope for jobs and a better life in the 1980s.

"Fifth, we must use the decade of the 1980s to attack the basic structural problems in our economy, through measures to increase productivity, savings and investment.

Conclusion. "With these energy and economic policies, we will make America even stronger at home in this decade—just as our foreign and defence policies will make us stronger and safer throughout the world.

"We will never abandon our struggle for a just and decent society at home. That is the heart of America and it is the source of our ability to inspire people to defend their own rights abroad.

"Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice.

"It is written that George Washington once reminded us: 'You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every hope that you entertain, you have a task that you must perform. For every good that you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer.'

"Our challenges are formidable. But there is a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980s with confidence and hope—and a bright vision of the America we want:

"An America strong and free.

"An America at peace.

"An America with equal rights for women—and for all citizens.

"An America with jobs and good health care and education for every citizen.

"An America with a clean and bountiful life in its cities and farms.

"An America that helps to feed the world.

"An America secure in filling its own energy needs.

"An America of justice, tolerance and compassion.

"For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people.

"Together as one people, let us work to build our strength at home.

"Together as one indivisible nation, let us seek peace and security throughout the world.

"Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement."

Two days prior to the formal delivery of the address to Congress, the texts had been released on Jan. 21 of the foreign policy and economic sections of the President's longer State of the Union message setting "five basic goals" for the USA:

"First, we will continue, as we have over the past three years, to build America's military strength and that of our allies and friends. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation will have reason to question our will to sustain the strongest and most flexible defence forces.

"Second, we will pursue an active diplomacy in the world, working —together with our friends and allies—to resolve disputes through peaceful means and to make any aggressor pay a heavy price.

"Third, we will strive to resolve pressing international economic problems—particularly energy and inflation—and continue to pursue our still larger objective of global economic growth through expanded trade and development assistance.

"Fourth, we will continue vigorously to support the process of building democratic institutions and improving human rights protection around the world. We are deeply convinced that the future lies not with dictatorship but democracy.

"Fifth, we remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II treaty [see page 30130] reflects our firm conviction that the United States has a profound national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide."

In connexion with the deferment of congressional consideration of SALT II, the President in the same foreign affairs section called the treaty "the single most important bilateral accord of the decade" and described it as being "neither an American favour to the Soviet Union or a Soviet favour to the United States". However, while stating that he believed that the Senate would ratify SALT II "because the treaty is, in its simplest terms, in the interest of our nation's security", he concluded: "I do not believe it advisable at this time to bring up the treaty for consideration on the Senate floor. The Congress and the executive branch must first deal with the pressing matters arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." (US International Communication Agency - New York Times) (*Prev. rep. 1979 Address 29485 A; 1980 Budget 29957 A; Iran 30205 A; Afghanistan 30229 A; SALT II 30117 A*)

A. SAUDI ARABIA — Occupation of the Grand Mosque at Mecca - Related Internal Security Developments - Moslem Reaction against United States - Changes in Leadership of Armed Forces

Following the armed occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the centre of the Islamic religion, during late November and early December 1979, a total of 63 persons were executed by beheading on Jan. 9, 1980, on the instructions of Saudi Arabian religious courts. In addition, 19 further death sentences were commuted by the courts to terms of imprisonment, 23 women and children were sent to corrective institutions and 38 persons were acquitted of charges connected with the occupation, while 102 of the insurgents died during or after the incident.

The occupiers of the mosque were believed to be members of the Qatan and Otaiba tribes and to belong to the country's Shia (Shi'ite) Moslem minority. However, little clear information was released by the Saudi Arabian Government concerning the exact identity or motives of the insurgents, and reporting of the incident by Western journalists was further limited by the fact that Mecca is permanently closed to non-Moslems. Frequently contradictory statements issued by the Government led to confused situations both in Saudi Arabia and in other Moslem countries, resulting particularly in the belief that the United States had been responsible for the attack.

The occupation of the mosque was regarded by Western observers as having embarrassed the Saudi royal family in view of its role as the guardian of several major Moslem shrines, and was followed during December 1979 and January 1980 by the resignation of the Governor of Mecca and by extensive changes in the leadership of the armed forces.

Occupation of the Grand Mosque

Some 200-300 armed persons took control of all major points of the Grand Mosque during the dawn prayer on Nov. 20, 1979, the first day of the new (15th) Moslem century. The Mosque (Al-Haram), which encloses the shrine of the sacred black stone (Kaaba), is the centre of the Moslem world and the most important centre of pilgrimage for Moslems, and contained an estimated 50,000 pilgrims at the time of the seizure.

It was widely reported that the group had attempted to force the congregation in the mosque to recognize their leader, Mr Mohammed ibn Abdullah al-Qatani, as the "expected Mahdi", or prophet, whose advent at the beginning of the 15th century had been predicted by certain "Mahdist" sects and who, it was claimed, was to "cleanse" Islam before the end of the world. The majority of the pilgrims were subsequently released, but several hundred were held by the gunmen as hostages.

Prince Nayef ibn Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Arabian Minister of the Interior, said in a statement broadcast on Nov. 21 that the Government had withheld any decision to attack the gunmen because the shedding of blood in the sanctuary was expressly forbidden by the Koran, the holy code of Islam. He added that there was no indication of the involvement of "certain nationalities" in the occupation, an expression which was generally interpreted as referring to Iranian Shia Moslems whose responsibility for the seizure of the mosque had been suggested by the Saudi Arabian press.

The confused situation in Mecca persisted for the next four days, during which the Saudi Minister of Information, Dr Muhammad Abdu Yamani, repeatedly assured reporters that an assault had been made on the mosque by Saudi Arabian troops, that the situation was now under control, and that the mosque had been reopened. (On Nov. 23 and Nov. 30, however, the mosque was not available for the regular Friday prayers, which were broadcast instead from the town of Medina over the national radio and television networks.)

On Nov. 25 the television network broadcast a ruling of the *Ulema* (the supreme body of Islamic jurisdiction), lifting the ban on the use of weapons in the mosque. Shortly afterwards some 2,200 troops entered the building in armoured personnel carriers and, using howitzers and light artillery, rapidly gained control of most of the building. Fighting then continued in the 270 vaults and chambers beneath the mosque until resistance ceased on Dec. 3 following the troops' use of tear gas, water and smoke to clear the tunnels. [Unconfirmed reports subsequently stated that the final assault on the mosque was directed by five officers of a French anti-terrorist unit and that special weapons and equipment used in the assault had been flown into Saudi Arabia on an official French aircraft.]

Responsibility for the seizure of the mosque was claimed on Nov. 27 by a group calling itself the "Moslem Revolutionary Movement

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in the Arabian Peninsula", which said in a statement to a Beirut (Lebanon) newspaper that the action was directed against the royal family.

The underground left-wing "Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula" on Nov. 26 also claimed responsibility for the attack, although its leader, Mr Nasser al-Said, subsequently denied such claims on Nov. 30. Mr al-Said added, however, that his organization sympathized with the action, which he saw as a spontaneous response to social injustice under the rule of the monarchy and which, he alleged, was being put down with unnecessary force and accompanied by the arrest in other parts of the country of over 7,000 sympathizers.

Prince Nayef, at a news conference held in Riyadh (the royal capital) on Jan. 13, 1980, again emphatically denied any significant involvement of foreign political influences in the occupation of the mosque, describing the insurgents as ill-organized, badly-trained and uneducated. He conceded, however, that they had driven a car full of weapons past the (unarmed) guards at one of the entrances to the mosque. It was also known that they had been equipped with food and gas masks as well as large quantities of ammunition which had been prepared in advance of the occupation.

Prince Nayef said in a television interview on Dec. 4 that 75 of the insurgents had been killed in the fighting, and added on Jan. 9, 1980, that 27 of the 170 persons arrested during the incident had since died of their injuries. He announced troop casualties as 127 dead and 451 injured, and civilian casualties as 26 dead and 109 injured. Mr al-Qatani (the alleged prophet) was said to have been killed in the fighting, and Mr Juheiman ibn Seif al-Otaiba, described as the tactician of the group, was among those executed on Jan. 9.

The trial of those arrested during the incidents at the mosque took place at secret sessions of the Saudi Arabian religious courts during early December, and news of the death sentences was first published on Dec. 13 by the Kuwait newspaper *Al-Qabas*. According to the Ministry of the Interior the 63 people executed at dawn on Jan. 9 in eight major towns and cities included 41 Saudi Arabians, 10 Egyptians, six South Yemenis, three Kuwaitis, one North Yemeni, one Sudanese and one Iraqi. Protests at the executions were made on Jan. 11 by Amnesty International in London, which called on the Saudi Arabian Government to abolish the death penalty.

Allegations of Further Disturbances in Saudi Arabia

Throughout the occupation of the mosque the Government maintained that the incident was an isolated sacrilege committed by "deviants from Islam", and consistently denied widespread press reports of further unrest within the country.

The Observer of London had previously published on Nov. 11, 1979, a claim that Saudi Arabian security forces had discovered plans for two pro-Iranian demonstrations by Shia Moslems in and near Mecca during the Moslem festival of Hajj (Oct. 27-29). Banners and political literature were alleged to have been confiscated, and some persons to have been deported.

An armed seizure of the tomb of the prophet Mohammed at Medina was said by Western sources to have coincided with that of the mosque at Mecca, but to have been immediately put down by troops.

Riyadh radio on Nov. 25 broadcast a denial by Dr Yamani of a Reuter report suggesting that 10,000 people had demonstrated in Jedda (the administrative capital) against the seizure of the mosque in Mecca.

Dr Yamani also denied on Dec. 3 the truth of a report published in the Saudi Arabian weekly, *Al-Hadaf*, that an abortive coup involving senior officers of the Air Force had been put down by force.

The Beirut newspaper *As-Safir* reported on Dec. 3 that 20,000 troops had sealed off four major oil-producing towns on the eastern (Gulf) coast following riots and demonstrations among the local, largely Shia Moslem, population. The detailed reports, which were also endorsed by the British and American press, were consistently denied by the Ministry of the Interior.

Anti-American Reactions in Other Moslem States

Despite Prince Nayef's Nov. 21 denial of major foreign involvement in the occupation of the mosque, the general initial lack of reliable information about the incident led to confusion in several Moslem countries, and rumours and misunderstandings became rife, resulting particularly in recriminations against the United States.

The Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, issued a statement from Qom (Iran) on Nov. 21 in which he accused "criminal American imperialism . . . and international Zionism" of responsibility for the occupation.

Further suspicion of the United States arose from the broadcasting in Pakistan of a speech made by Prince Nayef, in which his description of the gunmen as "renegades" was mistranslated as "non-believers". The statement caused considerable resentment among Moslems in Pakistan and resulted in a violent demonstration outside the United States embassy in Islamabad during which the building was destroyed by fire and two US marines shot dead; 35 demonstrators were injured when the police, who had at first taken no action, opened fire on the crowds. The US cultural centre in Lahore was destroyed by fire, also on Nov. 21, and the American Express office and British Council library in Rawalpindi were damaged by violent crowds. The dean of the diplomatic corps in Pakistan, the West German ambassador Dr Ulrich Scheske, delivered on Nov. 24 an official protest to the President of Pakistan, Gen. Zia ul-Haq, demanding adequate diplomatic protection against similar disturbances.

Protests and demonstrations against the alleged American involvement in Mecca also took place on Nov. 21 in other countries. In particular (i) in India the US consulate in Calcutta was attacked by some 3,000 Moslems who set fire to several vehicles and stoned the building, while similar incidents were reported from the town of Hyderabad; (ii) in Bangladesh, despite a ban on demonstrations, a large crowd chanted anti-American and anti-Zionist slogans in Dacca; and (iii) in Turkey the US consulate in Izmir was stoned by demonstrators.

The US State Department in Washington published on Nov. 23 a communiqué in which it deplored the occupation of the mosque and assured "all Moslems, and especially the people of Saudi Arabia" of its sympathy.

Resignation of Governor of Mecca - Changes in Leadership of Armed Forces

It was announced on Dec. 31, 1979, that King Khaled had accepted the resignation of the provincial Governor of Mecca, Prince Fawwar ibn Abdul Aziz, "for reasons of health", and that he had ordered the retirement of Lt.-Gen. As'ad Abdulaziz al-Zuhayr, the Commander of the Air Force, and of Lt.-Gen. Ali Majid Qabbani, the Director of Military Operations. Gen. Fayiz Muhammad al-Awfi, the director-general of the Saudi Arabian public security forces, was also to be removed from office.

It was subsequently announced on the Saudi Arabian radio network on Jan. 1-2, 1980 (i) that Maj.-Gen. Muhammad as-Salah al-Hammad had been appointed Chief of the General Staff *vice* Maj.-Gen. Osman Hamid, who had been retired from this office on Dec. 21 and promoted to the ministerial post of adviser to the Minister of Defence; (ii) that Shaikh Kamal Sindi, hitherto director-general of the Saudi Arabian national airline, had likewise become a ministerial adviser; (iii) that Brig.-Gen. Abdullah ibn Abdurrahman ash-Shaikh was to become director-general of the public security forces in succession to Gen. al-Awfi; (iv) that Maj.-Gen. Abdul Muhsin Ali al-Amran was to be Commander of the Land Forces; and (v) that Maj.-Gen. Muhammad Sabri was to succeed Lt.-Gen. al-Zuhayr as Commander of the Air Force.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Guardian - Observer - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 26970 A, 27069 A, 27412 A; Internal Security 27069 A; Relations with United States 29149 A, 29646 A*)

A. **EAST GERMANY — Death of Herr Friedrich Ebert**

Herr Friedrich Ebert, a senior member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), a Deputy Chairman of the East German Council of State and deputy president of the *Volkskammer* (Parliament), died in East Berlin on Dec. 4, 1979, aged 85.

Herr Ebert was the son of Friedrich Ebert, the first President of the Weimar Republic, and became a party functionary and subsequently a *Reichstag* deputy for the Social Democratic Party (SPD) from 1928 to 1933. During the Nazi era he was interned in three concentration camps, being elected in 1946 to the executive committee of the newly formed SED and in 1949 to the party's Politburo. He was First Burgomaster of East Berlin from 1948 to 1967 [see 9715 A; 22222 C], and was elected a member of the Council of State upon its foundation in 1960 [see 17658 A], becoming a Deputy Chairman in 1971 [see 25023 A] and earlier the same year deputy president of the *Volkskammer* [see 24768 A].

Herr Ebert's funeral took place in East Berlin on Dec. 8, 1979.—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Politburo 27875 A, 28115 A, 29099 A*)

A. BELGIUM — Departure of FDF from Coalition Government - Cabinet Reorganization - Postponement of Plans for Regional Parliaments - Developments in Language Dispute - Economic Developments

Dr Wilfried Martens, the Belgian Prime Minister, announced a reorganization of his Cabinet on Jan. 23, 1980, following the withdrawal of the French-speaking Democratic Front (*Front démocratique francophone*—FDF) of Brussels from the five-party coalition formed in April 1979 [see 29679 A]. Although the Government—which now comprised Dr Martens's own Flemish Christian Socials (CVP), the Walloon Christian Socials (PSC), the Walloon Socialists (PSB) and the Flemish Socialists (BSP)—still retained an overall parliamentary majority, the loss of the committed support of the 11 FDF representatives in the Chamber of Representatives reduced its effective voting strength to less than the two-thirds parliamentary majority required for the passage of constitutional amendments. As a result considerable uncertainty was created as to the future prospects of the constitutional amendments required for the devolution of powers to three proposed regional parliaments in the Flemish (Dutch-speaking) and Walloon (French-speaking) regions and in Brussels, inter-party disagreement over which had been a major cause of the political crisis of mid-January.

The conceptual basis of the proposed devolution had been set out in the so-called "Egmont Pact" agreed in March 1978 by all six parties in the then coalition Government [see 28458 C; 29179 A; 29376 A]. It had rapidly become clear, however, that, whereas all parties agreed on the establishment of full regional parliaments in Flanders and in Wallonia, there was deep disagreement on the powers and composition of the proposed body for Brussels [see also 29503 A; 29679 A]. While the French-speaking parties in the five-party coalition supported the view that the regional assembly in Brussels (where 85 per cent of the inhabitants are French-speaking) should hold full parity with the other two regional bodies, the Flemish coalition parties (CVP and BSP) maintained that such an arrangement would not properly reflect the relative demographic and economic weight of the two linguistic communities, since two-thirds of the country's regional power would thus be exercised by the French speakers, who represented only 44 per cent of the population.

The language issue was also frequently the source of civil disturbances during this period, contributing to the growth of numerous militant and secessionist factions in both linguistic groups.

The activities of these factions were most intense in the district of Fourons (Voeren) in north-eastern Belgium. Repeated violent clashes occurred in this mainly French-speaking area between militant Dutch-speaking groups and French speakers, the latter demanding the reversal of the clause in the 1962 law defining the linguistic borders [see 19601 A] which had placed the district under the Flemish administration of Limburg [see also 25013 A; 25233 A]. The armed confrontations in the area continued despite the imposition on Aug. 11, 1979, of a mayoral ban on assemblies of more than five persons, and on Oct. 21, following particularly severe rioting in the town of Fourons-le-Comte, a 1934 law banning the maintenance of uniformed private armies [see 1228 M] was invoked against the leader of the *Vlaamse Militantenorde*, an extremist right-wing Flemish group.

Three policemen were injured on Sept. 29 during a banned demonstration in Comines (south-western Belgium—see also 19601 A) by some 3,000 members of the Flemish nationalist *Volksunie* party, who were protesting against the refusal of the local authority to build a separate school for Dutch speakers in this predominantly French-speaking area.

The difficulties encountered by the Government during this period were further exacerbated by the critical state of the Belgian economy. Although consumer prices rose by an average of only 5.1 per cent in the year ending December 1979, and although the 1979 growth in gross national product (GNP) was about 3 per cent, the Belgian franc had become subject to periodic pressure on the European currency markets and the (seasonally adjusted) current balance-of-payments deficit of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union for the first six months of 1979 was $680,000,000, compared with a figure of $898,000,000 for the whole of 1978. By December 1979 the number of unemployed in Belgium had reached 308,900, or 7.6 per cent of the registered labour force, with women accounting for some 60 per cent of this figure.

The Government's projected public sector borrowing requirement for 1980 was 240,000 million Belgian francs (about $8,570 million at the exchange rate prevailing at the start of 1980), but proposals for the curtailment of spending on the social services, particularly on the health service (whose deficit in 1979 was some BF 24,000 million) produced strong reactions from the medical profession, which voted on Nov. 21 in favour of the stoppage of all but emergency work by doctors, dentists and pharmacists from Dec. 21. (This strike was suspended on Jan. 18, however, in view of the seriousness of the national economic and political crisis.) A number of other strikes, including a one-day general strike on Dec. 7, were also called during this period in protest at the Government's economic measures and at its decision not to introduce a standard 36-hour working week.

It was announced on Jan. 29, 1980, that the Government had concluded with representatives of Belgian employers and with the trades unions an agreement for the investment between 1980 and 1985 of a total of BF 44,000 million in the Belgian steel industry. The investments, which were to be made jointly by the Government and the private sector, included BF 8,000 million on projects in Flanders and BF 36,000 million in Wallonia (whose state of industrial development was generally less advanced than that of Flanders). The plan also provided for the loss by "natural wastage" of some 4,000 jobs in the steel industry before Dec. 31, 1981.

Postponement of Plans for Regional Assemblies - Withdrawal of FDF from Government - Cabinet Reorganization

A Royal Order was published in *Le Moniteur belge* (the Belgian official journal) on July 10-11, 1979, establishing the royal recognition of four transitional governmental bodies in preparation for the election of the three proposed regional parliaments. The four bodies comprised three-member executives for the French-speaking cultural community, for the Walloon region and for Brussels, as well as one six-member Flemish executive which had been formed by the amalgamation of the Flemish cultural and regional executives.

The Royal Order marked the formal introduction of the first stage of a three-phase plan for the devolution of extensive central governmental powers (but excluding matters of defence and foreign policy), and had been preceded on April 3, 1979, by the appointment in Dr Martens's Government of eight secretaries of state with regional and community responsibilities [see 29679 A] who, together with the four Ministers for French and Dutch Community Affairs and Education, and the three ministers with regional responsibilities, now comprised the membership of the four regional executives.

The second phase of the plan, during which the regional elected parliaments themselves were to be established with powers to issue decrees pending their full authorization as legislative bodies, was due to begin on Jan. 1, 1980, after debate in the Chamber of Representatives on their composition, status and responsibilities. This was to lead in turn on Jan. 1, 1982, to the third and final phase in which full regional legislative powers were to be transferred to the new bodies.

Following his appointment of Mr José Desmarets on Oct. 15, 1979, to the post of Minister of Defence and to one of the three posts of Deputy Prime Minister *vice* Mr Paul Vanden Boeynants (a former Prime Minister who had become president of the PSC—see 29940 C), Dr Martens made a government statement on Oct. 17 in which he spoke of the pressing need for parliamentary co-operation in the realization of phase two of the devolution plan, stressing his determination to expedite the necessary legislation particularly in view of the mounting violence affecting the linguistic disputes. Dr Martens also outlined in his speech his plans for cuts in public spending.

Despite growing dissatisfaction in the PSB at the proposed spending cuts and in the FDF at the Government's alleged indecision over the Brussels issue, all five coalition parties supported a vote of confidence in the Government's economic and political policy in the Chamber of Representatives on Oct. 24, when 125 members voted for the motion, 41 against and six members abstained.

However, controversy over the legislative status of the proposed Brussels parliament became heated during November and December because of the repeatedly expressed opinion of a large element of the CVP that Brussels should be awarded only limited regional status. This attitude was particularly strongly represented by Mr Léo Tindemans, who had resigned as Prime Minister in October 1978 because of his rejection of certain details in the Egmont Pact [see 29376 A]. Mr Tindemans, who had subsequently been elected president of the CVP *vice* Dr Martens on April 7, 1979, said in a radio interview on Nov. 24 that the question of regional powers for Brussels was too important to be decided by the people of Brussels alone, but should be determined by the whole population, "and principally by the Walloons and the Flemings".

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The reluctance of the CVP to accept the provisions of the Egmont Pact as originally drafted was confirmed on Dec. 15-16, when the party voted at a national conference held in Brussels for an absolute veto on any proposals for the award of full legislative powers to the Brussels regional parliament, calling instead for government of the city by a joint committee of the national Parliament in which both linguistic groups would be given parity. The conference also voted to oppose any election of regional parliaments until the final and immutable form of the constitutional reforms had been firmly agreed by the coalition parties.

The decisions of the CVP conference met with unanimous and immediate opposition from the French-speaking parties. Mr Vanden Boeynants (PSC) on Dec. 17 rejected in strong terms the CVP's position, and the PSC was called upon by Mrs Antoinette Spaak, the FDF president, to express its dissatisfaction by leaving the Government. Mr André Cools, the leader of the PSB, also expressed his disapproval and later on Dec. 17 joined Mrs Spaak and Mr Vanden Boeynants in a joint protest to Dr Martens at the CVP's decisions.

King Baudouin in his Christmas broadcast on Dec. 20 made an appeal for "respect for legitimate community and regional aspirations" and for general co-operation with the constitutional reforms, speaking of the "real and sometimes grave worries" surrounding the question. (Dr Martens had the previous week attacked militant Flemish factions who called for the creation of a Flemish republic, while certain French-speaking groups in Wallonia were similarly known to favour a Wallonian secession from the realm.)

The introduction of phase two of the constitutional reform, which had been scheduled to take place on Jan. 1, 1980, was postponed in view of the positions adopted by the FDF and CVP. On Jan. 6-7, during a 15-hour cabinet meeting, Dr Martens proposed to the coalition parties a compromise plan, which included the proposal to postpone the granting of self-government to Brussels while proceeding with regional parliaments for Flanders and Wallonia. After this plan has been rejected outright by the FDF on Jan. 8, Dr Martens held a three-hour meeting with King Baudouin the same day, and on Jan. 9 proposed a further compromise which was accepted by the Cabinet.

Under the new proposals all plans for the election of regional parliaments were to be postponed, together with the end of phase two, until Dec. 31, 1982, by which time a special joint parliamentary commission involving all parliamentary parties was to have decided upon the final form and powers of the regional assemblies and to have agreed upon the required constitutional amendments.

Despite the Cabinet's acceptance of the new compromise plan, it was announced on Jan. 16 that King Baudouin had accepted the resignation of the three FDF cabinet members and that all 11 FDF representatives in the Chamber of Representatives would henceforth withdraw their support for the Government. The three ministers concerned—Mr Lucien Outers (Minister of Foreign Trade and Scientific Policy), Mr Léon Defosset (Minister with Regional Responsibility for Brussels) and Mr François Persoons (Secretary of State for French Community Affairs)—claimed to have been removed from office against their will following the discovery by the CVP on Jan. 14 of a secret agreement between the parliamentary groups of the FDF, PSC and PSB for the obstruction of legislation deemed inimical to the interests of French-speaking regions. The Cabinet ruled on Jan. 16 that such inter-party agreements were unconstitutional as they curtailed the freedom of individual parliamentary representatives.

The withdrawal of the FDF from the coalition meant (i) that the Government (with only 140 of the 212 seats in the Chamber of Representatives) now lacked the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed for the adoption of constitutional amendments; (ii) that the Government no longer held a majority among the elected representatives from Brussels; and (iii) that, until the newly vacant posts were filled by French speakers, the Government itself had no legitimacy under the Constitution, Article 86 of which required parity of French and Dutch speakers in the Cabinet. Dr Martens mentioned the last point on Jan. 18 as the reason for the inability of his Cabinet to answer questions in the Chamber of Representatives, where the Government came under increasing pressure from the French-speaking parties to give assurances concerning the irreversibility of its commitment to the equal status of the three proposed regional parliaments.

A further compromise, proposed by Dr Martens and agreed by the Cabinet on Jan. 18-19, extended until Dec. 31, 1984, the final date for the joint parliamentary commission's report on the constitutional reforms (i.e. the end of phase two). Although all coalition parties had accepted these proposals by Jan. 22, the CVP made it a condition of its acceptance that the three regions should receive financial autonomy by the beginning of 1983, and that any legislation for Brussels should incorporate adequate protection for its Dutch-speaking minority.

Dr Martens on Jan. 23 announced the following changes in the Belgian Cabinet consequent upon the departure of the three FDF representatives.

Mr Robert Urbain (PSB), formerly Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, was appointed Minister of Foreign Trade; Mr André Baudson (PSB) became Minister of Posts and Telecommunications; Mrs Cécile Goor (PSC) was appointed Minister with Regional Responsibility for Brussels; Dr André Degroeve (PSB) became Secretary of State for French Community Affairs; Mr Georges Gramme (PSC), Minister of the Interior, was allocated the additional portfolio of Scientific Policy.

Mrs Goor (57) had been a member of the municipal council of Brussels since 1953 and a senator for Brussels since 1974. **Mr Baudson** (53), a lawyer, was vice-president of the Chamber of Representatives, to which he had been elected in 1968. **Dr Degroeve** (49) was the mayor of the Brussels suburb of Forest, a member of the Chamber of Representatives and chairman of the PSB in Brussels.

The revised programme of the Government, including the Jan. 20 proposals, received a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Representatives on Jan. 25, when 119 members voted for the motion, 52 voted against and eight members abstained.

Following its withdrawal from the Government on Jan. 16, the FDF on Jan. 31 held a meeting in Brussels at which several speakers called for united action against "Flemish triumphalism", accusing the PSC and PSB of neglecting the interests of the French-speaking community in their pursuit of power, while Mrs Spaak spoke of "a new phase in the FDF's campaign for the right of the people of Brussels to be their own undisputed masters".—(Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Financial Times - Guardian - OECD, Paris) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 29679 A, 29940 C; Devolution Plans 28458 C, 29179 A, 29376 A; Language Dispute 24771 A, 25013 A, 25233 A, 26259 A; Economic Policy 29179 A, 29488 C*)

A. WORLD BANK - IDA — Doubling of Authorized Capital of World Bank - Sixth Replenishment of IDA

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) announced on Jan. 14, 1980, that its Board of Governors had approved by the necessary three-quarters majority an increase equivalent to $40,000 million in the Bank's authorized capital stock, as recommended by the Board of Executive Directors on June 28, 1979. This increase represented roughly a doubling of the current authorized stock, which had in 1977 [see 28833 C] been raised to 34,000 million special drawing rights (SDR) or the equivalent at June 30, 1979, of nearly $44,000 million at the current dollar valuation. Of the subscriptions to be received, 7.5 per cent (about $3,000 million) would be paid into the Bank and the remaining 92.5 per cent (about $37,000 million) would be added to the subscribed capital which was callable only to meet the obligations of the Bank to holders of its securities and which served as backing for the Bank's obligations. Subscriptions to the increased capital would be accepted between Sept. 30, 1981, and July 1, 1986.

It was reported that the increase had been approved by 127 of the Bank's members, while among the few members which had not yet given their approval was the United States (with about 21.5 per cent of the Bank's voting power).

The membership of the Bank had been increased to 134 on Nov. 20, 1978, upon the admission of Cape Verde with a subscription of SDR 1,600,000 ($2,066,000); Cape Verde had simultaneously been admitted as the 121st member of the International Development Association (IDA, a World Bank affiliate) with a subscription of SDR 80,000 ($103,000). [For admission of Cape Verde to the International Monetary Fund also on Nov. 20, 1978, see 29382 B; for admissions to the World Bank and IDA, see page 29300.] Total actual subscriptions to the World Bank at June 30, 1979, were SDR 28,990,200,000 (then $37,429,247,000) and those to the IDA, including the first, second and third replenishment of resources, SDR 5,443,342,000 (then $6,601,046,000) with a further $11,824,498,000 under the fourth and fifth replenishments.

The World Bank explained that without an increase of the size envisaged it would have been forced to curtail its lending; that on the basis of the existing capital it would have had to limit its new commitments to a figure well below current levels; and that within a few years—particularly if the present rate of inflation continued—the real value of the reduced level of commitments would be cut in half, leaving the developing countries with increasingly smaller flows of real resources. The increase, on the other hand, would enable lending to continue to grow, in real terms, through the middle of the 1980s.

IDA Replenishment

The International Development Association announced on Jan. 17 that representatives of 33 countries had agreed to arrangements to increase IDA resources in real terms through a sixth replenishment of its funds totalling $12,000 million.

The first replenishment, of $750,000,000, had taken effect in 1964 [see pages 19968; 20619]; the second, of $1,200 million, in 1969 [see 22578 A; 23548 B]; the third, of some $2,400 million, in 1972 [see 24104 A; 25810 A]; the fourth, of $4,500 million, in 1975 [see 26142 A; 27020 A]; and the fifth, of over $7,600 million [see 28300 B], on Nov. 29, 1977.

The sixth replenishment, the IDA stated, would provide the Association with commitment authority for the three-year period from July 1, 1980, to June 30, 1983. The IDA's Executive Directors had approved the arrangements and were submitting them for adoption to the IDA Governors representing all member governments; no commitment to contribute by any member would be made until approval, where necessary, had been obtained from its legislature.

The agreed level of contributions to the sixth replenishment was as follows:

	US$ million	Percentage of total
Argentina	25.00	0.21
Australia	229.20	1.91
Austria	81.60	0.68
Belgium	201.60	1.68
Brazil	50.00	0.42
Canada	516.00	4.30
Denmark	144.00	1.20
Finland	72.00	0.60
France	645.60	5.38
Germany (West)	1,500.00	12.50
Greece	6.00	0.05
Iceland	3.60	0.03
Ireland	13.20	0.11
Italy	462.00	3.85
Japan	1,757.54	14.65
Korea (South)	3.00	0.03
Kuwait	200.00	1.66
Luxembourg	6.00	0.05
Mexico	20.00	0.17
Netherlands	360.00	3.00
New Zealand	10.02	0.08
Norway	144.00	1.20
Portugal	7.00	0.06
Romania	—	—
Saudi Arabia	390.00	3.25
South Africa	10.00	0.08
Spain	50.00	0.42
Sweden	360.00	3.00
United Arab Emirates	79.20	0.66
United Kingdom	1,212.00	10.10
United States	3,240.00	27.00
Venezuela	20.00	0.17
Yugoslavia	20.00	0.17
Unallocated	161.44	1.33
Total	12,000.00	100.00

Notes. (1) Iceland and Portugal were not, as of Jan. 15, 1980, in a position to take a final decision on the amounts shown.

(2) Portugal, Romania and Venezuela were not yet members of the IDA but were considering membership in connexion with the sixth replenishment.

(3) The unallocated amount of $161,440,000 was expected to be filled by extra contributions and by a contribution from Romania. The corresponding unallocated amount in the fifth replenishment had been subsequently filled by extra contributions.

As compared with the fifth replenishment, there was a reduction in the proportionate share of the United States (from 31.2 per cent), of Sweden (from 3.8 per cent) and of Canada (from 5.8 per cent), and increases in the proportionate shares of, inter alia, West Germany (from 10.9 per cent), Japan (from 10.3 per cent) and also Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Yugoslavia. Countries participating in the sixth replenishment which had not participated in the fifth were Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, Venezuela and possibly Romania. (World Bank, Washington - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. World Bank Capital Increase 28833 C; IDA Replenishment 28300 B; World Bank and IDA Membership page 29300*)

A. TANZANIA — Government Changes - Elections for Zanzibar Council of Representatives - Zanzibar Government Appointments

In Tanzanian government changes on Jan. 5, 1980, President Julius Nyerere announced the formation of a new Ministry of Planning and Economy (within the Office of the Vice-President), and also a ministerial reshuffle. The new appointments were as follows (with any previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

Prof. Kigoma Malima	Minister of State for Planning and Economy
Mr Ibrahim Kaduma	Trade
Mr Alphonce Rulegura (Trade)	Land, Housing and Urban Development
Mrs Thabita Siwale (Land, Housing and Urban Development)	National Education

Mr Nicholas Kuhanga, hitherto Minister for National Education, became vice-chancellor of the University of Dar-es-Salaam in place of Mr Ibrahim Kaduma, the new Minister of Trade.

Elections for the Zanzibar Council of Representatives (under the provisions of the new Constitution for Zanzibar, adopted by the island's Revolutionary Council in October 1979—see 30020 A) were held on Jan. 7, 1980.

The Council's 40 members were elected (for a five-year term) on a constituency basis, with each constituency contested by two candidates both nominated by Tanzania's ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM or Revolutionary Party); the electorate consisted of an estimated 5,000 CCM party delegates. (The new Constitution for Zanzibar had been approved unanimously on Dec. 28, 1979, by a special session of the CCM, and a bill incorporating the necessary amendments to the Tanzanian Constitution was approved by the Tanzanian Parliament at a special session on Jan. 2, 1980.)

President Aboud Jumbe of Zanzibar (who was also Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania) on Jan. 8 swore in Mr Agostino Ramadhani as Chief Justice of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, and on Jan. 12 appointed Brig. Ramadhani Haji Saki to the newly-created post of Minister of Planning for Zanzibar.—(Le Monde - Times - Daily Telegraph - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30020 A*)

B. LUXEMBOURG — Cabinet Change

M. Pierre Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, announced on Feb. 29 the appointment of M. Jean Spautz as Minister of the Interior and of Family and Housing. M. Spautz succeeded M. Jean Wolter, who had died on Feb. 25, having held this post since the formation in July 1979 of M. Werner's Christian Social-Liberal coalition Government [see 29901 A].

M. Spautz (49), a former steel worker with strong trade union affiliations, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1959, and in July 1979 became a member for Luxembourg in the European Parliament [see page 29897].

Upon his ministerial appointment M. Spautz gave up his seat in the European Parliament, since membership of the latter was incompatible with ministerial office in the national Parliament of any member country.—(Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 29901 A; Elections to European Parliament 29893 A*)

C. UNITED KINGDOM — Lord Lane appointed Lord Chief Justice

It was announced on March 24 that Lord Lane (61) would succeed Lord Widgery (68) as Lord Chief Justice on April 15. Lord Lane, who had become a high court judge in 1966 and a Lord Justice of Appeal in 1974, had been appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in October 1979. Lord Widgery had been Lord Chief Justice since 1971 [see 24460 B].—(Times - Daily Telegraph) (*Prev. rep. 24460 B*)

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A. UNITED NATIONS — World Health Organization - 32nd World Health Assembly - Agreement on Marketing Practices for Infant Milk Formula Feed - Global Eradication of Smallpox

The 32nd World Health Assembly, held in Geneva on May 7-25, 1979, approved a report by Dr Halfdan Mahler (Denmark), the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), recommending strategies for implementing the WHO goal of "health for all by the year 2000". The Assembly also approved the WHO programme budget for the 1980-81 biennium, but Arab countries were unable to obtain support for proposed measures directed against Israel and Egypt (in the light of the March 1979 peace treaty between these two countries—see 29941 A).

Dr Mahler's report endorsed the conclusions of the International Conference on Primary Health Care which had been held on Sept. 6-12, 1978 in Alma Ata (Soviet Union) under the joint auspices of the WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (The Alma Ata Declaration, unanimously approved by delegates from 140 of the 151 WHO member countries, called on governments to develop national strategies and action plans to implement primary health care and to end "the inadequate and inequitable distribution of health resources between and within countries".)

In approving Dr Mahler's report, the Assembly requested him to submit recommendations to the UN Preparatory Committee for the New International Development Strategy for inclusion in the proposed strategy for the third UN development decade 1981-90 (which was due to be considered by the UN General Assembly at its 35th regular session in 1980).

The 1980-81 budget approved by the Assembly (by 87 votes to six, with one abstention) represented a 2 per cent increase in real terms over the amounts budgeted for the 1978-79 period, the total of $427,290,000 also including a 7.6 per cent increase to allow for inflation and a 10.96 per cent increase to compensate for the decline in the value of the dollar against the Swiss franc. (In addition to the regular programme budget, the WHO Voluntary Fund for Health Promotion, first established in 1960, had received contributions of $48,000,000 in 1978.)

According to legislation passed in October 1978 by the United States Congress (on the initiative of Senator Jesse Helms—Republican, North Carolina), no appropriations had been made for US contributions to technical assistance programmes under UN agency budgets; however, Mr Joseph Califano, then US Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, assured delegates at the World Health Assembly on May 9 that the US Administration was "working energetically with the Congress on new legislation which will allow the US to make its contributions".

An attempt by Arab countries at the Assembly to have Israel's right to vote suspended (there being no provision for a country's expulsion under WHO rules) was withdrawn on May 23, after its prospects of success had been reduced the previous day when delegates approved a Canadian resolution under which a two-thirds majority would be required for such a measure. (According to reports in the Western press, a number of African and South American countries had resisted Arab pressure and voted in favour of the Canadian resolution, after an earlier resolution had been approved which provided for the introduction of secret balloting.) A resolution concerning "health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories including Palestine" was deferred until 1980, while a proposal to remove the WHO African and Middle Eastern regional headquarters from Alexandria (Egypt) was defeated in a vote on May 24. [This latter proposal had been made in accordance with a resolution passed at the Baghdad conference of Arab states held in late March 1979—see pages 29952-53.]

At a special WHO-UNICEF conference on infant and young child feeding, held in Geneva on Oct. 9-12, 1979, representatives of the infant food manufacturing industry agreed to accept restrictions on their marketing of infant milk formula feeds. The conference also recommended national legislation to eliminate certain marketing practices, and to stress the priority of breastfeeding within mother and child care strategies (which were identified as a crucial aspect of primary health care).

A series of reports in recent years had highlighted cases where the promotion of infant milk formula feeds had led mothers to believe that they were equivalent or even superior to breastmilk; such reports also emphasized the nutritional dangers of such formula feeds where instructions were inadequate (or inadequately understood), and the risk of infection from unsterilized water and feeding bottles. The specific recommendations agreed by the conference included a ban on sales promotion and promotional advertising directed at the general public (although industry spokesmen confirmed that "educational and informational" advertising would continue), and the stipulation that advertising directed to health service personnel should be limited to "factual and ethical information".

Representing companies accounting for some 85 per cent of infant food production, the International Council of Infant Food Industries (ICIFI) welcomed these regulations (whose provisions were already largely covered by an ICIFI voluntary code), but it was pointed out that national legislation would be necessary to cover the activities of companies not included within ICIFI, and the conference recommended that a code of legislation should be drawn up by the WHO and UNICEF.

The eradication of smallpox was announced by Dr Mahler in Nairobi (Kenya) on Oct. 26, 1979, two years having elapsed since the world's last recorded case of (non-laboratory) infection in Somalia [see 29057 A]. This announcement confirmed the certification by an international commission that no cases of smallpox had been detected in Africa despite "assiduous investigations" over a two-year period. It was announced in Geneva on Dec. 10, 1979, that the WHO considered the global eradication of smallpox to be complete, following a 10-year programme costing an estimated $112,000,000.

(The world's last recorded cases of smallpox occurred in Birmingham, England, where the escape of virus from a research laboratory in September 1978 resulted in the death of a medical photographer aged 40, and in the illness of her mother, who, however, sustained a relatively mild infection and later recovered.)

The WHO was expected to make an official declaration of the eradication of smallpox at the 33rd World Health Assembly in May 1980. It was recommended that vaccination against smallpox should be ended (although 200,000,000 doses of vaccine should be kept as a precautionary measure), and that research into the disease should be confined to four designated centres.—(Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - WHO, Geneva) (*Prev. rep. 31st World Health Assembly 29057 A*)

B. UNITED KINGDOM — Increased Rates of National Insurance Contributions

Mr Reginald Prentice, the Minister for Social Security, announced in a written parliamentary reply on Nov. 22, 1979, increased rates of national insurance contributions, to take effect from April 6, 1980, as follows. [For previous increases effective April 1979, see 29668 A.]

Employed Persons. The lower earnings limit (LEL) below which employees were not liable for contributions would be raised from £19.50 to £23 a week (i.e. just less than the new basic rate of the retirement pension—see page 29831) and the upper earnings limit (UEL) above which no additional contributions were payable from £135 to £165 a week (i.e. about seven times the basic pension rate).

For employees not contracted out of the state pension scheme, the rate of contribution (payable on all earnings up to the UEL) would go up from 6.5 to 6.75 per cent for the employee and from 10 to 10.2 per cent for the employer (after taking into account a net reduction in Redundancy and Maternity Pay Fund contributions from 0.2 to 0.15 per cent).

For employees contracted out, the rate of contribution on all earnings up to the LEL would go up from 6.5 to 6.75 per cent for the employee and from 10 to 10.2 per cent for the employer, and on earnings between the LEL and the UEL from 4 to 4.25 per cent and from 5.5 to 5.7 per cent respectively.

The reduced rate of 2 per cent for certain married women and widow beneficiaries would remain unchanged.

The employers' rates are shown exclusive of the surcharge payable under the 1976 National Insurance Surcharge Act [see 28196 B] as amended by the 1978 Finance Act [see 29226 A].

Self-employed. The flat-rate contribution would go up from £2.10 to £2.50 a week, and the small earnings exception would apply where earnings were below £1,250 a year (currently £1,050). Earnings-related contributions (unchanged at 5 per cent) would apply to profits or earnings between £2,650 and £8,300 a year (currently between £2,250 and £7,000 a year).

Voluntary Contributions. These would go up from £2 to £2.40 a week.

The Social Security (Contributions, Re-rating) Order 1979, implementing the above changes, was approved by the House of Lords on Dec. 4 and by the House of Commons on Dec. 13. (Hansard) (*Prev. rep. Contributions 29668 A; Increased National Insurance and Other Social Security Benefits page 29831*)

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GUIDE TO CONTENTS

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RETAIN Yellow Index 1680 and Green Index 1681
INSERT This Guide

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The publishers regret that the despatch of weekly issues and the production of normal indexes have been delayed as a result of a printing industry dispute. This interim guide provides an alphabetical subject listing of the main headings of articles. A full subject index covering these articles will be published as soon as possible, and the coverage of the delayed Names Index will be expanded in order to minimize the inconvenience to users.

A

AFGHANISTAN

☐ Entry of Soviet Troops - Overthrow of President Amin - Installation of Karmal Regime - Deployment of Soviet Troops throughout Country - The Internal and Military Situation - International Reactions - Imposition of Sanctions by United States and Other Countries - Moves to boycott Moscow Olympics, 30229 A

AFRICA

☐ West Africa - Proposed Guinean Accession to Mano River Union, 30243 A

AUSTRALIA

☐ Western Australia State Election — Liberal-National Country Party Government returned with Reduced Majority, 30228 A

B

BELGIUM

☐ Departure of FDF from Coalition Government - Cabinet Reorganization - Postponement of Plans for Regional Parliaments - Developments in Language Dispute - Economic Developments, 30249 A

G

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST GERMANY)

☐ Death of Herr Friedrich Ebert, 30248 A

I

IRAN

☐ The US-Iranian Crisis - Continued Detention of US Hostages in Tehran - US Endeavours to apply Sanctions against Iran - Transfer of Former Shah to Panama - Constitutional Referendum and Presidential Election in Iran - Other Internal Developments, 30205 A

K

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH KOREA)

☐ Assassination of President Park Chung Hee -

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH KOREA) (cont.)

Mr Choi Kyu Hah elected President - Cabinet formed by Mr Shin Hyon Hwack - Other Internal Developments, August 1979 to March 1980, 30216 A

L

LUXEMBOURG

☐ Cabinet Change, 30251 B

M

MALAWI

☐ Cabinet Changes, 30228 C

O

OMAN, SULTANATE OF

☐ Cabinet Change, 30228 B

P

PANAMA, REPUBLIC OF

☐ Cabinet Change - Proposed Opposition Boycott of Elections, 30244 B

S

SAUDI ARABIA

☐ Occupation of the Grand Mosque at Mecca - Related Internal Security Developments - Moslem Reaction against United States - Changes in Leadership of Armed Forces, 30247 A

SOVIET UNION

☐ Internal Exile of Dr Sakharov following Statements on Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan, 30243 B

T

TANZANIA

☐ Government Changes - Elections for Zanzibar Council of Representatives - Zanzibar Government Appointments, 30251 A

U

UNITED KINGDOM

☐ Increased Rates of National Insurance Contributions, 30252 B
☐ Life Peerages, 30215 A
☐ Lord Lane appointed Lord Chief Justice, 30251 C
☐ Southend, East By-election, 30244 A

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

☐ Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies - Opening for Signature, 30226 A
☐ World Health Organization - 32nd World Health Assembly - Agreement on Marketing Practices for Infant Milk Formula Feed - Global Eradication of Smallpox, 30252 A
☐ 34th Regular Session of General Assembly, 30221 A

UNITED STATES

☐ President Carter's State of the Union Address, 30245 A

W

WORLD BANK - IDA

☐ Doubling of Authorized Capital of World Bank - Sixth Replenishment of IDA, 30250 A

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A. INDIA — Internal Developments, October 1979 to January 1980

During the period preceding the general elections fixed for Jan. 3 and 6, 1980 [see page 29974], there was a wide realignment of political forces in India.

This development followed in particular (i) the resignation in July 1979 of the Janata Government of Mr Morarji Desai and the formation of a Government by Mr Charan Singh representing principally the breakaway Janata Party (Secular), the Congress and a group of Socialists; (ii) the withdrawal in August of the external support initially given to Mr Charan Singh's Government by the Congress (I) led by Mrs Indira Gandhi, the former Prime Minister; (iii) the formation in September 1979 of the *Lok Dal* (led by Mr Charan Singh) from the Janata (S), the Socialist group participating in the Government and certain independent parliamentarians; (iv) continued dissension within the Janata Party over the issue of dual membership of the party and of the *Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh* (RSSS) paramilitary Hindu communal organization; and (v) the alliance of the *Lok Dal* and the Congress (led by Mr Devararj Urs, the Chief Minister of Karnataka). [For all of these, see pages 29971-75.]

The principal developments in the period from October to December 1979 were as follows.

(1) The *Lok Dal*-Congress alliance virtually broke down during the weeks leading up to the general elections. Six members of Mr Charan Singh's Government resigned between Oct. 19 and Dec. 22, and the two parties failed to agree on either a common manifesto or a joint list of candidates.

(2) Mr H. N. Bahuguna, the leader of the Congress for Democracy (Secular) group—CFD(S)—who had resigned as Finance Minister on Oct. 19 at Mr Charan Singh's request [see page 29975], joined the Congress (I) on Nov. 21 together with his followers. Mrs Gandhi appointed him a general secretary of the party and a member of its two highest bodies, the working committee and the central parliamentary board.

(3) Mr S. A. Dange, the chairman of the Communist Party of India (CPI), whose consistent support for Mrs Gandhi had repeatedly brought him into conflict with his colleagues over the previous two years [see page 29346], sent a telegram to Mr Bahuguna congratulating him on his decision to join the Congress (I). After the CPI's executive committee had repudiated his action, Mr Dange resigned from the chairmanship and the executive on Nov. 26.

(4) Mr K. Brahmananda Reddy, the Minister for Industry, and Mr Ankineedu Prasad Rao, Minister of State for Tourism, resigned from both the Congress and the Government on Nov. 27. In his letter of resignation from the Congress Mr Reddy alleged that Mr Urs had been trying to run the party as his personal preserve, and planned to prevent Mr Reddy from being selected as a candidate for the elections. Mr Reddy, Mr Rao and a group of their supporters from Andhra Pradesh, including three members of the dissolved *Lok Sabha* and two members of the *Rajya Sabha*, announced on Dec. 1 that they would join the Congress (I).

Relations between Mr Reddy and Mr Urs had been strained since December 1977, when as the result of a conflict between Mr Urs and Mr K. H. Patil (then president of the Karnataka state Congress committee—see also page 29341) Mr Reddy, then president of the Congress, suspended Mr Urs from the party. This development was followed by a split in the Congress and the formation on Jan. 2, 1978, of the Congress (I), with Mrs Gandhi as its president and Mr Urs as her principal lieutenant [see pages 28954-5]. Mr Urs, however, was expelled from the Congress (I) in June 1979, whereupon he formed his own party, the Karnataka Congress, subsequently being elected president of the Congress [see pages 29968, 29975]. The Karnataka Congress was formally merged with the Congress on Nov. 26, but two days later Mr Patil resigned from the party, and on Dec. 2 he and his followers announced their decision to join the Congress (I).

(5) Mr Zulfiqarullah, the Minister of Communications, resigned from the Government on Dec. 3 and announced that the Moslem National Front, which he had represented in the Cabinet, would contest the elections in association with the Janata Party. The Front, an alliance of five Moslem organizations formed in August, was reported to have broken with the *Lok Dal* because of disagreements over the number of seats in Uttar Pradesh to be allotted to Moslem candidates.

As indicated above, disagreements arose in late 1979 between the *Lok Dal* and the Congress over policy questions, which frustrated their plan to issue a joint election manifesto, and also over the allocation of seats to be contested by each, especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Their differences came to a head on Dec. 4, when Mr Chandrajit Yadav, a member of the Congress working committee and parliamentary board, announced that he had resigned from the Congress, which he accused of adopting an "obstructionist" attitude over the allocation of seats in Uttar Pradesh, and had joined the *Lok Dal*, despite an agreement between the two parties that they would not accept defectors from each other. The Congress working committee decided on the following day to issue its own manifesto and to contest a large number of seats in Uttar Pradesh, even if this meant confrontation with the *Lok Dal* in some constituencies. In a press statement it said that "the coalition Government will remain undisturbed, unless further serious developments take place". A *Lok Dal* spokesman, however, commented that he saw no meaning in an alliance without a common manifesto and a common programme.

On Dec. 13, the final date for withdrawal of nominations, 4,633 candidates were left in the field. The Congress (I) put forward 486 candidates, the Janata Party 420, the *Lok Dal* 292, the Congress 210, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) —CPI(M)—60, the CPI 50 and other parties 279, and there were also 2,836 independent candidates. Only one candidate was returned unopposed—Dr Farooq Abdullah, the son of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah (the Chief Minister of Kashmir), who was the only candidate nominated for the Srinagar seat—and there were only two straight fights, in the Nagaland and Mizoram constituencies. The largest number of candidates for a single seat was in the union territory of Chandigarh, where there were 39.

No candidates were nominated in 10 of the 14 Assam constituencies, and all nominations were withdrawn in the Barpeta (Assam) and Shillong (Meghalaya) constituencies [see below]. Voting was subsequently countermanded in the Autonomous Districts constituency of Assam because of shortage of official personnel, in the Serampore (West Bengal) constituency, where the Labour Party candidate was killed when bombs were thrown at his election office on Dec. 29, and in an Orissa constituency where a candidate had died.

The electoral line-up was extremely complex, as party alliances varied from state to state. Whilst the *Lok Dal* and the Congress were allied in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and West Bengal, they put up opposing candidates in some constituencies in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The two Communist parties—the CPI and the Communist Party of India (Marxist)—which were allied with the *Lok Dal* in these two states, opposed the *Lok Dal*-Congress alliance in West Bengal. In Tamil Nadu the Congress (I) was allied with the *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* and the Janata Party with the *Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (ADMK) and the Communist parties; in Kerala the Congress (I) was allied with the Janata Party and the Congress with the Communist parties [see below]; and in Goa the two Congress parties were allied against the Janata Party and the *Maharashtrawadi Gomantak*.

The two ADMK representatives in the Government [see page 29973, second column], Mr Aravinda Bala Pajanor (Petroleum and Chemicals) and Mrs Sathiyavani Muthu (Social Welfare), resigned on Dec. 22 at Mr Charan Singh's request, after the ADMK had stated in its election manifesto that it would support a government headed by the Janata Party leader, Mr Jagjivan Ram (who had succeeded Mr Desai in this post on July 27, 1979—see page 29972).

Election Manifestos

The election manifestos issued by the five main parties are summarized below.

Janata Party. In its manifesto, released on Nov. 30, the Janata Party condemned President Sanjiva Reddy's "indefensible" dissolution of the *Lok Sabha*, and proposed to amend the Constitution to prevent misuse of office by the President, the Prime Minister and caretaker governments. It also promised to ban defections, to introduce state funding of elections and a public audit of party funds, to lower the voting age to 18 and to delegate more powers to the states. It reaffirmed its commitment to socialism, with a commanding role for the public sector, and to decentralization of the economy. It proposed the establishment of a special police force drawn from all sections of society to suppress communal violence and of special courts to deal with individuals or organizations guilty of promoting such violence. It promised to amend the Constitution to guarantee freedom of the press and to protect women's rights.

In the economic field it undertook to give primacy to agriculture and rural development in planning, and to ensure employment for at

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least one member of each family within 10 years. All surplus land would be distributed to landless members of the scheduled castes and tribes within five years, and tenants personally cultivating their land and sharecroppers would be granted ownership of it. Farmers were promised remunerative prices and industrial and agricultural workers a minimum wage. Concentration of economic power would be reduced, and prices would be stabilized. English would be retained as an additional official language until all the states agreed to its replacement.

Congress (I). The Congress (I) manifesto, released on Dec. 1, denounced the "all-round deterioration and drift resulting from the Janata Party's misrule", the atrocities committed against the scheduled castes and tribes and the minorities, which it attributed to the influence of the RSSS [see page 29969], and the "persecution" of Mrs Gandhi and her colleagues. "The Indian National Congress (I)," it declared, "is the only party and Mrs Indira Gandhi is the only leader who can save the country after its recent traumatic experience." It made no reference to the emergency of 1975-77, and claimed that the Congress (I) was opposed to press censorship and to coercion in the implementation of family planning—two of the main issues which had led to Mrs Gandhi's defeat in the 1977 elections [see page 28352]. Like the Janata Party, the Congress (I) advocated the formation of a special force to prevent communal violence, undertook to provide at least one adult in each family with employment and promised that Hindi would not be imposed as an official language.

In its economic policy, it pledged to attack inflation, to control conspicuous consumption by fiscal and monetary measures and to boost production by improving the investment climate. It would formulate a national incomes policy to "evolve relatively acceptable norms for different sectors and professions", and would restructure the tax system to reduce the burden on the middle classes.

Congress. The Congress manifesto, issued on Dec. 7, reaffirmed the party's support for the late Mr Nehru's policies of democracy, socialism, secularism and non-alignment, and condemned the "arbitrary misrule" of the emergency period. Public sector industries would be promoted "as a countervailing measure against the unbridled growth of private capital". In agriculture the Congress would work for scientific modernization and for structural changes leading to a fairer distribution of assets and income. Land ceiling laws would be enforced, surplus land distributed, especially among scheduled castes and tribes, and a fair minimum wage guaranteed to landless labourers. Low-cost, labour-intensive and small-scale production based on domestic raw materials and designs would be encouraged. Equal pay for women would be enforced. Freedom of the press would be safeguarded by a constitutional amendment including it among fundamental rights. (The party's differences with the *Lok Dal* were made clear by its emphasis on continuing Mr Nehru's policies, which had been strongly criticized by the *Lok Dal* leaders, and on the public sector of the economy.)

Lok Dal. The *Lok Dal* manifesto, released on Dec. 11, advocated an economy based on small property, in which neither individuals had unrestricted freedom to exploit the needs of others nor the state possessed unlimited power to curb economic freedom, and agriculture and cottage industries would have priority. No capital-intensive enterprises would be allowed to be established for a purpose which could be carried out on a cottage scale, and existing factories manufacturing goods which could be produced on a small scale would not be allowed to expand. Public enterprises which continued to show losses would be shut down unless they formed part of the basic structure of the economy, and only projects which were connected with national security or did not attract private capital because of long gestation would be set up in the public sector. Manufacture or construction in both the private and the public sector of non-essential luxury items such as refrigerators, television sets, skyscrapers, expensive cars, breweries, distilleries and casinos would be prohibited. Farm-tenancy would be replaced by peasant proprietorship, and householders would be made owners of the sites on which their houses stood.

The manifesto also stated that special agencies would be set up which would automatically inquire into charges of corruption and would not depend on the Government's initiative. To eliminate the role of "black money", a state fund would be established to finance election expenses and other political activities. A special commission would be appointed to solve disputes between the states, its rulings being binding on all concerned.

Communist Party (Marxist). The CPI(M) manifesto, published on Sept. 25, called for the defeat of both the Congress (I), which it described as "the main authoritarian danger", and the Janata Party, which was dominated by the "anti-democratic and casteist" *Jan Sangh* and RSSS. It advocated support for the *Lok Dal*-Congress alliance, despite its "class limitations", but said that only unity of the left-wing and democratic forces presented a long-term solution. Its proposals included making the right to work a fundamental right; expansion of the powers of the states; nationalization of monopolies; a just and equitable incomes and wages policy; abolition of landlordism; a minimum wage based on need; safeguards for the rights of Moslems; and equality for all Indian languages.

Legal Proceedings in Connexion with Emergency Offences

Details are given below of developments in the legal proceedings against Mrs Gandhi, her son Mr Sanjay Gandhi and members of her Government in connexion with offences allegedly committed by them during the period of emergency in 1975-77.

Mrs Gandhi. The Delhi High Court quashed on Dec. 20, 1979, the prosecution of Mrs Gandhi and Mr Pramab Kumar Mukherjee (the former Minister of Revenue and Banking) for refusing to testify before the one-man Shah Commission [see pages 28433; 28956; 29346]. Mr Justice T. P. S. Chawla ruled that Mr Justice J. C. Shah had had no right to waive the oath of secrecy taken by a minister, to inquire into the circumstances in which the emergency was proclaimed (which was a political question not covered by the commission's terms of reference), or to inquire into the alleged harassment of four Industry Ministry officials in April 1975, as this had occurred before the emergency was proclaimed. The Government was given permission to appeal to the Supreme Court against the ruling.

The Defence Ministry filed a suit on Dec. 25 to recover Rs 1,500,000 (about £850,000) from Mrs Gandhi as unpaid dues for the use of Indian Air Force planes in the 1977 general election campaign.

Mr Sanjay Gandhi. The Supreme Court rejected on Nov. 19 an application by the prosecution seeking cancellation of Mr Gandhi's bail during his appeal against the sentence of two years' imprisonment passed on him in connexion with the destruction of the film *Kissa Kursi Ka* [see page 29966]. The prosecution held that he had misused his liberty, as on three occasions he had encouraged his supporters to accompany him to court and create disturbances.

The producer of *Kissa Kursi Ka*, Mr Amrit Nahata, filed on Dec. 4 a petition to the Supreme Court, which was hearing Mr Gandhi's appeal, alleging that it was at the instigation of Mr Charan Singh (then Home Minister) that he had given evidence against Mr Gandhi. Mr Nahata, a former Congress member of the *Lok Sabha*, had been elected in 1977 as a Janata member, had defected to the Congress in July 1979 and was reported to be about to join the Congress (I).

The Central Bureau of Investigation registered a case against Mr Gandhi on Dec. 17 charging him with illegally selling iron and steel acquired for use in the Maruti car project.

Mr Shukla. A Special Court on Sept. 17 ordered the trial of Mr Vidya Charan Shukla on charges of abusing his position as Minister of Information in Mrs Gandhi's Government by ordering the Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publicity to prepare election posters for Mrs Gandhi and himself in 1977 without payment. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal against the order on Dec. 7.

Mr Bansi Lal. The Haryana Government withdrew on Sept. 22 four out of 35 criminal charges against Mr Bansi Lal (Defence Minister in Mrs Gandhi's Government), including one of misappropriating Youth Congress funds. In reply to opposition allegations that he had withdrawn the charges to win Congress (I) support against a no-confidence motion, Mr Bhajan Lal, the Janata Chief Minister of Haryana [see page 29970], said that they had been found to be legally weak, and that the remaining charges might also be withdrawn.

Mr Bansi Lal, who had been expelled from the undivided Congress for six years in April 1977 [see page 28436], was reinstated in the Congress (I) in October 1979.

The Police Agitation

The agitation which had developed among the police forces in May and June 1979 [see page 29970] revived in October, when a section of the Tamil Nadu police went on strike.

The state Government had recently recognized three associations covering different ranks of the police, but had refused to recognize a fourth organization called the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinates' Association. Strikes by supporters of this association began on Oct. 16 and spread rapidly, about 4,000 of the 30,000 police being involved. A number of clashes occurred between the strikers and the Central Reserve Police, which had been called in by the state Government, and 2,700 of the strikers were arrested. The strike generally remained peaceful, but on Oct. 29 strikers set fire to a bus in the Tirunelveli district, and an attempt was made to set fire to a police inspector's house in Madurai. The strike was called off on the following day.

The unofficial Central Industrial Security Force Staff Association announced on Oct. 19 that it would launch an agitation on Nov. 5 which might culminate in a general strike. Following negotiations, however, the Government agreed to approve the formation of associations in the Central Industrial Security Force [see page 29971] and to grant a number of the association's other demands, and the planned agitation was called off in consequence on Oct. 30.

Revival of Naxalite Activities

Terrorist activities by Naxalites, which had greatly declined in recent years, were reported on Feb. 4, 1979, to have been intensified in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab and Kerala, and to have spread to Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Assam. The total strength of the movement was estimated at about 15,000. Two Naxalites and a soldier had been killed in an encounter in West Bengal early in January, and in Tamil Nadu a policeman was murdered on Feb. 26 and a landlord on March 3. Naxalites were also believed to be responsible for five murders and several armed robberies in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh in the first half of 1979.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) had split since 1971 into three main factions, one which rejected terrorism, and the pro-Lin Piao and anti-Lin Piao factions, which continued to practise it [see 25018 A; page 26979]. The anti-terrorist faction announced on Nov. 30 that it would support the Janata candidates in the general elections in West Bengal, on the grounds that the *Lok Dal*-Congress alliance, the CPI(M)-CPI alignment and the Congress (I) were all "pro-Soviet".

The Andhra Pradesh High Court on April 27 set aside sentences of life imprisonment which had been passed on Mr Kanu Sanyal (the leader of the anti-Lin Piao faction—see also page 28755—who was currently being held in a West Bengal prison) and nine others on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Government by force, and ordered their release. The two judges differed, however, on the life sentences which had been passed on five other Naxalites [see page 24515; 25018 A; page 26979]. Whilst one judge confirmed the sentences, the other found Mr Choudhary Tejeswara Rao, Mr Nagabhusan Patnaik and Mrs Ramasita guilty of sedition but not of conspiracy, and acquitted the other two. These judgments were referred to a third High Court judge, who acquitted all five on July 13.

President's Rule introduced in Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala

President's rule was introduced in the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh on Nov. 3, 1979, following the resignation of the Government on Oct. 31 [see page 29976], and in Kerala on Dec. 5. (Assembly elections were subsequently held in Arunachal Pradesh on Jan. 3, 1980, and in Kerala on Jan. 21.)

A group of 15 Kerala Congress members of the Assembly led by Mr K. M. Mani had on Nov. 14 withdrawn their support from Mr C. H. Mohammad Koya's Government (formed in October—see page 29978), and subsequently joined the opposition Left Front. The Kerala Congress had previously split in July into two opposing groups, that led by Mr Mani and another of six members led by Mr P. J. Joseph, both of which had originally supported Mr Koya's Government. Another Kerala Congress member, Mr R. B. Pillai, formed a separate group also supporting the Left Front.

Mr A. K. Antony, the president of the state Congress in Kerala, announced on Nov. 27 that the Congress would fight the *Lok Sabha* elections in alliance with the Left Front, but refused to say whether it would withdraw its support from the Government. On the following morning Mr Koya advised the Governor, Mrs Jothi Venkatachellum, to "end the political uncertainty in the state" by dissolving the Assembly and ordering fresh elections. A few hours later Mr Antony informed her that the Congress had withdrawn its support from the Government, which was now in a minority, and proposed that the opposition parties should be called upon to form a ministry. The Congress and the Left Front parties, which claimed the support of 90 of the 139 members of the Assembly, subsequently requested Mrs Venkatachellum to invite Mr Mani to form a Government. She dissolved the Assembly on Nov. 30, however, and accepted Mr Koya's resignation on the following day, President's rule being introduced on Dec. 5. It was announced on Dec. 11 that elections to a new Assembly would be held on Jan. 21, 1980.

For the purposes of both the *Lok Sabha* and the Assembly elections, the political parties were grouped into two opposing alliances: the Left Democratic Front, consisting of the Congress, the CPI(M), the CPI, the Kerala Congress (Mani and Pillai groups), the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the All-India Moslem League; and the United Democratic Front, comprising the Congress (I), the Janata Party, the Moslem League, the Kerala Congress (Joseph group), the National Democratic Party, the Socialist Republican Party and the *Praja* Socialist Party.

Disturbances in North-Eastern States

Widespread disturbances occurred in the second half of 1979 in the north-eastern states of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura and the union territory of Mizoram. In Assam and Meghalaya these took the form of agitations against the alleged inclusion of immigrants from Bangladesh in the electoral registers, which led to the postponement of the elections in 12 of the 14 Assam constituencies and one of the two Meghalaya constituencies. Terrorist activities by secessionist organizations continued in Mizoram and Manipur and spread to Tripura, and there was evidence that separatists in all three areas, together with those from Nagaland, were attempting to coordinate their activities.

The primary cause of the disturbances was the native peoples' resentment of immigration from Bangladesh and from other parts of India, which had resulted in competition for land and employment. Another factor contributing to the unrest was the fears aroused by the Freedom of Religion Bill and religious restrictions recently imposed in Arunachal Pradesh among Christians, who formed the majority of the population in Mizoram and Nagaland and between a quarter and half of the population in Meghalaya and Manipur [see page 29969; 25468 B].

Assam - Agitation against "Foreigners" - Postponement of Elections - President's Rule introduced

An agitation against the inclusion of "foreigners" in the electoral rolls developed in Assam in the later months of 1979, under the leadership of organizations called the All-Assam *Sangram Parishad* and the All-Assam Students' Union. Although the campaign was nominally directed against immigrants from Bangladesh, about 200,000 of whom were alleged to be registered as voters, all non-Assamese-speaking people were subjected to intimidation. The Indian Citizens' Rights Protection Committee, which had been formed by Bengalis from West Bengal living in Assam, alleged on Nov. 26 that about 400,000 voters' names had been deleted from the rolls at the instance of the Assam Government on the pretext that they were not Indian citizens, and demanded that the revision of the rolls should be declared null and void.

During the period for the filing of nominations for the elections (Dec. 5-10) large crowds picketed government offices and the homes of prospective candidates, with the result that no nominations were received in 10 of the 14 constituencies. Furthermore, the police opened fire at Babanipur, in the Barpeta constituency, on Dec. 10 when a mob tried to prevent a candidate from filing her nomination papers, two people being killed; three of the candidates in the constituency then withdrew their nominations on Dec. 11, and the other candidate's nomination was rejected.

The state Government lost its majority in the Assembly on Dec. 8, when the 22 Congress and six CPI members withdrew their support as a protest against the Government's failure to maintain order, and on the following day all the 13 ministers submitted their resignation to the Chief Minister, Mr Jogendra Nath Hazarika. As he nevertheless refused to resign, his party, the Assam Janata Dal [see page 29976], elected Mr Keshab Chandra Gogoi on Dec. 10 to replace him as its leader. On the recommendation of the Governor, Mr Lallan Prasad Singh, who reported that no party or combination of parties was in a position to provide a stable government, President's rule was introduced on Dec. 12, although the Assembly (elected in February 1978—see page 29341) was not dissolved.

The agitation meanwhile continued, and a curfew was imposed on parts of Gauhati, the state capital, on Dec. 15 after mobs had fought the police and houses and shops had been set on fire. A non-co-operation movement on Dec. 27-29 almost totally disrupted work in government offices, and on Dec. 31 the Chief Election Commissioner, Mr S. L. Shakdher, announced that polling in the Autonomous Districts constituency had had to be postponed because the returning officer was unable to arrange the necessary personnel.

The violence reached its height during the voting period. In the oilfields region of Upper Assam picketing brought production to a standstill, and a curfew was imposed on the town of Digboi on Jan. 3, 1980, following several cases of arson and assault. In the Kamrup district of Lower Assam two people were killed in clashes on Jan. 7, and almost the entire north bank of the Brahmaputra in this district was declared a disturbed area on the following day. In the Cachar district the police opened fire on rioters three times on Jan. 7, and police and army patrols were empowered on the following day to shoot at sight anyone engaging in vandalism or arson.

Manipur - President's Rule introduced - Terrorist Activities

President's rule was introduced in Manipur on Nov. 14, 1979, on the recommendation of the Governor, Mr L. P. Singh. In his report he said that extremists had been responsible for 34 violent incidents during the year in which 21 people had been killed, including 12 policemen, and banks and government offices looted, and that the police had been "rendered increasingly ineffective in dealing with the activities of extremists

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because of gross maladministration, favouritism and nepotism". The Assembly's five-year tenure had already expired in February [see 26480 A], and if the present Ministry continued in office the situation might deteriorate further, making it virtually impossible to hold elections peacefully. Elections to the Assembly were ordered to take place at the same time as the *Lok Sabha* elections.

Terrorist activities by secessionists, who urged voters to boycott the elections, continued during the election campaign. A Janata candidate for the Assembly was shot and wounded in Imphal on Dec. 12, and polling in the constituency was countermanded after the CPI candidate was shot dead on Jan. 1, 1980.

Meghalaya - Agitation against "Foreigners" - Preventive Detention introduced

An agitation for the exclusion of "foreigners" from the electoral registers similar to that in Assam developed in Meghalaya in the later months of 1979. As a result of picketing by demonstrators, no nominations were received for one of the two *Lok Sabha* constituencies in the state.

The agitation was directed not only against immigrants from Bangladesh but also against all non-tribal people, and especially against Bengalis. Following disturbances in Shillong in which a number of Bengalis were killed, a curfew was imposed on Oct. 26. A memorandum submitted to the Union Government by a Bengali organization on Dec. 21 alleged that non-tribal people from other states were being evicted from their homes and their names removed from the electoral registers on the pretext that they were not Indian citizens.

Three people, including a non-tribal member and a former member of the Meghalaya Assembly, were shot dead and another member of the Assembly wounded when their car was ambushed in Assam on Dec. 13. In Shillong, where the curfew had been lifted on Dec. 15, a protest demonstration by Bengalis was attacked on Dec. 20, one person being killed and a number of shops set on fire. Although the curfew was reimposed and the police were ordered to shoot on sight at people engaged in violence or arson, further rioting occurred on Dec. 22, five people being killed, and on the following day five people on a bus were murdered near the Bangladesh border.

The Governor, Mr L. P. Singh, promulgated an ordinance on Dec. 26 empowering the state Government to detain any person without trial for six months with the object of maintaining security in the state. Nine people, including three members of the Assembly, were arrested under the ordinance on the following day.

Mizoram - Terrorist Activities

Two people were killed when a Mizo National Front (MNF) commando ambushed a lorry of the Border Roads Construction Force on Nov. 1. A government official was shot dead by an MNF terrorist in the town of Champhai, near the Burmese border, on Jan. 4, 1980.

Nagaland - Formation of All-Nagaland Communist Party

India, Bangladesh and Burma were reported on Oct. 25, 1979, to have agreed to co-operate against the activities of Naga rebels in the border areas of the three countries, following the formation of the All-Nagaland Communist Party, a Maoist organization. The new party was believed to have close links with a force of Naga rebels which had been encamped in Burma since it returned in 1977 after receiving military training in China [see page 28753], and also with Naga and Arakanese separatist organizations in Burma. Inside Nagaland, however, the situation had remained peaceful since the ambush on March 27 [see page 29979], which some sources regarded as the work of the All-Nagaland Communist Party.

Tripura - Terrorist Activities by Tripur Sena

A government press note of Oct. 29 reported that the State Intelligence Department had discovered a conspiracy by the *Tripur Sena*, in collusion with the MNF, to establish an independent state of Tripura by force. The *Tripur Sena* was said to be an extremist faction of the *Tripura Upajatia Juba Samiti*, a tribal organization with four members in the Assembly (following the Dec. 31, 1977, elections—see page 29342). Under the leadership of Mr Vijoy Rankhal, the note stated, it had sent insurgents to the Chittagong Hills areas of Bangladesh to obtain arms and military training from the MNF, and had collaborated with the MNF in carrying out acts of terrorism and armed robberies inside Tripura. Two members of the Border Security Force and a civilian were subsequently killed on Nov. 9 in an attack on a police camp.—(The Hindu, Madras - The Statesman, Calcutta - Times - Guardian) (*29965 A*)

A. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION — World Administrative Radio Conference - Adoption of New International Radio Regulations

A World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), organized by Mr Mohamed Mili (Tunisia), the ITU Secretary-General, and attended by delegates from 148 of the 154 ITU member countries was held in Geneva from Sept. 24 to Dec. 6, 1979 [for previous such meetings held in Geneva in 1959, see 17214 A]. Although decisions concerning high-frequency shortwave broadcasting and fixed satellite broadcasting were deferred for consideration at subsequent special conferences, agreements were concluded on the reallocation of frequencies between different types of usage, to take effect from Jan. 1, 1982.

A dispute over the election of a conference chairman delayed the start of detailed work at the conference for nearly four days, until on Sept. 27 the delegates agreed to elect by consensus Sr Roberto Severini, the Argentinian Secretary of State for Posts and Telecommunications. Western countries had supported proposals that the chair be taken by a New Zealand representative or by a Swiss compromise candidate, whereas the candidacy of an Indian representative had been advanced by the non-aligned group of countries (the summit conference of the non-aligned countries in Havana earlier in the month—see 30037 A—having called for the election of a non-aligned country representative as chairman of the WARC).

After the conference had been extended beyond its original scheduled closing date of Nov. 30, a 1,300-page final document was signed on Dec. 6, covering the revised division of the radio frequency spectrum into frequencies designated for a total of 55 different types of usage (including radio and television broadcasting, air and sea traffic control, radar frequencies and those used on a local basis such as police and taxi wavelengths and domestic radio-telephone services). The agreement excluded a number of politically controversial matters, notably (i) an Algerian proposal to allocate two-thirds of the airwaves to developing countries, whose current usages amounted to some 10 per cent of the total, in order to safeguard their present and future communications requirements, (ii) US proposals to expand the allocation of shortwave frequencies to international broadcasting, at the expense of the domestic usages of such frequencies (by African countries in particular), and (iii) a proposal by Colombia that countries should have sovereignty over the radio space above their territory, according to which fixed (geo-stationary) radio satellites (in synchronous orbit 22,300 miles above the equator) would be subject to control by the countries lying along the equator [see also 28217 B].

The conference decided that fixed-satellite broadcasting, with its implications for listeners' and viewers' access to foreign radio and television programmes, should be the subject of another conference to be held in 1985. It was also decided that the allocation of shortwave frequencies among competing national usages should be deferred until a conference in 1983 or 1984, when consideration would also be given to proposals for the gradual introduction of "single-sideband" radio broadcasting. (This technique, with a potential for allowing the double use of individual frequencies and thus for reducing airwave congestion, would require the conversion or replacement of the world's estimated 100,000,000 radio receivers currently designed for "double-sideband" reception.)

The ITU announced that its supreme governing body, the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, would meet in 1982 to fix the precise dates for the planned fixed-satellite and shortwave conferences.—(International Herald Tribune - Guardian - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Review of International Affairs, Belgrade) (*Prev. rep. 17214 A, 28217 B*)

B. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC — Cabinet Changes - Military Retirements

President Guzmán on Feb. 1, 1980, appointed Sr Emilio Ludovilo Fernández as Secretary of State (Minister) for Foreign Affairs *vice* Rear-Adml. Ramón Emilio Jiménez Reyes Hiso and Sr Secundino Gil Morales as Secretary of State for Interior and Police *vice* Sr Vicente Sánchez Baret.

Subsequently, Lt.-Gen. Mario Imbert McGregor was on March 3 appointed Secretary of State for the Armed Forces *vice* Lt.-Gen. Rafael Adriano Váldez Hilario. With this change, and with the retirement at the same time of Maj.-Gen. Rafael Neit Nivar Seijas, Maj.-Gen. Marcos Antonio Jorge Moreno and Brig.-Gen. Juan René Beauchamps Javier, President Guzmán completed the removal of senior officers who had supported former President Balaguer [see 29568 B; 29278 B]. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Latin America Weekly Report) (*Prev. rep. 30091 B; Cabinet 29278 B, 29568 B*)

A. CANADA — Announcement of Question to be put in Forthcoming Quebec Referendum - Quebec Government White Paper on Sovereignty-Association - Liberal Opposition's Proposals for Constitutional Reform - Quebec Legislation making French Sole Official Language of Provincial Assembly and Courts ruled Unconstitutional by Supreme Court of Canada

Mr René Lévesque, the Premier of Quebec, announced in the provincial Legislature on Dec. 20, 1979, the wording of the question to be put to the people of Quebec in a referendum to be held in the spring of 1980 on the province's constitutional future. The holding of such a referendum had been promised by Mr Lévesque during and since the provincial election of November 1976 which brought his *Parti Québecois* Government to power [see 28178 A].

The wording of the question was as follows:

"The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations. This agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, administer its taxes and establish relations abroad—in other words sovereignty—and, at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency. Any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be submitted to the people through a referendum. On these terms, do you agree to give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?"

Mr Lévesque told a press conference after his statement that the second referendum would not take place until after the next provincial election, due in 1980 or 1981, because the negotiations with the rest of Canada would last for 18 months to two years. If the negotiations were successful, Quebeckers would be asked in the second referendum to ratify the results. In the event of failure, the Quebec Government would ask for a mandate "for what is commonly called a unilateral decision".

Government White Paper on Sovereignty-Association

The Quebec Government's proposals for sovereignty-association were contained in a White Paper tabled in the province's National Assembly on Nov. 1, 1979. Excerpts from the document, entitled *Quebec-Canada: a New Deal*, are given below.

"**Quebec's Experience of Federalism.** No political system has an absolute value and federalism, for example, is not in itself good or bad. Indeed, it is obvious that it is not on the basis of theoretical arguments that a political system can be justified or condemned, but rather by examining the way it is applied and its long-term effects on a specific population. From the anglophone point of view, for instance, Canadian federalism may be judged favourably and rightly so, if it answers the aspirations and serves the interests of that group; but another group—in this case francophones—can no less justifiably judge the same political system unfavourably if it does not correspond to their aspirations or serve their interests. . . .

"In Canada in recent years federalism has been the object of severe criticism from many quarters. It is impossible here to review every element of that criticism, to analyse it through how citizens perceive the Canadian reality, or to evaluate the criteria on which their judgment is based. It is important, instead, to encourage people to embark on some real soul-searching between now and the referendum to distinguish between essentials and details and, in order to do that, to study federalism as Quebec has experienced it and from the point of view of Quebeckers.

"To grasp the essentials, one must go back to the beginning of Confederation in the 1860s and to the motives which finally led Canada to a federal system rather than the unitary system some people had proposed. For if a combination of economic, financial and military causes explain why the British colonies joined together in 1867, it does not explain the federal character of the system. . . . Quebec's aspiring to autonomy was one of the main reasons for the creation of the Canadian federal system; the unitary dream of English-Canadians, however, caused them to interpret Canadian federalism very differently from Quebeckers, a situation that gave rise to many misunderstandings. In 1867 Quebec acquired a certain political autonomy in so far as the central Government scrupulously respected the jurisdictions reserved for the provinces. Yet in the very first years of the federal system Ottawa intervened in areas that the provinces, and Quebec in particular, regarded as theirs. This trend towards centralization, more obvious at some times than at others but always present, grew stronger after the Second World War and particularly in recent years.

"It is noteworthy that Ottawa has consistently sought not so much to confirm or extend its authority over vast and costly jurisdictions as to take over the political levers with which a modern government can contribute to shaping the society of the future. In this respect, the federal Government's action is a greater threat to Quebec than to any other province, since it intensifies the minority status of Quebeckers and makes them increasingly dependent on the very level of government whose power they wished to escape. All of Quebec's political leaders, regardless of their party affiliations, fought for Quebeckers to have increasing control over their own affairs; none of them, however, succeeded in stopping the trend towards centralization, even if at times it was slowed down.

"What is the explanation for this? In the opinion of the Quebec Government, there were four major reasons for the trend towards centralization.

"First, the increased powers and influence of the central Government corresponded to the aspirations of the English-Canadian community, which quite naturally saw this 'national' Government as the main instrument of its progress as a society. In Canada the majority is inclined to favour centralization, whereas Quebeckers definitely do not.

"Secondly, the central Government was able to take advantage of certain crises in order to intervene in provincial jurisdictions: the depression, the Second World War, post-war social needs, unemployment, inflation, energy—all were pretexts for repeated federal intervention, with the consent of the Canadian majority, which deemed essential that Ottawa respond to the severity of the problems by 'national' solutions, disregarding the allocation of jurisdictions set down in the Constitution. The law is born of necessity, and Quebec was subjected, despite itself, to the law of the majority.

"Third, the wording of the British North America Act [of 1867] favoured the expansion of the central Government by giving it all the powers that are not specifically allocated to the provinces. It was fairly simple in this respect for Ottawa to take over new areas not covered by the 1867 Constitution: income security, research, urban affairs, radio and television, recreation, sports, consumer affairs, the environment and many others. The British North America Act reserved the future for the central Government; this seems normal to the Canadian majority, but not to Quebec.

"Finally, the increase in the central Government's power was possible because its fiscal and financial resources were so much greater than the provinces', since the Constitution gave it the right to levy all kinds of taxes while limiting the provinces to what is called direct taxation. . . .

"It is true that the cost of administration in the provinces and the programmes for which they are responsible have increased considerably since the end of the Second World War, but because federal grants for these programmes are earmarked they do not give the provinces any greater freedom, so that in many areas they must be content with managing programmes conceived and directed by the federal Government. Thus the provinces' freedom of action is reduced and their initiative undermined; they are subject to priorities set by others, and their decision making powers have not grown in line with their budgets. Quebec, a distinct society, is all the more sensitive to this situation in that its Government must constantly adapt its action to pan-Canadian programmes and to criteria ill suited to the specific needs of its population.

"**Federalism: An Impasse.** In the opinion of the Quebec Government, recent history has proved it is impossible to renew Canadian federalism in such a way as to meet the needs of both Quebec and Canada. . . . Many people hoped to find those answers in what was to be the greatest effort to revise the Constitution in Canadian history. From February 1968 to June 1971 First Ministers, cabinet ministers and civil servants met frequently, sometimes under television lights, sometimes behind closed doors, to review the problem of the Constitution in its entirety in order to find a satisfactory solution [see 22737 A; 23295 A; 28152 A]. For 3½ years many experts were consulted, hundreds of documents were drafted, dozens of official stands were taken. Yet in June 1971, after the Victoria Conference [see 28152 A], the whole undertaking collapsed, and the Canadian problem loomed as large as before.

"It would be impossible to summarize the story of that great debate here, even briefly. Let us simply remember that Quebec would have given up the principle and positions it deemed essential if it had endorsed the Victoria constitutional charter [ibid.]; only this would have assured the success of the conference—from the point of view of Ottawa and the other provinces. All through the many conferences and working meetings Quebec's ideas and those of English Canada never seemed reconcilable. While Quebec wanted above all a new division of powers that would have given constitutional recognition to the Quebec nation and guaranteed it the means to satisfy its aspirations, English Canada was interested primarily in patriating the Constitution, modernizing federal institutions such as the Senate and the Supreme Court, and in certain aspects of the distribution of powers between Ottawa and the provinces. As for the federal Government, which wanted most of all to incorporate in the Constitution a

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charter of fundamental and linguistic rights, it largely shared the view of English Canada.

"From the very beginning Quebec and the rest of Canada differed fundamentally on the very nature of the problem: the status of Quebec and Quebeckers, as a society within Canada. English Canada put the accent on individual rights and preferred to ignore any reference to collective rights; Quebec, on the contrary, maintained that the Canadian crisis could be overcome only by offically recognizing the national duality of Canada, and accepting the political consequences of this recognition. Surprised by the results of the 1976 Quebec election [see 28178 A], Ottawa moved to create a new commission of inquiry—the Pepin-Robarts Task Force—on Canadian unity, which submitted its report in January 1979 [see 29560 A]. As was to be expected, it provides a new diagnosis of what is called the Canadian crisis. Although they also sound the alarm on the urgency of revising the Canadian Constitution, the commissioners' analysis is different from that of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission [the 1963 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, whose final report was published between December 1967 and June 1970—see 22529 A; 23814 A; 24163 A]. The new commissioners abandoned the theme of equality between peoples and chose instead that of national unity: from a search for equality between the two founding peoples, they return to the simple recognition of duality. This change in perspective, which deserves to be emphasized, is particularly noticeable because the commissioners even specify that the dualistic character of the country is moderated, outside Quebec, by strong feelings of regionalism. In short, they tell Quebeckers that 'their' problem is only one of the six major problems Canada faces—the other five being the demands of the native peoples, a difficult economic situation, the alienation of the Canadian West, the awakening of new Canadians, and the questioning of the role of the central Government.

"Although the Pepin-Robarts report did not really propose a solution that entirely satisfied Quebeckers, it did recommend increasing Quebec's powers, particularly in cultural and social affairs. Yet, only a few weeks after it was published it had, to all intents and purposes, been shelved by Ottawa, along with the other reports of this type. And since the Clark [Progressive Conservative] Government has come to power [in May 1979—see 29767 A], there has been no mention of it. The most recent series of negotiations, which lasted from October 1978 to February 1979 [see 29560 A], constituted a desperate, last minute federal effort (Bill C-60) [see 29231 A] to show Quebeckers it was possible to agree on certain constitutional amendments. The failure of the exercise, all told, only confirms the opposite. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the new Conservative Government will really reactivate this file, for despite its election promises it does not seem prepared to face the constitutional problem head on, since it is not one of its priorities.

"In the view of the Quebec Government, the lamentable story of the many vain attempts to revise the Constitution proves how illusory it is to hope that federalism can ever be renewed in such a way as to satisfy both Quebec and the rest of Canada. An insurmountable obstacle blocks the way to 'renewed federalism', one that has stopped all those who have tried to bring about fundamental changes in the federal system; in order to strengthen Quebec, to build it, Quebeckers must, as the system now stands, ask English-Canadians to undermine and dismantle their national institutions. To respond to Quebec's needs and ensure its development, it would indeed be necessary to transfer to all the provinces so many powers that now belong to Ottawa that it would add up, in the eyes of English-Canadians, to the almost total disappearance of the central Government. As we have already said, English-Canadians insisted as early as 1867 on giving priority to their 'national' Government, just as they have tended in each crisis to increase its power and its means of action. How can we hope then, within the present system, that they will abandon something it took them more than 100 years to build? Their determination to preserve their institutions is probably equalled only by Quebec's determination to satisfy its needs and aspirations.

"Of course English-Canadians say they are ready to improve the system. But we must be wary of words: the expression 'renewed federalism', very much in fashion these days, can have many meanings. Certain Quebeckers, when they talk of 'renewed federalism' because they are dissatisfied with the status quo, think of a serious and substantial transformation of the system, not a cosmetic job. English-Canadians, on the other hand, give quite a different meaning to the term: it is a 'touched up' federalism that they want, since they feel that any reform must totally respect the role and the prerogatives of the central Government, seen as the 'national Government' of all Canadians. This prior requirement implies maintaining federal control on levers that, in Quebec's view, are indispensable to its own progress. The very balance of the system, as the Canadian majority wants it, requires that Quebec remains a province—or perhaps a territory—among 10 others, and forbids the formal and concrete recognition of a Quebec nation. The fact that it is impossible, in the present federal framework, for Quebec to become a nation constitutes the very basis of the Canada-Quebec political problem.

"Some Quebeckers believed in good faith that the answer to the problem was to give Quebec a special status. The idea, fashionable during the 60s and taken up again with certain variations, seemed to have the advantage of answering a good many of Quebec's aspirations without forcing the other provinces into constitutional rearrangements they did not want. But this solution was quickly rejected by English Canada, which was opposed to Quebec's possible acquisition of powers denied to the other provinces. . . . Of course, in an attempt to calm Quebec's fears, and confronted with certain obvious needs, the federal Government has consented to certain arrangements or administrative compromises that are in no way basic reforms of the system: each compromise has been made because of a crisis; they have been automatically offered to all the provinces to avoid giving Quebec special treatment; they have avoided any constitutional amendment; and they have been made only to the extent that the federal Government's supremacy in the areas involved was not weakened. In other words, the fundamental balance of the system must not be upset, something that would inevitably happen if Quebec changed its provincial status. All the constitutional debates of these past years make sense only if they are considered in terms of a change in status for Quebec. Quebec's approach to the issue of autonomy is not merely an administrative quarrel between Quebec and Ottawa; nor is it an expression of purely regional preoccupations to which some people would like to reduce Quebec's aspirations; it is the manifestation of the firm conviction of Quebeckers that they constitute a distinct community and people. Here lies the sole reason for their profound concern; the skirmishes of politicians and civil servants are unimportant. The irreconcilable difference in perspective thus largely explains why the efforts of recent years to revise the Constitution never got anywhere.

"One simple conclusion can be drawn from all these observations. If we want both to save the present system and to renew federalism, we will have to resign ourselves to giving up to the central Government, in which Quebeckers will always be in a minority, an impressive number of prerogatives and decision making centres that to date Quebec has been demanding for itself. For Quebeckers that would mean implicitly accepting the fact that control over some of their most vital affairs would go to a government over which they could never exert more than an indirect or passing influence; it would mean entrusting their interests and their future to others. Very few nations in the world would be satisfied with such an arrangement. Let us finally dispose of this impossible 'renewed federalism'; let us admit that there is no version that is acceptable to all of the supporters of the present system, and none that seems likely to be accepted in the foreseeable future. Thus it is obvious that to solve the Quebec-Canada political problem which the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission described more than 15 years ago, a different formula must be found. It is precisely this formula, which will satisfy both Quebec's need for autonomy and the . . . need of English Canada for cohesion, that the Quebec Government intends to propose. . . .

"**A New Deal.** If we are really looking for a new agreement between Quebec and the rest of Canada, it is absolutely essential to replace federalism by another constitutional formula. This search for a new formula must be carried out with due consideration for the fundamental, legitimate preoccupations of Quebeckers, who want to communicate and talk directly and freely with their neighbours and with other nations, who do not want to destroy Canada or to be completely separate from it, who wish to improve their situation, and who are determined to see that the changes to come are made democratically and without disorder. The Government of Quebec fully shares and endorses these preoccupations. Thinking of the future the Government of Quebec proposes a constitutional formula which would replace the present federal system and at the same time respect the legitimate feelings of Quebeckers towards Canada. This new system, while freeing Quebec from Ottawa's domination, would not break up an economic community that extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific; it would ensure for Quebec a maximum of autonomy while maintaining the natural interdependence and the historical and human links that exist between Quebec and the rest of Canada; it would enable Quebec to institute the measures that it lacks at present without forcing the other provinces to accept responsibilities they do not feel they need.

"This new system would provide permanent solutions to the many problems engendered by relations between Quebec and Ottawa over the years. Of the two roads open to Quebeckers—a federalism whose fundamental renewal is to all intents and purposes impossible because it would contradict the very nature of federalism, and a new agreement between Quebec and Canada capable of reconciling political autonomy and economic interdependence—the Government of Quebec has chosen the latter, sovereignty-association, a contemporary expression of Quebec's continuity, in brief a new deal.

"The recent history of international relations shows that federalism can no longer be regarded as the only formula capable of reconciling the objectives of autonomy and interdependence. Although it was fashionable in the past century, the federal formula must now give way to associations between sovereign countries. While no new federations are being created, economic associations are on the increase on every continent. . . . These various associations of sovereign states are distinguished from one another by the nature of their activity and the degree of their integration, as well as by the history of relations between the member states and their various characteristics: population, culture, political system, etc. . . . Basing itself firmly on the historical trend of Quebec thinking, which has always sought to redefine relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada on a more egalitarian basis, the Government of Quebec proposes this type of modern formula of association between sovereign countries to ensure for Quebeckers a better control of their own affairs, without shattering the Canadian economic framework. . . . Modern economic associations are generally the result of co-operation between individual countries and entirely sovereign nations, which have agreed to pool some of their powers. In such cases, integration is based on the sovereignty of the partners. In our case, however, economic integration already exists and it is the sovereignty of the partners that must be established. The point of departure is different but the aim is identical.

"**Implications of Sovereignty.** The idea of sovereignty is clearly defined in international law: it is, in general terms, the power to make decisions autonomously, without being subject in law to any superior or exterior power, which implies that the sovereign state has full jurisdiction over a given territory. Sovereignty ensures complete autonomy, in the sense that the state enjoys full legal freedom in all fields; its authority is exercised to the exclusion of any other within the limits of its territory; and it can be present in the community of nations. The sovereign state may, however, of its own accord and without giving up its sovereignty, agree to limit its scope or to delegate part of it in certain specific fields. Thus, for two states linked by an agreement or parties to an association, the joint exercise of their sovereignty would necessarily be reflected in reciprocal concessions. In the case that concerns us, any limitation that Quebec would agree to impose on the exercise of its sovereignty would entail, in return, the corresponding limitation, accepted by Canada, of its own sovereignty. In a federal system, sovereignty is shared by two powers, one of which, the central power, has priority. Consequently, citizens are ruled by two governments, two sets of laws and two court systems; there are two kinds of elections, one to elect the central Parliament (the House of Commons in Ottawa), the other to elect a local Parliament (the National Assembly in Quebec); there are also two taxation systems. On the other hand, there is a single customs tariff, a single currency and a single international personality.

"Under the formula proposed by the Government of Quebec, sovereignty would reside entirely in the State of Quebec, so that Quebeckers would be ruled by a single government and would pay taxes only to Quebec. Because of the association, Quebec and Canada would continue to share a single customs tariff and a single currency. Each partner, however, would have its own international personality. In legal terms, the difference between the two formulas could be stated this way: at present, the relations between Quebec and Canada are ruled by a constitution that divides powers between two governments, only one of which, the federal Government, has an international personality; in the formula proposed by the Government of Quebec, both Quebec and Canada would have an international personality, and their relations would be ruled not by a constitution, but by a treaty of association. While the present situation of Quebec in relation to Ottawa resembles that of the states of Maine or Illinois in relation to Washington, within the framework of an association it would be more like that of France or Holland in relation to the European Common Market, with certain important differences.

"Any comparison, though, has its faults. The United States or the Common Market arose out of needs and situations that do not necessarily correspond to those of Quebec and Canada today, and the same can be said of all associations that have been attempted throughout the world until now. Very different political formulas and structures correspond to diverse experience, and none represents a model made to measure. Although the best known reorganization and association experiment, that of Europe, is often evoked in the present document, this does not mean that the proposal of the Quebec Government is totally based on it, as though it were a prototype that could be imported here, particularly since the European experiment is far from complete.

"**Types of Association.** The economic association of sovereign states may assume many forms, according to the combination of shared elements and total sovereignty that is selected. Sharing a certain number of elements may be carried out through legal, statutory or institutional arrangements as numerous as they are varied, so that between the state almost free of any ties and the national community almost completely eclipsed by a larger state there is an infinite number of intermediary situations and possible arrangements. It is customary to distinguish four general integration formulas, from the least restrictive to the most complete: the free trade zone, the customs union, the common market, and the monetary union. . . .

"**The Proposal.** For a proper understanding of the formula proposed by the Government of Quebec, we will describe how it will function by examining the powers that will be exercised by Quebec and specifying the extent of the association between Quebec and Canada; we will also say a word about the Quebec-Canada community structures that must be provided for. We hasten to state that the changes described here will not occur overnight after the referendum, but will be, can only be, the result of negotiations between Quebec and Canada, negotiations that will be started as a result of a positive answer in the referendum.

"**Sovereignty.** Through sovereignty Quebec would acquire, in addition to the political powers it already has, those now exercised by Ottawa, whether they were assigned to the Federal Government under the British North America Act of 1867 or whether it assumed them since that time, directly or indirectly. Sovereignty is the power to levy all taxes, to make all laws and to be present on the international scene; it is also the possibility to share freely, with one or more states, certain national powers. Sovereignty for Quebec, then, will have a legal impact on the power to make laws and to levy taxes, on territorial integrity, on citizenship and minorities, on the courts and various other institutions, and on the relations of Quebec with other countries. . . .

"**External Relations.** Quebec will continue to be bound by the treaties to which Canada is now a signatory. It may withdraw from them should the occasion arise according to the rules of international law. . . . In order to fully play its role on the international scene and defend its interests, Quebec will ask to be admitted to the United Nations and to its specialized agencies. Finally, while developing its relations and its co-operation with francophone countries, Quebec will consider remaining a member of the British Commonwealth.

"**Association.** In today's world no nation, great or small, can live in isolation. Interdependence, considering the economic advantages that it brings, far from being as constraining as some seem to think, can on the contrary result in enriching forms of co-operation and interaction, and thus improve the present and future lot of the societies taking part. Quebec has never wanted to live in isolation; from the start it has accepted interdependence. However, it wishes to ensure that it will be directly involved in determining the terms of this interdependence. To this end, the Quebec Government intends to negotiate with the rest of Canada a treaty of community association, whose aim will be, notably, to maintain the present Canadian economic entity by ensuring continuity of exchange and by favouring, in the long run, a more rapid and better balanced development of each of the two partners. This treaty will have an international status and will bind the parties in a manner and for a term to be determined. It will define the partners' areas of common activity and confirm the maintenance of an economic and monetary union between Quebec and the rest of Canada. It will also determine the areas where agreement on goals will be considered desirable. Finally, it will establish the rules and institutions that ensure the proper functioning of the Quebec-Canada community, and determine its methods of financing.

"**Free Circulation of Goods.** In order to ensure the free circulation of goods, the present situation in Quebec and Canada will be maintained, and each party will renounce any right to customs barriers at common borders. With regard to foreign countries, the partners will jointly establish the tariff protection they deem necessary, taking into account the short- and long-term interests of each of the parties, and multilateral agreements in the areas of trade and customs tariffs. However, Quebec will insist that the protection and development of its agricultural production be the object of special agreements. Finally, the two states will take the necessary steps to guarantee free competition within their market and will abstain from any discriminatory fiscal measure towards each other's products.

"**Monetary Union.** The dollar will be maintained as the only currency having legal tender, and real or liquid assets as well as letters of credit will continue to be expressed in dollars. Circulation of capital will be free, but each party will be entitled to proclaim an investment code or to adopt, if need be, particular regulations applicable to certain financial institutions.

"**Free Circulation of People.** In order to ensure the free circulation of people from one territory to the other, the two states will give up their right to impose a regular police control at their common border. It goes without saying that no passport will be required between Quebec and Canada. . . .

"**Community Institutions.** There will obviously have to be negotiations on the number, composition, authority, financing, operation and general nature of the community institutions that Canada and Quebec will have to create for the purposes of association. . . . The Quebec Government believes that, in general, it will be better to avoid increasing the number of community agencies, even if the areas composing the association are both numerous and important. This is why the Government proposes only four community agencies which, in certain cases, could originate in existing federal institutions that will be adapted for the purposes of the association (such as the monetary authority or the court of justice). The Quebec Government favours the establishment of four Quebec-Canada agencies: a com-

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munity council; a commission of experts; a court of justice; a monetary authority.

"The council will be made up of ministers from Quebec and Canada acting on instructions from their respective Governments. The representatives of Canada may be chosen by both Ottawa and the provinces. Chaired alternately by a Canadian and a Quebecker, the council would meet at fixed dates, or according to need. It will have decision-making powers on matters entrusted to it by the treaty of association, and decisions pertaining to fundamental issues will require the agreement of both Quebec and Canada. Negotiations after the referendum will determine what questions are deemed to be fundamental. Some are already obvious: broadening the scope of the treaty of association or an increase in the terms of reference of community agencies for instance.

"As for the commission of experts, whose mandate will be defined by the treaty of association, it will be composed of Quebec and Canadian specialists chosen for their competence and appointed for a limited period of time. It will act as the general secretariat of the community and will be subject to the guidelines of the council. In addition to supporting and advising the council members, it will be responsible for establishing technical liaison with the international bodies concerned in matters of customs and trade, and for negotiating the international agreements that will bind the community on those subjects. These agreements will then be approved and signed by the council of the community.

"The court of justice will comprise an equal number of judges appointed for a limited period of time by Quebec and by Canada, and a chairman chosen jointly by the two states. It will have exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and implementation of the treaty of association; its decisions will be final and binding on both parties.

"The central monetary authority will be chaired alternately by each Government; the number of seats allocated to each party on the board of directors will be proportional to the relative size of each economy. . . ."

Quebec Liberal Party's Constitutional Proposals

The provincial Liberal Party, the main opposition in the Quebec National Assembly, published on Jan. 9, 1980, a series of proposals for constitutional reform, including the abolition of the federal Senate and a considerable shift of power from Ottawa to the provinces. The main proposals, drawn up by a special committee of constitutional experts in a document entitled *A New Canadian Federation*, were as follows:

Senate. This should be replaced by an 80-member Federal Council composed exclusively of provincial representatives, with power inter alia to remove Supreme Court judges and approve the appointments of heads of Crown Corporations.

Federal-Provincial Relations. The two orders of government would be "equal before the law and the Constitution", with separate and distinct responsibilities. Any power not claimed by a province would no longer automatically revert to the federal Government, and Ottawa would no longer have the power to move unilaterally into areas of provincial jurisdiction and to disallow provincial legislation. The federal Government would control foreign policy, national security and defence, inter-provincial commerce, tariffs and customs duties, the Post Office, monetary policy, and the "redistribution of wealth" between regions; while provincial jurisdiction would cover prisons, roads, airports, social programmes, health, hospitals, social security, pensions, family allowances and unemployment insurance.

Language Rights. Canada should become a "duality" of its two founding peoples by the spread of bilingualism and minority language rights across the country and their entrenchment in a new constitution. Under the latter, English and French would both become official languages of the courts and legislatures in Ontario and Quebec, and the "distinct personality" of Quebec would be protected. In addition, each province would have to have at least one primary and secondary school where education in the minority language was available, while English and French would be designated as the two official languages throughout Canadian life, and not just in federal institutions as at present.

The report also favoured the abolition of the monarchy, while agreeing that the issue had not "achieved such importance as to justify it being considered among the matters to be urgently reviewed".

Legislation making French Sole Official Language of Provincial Assembly and Courts ruled Unconstitutional by Federal Supreme Court

The Canadian Supreme Court ruled on Dec. 13, 1979, that provisions of Quebec's Bill 101 ("Charter of the French Language in Quebec") making French the sole official language of the National Assembly and courts [see 28782 A] were unconstitutional because they conflicted with Section 133 of the British North America Act guaranteeing the right of legislators and litigants in Quebec to use either the English or French language.

Upholding similar rulings by two Quebec courts, the Supreme Court ruling stated that Section 133 was an entrenched provision of the Canadian Constitution "not only forbidding modification by unilateral action of Parliament or of the Quebec Legislature, but also providing a guarantee to members of Parliament or of the Quebec Legislature and to litigants in the courts of Canada or of Quebec that they are entitled to use either French or English in parliamentary or legislative assembly debates or in pleading (including oral argument) in the courts of Canada or of Quebec". The decision applied retroactively to all Quebec legislation introduced since Aug. 26, 1977, when Bill 101 was enacted.—(Globe and Mail, Toronto - Department of External Affairs, Ottawa) (*Prev. rep. Sovereignty-Association 29560 A; Quebec Language Legislation 28782 A*)

A. ISRAEL — New Foreign Minister - Introduction of Shekel as Currency Unit - Related Economic Measures

At a special meeting on March 10, 1980, the Israeli Cabinet endorsed the appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mr Itzhak Shamir, a member of the *Herut* component of the ruling *Likud* front and hitherto Speaker of the *Knesset* (Parliament). Responsibility for the Foreign Affairs portfolio had been held ad interim by the Prime Minister, Mr Menahem Begin, since the resignation of Mr Moshe Dayan in October 1979 [see 30107 A].

Mr Shamir's appointment was approved by the *Knesset* later on March 10 by 55 votes to 39. On March 12 Mr Itzhak Berman (of the Liberal Party component of the *Likud* front) was elected unopposed as the new Speaker of the *Knesset* by 64 votes to none with 35 abstentions.

Mr Shamir (65) was born in Poland and emigrated to Palestine in 1935, subsequently becoming a leader of the Stern Gang of underground Jewish militants who fought against British rule during the latter stages of the Mandate. First elected a deputy in December 1973, following the *Likud* electoral victory in May 1977 he was elected Speaker of the *Knesset* on June 13, 1977 [see page 28537]. In view of Mr Shamir's open criticism of the September 1978 Camp David agreements on a Middle East peace settlement [see 29646 A], Mr Begin had reportedly given the Cabinet his personal assurance that the new Foreign Minister would fully carry out the Government's foreign policy.

With effect from Feb. 24, 1980, the pound (or lira) was replaced by the shekel as Israel's currency unit, one shekel being worth 10 old pounds (which would remain legal tender during a three-month transitional period). The change was announced on Feb. 22 by the Finance Minister, Mr Yigal Horowitz, and the governor of the Bank of Israel, Mr Arnon Gafny—who both stated that it was part of the Government's strategy to combat inflation.

The shekel was first used in Babylon in the third millenium BC, the earliest biblical reference to it being in Genesis in connexion with Abraham's purchase of the Cave of Machpela to bury his wife Sarah. It was reported that the decision to introduce the new unit had been taken secretly two years previously and that the new banknotes had been printed in the Netherlands and new coins minted in Canada and Sweden.

Official figures gave the inflation rate for 1979 as a whole as 116 per cent, while in early 1980 the rate was unofficially estimated to have reached the equivalent of 150 per cent a year. By the end of January 1980 government figures showed that the Israel pound was worth less than one-hundredth of its value in September 1951, when official measurement of the country's cost of living index had started. Between late November 1979 [see 30107 A] and late February 1980 the value of the Israel pound against the US dollar had declined by about 18 per cent from £I 32.41 to £I 39.50 = US$ 1.

Two government bills tabled in the *Knesset* (Parliament) on Feb. 25 provided (i) that all cash and business transactions above certain levels should be officially registered and (ii) that owners of capital and other assets above specified levels would also be required to register full details within three months of the bill's enactment. Announcing these measures on Feb. 22, Mr Horowitz said that they were intended to combat "the parallel black economy which . . . has become a cancer in the body of the nation" and added that "the vast sums of undeclared income and assets in the economy play a major role in feeding inflation".—(Jerusalem Post - Le Monde - Times - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. 30107 A*)

A. TUNISIA — General Elections - New Cabinet - Mr Nouira's Illness - Internal Security Developments - Insurgent Attack on Gafsa - Deterioration of Relations with Libya

In general elections held on Nov. 4, 1979, candidates nominated by President Habib Bourguiba's ruling Destour Socialist Party (PSD) were returned for all seats in the National Assembly, the size of which was increased from 112 to 121 members. Although voters in the 22 multi-member constituencies were for the first time able to choose between two candidates for each of the 121 seats, no opposition candidates were nominated, with the result that all 242 names on the ballot papers were drawn up by the PSD (which remained the country's only legal political party—see 29362 A). [For the previous elections in November 1974, see 26822 A.]

The official results showed that out of a total electorate of 1,800,144 the number going to the polls was 1,465,260 (81.4 per cent), of whom 1,409,606 cast valid votes; the remaining 55,654 votes (3.8 per cent of those cast) were declared invalid. (On Nov. 27 the National Assembly's verification committee declared the result for one seat in the Kairouan constituency null and void after upholding a charge of irregularities lodged by the defeated candidate, thus necessitating a new election for that seat within three months.)

The decision providing for the nomination of two candidates per seat had originally been taken by the annual meeting of the PSD central committee in March 1979 and an appropriate amendment to the electoral code had been adopted by the National Assembly on July 31. On the latter occasion the Prime Minister and PSD secretary-general, Mr Hedi Nouira, said that the change confirmed the "opening" of the ruling party and also reinforced the tendency towards the presentation of lists drawn from PSD activists and from other persons "of good intentions".

However, a decision not to seek participation in the elections was subsequently announced by the opposition Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS) led by Mr Ahmed Mestiri, which asserted in its French-language publication *Démocratie* (issue of Oct. 9) that "as long as other parties are not authorized in Tunisia, no normal electoral consultation can take place". Moreover, a similar position was taken by the Movement of Popular Unity (MUP), comprising supporters of Mr Ahmed Ben Salah, the former Economy and Planning Minister who had escaped from prison in Tunisia in 1973 and was currently living in exile [see page 28902; 25718 A; 24069 A].

As described in 29362 A, the MDS had constituted itself into a political party in June 1978 but had subsequently received no response from the Tunisian authorities to its request for legalization. Although the Movement had continued to be able to publish *Démocratie* and the latter's Arabic counterpart, *Errai*, issues of both publications were from time to time seized by the police and several contributors to them were prosecuted; moreover, in December 1978 a three-month ban was placed on *Errai* after it had published an article criticizing the Government's alleged "sickness" (widely taken as a reference to the state of President Bourguiba's health) and lack of direction in economic policy. [For the PSD political bureau's March 1980 decision to rescind the exclusion of Mr Mestiri and other opposition figures from the ruling party, see below.]

In the course of 1979 the Government made what were seen as conciliatory gestures to its opponents by releasing or dropping proceedings against a considerable number of trade union activists who had been arrested during the serious industrial and political disturbances of January 1978 [see 28901 A]. In particular, President Bourguiba marked his 76th birthday on Aug. 3, 1979, by granting pardons to nine prominent political detainees, including Mr Habib Achour, the trade union leader who had been sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment with hard labour in October 1978 after being convicted of various charges arising from the January 1978 events [see 29362 A].

Mr Achour had been secretary-general of the *Union générale des travailleurs de Tunisie* (UGTT) at the time of his arrest in January 1978, and his conviction in October 1978 had provided a focus for renewed international protests at the Tunisian Government's alleged repression of trade unionists and other opposition elements. Following his release from prison Mr Achour was reported to be living under virtual house arrest in Tunis, with only his immediate family being allowed to visit him. In November 1979 he was re-elected a vice-president of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) at the ICFTU's 12th congress in Madrid, notwithstanding the fact that his arrest had been followed by the installation of a new UGTT leadership; in response, the latter decided on Nov. 29 to freeze relations with the ICFTU (which in any case continued to regard Mr Achour and his former executive members as the legitimate UGTT leadership).

In a hijacking incident related to the internal situation, three Tunisians on Jan. 12, 1979, forced the pilot of a Tunis Air Boeing 727 en route from Tunis to Djerba with 75 passengers on board to fly to Tripoli in Libya. After releasing the passengers unharmed early on Jan. 13, the hijackers demanded that in exchange for the release of the eight crew members the Tunisian Government should release Mr Achour (then still in prison) and also lift travel restrictions on Mr Mohamed Masmoudi (who had been dismissed as Foreign Minister in 1974—see 26466 A; page 28902). However, after Mr Masmoudi had denounced the hijacking as "piracy", the hijackers surrendered to the Libyan authorities later on Jan. 13 without their demands having been met by the Tunisian Government (which subsequently alleged that the hijacking had been carried out with the complicity of the Libyan Government).

In other major internal security developments (i) five MUP members who had been sentenced to prison terms of two to three years in August 1977 (when Mr Ben Salah had also been sentenced in absentia—see page 28902) were released on Nov. 9, 1978, whereas a sixth member of the group, Mr Mounir Kachoukh, continued to serve his four-year sentence; (ii) a Tunis tribunal on June 30, 1979, sentenced 28 persons (some in absentia) to prison terms ranging from one to 7½ years for membership of the illegal *Parti révolutionnaire du peuple tunisien* (PRPT) and *Front nationaliste progressiste pour la libération de la Tunisie* (FNPLT); and (iii) 49 persons alleged to be Marxist-Leninists were on Aug. 21, 1979, sentenced to prison terms of up to 3¾ years after being convicted of various charges relating principally to the publication of a clandestine version of *Ech-Chaab*, formerly the organ of the UGTT.

Appointment of New Cabinet under Mr Nouira - Earlier Dismissal of Defence Minister - 10th PSD Congress - Condemnation of Islamic Fundamentalists

Three days after the Assembly elections President Bourguiba on Nov. 7 appointed a new Cabinet in which Mr Nouira retained the premiership which he had held since November 1970 [see 24293 C; 24347 B]. The full composition of the new Cabinet, which contained five new appointments and several portfolio changes, was as follows [see below for later changes following the incapacity of Mr Nouira]:

Mr Hedi Nouira . .	. . Prime Minister
Mr Habib Bourguiba jr.	. . Special Adviser to the President
Mr Salaheddine Bali . .	. . Justice
Mr Mohamed Fitouri . .	. . Foreign Affairs
Mr Othman Kecherid . .	. . Interior
Mr Rashid Sfar . .	. . Defence
Mr Mohamed Sayah . .	. . Minister-Delegate responsible for Prime Minister's Office
Mr Mohamed M'Zali . .	. . National Education
Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia	. . Higher Education and Scientific Research
Mr Fouad M'Baza . .	. . Information and Culture
Mr Abdelaziz Mathari	. . Finance
Mr Mohamed Ali Souissi	. . Equipment
Mr Lassaad Ben Osman	. . Agriculture
Mr Mustapha Zaanoumi	. . Minister-Delegate attached to Prime Minister responsible for Planning
Dr Dhaoui Hannablia. .	. . Public Health
Mr Hassan Belkhodja. .	. . Transport and Communications
Mr Salaheddine Mbarek	. . Trade
Mr Hedi Zeghala . .	. . Youth and Sports
*Mr Amer Rourou . .	. . Industry, Mines and Energy
*Mr Mohamed Ennaceur	. . Social Affairs
*Mr Moncef Zaafrane . .	. . Secretary-General of the Government
*Mr M'hamed Chaker . .	. . Secretary of State attached to Prime Minister responsible for Administrative Affairs
*Mr Brahim Khouaja . .	. . Secretary of State for Posts and Telecommunications

* Incoming member of Cabinet.

The return of **Mr Ennaceur** to the same portfolio (Social Affairs) which he had resigned a month before the January 1978 disturbances [see page 28901] was regarded as a further indication of the Government's desire for social and industrial reconciliation. Of the other incoming members of the Cabinet, **Mr Zaafrane** was a former member of Mr Nouira's staff, while **Mr Rourou, Mr Chaker** and **Mr Khouaja,** all engineers by profession, were "technocratic" appointments.

The Defence portfolio had been allocated to Mr Sfar (hitherto Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy) on Sept. 12 *vice* Mr Abdallah Farhat, who had held the post since May 1976 [see

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27816 B] and who had been regarded as one of the "strong men" of the regime. While no official explanation was given for Mr Farhat's dismissal, press reports suggested that it reflected President Bourguiba's dissatisfaction with the proceedings of the 10th PSD congress held in Tunis on Sept. 5-9, 1979, for which the then Defence Minister, as party treasurer and a political bureau member, had been primarily responsible. Mr Farhat was also succeeded as party treasurer by Mr Sfar, while on Nov. 9 it was announced that the former had been excluded from the PSD political bureau.

Whereas there appeared to be no foundation to assertions by exiled opposition sources that a coup had been attempted, informed observers suggested that President Bourguiba had objected to Mr Farhat's use of military associates to organize the congress and also to the manner of the election of the party's 80-member central committee, in which many of the 850 delegates had apparently voted under direction. In particular, Mr Farhat was thought to have used his influence to secure the unanimous election of Mr Nouira (with whom he was closely associated), while ensuring that the Prime Minister's political rivals received less impressive support. However, speculation that the President's displeasure extended to Mr Nouira himself subsided when the latter was reappointed secretary-general of the PSD on Sept. 19 and was thus effectively confirmed in the premiership.

The 20-member PSD political bureau appointed by President Bourguiba (as life-president of the party) from the central committee membership included six new members, notably Mr Sfar and Mrs Fathia M'Zali (president of the National Union of Tunisian Women), who became the first female member of the body. Those reappointed included Mr Mohamed Sayah (a member of the Cabinet), who was also (on Sept. 19) reappointed director of the party notwithstanding the fact that he had been re-elected to the PSD central committee with the lowest number of votes among the 80 successful candidates.

Following the installation of the new Cabinet both Mr Sayah (on Dec. 6) and Mr Nouira (on Dec. 28) condemned the activities of Islamic fundamentalist opponents of the Government. On the latter occasion the Prime Minister issued a strongly worded warning that the authorities would not allow the country's mosques to be transformed into political tribunes "sowing hatred and encouraging fanaticism".

Stimulated by the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979 [see 29733 A], the Tunisian fundamentalist, or "integralist", Khwanjia movement had greatly increased its following by the end of the year, particularly among Tunisian students. In early December 1979 a three-month ban was placed on one of the movement's publications, *Al Moujtamaa*, and legal proceedings instituted against Mr Rachid Ghanouchi and Mr Abdelhamid Attia, respectively editor and director of the journal. Other leaders of the movement included Mr Abdelfettah Mourrou and Mr Hasen Ghodbani (the latter being currently resident in Paris).

In a further hijacking incident, a Tunisian man on Jan. 14, 1980, took control of an Italian DC-9 airliner which was en route from Rome to Tunis with 89 people on board. After the pilot had informed the hijacker that bad weather conditions prevented him from flying to Libya as instructed, the airliner landed in Palermo in Sicily, where the hijacker demanded that the Tunisian Government should release 25 political prisoners. However, early on Jan. 15 he surrendered to the Italian police and was found to be unarmed, the 83 passengers and crew of six being all unharmed.

Mr Nouira's Incapacitation - Appointment of Acting Prime Minister and New Interior Minister - PSD's Decision to rescind Exclusion of Prominent "Liberals"

During the night of Feb. 25-26 Mr Nouira suffered a stroke resulting from what was later diagnosed as a cerebral infarct and was flown from Tunis to Paris for medical treatment. In the light of his absence President Bourguiba on March 1 appointed the Minister of National Education, Mr Mohamed M'Zali (55), as Acting Prime Minister "entrusted with the task of co-ordinating government business at the office of the President".

At the same time it was announced that Mr Idris Guiga, Tunisia's ambassador to West Germany and a former minister (1973-76), had been appointed Interior Minister in succession to Mr Othman Kecherid, who had been "given other duties" and whose departure from the Government was thought to reflect official concern over an insurgent attack on Gafsa in late January [see below]. On March 4 Mr Guiga was also appointed a member of the PSD political bureau.

As stated above, Mr Nouira (68) had been Prime Minister since November 1970. In view of his reappointment to the premiership following the November 1979 elections he had been regarded as the likely successor to President Bourguiba in terms of the constitutional provision that on the death, resignation or incapacitation of the President the Prime Minister then in office would assume the presidency for the remainder of the current legislative term [see 27774 A, where details are also given of the 1975 constitutional amendment conferring the presidency on President Bourguiba for life].

Mr M'Zali had been Minister of Education since 1976, when he had replaced Mr Guiga [see 27816 B], and Mr Kecherid had, prior to the latest cabinet reorganization, been Minister for Relations with the National Assembly and Secretary-General of the Government [see 28901 A].

A meeting of the PSD political bureau held on March 8 under the chairmanship of President Bourguiba decided to rescind decisions taken in 1972-74 under which eight prominent "liberal" opposition figures, including Mr Mestiri (now leader of the MSD—see above), had been expelled from the ruling party. At the same time the political bureau established a 22-member "Consultative Council of Militants" under the chairmanship of Mr Bechir Zarg Layoun (a close associate of the President during the struggle for independence and more recently an outspoken critic of Mr Nouira) and comprising mainly veteran party members who had taken no part in recent political life.

In addition to Mr Mestiri (a former Defence and Interior Minister who had been expelled from the PSD in January 1972—see 26264 A), those reinstated to party membership were Mr Beji Caid-Essebsi, Mr Habib Boulares, Mr Mohamed Ben Ammar, Mr Hassib Ben Ammar (now editor of *Essai*), Mr Mohamed Mouada (now an assistant secretary-general of the MSD), Mr Sadok Ben Jamaa and Mr Mohamed Salah Belhadj—all former government ministers or high party officials who had been expelled by the ninth PSD congress in September 1974 after signing a declaration calling for the liberalization of the regime [see 26822 A]. (Also reinstated to party membership on March 8 were Dr Sulaiman Ben Sulaiman and Mrs Radhi al-Haddad, who had been expelled in March 1950 and March 1974 respectively, whereas it was noted in the press that the September 1974 exclusion of the former Foreign Minister, Mr Masmoudi, was not rescinded.)

Reacting to the lifting of the expulsion decisions (which was apparently carried out without prior consultation with those concerned), Mr Mestiri and Mr Mouada said that "this gesture seems to proceed from good intentions" but did not alter their belief in the need for "substantial changes responding to the aspirations of the people". On the other hand, the other six reinstated "liberals" (who although originally associated with the MSD had not been included in its leadership in June 1978 —see 29362 A) said that the decision could be "the beginning of a process leading Tunisia to a real democratization to the benefit of all its citizens".

Attack on Gafsa by Tunisian Insurgents - Tunisian Allegations of Official Libyan Involvement - French Military Support for Tunisia - OAU and Arab League Resolutions

Relations between Tunisia and Libya suffered a major deterioration in late January 1980 following an armed attack on the Tunisian town of Gafsa by a group of Tunisian insurgents who, according to the Tunisian authorities, had been trained in Libya. Moreover, the subsequent deployment of French military support for the Tunisian Government engendered serious strains in relations between Libya and France, the former accusing the latter of seeking to recolonize its former Tunisian protectorate.

The attack on Gafsa coincided with the second anniversary of the serious industrial and political disturbances mounted by the internal Tunisian opposition in January 1978 [see 28901 A].

According to the official Tunisian version of the events at Gafsa (an oasis town at the centre of the country's phosphate mining area —see accompanying map), early on Jan. 27 a party of some 50 armed men, all Tunisians, seized the army and police barracks and other buildings in the town and took a number of hostages; they were then engaged in heavy fighting by the Tunisian security forces, who succeeded in regaining control of the town in the evening of Jan. 27. A statement issued on Jan. 30 by the then Tunisian Interior Minister, Mr Othman Kecherid (for whose subsequent replacement, see above), gave the casualties resulting from the fighting on Jan. 27 as 41 dead (22 security personnel, 15 civilians and four insurgents) and 111 injured (92 security personnel, 16 civilians and three insurgents), while 42 of the insurgents were said to have been arrested. (Whereas the Tunisian authorities claimed to be in full control of the situation by Jan. 28, press reports suggested that sporadic fighting had continued for several days in the hills around Gafsa, that as many as 300 insurgents had been involved and that the final casualty toll was considerably higher than the official Tunisian figures indicated.)

On the basis of their interrogation of captured insurgents the Tunisian authorities maintained that although a majority of the raiders had crossed into Tunisia from Algerian territory the attack had been planned and organized in Libya at the instigation of the Libyan Government, which was said to have recruited the group from among the large number of immigrant Tunisian workers in that country. Stratagems said to have been adopted by the group to implicate Algeria in the attack and to conceal the Libyan connexion included wearing clothing with Algerian markings and using Algerian Arabic accents.

According to the Tunisian account, about 30 of the attackers had flown from Tripoli to Algiers via Beirut and Rome purporting to be a sports team and had then made their way to the Tunisian border to the east of Tebéssa, where they had crossed on the night of Jan. 26-27. On arrival in the Gafsa area they had joined up with another group of dissident Tunisians, some of whom had originally flown into Tunis from Tripoli via Marseilles and Rome. The raiding party had armed itself with a variety of weapons which had previously been smuggled into the area by Libyan agents and placed in secret caches (many of which were thought to have remained undiscovered by the Tunisian security forces). The original plan of the insurgents following the capture of Gafsa was said to have been to declare a revolutionary government in the expectation that many people in the area would rally to its support and that Libyan forces would be sent in to give it military backing. (In a communiqué received by the Agence France-Presse in Paris on Jan. 28 responsibility for the attack was claimed by the hitherto unknown *Résistance armée tunisienne*, which said that it had been launched on the second anniversary of the "bloody massacre" perpetrated by the Tunisian regime in January 1978 as "the starting point of a movement whose final aim is the liberation of our people from the dictatorship of the PSD and from neo-colonialist domination".)

Whereas the leader of the insurgents was originally thought to have been killed in the fighting on Jan. 27, the Tunisian news agency TAP reported on Feb. 6 that among three people arrested that day was the suspected leader of the attack, Mr Ahmed Mergheni. At the same time it was reported that the Tunisian authorities had also arrested Shaikh Larbi al-Akrenei and Mr Ezzedine Sharif, two Tunisians said to have smuggled arms into the Gafsa area from Libya and to have taken part in the attack itself. (Both Shaikh Larbi al-Akrenei and Mr Sharif had previously served heavy prison sentences for involvement in an assassination plot against President Bourguiba in December 1962—see 19205 A.)

While accepting the Algerian Government's denial of any official involvement in the Gafsa attack, the Tunisian Government demonstrated its belief that the Libyan Government was implicated by suspending diplomatic relations with Libya on Jan. 30, on which date the Libyan ambassador was expelled from Tunis and Tunisian diplomatic representatives recalled from Libya. For its part, the Libyan Government consistently denied any official involvement, although the Libyan leader, Col. Moamer al Kadhafi, made several statements expressing support for the "popular revolution" which he claimed was currently in progress in Tunisia.

Relations between Tunisia and Libya had been strained since the abortive merger agreement between the two countries of January 1974 [see 26466 A; 26980 B] and had been further exacerbated by the longstanding dispute between the two Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Gabès [see 28515 A]. Although some improvement in relations had taken place from late 1977 [see page 29364], leading to the submission of the delimitation issue to the International Court of Justice in December 1978 [see 29399 A], the Gafsa incident had been preceded by renewed mutual recriminations on various aspects of bilateral relations. Moreover, the delimitation issue again came to the fore when in early February 1980 a Libyan oil prospecting platform was stationed in the disputed zone of the Gulf of Gabès, this move being described by Mr Nouira as "an act of provocation".

[According to a report in *The Sunday Times* of Feb. 17, 1980, the Tunisians who attacked Gafsa were part of a "force of 7,000 volunteer soldiers and terrorists currently training in 20 Libyan camps" who had been recruited from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast and from non-African countries such as South Yemen, Pakistan, the Philippines, Vietnam and North Korea and who also included some members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Described by Col. Kadhafi as "the liberators of the Third World", these recruits were (according to the report) being trained by Palestinian, Syrian and North Korean instructors in the use of sophisticated Soviet-made weapons such as the "Shilka" self-propelled anti-aircraft gun used successfully by Egyptian forces in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and were also receiving training in military tactics and communications from "several thousand Soviet, Cuban and East German instructors". The planning of guerrilla operations was carried out by the "Bureau for Exporting the Revolution" (*Maktab Tasdir Athaoura*) supervised by Col. Kadhafi himself, who was "grooming 'liberation armies' to take over in a whole range of countries south of the Sahara", including Benin, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast and Zaïre. According to the report, "a force of Egyptian guerrillas and terrorists" who had "sworn an oath to kill President Sadat" was being trained in two Libyan camps near the Egyptian border, while men and arms were currently being sent to support the Polisario guerrillas in their conflict with Moroccan forces in the Western Sahara.]



(*Le Monde*)

In response to a Tunisian request the French Government on Jan. 28 sent military transport aircraft and Puma helicopters to Tunisia accompanied by a group of French military advisers, while on Jan. 30 it was confirmed that three French warships together with an escort of five submarines had been despatched from Toulon to patrol the eastern Mediterranean off the Tunisian-Libyan coast. Subsequent allegations from Libyan and other sources that the French advisers had actively participated in the security operation against the Gafsa insurgents were rejected by French and Tunisian officials, who maintained that the French aircraft and helicopters (which were withdrawn on Feb. 12) had been used solely for transporting those injured from the scene.

In addition to securing French military assistance, in the aftermath of the Gafsa attack the Tunisian Government sent envoys to a number of Western and other countries to seek diplomatic support and pledges of military and economic assistance. In this connexion the US Defence Secretary, Dr Harold Brown, confirmed on Jan. 31 that the United States had agreed to accelerate deliveries of military equipment to Tunisia (which had originally been scheduled for 1981 and which were reported to be worth some $100,000,000).

The French involvement in Tunisia was strongly condemned by the Government of Libya, where on Feb. 4 the French embassy in Tripoli was attacked by a large crowd of demonstrators and set on fire after the French ambassador (M. Charles Malo) and his staff had escaped unharmed from the building. On the same day the French cultural centre in Benghazi was attacked and ransacked by Libyan demonstrators.

After submitting an official protest that the Libyan authorities had failed to respond to a request for protection for the Tripoli embassy, the French Government on Feb. 5 recalled its ambassador and part of his diplomatic staff from Libya and requested the Libyan Government to make a corresponding reduction in the number of its diplomatic staff in Paris. Also on Feb. 5 the Tunisian Government followed up its earlier suspension of diplomatic relations with Libya by recalling its 400 co-operation workers from that country.

In a statement on Feb. 7 Col. Kadhafi accused the French Government of building a "new imperialist bridge" in Africa by invading part of the continent, while on Feb. 10 he said that Libya would oppose the "colonialist and interventionist" French policy in Africa "by every means possible including war". Two days later on Feb. 12 an emergency meeting of the Libyan General People's Congress demanded that France should withdraw its "invasion force" from Tunisia and called for the creation of a "strategic alliance with the oppressed people and revolutionaries of Tunisia" in their struggle to overthrow President Bourguiba.

Among other Arab states little official comment was made on the Gafsa attack itself, although several Arab Governments were reported to have considerable reservations about the French military role. Thus on Feb. 8 President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria said that his Government, which "believes in non-interference in internal affairs", was "following with preoccupation any presence of foreign forces at its frontiers".

In the first half of February appeals to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League were made by both Tunisia and Libya, the former seeking condemnation of Libya's alleged involvement in the Gafsa attack and the latter demanding censure of what it described as "the French invasion of Tunisia". Subsequently, both the 34th session of the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa and an emergency meeting of the Arab League's Council of Foreign Ministers in

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Tunis adopted resolutions (on Feb. 15 and 28 respectively) reaffirming the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty but making no reference to the French involvement in Tunisia. Attempts at the Tunis meeting to bring about a reconciliation between Tunisia and Libya were reported to have failed, the principal outcome of the session being the establishment of a four-member committee charged with mediating between the two Governments.

The Tunis resolution, after reaffirming "the provisions of Article 8 of the Arab League Charter regarding each state's right to sovereignty, independence, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the current regime" and recalling the commitment of Arab states to settle their differences within the Arab framework, invited Tunisia and Libya "to put an end to all sorts of campaigns between them in all fields" and to try to normalize their mutual relations. To this end, the resolution continued, the Council had agreed to set up a committee comprising the Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Syria, Kuwait and Jordan [the last-named country immediately withdrawing] and a representative of the Arab League secretariat, which would contact the two Governments concerned and if necessary report back to the full Council of Ministers.

After holding talks with President Bourguiba in Tunis on Feb. 28, the Arab League committee flew to Tripoli the following day for discussions with the Libyan Government. Following the latter meeting the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr Abdel Halim Khaddam, said on Feb. 29 that the committee's mission had been "successful" and that Libya had expressed readiness to implement the League's Tunis resolution. Immediately after the Tunis meeting Col. Kadhafi said that in the light of a statement by President Giscard d'Estaing on Feb. 26 that French forces had not actively intervened during the Gafsa fighting "the possibilities of a serious confrontation with France have disappeared".

Notwithstanding the efforts of the Arab League committee, however, Tunisian-Libyan relations continued to be severely strained in the first half of March, during which a radio station calling itself "Radio Free Gafsa" kept up broadcasts from Tripoli calling for the overthrow of the Bourguiba regime. Accordingly, the Tunisian Government on March 15 sent a further note to the Arab League protesting against the continuing transmission of anti-Tunisian propaganda from Libya in contravention of the Feb. 28 resolution of the League's Council of Ministers.—(Le Monde - Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Tunisian Embassy, London) (*Prev. rep. 1974 Elections 26822 A; Cabinet and Internal Security 29362 A, 28901 A; Tunisian-Libyan Relations 29399 A, page 29364, 28515 A; Franco-Tunisian Relations 27507 A*)

A. UNITED NATIONS — Third General Conference of UN Industrial Development Organization

The third general conference of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was held in New Delhi (India) from Jan. 21 to Feb. 9, 1980, and was attended by delegates from 133 countries. The conference ended in disagreement over methods of promoting industrial development in the Third World; following the rejection of an Indian compromise draft, a final declaration embodying the proposals of the developing countries (notably calling for the creation of a new large-scale global fund) was adopted despite the opposition of the Western industrialized countries.

In preparatory documents for the conference, the UNIDO Secretariat had noted that the developing countries accounted for only some 9 per cent of world industrial output, and that on existing trends this proportion would increase to 13 per cent at most by the year 2000; this fell well short of the 25 per cent target established in the Lima Declaration, adopted by UNIDO at its second general conference in 1975 [see 27163 A] and subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly at its seventh special session later that year [see pages 27393-94]. Proposals drawn up by the UNIDO Secretariat accordingly included the encouragement of large-scale additional flows of investment to developing countries on a regular and sustained basis, by means of a global fund supported by an international industrial finance agency.

The conference was opened on Jan. 21 by Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, and those who addressed delegates on the opening day included Mr Salim A. Salim, the President of the UN General Assembly, Mrs Indira Gandhi, the newly elected Prime Minister of India, President Reddy of India, and Mr Abderrahman Khene, the Executive Director of UNIDO. The conference elected as its president Mr Narasimha Rao, the Indian Minister of External Affairs.

Disagreement between Western and developing countries over financing the industrialization of the latter emerged as a major issue at the conference, when the Group of 77 (currently comprising 119 developing countries in all) announced their proposals for a "New Delhi Plan of Action" on Jan. 25.

The Group of 77 (having held a preparatory meeting at ministerial level in Havana, Cuba, in December 1979) advocated two major new funding initiatives, the first being the "Castro Plan" (for a minimum flow of $300,000 million in development aid during the 1980s, as proposed by President Castro of Cuba in his speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1979—see 30221 A) and the second a special "global North-South fund for the promotion of industrialization in developing countries". The resources of the latter, a proposed $300,000 million in the period 1980-2000, would be contributed primarily by developed countries and also by third-world countries with "excess financial liquidity"; control of the fund's administration and operation would be primarily by developing countries, and at least one-third of all investment would go to landlocked, island and geographically disadvantaged countries. Other proposals included the cancellation of the debts of the poorest countries, the establishment of a link between development assistance and the allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the fundamental reform of the international monetary system. With regard to energy policy, the plan suggested that developing countries set up "multinational enterprises in energy and energy-related capital equipment" and that developed countries introduce conservation measures as well as removing "arbitrary restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology needed by developing countries for their industrialization".

Representatives of a number of Western countries (notably the United Kingdom and the United States) expressed serious doubts over the value of setting ambitious targets for industrial development, and emphasized the importance of encouraging private sector investment rather than creating new international funding bodies (whose work, it was feared, might encroach on the existing responsibilities of the World Bank and the IMF in this field).

Discussion was interrupted, and the conference session scheduled for Jan. 31 was cancelled, after the Group of 77 on Jan. 29 put forward a proposed "New Delhi Declaration" and insisted that this document, together with the "Plan of Action", should constitute the sole basis of negotiation at the conference.

The proposed declaration was rejected by the Group B (industrialized) countries on the grounds that it was concerned with political rather than economic matters. (The document reiterated a number of themes in the Havana Declaration issued in September 1979 at the sixth summit conference of heads of state or government of the non-aligned countries—see 30037 A; it included condemnations of inter alia colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism including apartheid and Zionism, and also expressions of support for the struggle of the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Palestine and Western Sahara.)

It was reported that the presentation of this declaration also gave rise to disagreements within the Group of 77, necessitating the appointment of mediators to preserve the unity of the group; Saudi Arabia reportedly opposed both the form and the content of the declaration, while a number of African countries also had reservations (the Moroccan delegation leader, besides seeking the deletion of the passage relating to the Western Sahara, commenting that a general declaration without concrete content would not advance the negotiations).

Although a procedural formula was accepted under which the interrupted negotiations were resumed on Feb. 1, substantive discussions had reached apparent deadlock by Feb. 5, when the Group of 77 addressed a "solemn and urgent appeal" to the industrialized countries not to allow the conference to end in failure. In his capacity as conference president, Mr Rao then began an attempt to work out a compromise proposal which might win consensus acceptance.

While omitting references to Zionism and to the Western Sahara, Mr Rao's compromise proposal retained the principal features of the "Plan of Action" submitted by the Group of 77, including (i) a proposed minimum annual flow of $25,000 million in development aid during the 1980s (although this was not described as "the Castro Plan" in Mr Rao's draft) and (ii) a global fund to promote industrialization (the magnitude of which was apparently similar to that proposed by the Group of 77).

Although the conference was extended for an extra day after the scheduled closing date of Feb. 8, it became clear that Mr

Rao's proposal would not form the basis for consensus agreement, its essential elements remaining unacceptable to the Western industrialized countries. The attempted compromise draft was accordingly withdrawn, whereupon the Group of 77 proposals were submitted to a vote and adopted on Feb. 9 (by 83 votes to 22 with one abstention) as the "New Delhi Declaration and Plan of Action".

Those voting in favour were the Group of 77 countries (except Saudi Arabia, which abstained, and a number of African countries which were not present for the vote) and also China and the Soviet bloc (Group D) countries. On behalf of the latter, however, the Soviet Union entered a reservation making it clear that no commitment had been made to contribute to the intended global fund; a similar reservation was entered by Kuwait. Those voting against were the Group B Western industrialized countries (except Turkey), whose support was effectively essential for the implementation of the substantive elements of the final document.

Mr Ahmed Ghezal (Tunisia), the spokesman for the Group of 77, attributed the absence of consensus to the "rigid negative attitude" and "absence of political will" on the part of the representatives of the developed countries. Mr John McDonald, leading the United States delegation, said that he feared that "the outcome of the conference will sour relations" and he added that in his opinion the United States would now not be prepared to ratify the new UNIDO constitution agreed in April 1979 [see 29680 B], under which the organization's status was to be upgraded to that of a UN autonomous specialized agency.—(Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Guardian - Times - International Herald Tribune - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - UN Information Centre, London) (*Prev. rep. New UNIDO Constitution, 29680 B; Second General Conference, 27163 A*)

A. KENYA — Unopposed Return of President Moi - Election of New National Assembly - Cabinet Reorganization

Following the dissolution on Sept. 25, 1979, of the National Assembly elected in 1974 [see 26823 A], it was announced on Oct. 1 that elections would be held on Nov. 8 for the office of President of the Republic, for the 158 elective seats in the National Assembly and for local government bodies.

It had been announced on Sept. 11 that all candidates for the National Assembly would have to be proficient both in English (the country's official language) and in Kiswahili (the national language). All candidates had to be members of the Kenya African National Union (KANU, Kenya's sole legal political party) and all those nominated had to be approved by KANU's national council. The latter, meeting on Oct. 4, rejected the candidatures of 23 applicants, among them Mr Oginga Odinga (former Vice-President and also former leader of the Kenya People's Union, which was banned in 1969, whereafter he had been detained until 1971—see 24556 C—and had subsequently rejoined KANU—see 26823 A); Mr Achieng Oneko (a former Minister of Information, prior to 1966—see 21430 B); and Mr George Anyona (amnestied in December 1978 after being sentenced to 1½ years in prison in connexion with questioning the allocation of state contracts—see page 29480 and 28476 A).

On Oct. 16 it was announced that President Moi had been declared the sole candidate for the presidency, and he was thus returned to office without election. Vice-President Mwai Kibaki was similarly returned unopposed.

President Moi had acceded to the presidency upon the death of President Kenyatta in August 1978 [see page 29478] and had been formally installed as President in October of that year [see page 29479]; Mr Kibaki had himself been appointed Vice-President in succession to Mr Moi also in October 1978 [ibid.].

The parliamentary elections were contested by 742 candidates (up to 13 for a single constituency). On Sept. 29 it had been announced that the Government had banned the publication of any pre-election opinion poll.

As a result of the elections seven cabinet ministers, 15 assistant ministers and almost half the members of the previous Assembly lost their seats.

The ministers who were defeated were (i) Mr Mbiyu Koinange, Minister of Natural Resources and previously a Minister of State (and confidant of the late President Kenyatta, his brother-in-law), who was defeated by Mr Njenga Karuma, chairman of GEMA (a Kikuyu welfare and business association); (ii) Mr Isaac Omolo Okero, Minister of Power and Communications and national president of KANU, defeated by Mr Otieno Ambala, son-in-law of Mr Odinga; (iii) Mr Nathan Munoko, Minister of Works; (iv) Mr James Nyamweya, Minister of Labour; (v) Dr Julius Kiano, Minister of Water Development, defeated by Mr Kenneth Matiba, a wealthy businessman; (vi) Mr Taita Towett, Minister of Education; and (vii) Mr Jackson Angaine, Minister of Lands and Settlements, who had been a member of the Cabinet since 1963. Among other former members of the Assembly not re-elected was Mr John Marie Seroney, released in December 1978 [see page 29480] after being detained under President Kenyatta in 1975 [see 27849 A].

Among the ministers re-elected, Dr Munyua Waiyaki (Foreign Affairs) defeated Mr Andrew Ngumba (the Mayor of Nairobi—see 28476 A). Among other members newly elected were (i) Mr Philip Leakey (30, younger son of Dr Louis and Mrs Mary Leakey, the famous anthropologists, and brother of Mr Richard Leakey, director of Kenya's National Museum), who became the first White member of Kenya's Parliament since Mr Bruce McKenzie (who served as Minister of Agriculture, 1963-70) and (ii) Mr Krishna Gautama, a Hindu and former chairman of the Kenya Law Society, as the first Indian to enter Parliament since 1969. Also elected were Dr Njoroge Mungai, chairman of KANU's Nairobi branch, a nephew of President Kenyatta and former Foreign Minister (prior to 1974—see 26823 A); Mr Ngengi Muigai, another nephew of President Kenyatta; and four women.

It was estimated that 70 per cent of the electorate had taken part in the poll.

President Moi announced the composition of a reorganized Cabinet on Nov. 28 as follows (with previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

*Mr Daniel T. Arap Moi	President
Mr James S. Gichuru (Defence)	Ministers of State
Mr Godfrey Gitahi Kariuki (Assistant Minister of Lands and Settlement)	
Mr Kiprono N. K. Biwott	
*Mr Mwai Kibaki	Vice-President and Minister of Finance
*Mr Charles Njonjo	Attorney General
Mr James C. N. Osogo (Health)	Agriculture
Mr Jeremiah M. Nyageh (Agriculture)	Livestock Development†
Dr Zachary T. Onyonka (Housing and Social Services)	Economic Planning†
Mr Robert S. Matano (Local Government)	Social Services and Housing
Dr Munyua Waiyaki (Foreign Affairs)	Energy†
*Mr Stanley S. Oloitiptip	Home Affairs
Mr Matthew J. Ogutu (Tourism and Wildlife)	Co-operative Development
*Mr Daniel M. Mutinda	Information and Broadcasting
Mr Eliud T. Mwamunga (Commerce and Industry)	Industry†
Mr Paul J. Ngei (Co-operative Development)	Works
Dr Robert J. Ouko (Economic Planning and Community Affairs)	Foreign Affairs
Mr Arthur K. Magugu	Health
Mr Charles W. Rubia	Local Government and Urban Development†
Mr Joshua J. Kamotho	Higher Education†
Mr John H. Okwany	Commerce†
Mr Moses Mudawadi	Basic Education†
Mr Elijah W. Mwangale	Labour
Mr Gilbert M'mbijiwe	Tourism†
Dr Jonathan K. Ngeno	Water Development
Mr A. J. Omanga	Natural Resources and Environment
Mr Henry K. Kosgey	Transport and Communications†

* No change. †Newly-created ministries.

The duties of the three ministers of state (attached to the President's Office) included Defence, the Kerio Valley, Talke Basin and Tana River Development Authorities and the Council for Science and Technology.

Also appointed were 49 assistant ministers, among them Mr Philip Leakey as one of the two Assistant Ministers of Natural Resources and Environment and Mr Martin Shikuku (released from detention in December 1978—see page 29480) as Assistant Minister of Livestock Development.

President Moi also announced the appointment of 11 additional members to the National Assembly (being, under the Constitution, entitled to nominate up to 12 such members) and of various other office bearers. These latter included Mr Odinga, who was appointed

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chairman of the Cotton Board, the object of this appointment being, in the words of the President, "to give Mr Odinga a chance to disprove malicious rumours" spread about him.

On Dec. 12, 1979, Mr Moi was sworn in as President and C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kenya, while Vice-President Kibaki and all cabinet ministers were also sworn in.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Times - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. 29477 A; 1974 National Assembly Election 26823 A*)

A. SOVIET UNION - SPAIN - WEST GERMANY — Visit by Soviet Foreign Minister to Spain and West Germany

The Soviet Foreign Minister and Politburo member, Mr Andrei Gromyko, paid an official visit to Spain on Nov. 19-21, 1979, where he had talks with the Prime Minister, Sr Adolfo Suárez González, the Foreign Minister, Sr Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, and King Juan Carlos. The visit was the first to Spain by a high-ranking Soviet official—relations between the two countries having been broken in the Civil War and resumed only in February 1977 [see page 28329].

During the visit Mr Gromyko urged Spain to continue to maintain an independent foreign policy, but Sr Oreja, in an implicit reference to the possibility of Spain joining NATO [see 30020 B; pages 29115 and 28680], affirmed his country's commitment to the Western world.

Sr Oreja said that Spain felt itself to be part of the Western world in terms of history, culture and way of life but stressed that "in this choice we do not wish to see . . . any antagonism towards any country or group of countries". In response Mr Gromyko referred to recently announced NATO plans to install new nuclear weapons in Western Europe [see 30159 A] and warned that the Soviet Union would not remain indifferent if missiles were placed "on our doorstep"; however, he reiterated that "our nuclear weapons will not be used against those states which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territory" and that the Soviet Union was "ready to formulate corresponding commitments with any interested state".

In his speech Sr Oreja defended the need for all states to abstain from any intervention, direct or indirect, in the internal or external affairs of others, and he added: "We believe that the time has come to progress from the mere condemnation of terrorist activities, as proclaimed in the Final Act at Helsinki [i.e. at the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE—see 27301 A], to an active commitment for international co-operation."

A joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit in Madrid stated that the two countries resolved to take the necessary steps to ensure the success of the next round of the CSCE which was due to be held in Madrid in the autumn of 1980 [see 28957 A]. The two sides also expressed support for the rapid establishment of a just and lasting peace throughout the Middle East.

An agreement was signed on Nov. 21 on cultural and scientific co-operation between the two countries for 1980-81, as well as a protocol on co-operation between the Leningrad State Hermitage and the Madrid Prado Museum.

From Madrid Mr Gromyko on Nov. 21 flew direct to Bonn for an official visit lasting until Nov. 24, during which in addition to discussions with his West German counterpart, Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, he also had talks (on Nov. 23) with the Federal Chancellor, Herr Helmut Schmidt. Although no mention was made of the question in the final communiqué on the visit, NATO plans for the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe formed the dominant theme of the talks, during which differences between the two sides were highlighted.

At an official dinner given for Mr Gromyko on Nov. 22 Herr Genscher voiced concern that the deployment of Soviet SS-20 long-range theatre nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe [see pages 30160; 28965] had upset the East-West military balance, to which the Soviet Foreign Minister had responded that the "existing balance" must be maintained, adding that "on this question we and the Federal Republic of Germany do not speak the same language". Subsequently, at a press conference on Nov. 24, Mr Gromyko reiterated the Soviet Union's readiness to enter into immediate negotiations on the question of medium-range nuclear weapons but said that such negotiations should begin before any NATO decision to deploy new types of missiles in Western Europe, which would "represent a new stage in the arms race".

A communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit said inter alia that the two sides had confirmed that they did not see any reasonable alternative to the policy of détente and had agreed that the working out of further concrete steps in the sphere of disarmament and curbing armaments must be accelerated. The communiqué also recorded that Mr Gromyko had confirmed invitations to Herr Schmidt and Herr Genscher to visit the Soviet Union, which had been "accepted with satisfaction".—(La Vanguardia, Barcelona - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Times - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - Soviet Embassy Press Department) (*Prev. rep. Soviet-Spanish Relations page 28392; Spain-NATO 30020 B, pages 29115, 28680; Soviet-West German Relations 29093 A*)

B. GUINEA — Parliamentary Elections - Release of Detainees - Allegations of Further Arrests

In elections held on Jan. 27, 1980, a total of 210 deputies were elected (on the list of the ruling *Parti démocratique de Guinée*—PDG) to the new Popular National Assembly.

The Assembly, which replaced the 150-member Legislative Assembly elected in December 1974 [see 26922 C], was described as the country's "supreme legislative body" by President Sekou Touré in his speech at the opening session on Feb. 15.

In August 1979 and January 1980, the release was announced of three detainees serving sentences in connexion with the attempted "invasion" of Guinea by dissidents and mercenaries in November 1970 [see 24353 A; 24525 A].

Mgr Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo, then Archbishop of Conakry, who had received a life sentence with hard labour in January 1971, was released on Aug. 7; he then travelled to Liberia, where he thanked President Tolbert for interceding on his behalf, and thence to France where he intended to live (having maintained dual French and Guinean nationality when Guinea became independent in 1958—see 16600 A). Mgr Tchidimbo formally resigned his archbishopric on Aug. 23, this having reportedly been made a condition of his release by the Guinean authorities, and his successor was named on the same day by Pope John Paul II as Mgr Robert Sarah (34), a priest with a parish in Conakry.

Mr Edouard Lambin, reportedly the last remaining detainee with dual French and Guinean nationality, was released on Jan. 17, 1980, while on Jan. 31 it was announced in Dakar (Senegal) that Mr Alassane Diop, a former Guinean Government minister [see 16600 A; 17325 A] condemned in July 1971 for giving "fifth column" backing to the "invasion" attempt of the preceding November [see 25353 A], had been released and had gone to Senegal.

However, exiled Guinean opposition elements (in a communiqué issued on Sept. 20, 1979) alleged that detentions on political grounds continued in Guinea, and that some 20 former exiles returning from the Ivory Coast and Senegal (following normalization of relations between those countries and Guinea —see 29701 A; 29036 A) had been arrested during August 1979.—(Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29701 A*)

C. ZAMBIA — Cabinet Changes - Imprisonment of Former Minister

President Kaunda of Zambia announced on Dec. 24, 1979, a minor cabinet reshuffle, including the following appointments (with previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

Mr Joshua Lumina (Finance and Technical Co-operation)	Labour and Social Services
Mr Kebby Musokotwane (Youth and Sports)	Finance and Technical Co-operation
Mr Ben Kakoma	Youth and Sports

The post of Minister of Labour and Social Services had been vacant since the suspension on March 13, 1979, of Mr Dingiswayo Banda (who was also Chief Whip in the National Assembly), who was accused along with two other men of unlicensed elephant hunting in contravention of the Wildlife Conservation Act. Having been convicted and fined by a magistrate's court, Mr Banda appealed to the Zambian High Court, but his appeal was dismissed on March 27, 1980, and his sentence was increased by the High Court to 12 months' imprisonment with hard labour, with another nine-month prison sentence to run concurrently.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 29450 A*)

A. GREECE — Party Political Developments - Divorce Law - Internal Security Developments - Defence Appointment - Economic Policy - Relations with Communist Countries

The revival of the Progressive Party was announced in November 1979 by Mr Spyros Markezinis (70), who had originally formed the party in 1955 [see 14732 A] and who had last been actively involved in political life as Prime Minister under the Papadopoulos regime in October-November 1973 [see 26165 A; 26325 A]. Mr Markezinis, who had stated in his memoirs that he had accepted the latter office in the hope of guiding the colonels' regime towards a form of democracy [see also page 28688], accused the New Democracy Government led by Mr Konstantinos Karamanlis of betraying its conservative voters by adopting a quasi-socialist approach to economic problems and by keeping Greece outside the military side of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and stated that the Progressive Party advocated a minimum of state intervention in the economy and a "thoroughly pragmatic approach" to foreign affairs. [For the withdrawal of Greek armed forces from NATO in 1974, see 26709 A.]

However, unlike the existing right-wing party in the Greek Parliament, the National Front, the Progressive Party did not pledge itself to work for the restoration of the monarchy or for an amnesty for those convicted of offences connected with the period of military rule in Greece.

A law passed by the Greek Parliament on Feb. 9, 1979, to remain in force for a period of six months, permitted divorce on the grounds of six years' separation on the petition of one spouse only, whereas the Greek Orthodox Church (which strongly opposed this measure) required the consent of both spouses except in cases of proven adultery. A number of bishops who refused to sign divorce papers issued under this law were subsequently sued for dereliction of duty. In early February 1980 senior bishops, professors of theology, members of Parliament and members of the judiciary attended a conference organized by the Greek Orthodox Church to examine proposals for the legalization of civil marriages which were currently being studied by the Government with a view to bringing Greek law (which recognized only religious marriages) into line with that of all other European countries.

Internal Security Developments - New Chief of Defence Staff

On June 1, 1979, 10 members of the extreme right-wing "Organization of National Restoration" (said to have been formed by supporters of the former military regime with the aim of destabilizing democracy in Greece), including two army officers, were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10 months to life after being found guilty of causing a series of bombings in Athens over a two-year period in which more than 50 people had been injured.

Those sentenced had been arrested in January 1979 following the detonation of over 40 devices in the capital on the night of Dec. 17, 1978, for which the Organization of National Restoration had claimed responsibility as "an act of commemoration" for the assassination on Dec. 14, 1976, of the convicted torturer Mr Evangelos Mallios [see page 28686].

On Jan. 31, 1979, another convicted torturer, Mr Petros Babalis [ibid.], was shot dead in Athens, responsibility being claimed by the left-wing "June 1978" terrorist organization, which was reported to be an offshoot of the "17 November Revolutionary Organization" which had claimed responsibility for the murders of Mr Mallios and (in December 1975—see page 28687) of the alleged US intelligence officer Mr Richard Welch.

Earlier on Jan. 31 a number of vehicles had been destroyed by bombs at an Athens bus depot, responsibility being claimed by the "People's Revolutionary Struggle" (which was also believed to be an offshoot of the 17 November Revolutionary Organization) which had previously claimed responsibility for attacks on the premises of US companies in Salonika (Thessaloniki) in November 1978 and which subsequently claimed responsibility for the bombing of an Athens court building in May 1979.

Subsequent terrorist incidents included the murder in an Athens suburb on Jan. 16, 1980, of the deputy head of the police riot control squad, Supt. Pandelis Petrou, and his driver.

Investigations in connexion with this incident resulted in the arrest, announced on Feb. 15, of 10 members of a group calling itself "Popular Front Action", said to be an offshoot of an organization known as "Marxist-Leninist People's Power". Those arrested, who included four Greek Cypriots, were charged on Feb. 16 with belonging to an organization planning terrorism in Greece following the discovery of plans of potential targets in Athens, including the US embassy and the US ambassador's residence. Several of those arrested were said by the security police to have been trained in Lebanon by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Gen. Ioannis Davos, the Chief of the National Defence General Staff since September 1976 [see page 28690], resigned from this post on Jan. 8, 1980, and was succeeded by Lt.-Gen. Agamemnon Gratsios, hitherto Chief of Staff of the Army [ibid.]. Gen. Davos was on Jan. 15 sworn in as Under-Secretary of National Defence.

Economic Trends in 1978 and 1979

From June 1978 onwards the Greek Government's economic policies were modified following what the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development described as a period of "expansionary demand management in the three years to mid-1978 accompanied by substantial pay increases [which had] resulted in a continuing strong expansion of final domestic demand, with the inflation rate remaining comparatively high and accelerating in the first half of 1978".

A series of measures announced on June 18, 1978, included (i) cuts in the Government's budgeted expenditure for 1978 totalling about 8,000 million drachmas (the rate of exchange being approximately 37 drachmas per US dollar); (ii) measures to combat tax evasion; (iii) a freeze on certain prices (mainly affecting public utilities) until the end of the year; and (iv) monetary measures which marked a return to reliance on officially-controlled interest rates as an instrument of policy after a period of more flexible monetary management. In August 1978 further price controls were introduced until the end of the year, measures were taken to control commercial rents over a six-year period, and various tax measures were introduced (including an extraordinary tax to cover expenditure necessitated by the recent Salonika earthquake—see 29311 A).

Due partly to the Government's counter-inflationary measures, the annual rate of retail price inflation fell from 13½ per cent during the first half of 1978 to less than 10 per cent during the second half, the overall annual rate of 12½ per cent being similar to that of 1977. Real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by about 6 per cent in 1978, the recorded unemployment rate remained at about 2½ per cent, and the balance-of-payments deficit on current account fell to just under 4 per cent of GDP, compared with about 5 per cent in the three years to 1977. Manufacturing investment remained constant after declining at an average annual rate of about 5½ per cent between 1974 and 1977 (although this improvement was due to major projects in the public sector). There was an effective depreciation in the value of the drachma of 13½ per cent during the 12 months to November 1978, when a policy of maintaining a stable exchange rate was adopted.

During January 1979 there was a strong upturn in the rate of price inflation following the expiry of various price control measures at the end of 1978, and on Feb. 23, 1979, strict controls were introduced on all prices and wages which provided inter alia for the cancellation of recent "unjustified" price rises. The economy nevertheless continued to face strong inflationary pressures during the succeeding months in which a major factor was the sharp rise in the price of oil [see 29981 A]; about 70 per cent of Greece's energy needs were met by imported oil, about one-eighth of which was purchased at record spot market prices, and various measures designed to curb energy consumption were introduced during the year. A fiscal "austerity package" announced on Aug. 21, 1979, included a 16,000 million drachma cut in public expenditure (equivalent to nearly one-third of the year's anticipated public sector deficit), credit restrictions, increases in interest rates and a strengthening of controls on wages and profits.

On Nov. 8, 1979, a $500,000,000 10-year loan agreement was signed with a consortium of international banks in order to assist the financing of the Government's capital budget and the servicing of the country's foreign public debt and to increase Greece's foreign exchange reserves. Various consumption taxes, import controls and other measures designed in particular to cut imports of consumer durables were announced on Nov. 30, to remain in force until June 30, 1980, and on Dec. 12 it was announced that the country's shipowners were planning to increase their remittances to Greece by about £500,000,000 in 1980 in order to alleviate the foreign exchange crisis. It was estimated that Greece's 1979 balance-of-payments deficit would total up to $2,300 million (compared with $1,260 million in 1978), spending on oil imports having risen by 66.3 per cent in the first nine months of the year and spending on other imports by 28.1 per cent.

Consumer prices were estimated to have risen by an overall 24.5 per cent in 1979, with rises of over 30 per cent reported for foodstuffs and other essential items, and widespread industrial unrest over the Government's wage controls and other labour policies intensified during January 1980. Those taking strike action included

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in particular bank employees seeking a 30 per cent pay increase, whereas they had been offered 11 per cent.

Relations with Communist Countries - Visits to Soviet Union and China by Mr Karamanlis

The first visit to the Soviet Union by a Greek Prime Minister was made on Oct. 1-5, 1979, by Mr Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr George Rallis. The visit was in response to an invitation issued during an official visit to the Soviet Union by Mr Rallis on Sept. 4-10, 1978 (the first such visit by a Greek Foreign Minister), during which he had signed a consular convention and an agreement on cultural and scientific co-operation.

After leaving the Soviet Union Mr Karamanlis visited Hungary on Oct. 6-7 and Czechoslovakia on Oct. 8-10. Earlier in 1979 Mr Karamanlis had visited Yugoslavia on March 16-17 and Romania on March 18-20, while President Zhivkov of Bulgaria had visited Greece on April 29-30 (the question of multilateral co-operation among Balkan states, as envisaged at a meeting held in Athens in 1976—see 27692 A—being a major item of discussion during these three visits).

During his visit to the Soviet Union, which he described as "filling a vacuum in Greek foreign policy", Mr Karamanlis signed a joint political declaration with Mr Alexei Kosygin (Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers) setting out various "general principles" for the "steady reinforcement of friendly relations and the development of a mutually profitable harmonious co-operation" between the two countries, based on the United Nations Charter and the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [see 27301 A].

Mr Rallis and Mr Semyon Skachkov (Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries) signed an economic and technical co-operation agreement under which it was agreed to establish a joint commission on co-operation questions. A contract was signed for the supply of 2,000,000 tonnes of Soviet oil to Greece in each of the four years from 1980, and verbal agreements were reached on (i) the supply of electrical current to Greece (300,000,000 kWh in 1980 and 1981, rising to 1,000 million kWh per annum over the following four years) and (ii) Soviet technical and financial assistance for the construction in Greece of an alumina plant with a capacity of 600,000 tonnes.

On Nov. 12-16, 1979, Mr Karamanlis became the first Greek Prime Minister to visit China, in response to an invitation made by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Huang Hua, during a visit to Greece on Sept. 21-24, 1978, when an agreement on cultural co-operation had been signed.

Mr Karamanlis had talks with Chairman Hua Guofeng and Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping during which the two sides reviewed both the international situation and bilateral relations. The Chinese leaders praised the Greek Government's foreign policy, and in particular its recent signature of a treaty of accession to the European Communities [see page 30012] and its encouragement of closer inter-Balkan co-operation, while Mr Karamanlis said that it was in the interests of world peace for the Balkan region to remain "outside the super-power competition".

It was noted that prospects for economic co-operation were limited by inter alia the distance separating the two countries, but that certain areas, including merchant marine activities, provided scope for co-operation. A three-year framework agreement was signed on scientific and technological co-operation.—(Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - Economist - Greek Press and Information Office, London - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - OECD, Paris) (*Prev. rep. Internal Political Developments 29623 A, 29445 A; Internal Security 29311 A; Relations with Albania 29404 A*)

A. ICELAND — General Elections - Formation of New Cabinet under Mr Thoroddsen - President Eldjárn's Decision not to seek Re-election

General elections to the 60-seat *Althing* (Parliament) held in Iceland on Dec. 2-3, 1979, resulted principally in gains for the centrist Progressive Party and losses for the Social Democratic Party and the Communist-dominated People's Alliance. The elections were held following the collapse in October 1979 of the three-party centre-left Government of Progressives, Social Democrats and the People's Alliance which had been formed after the last elections in June 1978 [see 29963 A; 29260 A].

The results of the elections, in which nearly 90 per cent of the registered electorate of 144,000 voted, were as follows (June 1978 figures being shown for comparison):

	Seats		Percentage	
	1979	1978	1979	1978
Independence Party . .	21	20	35.4	32.7
Progressive Party	17	12	24.9	16.9
People's Alliance	11	14	19.7	22.9
Social Democrats	10	14	17.4	22.0
Others	1[1]	0	2.6	5.5[2]

[1] An independent right-wing candidate elected as a result of a disputed Independence Party nomination.

[2] Including 3.5 per cent cast for the Liberal and Leftist Union, which did not contest the 1979 elections.

The elections were followed by protracted inter-party negotiations during which unsuccessful attempts to form a new cabinet were made successively by Mr Steingrímur Hermannsson (leader of the Progressive Party), Mr Geir Hallgrímsson (leader of the Independence Party), Mr Svavar Gestsson (a left-wing socialist member of the People's Alliance) and Mr Benedikt Groendal (leader of the Social Democratic Party and Prime Minister of the caretaker minority Social Democratic administration which had been in office since the October 1979 political crisis—see 29963 A).

After President Eldjárn had warned on Jan. 29, 1980, that he would swear in a non-parliamentary cabinet if the parties could not reach agreement on a new coalition within two weeks, the deadlock was broken in early February by the vice-chairman of the Independence Party, Mr Gunnar Thoroddsen, who secured the support of two other Independence Party deputies for a coalition with the Progressive Party and the People's Alliance under his premiership. The composition of the new Cabinet, which took office on Feb. 8, was as follows:

Mr Gunnar Thoroddsen (Ind.) . .	Prime Minister
Mr Ólafur Jóhannesson (Prog.) . .	Foreign Affairs
Mr Fridjón Thórdarson (Ind.) . .	Justice
Mr Pálmi Jónsson (Ind.)	Agriculture
Mr Ingvar Gíslason (Prog.)	Education
Mr Steingrímur Hermannsson (Prog.)	Fisheries and Communications
Mr Tómas Árnason (Prog.)	Trade and Commerce
Mr Svavar Gestsson (PA)	Health and Social Security
Mr Ragnar Arnalds (PA)	Finance
Mr Hjörleifur Guttormsson (PA) . .	Energy and Industry

Mr Thoroddsen (69), who went against the wishes of his party leader in forming an administration, had come into conflict with the Independence Party leadership as early as 1952, when he had supported the successful presidential candidacy of his father-in-law, Mr Asgeir Asgeirsson [see 12353 C]. Having served as Finance Minister in successive Cabinets appointed in November 1959 and November 1963, he later served as Iceland's ambassador to Denmark and in 1968 unsuccessfully contested the presidential election held on the retirement of President Asgeirsson [see 22798 C]. A lawyer by training, he had most recently held ministerial office as Minister of Industry and Social Affairs from 1974 to 1978.

In a policy statement on Feb. 27 Mr Thoroddsen said that the main task of his Government would be to combat inflation (the retail price index having risen by a record 61 per cent in 1979).

In a new year address to the nation President Kristján Eldjárn (63), who had held office since 1968 [see 22798 C], announced that he would not seek re-election when his third term expired in mid-1980.—(Icelandic Embassy, London - Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Economist) (*Prev. rep. 29963 A, 29260 A*)

B. WEST GERMANY — Hesse - Cabinet Change

The Social Democratic (SPD) representatives in the Hesse *Landtag* (Parliament) on March 26, 1980, unanimously elected the SPD parliamentary group leader, Herr Karl Schneider, to be Minister of Agriculture and Environment *vice* Herr Willi Görlach (SPD), who had resigned this post the previous week following the discovery by the federal prosecution that two officials from the Ministry had passed on confidential information to a private company. A spokesman for the Hesse *Land* Government (a coalition of the SPD and the Free Democratic Party) said on March 26 that Herr Robert Metzler, the Secretary of State to the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment, had also announced his retirement from office.

Herr Schneider, who was to assume his ministerial functions on May 13, 1980, was succeeded as SPD parliamentary group leader in the *Landtag* by Herr Norbert Winterstein.—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin) (*Prev. rep. Hesse Cabinet 29474 A*)

A. DOMINICA — Change of Government following General Strike - Subsequent Developments, June 1979 to February 1980

Mr Patrick R. John, who had become the first Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica upon its attainment of full independence under a republican constitution in November 1978 [see 29525 A], was obliged to relinquish this office in June 1979 in the face of widespread opposition, his resistance to which had brought about a major political crisis involving the departure from the country of President Degazon and the resignation of virtually the entire Cabinet.

Mr Oliver J. Seraphine, the former Minister of Agriculture, Lands and CARICOM Affairs, became the new Prime Minister in an interim Government which took office pending the calling of a general election (which was constitutionally required to be held not more than three months after the expiry, on April 28, 1980, of the term of the current Parliament elected in 1975—see 27217 B).

The crisis was precipitated by the action of security forces in using firearms and tear gas to break up a peaceful demonstration against the Government by a crowd of between 13,000 and 18,000 people in the capital, Roseau, on May 29, 1979, as a result of which one man was shot dead, nine people were wounded (three of them critically) and a baby was asphyxiated. The demonstration had been organized by trade unions to protest against the Government's introduction in the House of Assembly of legislation to amend the Industrial Relations Act and the Libel and Slander Ordinance.

The industrial relations legislation was designed inter alia to ban strike action by civil servants and workers in essential services (which had recently caused severe disruption in Dominica), while the libel legislation proposed severe penalties for journalists and publishers and was regarded as a measure to prevent the further publication by the *New Chronicle* newspaper of allegations of secret links between the Governments of Dominica and South Africa.

As stated on page 29527, such allegations had first been made in December 1978, when the *Nation* newspaper of Barbados had named Mr Sydney Burnett-Alleyne, an arms dealer said to have been involved in plans to use Dominica as a base from which to launch a mercenary invasion of Barbados, as an intermediary in an approach by the Dominica Government for financial assistance from South Africa. A well-documented report had subsequently been shown on British television in which it was alleged inter alia that Dominica's Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs, Mr Leo I. Austin, had sought through Mr Burnett-Alleyne to negotiate South African financial backing for various major development projects, including an oil refinery which would supply South Africa.

It was further alleged that these projects were connected with plans to create a free port zone of 45 square miles to be managed by the Caribbean Southern Corporation of Texas (which refused to identify its parent company) on terms which would have granted it virtual exemption from the laws and taxes of Dominica for a period of 99 years. (The Government was, however, obliged to call off the free port project in early May following strong opposition from local farmers and landowners.)

Following the events of May 29 all public services in Dominica were paralysed by a general strike called by the five major trade unions, and meetings were held throughout the island to demand the resignation of Mr John's Government. Mr John responded that the Government would "not willingly be forced out of office", and accused the opposition Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) of involvement in plans to stage a coup against his Dominica Labour Party (DLP) Government, alleging that the May 29 demonstration had been part of these plans. Mr John's position was weakened, however, by the subsequent resignation from the Government of Mr Seraphine (who was considered to represent the views of the "moderates" in the ruling party), who said that he wished to dissociate himself from Mr John's policy of "repression".

Mr Seraphine moreover confirmed Mr John's involvement in discussions with South African interests, thereby making it politically impossible for the Prime Minister to win the support of other members of the Caribbean Community in his bid to retain power in Dominica (see 29689 A for CARICOM reactions to the overthrow of the Gairy Government in Grenada in March 1979). Following Mr Seraphine's disclosures the conservative Government of Trinidad and Tobago announced the rejection of an aid application made by the John Government on the grounds that its Caribbean Aid Council [see 29790 A] was debarred from recommending aid to countries which had been involved in the "furtherance of trade and/or other relations with countries such as South Africa and Rhodesia where apartheid and other such practices exist".

(A South African Government statement issued on Aug. 15, 1979, by the Minister of Industries, Trade and Consumer Affairs, Dr Schalk van der Merwe, dismissed allegations of government involvement in Dominican development projects as "completely unfounded", but confirmed that the South African embassy in London had received inquiries from "persons professing to be the accredited representatives of the authorities of Dominica" which it had referred to "private sector concerns" which might have been interested in participating in projects in Dominica.)

Concessions made by Mr John during early June 1979 following Mr Seraphine's resignation at the beginning of the month included the shelving of the Government's controversial industrial relations and libel legislation, the dismissal from the Government of Mr Austin and the announcement that the Government was willing to appoint an independent commission of inquiry into the events of May 29 and to accept United Nations supervision of Dominica's next general election.

Pressure on the Prime Minister to resign was nevertheless intensified, and a broadly-based Committee for National Salvation was formed as an alliance of interest groups opposed to Mr John, including both radical and moderate political elements, trade unionists, farmers, businessmen and churchmen. An opposition rally held on June 7 called for the Government's resignation by June 12.

The President of Dominica, Mr Fred E. Degazon, left the island and travelled to the United Kingdom with his family on June 11, apparently after Mr John had rejected his advice to call a general election, while at about the same time the resignation was announced of the Speaker of the House of Assembly, Mr Pershing Waldron.

On June 13, 1979, the Committee for National Salvation held a closed meeting to select its nominee to succeed Mr John as Prime Minister in an interim Government, it being agreed to endorse Mr Seraphine. The latter announced that he was forming a Democratic Labour Party with the support of about half of the 21 Dominica Labour Party members (16 elected representatives and five appointed senators) of the 30-member House of Assembly, thus putting the Prime Minister and his remaining supporters in a minority position vis-à-vis the combined opposition.

On June 15 Mr John sought to forestall a parliamentary defeat by appointing as acting President Sir Louis Cools-Lartigue (who had previously served as President on an interim basis immediately after independence—see 29525 A) and advising him to prorogue Parliament immediately and to dissolve it with effect from Sept. 1 pending a fresh general election. Sir Louis acted in accordance with this advice on the same day, but on June 16 rescinded both measures and resigned from office after protesters had stoned his house and burned his car without any intervention by the security forces (who had joined the general strike).

In subsequent rioting the government registry building was burned down, the fire destroying public records and the premises of the high court, various business establishments owned by supporters of the Government were looted, and the manager of the government-controlled broadcasting station was attacked and forced to resign.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Education, Youth Affairs and Co-operatives, Mr Henkel L. Christian, resigned on June 16, 1979, and by June 18 all of Mr John's remaining cabinet ministers were reported to have resigned except Mrs Sylvia Burton (Minister of State for Health, Industrial Relations and Women's Affairs), who had not returned to Dominica since leaving the island to attend the funeral on May 29 of the former Premier of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Mr C. A. Paul Southwell (for whose death see 29728 B).

Mr John then agreed to the summoning of a meeting of Parliament as a result of which Mr Jenner Armour, a lawyer, was elected acting President of Dominica and a majority of the elected representatives voted for the appointment as Prime Minister of Mr Seraphine, who was accordingly sworn in by Mr Armour on June 21, 1979.

On June 22 Mr Seraphine appointed what was described as a "broadly-based Cabinet" which included one other member of the John Government (Mr Luke T. Corriette), two former ministers (Mr Michael A. Douglas and Mr Ferdinand F. Parillon) who had been dismissed by Mr John in January

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JUN 9 1980
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1978 partly for their alleged communist tendencies [see page 29527], and a senator (Mr Brian Alleyne) who had been nominated to Parliament by the DFP. The DFP nevertheless continued to form the official opposition despite the reported offer of a ministerial post to its leader, Miss Mary Eugenia Charles. The full membership of the new Cabinet was as follows:

Mr Oliver J. Seraphine. . . .	Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr Ferdinand F. Parillon . .	Home Affairs and Housing
Mr Luke T. Corriette	Communications, Works and Tourism
Mr Michael A. Douglas . .	Finance, Trade and Industry
Mr Atherton Martin	Agriculture, Lands, Fisheries and Marketing
Mr Charles Maynard	Education and Health
Mr Brian Alleyne	Attorney General

Developments following Formation of Interim Government - Impact of Hurricane David - Renewed Political Tension

Following the removal from office of Mr John, the general strike was called off after having caused economic losses estimated at up to 6,000,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars (about US$2,250,000). Following his assumption of office Mr Seraphine stated that the main priority of his Government was to rebuild the economy, and that "fair elections" would be held following the completion of voter registration procedures.

Mr Seraphine said that the new administration would inter alia carry out a review of all contracts signed by the previous Government, abolish all statutory boards and place all public sector arrangements in the hands of the government development corporation. Bona fide foreign investment would be welcomed for development projects "to be proud of", but Dominica would "no longer harbour criminals and Mafia types". There would be an investigation into the conduct of Mr John and Mr Austin, particularly as regards their contacts with South African interests, and it was possible that legal action would be taken against them. (Mr Austin was subsequently committed for trial on fraud charges in early 1980.)

However, the new Government's plans for economic recovery and early elections subsequently suffered a severe setback when Dominica was struck by hurricane David on Aug. 29, 1979 [see 30091 B], causing what a British aid official described as "a major social and economic disaster which will require a number of years to remedy". (The final death toll in Dominica was 37, with up to 10,000 people being injured, three-quarters of the population rendered homeless and virtually every essential service extensively damaged.)

Stating that international aid of about US$250,000,000 would be required for basic rehabilitation work alone, Mr Seraphine said that "we now have an island and its people, virtually nothing more: we will have to build it back from scratch". In the weeks following the hurricane the island was almost totally dependent on emergency supplies from abroad, and a dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed after the looting of some relief cargoes.

Major aid donors included Britain, Canada, France, the United States and the Organization of American States. A new British aid grant to Dominica of £1,000,000 for rehabilitation projects was announced on Nov. 19, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Dec. 26 announced the approval of purchases by Dominica equivalent to its total quota in the Fund of 1,900,000 special drawing rights, half of this amount to compensate for a fall in the country's 1979 export earnings to less than 50 per cent of the 1978 level and half to assist with hurricane relief works. (The IMF stated in this connexion that the hurricane had resulted in the destruction of all of Dominica's banana plantations and 60 per cent of coconut and citrus trees.)

In early October 1979 Mr Atherton Martin (Minister of Agriculture, Lands, Fisheries and Marketing) was dismissed from the Cabinet, apparently for expressing left-wing political opinions and in particular for advocating closer ties with Cuba. His responsibilities were assumed by Mr Parillon (Minister for Home Affairs and Housing).

Mr Seraphine referred to Mr Martin as "making public statements and pursuing ideological paths that have served to embarrass me and affect my image as head of the interim Government", adding that "donors helping us to recover from the hurricane damage are anxious to understand the ideological position of Dominica". (The US ambassador to the eastern Caribbean states, Miss Sally Shelton, denied an allegation by Mr Martin that she had used US aid policy to bring pressure to bear on Mr Seraphine in this connexion.)

At the same time a rift became apparent between Mr Seraphine and the Committee for National Salvation, whose most recent meetings had not been attended by the Democratic Labour Party and which the Prime Minister now criticized for having obliged him to appoint a Cabinet "of leftists and rightists" whose composition "served only to frustrate the conduct of government affairs". Among the members of the Cabinet, the dismissal of Mr Martin was publicly criticized by Mr Parillon, Mr Maynard and Mr Alleyne, all of whom stated that until a fresh general election had been held the Prime Minister should exercise his right to dismiss ministers "with considerable restraint".

In December 1979 Mr Parillon himself resigned in protest against alleged interference in his responsibilities by Mr Michael Douglas (who subsequently became Minister of Agriculture while retaining responsibility for Finance, Trade and Industry), while Mr Maynard and Mr Alleyne were dismissed in January 1980, apparently for criticizing Mr Seraphine's failure to call fresh elections immediately after the completion of the electoral registration process in late 1979.

It was suggested in press reports that Mr Seraphine wished to prolong the life of the current Parliament until his Government had presided over the initial stages of a major economic reconstruction programme funded by a consortium of international lending agencies under the general direction of the Caribbean Development Bank.

During February 1980 pressure on the Government to call an immediate general election was intensified, and those making public demands to this effect included the DFP, the Roman Catholic Church, the Dominica Association of Industry and Commerce and the Joint Trade Union Action Committee (some of whose member unions advocated strike action to put further pressure on the Government).

Also during February 1980 the resignations occurred of President Degazon (who was believed to be still in the United Kingdom) and of the acting President, Mr Jenner Armour, who announced his intention to contest the next general election as an independent candidate. Mr Aurelius Marie (76), a former magistrate, was subsequently appointed President of Dominica as the agreed nominee of all the parties in the House of Assembly.—(Insight - Caribbean and West Indies Chronicle - Latin America Political Report - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - New York Times - Cape Times - Overseas Development Administration, London - IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. 29525 A*)

A. BULGARIA — Appointments to Council of Ministers

Under a decree issued by the State Council on Feb. 27, 1980, Mr Stamen Stamenov, the Minister of Metallurgy and Mineral Resources since the merging of the two ministries in November 1977 [see 28810 A], was appointed a Deputy Premier, no immediate successor to his former post being named.

In accordance with an earlier decree issued on Dec. 28, 1979, Mrs Drazha Vulcheva, Minister of National Education since November 1977 [ibid.], had similarly been appointed a Deputy Premier. Mrs Vulcheva, who was also a candidate member of the Communist Party's Politburo, was succeeded as Minister of National Education by Mr Aleksandur Fol, hitherto First Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Culture. At the same time Mrs Panka Babukova was appointed First Deputy Minister of Education with ministerial rank.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Council of Ministers 30068 C*)

B. BAHAMAS — Government Changes

In cabinet changes announced in mid-October 1979 (i) Mr Clement T. Maynard (Tourism and Aviation) became Minister of Labour and Home Affairs; (ii) Mr Livingstone N. Coakley (Education and Culture) became Minister of Tourism and Aviation; and (iii) Mr Darrell E. Rolle (Labour and Home Affairs) became Minister of Education and Culture. Responsibility for Labour had earlier been combined with that for Home Affairs (and responsibility for National Insurance with that for Health) following the election of Sir Clifford Darling (originally appointed Minister of Labour and National Insurance —see 28531 A) as Speaker of the House of Assembly.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Bahamas High Commission, London) (*Prev. rep. 28531 A*)

A. ST LUCIA — Formation of Labour Government following General Election - Subsequent Political Developments - Foreign and Regional Policies

The United Workers' Party (UWP) Government of Mr John G. M. Compton, which had held power in St Lucia since 1964 and had led the island to full independence from the United Kingdom in February 1979 [see 29589 A], was defeated by the St Lucia Labour Party (SLP) in a general election held on July 2, 1979. The previous Parliament elected in May 1974 [see 26558 B] had been dissolved in accordance with a constitutional provision requiring a dissolution not later than June 6 [see page 29591].

The election, which was fought as a two-party contest in each of the 17 constituencies between candidates of the UWP and the SLP, resulted in an increase from seven to 12 in the SLP's representation in the House of Assembly, while the UWP's representation fell from 10 to five members (with three ministers in the Compton Government losing their seats). There was a turnout of 61 per cent among a registered electorate of 69,966 (compared with an 83 per cent turnout among an electorate of 39,815 in May 1974).

The election campaign, which followed an eight-week strike by teachers and civil servants, was conducted in a generally tense atmosphere, and a number of violent clashes occurred between supporters of the rival parties.

The SLP's election manifesto criticized in particular the UWP Government's economic policies, and promised that an SLP Government would give priority to measures designed to reduce St Lucia's high level of unemployment and to ensure that the benefits of economic development were more widely shared by the whole population. In particular, greater encouragement would be given to local enterprise; idle agricultural land (much of it foreign-owned) would be acquired for redistribution to the landless; the tax structure would be reformed; and the tourist industry would be reorganized with a view to greater local ownership of small hotels.

The SLP leader, Mr Allan F. L. Louisy, said after his appointment as the country's new Prime Minister that his Government felt that it had a "special duty" towards the unemployed and the least well-off sections of society, adding: "We cannot survive as a nation or as a people while the masses live in squalor and destitution—my Government considers the improvement of their lot to be the first charge on the national conscience and the national pocket."

The full membership of the new Government formed by Mr Louisy after the election was as follows:

Mr Allan FitzGerald Laurent Louisy	Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Development and Planning
Mr George Odlum	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade, Industry, Tourism and Foreign Affairs
Mr Peter Josie	Agriculture, Lands, Fisheries, Labour and Co-operatives
Mr Kenneth Foster	Communications and Works
Mr Evans Calderon	Housing and Health
Mr Winston Cenac	Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs
Mr Jon Odlum	Community Development, Youth and Sport
Mr Michael Pilgrim	Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office

Responsibility for Education and Culture was entrusted to Mr Kenny Anthony (28) as "government adviser" on these subjects, his formal appointment to ministerial office being precluded by the fact that he was neither an elected member of the House of Assembly nor eligible for nomination to the Senate (by virtue of a constitutional requirement that senators should be aged at least 30—see page 29590).

Mr Louisy (62), who since being called to the English Bar in 1949 had held various legal and judicial offices in Commonwealth Caribbean territories, had entered local politics to assume the leadership of the SLP in 1974 following his retirement as a high court judge. **Mr George Odlum**, the deputy leader of the SLP and the president of the Farmers' and Farm Workers' Union, was closely associated with the "new left" movement in Commonwealth Caribbean politics [see also 29689 A] and was widely regarded as playing a dominant role in the formulation of SLP policies. **Mr Josie**, the president of the Seamen and Waterfront Workers' Trade Union, was also a prominent member of the radical wing of the party.

In the months following the general election there was an increasingly open polarization within the SLP between the supporters of Mr Louisy and those of Mr George Odlum, it being claimed by the latter that Mr Louisy had undertaken to step down as Prime Minister in his favour on Dec. 31, 1979, and to become Governor-General of St Lucia *vice* Sir Allen Montgomery Lewis. Mr Louisy remained in office, however, stating that public opinion and the course of events since the general election did not favour his relinquishment of the premiership.

Major domestic issues on which there had been public disagreement between Mr Louisy and Mr Odlum included the future organization of the country's security forces, regarding which Mr Louisy took the view that it was sufficient to strengthen the police force rather than to establish an army, as had been proposed by Mr Odlum.

In late February 1980 St Lucia's political crisis deepened when the Odlum faction of the SLP opposed the swearing-in of Mr Boswell Williams as acting Governor-General upon the departure from office on pre-retirement leave of Sir Allen Montgomery Lewis.

Foreign Policy - Declaration of St George's by Prime Ministers of St Lucia, Grenada and Dominica

In his capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Odlum played a leading role in the formulation of policies which differed significantly from those of the previous UWP Government; the latter had chosen to stress the country's links with the West rather than to participate in the non-aligned movement after independence [see page 29591], and had been associated with the conservative group within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) when an ideological split had developed among member countries over the "new left" coup in Grenada in March 1979 [see 29689 A].

In contrast, the SLP Government declared its intention to apply for full membership of the non-aligned movement, and attended the movement's September 1979 summit conference in Havana with observer status [see page 30038]. It also established diplomatic relations with Cuba on Aug. 24, 1979 (and agreed in October 1979 to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea), and adopted a policy of close co-operation with Grenada in regional affairs.

In mid-July 1979 (i.e. only two weeks after the SLP's election victory) Mr Louisy travelled to St George's (the capital of Grenada) for a "mini-summit" meeting with the Prime Minister of Grenada, Mr Maurice Bishop, and the recently appointed Prime Minister of Dominica, Mr Oliver Seraphine (who had in the previous month formed an interim Government including a number of left-wing politicians—see 30269 A). After their meeting the three heads of government issued a 20-point "Declaration of St George's" which was described by *Insight* of August 1979 as "aimed at establishing a common position among the three new 'progressive' independent Governments of the eastern Caribbean on sub-regional, regional and certain international issues".

The main areas of co-operation agreed upon in the Declaration included (i) frequent consultation and exchanges of visits between the three Governments; (ii) freedom of movement between nationals of the three states; and (iii) the exchange of information on oil exploration and energy matters. On regional issues, it was agreed (i) that proposals to establish a regional military force should be limited to defence against external aggression (i.e. rather than against internal unrest, as had been proposed at a meeting held in the aftermath of the Grenada coup and attended by inter alia the former heads of government of St Lucia and Dominica—see page 29691); (ii) to press for the unconditional independence of Belize (which had been prevented by a long-standing dispute between Guatemala and the United Kingdom—see 28617 A); and (iii) to "oppose colonialism in the region and internationally". On wider foreign policy matters, it was agreed inter alia to pursue policies based on independence and non-alignment and to support liberation movements in southern Africa.

In order to co-ordinate the implementation of the Declaration, to communicate with other governments on matters arising from it and to evaluate related areas of technical co-operation, the three Prime Ministers agreed to establish a consultative commission and a technical commission.

The Declaration was condemned by the Deputy Premier of the UK Associated State of Antigua, Mr Lester Bird, as "a divisive move", but was defended by Mr George Odlum as

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"an attempt to deepen the integration movement and further unify the peoples of the eastern Caribbean".

Referring to reports that the formation by the three states of an ideologically-aligned sub-group threatened the implementation of the May 1979 agreement to establish an Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS, to comprise Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent—see 29770 A), Mr Odlum said that the signatories of the Declaration of St George's fully supported the eventual formation of the OECS provided that it served as an instrument of "integration at the level of the masses and not merely at the institutional level" and that its formal establishment was preceded by "the widest possible consultation of and participation by the people".

As regards the proposed pooling of diplomatic representation by OECS member states [see page 29771], Mr Odlum said that the Governments of Grenada, St Lucia and Dominica now favoured the establishment of common facilities and personnel to be shared by separate national diplomatic representatives rather than the appointment of joint representatives.

As stated on page 30086, St Lucia subsequently joined Grenada, Jamaica and Guyana in issuing a joint declaration in October 1979 criticizing the recent announcement by President Carter that the United States intended inter alia to reinforce its military capability in the Caribbean. It was stated by the four Governments that they were determined to "preserve the Caribbean area as a zone of peace free from great power rivalry" and that they felt that no decision affecting the Caribbean should be taken by a major power "without proper consultation with and full involvement of the sovereign governments which represent the inhabitants of the region".

Dominica's failure to associate itself with this declaration was regarded as a result of its heavy dependence on emergency aid from the United States and other Western countries following the August hurricane disaster [see page 30091], which was seen as diminishing the Seraphine Government's ability to fulfil its undertaking to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Review of Terms of Major Industrial Project

Following its election victory, the SLP announced its intention to review the terms of the contract under which the (US) Amerada Hess Corporation was constructing an oil refining and trans-shipment complex and free port zone in St Lucia [see page 29592].

When the contract was under negotiation with the UWP Government the SLP had criticized the various tax and other advantages to be granted to the corporation, but had nevertheless supported the Government when a vote was taken in the House of Assembly in 1977 in view of the corporation's insistence that it would not proceed without the unanimous approval of the House. At the time of the announcement the corporation had almost completed the construction of the trans-shipment centre and was planning to commence work on the associated refinery.

Features of the contract which had come under criticism by the SLP included its apparently unlimited nature, with no provision being made for the periodic review of its terms or for its termination; the provision that disputes between the parties should be submitted to the arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris rather than resolved in the courts of St Lucia; the lack of any significant controls over the transfer of foreign currency out of St Lucia by the corporation; and the low level of oil throughput royalties to be paid to the Government (2 US cents per barrel of crude oil handled and 4 US cents per barrel of refined oil manufactured—these amounts being fixed for a period of 20 years, whereas the SLP considered that they should be pegged to movements in world oil prices).

Talks between the St Lucia Government and Amerada Hess subsequently commenced in August 1979 under pressure of a strike by workers at the site, but were understood to have ended later in the year without any significant concessions having been made by the corporation. A statement issued by Amerada Hess in February 1980 confirmed its intention to proceed with the project and said that the corporation had spent a total of 170,400,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars in St Lucia since July 1977 (including EC $5,300,000 in voluntary donations for government projects) and would continue to spend "substantial sums" there for many years to come.

It was reported by *The Guardian* of Jan. 28, 1980, that Amerada Hess had recently made a substantial donation to the St Lucia Government to finance a youth employment scheme and the construction of a hospital, but had done so only after the Government had agreed to designate the refinery project as an essential service, thereby making strikes illegal.

The influence of multinational corporations in the region was criticized by the Prime Ministers of St Lucia, Grenada and Dominica at their meeting in July 1979 [see above], at which it was agreed to co-operate in an investigation of the current situation.—(Insight - Caribbean and West Indies Chronicle - Latin America Political Report - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. St Lucia 29589 A; OECS 29770 A*)

A. MAURITANIA — Deposition of President Louly by Lt.-Col. Kaydalla - Other Government Changes - IMF Loan

President Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Ahmed Louly was deposed on Jan. 4, 1980, as head of state and President of the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN—the supreme organ of power in Mauritania) by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Lt.-Col. Khouna Ould Kaydalla. The latter assumed both of Lt.-Col. Louly's posts and also retained the premiership and the Defence portfolio.

Lt.-Col. Kaydalla (40) had become Prime Minister in May 1979 on the death of Lt.-Col. Ahmed Ould Bousseif [see 29925 A]. Lt.-Col. Louly became head of state and President of the CMSN in early June after Col. Mustapha Ould Mohamed Salek had handed in his resignation [ibid.].

At the same time Lt.-Col. Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi (Second Vice-President of the CMSN), Maj. Thiam El Hadj (Minister of Youth, Sport, Traditional Industry and Tourism) and Lt.-Col. Cheikh Ould Beida (the comptroller-general) were removed from their posts and also from the CMSN permanent committee. A number of other cabinet changes also took place.

The composition of the reorganized Cabinet, incorporating a subsequent change on April 11 when Maj. Moulaye Ould Boukhreiss was replaced as Minister of the Interior by Maj. Cheikh Sidi Ahmed Babamine, was as follows:

* Lt.-Col. Khouna Ould Kaydalla	Prime Minister and National Defence
Capt. Oahhan Ould Ahmed Mahmoud	Minister in charge of CMSN Permanent Secretariat
† Mr Mohamed El Mokhtar Ould Zamel	Foreign Affairs
* Mr Yedali Ould Cheikh	Justice
Maj. Cheikh Sidi Ahmed Babamine	Interior
* Mr Ahmed Ould Zein	Finance
Mr Soumare Oumar	Planning and Fisheries
* Maj. Ann Amadou Baraly	Equipment and Transport
Mr Mohamed Ould Amar	Rural Development
Mr Mamadou Cissoko	Industry, Mines and Commerce
Mr Ahmedou Ould Sidi Henena	Information, Culture, Posts and Telecommunications
* Mr Yahya Ould Menkouss	Public Services and Formation of Cadres
Mr Hassiny Ould Didi	Education
† Dr Ba Omar	Youth, Sport, Traditional Industry and Tourism
* Dr Youssef Dia Jana	Labour, Health and Social Affairs
† Lt.-Col. Ahmed Mahmoud Ould El Houssein † Lt.-Col. Dia Amadou	Minister-Councillors to the President

* No change. † Changed portfolio.

A statement from the CMSN announcing the changes in the Government said that they had been carried out in order to "adapt the political structure to the important tasks of administrative and economic reconstruction and the consolidation of peace". Lt.-Col. Kaydalla later said that Mauritania would continue its policy of strict neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict (from which Mauritania had withdrawn in August 1979—see 29917 A).

The IMF on Dec. 27, 1979, agreed to a purchase by Mauritania of the equivalent of 10,500,000 special drawing rights (SDR) under the Fund's compensatory financing facility to make up for an export earnings shortfall from July 1978 to June 1979.

The shortfall had been due largely to a reduction in both the price and the volume of exports of iron ore, the country's most important export commodity [see also 27058 A], reflecting the weakness of world demand for iron ore in 1978; the drop in the volume of exports was also due to damage to mining and transportation facilities which occurred while Mauritania was involved in the Sahara conflict.

The official Mauritanian Press Agency noted in January 1980 that, according to a recent IMF report, "measures put into force by the Government have brought about a moderate recovery of the economy and a stabilization of the previous imbalance"; furthermore, the IMF had stated that "the determination of the Mauritanian Government and the signing of peace agreements ending Mauritanian involvement in the Western Sahara conflict create a favourable context for the undertaking of a vast recovery programme that will allow the reduction of the imbalance in 1980-81".—(West Africa - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. 29925 A; Western Sahara 29917 A; Overthrow of President Ould Daddah 29256 A; IMF Drawing 28443 A*)

A. SEYCHELLES — Government Action against Alleged Plotters

President France Albert René announced on Nov. 16, 1979, that a plot "sponsored from abroad with the co-operation of mercenaries standing ready in Durban" (South Africa) had been uncovered and that a number of persons had been arrested and a curfew imposed.

The President said that he had for several months been aware of the plot which (he claimed) had been prepared by a group of businessmen who intended to make Seychelles into a large casino and arms trade centre in the Indian Ocean. It was later reported that 87 persons had been arrested, among them Mr Bernard Verlaque, editor of *Weekend Life* (the islands' principal independent newspaper, which had been closed down two weeks earlier), Mr Gérard Hoarau, the head of the immigration service, Mr Chanery Chetty, Minister of Finance prior to the 1977 coup which overthrew President James Mancham, and M. Jacques Chevalereau, a Frenchman entrusted with the training of the Seychelles harbour police.

Earlier, scenes of violence had taken place on Oct. 11-12, 1979, when several thousand students demonstrated in protest against government plans to introduce "compulsory" national service for young people above the age of 15 years. The President claimed that the students were trying to create "a counter-revolutionary situation" in order to overthrow the Government and he ordered all schools to be closed for a week; at the same time he gave an assurance that the proposed national service would be optional. On Oct. 15 over 6,000 people demonstrated in Victoria (Mahé), the islands' capital, to express their support for the President, and the People's Assembly subsequently passed a vote of confidence in him.

Leaflets were later distributed by a *Mouvement pour la résistance* calling for the resignation of the Government, the withdrawal of Tanzanian troops and the holding of elections under international control. (The 250-man contingent of Tanzanian troops, which had been present in Seychelles since 1977—see also 28485 A and 29059 A —was on Nov. 15, 1979, reinforced by some 100 Tanzanian soldiers and by another 200 shortly afterwards.)

In Paris it was announced on Dec. 17 that the French Government had recalled six French technical co-operation workers, had suspended its aid to Seychelles (said to be worth $7,000,000) and had called for the release of M. Chevalereau. At the same time 12 Frenchmen (out of the 30-member crew of the *Topaz*, Seychelles' only naval vessel), who had been ordered off the vessel for being "connected" with M. Chevalereau, were also recalled to France.

Also on Dec. 17 the Anglican Bishop French Chang-Him and the Roman Catholic Bishop Félix Paul were reported to have issued a joint pastoral letter, in which they expressed their concern at conditions in Seychelles. They stated that they were unable to verify how many persons had been detained as they had not been granted access to the prisoners, and they asked the authorities either to bring them to trial or to release them, adding: "We can approve neither injustice nor a situation in conflict with human rights."

A week later some 100 political prisoners were released but a number of others continued to be held, among them M. Chevalereau, while another five Frenchmen were deported. Subsequently, on Jan. 7, 1980, it was reported that 10 young people had been sentenced to prison terms ranging from one to four years in connexion with the protest demonstrations of October 1979 [see above]. (On Jan. 10 the curfew was reduced to the hours from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.)

On Jan. 28 it was reported that M. Chevalereau had been deported on the previous day after admitting that he had co-operated in preparing a coup against President René; it was added that M. Chevalereau's revelations would enable the police to continue their investigations, and that according to President René the plot had been initiated by ex-President Mancham and Mr Adnan Kashoggi, a Saudi Arabian millionaire (who had been a landowner in Seychelles but whose holdings had been the only ones to be sequestrated by President René's Government). M. Chevalereau, however, said on arrival in Paris on Jan. 18 that he had in no way participated in the alleged plot.

In regard to his country's foreign policy President René stated on several occasions that he would not allow Seychelles to become involved in great power rivalry.

At a Soviet diplomatic reception he was on Nov. 8, 1979, reported to have said that the great powers should not use "our doorstep" as a battleground and that the Indian Ocean states were "the only countries with a legitimate right to have a military presence in this part of the world". On Dec. 5 he announced that he would restrict visits to Seychelles by foreign navies and that he would accept military co-operation from third-world countries only. (Seychelles territorial waters had then been visited by a US and a Soviet warship in turn.)

Following visits to Libya and Algeria by Mr Jacques Hodoul, the Seychelles Foreign Minister, it was reported on Feb. 14, 1980, that Algeria and Guinea would send advisers to assist Seychelles with education.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Cape Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29796 A, 29612 B*)

B. VENEZUELA — Cabinet and Military Changes - Amnesty for Former Guerrillas - Release of Mr Niehous - Political Developments

In late 1979 Sr Luis Pastori was appointed Minister of State for Culture *vice* Sr Guillermo Yépez Boscán, who had held the post since March 1979 when President Herrera Campins took office [see 29603 A].

Earlier, President Herrera Campins in May 1979 named Gen. Angel Vicente Berrío Brito as the new C.-in-C. of the Army *vice* Gen. Arnaldo Castro Hurtado, who had asked to be relieved of his post. Gen. Castro Hurtado was known to be opposed to the new President's policy of granting amnesties to former left-wing guerrillas, which was also attacked by the Democratic Action (AD) party which lost power in the December 1978 elections [see 29538 A]. The pacification policy was, however, believed to have facilitated the release from captivity on June 30, 1979, of Mr William F. Niehous, a US industrialist kidnapped in February 1976 by the "Argimiro Gabaldón" commando [see 28284 A].

Mr Niehous was officially reported to have been rescued by police who stumbled across the hideout near Ciudad Bolivar, in the southeast (two guerrillas being shot dead), but it was subsequently alleged that the Government had negotiated a deal with the kidnappers and that the death of the two men had been due to over-zealousness on the part of the police. Gen. Castro Hurtado claimed in a television interview, moreover, that those truly responsible for the kidnap of Mr Niehous had been among a number of guerrilla leaders recently pardoned by the Government.

The guerrilla leaders in question, namely Sr Julio Escalona, Sr Marcos Gómez, Sr Fernando Soto Rojas and Sr Diego Salazar, had been granted a presidential pardon on May 18, 1979. Police investigations were also dropped in September 1979 against one of Venezuela's best-known guerrilla leaders, Sr Douglas Bravo [see 22118 A; 22501 A; 24506 A], who was not in custody.

At the time of the Niehous kidnapping two parliamentary deputies, Sr Salom Meza Espinoza (People's Electoral Movement) and Sr Fortunato Herrera (Democratic Republican Union), had been deprived of their parliamentary immunity and imprisoned on charges of complicity with the guerrillas [see 28284 A]. Sr Meza Espinoza and a member of the Socialist League, Sr David Nieves, were released on their election to Congress in December 1978, but Sr Herrera remained in prison. Sr Jorge Rodríguez, also of the Socialist League, who was arrested at the same time, had died in political police custody in 1976 [ibid.].

Sr Eduardo Fernández was in November 1979 elected secretary-general of the ruling Social Christian Party (COPEI) at its national convention *vice* Sr Pedro Pablo Aguilar. The victory of COPEI in the 1978 elections was consolidated in municipal elections held in June 1979 in which it won over 50 per cent of the 4,500,000 votes cast, compared with 29 per cent for AD and some 18 per cent for the combined left-wing parties.—(Guardian - Le Monde - Financial Times - Latin America Political Report - Bank of London and South America Review) (*Prev. rep. 29603 A, 29538 A*)

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A. UNITED NATIONS — 20th Biennial Conference of Food and Agriculture Organization - Third Annual Meeting of Governing Council of International Fund for Agricultural Development

The 20th biennial conference of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was held in Rome on Nov. 10-28, 1979, and was attended by some 1,500 delegates representing the organization's 146 member countries (this total having been reached with the admission of Dominica and Western Samoa on Nov. 12). Significant developments included the approval of the FAO regular budget by majority vote (with the United States and other major contributors abstaining), and a decision to close the FAO Near East regional office in Cairo "henceforth and until decided otherwise".

The conference was formally opened on Nov. 10, and voted unanimously to elect as its chairman Sr Jaime Lamo de Espinosa, the Spanish Minister of Agriculture.

Pope John Paul II, the first Pope to address a regular FAO conference (although Pope Paul VI had addressed a special FAO conference on the occasion of the organization's 25th anniversary in 1970), said in his speech on Nov. 12 that development should be directed towards the basic needs of all, and he added: "The time of illusions is past when it was thought the problems of underdevelopment and differences in growth among countries could automatically be solved by exporting the industrial models and ideologies of developed countries. The time is past when it was thought that the right of all people to food could be guaranteed by aid programmes made possible by the gift of surpluses or by emergency aid programmes in exceptional cases."

Mr Edouard Saouma, the FAO Director-General, reported to the conference on Nov. 13 that the world food situation was grim, a further deterioration having occurred in the two years since the 19th FAO conference. He called for approval of the five-point plan for world food security, launched in March 1979 [see 29937 A], and this plan was later endorsed by the conference. Mr Saouma also referred to the provisional results of an FAO study "Agriculture Towards 2000" which suggested that, even if agricultural production were to achieve the 4 per cent annual growth rate which the FAO regarded as feasible, there would still be 250,000,000 people malnourished at the end of the century. The study also indicated that annual cereal imports by developing countries would reach some 115,000,000 tonnes by the year 2000. In projections published in September the FAO had estimated that developing countries would need to increase their annual cereal imports from 72,000,000 tonnes in 1977-78 to 94,000,000 tonnes by 1985, and that over 36 per cent of this would be needed in "least developed" and "most seriously affected" countries (LDCs and MSAs—see 29051 B).

Mr Robert Bergland, the United States Secretary of Agriculture, addressing the conference on Nov. 13, called for agreement on a new and enlarged Food Aid Convention to replace the one still in effect under the 1971 International Wheat Agreement (IWA—see 25577 A). He offered an annual US contribution of 4,470,000 tonnes of grain under a proposed convention comprising 10,000,000 tonnes, and he urged that this should no longer be held up pending overall agreement to replace the IWA [see page 29892]. (A similar offer involving an annual contribution of 600,000 tonnes was made by Canada; the initiative was also supported by inter alia the Nordic countries, and was welcomed by Mr Saouma as a potentially important step towards improved world food security.)

Presenting proposals for the FAO regular budget for the 1980-81 biennium, Mr Saouma said on Nov. 14 that, taking account of inflation, a total of $278,000,000 would represent "a very modest increase" of under 2.6 per cent per annum in real terms compared with the 1978-79 budget. [For budgetary recommendations made by the FAO Council in June 1979, see 29937 A.]

The conference subsequently voted to approve Mr Saouma's proposals, with the abstention of the United States (which provided 25 per cent of assessed contributions to the FAO budget) and of Canada, West Germany, Japan, Mexico and the United Kingdom (which together provided over 30 per cent). It was reported in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of Nov. 21 that the so-called "Geneva Group", responsible for co-ordinating the policy of countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with regard to UN budgetary matters, had previously decided to seek to restrict real budget increases to a maximum of 2 per cent per annum.

FAO resources in the 1980-81 biennium would also include voluntary contributions from member states of some $178,000,000 and funds amounting to $335,000,000 from the UN Development Programme.

A Saudi Arabian proposal to relocate the FAO Near East regional bureau, currently in Cairo and boycotted by Arab governments opposed to Egypt's March 1979 peace agreement with Israel [see 29941 A], was modified to provide instead for the closure of the bureau "henceforth and until decided otherwise by the conference"; its functioning would meanwhile be reviewed [see 29937 A]. This modified resolution was then adopted unanimously; the outcome was described by the Egyptian delegation as a wise solution during a temporary and transitory phase, and by the US delegation as evidence of "a remarkable spirit of co-operation". (The Saudi Arabian proposal was made in accordance with a resolution passed at the Baghdad conference of Arab states held in late March 1979—see pages 29952-53. A proposal to relocate the African and Middle Eastern regional bureau of the World Health Organization had been rejected at the latter's annual Assembly in May—see 30252 A.)

Among other decisions, the conference approved in modified form (and subject to reservations entered by a number of developed countries) a resolution submitted by the Group of 77 developing countries criticizing protectionist trends in agricultural trade (this issue having been referred to the conference following failure to reach consensus at a meeting of the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems on Oct. 15-19). The conference approved a programme to assist developing countries in exploiting fishery resources within their exclusive economic zones [see page 29937], and endorsed a funding target of $35,000,000 over the next three years for this programme, as well as supporting a call for contributions to another new FAO special action programme against trypanosomiasis. It was also decided that Oct. 16 should be designated as World Food Day, with effect from 1981.

Third Annual Meeting of Governing Council of International Fund for Agricultural Development

The Governing Council of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) held its third annual meeting in Rome on Jan. 15-18, 1980, and approved proposals for commitments from the Fund during 1980, as well as discussing the question of eventual replenishment of the Fund's capital in 1981.

The agreed programme for 1980 covered 30 projects and a total of $400,000,000 in commitments from the fund; following commitments of some $120,000,000 in 1978 (the first year of operations—see 29937 A) and $375,000,000 in 1979, the initial capital of just over $1,000 million subscribed to IFAD [see 28883 A] would be in need of replenishment to cover continued operations in 1981 and beyond. Although not officially on the agenda for this meeting, the question of replenishment was reportedly discussed at length, with delegates endorsing the principle of replenishment but apparently disagreeing both over the overall volume of funding for 1981-83, and more particularly over the proportions of such funds to be contributed respectively by developed countries and by petroleum exporting countries (similar discussions on contributions to the Fund having preceded the inauguration of IFAD—see pages 28065-66 and also 28076 A; 28883 A).

The membership of IFAD was increased to 131 countries when the Governing Council approved the admission of China, Dominica, Grenada, Ivory Coast, Maldives and St Lucia. IFAD thus became the first international financial institution to include China as a member.—(International Herald Tribune - Times - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - FAO, Rome - UN Information Centre, London) (*Prev. rep. 29937 A*)

B. ANGOLA — Resignation of Defence Minister

It was reported on Feb. 10, 1980, that Cdr. Iko Teles Carreira had been relieved of his post as Minister of Defence in order to attend a two-year training course abroad and that President José Eduardo dos Santos (as C.-in-C. of the armed forces) would share control over defence matters with the Army Chief of Staff. Cdr. Carreira, who had been Defence Minister since Angola's independence in 1975 [see 27497 A], had also resigned from the political bureau of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Party of Labour (MPLA-PT) at the end of December 1979 in the course of a central committee meeting at which Col. Julião Mateus Paulo Dino Matroce was elected a full member of the committee and Cdr. Francisco Magalhães Paiva a candidate member.

In March 1980 Mr Manuel Pedro Pacavira (Minister of Agriculture) was appointed central committee secretary for political and ideological education, propaganda and information, Mr Lucio Lara (the MPLA-PT secretary-general) retaining overall control of political education.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - West Africa) (*Prev. rep. Government Changes 30027 A*)

A. ST KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA — Defeat of Labour Government in St Kitts-Nevis General Election - The Constitutional Question

General elections held in St Kitts-Nevis on Feb. 18, 1980, resulted in the defeat of the St Kitts Labour Party led by Mr Lee L. Moore, who had held the premiership since May 1979 [see 29728 B]. The Labour Party had been in power for nearly 30 years, having most recently been returned to office in the December 1975 elections [see 28267 A, where details are also given of the administrative separation of Anguilla from the UK Associated State of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla].

Of the nine elective seats in the House of Assembly (i.e. for the St Kitts and Nevis constituencies, the 10th seat provided for Anguilla under the Constitution having remained vacant since the latter island's unilateral declaration of independence in 1967—see 22262 A), four St Kitts seats were won by the St Kitts Labour Party and three by the People's Action Movement (PAM), while both Nevis seats were retained by the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP). The Labour Party won 58 per cent of the votes cast in St Kitts, as against 42 per cent for the PAM, while the NRP won 84 per cent of the votes cast in Nevis, as against 16 per cent for the Labour Party.

The Labour Party had held five seats in the outgoing House, having lost one of the seven seats which it had won at the 1975 general election to the PAM leader, Dr Kennedy Simmonds, at a by-election in January 1979, while a second seat had become vacant in May 1979 upon the death of the then Premier, Mr C. A. Paul Southwell [see 29728 B]. The Labour Party chairman and Minister of Legal Affairs, Education, Health and Social Affairs, Mr Fitzroy C. Bryant, who like Mr Moore was associated with the younger generation of Labour politicians which had come to prominence in the party since the death in 1978 of its founder, Mr Robert L. Bradshaw [see 29235 A], lost his seat in the 1980 election.

Following the announcement of the election results the leader of the NRP, Mr Simeon Daniel, reached agreement with Dr Simmonds on the formation of a coalition Government with the PAM, and Dr Simmonds was accordingly sworn in as the new Premier on Feb. 19 by the Governor, Sir Probyn Inniss. Ministerial responsibilities were allocated among all five MPs of the two parties as follows:

Dr Kennedy Simmonds (PAM) . .	Premier and Minister of Home and External Affairs, Trade, Development and Industries
Mr Simeon Daniel (NRP) . .	Finance and Nevis Affairs
Mr Michael O. Powell (PAM) . .	Agriculture, Lands, Housing, Labour and Tourism
Mr Ivor A. Stevens (NRP) . .	Communications, Works and Public Utilities
Mr Sydney Morris (PAM) . .	Education, Health and Social Affairs

The PAM's election manifesto had promised the abolition of income and consumption taxes and had accused the Labour Government of "drifting into socialism", and it was claimed by Mr Moore that "people of the middle class, those with property interests and people who are against the working classes voted against the Labour Party" in St Kitts. (Mr Moore had earlier alleged in October 1979 that the PAM was plotting to overthrow his Government with Anguillan aid, and that a "high official" of the party had visited New York to purchase arms.)

An important consequence of the Labour Party's defeat in the election was expected to be the politicization for the first time of industrial relations in St Kitts in view of the Labour Party's close links with the dominant St Kitts Trade and Labour Union.

The election result also called into question the constitutional future of the territory, in view both of the secessionist policies of the NRP and also of the PAM's view that full independence from the United Kingdom was desirable only on the basis of a stronger economic position and substantial development aid pledges from foreign donors. Prior to the election, it had been anticipated that a constitutional conference would be held in London in March 1980 with a view to the termination of associated status for St Kitts-Nevis in June 1980, with Anguilla attaining de jure status as a separate British dependency; however, because of the change of government in St Kitts-Nevis, this timetable effectively lapsed.

The original timetable was reported to have been agreed upon by the British Government and the then Labour Government of St Kitts-Nevis at talks held in London in mid-December 1979, at which Mr Moore was understood to have accepted a British proposal that an entrenched clause be included in the independence constitution providing for the holding, under Commonwealth Secretariat auspices and within 18 months of independence, of a referendum among Nevisians resident in St Kitts-Nevis to determine whether Nevis should attain separate independence.

In talks held some months previously between NRP representatives and the UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Nicholas Ridley, the latter was reported to have reiterated earlier British proposals for a federal form of independence constitution [see 29728 B] and to have rejected the NRP's demand that Nevis should attain separate status as a British dependency; he was also understood to have stated that the only alternative was separate status as an independent country, although if Nevis chose this course it could not expect to be granted British aid.

Although the NRP had subsequently decided to adopt a policy of seeking separate independence for Nevis rather than separate dependent status, the party had nevertheless rejected the constitutional provision for Nevis proposed at the December 1979 talks on the grounds that it could not be guaranteed that the Government of a fully independent St Kitts-Nevis would not seek to amend the constitution to avoid the holding of the proposed referendum. The following statement was issued by Mr Daniel at the conclusion of the talks: "The Nevis representatives deplore the decision of the British Minister in trying to impose a constitution on the people of Nevis against their expressed will; and for trading with St Kitts the fundamental rights of self-determination of the people of Nevis in exchange for the release of Anguilla to Britain by the St Kitts Government. We therefore will not be signatories to any constitution for the independence of St Kitts-Nevis."

The British Government was understood to have emphasized during the talks that Britain would in no circumstances intervene militarily in Nevis as it had done in Anguilla following the latter island's unilateral declaration of independence from the Government in St Kitts in 1967.—(Insight - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Guardian - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. 29728 B; 1975 Elections 28267 A*)

B. COOK ISLANDS — Trials arising from 1978 General Election Campaign - Economic Policy

Sir Albert Henry, the former Premier of the New Zealand associated state of the Cook Islands, who in December 1978 had been charged with misappropriation, fraud and bribery in connexion with the March 1978 Legislative Assembly elections after it had been found that he and eight other members of his Cook Islands Party (CIP) had been irregularly elected [see 29553 A], went on trial in mid-August 1979 before the High Court in Rarotonga (the principal island in the group). Other defendants charged with related offences included the US businessman Mr Finbar Kenny, delays concerning whose case had been a main cause of repeated adjournments of the proceedings.

The prosecution had originally sought Mr Kenny's extradition to the Cook Islands, but he had in June 1979 agreed to travel to Rarotonga voluntarily as part of a "plea-bargaining" agreement with the US Justice Department, which in the following month prosecuted his Kenny International Corporation for a criminal violation of the 1977 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [ibid.] in connexion with its involvement in the Cook Islands elections but which undertook not to prefer further charges under the plea-bargaining agreement. (As a result of the charge which was brought in the United States the corporation was fined US$50,000, and Mr Kenny undertook to make restitution to the Cook Islands Government of $NZ 337,000 which had been unlawfully obtained by Sir Albert Henry from the Cook Islands Philatelic and Numismatic Bureau principally to finance the chartering of aircraft to transport CIP voters from New Zealand to the Cook Islands.)

Sir Albert pleaded guilty to the charges against him, and was fined $NZ 200 (the maximum laid down) on each of two counts of conspiracy to defraud the Crown and $NZ 1,000 for a breach of the Public Monies Act, and was ordered to pay $NZ 2,000 costs.

Mr Justice Beattie said that it was only on account of Sir Albert's age (73), his state of health and his service to his country that he had not been sentenced to a term of imprisonment (the maximum term for conspiracy being five years). The judge added that Sir Albert had "tried to put himself above the law and had let down his people", and would therefore be placed on probation for three years, with the requirement that he should give a written assurance that he

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would not stand as a candidate for the Legislative Assembly or offer himself for any other political office in the Cook Islands during this period, since he had "forfeited the right to serve this country any further in any political fashion".

Of the other defendants, Mr Kenny was fined $NZ 200 for conspiracy and was ordered to pay costs totalling over $NZ 60,000, while Mr James Little, the director of the Cook Islands Philatelic and Numismatic Bureau and Mr Kenny's local agent, was fined $NZ 150 for conspiracy with $NZ 750 costs and was required to undertake not to involve himself further in local politics. Both men had pleaded guilty. Mr Geoffrey Henry (the Leader of the Opposition and cousin to Sir Albert) and Mr Charles Turner (the former Advocate General) were both acquitted of conspiracy, but the former was fined $NZ 500 for a breach of the Public Monies Act, while the latter was ordered to pay $NZ 300 costs upon his discharge without conviction for a similar offence. Charges under the Public Monies Act against Mr Apenera Short (a former Deputy Premier) were dismissed, and the court did not proceed with a charge of conspiracy against him.

Sir Albert Henry subsequently appealed against the terms of the probation order against him as "inappropriate, unreasonable and oppressive", his appeal being upheld in late October 1979 by three judges of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Auckland, sitting as the Court of Appeal for the Cook Islands.

Noting that there was no law in the Cook Islands making a criminal conviction a bar to political office, the court ruled that it was not the place of the High Court "to repair any supposed omission by the legislature by imposing a special condition as imposed here", adding that it was "entirely wrong for a court to impose what is a political penalty when the legislature itself has not done so".

The Democratic Party (DP) Government led by Dr Thomas Davis (which held 16 of the 22 seats in the Legislative Assembly following the holding of a by-election ordered in connexion with the irregularities in the 1978 general election) subsequently introduced an Electoral Amendment Bill in December 1979 seeking to disqualify as candidates for election to the Assembly (i) persons convicted of crimes against the state, murder and other serious offences, who would be disqualified for life, and (ii) persons convicted of crimes involving dishonesty and obstruction of justice, who would be disqualified for five years.

As regards Mr Kenny's connexion with the Cook Islands Philatelic and Numismatic Bureau, the Davis Government had announced after the August trials that it would re-examine the contracts under which the Bureau operated, which according to Dr Davis had been drawn up in a highly secret manner during Sir Albert Henry's premiership.

Economic Policy

After assuming office in July 1978, the DP Government successfully implemented policies designed to stimulate agricultural production and to reduce the recurrent budget deficit (which had been cut from about $NZ 3,000,000 to about $NZ 800,000 by August 1979). In an economic policy statement in late 1979, the Government said that a main aim of its strategy was to encourage private enterprise in commercial activities, including export trade, which had hitherto been reserved for public sector concerns under what was described as the "restrictive and ill-advised legislation as well as unrealistic policies" of the previous Government. In early 1980 restrictions were imposed on land purchases by non-residents following a number of speculative transactions which had caused local protests.

An economic zone of 200 nautical miles was proclaimed by the Cook Islands on Oct. 2, 1979, and the Government subsequently opened negotiations with fishing nations and companies "to ensure that the best possible advantage is made of the zone".—(Pacific Islands Monthly - New Zealand News UK - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. 29553 A*)

A. GABON — Presidential and Legislative Elections - Cabinet Reorganization

President Omar Bongo of Gabon was on Dec. 30, 1979, re-elected for a further seven-year term, after the Gabonese Democratic Party (GDP) had unanimously chosen him on Nov. 18 as the sole candidate for the presidential elections.

According to the official figures, President Bongo won 99.85 per cent of the votes cast; this total (over 700,000) noticeably exceeded the official number of registered voters, and it was explained that numerous non-registered voters had participated in polling, along with foreign nationals resident in Gabon for at least one year.

It was announced by Libreville radio on Feb. 12, 1980, that in legislative elections held earlier in the month the people "have voted massively in favour of the candidates proposed by the GDP". The announcement added that the National Assembly would comprise 93 members, of whom 84 were elected and nine nominated by President Bongo.

A cabinet reorganization was announced by Mr Léon Mébiame, the Prime Minister, on Feb. 28, 1980, as a result of which the Cabinet was composed with 28 members as follows:

* President Omar Bongo	Head of Government, Defence, Telecommunications, Civil Aviation
* Mr Léon Mébiame	Prime Minister, in charge of Control of State Corporations, Chairman of National Consultative Council
* Mr Georges Rawiri	First Vice-Prime Minister, Minister of Transport and Merchant Navy
†Gen. Raphaël Mamiaka	Minister of State in charge of Health and Population
* Mr Edouard-Alexis Mbouy-Boutzit	Minister of State in charge of Mines and Energy
* Mr Henri Minko	Minister of State for Registration, Titles, Preservation of Public Land, Housing, Urban Affairs, Surveys
* Mr René Radembino-Coniquet	Minister of State and Secretary-General to the Presidency
†Mr Jules Bourdes Ogouliguende	Minister of State for Public Health, Labour and Employment
†Mr François Owono-Nguema	Minister of State in charge of Culture and Arts, Youth, Sports and Leisure
†Mr Théodore Kwanou	Justice, Keeper of the Seals
* Mr Martin Bongo	Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation
* Mr Jean-François Ntoutoume	Personal Adviser to the President, in charge of Economic and Financial Co-ordination and Civil Aviation
Mr Julien Mpouho-Epigat	Minister-Delegate to the Presidency, in charge of National Defence and Veterans
Mr Zacharie Myboto	Minister-Delegate to the Presidency, in charge of Information, Posts and Telecommunications
Mr Jean-Pierre Lemboumba	Economy and Finance
†Mr Richard Nguema	Territorial Administration and Local Collectivities
†Mr Jean Boniface Assèle	Public Works and Construction, Commander-in-Chief of the National Police
Mr Pascal Nze	Planning, Development and Participation
* Mr Etienne Moussirou	Commerce and Industrial Development
†Mr Michel Anchouey	Agriculture
Mr Dominique Boungouere	National Education
†Mr Jacques Libizangomo Joumas	Higher Education, Scientific Research and Environment
* Mr Léon Auge	National Guidance, Specialized Organs of the Party, and Civil Service
†Dr Hervé Moutsinga	Tourism and Territorial Management
Mrs Antoinette Oliveira	Social Affairs and Feminine Promotion
Mr Joseph Amiar Nganga	Professional Training and Handicrafts
Mr Gaston Louis Mayila	Minister Secretary-General of the Government
†Mr Augustin Hervo-Akendengue	Minister-Delegate to the Prime Minister, in charge of Interministerial Co-ordination, Reform of State Corporations and Mixed Economy

* Held same (or similar) portfolio prior to reorganization.

† Held different portfolio prior to reorganization.

Eight secretaries of state were also appointed.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 28903 B, 28572 A, 28075 B*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. THAILAND — Resignation of Gen. Kriangsak Chamanan - Cabinet formed by Gen. Prem Tinsulanond - Guerrilla Activities

An economic crisis in Thailand, caused by accelerating inflation and an increasingly adverse balance of payments, led to two changes of government in the first three months of 1980. The Prime Minister, Gen. Kriangsak Chamanan (first appointed in November 1977—see 28861 A; 29818 B), formed a new Cabinet on Feb. 11, but resigned on Feb. 29 to avoid a parliamentary vote of no confidence and was succeeded by Gen. Prem Tinsulanond, the Defence Minister, who formed a Government on March 12.

The primary cause of the crisis was the cost of oil, which had accounted for only 4 per cent of Thailand's total imports by value before the increases in 1973 [see 26224 A; 26355 A], but rose to 23 per cent in 1977. Oil imports totalled $1,100 million in 1977, $1,500 million in 1979, and were expected to cost $2,500 million in 1980 [for 1979 oil price increases see 29981 A]. The annual inflation rate rose from 8.5 per cent at the beginning of 1978 to 14.9 per cent in 1979, and by February 1980 was over 20 per cent.

To counteract Thailand's growing trade deficit and declining foreign exchange reserves, Gen. Kriangsak's first Government freed the baht from its link with the US dollar on March 8, 1978, and pegged it to a weighted basket of currencies, including the dollar, the Japanese yen and the West German Deutsche Mark. [The baht had in July 1973 been revalued upwards to 20 baht = US $1.00 from the rate of 20.8 baht which had been in force since 1963—see 26049 B; 19692 C.] At the same time the Government raised tariffs on 141 import items, including luxury goods, such as passenger cars, air-conditioners and electric household appliances, and goods which could be produced locally, such as textiles, footwear and car parts.

The economic crisis came to a head in October 1979, when the Government doubled the price of electricity and water, which had been subsidized for many years, whereupon many firms raised their prices to cover the increase. After a protest campaign by the trade unions and students the Government rescinded the increases on Nov. 8, but the firms which had raised their prices did not reduce them.

Steeply rising prices, which were not accompanied by corresponding wage increases, led to a strike in January 1980 by workers in four state-owned cigarette factories and threats of sympathy strikes by other unions. Gen. Kriangsak cancelled a visit to West Germany on Jan. 23 an hour before he was due to leave, giving as his reason the tobacco workers' strike and the fact that "the situation in the country is not in good order".

Popular discontent further increased when fuel prices were raised on Feb. 10, for the third time in a year. The increases ranged from 25 per cent for premium-grade petrol to 57.7 per cent for paraffin, which led to allegations by the opposition that the Government was subsidizing the limousines of the rich at the expense of the poorest section of the community.

Gen. Kriangsak formed a new Government on Feb. 11 composed as follows:

†Gen. Kriangsak Chamanan	Prime Minister and Agriculture and Co-operatives
*Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya	Deputy Prime Ministers
*Gen. Sirm Na Nakorn	
†Gen. Lek Naeomali	
*Gen. Yos Thephatsadin Na Ayudthaya	Ministers attached to the Prime Minister's Office
*Mr Bunying Nandabhiwat	
*Gen. Porn Dhanabhumi	
†Mr Damri Noimanee	
*Gen. Prem Tinsulanond	Defence
Mr Sommai Hoontrakul	Finance
†Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Sawetsila	Foreign Affairs
*Mr Somporn Boonyakupta	Communications
*Mr Ob Vasuratana	Commerce
†Mr Pratuang Kiratibutr	Interior
Mr Rat Srikraivin	Justice
†Dr Boonsom Martin	Education
Dr Sem Pringpuangkaew	Public Health
†Air Chief Marshal Prasong Kunadilok	Industry
Mr Surin Sethmanit	Science, Technology and Energy
*Mr Kasem Suwannakul	Bureau of University Affairs

* No change. † Wholly or partly changed responsibilities.

There were also 18 deputy ministers. Gen. Lek Naeomali had previously been Minister of the Interior, Mr Damri Noimanee and Mr Pratuang Kiratibutr Deputy Ministers of the Interior, Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Sawetsila a Minister attached to the Prime Minister's Office, Dr Boonsom Martin Public Health Minister and Air Chief Marshal Prasong Kunadilok a Deputy Communications Minister. Mr Sommai Hoontrakul, who took over the Finance portfolio from Gen. Kriangsak, was a former Governor of the Bank of Thailand. Of the 38 members of the Government 14 (including five deputy ministers) were high-ranking members of the armed forces and only three were members of the House of Representatives—this being generally regarded as a reflection of Gen. Kriangsak's loss of parliamentary support.

The cabinet changes failed to appease the opposition parties, which demanded that Parliament should be recalled to debate a no-confidence motion. About 10,000 students took part in an anti-government demonstration on Feb. 19 at Thammasat University, in Bangkok—the first since the coup of Oct. 6, 1976 [see page 28103]—the police making no attempt to intervene. When the House of Representatives met in emergency session on Feb. 29 Gen. Kriangsak submitted his resignation, stating that he was doing so in order to avoid a conflict between the Government and Parliament. It was commented that this was the first occasion on which a military ruler had resigned in Thailand as a result of parliamentary pressure.

A closed session of Parliament on March 3 nominated Gen. Prem Tinsulanond as Prime Minister by 399 votes (200 from the Senate and 199 from the House of Representatives), against 80 for Mr Kukrit Pramoj (leader of the Social Action Party and Prime Minister in 1975-76), four for Gen. Kriangsak and two or one each for five other nominees. Gen. Prem was formally appointed Prime Minister by the King later the same day.

Gen. Prem Tinsulanond (59), a career officer, achieved considerable success against the communist guerrillas in the north-eastern provinces in 1974-77 through his policy of winning the support of the peasantry, and was generally respected in the Army because of his reputation as being opposed to corruption and his refusal to become involved in political intrigues. He was appointed a Deputy Minister of the Interior in Gen. Kriangsak's first Government in November 1977, Army C.-in-C. in September 1978 [see 29584 C] and Defence Minister in May 1979 [see 29818 B].

The membership of Gen. Prem's Government was announced on March 12 as follows:

†Gen. Prem Tinsulanond	Prime Minister and Defence
Maj.-Gen. Pramarn Adireksan	Deputy Prime Ministers
*Gen. Sirm Na Nakorn	
Dr Thanat Khoman	
Mr Boonchu Rojanasathien	
Mr Somsak Xuto	Ministers attached to Prime Minister's Office
Mr Meechai Ruechuphant	
Mr Bunyong Wattanapong	
Dr Amnuay Viravan	Finance
*Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Sawetsila	Foreign Affairs
Mr Banharn Silapa-Archa	Agriculture and Co-operatives
Adml. Amorn Sirikaya	Communications
Mr Tamchai Khamphato	Commerce
*Mr Pratuang Kiratibutr	Interior
Mr Chuan Leekphai	Justice
Dr Anuwat Wattanapongsiri	Science, Technology and Energy
Dr Sippanont Ketudat	Education
Mr Thongyod Chitthavira	Public Health
Maj.-Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan	Industry
*Mr Kasem Suwannakul	Bureau of University Affairs

* Held same post in previous Government. †Took new portfolio.

There were also 17 deputy ministers. The Government included 17 members of the House of Representatives, drawn from the Social Action, Thai Nation and Democratic parties, which together commanded a majority of the seats. Among the Deputy Prime Ministers the parties were represented by Maj.-Gen. Pramarn Adireksan, leader of the Thai Nation Party; by Dr Thanat Khoman, leader of the Democratic Party and a former Foreign Minister; and by Mr Boonchu Rojanasathien, who was deputy leader of the Social Action Party and president of the Bangkok Bank. The fourth Deputy Premier, Gen. Sirm Na Nakorn, had been Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces since 1978 [see 29584 C]. Maj.-Gen. Chatichai was secretary-general of the Thai Nation Party and was Foreign Minister in 1975-76 and Minister of Industry in 1976-77. Adml. Amorn was a former Deputy Minister of Defence [ibid.] and was hitherto a Deputy Minister of Communications. The two outgoing Deputy Ministers of

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Defence (Adml. Kawee Singha and Air Chief Marshal Paniang Kantarat, who had previously been appointed respectively C.-in-C. of the Navy and of the Air Force—ibid.), retained their ministerial posts.

Under an order signed on March 25, Gen. Prem Tinsulanond took personal responsibility for supervising the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, while certain ministries and other principal governmental bodies came under the supervision or authority of the four Deputy Prime Ministers as follows: Maj.-Gen. Pramarn Adireksan supervision of Communications Ministry and Civil Service Commission, and to act on behalf of the Prime Minister in the Office of the Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office, in the Cabinet Secretariat and in the Audit Bureau; Gen. Sirm Na Nakorn supervision of, inter alia, the Education Ministry and the Bureau of University Affairs, and full power to act on behalf of the Prime Minister in the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand; Dr Thanat Khoman supervision of the Ministries of Justice, of Science, Technology and Energy and of Public Health, and of certain other bodies; Mr Boonchu Rojanasathien supervision of the Ministries of Commerce and Industry and of the National Statistics Office, and full authority in the National Economic and Social Development Board.

Under a separate order the main responsibilities of the Ministers attached to the Prime Minister's Office were allocated as follows: Mr Somsak Xuto Public Relations Department, Department of Technical and Economic Co-operation, Tourist Authority, Bangkok Mass Transit Authority and Zoological Park Organization; Mr Meechai Ruechuphant Juridicial Council, Civil Service Commission, Anti-Corruption Committee; Mr Bunyong Wattanapong National Education Committee, Narcotics Control Board, National Youth Promotion and Co-ordination Board, National Statistics Office and Sports Promotion Organization. (Many of the responsibilities of these three ministers also came under the supervision of one or other of the four Deputy Prime Ministers.)

Guerrilla Activities

Heavy fighting between government troops and communist guerrillas took place in the summer of 1979 in Chiang Rai, the northernmost province of Thailand, where over 1,000 troops supported by artillery and aircraft launched an offensive on July 4. It was announced on Aug. 3 that they had captured a major guerrilla base, at least 100 guerrillas being killed or wounded in the offensive, against 20 soldiers killed and 103 wounded. On Aug. 25, however, 35 soldiers were killed in an attack on a hill occupied by the guerrillas.

The political leanings of the various guerrilla groups at this time were not clear, as the Thai Communist Party was known to have split into pro-Chinese and pro-Vietnamese factions, and its radio, the "Voice of the People of Thailand", had ceased to broadcast in July [see pages 29819-20]. The Vietnamese radio on Aug. 17 condemned the "Peking-armed terrorists" and "Maoist bandit groups led by Peking henchmen" operating in Thailand, but the Laotian Government's attitude was more equivocal. Although Vientiane radio referred to the guerrillas in Chiang Rai on Aug. 27 as "the Thai people's armed forces", the Governor of Nong Khai province (on the Laotian border) stated on Sept. 17 that a large number of guerrillas expelled from Laos had been captured, "thanks to the friendly relations between Thailand and Laos and their co-operation in exchanging information". The Thai radio reported on Nov. 7 that, according to students who had recently surrendered to the authorities after returning from Laos, a new Thai Communist Party had been set up in Laos under the leadership of Mr Thoetphum Chaidi and Mr Bunyen Wothong, but was already divided into pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese and non-aligned factions. Similar reports of the formation of a new Thai Communist Party in Laos had previously been denied by the Laotian ambassador in Bangkok on Oct. 8.

The Bangkok correspondent of *Le Monde* reported in the issue of Feb. 23, 1980, that the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Thailand had circulated a document among its members condemning the policies of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, which it had previously supported, and comparing them to "the ultra-leftist line of Lin Biao and the gang of four" (the Chinese extremist leaders overthrown in 1971 and 1976 respectively—see 25437 A; 28205 A). In particular, the document condemned the forced evacuation of the towns, the purges of supporters of the Lon Nol regime, the abolition of money, the internment of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the exclusion of intellectuals and non-Communist elements from the National Assembly, the regime's refusal to accept foreign aid, its failure to conduct propaganda abroad and the fact that in its relations with Vietnam it had "insisted on settling the problem by war"—an implication that in the war with Vietnam Kampuchea had been the aggressor.

Two grenades were fired into the courtyard of the US embassy in Bangkok on Nov. 30, 1979, causing only superficial damage. Although no one claimed responsibility for the incident, it was suspected to be the work of members of the Moslem minority. A member of a parliamentary fact-finding mission which had recently visited the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat (bordering Malaysia) stated on Dec. 4 that some Islamic governments were financing the Moslem secessionist guerrillas in those provinces.

The Supreme Command information office reported on March 2, 1980, that three incidents involving guerrillas had occurred during Feb. 21-24, and commented that "terrorism seems to have increased of late for various reasons, one of which is the co-ordination in the timing of activities between terrorists in rural and urban areas to coincide with economic and political difficulties taking place in the urban areas".—(Thai Information Service, London - Times - Financial Times - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29818 B*)

A. URUGUAY — Internal Political and Security Developments - Cabinet Change

Official preparations for the presidential and congressional elections scheduled for November 1981 [see 28577 A; 29146 A] included (i) the drafting of a new constitution which, it was envisaged, would be submitted to a national plebiscite in late 1980 and (ii) the publication by the electoral court in March 1979 of a political parties charter, which was submitted to the Council of State (the body set up in 1973 to take the place of the dissolved Congress—see 26286 A) for consideration. At the same time the Council was also scrutinizing a new law on trade union activity.

The political parties charter laid down guidelines for the establishment, organization, naming and funding of new political parties; established guarantees for the legitimacy of party leaders by requiring them to submit to periodic elections by their parties' registered members; and provided that accounts must be audited annually. Parties would not be permitted to maintain ties with any foreign state or organization or to have among their members people involved in any organization aiming to destroy, by violence or propaganda, the political structure of the country. In order to remain officially recognized the party would have to maintain a level of support equivalent to not less than 0.5 per cent of the number of valid votes in the previous general election.

All politicians who took part in the 1966 and 1971 general elections had been deprived of political rights for 15 years under a decree published by President Aparicio Méndez on Sept. 1, 1976—the day of his inauguration [see 28028 B].

The president of the supreme military court stated at the end of July 1979 that there were 1,655 political prisoners in Uruguay (although Amnesty International estimated the number at about 6,000); he added that since 1972 more than 4,000 people had been taken into custody but that 90 per cent of these had been tried [see also 29146 A].

The Inter-Parliamentary Council—the directing organ of the Inter-Parliamentary Union—at its 124th session held in Prague on April 16-21, 1979, adopted resolutions requesting information on two Uruguayan parliamentarians detained without trial since 1975 (Sr José Luis Massera Lerena and Sr Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky—see 29146 A); in addition, it urged that sentences of between eight and 12 years passed during 1978 on four other parliamentarians—Sr Jaime Gerschuni Pérez, Sr Alberto Altesor Gonzales [ibid.], Sr Gerardo Cuesta Villa and Sr Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala—should be examined by the supreme military tribunal and that those sentenced should enjoy the guarantees set out in the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ratified by Uruguay on April 1, 1970.

The internationally known Argentinian pianist, Sr Miguel Angel Estrella, was released from prison in Uruguay and expelled to France on Feb. 12, 1980, after being in custody since December 1977. Sr Estrella was sentenced in August 1979 to 4½ years' imprisonment for "subversive association" and attacking the Constitution, but won an appeal against his sentence.

The United States was reported in 1979 to have restored to Uruguay some of the military aid cut off in 1976 because of human rights violations [see 28217 A and also 28625 A], Uruguay being now authorized to purchase small military items on a case by case basis [see also 29146 A].

Dr Carlos Alberto Maeso Rodríguez was in early 1980 appointed Minister of Labour and Social Security *vice* Dr José Enrique Etcheverry Stirling, who had held the post since 1976 [see 28028 B].—(Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Bank of London and South America Review - Latin America Weekly Report - Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva) (*Prev. rep. 29562 B, 29146 A*)

A. UGANDA — Internal Political and Security Developments - Cabinet Changes - Partial Withdrawal of Tanzanian Forces - Foreign Aid - Other Developments

Following the appointment of Mr Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa as President of Uganda by the National Consultative Council (NCC) on June 20, 1979 [see 29837 A], Uganda's interim Government was during the succeeding months preoccupied with (i) internal security arrangements and (ii) establishing the extent of President Binaisa's authority, particularly with regard to cabinet changes announced by him in November 1979 and February 1980. Political factions within and outside the Government began moves in anticipation of the holding of general elections—which had been promised by June 1981 [ibid.] but which were, according to statements made by President Binaisa in March 1980, to be brought forward to late 1980. Meanwhile certain measures were undertaken with a view to reconstructing the country's economy, including in particular efforts to attract international emergency aid and development funds. The principal events during the period July 1979-March 1980 are described below.

Internal Security Developments, July-December

Addressing a meeting of the Uganda National Liberation Front (the UNLF, formed at the Moshi conference in March 1979 by exile groups aiming to overthrow the regime of the then President, Field Marshal Idi Amin Dada—see page 29671), President Binaisa said on Aug. 13, 1979, that in the interests of national unity no political party activity would be allowed in opposition to the UNLF.

Mr Binaisa added that the politics of the UNLF were sufficiently broad to allow all parties to operate within its framework, and that the Government would not hesitate to ban any political organization which threatened unity during a period of national reconstruction; he repeated his promise that democratic elections would be held within two years of liberation [see 29837 A], specifying that this meant "by June 3, 1981" [i.e. two years from the completion of the occupation of Uganda by anti-Amin forces]. His statement confirmed the announcement on May 8 by Prof. Daniel Wadada Nabudere, the then Minister of Justice, that the UNLF would for two years be the sole authorized political organization [ibid.]. A ban on all demonstrations had also been announced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on July 22.

President Binaisa referred in his Aug. 13 speech to the creation of numerous small political parties since the overthrow of the Amin regime; one such, reportedly formed by Ugandan "non-exiles" who had remained in the country under the Amin regime (as distinct from the "exiles" who founded the UNLF—see above), was known as the Uganda National Union (UNU) and was said to be seeking affiliation with the UNLF.

Reports that 30,000 pro-Amin troops were massed in southern Sudan, although categorically denied by the Sudanese embassy in Nairobi (Kenya), were reasserted by President Binaisa in a speech on Aug. 9 (on his return from the Lusaka conference of Commonwealth heads of government—see 29901 B); he appealed furthermore to Commonwealth leaders to send troop contingents to defend Uganda (although this appeal was not followed up). Mr Binaisa added that while Uganda was at peace with its other neighbours, he doubted whether it was at peace with Sudan. (For subsequent restoration of normal relations with Sudan, see below.)

An earlier proposal for a Commonwealth force for Uganda had reportedly been made in late July by supporters of the former President, Prof. Yusuf Lule (who had been dismissed by the NCC on June 20 in a move the legitimacy of which he continued to dispute—see 29837 A).

This proposal, the objective of which was to secure the removal of Tanzanian troops from Uganda [see 29837 A and also below], was part of the programme of an intended new pro-Lule party, to be called the Uganda Democratic Union (in connexion with which Mr Robert Sebunya, a former Deputy Minister of Information under the Lule regime, was briefly detained during August). Prof. Lule was on July 18 described as a public enemy by Mr Paulo Muwanga, then Minister of Internal Affairs; Mr Muwanga (whose name was given as Mr Paul Mwanga in 29837 A and previous articles) alleged that Prof. Lule was working to overthrow the Government, in collusion with pro-Amin troops.

Dr Lukatome Andrew Kayiira and Mr Paul Semogerere, both members of the NCC and former cabinet members, were reported (in *The Daily Telegraph* of Sept. 10) to be taking legal action to challenge the legitimacy of Prof. Lule's dismissal. (Dr Kayiira had left Uganda in August and gone into exile in Kenya—see below.) It was later reported (in *Le Monde* of Nov. 15) that pamphlets had been distributed in Kampala announcing the formation of a clandestine pro-Lule Uganda Democratic Movement, which aimed inter alia to re-establish Uganda's original 1962 independence Constitution [see 19033 A].

Groups of pro-Amin soldiers were allegedly responsible for a number of violent incidents in northern Uganda, while several arrests of former Amin officials were also made.

Among those killed was an Italian missionary, whose death on Sept. 18 was stated by the missionary order concerned to be the seventh such killing in recent months. A total of 20 people were reported to have died in another incident on Oct. 2, and reports of widespread raids in the Karamoja and Sebei districts (in the east) began to emerge in early December [see also below].

Mr Muwanga announced on Aug. 16 that 238 people imprisoned during the liberation struggle would be released within two weeks, but a number of people were subsequently arrested, including, on Sept. 13, two men said to be former Amin supporters who were charged with the murder of two Swedish journalists in April. On Oct. 2 it was announced that 450 people had been arrested following the discovery of lists of former Amin agents, and on Oct. 12 it was reported that Mr Ali Towili (who had been director of police training until his dismissal and arrest by President Amin in May 1978—see 29306 A) had been captured near the border with Zaïre. Maj. Robert Astles, a British-born resident of Uganda who was said to have been a special adviser to President Amin and who had been extradited from Kenya to face charges in Kampala [see 29837 A], was on several occasions between June and October remanded in custody on six charges of theft and shopbreaking; although these minor charges were eventually dropped, Maj. Astles continued to be held in connexion with charges of murder and armed robbery. Meanwhile the NCC was reportedly considering the creation of special "human rights courts" to try former officials of the Amin regime, but a debate on this issue was postponed by the NCC on Jan. 31, 1980.

A growing campaign of violence, notably in Kampala, was reported in July-September, with a dusk-to-dawn curfew being imposed in the capital on Sept. 1 and special measures being taken to protect foreign diplomats, in response to the killings of prominent foreigners and Ugandan citizens by groups of armed men in uniform.

According to a report in *The Guardian* on Nov. 24, the violence was eventually brought under control by the arrest in late September of 23 men disguised as soldiers, and the closure of a European company (allegedly linked to pro-Lule groups) which had provided these men with funds. It had earlier been reported that killings were frequently blamed on Tanzanian soldiers, whereas officials maintained that the violence was politically motivated with the aim of discrediting the Government. (The Ugandan Government also criticized sections of the press, as well as certain Western diplomats, for exaggerating the problem, although on Sept. 20 the Ugandan police authorities stated that over 100 people had been killed in Kampala over the previous three months.)

Among those killed were, in incidents on Aug. 27, two doctors and a British chemistry professor, Dr Woitek Popiel, who was working at Makerere University in connexion with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As a result of this incident, and others involving diplomats in Kampala, the UNDP withdrew part of its staff from Uganda to Nairobi, while diplomatic personnel met on Aug. 29 to seek additional security measures. Mr Yoweri Museveni, the then Minister of Defence and also Acting President (during Mr Binaisa's absence at the Havana summit meeting of heads of state or government of the non-aligned countries—see 30037 A) announced on Sept. 1 the imposition of a curfew throughout the district of Kampala, the intensification of military and police patrols and the assignment of special security guards to all diplomats. The violence nevertheless reportedly continued during September; Mr Enoch Olinga, the head of the Baha'i sect in Uganda, was murdered together with his wife and three children on Sept. 16, while on Sept. 19 some 2,000 people fled from a Kampala suburb where there had been a number of killings including (on Sept. 17) that of Mr James Sewara Matoru (a nephew of the former King or Kabaka of Buganda, who had been overthrown in 1966—see 21429 A).

As part of the campaign of political violence, according to Mr Museveni's statement of Sept. 1, an unsuccessful attempt had been made to blow up the Nile Mansions Hotel (where members of the Government lived). Two prominent journalists, Mr Simon Mwebe and Mr Luke Kazinja, were arrested in early August and detained until Nov. 28 in connexion with this attempt, in which Mr Museveni alleged that "frustrated members of the NCC" were also implicated. It was reported on Aug. 29 that Dr Kayiira had fled to Kenya and that his four children had been taken away by Tanzanian soldiers in an attempt to make his wife reveal his whereabouts; Mr Muwanga acknowledged on Aug. 30 that Dr Kayiira's children had been "taken into care", and he added that they had been abandoned by their

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father when he fled from the security forces, but the children were subsequently released on Sept. 17.

Mr Walusimbi Mpanga, the former Mayor of Kampala, and Mr Sam Njuba, the chairman of the Uganda Law Society, were arrested without charge for security reasons, on Aug. 28 and Sept. 12 respectively, under the controversial Public Order and Security Act. (This Act had been introduced in 1967 under the regime of the then President Milton Obote, and had allegedly provoked the resignation "for health reasons" of Mr Binaisa in June 1967 from his post as Attorney General—see 22133 A; 23239 B.) Both men were released on Oct. 17, after the detentions had provoked widespread criticism, and on Oct. 21 President Binaisa said that the NCC was to consider new security laws to replace the Public Order and Security Act (which provided inter alia for detainees to be held for up to five years without trial).

In another development, it was reported on Nov. 7 that the Government had lifted the bans imposed by the Amin regime in September 1977 on some 27 religious groups, most of them Protestant Christian organizations [see 28798 B].

In a speech on Oct. 6 at the inauguration of the enlarged NCC [see below], President Binaisa stated that measures were to begin to train Ugandan security personnel to take over eventual responsibility from Tanzanian forces; 5,000 people would be recruited for police training, and selected vigilantes would form the nucleus for a proposed new people's militia on which the future Ugandan army would be based [see also below].

In an earlier announcement (on Sept. 8) President Binaisa had made it clear that the 20,000 Tanzanian troops would remain in the country until effective Ugandan replacements were trained, while on Oct. 1 Mr Muwanga announced the arrival of 500 Tanzanian police and the impending arrival of a further 500. Agreements signed by Mr Muwanga in Dar-es-Salaam on Dec. 12 provided for the Tanzanian defence forces and police to remain in Uganda for up to two years and to undertake the training of Ugandan forces, it being emphasized that this agreement did not constitute a defence treaty between the two countries and that it had no threatening implications for third parties. The Ugandan budget (which was debated by the NCC on Dec. 5) included payments equivalent to $110,000,000 to Tanzania for the provision of security personnel, as well as an amount equivalent to $65,000,000 for Ugandan defence spending, most of which was to meet the maintenance costs of Tanzanian army and police units in Uganda.

Expansion of NCC - New Currency Issue - Cabinet Changes - Other Internal Political Developments, October 1979 to February 1980

The NCC was expanded to 127 members as a result of elections held by newly-created district councils on Oct. 3; the expanded NCC was then inaugurated by President Binaisa on Oct. 6 and began regular open sessions on Oct. 10.

Members of 33 district councils had been nominated by the UNLF in September, and these councils selected 61 new NCC members (from among 728 candidates short-listed by the existing NCC from an original total of 1,288). Additional NCC members were also appointed by Mr Museveni from the Uganda National Liberation Army. The expansion, designed to increase the representation of "non-exiles" on the NCC, was nevertheless criticized by Mr Lamech Ntambi, the secretary-general of the UNU, who alleged that the elections were packed with former members of the Uganda People's Congress (the UPC, the party of former President Obote, who had himself remained in exile in Tanzania since his overthrow by Gen. Amin in 1971—see 29669 A; 24450 A).

Security arrangements for the NCC were strengthened on Nov. 15, after the session had been adjourned the previous day following reports that eight members had been threatened with assassination.

Mr Jack Sentongo, the Minister of Finance, announced on Oct. 19 that new currency notes would be introduced the following day, and that the old 1973-issue notes (bearing the portrait of Field Marshal Amin) would be withdrawn over the period Oct. 20-28.

A cash limit of 5,000 shillings (about £300) was placed on the issue of new notes to each individual or company; where amounts exceeding this limit were presented in old currency for exchange, the balance would be placed on account and would be subject to existing weekly withdrawal limits. It was reported, however, that such restrictions were widely circumvented, while the currency changes were also accompanied by outbreaks of violence.

Uganda's borders were sealed during the nine-day currency exchange operation and anyone entering the country was subject to thorough search. Announcing this precaution, and also a temporary ban on all public rallies, Mr Sentongo explained that the Government was anxious to prevent the return to Uganda of large sums of money which he said had been taken abroad by fleeing pro-Amin forces.

President Binaisa unexpectedly announced a government reshuffle on Nov. 19, apparently without the prior approval of the NCC; the changes notably included the assumption of the Defence portfolio by Mr Binaisa himself, while Mr Museveni (whom Western press reports described as the most prominent young left-wing member of the Government—see also page 29672) was transferred from Defence to Regional Co-operation. The NCC, after reportedly contesting the President's right to make such decisions unilaterally, finally agreed to a formula allowing him to initiate cabinet changes; a modified list of changes was then approved by the NCC and announced by President Binaisa on Dec. 22.

According to the agreed procedure, which emerged on Nov. 23 after a closed three-day session of the NCC, President Binaisa recognized his error in making his original announcement without prior NCC approval; in future the President would have the right to make government changes but such changes should be submitted to a specially-created standing committee of the NCC for approval before being made public.

The cabinet list published on Dec. 22 included the following appointments (with previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

President Binaisa (Foreign Affairs) . .	Defence
Lt.-Col. William Omaria	Deputy Minister of Defence (with cabinet membership)
Mr Otema Alimadi	Foreign Affairs
Mr Museveni (Defence)	Regional Co-operation
Mr Ephraim Kamuntu	Commerce
Prof. Yoweri Kyesimira (Industry) . .	Transport
Mr Okui Omoding	Industry

Mr Alimadi had been Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Lule regime [see page 29672]; from June 25 onwards, although not listed as a member of the Cabinet, he had continued to hold this post, but overall responsibility for foreign affairs had been assumed by President Binaisa [see also page 29839]. Mr Ateker Ejalu, the former Minister of Regional Co-operation, was named as ambassador to Japan. Mr P. Kaboha, the former Minister of Commerce, was on Nov. 19 named as Minister of Rehabilitation and Rural Development, but he was omitted from the cabinet list published on Dec. 22 (as was Mr Wilson Okwenje, who as Minister for the Civil Service and Cabinet Affairs had been listed as a cabinet member on July 25 —see page 29839). President Binaisa had in addition proposed on Nov. 19 the creation of a Ministry for Presidential Affairs, to which he had named Dr Barnabus Kununka, with Mr Haji Badru Wegulo taking over as Minister of Labour; however (according to *The Times* of Dec. 23) this change was vetoed by the NCC and Dr Kununka accordingly remained as Minister of Labour. Lt.-Col. Omaria was on March 14, 1980, promoted to the rank of full colonel.

A second government crisis developed in February 1980, following President Binaisa's decision on Feb. 10 to dismiss Mr Muwanga from the Cabinet and to appoint him as ambassador in Geneva. The NCC met in closed session on Feb. 14-15, with reports suggesting that members of the Government were seeking President Binaisa's resignation, but the crisis was apparently resolved following an intervention by President Nyerere of Tanzania, and Mr Muwanga was reinstated in the Cabinet on Feb. 25 as Minister of Labour (certain other changes being made at the same time—see below).

Mr Muwanga, who had been a prominent member of the UNLF since its inception in March 1979 [see page 29671], and who was reputedly part of the pro-Obote faction within the Government, was reported (in *Le Monde* of Jan. 18, 1980) to have been strongly criticized by an 11-member Ugandan Government committee which had been set up the previous November to assess the operations of the Army, police and prisons. The committee's report allegedly gave details of a private pro-Obote militia force of some 12,000 men in northern Uganda, most of whom were members of the Acholi and Lango tribes; this militia was said to be loyal to Col. (later promoted to Brig.) David Oyite-Ojok, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and Col. (later promoted to Maj.-Gen.) Tito Okello, the commander of the Uganda National Liberation Army [see page 29672], while a rival force in western Uganda was said to be loyal to Mr Museveni. The report was said to emphasize the need for integration of all such private militia forces into a national army, but *Le Monde* asserted that President Nyerere had urged that its publication be withheld to avoid precipitating a confrontation between rival factions within the Ugandan Government (this advice having allegedly been given to President Binaisa during a visit to Tanzania on Jan. 15).

The dismissal of Mr Muwanga also followed a renewed increase in outbreaks of violence and armed robbery during January, and further raids by pro-Amin troops in the north. The Ugandan newspaper *The Citizen* reported thousands of deaths, and it was alleged that Ugandan and Tanzanian soldiers were implicated in a number of incidents, notably including the arrest of 400 men by Tanzanian troops in a village near Kampala, after three Tanzanian soldiers and three villagers had been killed there on Jan. 20. This incident was reportedly the subject of a cabinet meeting called by President Binaisa on Jan. 22, while coverage of the issue by the *Uganda Times* (the official daily newspaper) was thought to be responsible for the arrest of the paper's editor, Mr Ben Bella Ilakut, under an order signed by Mr Muwanga on Jan. 23. Three independent newspapers, the *Citizen*, the *Economy* and *Ngabo* (the Shield) were closed on Feb. 7-8, but they were reopened, and Mr Ilakut was released, when President Binaisa announced the dismissal of Mr Muwanga on Feb. 10.

Mr Muwanga claimed (according to *The Daily Telegraph* of Feb. 17) that his dismissal had been precipitated by his attempt to arrest Mr Thomas Matthew, a British-born Swiss resident employed in the Ugandan National Security Services within the President's Office, whom he claimed to have identified as a former member of the State Research Bureau (the security police under the Amin regime—see 28928 A).

Whereas President Binaisa apparently averted any attempt to force his resignation at a meeting of the NCC Executive Committee on Feb. 15, *The Times* reported on Feb. 22 that Mr Benjamin Mkapa, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, had visited Uganda to convey a message from President Nyerere urging reconciliation between opposing Ugandan Government factions; in a subsequent statement broadcast by Uganda radio on Feb. 25, President Binaisa "accepted a decision by the NCC to reappoint Mr Muwanga in the Cabinet as Minister of Labour". Dr Kununka took over as Minister of Internal Affairs, and at the same time Mr Fred Sempebwa was appointed as Minister of State in the Office of the President (this post having been created the preceding November but left unfilled at that time).

Reports continued to emerge of violent incidents both in Kampala (where Father Wilfred Letine, a Canadian priest of the White Fathers order, was among the victims when he was shot by armed robbers on Feb. 18) and in the Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda. Armed Karamojong tribesmen were conducting large-scale cattle-raiding attacks on neighbouring tribes, according to Uganda radio, which reported on March 10 that at least 54 people had been killed and that thousands more had fled. (For reports of famine in Karamoja region, see below.)

Partial Withdrawal of Tanzanian Forces - Political Developments in Anticipation of Elections

Reports of the impending withdrawal of part of the Tanzanian troop contingent in Uganda were confirmed on March 11 by President Nyerere, who stated that 10,000 troops would be withdrawn over the next few weeks. (Tanzanian radio reported on April 2 that the first contingents of these troops had arrived home, and that Lt.-Gen. Abdallah Twalipo, the Commander of the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces, had confirmed that in all half of the 20,000 Tanzanian troops were being withdrawn by April 6 after successfully training the Ugandan troops who would replace them.)

President Nyerere's statement, made in Vienna during a visit to Austria, followed discussions in Dar-es-Salaam on March 5-6 between him and President Binaisa (and also involving leading NCC members, notably Mr Edward Rugumayo, the Chairman of the NCC). President Nyerere (who was reportedly considering the withdrawal of the remaining 10,000 Tanzanian troops from Uganda by September) said that Uganda did not face a security problem "in the sense of a possible invasion from neighbouring countries", but reports in the Western press alleged that he complained to President Binaisa at the prevalence of tribalism, factionalism and corruption within the latter's Government. In addition, hostility among Ugandans to Tanzanian troops had led to clashes on several occasions; thus on Feb. 21, Dr Kununka announced that the body had been found of a Tanzanian soldier who had apparently been stoned to death, and several serious incidents were reported later in March [see below].

President Binaisa flew to Nairobi on March 10 for a meeting with President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, marking an improvement in the hitherto strained relations between their respective Governments.

President Binaisa said that the meeting had been concerned with bilateral problems, notably border smuggling and the development of freight connexions between Uganda and the Kenyan port of Mombasa; he denied reports that there had been discussion of a possible Commonwealth peace-keeping force to replace the Tanzanian troops in Uganda (pending the creation of adequate Ugandan security forces, only 5,500 men having reportedly received training so far under arrangements with the Tanzanian forces).

A meeting had earlier been held (on Oct. 29, 1979) between Dr Alimadi and his Kenyan counterpart, Dr Munyua Waiyaki, at which Dr Alimadi had announced Uganda's intention of establishing a diplomatic mission in Nairobi at the level of full high commissioner; Dr Waiyaki for his part had emphasized the importance of direct communication between the Foreign Ministers of Kenya and Uganda on major issues so as to minimize misunderstandings. (The expulsion of several thousand Ugandans from Kenya in July because of alleged involvement in violent crime—see page 29838—had given rise to an official Ugandan protest over their treatment on July 28, and to the withdrawal of Uganda's liaison officer based in Nairobi. Whereas this dispute had apparently been resolved at a meeting between Presidents Binaisa and Moi on Aug. 8-9, the border measures associated with Uganda's currency changes in October—see above—reportedly gave rise to concern in Kenya that the temporary restrictions might become a permanent obstacle to trade across the Ugandan border, and the Kenyan Government on Oct. 20 announced its own temporary measures to close the Ugandan border until the position had been clarified. The Kenyan Government announced subsequent measures, including partial closure of the border once again on Dec. 18, intended to control widespread smuggling connected with the extensive black market in Uganda.)

Members of the NCC reportedly objected to President Binaisa's unexpected visit to Kenya on March 10, which had allegedly been arranged without their knowledge. In another development, President Binaisa invited Dr Kayiira (who had fled from Uganda to Kenya in August—see above) to return from exile.

Amid speculation that President Binaisa's Government might advance the date of general elections in Uganda (due to be held by June 1981—see 29837 A and also above), Dr Obote announced on March 12 that he would return to Uganda to begin campaigning as soon as a polling date was announced, and that he expected his Uganda People's Congress (UPC) party to win a majority in the elections.

Dr Obote, speaking in Dar-es-Salaam, said that he had remained outside Uganda to allow the new leaders time to reconcile themselves, but that "they had forgotten about reconciliation and nothing is being done about reconstruction".

President Binaisa said at a press conference in Kampala on March 19 that his Government might bring forward the date of elections, but that the decision lay with the NCC; he also referred for the first time to the possibility that Uganda might invite the Commonwealth or the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to send a peace-keeping force to Uganda as Tanzanian troops were withdrawn.

Having previously indicated that former Presidents Lule and Obote could return to contest elections, President Binaisa said that he saw no reason why his Government should not face the electorate before the June 1981 deadline, and perhaps before the end of 1980. He emphasized, however, that the UNLF was Uganda's sole political organization; while no properly qualified candidates would be excluded from participation in the elections within the UNLF framework, he said that there was no question of going back to what he called the old divisive political groups. Repeating these points in a speech to UNLF delegates on March 25 to mark the first anniversary of the creation of the UNLF, he stressed that "all the political parties are gone and gone forever", and he also warned Ugandan military leaders that the country would not tolerate another military dictatorship after overthrowing the Amin regime. (According to a report in *The Times* of March 24, the UNLF executive committee had proposed that elections be held in December 1980, but many members of the NCC were expected to oppose a one-party UNLF framework and to insist that individual parties be allowed to organize and contest the elections separately.)

Further clashes involving Tanzanian troops occurred in March; President Binaisa reportedly promised a judicial commission to investigate an incident at Kibule, near Kampala (where Tanzanian soldiers allegedly killed five civilians and burned houses in reprisals on March 17 after the death of one of their colleagues and five Ugandan civilians in shooting the previous day), but on March 18 Dr Picho Owiny, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, announced that the press was prohibited from publishing criticism of the presence of Tanzanian troops in Uganda (with the press being debarred at the same time from questioning the legality of the Government). In other incidents Mr William Lubwama, the owner of the independent pro-Lule newspaper *Ngabo*, was shot dead on March 15 and his companion Mr Gaster Nsubuga (described as a prominent pro-Lule politician) was wounded; Mr Nsubuga was murdered in hospital while undergoing treatment for these injuries. On March 21 at least 30 Ugandans were reported to have been shot dead in Katunguru, a village in the south-east, near the Zaïrean border, in a reprisal attack following the killing of a Tanzanian soldier accused by the villagers of raping a local woman. On March 25, six Ugandans were reportedly killed by troops at the village of Banda near Kampala, where a Tanzanian soldier had been killed in a motor accident.

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Meanwhile it was announced on March 19 that 1,100 Ugandan prisoners of war formerly held in Tanzania (including 700 former Amin soldiers and 400 civilians) had been transferred to custody in Uganda.

Economic Measures - Development and Emergency Aid

Ugandan Government planning for economic reconstruction included agreements under which foreign-owned businesses expropriated by the Amin regime were enabled to resume operations in Uganda [see below], while appeals were also made to aid donors both for development assistance and for immediate relief supplies of food and other essential items to combat the threat of famine in north-eastern Uganda.

An economic policy statement, reportedly approved in September 1979 by the NCC after several months of debate, emphasized encouragement of private enterprise and international investment (including provisions for the repatriation of profits by foreign businesses, and "appropriate measures" to restore land to those expropriated under the Amin regime) within a mixed economy, with the Government retaining majority control of vital sectors (including power, water supply, air travel, telecommunications, banking, insurance, cement production, mining, textiles, breweries, tourism and the marketing of major products such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco). Efforts would be made to persuade skilled Ugandans in exile to return home, and also to develop the tourist industry (although a five-year ban on game hunting had been announced on Aug. 22 by Mr James Obua-Otuwa, the Minister of Tourism and Wildlife).

The policy statement had been preceded by a speech on July 12 by Mr Sentongo (the Minister of Finance), in which he proposed inter alia the establishment of a compensation commission, to negotiate claims arising from the Amin regime's expulsion of Asians in 1972 [see 25469 A; 25597 A] and takeover of their businesses, as well as those owned by UK and other foreign interests, in 1972-73 [see 25773 A; 26062 A]. The establishment of this compensation commission was announced in March 1980 to handle claims estimated to total over £200,000,000. Meanwhile, an agreement had been announced on Nov. 11 whereby the Ugandan Government and the British trading group Mitchell Cotts would own 51 and 49 per cent respectively of a new company created to run some 6,000 acres of tea estates in Uganda (these estates, formerly owned by Mitchell Cotts, having been nationalized in 1972). The company's outstanding compensation claim was left unresolved, a similar formula being agreed in March 1980 whereby the Asian Madhvani and Mehta families would return to participate in management of sugar, tea, steel and other enterprises formerly owned by them.

Mr Sentongo had also announced on July 12 an immediate moratorium until 1980-81 on repayments of Uganda's foreign debt, which stood at £165,000,000 with service payments already some £30,000,000 in arrears. He indicated that Uganda's foreign currency reserves were at that time £272,000,000 in deficit, while provisional balance-of-payments figures showed a £43,000,000 deficit and external commitments of over £57,000,000 were due but not yet discharged. A Commonwealth team of economic experts led by Prof. Dudley Seers [see 29837 A] reported in July that Uganda would need some $300,000,000 in direct untied balance-of-payments assistance in the coming six-month period, during which time export earnings (primarily from coffee) were expected to cover only one-third of the country's overall import requirements of some $900,000,000 for essential supplies, spare parts and consumer goods. A further third might be financed from sources such as export credits and International Monetary Fund (IMF) drawings, including purchases under the Fund's compensatory finance facility to cover shortfalls in the preceding year's export earnings attributable largely to a temporary fall in coffee prices. The report also highlighted the problem of the predominance of the *magendo* or black market throughout the Ugandan economy (which made it impossible to obtain an accurate measure of production, distribution, imports and exports).

Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Commonwealth report, aid donors at a conference convened in Kampala at the end of August reportedly restricted their pledges in the main to aid tied to specific development projects, a total of some $135,000,000 being promised at this time. President Binaisa, in a speech in London on Aug. 31 (when en route to Havana for the non-aligned conference), appealed urgently for increased untied cash aid; in response to reports that donors were reluctant to make commitments in view of instability in Uganda, he asserted that the extent of lawlessness in Kampala and other towns [see above] had been greatly exaggerated. (Mr Muwanga on Sept. 6 strongly criticized Mr Richard Posnett, the British high commissioner in Uganda, who he said had discouraged aid donors and induced expatriates to leave Kampala by overemphasizing the violence there, a criticism which was repudiated by Mr Posnett.)

Following the visit of an IMF mission to Kampala in late August, a standby arrangement was approved on Jan. 7, 1980, authorizing Ugandan purchases up to the equivalent of 12,500,000 special drawing rights (SDRs) during 1980 (about US$16,000,000), and further purchases equivalent to SDR 25,000,000 under the compensatory financing facility because of Ugandan export shortfalls in the 12 months to September 1979, attributable largely to a temporary fall in the price of coffee, Uganda's leading export product. (An earlier purchase equivalent to SDR 5,000,000 had been approved by the IMF on Aug. 24, 1979, because of export shortfalls in the 12 months to March 1979.)

Announcing the standby arrangement and compensatory financing on Jan. 7, the IMF stated that during the period 1970-78 the cumulative overall balance-of-payments deficit had amounted to SDR 106,000,000, while in 1979 "non-economic developments" had severely disrupted production, transportation and exports; real gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated as a result to have fallen by 8 per cent in the past year and the annual rate of inflation to have accelerated to 60 per cent from an average rate of 50 per cent during the preceding five years. The Government's stabilization programme in support of which the standby arrangement was approved aimed inter alia at achieving an increase in real GDP of 7 per cent in 1980, at halving the inflation rate and at raising gross official reserves while further reducing external payments arrears; these objectives would be sought by renewing export growth and reviving productive capacities, as well as by reducing domestic financial imbalances.

At a meeting of a consultative group on aid to Uganda, convened in Paris on Nov. 7-8, 1979, under the chairmanship of the World Bank and attended by representatives of nine countries and eight international aid bodies, Mr Sentongo appealed for an "immense" effort to meet Uganda's aid needs, adding that a sum of $1,000 million over the coming year should be regarded as a minimum target.

In Resolution 34/122 adopted without a vote on Dec. 14, 1979, the United Nations General Assembly, expressing deep concern at the "tragic loss of life, widespread destruction of property and severe damage to the economic and social infrastructure of Uganda during the past eight years" and recognizing that Uganda was not only landlocked but also one of the least developed (LDC) and most severely affected (MSA) countries, urgently appealed to all member states, organizations and specialized agencies of the UN system and international economic and financial institutions to contribute generously through bilateral or multilateral channels to the reconstruction, rehabilitation and development needs of Uganda. The General Assembly also, inter alia, invited various organizations within the UN framework to bring to the attention of their governing bodies for their consideration the special needs of Uganda and to report the decisions of these bodies to the UN Secretary-General by Aug. 15, 1980.

The French Foreign Ministry announced on Nov. 12 that France would provide $30,000,000 in aid for Uganda, for urgent needs and for development projects including railway reconstruction. (It was later reported by Uganda radio on Nov. 25 that President Binaisa had held co-operation talks with Chinese Government representatives and had asked for Chinese assistance in building a 200-mile railway link between Mityana—west of Kampala—and Kabale in south-western Uganda.) The offer of a further £4,000,000 in British grant aid to Uganda was announced on Nov. 8 (following the visit to Uganda on Sept. 14-16 by Mr Neil Marten, UK Minister for Overseas Development), in addition to £2,000,000 already granted in April [see page 29838] and May. Following the completion in September of United States congressional action to lift restrictions on non-military aid to Uganda [ibid.], Mr Andrew Young, the former US permanent representative at the United Nations, who was on a trade mission to African countries, made an unscheduled visit to Uganda on Sept. 19 and promised $6,000,000 in aid; it was subsequently announced (on Feb. 2, 1980) that the USA was (subject to congressional approval) to allocate $20,000,000 for aid to Uganda in the 1980 fiscal year. Meanwhile, a Ugandan delegation led by Mr Ejalu, the then Minister for Regional Co-operation, had visited the Soviet Union for talks in late July 1979, and on Nov. 9 President Binaisa had announced in Kampala that his Government was inviting large-scale Cuban involvement in agricultural development, particularly in the sugar sector.

Following reports of a famine threatening north-eastern Uganda, particularly in the Karamoja region, a meeting was held in Kampala on Feb. 27 to co-ordinate the responses of UN and other aid agencies involved in relief and agricultural development work in Uganda.

The affected areas, suffering dislocation after the recent hostilities and lacking essential inputs such as seeds, machinery and basic cultivating tools, had in addition experienced a prolonged drought; President Binaisa estimated on March 4 that 20,000 people could die unless increased emergency aid was forthcoming, and he added that

Uganda urgently needed 300,000 tonnes of maize and also edible oils, salt, sugar, blankets, clothing, soap and medicines. (It had earlier been reported that an agreement on the diversion of 70,000 tonnes of US grain from Kenya to Uganda had broken down in February after some 8,500 tonnes had reached northern Uganda.)

In an earlier incident the UN World Food Programme, which had on July 4 and Aug. 22, 1979, approved grants of food aid worth a total of $4,500,000 to war-damaged areas of Uganda, suspended its aid on Sept. 7 until Tanzanian troops agreed to release lorries carrying supplies through Uganda to southern Sudan. The Tanzanian troops, who had arrested the Kenyan lorry drivers in mid-August on the grounds of alleged arms smuggling, agreed to release them and their lorries on Sept. 13, in accordance with a Ugandan Government decision two days earlier.

Exile of Former President Amin - Uganda's Relations with Libya and Sudan

Whereas on Dec. 9 Mr Muwanga (then Minister of Internal Affairs) stated on his return from a visit to Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia that Field Marshal Amin was "under virtual house arrest" near Tripoli, the Libyan leader, Col. Moamer al Kadhafi, said in an interview published by the French newspaper *Le Figaro* on Dec. 22 that Field Marshal Amin had left Libya. Mr Muwanga further stated on Jan. 10 that Field Marshal Amin had gone to Saudi Arabia, although the Saudi Government denied this, while on Feb. 16 President Binaisa said that Field Marshal Amin had left Libya after an incident between his bodyguards and Libyan troops; he added that the Ugandan forces should hunt down the former dictator and bring him to justice.

An improvement in Ugandan-Libyan relations was marked by a visit to Libya by Mr Muwanga in late November (following a Libyan goodwill mission to Uganda earlier in the month).

The Tanzanian Government announced on Nov. 28 that the last 47 Libyan troops captured in Uganda [see 29837 A] had been released (the others having reportedly been released in June); the Libyan Government subsequently allowed the return to Uganda of 52 nurses to whom exit visas had previously been refused, and also agreed to discuss the return of a Boeing 707 aircraft used by Field Marshal Amin on his flight from Uganda earlier in the year. Uganda radio announced on March 5, 1980, that the Libyan embassy in Kampala had been reopened by a chargé d'affaires who was shortly to be superseded by the appointment of an ambassador.

During a visit to the Sudan in December, designed to help restore normal relations, Mr Alimadi announced on Dec. 27 that Uganda had withdrawn all troops stationed along the Sudanese border.

Mr Alimadi stated that Ugandan refugees, some 50,000 of whom were thought to be in southern Sudan despite the return of several thousands in preceding months, were free to go back to Uganda. Discussions were also opened on the return of several hundred vehicles which had been driven into the Sudan by Field Marshal Amin's defeated army.

While in the Sudan, Mr Alimadi indicated that Uganda would shortly reopen its embassy in Khartoum.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - International Herald Tribune - Economist - Observer - IMF, Washington - FAO, Rome - World Bank European Office, Paris - UN Department of Public Information, New York - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29837 A*)

A. JAPAN — Military Espionage Scandal involving Soviet Union - Replacement of Director-General of Defence Agency

Mr Masayoshi Ohira, the Japanese Prime Minister, announced on Feb. 3, 1980, that Mr Kichizo Hosoda, a member of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), was to become Director-General of the Defence Agency in succession to Mr Enji Kubota, who had resigned this post on Feb. 2.

Mr Kubota, who had been appointed on Nov. 8, 1979 [see 30061 A], had accepted the political responsibility for a major espionage affair involving a retired intelligence officer and former major-general of the Ground Self-Defence Force (i.e. army) who had been arrested on suspicion of espionage for the Soviet Union.

Maj.-Gen. Yukihisa Miyanaga was arrested on Jan. 18 together with First Lt. Eiichi Kashii and Warrant Officer Tsunetoshi Oshima (a serving intelligence officer). All three confessed on their arrest to having supplied the Soviet embassy in Tokyo with information concerning inter alia the strengths of Japanese troops in northern Japan. The Metropolitan Police Department said, however, on Jan. 19 that some of the information passed on had been compiled by the United States intelligence services and related to Chinese and North Korean troop strengths. Radio equipment and a diary containing number codes were found in Mr Miyanaga's house.

Col. Yuri Kozlov, the military attaché at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo whom Mr Miyanaga had named as his principal contact, left the country on Jan. 18 shortly after the arrest of the three men, refusing on the grounds of diplomatic immunity a request made by Japanese police for his interrogation.

The Japanese Government issued on Jan. 19 a statement expressing "deep regret" at the affair, and on Feb. 8 lodged an official complaint with the Soviet embassy. Mr Kubota on Jan. 22 publicly accepted the political blame for the incident.

The Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defence Force, Gen. Shigeto Nagano, resigned on Jan. 28, being replaced by Gen. Toshimichi Suzuki, and 10 other members of the armed forces were also disciplined.

Mr Kashii and Mr Oshima were dismissed from their military posts after their indictment on Feb. 8, together with Mr Miyanaga, on 12 charges of passing on to an unnamed foreign power nominally secret information. More serious charges were not preferred despite the confessions made by the three men.

Maj.-Gen. Miyanaga was on April 14 sentenced to the maximum one-year term of imprisonment laid down by the Japanese Self-Defence laws for the abuse of official secrets, while Mr Kashii and Mr Oshima were each imprisoned for eight months. Strong opposition pressure to amend the Self-Defence laws had been resisted by Mr Ohira in a speech given to the Diet on Feb. 9.

Mr Hosoda (67) belonged like Mr Kubota to the LDP faction led by Mr Takeo Fukuda, the former Prime Minister [see also 30061 A], and had at different times been chairman of the LDP finance committee, director of the LDP accounts bureau and chairman of the House of Representatives steering committee.—(Japan Times - New York Times - Guardian - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet, Political Parties 30061 A; Armed Forces 29475 A; Defection of Soviet Pilot to Japan 27599 A; 28166 B*)

B. UNITED KINGDOM — Abolition of Metrication Board

In accordance with a decision announced on Nov. 14, 1979, the Metrication Board was abolished effective April 30, 1980.

The Board had been set up in 1969 [see 23457 B], but although in 1972 the end of 1975 had been fixed as a "reasonable aim" for the completion of most of the changeover to metric measurement [see 25332 C], it was announced in May 1978 by the then Labour Government that the move to metrication should now effectively take place on a voluntary basis without recourse to orders which imposed statutory cut-off dates for the use of imperial units at point of retail sale [see 29118 A].

The announcement that the Metrication Board would come to an end was made by Mrs Sally Oppenheim, Minister of State for Consumer Affairs, in a written parliamentary reply on Nov. 14, when she stated that the Secretary of State for Trade (Mr John Nott) and she had been reviewing the functions of a number of public bodies for which they had responsibility (i.e. in the context of the general review by the Government of "quangos", or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations—see also page 30153).

Metrication, she said, had now been extensively adopted in manufacturing industry and also in retail trade, where most prepackaged goods sold in prescribed quantities were now sold in metric sizes; there was thus now "very limited scope" for the Board's activities, which could easily be fulfilled by the Departments of Trade and of Industry. In a few months' time, after the final statutory orders made by the previous Government prescribing metric sizes for tea and suet had taken effect, there would be few, if any, cases where public information was necessary. The Government had no plans for further compulsory orders, and it was "in everybody's interest that as industry continues to go metric it should proceed to expedite in an orderly way, on a voluntary basis, a programme for any future metrication".

Current appointments to the Metrication Board expired on April 30, 1980, Mrs Oppenheim explained, and in present circumstances she did not intend to renew these or to make new appointments, so that the effect would be that the Board would then come to an end.—(Hansard - Trade and Industry - Metrication Board) (*Prev. rep. 29118 A*)

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A. CHILE — Cabinet Reorganization - Relations with United States, Britain and France - Cancellation of Presidential Tour of Far East - Trade Union and Internal Security Developments

A cabinet reorganization was carried out on Dec. 14, 1979, in which five new ministers were appointed. A full cabinet list is given below, incorporating a subsequent change at the Foreign Ministry carried out when Sr Hernán Cubillos Sallato resigned on March 26, 1980 [see below].

Sr Sergio Fernández Fernández	Interior
Gen. César Raúl Manuel Benavides Escobar	Defence
* Sr José Luis Federici	Economy
†Sr René Rojas Galdames	Foreign Affairs
†Sr Alfredo Prieto	Education
†Gen. René Peri Farstrong	Lands and Settlements
†Gen. Alejandro Medina Lois	Public Health
Sr Sergio de Castro Spikula	Finance
†Gen. Caupolicán Boisset Mujica	Transport and Communications
Sr José Piñera Echenique	Labour
Gen. Jaime Estrada Leigh	Housing and Urbanization
Capt. Roberto Quiñones	Mines and Energy
Sr Alfonso Márquez de la Plata	Agriculture
Sr Hugo León Puelma	Public Works
Srta Mónica Madariaga Gutiérrez	Justice
Sr Miguel Kast	Director of Odeplán
†Gen. Sergio Badiola Brodberg	Secretary-General to Cabinet
* Gen. Julio Fernández Atienza	Head of President's Consultative Committee

* Changed portfolio. † New minister.

Following the Government's announcement in January 1979 of trade union reforms, including the limited right to strike, which were to take effect from mid-1979 [see 29601 A], the Government in early July issued a number of decrees regulating labour activity in the framework of these reforms.

The decrees inter alia (i) revoked a special statute protecting the job security of copper miners; (ii) made trade union affiliation and the payment of dues voluntary; (iii) allowed collective bargaining but restricted negotiation to individual factories or work units (thereby undermining the peasant unions, which had been organized on the basis of contracts covering farm workers by provincial district); (iv) stipulated that a strike could be called only if approved by secret ballot and only after mandatory arbitration; and (v) limited strikes to a maximum period of 60 days, the employer having the authority to declare a lock-out and take on replacement labour after 30 days. Strikes were prohibited in any sector connected with national security, public services, the "normal supply of the market" or the "public interest".

Withdrawal and Subsequent Return of US Ambassador in Connexion with Letelier Case

The US ambassador to Chile, Mr George Landau, was recalled from Santiago for consultations on Oct. 8, 1979 (for the third time in just over a year), after the Chilean Supreme Court issued a final rejection of a US demand for the extradition of three former Chilean secret police officers who were wanted in connexion with the murder in Washington in 1976 of the former Chilean ambassador to the USA and cabinet minister under President Allende, Sr Orlando Letelier, and his colleague, Mrs Ronni Moffitt [see 28273 A]. However, Mr Landau returned to Chile on Dec. 5 in spite of a US announcement at the end of November that it intended to apply diplomatic, military and economic sanctions against Chile.

Mr Landau had been recalled from Santiago from June 23 to July 2, 1978, because of "lack of co-operation" on the part of the Chilean authorities [see page 29267], and was again recalled on May 31, 1979, after the President of the Chilean Supreme Court, Sr Israel Bórquez, on May 14 rejected the US extradition request on the grounds of insufficient evidence; Sr Bórquez pointed out that the chief witness, Mr Michael Vernon Townley Welch, had had his own sentence reduced in return for giving evidence [see page 29602 and below]—testimony under inducement being invalid under Chilean law. Mr Landau returned to Chile on June 8, but the Chilean ambassador was recalled from Washington on June 14.

Hearing an appeal against the May 14 ruling, five Supreme Court judges on Oct. 1 ruled unanimously that there was no reasonable presumptive evidence of the participation of the three officers in the murders. This decision being final, the three officers were immediately released from house arrest. However, the US State Department spokesman, Mr Hodding Carter, said on Oct. 2 that the USA was "gravely concerned" that three "terrorists" had been freed from custody.

Following the renewed withdrawal of Mr Landau on Oct. 8, the US Administration at the end of November announced a reduction of the size of the US embassy and military staffs in Santiago, currently numbering over 80; the blocking of any future financing or guarantees for loans to and projects in Chile by the Export-Import (Exim) Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the halting of all military deliveries and economic aid to Chile. The Administration also stated its intention to "examine critically" any Chilean applications for loans from international financial institutions.

It was noted in the press that these sanctions were largely symbolic in that (i) the last Exim Bank loan had been made to Chile in 1974 and the last OPIC loan in 1970; (ii) that, as US military sales to Chile had been banned in 1976 [see page 27646], only the delivery of equipment ordered prior to this, consisting mainly of spare parts for ships and aircraft, would be subject to the new embargo; and (iii) that economic aid in the current year amounted to only $3,800,000 in food and agricultural projects (US economic aid to Chile having been limited in 1977 and subsequently completely rejected by Chile —see pages 28486 and 28275).

In response the Foreign Minister, Sr Cubillos, issued a declaration on Nov. 30 condemning the US measures as "a return to the old methods of US imperialism in Latin America" and as "aggressive and bullying behaviour". He also rejected a US charge that Chile had "effectively condoned terrorism", maintaining that Chile had "fought terrorism efficiently on all fronts".

A sentence of up to 10 years was confirmed on Mr Townley by a Washington court on May 11, 1979, for planting the bomb which killed Sr Letelier and Mrs Moffitt; as agreed in court in August 1978, parole would be considered after 3½ years because he had given evidence for the prosecution [see page 29602]. Two Cuban exiles had been sentenced to life imprisonment in March 1979 for complicity in the murders [ibid.].

Return of UK Ambassador to Santiago - Chilean Efforts to reduce International Isolation - Replacement of Foreign Minister

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office announced on Jan. 16, 1980, that relations with Chile were to be restored at ambassadorial level. The British ambassador had been withdrawn in December 1975 by the then Labour Government after a British woman, Dr Sheila Cassidy, was arrested and tortured by the Chilean authorities before being expelled [see page 27645]; the departing Chilean ambassador in London was not replaced in 1977.

Mr Nicolas Ridley, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said on Jan. 16 that Britain's best interests were no longer served by the absence of ambassadors, and that the appointment of ambassadors would allow the Government to make its views known at the highest level; that Dr Cassidy's case was not closed; that he had received assurances from the Chilean Government that they "sincerely regretted" the treatment of Dr Cassidy and had continued to conduct exhaustive investigations into the affair; and that investigations were also continuing into the disappearance following the 1973 coup of Mr William Beausire, an Anglo-Chilean with a UK passport. Mr Ridley noted that the posting of an ambassador in any country did not indicate support for or approval of that regime and that Britain had voted in favour of a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1979 condemning human rights abuses in Chile [see page 30225]. He added that the existing ban on UK arms sales to Chile would remain.

The Conservative Government was heavily criticized by the Labour opposition in the House of Commons on Jan. 17 for its decision to restore full relations with Chile, and further controversy arose when Mr Ridley was quoted as having made a remark casting doubt on Dr Cassidy's version of events during a recent meeting with members of the Chile Solidarity Campaign. Mr Peter Shore, the opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman, on Feb. 8 called for a reconsideration of the decision to send an ambassador and for a personal apology to be sent to Dr Cassidy from Lord Carrington (the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary). However, Mr Ridley made it clear on Feb. 12 that "neither the Government nor I personally doubt in any way the truth of Dr Cassidy's account of events in 1975". Although Britain had not been able to persuade Chile to accept the validity of the case in view of the lack of independent proof, "the Chileans know we are not happy, and we do not regard the case as closed".

The new ambassador, Mr John Heath, presented his credentials to President Pinochet on March 6. Sr Miguel Schwitzer, the Chilean Justice Minister at the time of the Cassidy case, was appointed ambassador to Britain.

In January 1980 the British Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) released details of the first two major credit lines to Chile since 1972 (when there had been defaults under the Allende Government). The decision to restore full ECGD cover to Chile had been taken in 1979.

Following a "private" visit to London in September 1979 Sr Cubillos (the Chilean Foreign Minister) went on to France, Spain, Switzerland and West Germany on a diplomatic mission designed to reduce Chile's international isolation and improve trade contacts with Europe. Sr Cubillos's visit to France (on Sept. 11-13) coincided with the sixth anniversary of the Chilean coup and provoked protests from exile groups and from the French left-wing opposition. Protests were also registered during his stay in Britain, Spain and West Germany.

In France Sr Cubillos had talks with the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Ministers, respectively M. Jean François-Poncet and M. Jean-François Deniau. A communiqué issued by the French Foreign Ministry on Sept. 13 said that M. François-Poncet had "drawn the attention" of Sr Cubillos to the question of missing persons in Chile, had insisted on the right of refugees to return to Chile (France having accepted more than 6,000 since the 1973 coup) and had recalled the importance which France attached to respect for human rights.

A Chilean radio report on Sept. 27, 1979, confirmed that Chile was purchasing 16 French Mirage jet aircraft, which were subsequently reported to be Mirage-50s (i.e. Mirage-IIIs equipped with Atar-9 K-50 engines). A number of Chilean pilots arrived in France in October for training on Mirage-50s.

President Pinochet and a large delegation including Sr Cubillos left Chile on March 22, 1980, for an 11-day tour of Fiji and the Philippines, a stopover in Hong Kong during the return journey also being planned. However, the tour was cancelled on the following day after President Marcos of the Philippines made it known at the last minute that he could not receive the Chilean President (who encountered hostile demonstrations in Fiji) because he had "urgent business" outside Manila.

Immediately on returning home on March 24 President Pinochet announced the recall of the Chilean ambassador to the Philippines, the decision by President Marcos being described as "an insult unprecedented in international diplomatic history". On the following day the President asked for the resignation of Sr Cubillos and replaced him on March 29, as stated above, by Sr René Rojas Galdames, hitherto ambassador to Spain.

The Philippine Government said on March 25 that the visit had been called off because "foreign terrorists" had entered the country to kill President Pinochet and Philippine leaders, and that eight people had been arrested on March 23 (the eve of his arrival), four others being sought. Furthermore, on March 28 President Marcos sent a special envoy to Chile to convey his personal apologies to President Pinochet. As a result, the latter announced on April 2 that he had decided to consider the "unfortunate incident" closed.

News of the cancellation of the Philippine visit reached Gen. Pinochet on the Chilean territory of Easter Island (in the south-eastern Pacific), where the presidential aircraft had made a preliminary stopover before travelling on to Fiji on the first stage of the tour. In Fiji itself, employees at Nadi international airport at first refused to service or refuel the presidential aircraft, and demonstrators shouted hostile slogans at the Chilean party.

During March protests had been registered in the Philippines at the forthcoming visit by a number of prominent figures including the trade union leader, Mr Bonifacio Tupaz, who said in a letter to President Marcos on March 11 that the Philippines would be condemned in all international forums if Gen. Pinochet was allowed to enter the country.

Internal Security Developments

The Chilean Government continued to take measures against its opponents in 1979-80, while church and human rights organizations pressed for investigations into the fate of over 600 missing persons whose cases they had fully documented [see 29601 A].

In February 1980 new laws entered into force granting the Interior Minister powers to banish government opponents into internal exile for up to three months or to place "disruptive" elements under house arrest. This had previously been the prerogative of the head of state and had been applicable only under a state of siege [see 29029 A]. Sr Fernández said that the intention was to eliminate the need for other more severe measures such as expulsion.

As the result of demonstrations in Santiago on May 1, 1979, about 365 people were arrested, many of them students, and 12 referred to military courts, the remainder being released in the course of the month. About 100 theological students at the Catholic University of Chile staged a one-day fast on May 17 in protest at the detentions and were ordered by the military rector, Adml. Jorge Swett, to be suspended or expelled. (At the end of April 1979 student delegate elections at the University of Chile had resulted in only 28.65 per cent of the vote being cast for pro-government candidates, compared with 59.20 per cent for opposition candidates and 12.15 per cent for independents.)

In November 1979 the Church drew the attention of the Government to the existence of over 600 unmarked graves in the main cemetery in Santiago—a civil judge being appointed to investigate—and also presented the Government with evidence concerning the discovery of 14 bodies in the Maipo river (near Santiago) in 1976, claiming that the secret police had had a training centre nearby. A civil judge was also appointed to investigate the discovery of about 20 skeletons in unmarked graves in Yumbel (near Concepción) in southern Chile in October 1979.

A previous inquiry by a civil judge into the murders of at least 15 people whose skeletons were found in an abandoned lime kiln at Lonquen, north of Santiago, in December 1978 [see page 29602] had led to the arrest of eight national policemen in July 1979 on charges of murdering the victims after the 1973 coup. However, the eight men were released by a military tribunal in October 1979 under the terms of an amnesty.

The state of emergency continued in force in Chile, having been regularly extended (most recently on March 8, 1980, for a further six-month period) since the state of siege was lifted and replaced by the state of emergency in March 1978 [see 29029 A]. (Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - International Herald Tribune - Latin America Weekly Report - Bank of London and South America Review - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29601 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Changes in Immigration Rules

Changes in immigration rules were introduced effective March 1, 1980, which inter alia ended the automatic right of entry of husbands or fiancés of women settled in the UK, placed further restrictions on the entry of parents, grandparents and children over the age of 18, and ended the practice of allowing permanent settlement for those who came to the UK for a temporary stay. The changes had been promised in the Conservative Party's general election manifesto [see page 29636] and in the Queen's Speech of May 15, 1979, opening the new Parliament [see 29705 A].

White Paper on Proposed Changes

The detailed proposals had been published in a White Paper (Cmnd. 7750) on Nov. 14, 1979, as follows:

Husbands and Fiancés. The White Paper said that the husband of a woman who was settled in the UK would be admitted if he held a current entry clearance granted to him for that purpose. However, an entry clearance would be refused if the entry clearance officer had reason to believe that the marriage was one entered into primarily to obtain admission to the UK; or that one of the parties no longer had any intention of living permanently with the other as his or her spouse; or that the parties to the marriage had not met. Where the officer had no reason to believe that any of these circumstances applied, an entry clearance might be issued provided that the wife was a citizen of the UK and Colonies born in the UK. A passenger holding an entry clearance under such conditions should be admitted for an initial period of up to 12 months.

An entry clearance would be refused on similar grounds as for husbands to a man seeking to enter the UK for marriage to a woman settled there and who intended himself to settle therafter. In addition, an entry clearance should not be issued unless the officer was satisfied that adequate maintenance and accommodation would be available for the fiancé until the date of his marriage without the need to have recourse to public funds. A man holding an entry clearance should be admitted for three months and advised to apply to the Home Office once the marriage had taken place for an extension of stay. A prohibition on employment should be imposed.

Under the existing rules, dating from August 1974 [see page 29636], husbands were issued with entry clearances on proof of marriage, while fiancés were admitted initially for three months and given resident status after marriage.

Entry of Parents, Grandparents and Children over 18. Parents and grandparents aged 65 or over would, in addition to the existing requirements, have to prove that they were without relatives in their own country to whom they could turn and that they had a standard

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of living substantially below that of their own country. Those under 65, except widows, would not qualify for entry save in the most exceptional circumstances, and certain other close relatives would be in a similar position. Children aged 18 or over would qualify for settlement only where the circumstances were of the most strongly compassionate nature, although special consideration would be given to daughters aged under 21 who formed part of the family unit overseas and had no other relatives to whom they could turn.

Visitors and Students. People admitted for temporary purposes, such as visits or studies, would not be eligible to remain for another temporary purpose if that carried with it the prospect of eventual settlement. It would therefore no longer be possible for someone who had entered as a visitor or student to remain for work or business or as a person of independent means. There would be time limits of one year and four years respectively on the total periods for which a person might be admitted or granted extensions of stay as a visitor or as a student for a succession of short courses.

Mr William Whitelaw, the Home Secretary, told the House of Commons on Nov. 14, 1979, that it was not his intention to keep out the husband or fiancé of a woman who had been born in the UK and whose marriage was not contracted for immigration purposes. The object of the new rules was to prevent the exploitation of marriage as an instrument of primary immigration. He had not overlooked the fact that some girls would have been born abroad because their parents happened to be out of the country, for example in crown service or business, at the time of their birth. It was his intention to consider such cases sympathetically for favourable treatment outside the rules.

Parliamentary Debates on White Paper

The House of Commons approved the White Paper on Dec. 4, 1979, by 294 votes to 252, having rejected by 296 votes to 251 an opposition amendment declining approval on the grounds that the White Paper violated the "principle that the rights of all British citizens legally settled here are equal before the law whatever their race, colour or creed".

Mr Whitelaw, moving approval of the White Paper, said that since the 1974 change in the immigration rules, marriages had been contracted with the primary aim of enabling men to come to Britain and settle. The 1973 figure for husbands from the new Commonwealth and Pakistan accepted for settlement on arrival was only about 200, but in 1974 it was 2,200; in 1975 about 5,000 and in 1976 more than 6,300. Thereafter the flow had been affected for a time by changes in the immigration rules giving less priority to applications from husbands and wives. However, in the 12 months to mid-1979 the figure had been 5,600 and the Government knew from the number of applications in the pipeline that the pressure to come by this route was as keen as ever. The question was of men being able to use a provision in immigration control which enabled them to settle on marriage but to come in no other way. That loophole had to be stopped, and the Government had a clear mandate to do so. That meant inevitably that the right of some women settled in the UK to be joined by husbands and fiancés would be removed. That was the price they had to pay to stop marriage being used as a means to settle in Britain.

Mr Whitelaw continued: "I have already made it clear that it is not part of my intention to affect the position of a girl who was born abroad because her parents happened to be out of the country at the time. I made it quite plain in my statement [of Nov. 14—see above] that we would treat her as though she was born here. I have always made it plain that both she, and our citizens born here, would be able to be joined by their husbands and fiancés for marriages that were not contracted for immigration purposes. Nevertheless, the argument has been put to me that the rules should confer not a discretion but a right on women born here to be joined by their husbands. It has also been suggested that women who happen to have been born abroad because their parents were out of the country at the time should have their right to be joined by their husbands written into the rules and not left to the exercise of discretion outside the rules.

"I have considered these arguments carefully and they seem to have great force. I am glad to be able to inform the House that I accept them. The new rules, when laid, will incorporate both suggestions. They will provide that no woman will be able to bring in her husband or fiancé if the marriage is primarily in order to obtain his admission to the UK, or if one of the parties no longer has any intention of living permanently with the other, or if the parties to the marriage have not met. Otherwise an entry clearance will—not may—be issued provided that the woman is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies who was either born in the UK or born to a parent who was born here. We cannot go further and extend the provision to all women who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. This would mean leaving the door open to further primary immigration because of the facility of registering minor children as citizens under our nationality law." Pointing out that under the 1971 Immigration Act [see 24965 A] the wives of Commonwealth citizens settled in the UK on Jan. 1, 1973, must remain as free to come and go as they were before the passing of that legislation, Mr Whitelaw said that men could not be treated in precisely the same way as women. The Government had said that it would introduce a new Nationality Bill to define entitlement to British citizenship and to the right of abode in the UK [see page 29636; 29705 A]. That remained the Government's intention, although the Bill could not be introduced in the present session because of the parliamentary timetable. He intended to publish a White Paper in 1980.

Having dealt with the other proposed changes, Mr Whitelaw said that the measures were necessary and reasonable. People had a right to expect primary immigration to be kept to an absolute minimum, and that was what the Government's proposals would do. Their numerical effect, when they came fully into operation, would be to reduce the recent levels of immigration by about 3,000 to 4,000 a year. Although actual or potential sources of primary immigration which might in turn lead to further immigration under the existing rules would be blocked, there was nothing in the proposals which changed the rights of people lawfully settled in Britain. A comprehensive revision was essential because, apart from husbands and fiancés, the rules had remained substantially unchanged since 1973 [see 25790 C]. In present circumstances, and the six years' experience of operating the rules, it was clear that considerable changes were necessary, if not overdue. The combined effect of this revision should be a more practical, effective and reasonable set of rules with which the immigration services could work in the often thankless but highly important task which successive Governments and Parliament had laid on them.

Mr Merlyn Rees (chief opposition spokesman on home affairs), moving the opposition amendment, said that the total effect of what the House was discussing was 2,000 to 3,000 people. There were large numbers of people who obviously, at the time of the election and still, believed that this was making a profound change in terms of numbers. It was not. In respect of fiancés it was a small number, and it was not worth the candle to make people believe that something much bigger was being attempted when it was wrong morally and in other ways. The matter of fiancés should be dealt with in the context of a new Nationality Act; what the Home Secretary had just announced would "not be supported" by such new legislation. One word used by Mr Whitelaw was that of "exploitation" of the right for fiancés and husbands to come to Britain. What did this mean? Surely Mr Whitelaw was not saying that arranged marriages were an abuse? Marriages of convenience were one thing, but there was a tradition in Asian families of marriages arranged by the parents. They might not like it, and consider it foreign, but this was not an abuse. It was important that they ceased to talk about immigration. There was a problem in the inner city areas and the House should be putting its mind to that.

In the two divisions the Government was supported by five Ulster Unionists, while the Liberals and the two Scottish National Party members voted with the opposition. However, it was estimated that 17 Conservative backbenchers deliberately abstained, including Mr Cyril Townsend (Bexley, Bexleyheath), who resigned as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Mr Reginald Prentice, Minister of State for Social Security (Disabled).

In the House of Lords on Dec. 11, 1979, a motion, moved by Lord Avebury (Liberal), deploring the White Paper proposals as "racially and sexually discriminatory, incompatible with our international obligations and contrary to the principles of natural justice" was defeated by 80 votes to 55.

The new immigration rules as laid before Parliament on Feb. 20, 1980, contained the concessions on the entry of husbands and fiancés announced by Mr Whitelaw on Dec. 4, 1979 [see above], and omitted the entry requirement that parents and grandparents aged 65 or over must prove that they had a standard of living substantially below that of their own country. However, the requirement would still apply to more distant relatives and to parents and grandparents under 65, except widowed mothers.

An opposition motion to disapprove the new rules was rejected in the House of Commons on March 10 by 307 votes to 255, with two Ulster Unionists supporting the Government and five Liberals and Mr Dafydd Wigley (*Plaid Cymru*) voting with the opposition. A similar motion, moved by Lord Avebury, was defeated in the House of Lords on March 20 by 103 votes to 35.—(Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. 1973 Immigration Rules 25790 C; 1971 Immigration Act 24965 A; 1979 Queen's Speech 29705 A; Admission of Vietnamese Refugees page 30079*)

A. UNITED STATES — Serious Accident at Nuclear Power Station on Three Mile Island - Subsequent Developments

The most serious accident so far recorded in the United States' nuclear power programme occurred on March 28, 1979, in one of the two nuclear fission reactors at a power station on Three Mile Island in the Susquehanna river in Pennsylvania (about 80 miles north of Washington). During the accident the uranium core of the reactor became severely overheated and a quantity of radioactive matter was released into the atmosphere and into the river itself, causing the evacuation of a large number of people from the immediate area of the plant.

Public uncertainty over the actual course of events contributed to the disquiet felt among the local population, 13,000 of whom lived within five miles of the site. The towns of Harrisburg (population 68,000) and York (population 47,000) also lay within 15 miles of the plant, and both reported increased levels of atmospheric radiation during and immediately after the accident.

Following the accident the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), whose main task was the licensing and general supervision of all nuclear power projects in the United States [see 27169 A], was criticized by a number of investigative commissions for its handling of the crisis, and its chairman, Mr Joseph Hendrie, was subsequently removed from office on Dec. 7 on the instructions of President Carter.

The Accident at Three Mile Island

The two nuclear reactors on Three Mile Island were of the pressurized water type and had been intended to produce a total output of 1,700 megawatts. Whereas the No. 1 reactor had been in service since 1974 and had a satisfactory safety record, No. 2 had been in full operation only since Dec. 30, 1978, but had been closed several times since that date due to malfunctions. The safety of pressurized water reactors, and particularly of those built by the company responsible for those at Three Mile Island, had for some time been the subject of considerable debate, and all reactors built by this company were temporarily closed for checks and modifications following the accident. The No. 1 reactor on the site was closed for maintenance at the time of the accident in No. 2, and was not subsequently permitted by the NRC to resume its production of power.

The leakage of radioactive matter from the plant resulted from a combination of mechanical and electrical failures which were compounded by errors made by the operators at the plant. Some of these errors were, however, subsequently attributed to the instrumentation of the plant and to the design of its control rooms.

The core of the No. 2 reactor at Three Mile Island contained uranium 235 in the form of some 36,000 rods which were held in zirconium alloy tubes. Under normal circumstances the nuclear fission of the uranium elements created intense heat which was carried away by a sealed and highly pressurized primary loop of irradiated water (largely "heavy water"—deuterium oxide). The irradiated water, thus heated to the core's normal working temperature of about 580 degrees Fahrenheit, was then passed into steam generators where it transferred its heat to a secondary system of non-radioactive water. The resulting steam in the secondary system was then channelled through a conventional turbine and generator, producing electric current, and was cooled and condensed back to water by a third, air cooled, loop of water, before its return to the steam generator.

The first malfunction occurred in the No. 2 reactor at 4.00 a.m. on March 28, 1979, when the main pumps in the primary core cooling system stopped, apparently because of a failure in the secondary circuit. Auxiliary pumps were automatically brought into action, but failed to deliver water because the valves controlling their flow had been left closed. Within about 10 seconds the temperature and pressure inside the reactor had built up to the point where (i) an emergency relief valve opened to reduce water pressure and (ii) the nuclear reaction of the core was slowed by the automatic insertion of control rods between the fuel rods, inhibiting the generation of heat by the uranium elements. The emergency relief valve, however, also failed and jammed in an open position, resulting in a severe loss of coolant from the primary and secondary systems which was not discovered by the operators for more than two hours.

The closed valves to the auxiliary pumps were discovered and reopened at 4.08 a.m., but two high-pressure pumps in the primary system were turned off by the operators at 4.04 and 4.10 a.m. respectively in the belief that there was adequate water in the reactor vessel. (Subsequent investigation established, however, that at this point up to half of the uranium fuel rods were uncooled due to the water loss, and remained so for up to 50 minutes, some reaching temperatures of well over 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit.) The steam generators were subsequently found to have sustained serious damage as they boiled dry, and some of the zirconium tubes melted or split, allowing uranium to fall to the bottom of the reactor.

During the next three hours the pressure in the primary cooling system fluctuated between 700 and 2,100 pounds per square inch (psi), and at 7.00 a.m. the pressure relief valve of one of the steam generators was closed due to suspected leakage. It was reopened, however, at 7.45 a.m. when pressure readings reached 2,150 psi. (Reliable information concerning much of the reactor was, however, unobtainable during this period due to the failure for 90 minutes of the information printout of a computer.)

The Metropolitan Edison Company (the largest of the three utility companies operating the plant) declared a general emergency at 7.30 a.m. following the discovery of large quantities of spilled radioactive water in the containment building which housed the reactor itself, as well as in the basement of an unprotected auxiliary building. The water was understood to have escaped from a pressurized vessel inside the containment building and to have been led to the auxiliary building's tank, where a large quantity was discharged onto the floor. Some of this water changed at once to radioactive steam and escaped into the atmosphere, but further quantities of radioactive steam were deliberately released from the sealed containment building throughout the day in order to avoid an excessive build-up of pressure in the building.

At about midday the pressure in the reactor vessel fell rapidly and, as parts of the core reached very high temperatures, fresh cooling water was discharged into the vessel. The sudden fluctuations of temperature and pressure were widely believed to be responsible for the breakdown of water molecules into their constituent elements, resulting in the unexpected formation of a large bubble of hydrogen in the reactor vessel.

Although the reactor was now cooling, the bubble represented a new danger because of the presence of a small proportion of oxygen in the reactor which, it was feared, could combine with the hydrogen to cause a spontaneous, non-nuclear explosion of sufficient force to rupture the vessel and to cause the consequent loss of all cooling fluid. Further concern was expressed that the gases, if allowed to expand, would expose the core by displacing the coolant (it being not yet known that this had in fact already occurred). Either event could, if sufficiently severe, result in a disastrous "melt-down" which would, according to scientists, happen if a substantial part of the core reached its melting point of about 5,200 degrees Fahrenheit. In this event the core would melt the metal reactor vessel and could burn through the concrete floor of the reactor where, if not contained by the hard rock under the plant, it could emit uncontrolled radiation into the earth and atmosphere.

The NRC, which sent investigators to the site immediately upon hearing of the alert, reported on April 2 that levels of radiation inside the (now evacuated) reactor containment building had been measured at up to 30,000 rems (a measure of the biological effect of radiation on human cells) per hour. (Scientists believe that a man exposed to 400 rems would die in a short time.) The radiation was thought to originate from radioactive fission by-products such as krypton 85, caesium 137, xenon 133, rubidium 86, cobalt 60 and iodine 131, which was present in large quantities.

The normally accepted maximum permitted radiation exposure for members of the general public in the United States was 200-500 millirems, or 0.2-0.5 rems, during any year, although workers on nuclear projects were allowed up to five rems per year. (A standard diagnostic X-ray yields 20-30 millirems.) Five of the 60 staff on duty at the plant at the time of the accident were found to have absorbed up to one rem (i.e. one-fifth of their permitted annual exposure) on March 28, but a subsequent check on 400 residents living near the reactor showed relatively little absorption of radioactive matter.

The most serious immediate danger was felt to be the pollution of the environment through iodine 131, and the NRC consequently established an extensive network of measuring devices to monitor exposure levels throughout the area. (Iodine 131, when carried to earth by rain, is typically absorbed in grass and, if transmitted to humans through cow's milk, accumulates in the thyroid where it is known to cause cancer.) Recorded levels of milk contamination in the area, however, remained minimal throughout, partly because radiation was rapidly dispersed by a changeable wind and partly because cattle were at that time being fed on stored fodder instead of grass.

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The Governor of Pennsylvania, Mr Richard Thornburgh, called a press conference on March 30 at which he ordered the closure of 23 schools in the area of Three Mile Island and recommended (i) that pregnant women and pre-school children living within five miles of the reactor should be evacuated, and (ii) that the remainder of the population should remain indoors until further notice. Governor Thornburgh, who had until this point recommended against such measures, took this action following the release on that morning of further radioactive gas into the atmosphere above the plant, and the discovery that some 400,000 gallons of slightly radioactive water had been discharged on March 29 into the Susquehanna river.

The March 30 release of gas, which had not been notified to the Pennsylvania authorities, caused considerable conflict between Metropolitan Edison, the NRC and the state authorities. Whereas Metropolitan Edison maintained that the venting had been a controlled automatic process to limit gas pressure inside the plant, and quoted the maximum radiation level of the gas at 350 millirems per hour, the Pennsylvania bureau of radiological health asserted that the emission had been unplanned and uncontrolled, and the NRC claimed to have measured 1,200 millirems per hour in the air above the plant.

Further controversy surrounded the treatment of the Hydrogen gas in the reactor vessel. The NRC said on March 31 that Metropolitan Edison had made on March 30 an unauthorized, "potentially dangerous and unacceptable" attempt to collapse the bubble by considerably increasing the coolant flow through the core. The result had been the division of the bubble into two parts, one of which contained potentially combustible proportions of hydrogen and oxygen. The NRC also revealed on March 31 that an explosion of hydrogen gas had already occurred in the containment building which housed the reactor (but not in the reactor itself) immediately after the accident on March 28. Whereas the NRC claimed to have been told of this occurrence only on March 30, Metropolitan Edison later maintained that NRC inspectors had witnessed the explosion.

The following days were also characterized by conflicting reports which caused further unrest among the local population. Metropolitan Edison announced on March 31 that the hydrogen bubble had been reduced in size by about one-third, but these claims were immediately contested by Mr Harold Denton, the NRC chief of operations; while Governor Thornburgh on March 31 lifted his recommendation that the population stay indoors, the chairman of the NRC, Mr Joseph Hendrie, spoke of the possibility of an evacuation of all persons living within 10 or 20 miles of the plant in view of the possibility of a "melt-down". President Carter, who visited the site briefly on April 2, also urged the population to co-operate with any emergency measures which became necessary.

Civil defence officials estimated on April 1 that about 50,000 of the 950,000 residents living in the four counties around Three Mile Island had left their homes since the accident. Queues formed at petrol stations, and several banks reported difficulty in meeting the demand for cash withdrawals.

As the core of the reactor cooled, a successful attempt was made to remove the hydrogen bubble from the reactor vessel by forcing its re-absorption into the cooling water with the aid of further equipment brought into the site. Meanwhile the irradiated water flooding the auxiliary building was returned to the containment building, which was reported to be up to four feet deep in water. This stage of the operation, which began on March 31, was interrupted on April 6 by further equipment failures, but led on April 27 to the announcement that the core temperature had fallen to 222 degrees Fahrenheit and that the final stage of the cooling process, known as a "cold shut-down", had begun.

In the "cold shut-down" stage all pumps in the primary cooling system were turned off so that the core was cooled solely by the natural convection of water in the primary cooling system. Further heat continued to be drawn off through the steam generators.

Following a further release of radioactive gases from the plant on April 7, chemicals were applied on April 7-8 to the interior walls of the containment building in order to collect and stabilize the iodine 131 inside the building. The smaller accumulations of caesium 137 and of krypton 85 gas, however, continued to be a source of difficulty because of their longer radioactive life.

Whereas iodine 131 has a "half-life" of only eight days (i.e. loses half of its radioactivity in that period), and xenon 133 about five days, krypton 85 and caesium 137 have half-lives of 10 years and 30 years respectively. Metropolitan Edison outlined on Aug. 14 a plan to vent the krypton gas in closely controlled quantities into the atmosphere, but had not received permission for this release by the end of March 1980.

Findings of Investigative Commissions

A series of official investigations into the causes and implications of the accident were initiated during the remainder of 1979, these reaching broad agreement on the course of events and often sharply criticizing the manner in which the matter had been handled not only by Metropolitan Edison but also by the plant's manufacturers and particularly by the NRC itself. The latter was accused by a special presidential commission of failing to take control of the situation, of presenting continually divergent information and of thereby contributing to the early confusion surrounding the accident. Following the presidential commission's recommendations for a restructuring of the NRC, President Carter on Dec. 7 announced a number of changes including the replacement of the NRC's chairman.

The first official report on the accident was presented to the five commissioners of the NRC on April 4 by its own group of federal safety investigators. The report alleged inter alia (i) that the plant's operators had violated plant specifications and federal safety regulations by leaving the two auxiliary pump valves closed after routine maintenance, at least two weeks before the accident; (ii) that the operators had drawn inappropriate conclusions from a water level indicator in the pressurizer, resulting in the incorrect decision to turn off the emergency cooling system; and (iii) that the design of the containment vessel and its instrumentation had been inadequate. The NRC subsequently ordered the temporary closure of all other nuclear power stations built by the same firm, Babcock and Wilcox [see below]. The latter denied the allegations against its reactors, placing the blame on component failure, and maintained that all contingencies had been planned for. (The US firm of Babcock and Wilcox is a separate concern from the British company of the same name.)

The Government's advisory committee on reactor safety also submitted a report to the NRC on April 17 in which it strongly recommended the compulsory installation of extra instrumentation in all of the 42 pressurized water reactors operating in the United States. According to the report the temperature gauges at Three Mile Island had been unsuitable for the measurement of high temperatures, and the pressurizer water gauge was also described by the committee as providing no adequate guide to water levels in the reactor vessel. (Babcock and Wilcox, however, maintained that the instrumentation had been "unimportant" as a factor in the crisis.)

An NRC staff report published on May 13 attributed the operators' errors partly to the allegedly poor layout of the control room. The NRC had heard from the plant operators that as many as 100 alarms had operated simultaneously at the time of the accident, and that certain warning lights had been blocked from view. A further staff report published by the NRC on Aug. 2 stated, however, that the emergency equipment and procedures at the plant had been basically adequate but had been rendered ineffectual by the errors made by the operating staff.

The NRC also sponsored an independent committee of inquiry led by Mr Mitchell Rogovin, a Washington lawyer, which published on Oct. 12 a report alleging that the NRC had shown a "serious deficiency" in its handling of the early stage of the accident. It spoke in particular of fragmented and frequently contradictory statements made by the five commissioners; of poor internal communications resulting in the inefficient evaluation of evidence; and of the lack of clear or co-ordinated functions within the commission. The committee in its final report—which was published on Jan. 24, 1980, and which was again strongly critical of the organization and management of the NRC—added that the melting of a substantial proportion of the reactor fuel had been averted by only 30-60 minutes. Operators at the plant had told the committee that NRC officials had witnessed core temperature readings in excess of 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit, and that the presence of hydrogen in the containment building had been from the beginning clear evidence of serious damage to the core. (The NRC had, however, denied any early knowledge of such damage.)

President Carter announced on April 5, 1979, the formation of an independent presidential commission to investigate the circumstances of the accident, and nominated on April 11 a body of 12 persons to be chaired by Mr John Kemeny, the president of Dartmouth College. The commission, which began its sessions on April 26, investigated at first the allegations made against the design of Babcock and Wilcox reactors.

NRC officials informed the presidential commission on June 1 that the design of the two reactors at Three Mile Island had been approved before the introduction in 1975 of new regulations requiring two separate systems for the containment of spilled radioactive water. The Three Mile Island plant, they said, had only one such system.

Senior company officials conceded to the commission on July 20 that no action had been taken by Babcock and Wilcox on two memorandums submitted in November 1977 and February 1978 by two of the company's engineers. These memorandums, which warned of the lack of contingency plans in cases of coolant loss, had been written following an accident which occurred on Sept. 24, 1977, in a Babcock and Wilcox reactor in Toledo, Ohio, where coolant had been lost but where the situation had been contained.

The commission published on Oct. 30 a final report in which it said that "fundamental changes [would] be necessary in the organization, procedures and practices, and above all in the attitudes of the NRC and of the nuclear industry—to the extent that the institutions we investigated are typical".

The 179-page report criticized in particular (i) staffing levels and standards of operator training at the Three Mile Island plant; (ii) the degree of understanding of the nuclear process shown by Metropolitan Edison; (iii) an alleged widespread unwillingness among operators to believe in the seriousness of the risks involved in handling nuclear fuels; (iv) the design of control rooms in most nuclear reactors, which were said often to overlook the needs of operators; (v) the alleged lack of adequate emergency plans at or in the vicinity of the plant; and (vi) the internal organization of the NRC, which was accused of poor communications and of a failure to ensure adequate standards of safety. The commission said, however, that most of the radiation released during the accident had been successfully contained and that the health risk to the public had been "very low", apart from the severe mental stress imposed on the local population.

The report also made 44 recommendations to President Carter, including (i) the reorganization of the NRC as a 15-member executive committee with a single director appointed by the President; (ii) the creation of a further body within the NRC to organize and inform public debate of nuclear issues; (iii) the periodic renewal of operating licences for nuclear power plants; and (iv) the tightening of regulations concerning the location and equipment of such plants.

In conclusion the commission stated that its findings did not suggest that nuclear power was "inherently too dangerous to allow [it] to continue and expand", but added that "neither do they suggest that the nation should move forward aggressively to develop additional commercial nuclear power". Members of the commission said that eight of its 12 members had favoured a temporary ban on the licensing or construction of new nuclear plants, but that disagreements over the formulation of such a recommendation had prevented the adoption of such a ban.

President Carter subsequently released on Dec. 7 a press statement in which he announced several changes in the federal supervision of nuclear affairs, but reaffirmed his conviction of the need for nuclear power, referring particularly to the recent blocking of oil imports from Iran [see page 30206].

"We do not have the luxury of abandoning nuclear power or [of] imposing a lengthy moratorium on its further use", President Carter said. He added, however, that he fully agreed with the spirit of the Kemeny commission's recommendations, and he announced (i) that he had removed the chairman of the NRC, Mr Joseph Hendrie, from this office; (ii) that he had asked Dr John Ahearne, another NRC commissioner, to take on the post of temporary chairman pending the presidential appointment of a successor from outside the NRC, who would be given increased executive powers; (iii) that he had ordered a complete review of emergency plans in all states which operated nuclear reactors; (iv) that the NRC had been instructed to appoint resident federal inspectors to all reactor sites; and (v) that "virtually all of the other recommendations of the Kemeny commission" were to be implemented. He also called for the improvement of staffing, operator training and design of reactors and control rooms on nuclear power sites.

Temporary Closure of Babcock and Wilcox Reactors - Discussion of Construction and Licensing of New Reactors

The accident in the No. 2 reactor at Three Mile Island occurred at a time of increasing pressure exerted on the Government by anti-nuclear campaigners to revise its policy of simplifying procedures for the licensing of nuclear power stations, and led to widespread demands for the closure of all Babcock and Wilcox reactors as well as for the temporary suspension of all construction or licensing of further nuclear reactors. At that time some 70 nuclear reactors, including nine built by Babcock and Wilcox, were in operation in the United States, about 90 were under construction and about 35 had been completed but had not yet entered service. [For comparable position in 1977, see page 28478.]

The NRC refused on April 6, 1979, a request by the Governor of California, Mr Edmund Brown, for the closure of the Rancho Seco reactor in California, built by Babcock and Wilcox, and confirmed its opinion that all operating reactors apart from those at Three Mile Island should continue to generate at full power.

The Commission amended its policy on April 27, however, on the recommendation of its director of safety, Mr Roger Mattson, and announced the closure of all operating Babcock and Wilcox reactors until safety checks and modifications had been made (only four of the nine reactors concerned being in full operation at that time). By July 7, however, six of the nine had been approved by the NRC and reopened (two of the remaining three being the reactors at Three Mile Island).

The Senate approved on July 17, 1979, a proposal for the withholding after June 1, 1980, of new operating licences and the revocation of existing operating licences for reactors in any states which had by that date developed no federally-approved emergency response plans. (In May 1979 a total of 16 states operating 41 reactors had no such plans.) It decided, however, against a recommendation for the immediate suspension of all new licensing.

A House of Representatives interior committee had meanwhile voted on May 9, 1979, to recommend a six-month suspension of all new construction permits for nuclear power stations as well as for the suspension of the issue of new operating licences until the states involved had produced federally-approved emergency response plans; these proposals were, however, rejected by the full House of Representatives on Nov. 29 during a debate on the NRC's budget. The House on Dec. 4 finally approved an authorization bill providing a sum of $426,700,000 for the NRC's budget during the fiscal year 1980 (commencing Oct. 1, 1979). President Carter, in his Dec. 7 announcement, requested the allocation of an additional $65,100,000 for the use of the NRC, the Department of Energy and the Federal Emergency Planning Agency for the improvement of nuclear safety.

Despite the presidential commission's decision not to recommend a suspension of new licensing, Mr Hendrie announced on Nov. 4 (i.e. before his removal from office) that the NRC would issue no further operating licences until it had evolved a new set of safety, siting and emergency regulations which would also apply to all plants under construction. (The NRC resumed its issue of operating licences on Feb. 29, 1980, when a new reactor in Tennessee received a provisional approval for operation.)

Further Related Developments

Members of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) met with NRC representatives on June 27-28, 1979, to discuss the causes of the accident, and resolved to examine in further meetings the technical implications of the events at Three Mile Island.

The NRC on Oct. 28 imposed a fine of $155,000 on Metropolitan Edison in respect of seven violations of safety regulations. The company paid the fine during February 1980 without contesting the verdict.

General Public Utilities, the holding company which owned the Three Mile Island plant, announced on Aug. 14 a plan for the restoration and reopening of the No. 2 reactor. The plan envisaged the removal of the core by the end of 1981 and the return of the plant to full operation by June 1983, and was expected to cost $400,000,000, of which $300,000,000 would be met by the company's insurance cover. The chairman of the company, Mr Herman Dieckamp, told the Senate nuclear regulation subcommittee on Nov. 9 that he had also applied to the Energy Department for financial assistance with the operation, which he described as "an important opportunity to add to the nation's nuclear expertise". The company had earlier, on June 19, agreed with a consortium of 43 banks on a $409,000,000 revolving loan to cover expenses incurred by the accident, such as the purchase of electrical power from other companies in order to meet consumer demand. An application for permission to raise the price of its electricity in order to meet these costs was refused.

General Public Utilities announced during late March 1980 that it intended to sue Babcock and Wilcox for the complete cost of reinstating the damaged Three Mile Island reactor (believed to be some $500,000,000), alleging that Babcock and Wilcox was guilty of "gross negligence, strict liability for equipment failure, intentional breach of contract and breach of express and implied warranties" in view of its failure to

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implement the lessons of the September 1977 accident in the reactor at Toledo.

It was announced on Nov. 13 that a probe inserted into the containment building at Three Mile Island had registered lower levels of radiation than had been expected (3-5 rems per hour), although the building was still too dangerous to enter at this stage.

A further release of radioactive matter, mainly krypton 85, from the plant occurred on Feb. 11, 1980, when a valve in the primary cooling system of the No. 2 reactor failed and let about 1,000 gallons of radioactive water into the basement of an auxiliary building. The NRC on Feb. 15 ordered an enquiry into the incident.

A further accident involving coolant loss occurred on Feb. 26, 1980, in another Babcock and Wilcox reactor at the Crystal River plant in Florida. About 40,000 gallons of radioactive water were understood to have escaped into the containment building of the reactor, which had been the last Babcock and Wilcox reactor to be approved by the NRC after its April 1979 closure. The NRC said that no radioactive matter had escaped into the environment during the accident, and a "cold shutdown" was achieved on Feb. 29.

Small amounts of radioactive cobalt and tritium were found during April 1980 in test wells bored near the base of the No. 2 reactor at Three Mile Island. State and federal officials stressed, however, that there was no danger of contamination of drinking water, and Metropolitan Edison said on April 9 that the probable source was a storage tank containing cooling water for the undamaged No. 1 reactor.—(New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Economist - Financial Times - OECD, Paris - US International Communication Agency - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. US Nuclear Policy 28478 A*)

A. CANADA — Federal General Election - Defeat of Minority Progressive Conservative Government - Liberals returned to Power with Overall Majority - New Liberal Cabinet

The minority Progressive Conservative Party Government of Mr Joseph Clark, which had held office since the general election of May 22, 1979 [see 29767 A], was defeated by the Liberal Party, led by Mr Pierre Trudeau, in a further general election held on Feb. 18, 1980.

This second election was precipitated by the Government's defeat in the Canadian House of Commons on Dec. 13, 1979, on a New Democratic Party (NDP) motion of no confidence in respect of the budget, which "unreservedly" condemned the Government for its "outright betrayal of its election promises to lower interest rates, [to] cut taxes and to stimulate the growth of the Canadian economy, without a mandate from the Canadian people for such a reversal."

The motion was carried by 139 votes (112 Liberals and 27 New Democrats) to 133, with the five Social Credit members, who had supported the Government on three previous no-confidence motions since the opening of the new Parliament on Oct. 9, 1979, abstaining. Mr Clark, having formally asked the Governor-General for a dissolution of Parliament, announced on Dec. 14 that the election would take place on Feb. 18, 1980.

The main proposals in the budget, introduced on Dec. 11, 1979, were: an immediate increase of 18 cents a gallon in the excise tax on petrol; a rise in the price of oil and natural gas of $4 a barrel in 1980 and $4.50 a barrel each year thereafter until 1983 from the current price of $13.75, with a review mechanism to keep Canadian prices at 85 per cent of the US price; a new federal tax to take half of the revenues produced by oil and natural gas price increases exceeding $2 a barrel and 30 cents a cubic foot; a tax credit of up to $80 per adult and $30 per child, with those with incomes below $21,380 in 1980 receiving the full credit; increased taxes on cigarettes, beer, wines and spirits; and a 5 per cent surcharge on federal income tax paid by corporations. Mr John Crosbie (Finance Minister), introducing the budget, said that by means of higher taxes and severe restraint on public expenditure the federal deficit would be reduced from over $11,000 million in 1979-80 to $9,000 million in 1983-84.

Mr Trudeau, who had on Nov. 21, 1979, announced his resignation from the leadership of the Liberal Party (which he had held since 1968—see 22747 A), stated on Dec. 18 that he would lead the party in the forthcoming election.

In his resignation statement of Nov. 21, Mr Trudeau said that he was asking the party's national executive to call a convention in March 1980 to choose a new leader. He continued: "There is no easy way or ideal time to leave, and there are always strong public and private reasons both for going and for staying on. At a point in time one simply makes the decision as to what is best. . . . Liberals are in the process of rethinking the party's policies and of rebuilding its organization to be ready to return to office. In my view one element of that renewal should be a change in the leadership. . . ."

However, Mr Trudeau told a press conference on Dec. 18 that, after two days of long consultations with friends and colleagues, he had decided to accept the strong appeal of the Liberal Party's caucus and national executive to stay on as leader, and that, if elected, he would form a new Government. The decision was the most difficult he had ever made, because his "strongest desire" was to leave politics and raise his family in Montreal. Mr Trudeau added that this would be his last election, his intention being to have the party select a new leader well before the next election.

Although energy policy was an important issue, the election campaign was largely dominated by the competing personalities of Mr Trudeau and Mr Clark.

The final state of the parties in the new House of Commons, compared with that after the previous election in May 1979, was as follows:

	1980	1979
Liberals	147	114
Progressive Conservatives	103	136
New Democratic Party	32	26
Social Credit Party	0	6

Party strengths at the dissolution of the previous House on Dec. 14, 1979, were: Progressive Conservatives 136; Liberals 114; NDP 27; Social Credit Party 5. Since the May 1979 election the Progressive Conservatives, despite losing a by-election to the NDP, had maintained their strength through the defection of a Social Credit MP [see 30043 B].

Party representation in the new House of Commons by provinces was as follows:

	Lib	PC	NDP
Newfoundland	5	2	0
Prince Edward Island	2	2	0
Nova Scotia	5	6	0
New Brunswick	7	3	0
Quebec	74	1	0
Ontario	52	38	5
Manitoba	2	5	7
Saskatchewan	0	7	7
Alberta	0	21	0
British Columbia	0	16	12
Yukon	0	1	0
North-West Territories	0	1	1

Altogether the Liberals gained 24 seats from the Progressive Conservatives and five each from the NDP and Social Credit; the Progressive Conservatives gained one seat from the Liberals; and the NDP gained 10 seats from the Progressive Conservatives.

The polarization between Quebec and the rest of Canada shown in the previous election was further emphasized, with the Liberals winning 74 of the 75 seats in the former against only two in the Prairie provinces (Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan), and losing their remaining seat in British Columbia. The Progressive Conservatives, while retaining their predominance in Alberta, lost seats in all the other provinces except Newfoundland, and the NDP, despite losing its two remaining seats in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia to the Liberals, continued its advance in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia at the expense of the Progressive Conservatives.

Although Mr Clark retained his Alberta seat with an increased majority, four Progressive Conservative ministers were defeated, as follows: Mr David MacDonald (Communications and Secretary of State); Mr Heward Grafftey (Minister of State for Science and Technology), Mr Robert René de Cotret (Industry, Trade and Commerce and Minister of State for Economic Development), who had resigned from the Senate to fight a Quebec constituency, and Mr Ronald Atkey (Employment and Immigration).

Of the other party leaders, Mr Trudeau and Mr Edward Broadbent (NDP) were re-elected in Quebec and Ontario respectively, but Mr Fabien Roy (Social Credit) lost his seat in Quebec, together with his four colleagues. Among the new Liberal MPs were three former ministers defeated in the previous election, Mr Daniel MacDonald (Veterans' Affairs), Mr John Roberts (Secretary of State) and Mr Jack Cullen (Employment and Immigration). Also elected were Mr

Bryce Mackasey, a former federal minister and member of the Quebec National Assembly [see also 29400 B], and Mr Gerald Regan, Premier of Nova Scotia from 1970 to 1978 [see 29314 A], who defeated Progressive Conservatives in Ontario and Nova Scotia respectively.

Figures of the vote for each party, covering 98.7 per cent of the total poll, were announced as follows on Feb. 20: Liberals 4,749,886 (43.9 per cent); Progressive Conservatives 3,568,361 (33.0 per cent); NDP 2,142,054 (19.8 per cent); Social Credit 173,295 (1.6 per cent); others 186,246 (1.7 per cent). The Social Credit vote in Quebec fell from about 16 per cent in May 1979 to less than 2 per cent. [Comparative approximate percentages obtained nationally in May 1979 were Liberals 39.9 per cent, Progressive Conservatives 36.0 per cent, NDP 18.0 per cent; Social Credit 4.5 per cent and others 1.5 per cent.]

Formation of Liberal Cabinet

Mr Clark having resigned, a Liberal Cabinet was sworn in on March 3 with the following membership:

Mr Pierre Trudeau (60)	Prime Minister
Mr Allan MacEachen (58)	Deputy Prime Minister and Finance
Mr Jean-Luc Pepin (55)	Transport
Mr Jean Chrétien (46)	Justice, Attorney General and Minister of State for Social Development
Mr John Munro (49)	Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Senator H. A. (Bud) Olson (55)	Minister of State for Economic Development
Mr Eugene Whelan (55)	Agriculture
Mr Herbert Gray (48)	Industry, Trade and Commerce
Mr André Ouellet (40)	Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Postmaster General
Mr Daniel MacDonald (61)	Veterans' Affairs
Mr Marc Lalonde (50)	Energy, Mines and Resources
Senator Raymond Perrault (56)	Government Leader in the Senate
Mr Roméo LeBlanc (52)	Fisheries and Oceans
Mr John Roberts (46)	Minister of State for Science and Technology and Minister of the Environment
Miss Monique Bégin (44)	Health and Welfare
Mr Jean-Jacques Blais	Supply and Services
Mr Francis Fox (40)	Secretary of State and Communications
Mr Gilles Lamontagne (61)	National Defence
Mr Pierre De Bane	Regional Economic Expansion
Senator Hazen Argue (59)	Minister of State with responsibility for the Canadian Wheat Board
Mr Gerald Regan (51)	Minister of Labour and Minister of State for Sports
Mr Mark MacGuigan (49)	External Affairs
Mr Robert Kaplan (52)	Solicitor General
Mr James Fleming (40)	Minister of State for Multiculturalism
Mr William Rompkey (43)	National Revenue
Mr Pierre Bussières (40)	Minister of State (Finance)
Mr Charles Lapointe (35)	Minister of State (Small Business)
Mr Edward Lumley (40)	Minister of State (Trade)
Mr Yvon Pinard (39)	President of the Privy Council and Leader of the House of Commons
Mr Donald Johnston	President of the Treasury Board
Mr Lloyd Axworthy (40)	Employment and Immigration
Mr Paul Cosgrove (45)	Public Works
Mrs Judy Erola (45)	Minister of State (Mines)

The main features of the new Cabinet were an increase in the number of ministers, compared with the Progressive Conservative Cabinet, from 30 to 33 and the abolition of Mr Clark's inner Cabinet of 12 ministers. Mr Trudeau also abolished the post of Minister of State for Federal-Provincial Relations.

Mr Pierre Trudeau was born on Oct. 18, 1919, and studied law, politics and economics at Montreal, Harvard, Paris and London. Having served in 1949-51 as an economic and constitutional adviser in the Cabinet Secretariat in Ottawa, Mr Trudeau for the next 10 years practised law in Montreal and took an active part in Quebec provincial politics. He was appointed associate professor of law in the University of Montreal in 1961, and was first elected to the Canadian House of Commons for the Montreal constituency of Mount Royal at the 1965 general election. He was appointed to the Cabinet in April 1967 as Minister of Justice and Attorney General, and in the following April succeeded Mr Lester Pearson as federal leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister [see 22747 A]. He won the general election of June 1968 [see 22841 A] and remained in office until defeated by Mr Clark in May 1979.

Biographies of other ministers are given below.

Mr Allan MacEachen, MP for Cape Breton Highlands-Canso (Nova Scotia), first entered the federal Parliament in 1953 and had held the following portfolios in previous Liberal Cabinets: Labour (1963-65), National Health and Welfare (1965-68), Manpower and Immigration (1968-70), President of the Privy Council (1970-74 and 1976-79), External Affairs (1974-76), Leader of the House of Commons (1976-79), Deputy Prime Minister (1977-79).

Mr Jean-Luc Pepin, MP for Ottawa-Carleton (Ontario), was first elected in 1963 and held office as Minister without Portfolio (1965), Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (1965-68) and Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce (1968-72). Having been defeated in the 1972 general election [see 25661 A], he was joint chairman of the task force on Canadian unity in 1977-79 [see 29560 A] and was elected for his present constituency in May 1979.

Mr Jean Chrétien, MP for St Maurice (Quebec), was first elected in 1963 and had held the following posts: Minister without Portfolio (1967-68), National Revenue (January-July 1968), Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1968-74), President of the Treasury Board (1974-76), Industry, Trade and Commerce (1976-77), Finance (1977-79).

Mr John Munro, MP for Hamilton, East (Ontario), was first elected in 1962 and had been Minister without Portfolio (April-June 1968), Minister of National Health and Welfare (1968-72) and Minister of Labour from 1972 until his resignation from the Cabinet in September 1978 [see 29435 A].

Senator H. A. (Bud) Olson, was first elected to the House of Commons in 1957 as Social Credit MP for Medicine Hat (Alberta) and, having joined the Liberal Party in 1967, was Minister of Agriculture from 1968 until losing his seat in the 1972 general election [see 25661 A]. He was appointed to the Senate in 1977.

Mr Eugene Whelan, MP for Essex-Windsor (Ontario), was first elected in 1962 and held the Agriculture portfolio from 1972 to 1979.

Mr Herbert Gray, MP for Windsor, West (Ontario) since 1962, had been Minister without Portfolio (1969-70), Minister of National Revenue (1970-72) and Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs from 1972 until August 1974 [see 26713 B].

Mr André Ouellet, MP for Papineau (Montreal) since 1967, had held the following portfolios: Postmaster General (1972-74), Consumer and Corporate Affairs (1974-76), Urban Affairs (1976-79), Public Works (1978-79).

Mr Daniel MacDonald, MP for Cardigan (Prince Edward Island) from 1972 to May 1979 and again from February 1980, had been Minister of Veterans' Affairs from 1972 to 1979.

Mr Marc Lalonde, MP for Outremont (Montreal) since 1972, had been Minister of National Health and Welfare (1972-77), Minister of State for Federal-Provincial Relations (1977-78), and Minister of Justice and Attorney General (1978-79).

Senator Raymond Perrault, a former leader of the Liberal Party in British Columbia and federal MP for Burnaby-Seymour (British Columbia) from 1968 to 1972, was appointed to the Senate in the latter year and had been Government Leader in the Upper House from 1974 to 1979.

Mr Roméo LeBlanc, MP for Westmorland-Kent (New Brunswick) since 1972, had been Minister of Fisheries (1974-79) and Minister of the Environment (1976-79).

Mr John Roberts, MP for Toronto, St Paul's, 1968-72, 1974-79, and since February 1980, was Secretary of State (1976-79).

Miss Monique Bégin, MP for St Leonard-Anjou (Montreal), was first elected in 1972 and had been Minister of National Revenue (1976-77) and Minister of National Health and Welfare (1977-79).

Mr Jean-Jacques Blais, MP for Nipissing (Ontario), was Postmaster General (1976-78) and Solicitor General (1978-79).

Mr Francis Fox, MP for Blainville-Deux Montagnes (Quebec), was first elected in 1972 and had been Solicitor General from September 1976 until his resignation from the Cabinet in January 1978 [see 28886 A].

Mr Gilles Lamontagne, a former Mayor of Quebec, was first elected for Langelier (Quebec) at a by-election in May 1977 [see 28452 A] and had been Minister without Portfolio (January-February 1978) and Postmaster General (1978-79).

Mr Pierre De Bane, MP for Matapedia-Matane (Quebec), was Minister of Supply and Services (1978-79).

Senator Hazen Argue, a member of the Upper House since 1966, was elected to the House of Commons in 1945 as Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) MP for Assiniboia (Saskatchewan),

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but joined the Liberal Party in February 1962 [see 18773 C], having failed, as national CCF leader, to be elected NDP leader at the latter party's founding congress in August 1961 [see 18352 A]. He retained his seat for the Liberals in the 1962 general election [see 18927 A], but lost it to a Progressive Conservative in April 1963 [see 19413 A].

Mr Gerald Regan, MP for Halifax (Nova Scotia) from 1963 to 1965 and since February 1980, was Premier of Nova Scotia from 1970 to 1978 and provincial Liberal leader from 1965 to 1979.

Mr Mark MacGuigan, MP for Windsor-Walkerville (Ontario) and a former law professor, was first elected in 1968. **Mr Robert Kaplan**, MP for York, Centre (Toronto) since 1974, represented Toronto, Don Valley from 1968 to 1972. **Mr James Fleming**, MP for Toronto, York, West since 1972, is a former broadcaster. **Mr William Rompkey** has been MP for Grand Falls-White Bay-Labrador (Newfoundland) since 1972. **Mr Pierre Bussières**, a former teacher and Liberal Party organizer, has been MP for Charlesbourg (Quebec) since 1974. **Mr Charles Lapointe**, MP for Charlevoix (Quebec) and a former foreign service officer, was first elected in 1974. **Mr Edward Lumley**, MP for Stormont-Dundas (Ontario) and a former Mayor of Cornwall (Ontario), was first elected in 1974. **Mr Yvon Pinard**, MP for Drummond (Quebec) since 1974, is a lawyer. **Mr Donald Johnston**, MP for St Henri-Westmount (Quebec) and a tax lawyer, was first elected at a by-election in October 1978 [see 29400 B]. **Mr Lloyd Axworthy** has been MP for Winnipeg-Fort Garry (Manitoba) since May 1979. **Mr Paul Cosgrove**, a former Mayor of Scarborough (Toronto), has been MP for Toronto, York-Scarborough since February 1980. **Mrs Judy Erola**, MP for Nickel Belt (Ontario), won the constituency from the NDP in February 1980.

Of the other members of Mr Trudeau's previous Cabinet, Mr Alastair Gillespie (Energy, Mines and Resources and Minister of State for Science and Technology), Mr Anthony Abbott (National Revenue and Minister of State for Small Business), Mr Norman Cafik (Minister of State for Multiculturalism), Mr Barnett Danson (National Defence), Mr Hugh Faulkner (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), Mr Otto Lang (Transport), Mr Leonard Marchand (Minister of State for the Environment) and Mrs Iona Campagnola (Minister of State with responsibility for fitness and sport) lost their seats in May 1979 and did not seek re-election; Mr Martin O'Connell (Labour) and Mr Jack Horner (Industry, Trade and Commerce) were defeated in May 1979 and February 1980; Mr Donald Jamieson (External Affairs) had resigned his seat in the federal Parliament in June 1979 on becoming leader of the Newfoundland Liberal Party [see 29780 B]; Mr Robert Andras (President of the Board of Economic Development Ministers) and Mr Marcel Lessard (Regional Economic Expansion) did not seek re-election in February 1980; and Mr Judd Buchanan (President of the Treasury Board), Mr Jack Cullen (Employment and Immigration), Mr Warren Allmand (Consumer and Corporate Affairs), Mrs Jeanne Sauvé (Communications) and Mr John Reid (Federal-Provincial Relations) were not included in the new Cabinet. Mrs Sauvé was elected Speaker of the House of Commons when the new Parliament met on April 14.—(Globe and Mail, Toronto - Department of External Affairs, Ottawa) (*Prev. rep. 1979 Election 29767 A; By-elections 30043 B; Cabinet 29936 B*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Extension of Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act - IRA and INLA Bombing Incidents in England - Attacks on British Soldiers in West Germany

The House of Commons approved on March 4, 1980, by 115 votes to 26, an order extending for a further 12 months until March 1981 the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, which had received the Royal Assent on March 25, 1976 [see 27738 A]. The Government was supported by Labour and Official Unionist members, while those voting against the order comprised 24 Labour backbenchers, one Liberal and Mr Gerard Fitt (Socialist)—the latter having resigned from the leadership and membership of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) of Northern Ireland in November 1979.

Mr William Whitelaw (Home Secretary), moving approval of the order, said that since 1974 there had been 220 exclusion orders—54 during the past year—made under that part of the Act which empowered the Home Secretary to cause a person to be removed from the UK when he was satisfied that someone was or had been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, or was attempting or might attempt to enter the country for that purpose. Of those against whom exclusion orders had been made, 37 had had their cases considered by an independent adviser, with the result that 12 of the orders had been revoked. Furthermore, an additional six orders had been revoked for other reasons. Up to Feb. 29, 1980, a total of 199 people had been removed (167 to Northern Ireland and 32 to the Irish Republic). In all, 4,586 people—724 during the past year—had been detained (either at ports or inland) under the section which enabled the police to detain for up to 48 hours a person who was reasonably suspected either of having committed an offence under the Act or of being concerned in terrorism. In 549 cases—170 during the past year—an extension of detention for up to another five days had been granted. A total of 307 people—51 in the past year—had been charged after detention with various offences, including murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to cause explosions, offences under the Firearms Act, robbery and theft, and offences under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and its predecessor of 1974 [see 26870 A].

The House of Lords approved the order on March 17 without a division.

IRA and INLA Bombing Incidents in England

Between Dec. 17 and 22, 1979, eight letter bombs posted in Brussels arrived in England.

Of the eight, two exploded in postal sorting offices at Dover and Gerrard's Cross (Buckinghamshire) causing minor injuries; three were delivered to the respective addresses of Sir William Mather, chairman of the Institute of Directors, of Lord Croham, industrial adviser to the Bank of England and deputy chairman of the British National Oil Corporation, and of Sir Charles Villiers, chairman of the British Steel Corporation; and the remaining three addressed to Sir Arthur Knight, chairman of the National Enterprise Board, to Mr James Prior, Secretary of State for Employment, and to Mr Norman Siddall, deputy chairman of the National Coal Board, were intercepted by postal workers. A man, claiming to speak for the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army), said in a telephone call on Dec. 21 to the Dublin office of the British Broadcasting Corporation that that organization was responsible for the bombs. He said that he was from the Irish Republican Information Service in Dublin and gave a code name which had been frequently used in IRA statements.

The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)—the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party [see 28804 C]—claimed responsibility on March 7, 1980, for two bomb explosions which earlier the same day had destroyed sleeping quarters at the Army's School of Infantry on Salisbury Plain. No one was injured. An INLA spokeman said in telephone calls to broadcasting networks in Dublin and Belfast that it was nearly a year since the group had "executed" Mr Airey Neave, the former Conservative parliamentary spokesman on Northern Ireland [see 29791 A], and that the British Government had "reverted to a role of complacency regarding their war in Ireland".

Shooting of British Soldiers in West Germany

The Provisional IRA claimed responsibility for the shooting during February-March 1980 of three British soldiers in West Germany. The incidents were as follows:

(1) Col. Mark Coe (44), a senior staff officer at the headquarters of the First Corps of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), died in hospital on Feb. 16 a few hours after being shot outside his home in Bielefeld. In claiming responsibility on Feb. 19, the Provisional IRA admitted that it was also responsible for the murder in The Hague on March 22, 1979, of Sir Richard Sykes, the British ambassador to the Netherlands, for bombings at British Army bases in West Germany in 1978 and 1979, and for a bomb explosion in Brussels on Aug. 28, 1979, which injured 16 people including four British Army bandsmen. The IRA statement said that Sir Richard Sykes, who was shot dead as he was about to drive from his residence to the embassy, had engaged in intelligence operations against IRA members and was therefore more important than other ambassadors, and that Col. Coe, who had served in Northern Ireland in 1972, had been "executed in an army which is engaged in oppressing the nationalist people in the occupied six counties". The statement continued: "The reason for these attacks is crystal clear: the continued occupation of part of our country. Other British oppressors wherever they be stationed should know that by no means have we finished."

(2) Cpl. Stewart Leach (22), a military policeman, was seriously wounded by gunmen who fired on his car in Münster on March 1.

(3) Cpl. Stephen Sim (24) was shot and wounded on March 10 while jogging in Osnabrück.

An IRA statement on March 11 claiming responsibility for the shooting of Cpl. Sim said: "We assure the German people that none of our attacks are aimed at them, but solely at the British forces and administrators who are oppressing our people."—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. 29791 A*)

A. SRI LANKA — Cabinet Changes - Constitutional Amendment - Other Internal Developments

In a cabinet reshuffle on Feb. 14, 1980, President Junius Jayawardene took over responsibility for the nationalized tea, rubber and coconut plantations while Maj. Montague Jayawickreme assumed responsibility for other plantations (while retaining his Public Administration portfolio but relinquishing that of Home Affairs).

The previous Minister for Plantation Industries, Mr M. D. H. Jayawardene, had earlier resigned on Nov. 21, 1979, after he had attacked the Government's budget proposals [see below] in Parliament. In his speech he had accused the Finance Minister, Mr Ronnie de Mel, of bridging the deficit by obtaining commodity aid and grants, which he described as "what is given to beggars".

In the Feb. 14 reorganization the President also took over the Higher Education portfolio from Dr Nissaka Wijeyeratna, who himself became Minister of Justice and whose Education responsibilities were transferred to Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe (the latter retaining his Youth Affairs and Employment portfolio). The former Minister of Justice, Mr K. W. Dewanayagam, succeeded Maj. Jayawickreme as Minister of Home Affairs. In addition, (i) the Prime Minister, Mr Ranasinghe Premadasa, added Highways to his responsibility for Local Government, Housing and Construction and (ii) Mr Dharmasena Attygale was newly appointed as Minister for Indigenous Medicine (without cabinet rank).

In an earlier development, Mr Chelliah Rajadurai, a member of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), defected to the ruling United National Party (UNP) on March 24, 1979, and was appointed Minister for Regional Development on April 3.

This defection of Mr Rajadurai followed the adoption by the Sri Lanka Parliament on Feb. 22, 1979, of an amendment to the Constitution providing that members who resigned or were expelled from their party might in certain circumstances retain their seats.

The new Constitution adopted only six months earlier had provided that any member who resigned or was expelled from his party would automatically lose his seat and would be replaced by a nominee of his previous party [see page 29414]. The amendment was supported by the UNP and opposed by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), whilst the TULF, which did not take part in the vote, withdrew from the House after its leader, Mr Appapillai Amirthalingam, had attacked the amendment as intended to encourage defections from the opposition to the government benches.

Local elections held on May 19, 1979 (the first since 1969), resulted in sweeping victories for the UNP, which secured a majority in eight of the nine municipal councils and 29 of the 34 urban councils, whilst the TULF won control of the Jaffna municipal council and five urban councils, all in Tamil-speaking areas.

In the elections, which were held under the proportional representation system, the UNP won 313 seats, the SLFP 105, the TULF 58, the Communist Party seven, the (Trotskyist) *Lanka Sama Samaja* Party six, the Tamil Congress six and independents seven.

The Essential Public Services Bill, which banned strikes in essential services, was adopted by Parliament by 128 votes to 21 on Oct. 3 after a heated 15-hour debate. The Bill, which had been introduced following a threat to strike by doctors in the state medical service, had originally imposed mandatory confiscation of the property of strikers defying an essential services order and banned professional people convicted of striking illegally from practising. The Supreme Court, however, ruled on Oct. 2 that these provisions infringed fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution, and that if they were retained the Bill could be enacted only after a national referendum. These clauses were accordingly withdrawn and replaced by a provision giving the courts discretion to impose such penalties as they deemed fit.

The Government claimed on Oct. 19 to have discovered a plot by members of the SLFP trade union to assassinate President Jayawardene. Four men were arrested after bombs were discovered at the union's headquarters.

Dr Wijeyananda Dahanayake, who had been Prime Minister in 1959-60, won the Galle seat in a parliamentary by-election on Dec. 20, 1979, defeating his SLFP opponent by a 13,000 majority. In the 1977 elections, which he contested as an independent, he had been defeated by the UNP candidate, who was subsequently unseated as the result of an election petition. Dr Dahanayake fought the by-election as the UNP candidate.

Dr Dahanayake had originally been a member of the SLFP [see 17040 A] but had subsequently formed the Ceylon Democratic Party in 1960 [see 17356 A]; later he joined the Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party [see page 20588] and was Home Affairs Minister in the UNP-led coalition Government from 1965 to 1970 [see 20697 A].

Measures against Terrorism - Appointment of Commission on Devolution

A state of emergency was declared on July 11, 1979, in the (northern) Jaffna district and at Katunayake and Ratmalana airports (near Colombo). This measure was directed against the Tamil separatist "Liberation Tigers", who had murdered 14 policemen in the past year and had destroyed Air Ceylon's only airliner at Katunayake airport on Sept. 7, 1978 [see page 29415]. Under the emergency regulations arson and attempting to overthrow the Government by illegal means were made punishable by death.

The Prevention of Terrorism Bill, which made murder, kidnapping and abduction punishable by life imprisonment, was adopted by Parliament on July 19 by 131 votes to none, the SLFP members abstaining from voting. The TULF members did not take part in the vote, as they were boycotting Parliament as a protest against a bill passed on July 3 which transferred three Sinhalese-speaking areas of Anuradhapura district (in northern Sri Lanka) to the Tamil-speaking Vavuniya district. After President Jayawardene had promised to rescind this Bill, which the TULF regarded as intended to bring a Tamil district under Sinhalese control, they ended their boycott on Sept. 4.



(*Carpress*)

The Government on Aug. 5 appointed a commission headed by Mr Victor Tennekoon, a former Chief Justice, to report on devolution and decentralization of the administration and the creation of elected district councils, in accordance with its promise on taking office to organize an all-party conference to seek a solution to the problem of the Tamil minority [see page 28590]. The 10 members, who were required to be unanimous in their recommendations, included two TULF nominees, but the SLFP declined an invitation to nominate a representative.

The state of emergency in the Jaffna district was not extended when it expired on Dec. 27, as the situation was said to have returned to normal.

Status of Indian Tamils

President Jayawardene appointed a committee on March 3, 1980, to examine the problems of the stateless Tamils of Indian origin. Its three members included Mr Savumiamoorthy Thondaman, Minister for Rural Industrial Development and president of the Ceylon Workers' Congress, the main organization representing the Indian Tamil plantation workers [see page 29415].

The agreements of 1964 and 1974 between Sri Lanka and India on the future status of persons of Indian origin resident in Sri Lanka, estimated to number 975,000, provided that India would accept repatriation of 600,000 of them and that Sri Lanka citizenship would be granted to the remaining 375,000 [see 20405 A; 26418 A]. The Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act of 1967 laid down that four persons would be granted Sri Lanka citizenship for every seven granted Indian citizenship, but an amending bill adopted in 1971 linked the number to be granted Sri Lanka citizenship to the number actually repatriated to India, instead of the number registered as Indian citizens [see 22132 A; 26032 A].

Although the 1964 agreement envisaged that repatriation would be completed in 1979, by February of that year only 237,000 repatri-

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ates had arrived in India, and on April 19, 1979, an Indian Government spokesman stated that it had recently been agreed that 50,000 people would be repatriated every year over the next 10 years. As a result of the slow progress of repatriation and the consequent delay in granting Sri Lanka citizenship, about 500,000 persons of Indian origin resident in Sri Lanka were left stateless. A delegation from the Ceylon Workers' Congress which met President Jayawardene in December 1979 urged that the amending act of 1971 should be repealed, and that the Sri Lanka and Indian Governments should grant citizenship immediately to the number agreed upon without waiting for repatriation.

The repatriation of Indian Tamils, about 80 per cent of whom were tea workers, produced a serious labour shortage on some tea estates. Most Sinhalese were reluctant to work on the estates, as wages were lower than in other occupations and they were less able than the Tamils to endure the cold, wet climate in the central highlands, where tea is grown at between 3,000 and 5,000 feet above sea level. Tea production fell from its peak of 503,000,000 lbs in 1965-70 to just over 400,000,000 lbs in 1978, whilst Sri Lanka's share of the world market, because of increased competition from East African and other countries, fell from over 31 to about 25 per cent.

Economic Policy

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on Jan. 26, 1979, a request from the Government for an arrangement which would permit Sri Lanka to make purchases under the Fund's "extended facility" up to the equivalent of SDR 260,300,000 (US $335,000,000) of medium-term assistance over the next three years.

In connexion with this arrangement, the Fund stated: "The Government's programme for the medium term, which will be supported by the present extended arrangement, aims at further reducing unemployment, strengthening the balance of payments, and sustaining the rate of growth at about 6 per cent. Attainment of these objectives within a framework of relative price stability requires both the achievement of sharply higher levels of domestic investment and savings, and also the correction of price distortions with a view to achieving more appropriate production incentives in agriculture and industry. It is planned that the share of gross capital formation in the gross national product will rise from 16 per cent in the past to 25 per cent by 1981. The increased investment will be financed partly from higher use of external resources; however, a large part of increased investment will be financed from greater domestic savings. The latter are to be achieved partly through an interest rate policy aimed at encouraging financial savings and also through a redirection of government expenditure from consumer subsidies toward sharply higher levels of public investment. The Government will continue to implement a flexible exchange rate policy, permitting the value of the rupee to reflect basic exchange market developments and overall balance-of-payments objectives over the medium term."

The first two factories in the free trade zone, the establishment of which had been approved by Parliament in January 1978 [see page 28982], were opened on Nov. 15, 1978, on a 200-acre investment promotion zone at Katunayake, 18 miles north of Colombo. This zone represented the first testing area for the free trade zone, which was planned ultimately to enclose 200 square miles. It had previously been announced on Sept. 27, 1978, that foreign companies might repatriate profits earned in Sri Lanka and non-resident shareholders might receive dividends from locally registered companies.

In accordance with the Government's policy of limiting food subsidies, a new system was introduced from Sept. 1, 1979, whereby families with a total monthly income of Rs 300 and below (about £9 or US $20) would receive stamps to the value of Rs 123 to Rs 200 a month, according to the size of the family. These could be exchanged for essential foodstuffs, and unused stamps could be deposited as savings in the National Savings Bank. The scheme covered about 7,500,000 people, or a little over half the population.

The budget for 1980, which Mr de Mel presented to Parliament on Nov. 16, 1979, envisaged an unprecendented deficit of Rs 8,920 million ($600,000,000). In order to encourage investment, company tax was reduced from 50 to 40 per cent; investments in machinery and buildings were exempted from tax; new companies formed for development activities were exempted from tax for five years; the maximum income tax rate was reduced from 70 to 55 per cent; and foreign experts employed in Sri Lanka would be taxed at a flat rate of 25 per cent for the first three years. Increases in expenditure included a 10 per cent salary increase and exemption from income tax for public employees. Mr de Mel stated that it was hoped to cover the deficit by commodity and project aid, Appropriation Act loans and trust fund loans.

Despite substantial project aid from Britain, the United States, Sweden, West Germany, Canada and Japan, the Government's financial plans were upset by the rising inflation rate, which ran at 15 to 16 per cent in 1979 and was expected to reach 20 per cent in 1980, largely because of the cost of oil imports. After the trade figures for 1979 had revealed a record deficit of Rs 7,000 million ($470,000,000), President Jayawardene announced on Feb. 27, 1980, that all the remaining food subsidies, including the stamps scheme, would shortly be abolished. (The Hindu, Madras - Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Sri Lanka High Commission, London - IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. 29413 A; Economic Policy, IMF Arrangement, page 28982*)

A. WESTERN SAMOA — General Election and Subsequent Political Developments, February 1979 to Early 1980 - Economic Policy

A general election was held in Western Samoa on Feb. 24, 1979, following the expiry of the three-year term of the *Fono* (Legislative Assembly) elected in March 1976 [see 27868 B]. As in all previous elections held since the attainment of independence in 1962, all candidates stood as individuals and formal party politics played no part in the election campaign.

As stated in 27868 B, universal adult suffrage is used in Western Samoa only in the election of two members to represent the non-indigenous population (who are registered on an individual voters' roll), the remaining 45 members being elected in 41 constituencies by nearly 10,000 elected heads of *aigas* (traditional Samoan extended family units) registered on a roll of *matai*.

In late 1978 almost 1,500 *matai* titles were removed from the roll of *matai* by the Lands and Titles Court on the grounds that there were too many titles of the same type, but were restored prior to the election after strong protests had been made to the *O le Ao o le Malo* (Head of State), Malietoa Tanumafili II, who called a meeting of the Executive Council to consider the matter. (The Executive Council consists of the Head of State, the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers and has the power to review cabinet decisions.)

As a result of the election, in which about 7,500 votes were cast in the 41 *matai* roll constituencies, only 21 of the 47 members of the previous *Fono* retained their seats, the unsuccessful candidates including one cabinet minister, Mr Lilomaiava Niko (Education). The only woman to be elected was Mrs Fetaui Mata'afa (also known as La'ulu Fetauimalemau), the widow of the former Prime Minister, Mr Fiame Mata'afa Mulinu'u II, who in the previous general election had failed to retain her husband's former seat after winning it at the by-election caused by his death in 1975.

Mrs Mata'afa was one of several well-known members of the new *Fono*—including two former cabinet ministers (Mr Tofilau Eti and Mr Faasoo Sam Saili) and a former police commissioner (Mr Lavea Lio)—who launched a vigorous campaign after the general election to oppose the outgoing Prime Minister, Mr Tupuola Taisi Efi, when he stood for re-election to this office.

Mr Tofilau Eti and Mr Faasoo Sam Saili were among three "opposition" MPs who had accused Mr Tupuola of seeking to undermine their election campaigns by linking their names with a US company suspected of illegal practices. Both men were supporters of the former Prime Minister, Mr Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV, who had been defeated by Mr Tupuola in the 1976 election for the premiership and had shortly thereafter resigned from the *Fono*, where no effective "leader of the opposition" had emerged to take his place. (Upon his resignation Mr Tamasese had been appointed a member of the Council of Deputies, which exists to perform the functions of the Head of State if that office becomes vacant or if its holder is absent or incapacitated.)

In furtherance of their campaign to contest the election for the premiership, the opponents of Mr Tupuola formed a Human Rights Protection Party (the country's first formal political party) under the leadership of Mr Va'ai Kolone, an experienced politician and a former chairman of the public accounts committee, who subsequently received 23 votes when the members of the *Fono* met to choose a new Prime Minister on March 28, as against 24 votes cast for Mr Tupuola. Those voting for Mr Tupuola included Mr Va'ai Kolone's brother, Mr Lesatele Rapi (the Minister of Lands and Survey and Broadcasting in the outgoing Tupuola Cabinet, to which he had been appointed *vice* Mr Mano Togamau).

One of the criticisms which had been made of Mr Tupuola's record in office during the previous three years was that he had attempted to achieve an unacceptably rapid rate of economic development, and he said after his re-election that he now intended to inaugurate "a period of consolidation". He announced his new Cabinet as follows, drawn entirely from members of the *Fono* who had supported his re-election to the premiership (such support having never previously been a necessary condition for appointment to ministerial office).

*Mr Tupuola Taisi Efi ..	Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, Attorney General, Legislative, Local and District Affairs, Immigration and Police
†Mr Asi Eikeni	Justice, Labour, Public Service Commission, Youth, Sports and Cultural Affairs and Transport and Communications
†Mr Letiu Tamatoa	Economic Development, Copra and Cocoa Boards and Fisheries
Mr Faumuina Anapapa ..	Health
Mr Seuamuli Kurene ..	Works
†Mr Fuimaono Mimio ..	Education
Mr Seumanu Aita Ah Wa ..	Agriculture and Forests
‡Mr Lesatele Rapi	Lands and Survey and Broadcasting
‡Mr Vaovasamanaia Filipo ..	Finance

* Took additional responsibilities. †Changed portfolio.

‡No change.

In view of the emergence of an organized parliamentary opposition which, after the election as Speaker of one of the 24 pro-Tupuola members, had a technical strength equal to that of the Government, an unprecedented importance was attached to the outcome of electoral petitions mainly alleging bribery and "treating" by successful candidates. (Such petitions had frequently been filed after previous elections to the *Fono* but had for the most part been dismissed in the past on the grounds that the Supreme Court did not have sufficient knowledge of Samoan customs and traditions to rule on them.)

In a ruling delivered in early May 1979 upholding four petitions in respect of the February 1979 elections, however, the Chief Justice, Mr Bryan Nicholson (a New Zealander), sought for the first time to establish a clear legal distinction between the bribery of voters and the distribution of gifts in line with traditional customs, and declared that one opposition member and three pro-Tupuola members, including one minister (Mr Letiu Tamatoa), had been improperly elected. As a result of this ruling Mr Va'ai Kolone's parliamentary supporters outnumbered those of Mr Tupuola (including the Speaker) by 22 to 21 pending the holding of by-elections in August.

The Tupuola Government nevertheless remained in office, and by delaying the opening of the first session of the new *Fono* prevented a challenge to its status in the form of a motion of no confidence. Mr Tupuola justified the postponement of the parliamentary session (which would normally have opened in June 1979) on the grounds that it would help to contain the current political crisis by preventing the use of the *Fono* as a forum for further challenges to the legitimacy of members' election campaigns, including charges by his own supporters against members of the opposition. He criticized the recent legal interpretation of bribery as placing too severe a restriction on the traditional operation of *matai* suffrage, and pointed out that three of the defeated candidates who had lodged electoral petitions had themselves been judged to have used bribery.

In a speech in June 1979 drafted by the Prime Minister's department, the Head of State said that there was no cause for apprehension over the current situation, which was "a normal flow of the democratic process" and "should be faced from the point of view of finding a solution acceptable to the ordinary citizen". He added that "what is best for our country must be based . . . on the heritage that the Samoan people bring to the present" and that "short-term precedents can provide only a guideline and should not be allowed to restrict progress".

Despite this apparent attempt to minimize the significance of the Supreme Court's recent ruling, the Head of State was nevertheless petitioned by the Human Rights Protection Party to appoint Mr Va'ai Kolone as Prime Minister on the grounds that the country had lost confidence in the minority Tupuola Government. The Head of State however declined to consider this petition until after the by-elections were held on Aug. 18, 1979.

As a result of the by-elections two seats were retained by government supporters (including Mr Letiu Tamatoa, who was reappointed to the Cabinet) while each of the other two seats changed hands between the Government and the opposition, thus restoring the overall political balance in the *Fono* to its former state. However, despite its effective confirmation in office at this stage, Mr Tupuola's Government did not put its programme before the *Fono* until Nov. 13, 1979, when the first session of the new House finally opened after a hiatus of unprecedented duration.

Among the matters which were to be debated by the new *Fono* was a report on the electoral system which had been submitted to the Government in late 1978 but had not been published at that stage in view of the impending general election. The report, prepared by a commission of inquiry appointed by Mr Tupuola in 1976 under the chairmanship of Mr Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV, recommended (i) that universal suffrage, with a minimum voting age of 21, should be introduced in all parliamentary constituencies and (ii) that in constituencies where *matai* suffrage was currently used the right to stand as a candidate for election should continue to be restricted to holders of *matai* titles.

In December 1979 the death occurred of the Minister of Lands and Survey and Broadcasting, Mr Lesatele Rapi (70), who had begun his parliamentary career in 1948. The Government's support in the *Fono* was thus again reduced pending a by-election.

In early 1980 Mr Bryan Nicholson was effectively removed from office as Western Samoa's Chief Justice when the Government failed to reappoint him for a new term of office, this development being widely linked with the Prime Minister's earlier criticisms of Mr Nicholson's ruling on electoral bribery. The former editor of the government newspaper *Savali*, Mr Mike Field (also a New Zealander) had earlier been ordered to leave the country after resigning in protest at the banning of a report on the prosecutions arising out of the Chief Justice's ruling.

Economic Policy

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Aug. 21, 1979, announced its approval of a standby arrangement authorizing purchases up to the equivalent of 750,000 special drawing rights (currently about US $975,000) over the next 12 months in support of the Government's financial programme, Western Samoa's balance of payments having deteriorated in 1978 "principally as a result of lower export receipts due mostly to a weather-related decline in export volumes of copra and cocoa and an acceleration in the rate of growth of imports, mainly reflecting an increase in imports of development goods and a build-up of inventories".

The Government's financial programme was described by the IMF as "designed to alleviate the immediate balance-of-payments pressures by moderating demand and broadening the base of the economy over the medium term by improving and diversifying production". The policy measures taken to achieve these goals included "a depreciation of the exchange rate, an upward adjustment in interest rates, an increase in producer prices for major exports, a reduction in the overall fiscal deficit and steps to reduce the growth of domestic credit".

A purchase equivalent to SDR 1,250,000 had previously been authorized on Nov. 21, 1978, under the Fund's compensatory financing facility in view of the substantial fall in export earnings during 1978. An earlier purchase equivalent to SDR 500,000 had been approved under the same facility on Jan. 31, 1977, in respect of an export shortfall during 1976, although a 12-month standby arrangement equivalent to SDR 585,000 which had been approved at the same time had not been used in view of an upturn in export prices during 1977. A further 12-month standby arrangement equivalent to SDR 725,000 had however been announced by the Fund on Feb. 8, 1978.

As stated by the Fund, the Government's financial programme included a depreciation of the exchange rate; in this context, the effective rate for the tala against the US dollar was adjusted from WS$0.716 = US$1 at the end of 1978 to WS $0.9067 at the end of 1979. The major devaluation—of 15 per cent—occurred on June 20, 1979, when the middle rate was altered from WS $0.7276 to WS $0.8562, the Government explaining on this occasion that the main reason for the devaluation was the sharp drop in export revenue, with earnings from agricultural exports falling from WS $11,700,000 in 1977 to WS $8,300,000 in 1978.—(Pacific Islands Monthly - New Zealand News UK - Guardian - IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. 1976 General Election 27868 B; Exchange Rate and Purchases in 1975-76 from IMF 28161 B*)

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A. GIBRALTAR — General Election - Reappointment of Sir Joshua Hassan as Chief Minister - Agreement to reopen Gibraltar Frontier

Sir Joshua Hassan was reappointed Chief Minister of Gibraltar for a third consecutive term following a general election on Feb. 6, 1980, in which his Gibraltar Labour Party-Association for the Advancement of Civil Rights (GLP-AACR) retained eight seats in the 15-member House of Assembly. Six seats were won by Mr Peter Isola's Democratic Party for British Gibraltar (DPBG) and one seat by Mr Joe Bossano of the Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party (GSLP).

Three candidates put up by the Party for the Autonomy of Gibraltar (PAG) included Mr José Emmanuel Triay (who had contested the 1976 elections as an independent—see 28059 B), but none were returned. Two other candidates, Mr Eric Ellul (independent—ibid.) and Dr Cecil Isola (independent nationalist), also stood unsuccessfully.

Some 10,600 people went to the polls, representing 65 per cent of the electorate (75 per cent in the 1976 elections).

Sir Joshua Hassan's party stood for continuing links with Britain and the defence of Gibraltarian interests, with emphasis on the right of Gibraltarians to decide their own future.

The GSLP, which called for self-determination for Gibraltar, was formerly known as the Gibraltar Democratic Movement (GDM), changing its name in 1977 after three of its four elected members crossed the floor (two of these to the GLP-AACR).

In the course of 1979 Mr Isola became opposition leader and leader of the DPBG (which had been established subsequent to the 1976 elections and which stood for close ties with Britain) *vice* Mr Maurice Xibberas.

The PAG called for a negotiated settlement with Spain, contending that Gibraltar's colonial status must end and that a natural relationship should develop with Spain.

The composition of the Gibraltar Council of Minsters was confirmed on Feb. 12 as follows:

Sir Joshua Abraham Hassan	Chief Minister and Information
Mr A. J. Canepa	Economic Development, Trade, Labour and Social Security
Mr M. K. Featherstone	Public Works
Mr I. Abecasis	Tourism and Postal Services
Mr H. J. Zammitt	Housing and Sport
Mr F. Dellipiani	Education
Dr Reginald Valarino	Municipal Services
Mr John Brian Pérez	Medical and Health Services

The composition of the Hassan Government formed after the 1976 elections [see 28059 B] had subsequently been modified as a result of the retirement of Mr A. P. Montegriffo (Medical and Health Services) and Mr A. W. Serfaty (Tourism, Trade and Economic Development), following which Dr Valarino and Mr Pérez entered the Government.

UK-Spanish Agreement to reopen Gibraltar Frontier and commence Negotiations on Gibraltar Issue

Following meetings in Lisbon on April 9-10, 1980, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, and the Spanish Foreign Minister, Sr Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, agreed in principle to reopen the land frontier between Gibraltar and the Spanish mainland and to "suspend" the other restrictions which had been imposed when Gen. Franco had closed the border in 1969 [see 23453 A].

A joint communiqué issued on April 10 stated that negotiations would take place to solve the Gibraltar problem "in a spirit of friendship" and in accordance with "relevant" UN resolutions. Direct communications would be restored, other measures currently in force would be suspended, and future co-operation would be based on "reciprocity and full equality of rights". In seeking to "re-establish Spain's territorial integrity" Spain would ensure that "in the outcome of negotiations the interests of Gibraltarians are fully safeguarded", while Britain reaffirmed in the communiqué its commitment to "honour the freely and democratically expressed wishes of the people of Gibraltar".

The communiqué said in conclusion that British and Spanish experts would meet by June 1, 1980, to work out a timetable for reopening the border and formally restoring telephone and postal communications [telephone links between Spain and Gibraltar having remained informally in operation since their restoration for the Christmas period in December 1977]. Lord Carrington told the House of Lords on April 14 that after the completion of these practical preparations by June 1 at the latest the agreement could be speedily implemented.

Sir Joshua Hassan and Mr Isola, who issued a joint statement on April 12 expressing qualified support for the agreement, flew to London on April 13 for a meeting with Lord Carrington. On the same day 1,500 supporters of the GSLP marched to the residence of the British Governor in Gibraltar, Gen. Sir William Jackson, where Mr Bossano handed him a message asking Lord Carrington to exclude the "question of Gibraltar's decolonization and its future status" from any negotiations.

Sr Oreja told the foreign affairs committee of the Congress of Deputies (Lower House) on April 16 that Spain was willing to recognize all the rights of the people of Gibraltar except their territorial sovereignty, which "does not and never has belonged to them".

Earlier Developments concerning Gibraltar

Hopes of fresh moves towards solving the Gibraltar deadlock had arisen at the end of 1979 when Sr Oreja called in a speech to the Spanish Senate foreign relations committee on Dec. 6 for new negotiations to put an end to "this absurd anachronism"; at the same time he had indicated that an answer might be found by granting Gibraltar autonomous status as a region of Spain, as provided for in the new Spanish Constitution. (Regional autonomy had already been granted to Catalonia and the Basque region and was also envisaged on a lesser scale for other regions of Spain including Andalusia, the Spanish province surrounding Gibraltar—see 30181 A.)

Sr Oreja said that Britain had no legal claim to support its presence in Gibraltar other than Article 10 of the [1713] Treaty of Utrecht which laid down territorial limits and legal conditions; the "anachronistic provisions" of this treaty must now be superseded in a new, internationally-guaranteed document which would resolve the question of Gibraltar, and the principle which should prevail in the "decolonization" of Gibraltar was that of Spain's territorial integrity. Sr Oreja said that he had confidence in the "pragmatic sense which the British have always demonstrated, as they have done recently in the case of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia".

Furthermore, a seminar on Gibraltar—the first of its kind—had been organized in Segovia (Spain) on Dec. 7-8, 1979, by the Spanish Institute for International Affairs and had been attended by non-governmental representatives of Spain, Gibraltar and Britain, including Sir John Russell (UK ambassador to Spain from 1969 to 1974), a number of Spanish parliamentarians and the mayors of San Roque and La Linea (the Spanish towns closest to Gibraltar, whose economies had been severely affected by the border closure). At the conclusion of the seminar a resolution was approved by consensus proposing (i) the presentation of a petition to the Spanish and British Governments urging them to take steps towards fostering a climate of goodwill among the people of the region, (ii) regular Spanish-Gibraltarian contacts to increase mutual confidence and (iii) the holding of a further seminar on the issue in Gibraltar itself.

Talks had previously taken place on the Gibraltar issue on Nov. 24, 1977, in Strasbourg [see also 28714 A] when Dr David Owen, then UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, met Sr Oreja and also Sir Joshua Hassan and Mr Xibberas on the occasion of Spain's entry into the Council of Europe [see 28759 B]. The four men met again in Paris on March 15, 1978, when it was agreed to set up joint Anglo-Spanish working groups to deal with the consolidation of telephone communications, maritime links between Gibraltar and Spain, and pensions for Spaniards who worked in Gibraltar prior to the closure of the frontier in 1969. Two meetings of the working groups were held in 1978, the first in London on July 17 and the second in Madrid on Dec. 14-15 (at which a Gibraltarian delegation was also present).

Following the Conservative election victory in Britain in May 1979 the new Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, said on May 14 that British policy towards Gibraltar would not change. Lord Carrington and Sr Oreja had a meeting in New York on Sept. 24, 1979.

A 24-hour general strike was staged in La Linea on Oct. 9, 1979, the participants calling for an end to the "siege" of Gibraltar and the lifting of restrictions. The opposition Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) subsequently on Nov. 3, 1979, tabled a motion in the *Cortes* (Parliament) proposing that the time was ripe for a debate but opposing any linkage of the Spanish claim to Gibraltar with the current negotiations on Spanish membership of the European Community or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office was believed to have indicated to Spain that British support for Spain's entry into the European Community —see pages 30012, 29423 and 28657—would not be forthcoming as long as restrictions on Gibraltar remained in force. For Spain's position on membership of NATO, see 30020 B.)

The Congress of Deputies on March 27, 1980, unanimously approved a PSOE-sponsored resolution calling on the Government to negotiate with Britain on the decolonization of Gibraltar and the reopening of the border between Spain and Gibraltar. It proposed cultural, economic and other exchanges between Gibraltar and Spain and urged the Government to put into effect projects to revive the Campo de Gibraltar [i.e. the area around Gibraltar] economically and industrially.

Following a visit to Gibraltar on April 4-6, 1978, by Mrs Judith Hart, then Minister of State for Overseas Development in the Labour Government, it had been announced that British aid to Gibraltar for the period April 1978 to March 1981 would amount to £14,000,000.—(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London - Hansard - Times - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph) (*Prev. rep. 1976 Elections 28059 B; Imposition of Restrictions (1969) 23453 A; UK-Spanish Talks 28714 A*)

A. POLAND — Eighth Congress of Polish United Workers' Party - Resignation of Mr Jaroszewicz as Prime Minister - Appointment of Mr Babiuch as Successor - General Elections - Changes in Cabinet, Council of State and Politburo

Mr Edward Gierek, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), announced on Feb. 15 at the close of the party's eighth national congress that the Prime Minister, Mr Piotr Jaroszewicz, had asked not to be re-elected to the Politburo of the party's Central Committee and had requested to be released from his ministerial duties. The resignation followed a period of increasingly open criticism of Poland's recent economic performance and the downward adjustment of many of the country's short- and medium-term economic goals.

Mr Edward Babiuch, a Deputy Premier and a close associate of Mr Gierek, was on Feb. 18 appointed as Mr Jaroszewicz's successor, and announced on April 4 a reorganization of the Council of Ministers as well as an extensive programme of financial measures, intended to maintain standards of living while reducing the level of Poland's foreign debt.

Difficulties affecting the Polish Economy

Although the national economy was by the end of 1979 showing certain preliminary signs of stabilization after earlier difficulties, and although the overall foreign trade deficit fell during 1979 by $790,000,000 to $1,300 million, such developments were generally seen as being largely due to the restriction of imports of raw materials. The gross national income, according to figures published by the Central Statistical Bureau on Feb. 8, 1980, had fallen during 1979 by 2 per cent compared with the previous year, whereas an increase of 2.8 per cent had been anticipated, and the planned growth of national income for 1980 was accordingly reduced by the State Planning Committee, as announced on Dec. 2, 1979, to between 1.4 and 1.8 per cent. Interest charges and repayments due in 1980 in respect of the country's total foreign debt of about $17,000 million were expected by the Ministry of Finance to amount to some $5,000 million, and the Minister of Finance, Mr Henryk Kisiel, said in an interview with *The Financial Times* of London on Jan. 11, 1980, that Poland had been obliged to postpone its plans to reach an equilibrium in its foreign trade during 1980. The country would, he said, seek various credit agreements to the value of approximately $5,000 million during 1980 (a similar sum having been obtained during 1979).

The economic problems resulted in part from the extent of foreign borrowing entailed in the intensive development of Polish industry during the early 1970s following the accession of Mr Gierek as First Secretary of the PUWP in December 1970 [see 24389 A], as internal production problems and an increasingly competitive export market had caused difficulty in obtaining the foreign currencies with which to repay the debts. A succession of very poor grain harvests resulted in heavy reliance on imports particularly from the United States and Canada, and added significantly to the national debt. (In 1977 some 35 per cent of Poland's grain requirement was obtained in this way; the 1979 harvest was 17,000,000 tonnes compared with the planned harvest of 22,400,000 tonnes, and during 1979 a total of 8,400,000 tonnes were imported.) Shortages of animal fodder became prevalent, placing pressure on the Government's attempts to rebuild the national livestock population which had been reduced during the first half of 1976 by some 15 per cent due to widespread slaughtering [see page 28165 and 28812 B], so that shortages of meat supplies to consumers remained a particular source of public discontent throughout this period (most of Poland's best quality meat being exported).

Attempts to improve the efficiency of Polish agriculture met, however, with constant opposition from the farming community. A proposal made by the Government in 1976 that the owners of private farms or smallholdings (about 80 per cent of the total area under cultivation being of this type) should be obliged, if elderly or judged inefficient, to sell their land to the state-owned farms, was so strongly opposed by farmers and the Catholic Church that it had to be substantially amended so as to allow such farmers to pass on their property to their families in return for a state pension. Meanwhile the introduction of a compulsory state pension scheme for farmers also raised widespread protests, and during 1978 some 600,000 farmers were believed to have withheld their contributions. A series of milk delivery strikes also took place in several areas in protest at the new law.

In accordance with the decision of the five-year plan for 1976-80 to increase real earnings by 16-18 per cent against their 1975 levels [see page 28165], a series of wage increases significantly raised the average purchasing power of the population, but Polish industry was frequently criticized for its alleged inability to offer the range of consumer goods envisaged by the plan. A number of measures intended to stimulate the private sector, such as tax advantages for small businessmen and the protection of small shopkeepers, had only limited effect, and the Government was widely accused of a failure of management in this area.

In a further attempt to encourage foreign investment the Government on Feb. 1, 1978, aligned the commercial exchange rates of several Western currencies with the special rates already available for tourist transactions, the commercial rate for the US dollar being thus raised from $1 = 19.92 zlotys to $1 = 33.20 zlotys. (At the end of 1979 the rate stood at $1 = 31.00 zlotys.)

Expressions of Public Concern over Political Management

The months preceding the PUWP party congress were marked by intense public debate of the problems currently faced by Poland, and Mr Gierek himself conceded during a tour of Polish industrial areas during November 1979 that much of the economic and social progress foreseen in the five-year plan for 1976-80 was now unlikely to be achieved.

The first major attack on the Government's record was published during August 1979 by a prominent economist and senior party member, Mr Stefan Bratkowski, who alleged that the Government had failed to adapt its structures to the complex requirements of a developed industrial nation, and that bureaucracy currently represented a major obstacle to industrial progress. Mr Bratkowski called for the separation of the PUWP from the civil administration structure; for an independent parliament; and for free and independent trade unions and mass media.

Nowa, an unofficial publisher, printed during October 5,000 copies of a confidential document compiled during June 1979 by the "Experience and Future" (DIP) study group, an organization of intellectuals which included several senior PUWP members. The 76-page report, entitled "Report on the State of the Republic and Ways leading to Its Reform", criticized the inadequacy of party structures and warned of public frustration leading possibly to apathy or even "blind revolt". It stressed, however, that any political reforms undertaken "must not disturb the balance of power in Europe", and affirmed its faith in the Soviet Union as an "authentic and efficient ally".

The PUWP published on Oct. 29, 1979, a draft report for discussion by the approximately 3,000,000 party members before the congress in February 1980. Although the report admitted that agricultural targets for 1976-80 were not now likely to be fulfilled, it claimed that the country had made "considerable progress" since 1971, more than doubling its industrial production since that year, and said that the coal mining industry had met its target of 200,000,000 tonnes per annum. The document also spoke of the high priority to be given to housing in the new programme for 1981-85, but, unlike the 1975 draft for 1976-80, avoided firm predictions of achievements in this area. Dissidents and "enemies of socialism" in Polish society were strongly attacked, and an appeal was made for a "lively dialogue" with the Polish people.

The document found only limited public support, however, and Mr Gierek admitted during a speech given on Nov. 17 in Szczecin (Stettin) that the country's immediate prospects were worse than had

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been suggested by the report. In particular, housing programmes and meat supplies to consumers had not fulfilled the PUWP's expectations, he said, adding that the party must accept some of the blame for failures of management, and that a period of relative austerity lasting up to five years now seemed likely.

Mr Jaroszewicz defended the Government's overall performance in a speech given on Dec. 12 to a party conference in Warsaw, but said that the Government did not reject much of the recent criticism and was "trying to draw the correct conclusions" from it. "Where the needs of everyday life and socialist relations outstrip the potential, ability and attitudes of the people who make up the leading cadres", Mr Jaroszewicz said, "changes will have to be made."

In what was widely interpreted as an effort to promote a spirit of national unity, Mr Gierek published on Feb. 6, 1980, a warm tribute on the 75th birthday of Mr Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been First Secretary of the PUWP from 1956 until 1970. The tribute was the first official party recognition of Mr Gomulka since his removal from power following the failure of an attempt to impose sharp price rises [see 24389 A], and reflected a recent revival of interest in his policies (which had not favoured extensive Western involvement in the development of the national economy, and had generally sought to avoid foreign borrowing wherever possible).

Eighth Congress of the PUWP - Changes in Membership of Politburo - Election of Mr Babiuch vice Mr Jaroszewicz - Elections - Cabinet Changes

The eighth congress of the PUWP held in Warsaw on Feb. 11-15, 1980, was attended by 1,847 delegates and representatives from the Communist parties of all Warsaw Pact member states and from many other communist or socialist parties, including those of Vietnam and Yugoslavia. During the third day of the congress, the delegates divided into 18 discussion groups before presenting their final reports on the fourth day.

Mr Gierek delivered on Feb. 11 a four-hour opening speech to the congress in which he called upon the Polish people to "unite in the name of Poland's prosperity". He said that the general strategy decided at the sixth and seventh congresses of the PUWP [see 25136 A; 27642 B] had resulted in considerable social and economic successes, producing full employment and an improved system of social welfare. Since 1970, he said, real incomes had risen by some 50 per cent, national income by nearly 85 per cent, industrial output by 130 per cent and agricultural production by 30 per cent, including a 36 per cent improvement in livestock production. Some 9,000,000 people had been housed in new flats built during that period, and over 2,500,000 new jobs had been created by the Government's economic investment programmes.

Mr Gierek avoided, however, direct comparison of the whole period since 1970 with that since 1976, in which, he said, both internal and external economic conditions had deteriorated, due largely to the destabilization of world markets and increases in the prices of fuels and raw materials. The resulting imbalances in the economy, he said, had been aggravated by the series of poor harvests, but also "by a number of subjective shortcomings, and in particular by failure to implement the tasks in the field of increasing the efficiency of management". Mr Gierek said that although there was at present no foreseeable improvement in the world economic situation, progress could be achieved by improved discipline and organization in the work sphere.

Mr Gierek stressed the achievements of the coal and lignite mining industries, to which he attached particular importance in view of the recent increases in the cost of imported fuels, and outlined an extensive nuclear and thermal power generation programme for the 1981-85 period. Conditions were also on hand, he said, to achieve a production of up to 24,000,000 tonnes of steel and of some 500,000 tonnes of copper in 1985, in view of the planned modernization and development of these industries.

The importance of industrial exports to the recovery of the national economy was also emphasized by Mr Gierek, who called for a general improvement in the quality, reliability and attractiveness of Polish exports. Efficient management in the industrial sector generally was essential to the correct use of energy and of raw materials, he said.

Investment in the agricultural sector was expected to result during the period 1981-85 in a net rise in production of at least 12 per cent, particular emphasis being placed on grain crops and animal fodder, while the collective sector in farming was expected to increase in significance.

Mr Gierek stressed at length the firmness of the country's economic, political and defence links with the Soviet Union and with all Warsaw Pact states, describing the latter as "the fundamental and unshakeable guarantee of our national security". While making no direct reference to the recent involvement of Soviet troops in Afghanistan [see 30229 A], he welcomed that country's overthrow in April 1978 of the Government of President Daud [see 29037 A] and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Mr Gierek expressed concern at the decision of the United States Congress to postpone the ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) which had been signed by the US and the Soviet Union on June 18, 1979 [see 30117 A], and more particularly at the December 1979 decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy a new system of nuclear missile defences in Western Europe [see 30159 A]. This "new and particularly dangerous stage in the arms race", said Mr Gierek, called for a new initiative in the reduction of East-West tensions, and he proposed that a new conference on European disarmament should take place in Warsaw, which he saw as a symbolically appropriate venue in view of its past oppression by Nazi Germany.

Mr Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party and the leader of the Soviet delegation to the congress, told the assembly in his speech on Feb. 12 that the "fraternal alliance and comprehensive co-operation" between Poland and the Soviet Union had resulted in the growth of Soviet-Polish trade by almost 300 per cent since 1970, but reiterated Mr Gierek's demand for the improved efficiency and quality of production in Poland.

Mr Suslov attributed much of the current conflict in the world to the decay of what he described as imperialist societies, continuing: "China's aggression against Vietnam; the NATO decisions aimed at a new round in the arms race; the drawing up of huge US armed forces around Iran; the training and despatch of armed terrorists into democratic Afghanistan, which forced the Government of that country to request aid from the Soviet Union—all these are not random heterogeneous phenomena, but links in a single chain."

The addresses of the leaders of the delegations from both the Czechoslovak and East German Communist parties also stressed the defence aspects of the Warsaw Pact, accusing China of complicity with the Western powers in the raising of international tension.

Mr Vasil Bilak, a member of the Presidium and a secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, welcomed "the Soviet Union's comprehensive internationalist help to the Afghan people in its struggle to defend its inviolable right to independence and progress against external aggression by counter-revolutionary forces", while Herr Paul Verner, a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Party (SED), blamed NATO for the escalation of the arms race which, he said, "obliges us, together with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty states, to maintain our defence capabilities at the required level within the framework of the socialist military alliance".

Changes in Membership of Politburo - Resignation of Mr Jaroszewicz as Prime Minister - Election of Mr Babiuch

Mr Jaroszewicz (70) was one of four members of the Politburo who were on Feb. 15 not re-elected to this body. The reports of the 18 study groups on Feb. 14 had revealed often strong criticism of the Government's leadership, and Mr Jaroszewicz had not presented a speech which was scheduled to be delivered on that day.

Mr Stefan Olszowski, a former Foreign Minister and PUWP secretary, also failed to be re-elected to the Politburo, as did Mr Jozef Tejchma, Minister of Education and Training since February 1979 [see 29545 C] and Mr Jozef Kepa, Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection, also since February 1979 [ibid.]. Both Mr Tejchma and Mr Kepa had until the latter date held posts as Deputy Premiers.

The membership of the Politburo was elected as follows:

Full members: Mr Edward Gierek, Mr Edward Babiuch, Mr Zdzislaw Grudzien, Mr Henryk Jablonski, Mr Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Mr Stanislaw Kania, Mr Alojzy Karkoszka*, Mr Stanislaw Kowalczyk, Mr Wladyslaw Kruczek, Mr Jerzy Lukaszewicz†, Mr Jan Szydlak, Mr Andrzej Werblan* and Mr Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk†.

Candidate members: Mr Kazimierz Barcikowski, Mr Jozef Pinkowski*, Mr Tadeusz Pyka*, Mr Emil Wojtaszek* and Mr Zdzislaw Zandarowski*.

* New member. † Formerly a candidate member.

Mr Karkoszka had been a member of the PUWP secretariat since 1971 [see page 25138], and a secretary of the Central Committee and PUWP secretary for the Warsaw voivodship since 1976 [see 28164 A]; Mr Lukaszewicz had been a secretary of the PUWP Central Committee since 1971 and a candidate member of the Politburo since 1975 [see page 27643]; Mr Werblan had been a member of the PUWP secretariat since 1971 and was currently a secretary of the Central Committee; Mr Wrzaszczyk had been a candidate member of the Politburo since 1975 [see page 27643]; Mr Pinkowski had been a secretary of the Central Committee since 1974; Mr Pyka had been a Deputy Prime Minister since 1975 [see 27474 B]; Mr Wojtaszek had been Foreign Minister since 1976 [see 28164 A]; and Mr Zandarowski had been a member of the PUWP secretariat since 1972 [see 25228 A] and a secretary of the Central Committee since 1975.

It was also announced on Feb. 15 that Mr Gierek had been re-elected as First Secretary of the PUWP for a further term of five years.

The following were re-elected or newly elected as secretaries of the Central Committee: Mr Stanislaw Kania, Mr Jerzy Lukaszewicz, Mr Jozef Pinkowski, Mr Jerzy Waszezuk (new), Mr Andrzej Werblan, Mr Andrzej Zabinski (new) and Mr Zdzislaw Zandarowski. Mr Zdzislaw Kurowski and Mr Zbigniew Zielinski were re-elected as members of the secretariat. Former secretaries not re-elected were Mr Edward Babiuch, Mr Ryszard Frelek, Mr Alojzy Karkoszka and Mr Stefan Olszowski.

In his closing speech to the congress on Feb. 15, Mr Gierek announced that Mr Jaroszewicz had asked not to be re-elected to the Politburo and wished to retire from his duties as Prime Minister; Mr Gierek thanked Mr Jaroszewicz, whom he described as "an outstanding party and state activist", for the work which he had done since his appointment as Prime Minister in December 1970 in succession to Mr Jozef Cyrankiewicz [see page 24391].

At a session of the *Sejm* (Parliament) held on Feb. 18, Mr Edward Babiuch was unanimously elected to succeed Mr Jaroszewicz as Prime Minister.

Mr Babiuch (52) had been a member of the Polish United Workers' Party since 1948, being elected in 1970 as a member of the Politburo [see page 24391] and also as a secretary of the Central Committee (but relinquishing the latter post during the 1980 congress, it being incompatible with the post of Prime Minister). He had been a Deputy Chairman of the Council of State since 1976 [see 27722 A] and was regarded as a close associate of Mr Gierek.

Parliamentary and Voivodship Elections

Elections took place on March 23, 1980, to the *Sejm* and to the 49 voivodship councils in Poland. The National Unity Front (NUF), which comprised the PUWP, the United Peasants' Party (UPP), the Democratic Party (DP), the Roman Catholic Znak and Pax groups and a number of independents, presented 646 candidates for the 460 seats in the *Sejm* and some 10,200 candidates for the 6,740 seats in the voivodships.

Despite widespread appeals by dissidents for a general boycott of the elections, a statement issued on March 24 by the State Electoral Commission said that 98.87 per cent of the 25,098,816 electorate voted in the elections, casting 24,802,612 valid votes of which 99.52 per cent were for the National Unity Front's lists.

Many voters made use, however, of their right to alter the order of preference of the candidates on the ballot papers, often producing poor results for prominent politicians. In one constituency Mr Stanislaw Kowalczyk, the Minister of the Interior, fell from first place on the list to sixth place, whereas the leader of the parliamentary Roman Catholic Znak group, Mr Janusz Zablocki, rose from eighth place to second place. Mr Jaroszewicz was also re-elected to the *Sejm* despite dropping from first to fourth place in his Warsaw constituency.

Constitutive Session of New Sejm - Election of Council of State - Presentation of New Cabinet by Mr Babiuch

The newly elected *Sejm* assembled on April 2, 1980, when Mr Henryk Jablonski (PUWP) was re-elected Chairman of the Council of State, the remaining membership of the Council of State being elected as follows:

Deputy Chairmen: Mr Tadeusz Witold Mlynczak (DP), Mr Kazimierz Sekomski (independent), Mr Zdzislaw Tomal (UPP) and Mr Jerzy Zietek (PUWP).

Secretary: Mr Edward Duda (UPP).

Members: Mr Edward Gierek (PUWP), Mrs Eugenia Kempara (PUWP), Mr Emil Kolodziej (UPP), Mr Wladyslaw Kruczek (PUWP), Mrs Krystyna Marszalek-Mlyczyk (DP), Mr Jerzy Ozdowski (independent), Mr Jozef Ozga-Michalski (UPP), Mr Henryk Szafranski (PUWP), Mr Jan Sezepanski (independent), Mr Stanislaw Wronski (PUWP), and Mr Zdzislaw Zandarowski (PUWP).

The *Sejm* also approved on April 2 the appointment of Mr Babiuch as Prime Minister, and he subsequently presented on April 4 the following Council of Ministers, which included two new posts carrying ministerial rank to be occupied by the chairmen of two major co-operative unions.

* Mr Edward Babiuch	Prime Minister
Mr Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk	Deputy Premier and Chairman of Planning Commission
* Mr Roman Malinowski	Deputy Premier and Food Industry and Purchases
Mr Mieczyslaw Jagielski	Deputy Premiers
†Mr Kazimierz Barcikowski	
Mr Tadeusz Pyka	
Gen. Mieczyslaw Moczar	Chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control

Ministers

Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski	National Defence
Mr Stanislaw Kowalczyk	Internal Affairs
Mr Emil Wojtaszek	Foreign Affairs
Mr Henryk Kisiel	Finance
†Mr Ryszard Karski	Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy
Mr Jozef Kepa	Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection
Prof. Jerzy Bafia	Justice
Prof. Janusz Gorski	Science, Higher Education and Technology
Mr Marian Sliwinski	Health and Social Welfare
Mrs Maria Milczarek	Labour, Wages and Social Affairs
Mr Zygmunt Najdowski	Culture and Art
Mr Adam Glazur	Building and Building Materials Industry
‡Mr Zbigniew Bartoszewicz	Power Industry and Atomic Energy
Mr Wlodzimierz Lejczak	Mining
Mr Franziszek Kaim	Metallurgy
Mr Aleksander Kopec	Engineering Industry
Mr Stanislaw Mach	Light Industry
Mr Leon Klonica	Agriculture
Mr Tadeusz Skwirzynski	Forestry and Timber Industry
Mr Adam Kowalik	Internal Trade and Services
Mr Mieczyslaw Zajfryd	Transport
Mr Eugeniusz Szyr	Raw Materials
Gen. Mieczyslaw Grudzien	War Veterans' Affairs
* Mr Krzysztof Kruszewski	Education and Training
* Mr Henryk Pruchniewicz	Chemical Industry
* Mr Andrzej Jedynak	Heavy and Agricultural Machinery Industry
* Mr Zbigniew Rudnicki	Communications

Other Posts of Ministerial Rank

* Mr Jerzy Kuberski	Head of the Office for Religious Affairs
Mr Tadeusz Bejm	Deputy Chairman of Supreme Chamber of Control
Mr Eugeniusz Grochal	Chairman of State Prices Commission
§ Mr Tadeusz Rudolf	First Deputy Chairmen of Planning Commission
Mr Maciej Wirowski	
§ Mr Jan Kaminski	Chairman of Central Union of Self-Aid Agricultural Co-operatives
* Mr Wiktor Sielanko	Chairman of Central Union of Labour Co-operatives

*New appointment. †Appointed Feb. 18, 1980 [see below].
‡Appointed Aug. 9, 1979 [see below]. §Changed portfolio.

Mr Malinowski (45), an agricultural economist, was in 1975 elected secretary to the supreme council of the UPP.

Mr Barcikowski (52), a candidate member of the Politburo since 1971 and Minister of Agriculture from 1974 until 1977 [see 28812 B], was appointed Deputy Premier on Feb. 18, 1980, upon the election of Mr Babiuch as Prime Minister.

Mr Karski (54), Polish ambassador to Austria from 1973 to 1978, became First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy on his return to Poland in 1978, and was appointed Minister for Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy on Feb. 18, having held this post on a provisional basis since the resignation on Jan. 2 of his predecessor, Mr Jerzy Olszewski.

Mr Bartoszewicz (47), a Deputy Minister of Heavy and Agricultural Machinery since 1976, had succeeded Mr Andrzej Szozda as Minister of the Power Industry and Atomic Energy on Aug. 9, 1979. The First Deputy Minister and the Secretary of State to the Ministry of Power Industry and Atomic Energy had also been replaced on this date.

Mr Kruszewski (40) lectured at the University of Warsaw until his appointment in 1973 to the PUWP Central Committee, becoming in 1977 a secretary of the Warsaw party committee with responsibility for educational matters in the city.

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Mr Pruchniewicz (53) held various posts in the chemical industry before becoming Deputy Minister of the Chemical Industry from 1971-74 and from 1978 onwards.

Mr Jedynak (47), a former general director of the motor industry, was in 1976 appointed Deputy Minister for the Engineering Industry, and in 1978 succeeded Mr Karski as Polish ambassador to Austria.

Mr Rudnicki (51), an economist, became a member of the presidium and secretary of the DP in 1973.

Mr Kuberski (49) was Minister of Education and Training from 1972 until 1979, when he took up an appointment in the central committee of the PUWP [see 29545 C].

Mr Sielanko (44) held several posts in the electronics industry before becoming chairman of the Central Union of Labour Co-operatives in March 1980.

Mr Rudolf and **Mr Kaminski** were both hitherto Ministers without Portfolio [see 29545 C and 27722 A respectively].

The outgoing members of the Council of Ministers were Dr Longin Cegielski and Mr Kazimierz Sekomski (Deputy Chairmen); Mr Franciszek Adamkiewicz (Heavy and Agricultural Engineering); Mr Emil Kolodziej (Food Industry and Purchases); Mr Henryk Konopacki (Chemical Industry); Mr Edward Kowalczyk (Communications); Mr Jozef Tejchma (Education and Training); and Mr Kazimierz Kakol (Head of the Religious Affairs Office). Mr Jan Szydlak, who had also been recalled from his post as Deputy Premier on Feb. 18, was subsequently appointed chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions in succession to Mr Wladyslaw Kruczek, who had been appointed chairman of the PUWP Central Commission of Party Control.

Mr Babiuch said in his April 4 speech that the ministerial appointment of Mr Kaminski and Mr Sielanko was a consequence of the Government's wish to involve the leadership of the major co-operative unions more closely in its economic policy, but stressed that their ministerial duties would not limit the independent nature of their other functions.

Mr Babiuch outlined in his government statement an economic plan whose main elements were (i) a major reduction of fuel and raw material imports; (ii) a call for improved efficiency in commerce and industry; (iii) the gradual withdrawal of subsidies particularly on foodstuffs, to be offset by the reorganization of state subsidies to the benefit of large households and the lower paid; and (iv) the particular improvement of housing construction and of meat supplies to consumers. Mr Babiuch added, however, that no rapid improvement in standards of living seemed likely, and called for the co-operation of the public and of industry in overcoming the country's present difficulties.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Seventh PUWP Congress 27642 B; Cabinet 27722 A, 28164 A, 28812 B, 28863 A, 29226 C, 29545 C; Council of State 27722 A; Economic Developments 28863 A, 29845 A; Elections 27722 A*)

A. TOGO — Presidential and Parliamentary Elections - Referendum on New Constitution - Trial of Alleged Conspirators - Release of Political Prisoners - Reconstitution of Cabinet

On Dec. 30, 1979, President Gnassingbe Eyadema was re-elected for a seven-year term as the sole candidate nominated by the ruling *Rassemblement du peuple togolais* (RPT) at its congress held on Nov. 27-29, 1979. According to the official result, he received 1,286,391 votes and only 269 votes were cast against him.

On the same day the electors approved a 67-member list of candidates drawn up by the RPT for the new National Assembly (the first to be elected since that dissolved in 1967—see 21884 A); the approved list of candidates obtained 96 per cent of the votes cast.

As announced on Dec. 12, a referendum was held on the same day (Dec. 30) on a new Constitution—the first for over 12 years—approved by the RPT congress, with the official result of 99.9 per cent of the voters having voted for it and only 1,200 (all of them in Lomé, the country's capital) against it.

The new Constitution provided for the institutionalization of the RPT as Togo's sole legal political party and for a Parliament which was to control the strong executive power held by the President.

The age of civic majority, and thus the minimum voting age, had been reduced from 21 to 18 years on Dec. 16. In view of the fact that some 90 per cent of the electorate were illiterate, coloured ballot papers were used (green for a vote for the President, blue for a vote for the new National Assembly, and white for a "yes" vote and red for a "no" vote on the Constitution).

At a trial which ended on Aug. 25, 1979, a security court had passed sentences on 15 defendants—eight of them being tried in absentia—for their involvement in the coup planned for Oct. 15, 1977 [see 28756 C], but called off at the last moment as the conspirators realized that the Government of President Eyadema had received warning of their plans.

Of the accused present in court, Maj. Sanvi and Mr Emmanuel de Souza were condemned to death, and eight others who were given death sentences in absentia included Mr Gilchrist and Mr Bonito Olympio (sons of ex-President Olympio, killed in a coup d'état in 1963—see 19249 A) and Lt.-Col. Merlaud Lawson. Prison sentences were passed on three other defendants, among them Mr Sanvi de Tove (former director-general of the Compagnie française de l'Afrique de l'Ouest).

It was, however, disclosed on Aug. 26 that the court had asked President Eyadema to pardon Maj. Sanvi and Mr de Souza, and on Aug. 30 the President announced that he had done so. (Mr de Souza, who had been arrested in Accra, Ghana, on June 3, 1979, and exchanged—together with a brother of Lt.-Col. Lawson, Mr Teyi Lawson, arrested at the same time—against some 30 Ghanaians detained in Togo, was said to have made a full confession during the trial.)

On Jan. 13, 1980—the 13th anniversary of his accession to power [see 21884 A]—President Eyadema proclaimed the Third Togolese Republic and announced the release of 34 of the 45 political prisoners officially stated to be held in the country and the rehabilitation of the de Souza family, some members of which had been deprived of their nationality after the 1977 plot.

The 11 prisoners who continued to be held included those sentenced to imprisonment in August 1979 [see above]. In Paris a *Mouvement togolais pour la démocratie* (opposed to President Eyadema's regime), however, claimed on Jan. 15, 1980, that several hundred political prisoners were "languishing in Togo's prisons".

On March 3 the Government was reconstituted under a presidential decree as follows:

* President Gnassingbe Eyadema	Defence
* Mr Koudjolou Dogo	Planning and Administrative Reform
* Mr Kpotivi Tevi-Djidjogbe Lacle	Interior
* Mr Koffi Voule-Frititi	Youth, Culture and Sports
* Dr Anani Kuma Akakpo-Ahianyo	Foreign Affairs and Co-operation
* Mr Tete Tevi Benissan	Economy and Finance
* Mr Moussa Barque Barry . .	Public Works, Mines, Energy and Hydraulic Resources
* Mr Samon Kortho	Rural Planning
* Mr Hodabalo Bodjona . .	Public Health
* Mr Boumbèra Alassounouma . .	National Education and Scientific Research
* Mr Anani Gassou	Rural Development
* Mr Vigniko Amedegnato . .	Information
Mr Kwasivi Kpetigo	Industries and State Enterprises
Mr Koffi Douala	Commerce and Transport
Mrs Abra Amedome	Social Affairs and Women's Advancement
Mr Komla Tsatsu	Labour and Civil Service
Mr Akanyo Awounor Kodjovi	Justice and Keeper of the Seals

* No change.

The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications had on Sept. 20, 1979, been provisionally attached to the Presidency. Mr Kpetigo had first been appointed to the Cabinet as Minister of Commerce and Transport on the same date.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29780 A*)

B. LATIN AMERICA — Admission of Spain to ECLA

At a ceremony in Santiago (Chile) on April 8, 1980, Spain was formally admitted as the 34th member of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or Cepal), in accordance with a resolution approved at an ECLA session in La Paz (Bolivia) a year previously. (The other non-regional members of ECLA are Britain, France, the United States, Canada and the Netherlands.)—(La Vanguardia, Barcelona) (*Prev. rep. Spain, Relations with Andean Group page 30140*)

University of North Carolina

A. IRAN — Developments in Ethnic Minority Areas, February 1979 to February 1980

With the weakening of the central Government and the virtual disintegration of the Iranian armed forces in the wake of the Islamic revolution of February 1979 [see 29733 A], Iran's ethnic minority groups took the opportunity to press for concessions which they had been denied under the Shah and for the establishment of some form of autonomy under the new Iranian Constitution. There were five main groups involved, namely the Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkomans, who inhabited the border regions of the country and who together constituted about half of the Iranian population of some 35,000,000 (the remainder being predominantly Persians). (There were also three indigenous tribal groups in western Iran—the Qashqais, Lurs and Bakhtiaris—who had traditionally opposed Iranian rulers but who made few demands to the new regime.)

The Azerbaijanis, with a population estimated at between 5,000,000 and 10,000,000, formed the largest ethnic group, dominating the provinces of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan in the north-west of Iran with kinsmen across the border in the Soviet Union.

The Kurds, numbering about 4,000,000 in Iran, were the second largest group, living in the provinces of Western Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah and Ilam, likewise in the north-west of the country, while several million more Kurds lived across the border in Iraq and Turkey, where they had similarly fought for autonomy and opposed the central Government [see 30103 A and 29921 A respectively], and also in Syria and the Soviet Union.

The Arab community in Iran totalled about 2,000,000 in the oil-rich south-western province of Khuzistan which bordered Iraq, that country being repeatedly accused of aiding the Iranian Arab nationalists.

The Turkomans and Baluchis, both tribal groups and each with a population of about 1,000,000 within Iran, straddled large areas over the border. The Turkomans, inhabiting principally the north-eastern Iranian province of Mazandaran, had kinsmen in the Soviet Union, while the Baluchis, dwelling in the south-eastern province of Baluchistan and Sistan, were also strongly represented in Afghanistan and Pakistan where they had long struggled for autonomy.

All these groups had traditionally opposed the central Iranian Government, calling for varying degrees of self-rule, and the Kurds and Azerbaijanis had in 1946 succeeded, albeit briefly, in forming their own Soviet-backed republics [see 7952 A; 8432 A]. Each group differed in language and customs from the majority Persian community, while many of the Kurds, Baluchis and Turkomans also differed in religion, being members of the Sunni Islam sect while Shia Islam was established as the official Iranian religion in Article 12 of the new Iranian Constitution.

The demands of the ethnic groups ranged widely, including equal rights with Persians, cultural and religious freedom, land reform, economic development of their regions, greater representation in the central Government or complete autonomy, although none called for full separation from Iran. Later, however, the campaign of the minority communities tended to widen into a "democratic challenge" to the rule of the Islamic regime as a whole, the Azerbaijanis in particular opposing the sweeping powers held by the clergy which were firmly established in the Constitution [see page 30213 and also pages 30143 and 30144-45], while all opposed (i) the presence in their towns and cities of Revolutionary Guards (Pasderan, a paramilitary police force which by May 1979 had a permanent membership of about 10,000 directly responsible to the Revolutionary Council—see page 30141); and (ii) the formation of local revolutionary committees, similarly responsible to the Revolutionary Council, many of which were said to be dominated by Shia Persians even in the minority areas.

The protests of these groups, initially expressed in the form of demonstrations and rallies, gave rise to frequent outbreaks of violence, in particular in the Kurdish provinces where there was already an established Kurdish fighting force. [The seizure of the Iranian embassy in London by representatives of the Iranian Arab community in April-May 1980 will be dealt with in a subsequent article.] In addition, the Kurds, Azerbaijanis and Baluchis largely boycotted the referendum on the Islamic Constitution on Dec. 2-3 [see page 30213], while certain Kurdish, Arab and Azerbaijani movements had earlier called for a boycott of the elections to the Constituent Council of Experts [see page 30144] and some Kurdish organizations had also opposed the referendum on the creation of an Islamic republic [see page 30143].



(*New York Times*)

The attitude of the new Iranian regime towards the demands of the ethnic groups was complicated by the sharing of power between (i) the Revolutionary Council presided over by Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and (ii) the Government then led by Dr Mehdi Bazargan; generally, however, the leadership feared that the granting of autonomy demands could seriously jeopardize the unity of Iran, and that some groups wanted complete separatism rather than a degree of self-rule within Iran.

Initially efforts were made to placate the minority groups by offering to meet some, but not all, of their demands but force was frequently used to put an end to opposition, notably in Kurdistan where a large-scale offensive was launched in August-September. However, on Dec. 17 the Government presented details of a comprehensive autonomy programme for all Iranian provinces which satisfied the basic autonomy demands of the ethnic communities, while as a further concession (and in the face of a mass boycott of the presidential election—see page 30214) Ayatollah Khomeini on Jan. 20, 1980, was reported to have agreed to an amendment of Article 12 of the Constitution whereby non-Shias were to be given a degree of religious freedom in the areas where they formed the majority [see page 30213].

Details of the developments in the five main ethnic areas are summarized under cross-headings below.

The Kurdish Minority

The Kurds were the first of the minority groups to press the new Iranian leadership for concessions, and their struggle for autonomy gave rise to the most protracted bouts of fighting with government forces throughout 1979 and the first part of 1980. Ayatollah Khomeini, who equated the Kurdish revolt with a communist uprising (based on the espousal of left-wing views by Kurdish leaders and the discovery of Soviet and Czech-made weapons in the Kurdish areas), offered the Kurds only limited control over regional affairs, fearing (i) that the Kurds were ultimately seeking separation from Iran and (ii) that any concessions made to them would set a precedent for other minority groups seeking autonomy.

The Kurdish campaign was led by (i) Shaikh Ezzedin Hosseini, the Sunni Moslem leader of Mahabad (in Western Azerbaijan) whose movement comprised various left-wing Kurdish resistance groups, notably the (Marxist-Leninist) Komala and the Kurdish *Fedayeen* (or *Cherik Fedayeen-el-Khalq*), and (ii) Dr Abdel Rahman Qasemlu, who returned from exile in Europe in mid-1978 to head the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), also based in Mahabad; the KDPI, which had re-emerged in February 1979 after being banned since the mid-1940s under the Shah, also commanded the Kurdish guerrilla forces (known as *Pesh Mergas*).

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On Feb. 14, 1979, the Kurdish rebel leaders received a government delegation in Mahabad, led by Mr Dariush Foruhar (then Minister of Labour and Social Affairs), and in the course of their deliberations put forward their programme for autonomy, comprising basically (i) the right to determine all local affairs within the four Kurdish provinces through an autonomous Kurdish Government, and (ii) the right to promote their customs, culture and religion; matters of national defence, foreign policy and long-term economic and monetary plans, on the other hand, were to remain the responsibility of the central Government.

These demands were largely ignored by the Government over the following four weeks during which period efforts were made instead to exploit differences within the Kurdish community and to "play off" the Shias against the Sunni majority. This situation gave rise to a series of violent incidents culminating on March 18, 1979, in a rebellion in Sanandaj, the capital city of Kurdistan province, where fighting between *Pesh Mergas* and government troops continued for several days. The clashes subsided on March 22 when a government delegation, this time headed by Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, the spiritual leader of Tehran (who died on Sept. 10—see page 30142), arrived in the city and, after three days of talks, agreed to grant the Kurds (and other minority groups) limited autonomy.

In the course of the fighting, which was estimated to have claimed at least 100 lives and possibly over 200, the rebels were reinforced by Kurds from neighbouring towns and villages, while other minority groups were reported to have expressed their verbal support for the insurgents.

On March 19 Ayatollah Khomeini appealed over the radio for an end to the fighting in Sanandaj, stressing that "the people in Kurdistan should know that we have no differences with our Sunni brothers" and blaming the outbreak of violence on "counter-revolutionaries" and "foreign-inspired agents". The shooting abated on March 22 following the arrival in Sanandaj of the government delegation headed by Ayatollah Taleghani, which over the following three days held talks with Kurdish representatives, leading to the conclusion of an agreement between the two sides on March 24 under which the Kurds were to be granted a degree of autonomy on condition that they end their siege of the army barracks in Sanandaj and withdraw from the buildings which they had occupied in the city.

On March 25 Tehran radio gave details as follows of the government autonomy plan for the Kurds (which was also to be extended to other ethnic minority groups): (i) the Kurds would participate in the formulation of the new Iranian Constitution (Dr Qasemlu being elected on Aug. 3 to serve on the Constituent Council of Experts formulating the Constitution—see page 30144 and also below); (ii) full cultural freedom would be granted; (iii) Kurdish would be taught in local schools together with Farsi (Persian); (iv) Kurds would be permitted to administer regional affairs, a five-man provincial council being appointed to arrange the election of a new administrative council for the area; (v) Kurds would benefit from the provinces' natural resources; and (vi) they would be given facilities to develop their own economy. Also on March 25 Mr Ibrahim Yunessi was appointed the first Kurdish Governor-General of Kurdistan and on March 26 soldiers in Sanandaj released the last of the Kurdish prisoners whom they had seized during the fighting there.

Although Ayatollah Taleghani was said to have urged the Government to implement the autonomy plan the goodwill between the two sides dissolved in early April in the wake of violent clashes in north-eastern Iran, involving the Turkomans who were similarly pressing for autonomy [see pages 30308-09 below]. On April 4 Dr Bazargan, the Prime Minister, stated that autonomy concessions would henceforth be granted only on a national, and not an individual, basis and warned at the same time against any moves towards separatism. By this time, however, the Kurds were understood to be already largely controlling the day-to-day running of the main Kurdish towns and cities.

Fighting between Kurds and Azerbaijanis

Fighting broke out on April 20 in Western Azerbaijan between Kurds and Azeri-speaking Shia Moslems who supported Ayatollah Khomeini. The violence was centred around Naqadeh, a town on the border between Western Azerbaijan and Kurdistan with a mixed population of Kurds and Azerbaijanis, the latter forming the majority group. Following the collapse of a ceasefire on April 22, troops were moved into Naqadeh on April 23 and, according to Kurdish spokesmen, immediately sided with the Azeri community and fired indiscriminately on the Kurds. The Government estimated that between 70 and 80 people died in the clashes although other reports put the death toll at at least 200 and some as high as 1,000.

Tension between the rival communities in Naqadeh had arisen after the Islamic revolution when arms were distributed to the Azerbaijanis and not to the Kurds and had been exacerbated by the Kurdish boycott of the March 1979 referendum on the Islamic republic [see page 30143] (although the Azerbaijanis later also boycotted the Dec. 2-3 referendum on the Constitution—see page 30309 below and also page 30213). The friction developed into an outbreak of fighting on April 20 when shots were fired at a sports stadium in Naqadeh during a gathering of several thousand Kurds who were forming a local branch of the KDPI.

After several days of fighting troops on April 23 intervened in Naqadeh with the support of helicopters and tanks, and by April 26 calm was said to have returned to the area and both sides exchanged hostages.

Earlier, Shaikh Hosseini had protested that the soldiers sent into Naqadeh were themselves all Azeri-speaking, and accused them of committing atrocities against the Kurdish population, alleging in particular that they had fired at those attempting to flee and had set fire to property in Kurdish villages near Naqadeh.

(A Kurdish refugee committee was set up after the incidents in and around Naqadeh and said that several thousand Kurds had been made homeless by the fighting. On June 21 the committee warned that the refugees would renounce their Iranian citizenship and seek refuge in other Islamic countries if the Government did not help them to return to their homes and compensate them for damaged property. The committee also demanded that local revolutionary committees be replaced by joint Kurdish-Azeri councils and that "members of the Shah's regime", who they claimed were serving on the revolutionary committees, be brought to trial.)

Dispute between Kurdish Farmers and Landowners

There were renewed outbreaks of violence in the Kurdish areas (principally around Mahabad) towards the end of June caused primarily by friction between Kurdish farmers and landowners (aghas) who had been armed by government forces and were seeking to regain possession of land seized by Kurdish peasants after the revolution. (The aghas had in the past sided with the Shah in his efforts to control the Kurdish provinces and had in return been largely unaffected by the Shah's land reform programme—for which see 19293 A—many being permitted to retain farm land for themselves.)

The seizure of the farm land by the farmers had been based on their view that Kurdish autonomy was inextricably linked with a genuine land reform in the region. Since the collapse of the army presence in the Kurdish provinces in February the Kurds had, with the support of Shaikh Hosseini and the KDPI, sought to take possession of the land which they had hitherto worked for the aghas and began to farm the land for themselves.

Troops were reported to have intervened on a large scale on June 26 and in Jaldian, a village near the border with Iraq, were said to have destroyed several houses, causing residents to flee. The Government stated that such action was necessary as the villagers had shot at an army patrol although the villagers claimed that the patrol comprised not only soldiers but also armed landowners and that the latter had shot first. The Kurds also accused the troops of entering other villages with tanks and "shooting down" innocent people, while Revolutionary Guards were alleged to have opened fire on Kurds in Marivan (in Kurdistan province near the Iraqi border) during further clashes between farmers and landowners in mid-July.

Upon the entry of troops into Kurdish villages on June 26 the KDPI issued a declaration to Ayatollah Khomeini demanding to know why the regime had armed landowners who had "backed the Shah to the very end" and why the local revolutionary committees had been "agitating against the Kurds". Kurdish leaders called for the confiscation of the weapons and the bringing to trial of the aghas, warning that there was a "bloody conspiracy" in the Kurdish areas which could lead to new and violent disturbances, but stressed throughout this period that they did not wish to use violence and were prepared to negotiate with the Government over their autonomy demands.

Continued Unrest in Kurdish Provinces - Reinforcement of Security Forces

While the dispute over land ownership remained unresolved and the Kurds' demands for autonomy remained only partially fulfilled, unrest in north-western Iran increased from mid-1979 resulting in frequent anti-government demonstrations and clashes between Kurdish rebels and security forces and the takeover by Kurds of a number of army posts and police stations in Western Azerbaijan.

The Iranian authorities called for an end to the offensives against army and police positions and deployed reinforcements of security forces in areas of unrest which had been abandoned by the Shah's forces after the revolution. The arrival of large contingents of troops, Revolutionary Guards and police in Kurdish towns and villages was fiercely opposed by rebel forces and local residents and led to further outbreaks of fighting in the region, notably in Marivan, where as many as 20 soldiers were killed in clashes in the latter part of July.

The violence in Marivan had been preceded by the arrival on July 22 of troops and Guards at a garrison on the outskirts of the town; the Kurds insisted that security in Marivan should be maintained only by local forces, and in protest several thousand residents left their homes and set up tents on a nearby mountain, saying that they would not return until the security forces had been withdrawn. After unfruitful negotiations, the troops and Guards fired into the hills surrounding Marivan on July 27 and attempted to penetrate into the centre of the town which was under the control of heavily armed Kurds; in the subsequent fighting for control of Marivan and the main road connecting that town with the Iraqi border, government forces were believed to have suffered heavy casualties.

On July 27, Kurds seized some 60 railway workers at Qotur near the Turkish border in Western Azerbaijan in protest at the holding by Revolutionary Guards of 16 Kurds in Marivan, causing the breakdown of railway communications with Turkey. The Kurdish hostages were, however, released by the Revolutionary Guards on July 31 after a delegation of several thousand Kurds had arrived in Marivan from Sanandaj, some 60 miles away.

On Aug. 5 the Government and the residents of Marivan were moreover reported to have reached an agreement under which unarmed forces would be responsible for patrolling the town and all Revolutionary Guards would be removed. In return the Kurds were said to have given their assurances that they would not appear on the streets carrying weapons. The residents of Marivan thereafter began to return to their homes.

Kurdish Revolt in Paveh - Launching of Government Offensive against Kurds in August-September

In August-September the Iranian leadership launched a massive offensive against the Kurds in the north-west of the country, gaining control of many Kurdish strongholds often in fiercely fought battles which caused high numbers of casualties, the military operations being largely organized by Dr Mostafa Chamran (who was appointed Minister of Defence on Sept. 30—see page 30142).

During this period Ayatollah Khomeini repeatedly denounced the Kurds as "communist-backed enemies of the revolution", branded Shaikh Hosseini and Dr Qasemlu as "traitors" and also banned the KDPI. The Kurds were accused of receiving aid from "suspicious elements" abroad, Ayatollah Taleghani stating on Aug. 31 that the rebels were being helped by "the north" (an apparent reference to the Soviet Union), an Islamic nation (believed to mean Iraq—see page 30307 below for alleged Iraqi involvement in Arab revolt), Israel and "those runaway thieves" (a reference to supporters of the former Shah). (It was noted in the Western press at this time that Ayatollah Taleghani had hitherto been regarded as a defender of the autonomy demands of the Kurds and other minority groups.) The Kurds denied receiving large-scale aid from abroad, maintaining that their weapons had been seized from the Shah's forces during the revolution and that they were fighting solely to defend themselves against the government forces. The Soviet Union, for its part, in a broadcast by the official news agency Tass on Sept. 4, denied allegations that it had airlifted arms and supplies to the Kurds.

The Government's action against the Kurds had been precipitated by a revolt on Aug. 14 in Paveh, a town in Kermanshah province, about 60 miles south-west of Sanandaj, where some 2,000 insurgents attacked military positions and by Aug. 16 had gained virtual control of the whole town. On Aug. 18, on the direct command of Ayatollah Khomeini, who had that day declared himself C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces, Iranian troops and Revolutionary Guards moved into Paveh to put down the uprising, efforts to move reinforcements into the town earlier having been hampered by the rugged terrain. It was believed that as many as 400 people died in the battle for control of Paveh, 18 of these being Revolutionary Guards who, it was claimed, had been murdered by the insurgent forces. An estimated 29 Kurds were sent before firing squads between Aug. 19 and Aug. 21.



(*Le Monde*)

The Kurdish action in Paveh had coincided with the expiry of an ultimatum issued by the Kurds to the Government in which they had demanded (i) that they should be allowed to form their own security forces and (ii) that the commander of the local unit of Revolutionary Guards who, they claimed, had previously served in the Shah's former secret police (Savak), should be brought to trial. Many residents had left Paveh in protest at the presence of Guards in their town.

Following the attack by the Kurds the beleaguered military units in Paveh appealed for aid but the mountainous terrain and the Kurdish defence of mountain passes leading to the town hampered the despatch of reinforcements. The rebels moreover shot at helicopters bringing supplies and men (among them Dr Chamran) into Paveh.

The failure of the government forces to provide immediate support in Paveh led Ayatollah Khomeini on Aug. 17 to criticize Dr Bazargan's administration for not displaying enough "revolutionary enthusiasm" and the following day, upon assuming responsibility for the command of the armed forces, he accused both the Government and the Army of inadequate action in the defence of Paveh and warned of reprisals against senior officers if a counter-offensive was not launched within 24 hours.

Revolutionary Guards positioned outside Paveh accordingly attacked the town on Aug. 18 while the besieged forces inside launched a counter-attack; the rebel force retreated to hill-top positions on the apparent instructions of Dr Qasemlu who sought to open negotiations with Iranian authorities in order to avert further bloodshed.

On Aug. 19 Ayatollah Khomeini ordered a general mobilization of the armed forces, banned all leave for military personnel and placed Revolutionary Guards in a state of alert to face "another very critical situation" in Sanandaj where, he claimed, Kurds had besieged the army garrison, attacked tanks and armoured personnel vehicles, seized arms and ammunition and taken a number of women hostages. In response to the Ayatollah's commands, forces moved into Sanandaj to lift the reported siege on the garrison and took control of the city.

The (newly-appointed) Governor-General of Kurdistan, Mr Mohammed Rashid Shakiba, stated on Aug. 19, however, that reports of an uprising in Sanandaj were false, that the garrison was peaceful and that the local commanding officer had not asked for reinforcements. He confirmed that there had been no events in Sanandaj which warranted the intervention of the armed forces, the only incident being the disarming by townspeople of a lorry of Revolutionary Guards, and complained that Ayatollah Khomeini had not consulted him before ordering the mobilization.

The Guardian of Sept. 10 reported a public admission by Dr Bazargan in early September that the mobilization order had been based on "false information" and suggested reasons for Ayatollah Khomeini's motives in attempting to crush the Kurds as (i) to underline to all minority groups the "futility of insurrection"; (ii) to "boost the morale and stiffen the backbone of the badly demoralized armed forces"; and (iii) to deprive left-wing opponents of the Islamic leadership of refuge which they had hitherto found among the Kurds.

On Aug. 19 Ayatollah Khomeini had also denounced Shaikh Hosseini and Dr Qasemlu as being "seditious" and "corrupt on earth"; said that he would ban the KDPI and all other Kurdish political organizations; and barred Dr Qasemlu from the Constituent Council of Experts.

The following day he described the KDPI as the "devil's party", accused its members of collaboration with the United States and Israel and called for the arrest of Shaikh Hosseini and Dr Qasemlu. He moreover charged Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali (former head of the Islamic revolutionary courts—see page 30149) with responsibility for the revolutionary courts in the Kurdish provinces and called on Kurdish civilians to do their "divine duty" by informing authorities of Kurdish hiding places. Following these remarks thousands of Iranians on Aug. 20 demonstrated in Tehran and other towns and cities to demand the execution of the two Kurdish leaders.

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Coincidentally with Ayatollah Khomeini's comments on Aug. 19, Dr Qasemlu had himself announced his decision not to participate in the deliberations of the Constituent Council of Experts [see page 30144]. At the same time he stated that the Ayatollah was gradually restoring Iran to a "religious dictatorship of the Middle Ages" and, in the form of an open letter, he appealed to world leaders to save the Kurdish people from "genocide". Thousands of Kurds demonstrated in nine major Kurdish towns that day to demonstrate their support for their leaders while residents of Sanandaj also staged a peaceful sit-in in front of the army garrison.

Following further clashes in Kurdistan and the arrest of many Kurds, Ayatollah Khomeini in a radio broadcast on Aug. 22 offered a "pardon" to all Kurds who "returned to the road of Islam" and surrendered their weapons but excluded from this amnesty Dr Qasemlu and Shaikh Hosseini. He also promised that a day's oil revenues (amounting to about $70,000,000) would be given towards the development of the Kurdish region if the rebellion ceased, and offered a large reward for those who handed over the Kurdish leaders.

Further Fighting between Kurds and Government Forces - Collapse of Ceasefire - Government Takeover of Mahabad

After the fall of Paveh and Sanandaj to government forces, fighting broke out on Aug. 22 in Saqqez, some 65 miles north of Sanandaj in Kurdistan province, where rebels besieged the army garrison. Troop reinforcements were sent to Saqqez and during the night of Aug. 25-26 a 200-strong column, supported by helicopter gunships, tanks, rockets and heavy artillery, fought its way through Kurdish positions around the town and lifted the siege on the garrison.

Although most of the (500-strong) insurgent force had retreated from Saqqez before the fall of the town, an estimated 300 arrests were made there on Aug. 27. Among those held were military personnel, accused of failing to carry out orders and of siding with the rebels; nine of them were executed on Aug. 28 along with 10 civilians.

In Sardasht, some 40 miles south-west of Saqqez near the Iraqi border, rebels had on Aug. 26 killed four Revolutionary Guards in retaliation for the recent execution of a number of Kurds, having earlier warned that one Guard would be killed for every Kurd put to death.

On Aug. 27 a five-man Kurdish delegation, led by Mullah Rahim Abbasi, head of the Mahabad municipal council, arrived in Tehran for talks with Iranian leaders including Ayatollah Taleghani, Dr Chamran and Mr Sadeq Tabatabai, a Deputy Prime Minister and Government Spokesman. The Kurds presented the Government with a peace plan which included (i) an immediate ceasefire in the Kurdish provinces; (ii) the recall of Ayatollah Khalkhali; (iii) the convening of a wide-ranging conference to "solve the Kurdish problem through peaceful means"; (iv) an end to troop advances on Kurdish positions; (v) the withdrawal of Revolutionary Guards to bases outside Kurdish areas; and (vi) an end to the execution of Kurdish prisoners. [See page 30146 for reports of execution of Kurds and others belonging to "undesirable" political groups.]

Considerable controversy arose over this agreement, however, following the announcement on Aug. 29 by Mr Mohammed Hashem Sabaghian, the Minister of the Interior, that the plan also included the "temporary" occupation of Mahabad by government forces to restore law and order—a proposal immediately rejected by the KDPI.

Following the talks in Tehran on Aug. 27 Ayatollah Taleghani was said to have assured the Mahabad delegation that a ceasefire would be announced the following day, an unofficial truce already being observed by both sides pending the outcome of the peace negotiations.

On Aug. 28, however, hopes for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish crisis receded when Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the peace plan, refused to endorse the ceasefire and at the same time appointed a religious aide, Mr Hojjatoleslam Hosseini Kermani, as his special envoy to the Kurdish areas of unrest, reportedly instructing him to "crush" the Kurds rather than negotiate with them and to provide the government forces there with whatever assistance they needed to "restore peace to the region". On Aug. 30 the Ayatollah moreover warned Kurdish leaders that "we will bury you unless you leave the scene", while Mr Sabaghian, the Minister of the Interior, on Sept. 1 issued "probably the last warning" to the Kurds, rejected all negotiations with them and himself denounced the KDPI leaders as "traitors".

Against this background the main body of the Kurdish guerrilla force, numbering several thousand, began to strengthen its positions around Mahabad and moved the KDPI headquarters to Sardasht, near the Iraqi border, in anticipation of an attack on the most important of the remaining Kurdish strongholds. At the same time government forces on Aug. 30-31 advanced towards Mahabad, pounding positions held by the Kurds.

On Sept. 3, after some seven hours of sustained aerial attack on surrounding rebel positions, an army column entered Mahabad, meeting little resistance from the Kurdish force in the city which, together with several thousand residents, had largely retreated to the hills in the face of an attack by tanks and jet fighters which strafed positions below.

Dr Bazargan arrived in Mahabad on Sept. 7 when he was understood to have made a number of conciliatory gestures to the population, including the offer of a programme for economic development which was to be implemented "immediately", while he also expressed his readiness to fulfil earlier plans to convert the local garrison into a Kurdish university and to pardon all KDPI members, with the exception of Dr Qasemlu (and Shaikh Hosseini).

Following the takeover of Mahabad the Government continued its mopping up operation of Kurdish areas, concentrating on towns and villages near the border with Iraq, which country had on Sept. 2 been asked to tighten controls along its border, having previously frequently been accused of aiding the Kurdish rebels.

On Sept. 6 government forces took control of Sardasht, which was described by the Government as the "last stronghold" of the Kurdish insurgents. The Kurdish force was understood initially to have put up some resistance but many fled across the border together with a large proportion of the civilian population after coming under attack from helicopter gunships.

Sardasht had also served as a last refuge for many Kurdish civilians who had fled from other areas occupied by troops and Revolutionary Guards, and had also previously been a major transit point for rebels active on both sides of the border.

Resurgence of Kurdish Guerrilla Activity - Re-opening of Negotiations - Announcement of Government Autonomy Plan for Kurdish and Other Regions

Although the government forces had by early September 1979 driven rebel fighters from most major Kurdish towns and cities, Dr Qasemlu, in an interview with the (leftist) Paris daily *Libération* of Sept. 10, warned from his mountain hideout near Sardasht that the rebellion against the Iranian leadership was not over and pledged that a guerrilla war would be launched. In late September and throughout October units of Kurdish rebels left their mountain positions to launch attacks on government forces and on border and police posts, causing a number of casualties and seizing large quantities of weapons. In particular the Kurds harassed the Revolutionary Guards "at every opportunity", drawing a sharp distinction between these and regular army units and attacking the latter only in self-defence.

One of the most serious incidents in this guerrilla war occurred on Oct. 8 when Kurds ambushed a 72-man column of Revolutionary Guards travelling from Sardasht to Baneh (about 15 miles further south) and killed as many as 60. The attack prompted a government warning on Oct. 9 that a new offensive would be launched in the Kurdish provinces but this was not put into operation, notwithstanding the return of Dr Chamran to the area.

On Oct. 20 Kurdish fighters were reported to have virtually regained control of Mahabad after heavy fighting over the previous two days. Security forces withdrew to their barracks on Oct. 20 but shooting continued the following day. (By this time the Government had reportedly imposed a siege on the city, supplying the Revolutionary Guards and troops there by helicopter, but the blockade was lifted on Oct. 24.)

Faced with the new Kurdish operations in north-western Iran and the capture by the insurgents of territory only recently taken by the Government, Ayatollah Khomeini in late October reversed his policy of attempting to end the Kurdish rebellion by putting the revolt down by force and instead supported negotiations. A delegation including Mr Foruhar (who had recently been appointed to the post of Minister of State), Mr

Sabaghian and Mr Ezzatollah Sahabi (Minister of State for Planning and the Budget Organization) was charged with reopening talks with the Kurdish leaders and arrived in Mahabad on Nov. 2, whereupon Mr Foruhar announced before a crowd of some 3,000 that "the Islamic Government believes that the [Kurdish] demands are legitimate and must be fulfilled".

In advance of the mission the Government had declared a ceasefire and the KDPI, which by this time had regained much of the land which it had recently lost to the Army and Revolutionary Guards, agreed to hold its fire pending the outcome of the negotiations and the withdrawal of all Revolutionary Guards by early December (although sporadic fighting continued throughout this period).

Prior to the arrival of the government delegation in Mahabad on Nov. 2 Mr Foruhar had, in the course of an information visit to Kurdistan, clandestinely met Shaikh Hosseini on Oct. 16 in the latter's secret hideout. At a subsequent meeting in late November Shaikh Hosseini handed Mr Foruhar an eight-point plan for Kurdish autonomy, signed by himself, the KDPI, the Komala and the *Fedayeen*, which was described in a *Times* report of Dec. 3 as containing the "most detailed and specific demands to have been made by the Kurds since their secessionist revolts began 30 years ago", and which was given as follows:

"(1) Autonomy for Kurdistan should be officially recognized and be specifically referred to in the Constitution.

"(2) The Kurdish region, which is at present divided into four Iranian provinces, Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Western Azerbaijan, should be recognized as an autonomous unit.

"(3) A 'National Assembly of Kurdistan' should be elected by a free, direct and secret vote. The Assembly should choose an autonomous government of Kurdistan which will control all economic, social and cultural life and local security in the Kurdish region.

"(4) The Kurdish language should be recognized as the primary language in schools and for official letters. After the fourth year of primary studies, the Persian language would also be taught in schools.

"(5) Part of the national budget should be devoted to Kurdistan and this regional budget should be expanded to take account of the backward economy which has been imposed on Kurdistan in the past.

"(6) Kurdish representatives should play a role in central government.

"(7) Foreign policy, national defence [the Army], the national economy and long-term economic planning should rest with the central Government.

"(8) Democratic freedoms such as freedom of the press, free speech, political and religious freedom should exist all over Iran."

The Kurds warned Mr Foruhar that if their demands were not met they might cease to observe the de facto ceasefire in the area although the *Times* report pointed out that the Kurds appeared willing to "negotiate" on these demands and that Shaikh Hosseini might agree to some compromises, in particular on the first condition of the autonomy plan as voting on the referendum on the Constitution was already under way in early December.

Following further joint discussions Mr Foruhar, at a news conference called on Dec. 17, presented an outline of the Government's plan for self-government which satisfied the basic demands of the Kurds and which was understood to have met with the approval of Kurdish leaders. The main points of the plan—which would apply not only to the Kurdish provinces but also to all other "self-governed regions"—were as follows:

The central Government would retain responsibility for affairs concerning national defence, foreign policy, intelligence, foreign trade rights, affairs relating to customs, economic plans for the country as a whole, the drawing up of the general budget, general banking and monetary systems, loans, taxation, posts and telecommunications, transport and heavy industries.

The self-governed regions would be in control of all regional affairs regarding planning development, spending of the budget allocated to the area, rural economic and agricultural development, cultural education and affairs such as road building, urban development and housing in towns and villages as well as affairs regarding the mass media, health and welfare.

With regard to the appointment of executive officials, Mr Foruhar said that those responsible for affairs looked after by the central Government would be chosen by that Government while those officials responsible for regional affairs would be appointed "through nominations made by regional councils to the Government for government approval" or might be "selected by the Government and approved by the councils".

Self-governed regions would be permitted to maintain security of the area by the formation of urban and rural police forces although the chiefs of police would have to be appointed "under the supervision of, and in connexion with, the police of the Islamic Republic of Iran"; this applied likewise to the gendarmerie. It was also stressed that border security could not be the responsibility of the regions.

Mr Foruhar further said that provisions had been made in the government plan for the regional councils to run their affairs "according to the religion of the region" so that "the majority religion in every region is made official, thus influencing regulations", stressing at the same time that "other religions and their followers should be respected and should enjoy equal rights with the majority". [For announcement by Ayatollah Khomeini on Jan. 20, 1980, that Article 12 of the Constitution could be amended to allow Sunni Islam to be the official religion in areas where members of that sect formed the majority, see page 30213.]

Mr Foruhar added: "It has been decided that the self-governed regions are allowed, in addition to their share of the regional budget, to collect duty due to the general budget of the country from the region in order to be able to eliminate shortages in the region as quickly as possible. Also, in accordance with this plan, the Government will, when determining allocation of the general budget, act to compensate the regions which have in the past suffered more and have remained backward. In every self-governed region of Iran all strata and political organizations of the country including the guilds, religious, social and cultural societies are free according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran." He added: "In every self-governed region, teaching the ethnic language will accord with Article 15 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran which states that teaching the ethnic language, including Kurdish for Kurds, Baluchi for Baluchis, Azeri for Azerbaijanis, and teaching of the mother tongue for minorities residing within the self-governed regions—Armenian, Assyrian and Hebrew—will be free and from the first year of primary school will be taught together with Persian. Lessons however, are to be conducted in Persian, which is the national and common language of all Iranian ethnic groups and minorities; instruction in the ethnic language and literature will continue all the way up through school. The self-governed regions will organize educational establishments, primary and secondary schools and the like. Educational programmes will be supervised by the Ministry of Education."

Mr Foruhar continued: "Letters written in Persian or the ethnic language will be considered official within any self-governed region. But letters written to the central Government or to other self-governed regions should be written only in Persian. A university consisting of faculties of science and technology will be established in every self-governed region in which lessons will be conducted in Persian but it will include a course in the ethnic language and literature. Tehran University will have a faculty of language, literature and culture for all ethnic groups in Iran.

"According to Article 175 of the Constitution every self-governed region will have its regional radio and television which will come under the Voice and Profile of the Islamic Republic of Iran but some of its programmes will be devoted to regional affairs. There is also to be free publication of papers in the ethnic language and the Government will, upon the request from the self-governed region, extend all possible assistance in every respect towards the expansion of ethnic culture."

Summing up, Mr Foruhar said that "these are the rights which can be granted to people on a self-rule basis so that they can handle their own affairs and feel that all discrimination has been abolished".

Prior to the announcement of this programme the negotiations between the Government and the Kurds had been interrupted in early December when the Government appeared to reinforce troops in the Kurdish area in the wake of large-scale opposition by minority groups to the new Islamic Constitution. The referendum on this Constitution had been largely boycotted by the Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis and Turkomans [see page 30213], and violent incidents occurred also in areas inhabited by the Azerbaijanis and the Baluchis [see relevant sections below]. In the Kurdish regions military helicopters were reported to have attacked in particular three villages near Urmia (formerely Rezaiyeh) in Western Azerbaijan, while troops also surrounded Sanandaj.

Clashes between Kurds and Revolutionary Guards in Early 1980

Notwithstanding the announcement of the government plans for self-rule in Iranian provinces, the first two months of 1980 were characterized by renewed clashes in the Kurdish part of the country involving in particular the Revolutionary Guards, whose withdrawal from the area had been repeatedly demanded

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by the Kurds; the fighting occurred in particular around Sanandaj and Kamyaran, some 50 miles south of Sanandaj in Kurdistan province. Throughout this period Iranian authorities accused Iraqi insurgents of aiding the Iranian Kurds.

Fighting broke out in Sanandaj at the very beginning of the year but on Jan. 4, following the enforcement of a ceasefire, a six-point plan between local Kurdish authorities and the new Governor-General of Kurdistan, Mr Hossein Shahveisi, was announced which inter alia gave local police units responsibility for patrolling the city in place of Revolutionary Guards who were to be withdrawn.

The failure of the Guards to begin their evacuation of Sanandaj caused considerable tension in the city and, according to a *New York Times* report of Jan. 7, prompted the resignation of Mr Shahveisi after only two weeks in office. He was reported to have then joined forces with Kurds who had been staging a sit-in in his office (and in a local mosque) since Jan. 2. The Guards were, however, finally withdrawn from Sanandaj on Jan. 29, following negotiations between Kurds and a team of government representatives from Tehran.

Following the intervention of Revolutionary Guards in a clash between rebel and pro-government Kurds in Kamyaran on Jan. 30 fighting broke out and continued until Feb. 2 when the rebels were forced to withdraw from the town.

Clashes were also reported during this period in other Kurdish towns and villages, including Paveh, near the Iraqi border, and Bijar, some 50 miles north-east of Sanandaj. In three days of fighting in these areas the death toll was estimated to exceed 50, and insurgent forces claimed that they had taken a large number of hostages, among them Revolutionary Guards. Dr Qasemlu on Feb. 3 sent a telegram to Ayatollah Khomeini warning him that these latest clashes could lead to civil war and protesting that the armed forces were using heavy weapons against the population, killing women and children and destroying houses.

The Arab Minority

Unrest among the 2,000,000 Arabs in Khuzistan province posed a serious problem to the central Government, in particular with regard to the country's economy, as the area contained most of Iran's principal oil supplies, providing the preponderant part of the country's foreign income.

The province of Khuzistan had formerly been known as Arabistan and had until the discovery of oil there at the beginning of the century been dominated by Arabs. The Arabs claimed that as much as 80 per cent of the population there was still of Arab origin, the remainder being Persians who had settled there after oil had been found. The Iranian Government on the other hand stated officially that no more than 40 per cent were Arabs and that the unrest in Khuzistan was fomented by a minority "inspired from abroad". Although the ratio of Arabs to Persians in Khuzistan could not be clearly ascertained it was largely accepted that the Persians were more privileged than the Arabs, with better jobs, a higher standard of living and greater social advantages.

After the revolution the Arabs organized themselves in various political and cultural societies, collectively forming the Arab Political and Cultural Organization under the overall leadership of Shaikh Mohammed Taher Shobeir Khaghani. Their demands included (i) greater control over local government affairs (although, as in the case of the Kurdish autonomy demands—see above—matters such as foreign policy, defence and national economic planning would remain the responsibility of the central Government); (ii) a greater share of the oil revenues; (iii) the right to revive Arab culture and heritage and to have their children taught Arabic in school; (iv) Arab representation in the central Government; and (v) an end to alleged job discrimination in Khuzistan. Later the Arabs also called for a reduction of the powers of the Revolutionary Guards and for the formation of a joint Arab-Persian militia to replace the government security forces in the province.

On April 26, 1979, against a background of mounting tension in Khuzistan, some 35 representatives of the Arabs held a press conference in Tehran to put forward their demands, while Shaikh Khaghani made several visits to Qom over this period for talks with Ayatollah Khomeini, the latter agreeing at this stage only to the formation of a provincial council with limited autonomy rights and other minor concessions, such as were to be introduced in all other provinces of the country [see page 30302 above].

The discontent of the Arabs gave rise to a series of often violent clashes between supporters of Shaikh Khaghani on the one hand and Revolutionary Guards and other supporters of the Islamic leadership on the other, much of the unrest occurring in Khorramshahr, near the Iraqi border and just north of Abadan (the major oil refinery port). In an effort to ease the situation the Governor-General of Khuzistan, Rear-Adm. Ahmad Madani (then also Commander of the Iranian Navy and previously Minister of Defence in February-March 1979), on May 18 dissolved the revolutionary committees in Khorramshahr after the Arabs had complained of harassment by armed committee members, of attacks on their homes, arrests and the closing down of businesses.

At the same time, however, Rear-Adm. Madani ordered the Arabs to surrender their weapons by May 25; this move precipitated further clashes with Revolutionary Guards, culminating in fierce fighting between the two sides in the town on May 30-31 which caused as many as 200 deaths. The Guards received support from army troops and also local Persian residents while the Arabs were said to have been backed by Iraq in particular, with also Palestinian and other involvement. The Government blamed the fighting on "a minority backed by foreign powers and forces still loyal to the Shah".

A state of emergency was imposed on May 30-June 4, while troop reinforcements were airlifted into the city and security was reinforced around all oil installations in the province, notably in Abadan, where some fighting was also reported, and in Ahwaz further north.

According to Arab spokesmen the trouble in Khorramshahr on May 30 had commenced in the early hours of the morning when Revolutionary Guards stormed two buildings which members of the Arab Political and Cultural Organization had turned into their headquarters and where a large number were staging a sit-in protest, refusing to hand in their weapons as they had been instructed to on May 18. Shaikh Khaghani maintained that the raid was unwarranted as one hour before the attack by the Revolutionary Guards he had worked out an agreement with the Governor-General under which the Arabs would peacefully leave the buildings. Official sources on the other hand said that Arab gunmen had attacked first and also set fire to a police station. Fighting then spread to the streets of Khorramshahr where many buildings were set on fire and considerable damage was done to the port area, which had been paralysed by strike action over the previous three weeks.

Following the fighting in Khorramshahr, Arabs continued to demonstrate in the city, denouncing Rear-Adm. Madani and calling for his resignation and other concessions, including the renaming of Khuzistan as Arabistan, while there was also frequent apparently indiscriminate shooting by young Islamic extremists.

On June 1 unidentified gunmen opened fire on thousands of Arabs demanding inter alia the return of the bodies of their kinsmen killed on May 30-31 (the Iranian authorities having refused to release the bodies of these victims as they feared that funeral processions would foment further trouble).

Failure of Government-Arab Negotiations - Arab Sabotage Attacks - Reported Arrest of Shaikh Khaghani

While unrest continued in Khuzistan, representatives of the Government and Shaikh Khaghani were on June 6 reported to have reached an agreement which provided inter alia for (i) the appointment of Arabs to local government posts; (ii) the development of Arab villages; (iii) the transfer of responsibility for security in the province from Revolutionary Guards to the police and gendarmerie; (iv) the release of all Arab "political" prisoners arrested during the disturbances on May 30-31; (v) the bringing to trial and punishment of those responsible for the attacks on Arab property; (vi) an investigation into the causes of the fighting in Khorramshahr on May 30-31 and the granting of compensation to relatives of the victims; and (vii) freedom for the Arab Cultural and Political Organization to continue its activities.

In the following weeks, however, the Government failed to fulfil these terms and, according to some reports, members of the Arab community continued to be "arrested or persecuted". The Government was also understood to have demanded that the Arabs first surrender their weapons before peace talks could continue and announced on June 13 that only those "faithful to the revolution" would be allowed to carry arms into Khuzistan [see below].

On June 29 Shaikh Khaghani was quoted as saying that the agreement of June 6 was no longer valid as the Government had not fulfilled the two conditions which he considered most important at this stage, namely the release of Arabs taken prisoner during the May disturbances and the bringing to trial of those involved in assaults on Arab property. He said that negotiations between his people and the Government had reached an impasse and urged Iranian authorities to meet the demands of the Arabs, lest the more militant among them "take matters into their own hands".

Already in June Arab extremists had stepped up their protest demonstrations and had launched a campaign of sabotage attacks, in particular against oil installations (where Arabs formed a large proportion of the workers) and also against security forces. These activities continued sporadically into early 1980, notwithstanding Shaikh Khaghani's repeated denunciation of the operations, and caused considerable loss of life and damage to property.

(The Government's control over Khuzistan had been further threatened in mid-1979 in view of the arrival in Khorramshahr of several members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, who stated that they aimed to form "some kind of alliance" with the Arabs.)

Among the most serious incidents in Khuzistan in mid-1979 were bomb attacks on oil pipelines on July 7 and July 11, although the Government played down reports of the seriousness of the damage done.

The first explosion was in a pipeline some two miles from the Abadan refinery, carrying crude oil from the Agha Jari fields to Abadan, and caused a serious fire which spread to several other oil and gas pipelines. An Arab group calling itself "Black Wednesday" (an apparent reference to the May 30 fighting in Khorramshahr—see above) on July 10 claimed responsibility for this attack and for earlier acts of sabotage (among them a bomb explosion in the Abadan refinery on June 14).

The second bomb blast occurred in a crude oil line at a point about half-way between Ahwaz and the Abadan refinery and was also believed to have been instigated by "Black Wednesday" (although another group, known as the "Liberation Front of South Arabistan", was also said to be actively involved in acts of sabotage). The second explosion took place shortly after demonstrations had been held throughout the province to mourn those killed 40 days earlier in Khorramshahr.

Following further violent incidents Revolutionary Guards, supported by other Islamic gunmen, on July 15 attacked the home of Shaikh Khaghani in Khorramshahr, killing four of his bodyguards. Shaikh Khaghani was taken away and Rear-Adm. Madani said the following day that he had been moved to Ahwaz "for his own safety" and would thereafter travel to Qom for "talks with religious leaders". It was however reported from Qom at the end of July that Shaikh Khaghani was in fact under house arrest there.

The attack on the Shaikh's house on July 15 had followed an explosion earlier in the day when unidentified men threw grenades into a large crowd which had gathered in the main mosque of the city to mourn the death of a Guard the previous week; 11 people were believed to have been killed in the explosion and more than 50 wounded. Three Arabs were executed in Khorramshahr the same day after being found guilty of involvement in the attack and a further two were put to death on July 16.

Supporters of Shaikh Khaghani threatened further action if their leader was not returned to Khorramshahr and in response to this warning security in Khuzistan, in particular around the oil installations, was increased while Revolutionary Guards in Khorramshahr were reinforced by several hundred young Islamic militiamen who were reportedly instructed to deal harshly with Arab rebels. According to *The Daily Telegraph* of Aug. 24 the Guards had been authorized to shoot on sight anyone infiltrating a security zone around oil installations. A large number of arrests were made, between 30 and 40 on July 16 alone, while on July 24 two Arabs were executed on charges of planting bombs and a third for "acting against the Islamic republic".

In Ahwaz on Aug. 22 the trial began in camera of 14 members of the Socialist Workers' Party of Iran who had expressed their support for the Arab nationalist movement and had been arrested in June. The charges brought against them were thought to be for "counter-revolutionary activities" and the prosecutor was understood to have recommended the death penalty for them. However, Iranian authorities in late August agreed to a retrial after organizations abroad had protested that the defendants had been refused legal representation and after Amnesty International had appealed to Ayatollah Khomeini to intercede.

Notwithstanding the strict action taken against the Arabs, the latter intensified their sabotage campaign from late September onwards, many of them having the previous month taken strike action in the oil industry. These latest attacks responsibility for which was not claimed, included the following:

On Sept. 30 a microwave communications tower was blown up cutting off the country's telephone communications with Khorramshahr and Abadan, while in Khorramshahr itself a bomb blast rocked the office of the Governor-General.

On Oct. 3 a time bomb destroyed several carriages of a train bound for Tehran while it was just outside Ahwaz, killing a number of people. Eight Arabs were the following day executed for their part in earlier sabotage activities.

On Oct. 5 another time bomb exploded in a crowded bazaar in Khorramshahr, killing two and injuring 35.

On Oct. 18 saboteurs reportedly blew up four oil pipelines around Ahwaz, but the Government claimed that this did not affect output.

In early 1980 another oil pipeline between Ahwaz and Abadan was blown up on Jan. 15 causing a large conflagration, while on Feb. 4 six gas pipelines were sabotaged near Abadan.

Reported Iraqi Aid to Arabs - Consequent Deterioration of Relations between Iran and Iraq - Allegations of Palestinian Involvement

Iranian Government allegations that Iraq had smuggled arms and troops across the border into Khuzistan to help the Arab movement gave rise to a serious deterioration in relations between the two countries, culminating in early 1980 in a series of border clashes (details of which will be given in a subsequent article). Although Iraq denied the presence of any of its troops in Khuzistan it was widely believed that that country was supplying the Arabs with considerable supplies of Soviet-made weapons, including AK-47 (Kalashnikov) automatic rifles and RPG-7 rocket launchers, large caches of such weapons being discovered in particular on Minou island in the Shatt-al-Arab river between Iran and Iraq (and near the Abadan refinery). On June 13 the Iranian authorities announced a dusk-to-dawn curfew on the roads between Iraq and Iran effective June 15 and at the same time, as stated above, declared that only those "faithful to the Islamic revolution" would be permitted to carry arms into Khuzistan.

The tension between Iran and Iraq had been exacerbated in mid-1979 by (i) the house arrest in Iraq of Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al Sadr, the spiritual leader of Iraq's Shia Moslems [see page 30106], and (ii) an attack on June 4 by the Iraqi Air Force on several Kurdish villages in Western Azerbaijan, as a result of which at least seven Iranians were killed and extensive damage done to property [see page 30105], although Iran repeatedly accused Iraq of backing the Kurdish rebellion in north-western Iran [see above]. Iraqi radio on June 13 announced that Iraq had formally apologized for the aerial attacks, which were described as an error on the part of the pilots, and had also offered to compensate relatives of the victims; Iran continued to make strong protests to Iraq over the incidents, however, and anti-Iraqi articles continued to appear in the Iranian press.

On June 3 Rear-Adm. Madani accused the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (led by Mr Georges Habash) of "suspicious activities" in Khuzistan prior to the outbreak of fighting in May, while earlier in the year the Arabs had been accused of having contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which had opened an office in Ahwaz. [For opening of PLO office in Tehran in February 1979, see page 30148.] Arab representatives at their press conference in Tehran on April 26 [see above] denied these contacts however, while PLO officials gave their assurances to the Government that their staff in Ahwaz had been kept to a minimum to "avoid any controversy in the area".

The Baluchi Minority

Ethnic rivalry in the large south-eastern province of Baluchistan and Sistan had prevailed for several years between the Baluchis who, with a population of some 550,000, formed the majority group in the province and who were predominantly Sunni Moslems and spoke their own language, and the Persian-speaking Sistans, of whom there were about 110,000 and who were mainly of the Shia Moslem sect. Friction between the two communities had been due fundamentally to the fact that the Sistans were for the most part better educated than the Baluchis with better opportunities in employment and generally enjoying a much higher standard of living, while the Baluchis' demands for limited autonomy and economic concessions had persistently been ignored.

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The dissatisfaction of the Baluchis mounted following the Islamic revolution of February 1979 in view of (i) the new Government's failure to fulfil pledges of providing economic assistance and guaranteeing cultural equality, which they had long been denied under the Shah, and (ii) the stationing in the province of Revolutionary Guards from other parts of the country who, like the Sistans, were supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini, Persian-speaking and predominantly Shia Moslems. As a result, the Baluchis' resentment came to be directed increasingly against the new leadership, in particular against the Revolutionary Guards.

This situation gave rise to several incidents of violence and unrest, in particular in early December 1979 when the Baluchis largely boycotted the referendum on the Islamic Constitution on Dec. 2-3 [see page 30213], set fire to ballot boxes and reportedly also briefly took hostage the Governor-General of the province, Mr Habib Ghariri, and culminated in an outbreak of fighting on Dec. 20-22 in the provincial capital of Zahidan (near the border with Pakistan) between Baluchis on the one hand and Sistans and Persians on the other. In the two days of fighting at least 14 people were believed to have been killed and more than 80 wounded. On Dec. 22 a state of emergency was declared in Zahidan and troops were sent into the city to restore order, both sides later that day reportedly agreeing to a ceasefire (and the Revolutionary Guards being withdrawn to designated areas).

Reports on the immediate cause of the violence on Dec. 20 were conflicting, although it was evident that the trouble had arisen when several thousand people had gathered at a stadium in Zahidan to listen to Dr Ibrahim Yazdi, representative of Ayatollah Khomeini on ethnic matters (and formerly Foreign Minister), who had arrived in the provincial capital that day for talks with Baluchi and Sistan leaders in an effort to mediate in their dispute. Factions within the crowd began throwing stones and exchanges of fire with automatic weapons ensued; the fighting then spread to the main streets of the city. (Some reports indicated, however, that the Baluchis had in fact been building barricades in the streets of Zahidan prior to the incidents on Dec. 20 in preparation for some form of confrontation with their rivals.)

Ayatollah Khomeini, according to the *International Herald Tribune* of Dec. 28, blamed the violence on "foreigners and troublemakers" who had come to Baluchistan to "agitate", and Ayatollah Mohammed Kafami, a religious leader of the Sistans, attributed the disturbances to "American and communist agents provocateurs". According to the same report, Mr Mowlavi Abdul-Aziz Mollazadeh, leader of the Baluchis, claimed however that Revolutionary Guards had joined forces with "vicious elements among the Sistans" and had started the shooting, adding that his people wanted "autonomy within Iran" and calling on "outside officials" to leave the province, mentioning in particular Mr Ghariri and the Revolutionary Guards. Immediately after the outbreak of fighting on Dec. 22 Mr Mollazadeh had said that "today's trouble was created by the enemies of Islam" and stressed that "Persians, Baluchis and Sistans are all brothers".

Despite the ceasefire of Dec. 22, further incidents occurred in early 1980, among them, according to reports on Jan. 7, clashes between Sunni and Shia Moslems in Zahidan and the killing of two Revolutionary Guards in an ambush on the road leading south from Zahidan to Iranshahr (four insurgents also being killed in the attack).

The Turkoman Minority

Unrest in the north-eastern Iranian region of Turkmenistan broke out almost immediately after the February 1979 revolution when Turkomans began to press for concessions which they had long demanded under the Shah, including in particular (i) the redistribution of agricultural land owned by supporters of the Shah; (ii) the right to set up their own police and gendarmerie forces; and (iii) the official recognition of Turkoman as their language. The Turkomans, who were predominantly Sunni Moslems, also called for representation in the local revolutionary committees dominated by members of the Shia sect.

The land ownership issue was central to the dispute in Turkmenistan, the Turkomans claiming that under the Shah's 1963 land reform programme [see 19293 A] the royal family had taken vast areas of rich agricultural land from their farmers and had distributed it among favoured senior army officers and civil servants. After the revolution the Turkomans began to seize the disputed land, mostly farmed by absentee landlords, and also burnt many farm buildings. The landlords then appealed for help from the new Government which itself threatened to seize the land in an effort to put an end to the conflict.

The intransigence of the new regime with regard to the demands of the Turkomans gave rise to serious friction between the latter and local representatives of Ayatollah Khomeini, in particular the Revolutionary Guards.

In early March 1979 at least three Turkomans were believed to have died in rioting in the Caspian Sea town of Bandar Shah in a dispute over the controversial renaming of the town—the Turkomans advocating Bandar Turkoman and supporters of the Shia clergy Bandar Islam.

This tension culminated on March 26 in an outbreak of fighting between Turkoman rebels, apparently backed by Turkoman members of the left-wing *Fedayeen* guerrilla movement, and government security forces in Gonbad-e-Qavus, a principal Turkoman town in Mazandaran province some 50 miles south of the Soviet border. After efforts to appease the Turkomans and to impose a ceasefire had failed, troops were on April 3 moved in Gonbad-e-Qavus, meeting little or no resistance from the rebels who had by that time largely retreated. At least 50 people were killed and more than 300 injured in the eight days of fighting.

Throughout the clashes the Iranian Government claimed that the Turkoman rebels were receiving aid on a large scale from the Soviet Union, implying that the *Fedayeen* guerrillas had been allowed to pass across the border into the Soviet Union for refuge and supplies. The rebels however denied receiving aid and said that they had fought with weapons captured from the Iranian armed forces during the revolution and that they had obtained their supplies from outlying villages. They claimed that the border with the Soviet Union was closely guarded and that they had no contact with kinsmen on the other side.

The immediate cause of the fighting in Gonbad-e-Qavus on March 26 was attributed variously to (i) the shooting by Revolutionary Guards of a Turkoman tobacco seller; (ii) the opening of fire by Guards on a large crowd of Turkomans who had gathered together that day to call for autonomy and for a boycott of the March 30-31 referendum on an Islamic republic; and (iii) the prevention by security forces of peasants' efforts to reclaim land.

After the outbreak of violence on March 26 the rival sides set up barricades in Gonbad-e-Qavus and took hostages, while on March 26-27 Turkomans seized police posts along the Soviet border. On March 27 the Turkoman Political and Cultural Society, which had organized the boycott rally the previous day, issued a bulletin protesting that the Turkomans were being subjected to government discrimination and were being denied membership of the revolutionary committees which, they complained, were dominated by Shia Moslems. In addition the Turkomans reiterated their earlier demands for the return of land which they had been forced to surrender under the monarchy.

In an attempt to end the unrest the Government made efforts to appease the Turkomans, stating in particular on March 28 that the new Iranian constitution would pay special attention to Turkomans and other ethnic groups, although no details of provisions for autonomy or other concessions were given. The Government had also expressed its hope that the situation could be alleviated by the mediation efforts of Ayatollah Taleghani (currently involved in peace negotiations with the Kurds—see page 30302 above), who had suggested that the local revolutionary committee be replaced by a five-man council whose members were acceptable to the Turkomans.

On April 2 the Government announced a ceasefire between the opposing sides which provided for the following: (i) that all the wounded be taken to hospitals; (ii) that both sides retreat to "defensive lines", dismantle their barricades and help clean up the town; (iii) that the Army take control of the city until the re-establishment of law and order; and (iv) that discussions on the exchange of prisoners begin immediately.

The ceasefire was not, however, observed and on April 3 army units, allegedly with some assistance from *Mujaheddin Khalq* guerrillas (members of an extreme right-wing Shia Moslem organization), moved into Gonbad-e-Qavus without confrontation, the Turkoman fighters having by the morning of April 3 mostly retreated to nearby villages, while others had handed in their weapons to their local mosque and gone home. The Army then advanced towards the Soviet border to flush out retreating rebels. Dr Bazargan had earlier, on April 1, warned of an army intervention if the Turkomans had not ceased shooting by April 2, and troop reinforcements were said to have been moved towards north-eastern Iran at the end of March.

On April 4 Dr Bazargan moreover (in contrast to earlier government promises) said that there could be no settlement between the Government and factions demanding regional self-rule and warned against moves towards separatism [see also page 30302 above].

In September 1979, however, contacts were understood to have taken place between Turkoman and government representatives for discussions on development projects for the Turkoman area, on problems facing Turkoman farmers and, more importantly, on the return of their farmlands.

After some 10 months of relative calm in north-eastern Iran fighting between rival groups occurred once more in Gonbad-e-Qavus on Feb. 9-12, 1980, as many as 32 people being killed and many more injured. Turkoman *Fedayeen* members were again said to have been involved in the violence, although on this occasion they were not accused of receiving aid from the Soviet Union.

All shops, offices and schools were closed down during the unrest which was said to have also spread to Gorgan, a town some 75 miles south-west of Gonbad-e-Qavus. After violence had continued for three days troops reinforced the Revolutionary Guards to quell the latest rebellion, reportedly using artillery mortars, grenade-launchers and automatic rifles, although the rebels put up some resistance and returned fire from private homes.

The Azerbaijani Minority

The nature of the Azerbaijani dispute differed from that in the other ethnic minority areas and was regarded by many observers as presenting the most serious challenge to the Iranian leadership as it was, according to *The Guardian* of Dec. 10, "not just a question of regional rights or autonomy, although these enter into it, but a different view of the revolution and its future".

The Azerbaijanis formed the largest ethnic minority group, with a population estimated at between 5,000,000 and 10,000,000, and were, like the Islamic leaders, predominantly Shia Moslems, being led by Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, a moderate and much revered national religious leader, who had been one of the most important figures in the religious opposition to the Shah in Iran during the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. Moreover, the Azerbaijanis, in contrast to other minorities, played an important role in Iranian society and, although the majority lived in the north-western provinces of Western and Eastern Azerbaijan, many lived in cities such as Tehran, Isfahan and Mashad, where they were heavily represented in the military and civil service and among merchants, lawyers and political figures (Dr Bazargan himself being an Azerbaijani). They had thus been central to the Islamic revolution while the other groups had generally been peripheral to it.

Although widespread unrest did not break out in Azerbaijan until the end of 1979, Ayatollah Shariatmadari had long expressed his opposition to the supremacy of Ayatollah Khomeini and in particular rejected Article 110 of the Iranian Constitution which created for the latter the post of Wali Faqih—the highest authority in the country [see pages 30144-45]—claiming that this was contradictory to the "national sovereignty of the people" similarly established in the Constitution. Ayatollah Shariatmadari had also repeatedly expressed his belief that the clergy should not participate in the political running of the country and that secular involvement in the Government was vital, in particular for an economic revival to be possible. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani leader felt that neither Ayatollah Khomeini nor the Constitution acknowledged the fact that about half of the Iranian population were not Persian Shias, differing either in language or religion or both.

These views were backed by the (Azerbaijani) Moslem People's Republican Party (MPRP) which, under the political leadership of Mr Abdolhassan Rostamkhani, gave its full allegiance to Ayatollah Shariatmadari.

The first public display of Azerbaijani opposition to the powers of the clergy was expressed by an 80 per cent boycott of the referendum on the new Constitution held on Dec. 2-3 [see page 30213], which coincided with unrest among the Kurds and the Baluchis [see pages 30305 and 30308 above and also page 30213]. (Ayatollah Shariatmadari had, however, supported the draft Constitution published in June—see page 30144—which was generally considered to be more moderate.)

The unrest caused by the controversial referendum developed into a full-scale uprising on Dec. 5 following an attack on Ayatollah Shariatmadari's home in the holy city of Qom (south of Tehran) which killed one of his bodyguards, later spreading to Tabriz, the capital of Eastern Azerbaijan, which was peacefully taken over by the Azerbaijanis on Dec. 7 with the apparent support of local units of the Army, police and Revolutionary Guards.

The violence in Qom on Dec. 5 had begun when supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini had attacked Ayatollah Shariatmadari's home in what appeared to be an act of retaliation for the latter's disapproval of the Constitution. At least two people were killed in the assault, one of these being a 24-year-old Azerbaijani who was shot while on guard on the roof of Ayatollah Shariatmadari's house.

This incident immediately sparked off protest marches in Tabriz where demonstrators voiced their support for Ayatollah Shariatmadari and called for self-rule for themselves and other minorities; some reports in the Western press, however, suggested that these disturbances in Tabriz had been instigated by MPRP members who had gone to Tabriz to organize opposition to the referendum and had then remained there to stage some further form of protest.

The demonstrations in Tabriz continued virtually unabated over the following days notwithstanding a conciliatory gesture by Ayatollah Khomeini who on Dec. 6 visited the Azerbaijani leader in Qom to express his regrets at the incidents the previous day. (It was thought that this was only the third meeting between the two men since Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran in January.) By Dec. 7 Azerbaijanis had gained virtual control of Tabriz, having peacefully occupied the local premises of the national Iranian radio and broadcasting network and key government and other installations, including the offices of the provisional Governor-General, Mr Nureddin Gharavi, who was prevented from entering the building on Dec. 8. Also on Dec. 8 rebels refused landing permission to two aircraft carrying reinforcements of Revolutionary Guards to Tabriz airport.

Ayatollah Shariatmadari on Dec. 7 refused to order an end to the occupation of the buildings by his followers, issuing only repeated appeals for calm, and moreover made his first public declaration of support for Azerbaijani autonomy, saying that if the Kurds succeeded in their struggle for self-rule then his people should consider pressing for this too, but stressed that this did not amount to a call for separatism. The Kurds in neighbouring north-western provinces expressed their support for the Azerbaijani cause.

On Dec. 9 several thousand armed followers of Ayatollah Khomeini stormed the broadcasting centre, meeting no resistance from the small number of Azerbaijani insurgents guarding it. Later that day, however, MPRP supporters attempted to regain control of the centre (at least five of them being killed and many more wounded when Islamic militiamen apparently opened fire) and were said to have recaptured the premises after a night of fierce fighting.

Reports on Dec. 10 on the other hand indicated that Ayatollah Khomeini's followers had regained control of principal buildings in Tabriz. Revolutionary Guards on the same day stormed the MPRP offices in Urmia (Rezaiyeh) in Western Azerbaijan, killing two people.

Earlier, on Dec. 9, authorities in Tehran had seized the home and offices of a prominent Azerbaijani, Dr Ramatullah Moghaddam, and claimed that they had found alcohol and offensive literature in his possession. Dr Moghaddam, leader of the Iranian Radical Party, had briefly been Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan after the revolution but had resigned because of "interference from irresponsible people", and had on Dec. 7 been proposed by the MPRP (but not by Ayatollah Shariatmadari) to resume his duties in this office in place of Mr Gharavi.

A government delegation led by Mr Abolhassan Bani-Sadr (then Minister of Economic Affairs and later Iranian President) arrived in Tabriz on Dec. 10 for talks with "representatives of all Azerbaijani people". The MPRP, however, refused to meet this delegation on the grounds that it did not include any representatives of Ayatollah Shariatmadari and, although able to hold a number of talks with local figures, the delegation left Tabriz on Dec. 13 without having made any significant progress.

Earlier, on Dec. 7, another government delegation had arrived in Tabriz and held talks with Ayatollah Shariatmadari in the course of which the latter proposed the formation of a committee to investigate the Tabriz disturbances.

Relations between the Azerbaijanis and the Iranian leadership were further strained at this time by a series of acrimonious exchanges between Ayatollah Shariatmadari on the one hand and Ayatollah Khomeini and the Government on the other.

Ayatollah Shariatmadari was on Dec. 10 quoted as saying that he would not attempt to stop the struggle in Tabriz, and he blamed the Government for triggering off the fighting in Tabriz and of attempt-

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ing to move towards a new "dictatorship" by dissolving minority parties; in this connexion he refused to order the disbandment of the MPRP as had been requested by Ayatollah Khomeini on Dec. 9, saying "today it is the turn of the MPRP, tomorrow it is the turn of other parties". On Dec. 11 he reiterated his refusal to dissolve the MPRP, declaring that the Government would in any case "gradually dissolve all parties by labelling them as American, Zionist or anti-Islamic".

Ayatollah Khomeini on Dec. 10 said that those backing the Tabriz uprising were "corrupt" and "godless people opposed to Islam", claiming moreover that the United States and "Zionists" were also involved in the disturbances. His views were supported by other Iranian religious and political leaders (and by the media) who frequently denounced the Azerbaijani rebels as "counter-revolutionaries", while the Foreign Minister, Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, on Dec. 11 blamed the Azerbaijani crisis on "political extremists" and "those seeking to restore the Shah's regime and US influence".

Against this background another government delegation was understood to have arrived in Tabriz on Dec. 13, this time including representatives of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, and coincided with a demonstration by some 700,000 people in the city, among them uniformed soldiers and peasants from nearby villages, who marched through the city expressing their support for Ayatollah Shariatmadari. The crowd endorsed a 10-point programme drawn up by the MPRP prior to the rally which stressed the primacy of their spiritual leader and demanded inter alia that he be allowed to approve the appointment of local officials.

Throughout the second half of December the MPRP-sponsored protest demonstrations diminished as pressure on the party was stepped up.

On Dec. 27 the MPRP's offices in Tabriz were attacked by Revolutionary Guards, giving rise to fierce fighting between the rival sides which spread to the main streets of Tabriz. Earlier, agreement was purported to have been reached between the Government and Ayatollah Shariatmadari on the dissolution of the party, while on Dec. 19 it was stated that the MPRP had announced its intention to disband "because the political climate was unsuitable", although this subsequently reported to have been a false statement.

Renewed Disturbances in Tabriz in January 1980 - Execution of MPRP Supporters

Further clashes between supporters of the rival ayatollahs broke out in Tabriz on Jan. 4 following violent incidents in Qom earlier in the day.

The disturbances in Qom commenced when followers of Ayatollah Khomeini clashed with Azerbaijanis who were in Qom to commemorate those killed at Ayatollah Shariatmadari's house the previous month. Fighting spread to the main streets of the city, where the Azerbaijani rebels were said to have gone on the rampage, prompting the intervention of police and Revolutionary Guards who attempted to disperse the rival groups with tear gas and by firing shots in the air.

Although both religious leaders appealed for calm, fighting spread to Tabriz later on Jan. 4 after rumours had been circulated there that Ayatollah Shariatmadari's house in Qom had again been attacked. The radio and broadcasting centre was once more seized by MPRP followers but was later recaptured by Revolutionary Guards.

On Jan. 8 several thousand people rallied in Tabriz to express their support for Ayatollah Shariatmadari, many of them tearing up pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini. The following day, a Moslem religious holiday, many buildings were set on fire during fighting between rival groups and, in a further attempt by the Azerbaijanis to regain control of the broadcasting station, at least eight people were killed and several hundred wounded, MPRP supporters putting the death toll at 30. On Jan. 9 Ayatollah Khomeini again appealed for calm and called on the rebels in Tabriz to "give your service to Islam" and to "maintain the same responsibility which you showed during the revolution".

(During riots on Jan. 7 all Western journalists had been expelled from Tabriz, while on Jan. 13 Mr Gharavi announced that he had banned all foreign journalists from the city for what he described as "shameful" reporting on the incidents there. For restrictions on national press, see pages 30146-47.)

Amidst the hostilities in Tabriz Iranian radio had on Jan. 6 broadcast a statement, allegedly made by Ayatollah Shariatmadari, in which he dissociated himself from the MPRP. Supporters of the Azerbaijani leader in Tabriz immediately said that the statement was a fabrication and protested that he was under house arrest in Qom. Reports appearing in the Western press shortly after the broadcast, however, indicated that Ayatollah Shariatmadari might in fact have ended his support for the MPRP, but only in an effort to prevent further violence, while a *New York Times* report of Jan. 12 said that followers of Ayatollah Shariatmadari had reorganized themselves as the "Religious Followers of Ayatollah Shariatmadari" but kept the MPRP headquarters in Tabriz as their "bastion".

Earlier, however, in the evening of Jan. 11, Revolutionary Guards reportedly raided and seized the headquarters of the MPRP in Tabriz which was described as having served as a "base for rioters". In the ensuing gun battle four people died and 25 MPRP members were disarmed and taken to Tabriz prison. Eleven of these were then summarily tried and were found guilty of charges described variously as "subversion with guns", "waging war on God and his messenger" and of creating "intimidation, terror and chaos among the people". All these 11 men were executed early on Jan. 12, giving rise to renewed unrest in Tabriz where Azerbaijanis rampaged through the streets causing widespread damage.

Following these executions it was reported on Jan. 19 that 25 members of the Air Force based in Tabriz had been arrested and charged with plotting a coup in the province and of providing arms to the MPRP; no details of this alleged plot were given, although the Tehran daily *Kayhan* of Jan. 19 said that in all 50 officers and NCOs from the base were involved. *The Daily Telegraph* of Jan. 28 subsequently reported that four of those recently arrested had been executed on Jan. 26. (Guardian - Times - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Sunday Times - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Iran, Internal Developments 30205 A; Minority Groups page 30213*)

A. NETHERLANDS — Abdication of Queen Juliana - Accession of Queen Beatrix - Serious Rioting in Amsterdam

Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, who had acceded to the throne upon the abdication of her mother, Queen Wilhelmina, in September 1948 [see 9485 A], abdicated her title and duties as monarch on April 30, 1980, her 71st birthday, in favour of her eldest daughter and heir presumptive, Princess Beatrix Wilhelmina Armgard. The abdication, which had been announced by Queen Juliana in a radio and television broadcast on Jan. 31, took place in a closed ceremony held at the royal palace in Amsterdam and attended by members of the royal family and by the Dutch Cabinet. The former Queen then assumed the title of Princess Juliana.

Shortly afterwards Princess Beatrix was installed as Queen of the Netherlands in a ceremony held in the adjoining 15th-century Nieuwe Kerk (New Church). Queen Beatrix swore an oath of allegiance to the Dutch Constitution, receiving in return pledges of allegiance from each member of the States-General (Parliament), although, in accordance with Dutch tradition, no actual coronation took place. The ceremony was attended by some 3,000 guests from 56 countries, the United Kingdom being represented by Prince Charles.

Queen Beatrix, born on Jan. 31, 1938, spent most of the Second World War, together with her immediate family, in England and Canada, returning to the Netherlands in August 1945. She became Crown Princess on the accession of Queen Juliana in 1948 and in 1966, after university study, married Herr Claus von Amsberg, a former West German diplomat, who took the title of Prince Claus of the Netherlands. The German origin of Herr von Amsberg provoked major disturbances on the day of the wedding [see 21300 C], although he had by then assumed Dutch nationality. There are three sons, of whom the eldest, Prince Willem Alexander (born in 1967—see 22037 B), became Prince of Orange (heir presumptive) on April 30.

The accession of Queen Beatrix was the occasion of serious rioting in Amsterdam, despite the cordoning off by several thousand police officers of an area of several hundred yards around the Nieuwe Kerk. Originally a day of protest had been called by groups of squatters and homeless in Amsterdam (the city having a housing waiting list of some 54,000 people); however, other groups were believed to be responsible for the actual disturbances, which led to the injury of over 200 persons, including 102 police officers.—(Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Accession of Queen Juliana 9485 A; Royal Family 22992 C, 27985 A; Monarchy page 28838*)

A. NORTHERN IRELAND — Security Situation, October 1979 to March 1980 - Constitutional Conference - Mr Haughey's Call for Joint Initiative by British and Irish Governments - Other Developments

During the six months from October 1979 to March 1980 Provisional IRA violence in Northern Ireland continued with bomb explosions and attacks on the security forces, while the same period also saw a revival of sectarian killings. [For developments in the preceding six months, see 30049 A.]

Security statistics given in a written parliamentary reply on Feb. 12, 1980, by Mr Humphrey Atkins, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, showed that the number of people killed in the province in 1979 was 113 (81 in 1978), comprising 51 civilians, 48 army and UDR (Ulster Defence Regiment) personnel, and 14 policemen. However, the number of explosions and shooting incidents respectively decreased from 455 and 755 in 1978 to 422 and 728, while the number of persons charged with serious security-type offences also dropped from 843 to 670.

The principal incidents of violence in the six months from October 1979 are given below.

Oct. 5. A former UDR member was killed in an ambush in Newry (Co. Down).

Oct. 8. A soldier in civilian clothes was shot dead in an ambush in west Belfast.

Oct. 12. A solicitor's clerk was killed by gunmen in west Belfast.

Oct. 15. A part-time UDR member was shot dead while delivering vegetables to a school in Rosslea (Co. Fermanagh).

Oct. 19. Another part-time UDR member was shot dead while collecting milk near Fintona (Co. Tyrone).

Oct. 24. A shop owner was killed by gunmen outside his home in the Protestant Shankill district of Belfast.

Oct. 28. Gunmen killed a soldier and seriously wounded two policemen outside the Springfield Road police station in Belfast. One of the policemen died in hospital on Nov. 18.

Oct. 30. A part-time UDR member was shot dead while on his way to work near Dungannon (Co. Tyrone).

Nov. 5. A prison officer was shot dead outside the Crumlin Road prison in Belfast.

Nov. 7. Another prison officer was killed by gunmen near the same prison.

Nov. 8. Two Roman Catholic men were shot dead as they were leaving a public house in the Short Strand area of Belfast.

Nov. 13. A soldier was killed by a landmine explosion near Crossmaglen (south Armagh).

Nov. 22. A bomb explosion wrecked a nearly completed Roman Catholic church in north Belfast.

Nov. 26. Bombs damaged trains, hotels and shops in various parts of the province, injuring 13 people, one seriously.

Dec. 3. The chief prison officer at the Crumlin Road prison was shot dead outside his house in north Belfast, and a Roman Catholic market stallholder was found murdered in his home in west Belfast.

Dec. 6. Fire bombs badly damaged buildings in the centre of Lisburn (Co. Antrim).

Dec. 16. A landmine explosion killed four soldiers near Dungannon, and a fifth was killed by a bomb explosion near Forkill (south Armagh).

Dec. 17. A prison officer was shot dead near the Crumlin Road prison.

Dec. 19. A bomb explosion severely damaged Londonderry's head post office.

Dec. 23. A police reservist was killed in an ambush inside the Irish Republic (Co. Monaghan) while on his way to buy Christmas turkeys.

Jan. 1. A Roman Catholic man died in hospital after having been shot at his home in Belfast.

Jan. 2. A former UDR member was shot dead outside his home in Kingsmill (Co. Armagh).

Jan. 3. A police reservist was killed by gunmen at Newtownbutler (Co. Fermanagh).

Jan. 4. A young Roman Catholic man was found beaten to death in the Shankill Road area of Belfast.

Jan. 6. Three UDR members were killed and four others seriously injured in a landmine explosion near Castlewellan (Co. Down).

Jan. 13. A police reservist was shot dead at a football match in Belfast.

Jan. 17. Three people were killed and two others seriously injured when an incendiary bomb exploded on a commuter train travelling between Lisburn and Belfast.

Jan. 26. A soldier was shot dead while on foot patrol in west Belfast.

Feb. 1. Twenty buses were destroyed or damaged in a bomb attack on the Falls Road bus depot in Belfast.

Feb. 5. A part-time UDR member was shot dead near Blacklion (Co. Fermanagh).

Feb. 9. Mr Leonard Kaitcer, a Belfast antiques and jewellery dealer, was found murdered after having been kidnapped from his home on the previous day.

Feb. 11. Two policemen were killed in a landmine explosion near Rosslea (Co. Fermanagh).

Feb. 29. A Roman Catholic man died in hospital after being shot in west Belfast.

March 1. Bomb attacks on bus depots in Belfast and Newry destroyed 25 buses.

March 6. A former UDR member was shot dead near Tynan (south Armagh).

March 25. The Co. Armagh golf club was destroyed by two bomb explosions.

A body found on March 11 on a rubbish tip near Belfast was identified on March 14 as that of Herr Thomas Niedermayer, the former managing director of the Grundig electrical company in Northern Ireland and honorary West German consul in Belfast, who had been kidnapped from his Belfast home on Dec. 27, 1973 [see 26321 C].

Constitutional Conference - Consultative Document - Mr Fitt's Resignation as SDLP Leader

A constitutional conference, attended by representatives of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Alliance Party, began at Stormont on Jan. 7, 1980, but adjourned on March 24, having failed to reach agreement on the role of the Roman Catholic minority in a devolved government.

The Government's intention to convene the conference had been announced in the House of Commons by Mr Atkins on Oct. 25, 1979, in the following statement:

"The Queen's Speech [of May 15, 1979—see 29705 A] declared that the Government's intention was 'to seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs'. Since taking office in May, I have, for this purpose, had wide-ranging discussions in the province, and a series of private meetings with leaders of the main Northern Ireland political parties represented in this House. My discussions and meetings have confirmed the Government's view that it is right to transfer back to locally elected representatives some at least of the powers of government at present exercised from Westminster. The political parties in Northern Ireland themselves, in their election manifestos, asked for this, and there is widespread support for it in the province. There is, moreover, an awareness that such a restoration of political responsibility can be brought about in Northern Ireland only by all parts of the community recognizing and respecting the interests of others.

"It will in due course be a matter for Parliament to decide, on proposals put to it by the Government, what kind of powers and responsibilities are to be transferred to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland and through what kind of institutions they are to be exercised. The Government wishes, however, to put forward proposals that, so far as possible, have the agreement of the people of Northern Ireland. We intend therefore to convene a conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland to seek the highest level of agreement that we can on proposals for a transfer of responsibility, which the Government might put before this House in due course. We are, for this purpose, preparing a consultative document, which will be laid before Parliament, to serve as the basis of the conference. The document will set out the range of powers and responsibilities that the Government for its part would be prepared to see transferred from Westminster. It will set out as options for consideration by the conference a number of ways in which the transferred powers might be exercised, and, in each case, what the Government would regard as reasonable and appropriate arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority. Responsibility for law and order, which remains the Government's overriding priority in Northern Ireland, would not be transferred.

"I shall shortly be approaching the party leaders concerned to discuss with them the arrangements for a conference to be convened as soon as possible and, I would hope, by the end of November. Our aim will be to secure from the conference, drawing on suggestions in the consultative document, workable and acceptable arrange-

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ments for restoring to the people of Northern Ireland greater responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs which we can then recommend to this House in fulfilment of our commitment in the Queen's Speech.''

In reply to questions, Mr Atkins said that it would be his intention to invite to the conference representatives of the Official Unionist Party (OUP), the DUP, the SDLP and the Alliance Party, which between them represented four out of five voters in the province.

The consultative document, mentioned in Mr Atkins's statement, was published on Nov. 20 under the title *The Government of Northern Ireland: A Working Paper for a Conference* (Cmnd. 7763). Excerpts from the document are given below.

Dealing with the scope of the conference, the document said: ''It is at present the clear wish of a substantial majority of the people in Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. The conference will therefore not be concerned with the constitutional status of the province and will not be asked to discuss issues such as Irish unity, or confederation, or independence. Nor, since there is no serious prospect of agreement on them, will the conference be invited to consider either a return to the arrangements which prevailed before 1972 [i.e. the Northern Ireland Government and Parliament], or a revival of the system which obtained in the first five months of 1974 [i.e. the NI Executive—see 26301 A; 26573 A]. New patterns must be sought which take full account of the needs and anxieties of both sides of the community. The objective of the Government is the transfer of as wide a range of powers as can be agreed including, if acceptable arrangements can be made, all the powers transferred under the 1973 Constitution Act [see 26035 A]. While the Government will be ready to recommend to Parliament any workable transfer of powers which may be acceptable to the people of Northern Ireland as a whole, there are in its view certain principles which must be observed.

''These are:

''(i) The powers should be transferred to the elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland; and the overriding authority of Parliament will (as elsewhere in the UK) be preserved.

''(ii) In the words of the statement of Oct. 25, there will have to be 'reasonable and appropriate arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority'. Those arrangements will have to be acceptable to both sides of the community and also to HM Government. The political divisions of the people of Northern Ireland are such that the alternation of the parties in government, which is so important a feature of the Westminster system, is unlikely to take place. In the Government's view, it is essential for a transfer of powers to be made in a way which will take account of the interests of both parts of the community.

''(iii) Under any new arrangements, existing safeguards and remedies against discrimination on religious or political grounds should at least be maintained, and, if possible, improved.

''(iv) Responsibility for defence and foreign affairs (including relations with the European Community) will remain with the UK Government and Parliament, as will responsibility for the courts and electoral matters.

''(v) In the foreseeable future, given the Government's overriding commitment to combat terrorism, responsibility for law and order will also remain with Westminster.

''(vi) The general power to raise revenue by taxation will remain with Westminster; but this would not rule out the possibility of a local power to levy a rate.

''(vii) Public expenditure in Northern Ireland will continue as at present to be assessed on the basis of need, and to be financed with support as necessary from the UK Exchequer.''

Protection of Minority Community. ''It is, in the Government's view, essential to recognize that the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland require special arrangements to be made to protect the position of the minority community and to specify the role of its representatives in whatever new arrangements are adopted. This is because, given the basis on which support for political parties in Northern Ireland rests, the representatives of the minority community cannot so broaden their appeal as to expect to win office by way of any future election. Moreover, it is the perception of the minority community that the majority, in the exercise of the powers of government, have failed to take proper account of minority interests. In this situation it is necessary, if new arrangements for Northern Ireland are to gain the public confidence on which stability depends, that they should embrace a formula that gives appropriate recognition to the rights of both the majority and minority communities. A wide range of devices is available to help to protect the position of the minority within different systems of government. The choice of which to use depends to some extent on the nature of the chosen institutional framework and the extent of powers to be exercised. But most are adaptable in some form or other to any arrangements for the exercise of either executive or legislative powers.''

An appendix to the working paper set out six ''models'' as illustrations of the variety of regional bodies which might be created in Northern Ireland. They were described as follows: (i) a unicameral system of government with legislative and executive powers; (ii) a bicameral system of government with legislative and executive powers; (iii) a system of government with legislative and executive powers operating on an executive committee basis; (iv) a system of government with executive but no legislative powers operating on a committee basis; (v) a system of government with executive but no legislative powers based on the ''cabinet'' system, but with advisory committees; (vi) a system of government with executive but no legislative powers exercised by one or more local authorities.

The House of Commons debated and took note of the working paper on Nov. 29.

Mr Atkins, opening the debate, said that since the suspension of the Stormont Parliament in 1972 [see 25197 A], Northern Ireland had been governed, except for a short period in 1974, by direct rule from Westminster. Successive Governments and Secretaries of State and the civil servants in the departments responsible had done their best to give Northern Ireland an efficient and impartial administration and to make it sensitive to the special needs of the province. He believed that this had been done with some success and that direct rule had a fair degree of acceptability. But because district councils in Northern Ireland had a limited range of functions, far less than their counterparts in Great Britain, it meant that Northern Ireland ministers, and therefore Parliament, were burdened with too great a range of what were essentially local matters. The present system gave too little opportunity for the normal healthy wish of politically aware citizens to involve themselves in the administration of their affairs. This wish was as strong in Northern Ireland as elsewhere, perhaps stronger, and it was only right to seek to provide a proper democratic channel for its exercise.

The working paper did not set out a blueprint for the future government of Northern Ireland but was rather a working kit to help discussion about what form of devolved government would suit Northern Ireland in present circumstances, so as to assist the British Government in taking the necessary decisions and introducing the necessary legislation. The dimensions which had to be considered in deciding how to make progress were: the kind of institutions which might be created; the subjects and powers which might be transferred to an elected body in Northern Ireland; and the arrangements needed to look after minority interests. While in speaking of the minority community they had the Catholic one-third or thereabouts of the population in mind, when considering political institutions the term took on a different meaning, having reference to votes cast and seats held rather than to religious or other affiliations. In protecting the position of the minority community, they could use the direct or positive approach of giving them representatives in the decision-taking processes of government. There was also the indirect or negative approach of giving minority representatives powers, beyond what their numbers would justify, to block or delay certain decisions of the majority. The working paper also raised the possibility of safeguards taking the form of appeal to an external authority, like the Secretary of State, the Westminster Parliament or the judicial committee of the Privy Council. Without some such safeguards progress would not be made in devising institutions which would be acceptable to both communities in Northern Ireland and which would last.

Mr Atkins concluded: ''We are most anxious to be able to come to the House with proposals for the future government of Northern Ireland which we believe have the support of the people of Northern Ireland. There are various ways of assessing whether they have that support or not. One is a referendum. We shall keep it in mind if it seems the most appropriate way. It remains the Government's firm belief that a conference of the kind proposed not only is the best way forward but will take place and prove fruitful. The object is not necessarily to reach complete agreement on a full-blown constitution. It is to find the highest level of agreement for a transfer of powers of government to Northern Ireland so that proposals based on that level of agreement can be put by the Government here to Parliament. It is Parliament who in the end will have the responsibility of deciding what shall be done. There is a widespread desire in Northern Ireland to move away from direct rule and well wishers of Northern Ireland this side of the Irish Sea and elsewhere want to see progress made towards a devolved administration which both sides of the community can sustain and support.''

Mr Brynmor John, chief opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland, said that Mr Atkins had been somewhat cautious in dealing with the prospects. There was some danger of Parliament being inhibited and the debate being stifled if they tried to be over-cautious. The invitation to the parties was issued in public and they had a right to have a public response to the House as to what the situation was. Otherwise, Parliament would, to a large extent, be debating this in a vacuum, and in a somewhat academic atmosphere in ignorance of some of the facts.

The Rev. Ian Paisley, the DUP leader, said that there was no mileage in any discussions with Northern Ireland politicians, elected or otherwise, in trying to pursue a way to Irish unity, the old Stormont, or a power sharing executive. Agreement would never be obtained on these issues. It was tragic that all the Northern Ireland MPs could not in some way be involved in the conference. One-third of these MPs did not belong to any of the parties invited to the conference. Mr Atkins had to devise ways whereby these MPs did not become a sort of appendage to the conference, but became an integral part of it with their views being heard. (The four Northern Ireland MPs outside the parties invited to the conference were: Mr John Dunlop, United Ulster Unionist Party; Mr Gerard Fitt, formerly the SDLP leader—see below; Mr James Kilfedder, Ulster Unionist—see also below; and Mr Frank Maguire, independent.)

Mr James Molyneaux, the OUP leader, said that he could not forget that in 1975 Parliament set up a constitutional convention for Northern Ireland [see 27161 A]. His party took the view at that time, and still retained it, that the report of that convention [see 27761 A] provided a workable model. Was it seriously suggested that the elected representatives who laboured in that convention for almost a year to produce that report were so lacking in political integrity that if invited back again they would now be prepared to stand their principles on their heads? Would those people who put their hands to the convention report be expected to betray the trust placed in them by agreeing to the inclusion in government of those who were not merely believed to be republicans but who openly and proudly proclaimed their allegiance to another state? The OUP wanted to see a genuine and lasting improvement in methods of government. They trusted that after an interval for reflection and recovery of stability they could, without argument, cautiously resume progress. The Secretary of State and the Prime Minister had been assured that the OUP would help to co-operate fully in establishing sound government in Northern Ireland with a structure broadly along the lines of the Conservatives' own manifesto [see page 29636].

Mr Molyneaux had formally declined Mr Atkins's invitation to the conference on Nov. 27, following a decision of the OUP executive on Nov. 23 not to attend. In his letter to Mr Atkins, Mr Molyneaux, who had opposed the conference from the beginning, wrote: "I need not repeat my views in detail beyond restating my fear that, far from bringing parties together, a conference and the attendant publicity would drive them further apart, and damage what political stability had been created over the past three years."

Mr Gerard Fitt, MP for Belfast, West, resigned on Nov. 22 from the leadership of the SDLP, which he had held since the party's formation in 1970 [see 24245 A]. Mr Fitt announced his decision at a press conference, following the rejection of the working paper by the party's constituency representatives and executive on the grounds that it ruled out discussion of an Irish dimension and reduced power sharing from a condition for a devolved administration to a mere option.

Mr Fitt said: "At this moment I feel intense sadness at the decision which I was forced to take this morning. I was forced because I could no longer live with my own conscience as a socialist and as a social democrat, and continue to lead the SDLP." Recalling that the founders of the SDLP had recognized that it would not be easy to hold it together because the minority in Northern Ireland had never had one united party, he continued: "However, the SDLP succeeded beyond all possible bounds of belief, and over 10 years in the most murderous decade that we have had in Northern Ireland we managed to hold together. The socialists were few in number in the SDLP, but great in heart. The Nationalists were more numerous, therefore had more delegates at the party conferences, and were able to influence party policy more. However, after Sunningdale, the downfall of the Executive in 1974, and the convention which failed to reach any agreement, there has been a political vacuum in Northern Ireland. I have noticed that, in the absence of political initiative taken, there has been a Republican element emerging within the ranks of the SDLP. . . . Under no circumstances can I give any support to people who either owe their allegiance covertly, or overtly, or give support tacitly or otherwise, to the Republican movement. I cannot have any association with it. I have lost some of my closest friends, and many people have lost their lives, or limbs."

The working paper, Mr Fitt continued, stated what was a "fact of life", namely that "it is, at present, the clear wish of a substantial majority of the people of Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK". However, in that part of the document dealing with the role of the minority he detected a "tremendous advance". In reading through those options he was convinced that the way was open for power sharing by negotiations. "It would not be imposed," he went on, "it would have to be agreed at the conference, and I was prepared to go into that conference having all the misgivings I have had about the DUP, who would be a very large part of the political representation at that conference. No doubt the DUP would have had some misgiving about me, but it would have been prepared to go back there and negotiate in this document, and I am not assured that there would not have been success. . . . I am convinced that the only hope in Northern Ireland is by political progress. One must involve the majority Loyalist population in these talks. You cannot beat the Loyalist majority population in Northern Ireland. I have never believed that was the position."

Mr Fitt said that he had thought long and hard about his decision over the previous 48 hours. He had hoped desperately that the party would decide to go to the conference. He would still have resigned the leadership, but would have remained a member of the party and tried to use his influence. There was a time when he could have led the SDLP but it was a Nationalist party now. He continued: "Nationalism has been an honourable concept in the minds of many people, but I believe that it has not been successful. I have never been a Nationalist to the total exclusion of my socialist beliefs. The SDLP is nationalist." Asked about his political future, Mr Fitt said that he had asked fellow MPs that his parliamentary designation should be "Socialist".

Mr John Hume (42), the party's deputy leader and its sole representative in the European Parliament [see page 29899], was on Nov. 28 elected unopposed as leader of the SDLP in succession to Mr Fitt. A founder member of the party, Mr Hume was elected to the Stormont Parliament in 1969 as an independent and subsequently sat in the NI Assembly and Constitutional Convention.

After three meetings between Mr Hume and Mr Atkins, the SDLP agreed on Dec. 15 to take part in the conference on the basis of the following six-point agreement:

(1) The SDLP would be free to put forward to the conference papers containing its own proposals for the government of Northern Ireland.

(2) The Secretary of State, as chairman of the conference, would invite the participants to introduce their papers verbally, with the conference as a whole deciding how particular points in such papers should be pursued.

(3) The conference was not an end in itself, but a means of identifying the highest possible level of agreement on the transfer of responsibilities to locally elected representatives. Even after such a transfer, further political development would remain possible, depending on the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland. The point added: "Further political development would be fully consistent with Section 1 of the NI Constitution Act, 1973, which means not only that Northern Ireland will remain a part of the UK for as long as a majority of Northern Ireland's inhabitants so wish, but also that if such a majority indicated a wish for a change in their constitutional status, HM Government would not stand in the way of such a change."

(4) The conference—and in due course any elected body—would be able to discuss the "relationship between any elected representative body in Northern Ireland and the authorities of the Republic on all matters over which the former exercised responsibility".

(5) Arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority "by sharing of the exercise of governmental powers" would be on the table for discussion.

(6) The Secretary of State would be willing to continue meeting the parties apart from at the conference itself.

At the conference—which, as explained above, opened on Jan. 7, 1980—the DUP proposed that any future NI government should be made up entirely of the majority party in an elected assembly, with no minority representatives in the cabinet, although there should be a system of all-party departmental committees which would advise on legislation and could call ministers to account. Party representation on the committees, which would be composed exclusively of backbenchers, would be proportional to party strength in the assembly, and chairmanships would be allocated on the same basis.

The SDLP wanted a power sharing executive in which minority representatives would be guaranteed seats proportionate to their strength in the assembly, while the Alliance Party, led by Mr Oliver Napier, proposed a system of departmental committees under which each ministry would be run by an all-party committee, with a panel of committee chairmen allocating departmental budgets.

Mr Atkins told the House of Commons on April 3 (i.e. 10 days after the adjournment of the conference) that the Government wanted to get views from as wide an area of opinion in Northern Ireland as it could on proposals to be put forward in the light of what had been learned from the constitutional conference.

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Mr Haughey's Call for Joint Initiative by British and Irish Governments

Mr Charles Haughey, who in December 1979 had succeeded Mr Jack Lynch as *Taoiseach* (Prime Minister) of the Irish Republic [see 30110 A], called on Feb. 16, 1980, for a joint initiative on Northern Ireland from the UK and Irish Governments.

Addressing the *Ard-Fheis* (annual conference) of the ruling *Fianna Fail* party, Mr Haughey said: "We must all be conscious of the fact that, even as we gather here, the tragedy of the North continues. Violence, suffering and death are a normal part of everyday life. There are whole neighbourhoods which can hardly remember normal conditions and where thousands of young people have grown up knowing only tension and strife. The need for a solution becomes increasingly urgent. Unless one can be brought forward soon the situation could well become irretrievable. We know from history that under such stresses it is possible for society to deteriorate beyond recovery. In the view of some observers, Northern Ireland may well be on the verge of such a phase. The picture is a depressing one. Agriculture and industry in Northern Ireland now produce less than in the early 1970s. The population has been static, or has fallen. Unemployment in some places is more than 20 per cent.

"In these conditions, feelings of hopelessness, isolation and despair among individuals and families can become so deep, and widespread, that the will to restore the values and relationships of a normal society may well disappear over large areas, and leave behind communities which are utterly deprived in human and social terms. Surely the fine people of Northern Ireland deserve better than this. The situation is urgent, because time is running out. The time for a solution is now, and that solution can only come through political action. All but a tiny minority understand that violence can never bring a solution, and that solution can only come through political action. Let us make it absolutely clear that no Irish Government will tolerate any attempt by any group to put themselves above the law, or to arrogate to themselves any of the functions of government. There is one Army in this state, one police force and one judiciary, appointed under the Constitution, to uphold our laws. The Government, acting for the people, will ensure that these laws are effective and are enforced. Democracy will be defended, and the rule of law upheld. That is an essential element of national policy.

"For over 60 years now, the situation in Northern Ireland has been a source of instability, real or potential, in these islands. It has been so because the very entity itself is artificial and has been artificially sustained. In these conditions, violence and repression were inevitable. Should the present constitutional conference help to ensure civil rights and equality for all the people of Northern Ireland and to ensure also that security operates impartially, then so much the better. But the conference itself cannot provide a conclusive settlement. We must face the reality that Northern Ireland, as a political entity, has failed and that a new beginning is needed. The time has surely come for the two sovereign Governments to work together to find a formula and lift the situation on to a new plane, that will bring permanent peace and stability to the people of these islands. No settlement can be contemplated now which merely sows the seeds of future discord. There are massive financial, security and constitutional questions to be solved, guarantees to be worked out. But a start must be made. In my view, a declaration by the British Government of their interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland, by agreement and in peace, would open the way towards an entirely new situation in which peace—real lasting peace—would become an attainable reality. For our part, we gladly declare that we have no wish to dominate or coerce. The evils of domination and coercion at the hands of others are too deeply embedded in our folk memory for us ever to start down along that reprehensible road.

"Let me also say that in any discussion or negotiation which may be embarked upon, or any settlement which may be proposed, the safety and welfare of our fellow countrymen of the Protestant faith in Northern Ireland would be for me, personally, a special priority. I have lived among them as a boy, I know their qualities, I admire their virtues; I understand their deeply held convictions. It would be my concern to ensure that their place in the Ireland of the future was secure; that their talents and industry were given every opportunity to flourish; that their traditions were honoured and respected.

"Northern Ireland casts a long, dark shadow into every corner of these islands. The effects of the violent and unstable situation there are felt in a hundred different ways. Because of it, political life in this part of the country is a great deal less fruitful and constructive than it would otherwise be. We are forced to accept unpalatable measures, restrictions and curtailments of freedom that are alien to our outlook and our character. In the economic situation that confronts us, the cost of the security measures directly attributable to the Northern situation—about £70,000,000—is becoming increasingly onerous for us to bear. It represents an allocation of scarce resources that could well be used for many urgent desirable social purposes. Northern Ireland distorts official relations between Britain and Ireland. It hinders, too, the development of friendship and co-operation at every level between ordinary people in these islands who have such a great deal in common and who have such close personal ties going back over many generations. Perhaps, more than anything else, however, the situation in the North prevents the coming together of all our cultural traditions in a full flowering, and the harnessing of the energies of all the people of this island in a combined effort for their betterment, their welfare and their happiness. We look forward to some new free and open arrangement in which Irish men and women, on their own, without a British presence but with active British good will, will manage the affairs of the whole of Ireland in a constructive partnership within the European Community. This Government see Northern Ireland as the major national issue, and its peaceful solution as our first political priority."

Mr Haughey told a press conference on Feb. 17 that he intended immediately to circulate the text of his speech in every capital in which the Irish Republic was represented, and to "enlist the aid and support of all our friends in support of that policy". The diplomatic initiative would be directed primarily at the European Community and the United States, where Ireland's friends had not been given any clear objectives of Irish policy which they could support until now.

Formation of Ulster Progressive Unionist Party

Mr James Kilfedder, Ulster Unionist MP for Down, North, announced on Jan. 17, 1980, the formation of the Ulster Progressive Unionist Party (UPUP). MP for Down, North, since 1970, and before that for Belfast, West, in 1964-66, Mr Kilfedder left the former United Ulster Unionist Coalition (UUUC) at Westminster shortly after the general election of October 1974 [see page 28699] and sat as an Independent Unionist until the May 1979 general election when he was re-elected as an Ulster Unionist [see 29645 A]. He said that the UPUP stood inter alia for devolved government in Northern Ireland and for proportional representation in Westminster elections.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Irish Times - Hansard - Cmnd. 7763) (*Prev. rep. 30049 A*)

A. MALAYSIA — Federal Cabinet Changes and Associated Party Political Developments - By-election - Unrest in Kedah

The Minister of Transport, Tan Sri V. Manickavasagam, who had first entered the federal Cabinet in 1964 [see 20059 A], died in October 1979 and was succeeded on Oct. 22 by Datuk Lee San Choon. The latter's previous post as Minister of Works and Public Utilities was given to Datuk Samy Vellu (hitherto Deputy Minister for Housing and Local Government).

Tan Sri Manickavasagam had been the president of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), one of the component parties of the ruling National Front coalition [for which see 29405 A], and Datuk Samy Vellu became acting president of the party upon his death.

The parliamentary seat held by Tan Sri Manickavasagam for the previous 20 years was retained for the MIC by Mr V. Govindaraju at a by-election held on Dec. 1.

In a previous cabinet change on Sept. 27, 1979, Datuk Dr Neo Yee Pan (hitherto Deputy Minister of Finance) was appointed Minister of Housing and Local Government *vice* Dato Michael Chen Wing Sum.

Dato Michael Chen Wing Sum had resigned from the Government following his failure to defeat Datuk Lee San Choon (the incumbent president of the Malaysian Chinese Association, MCA) in a party leadership election held earlier in September. He had served as deputy president of the MCA for the previous two years, during which he had come into serious conflict with Datuk Lee San Choon.

On Jan. 23, 1980, a curfew was imposed in Alor Setar, the capital of the state of Kedah (in north-western Peninsular Malaysia) after a demonstration by over 10,000 rice farmers had been dispersed by armed riot police using tear gas. A total of 92 persons were charged with rioting and damaging government property. The farmers were protesting at the current level of producer prices and subsidies fixed by the National Rice and Padi Authority, but it was claimed by the state Government that this issue had been exploited by "militant groups" for political ends. This was understood to be a reference to the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP or PAS), which had been expelled from the National Front in December 1977 following a political crisis in the north-eastern state of Kelantan [see 29028 A; 28780 A]. (For 1974 disturbances stemming from farmers' grievances, see 26951 A.)—(Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Malaysian High Commission, London) (*Prev. rep. 29405 A*)

A. LESOTHO — Internal Developments - External Relations - New Currency

Following reported heavy fighting in northern Lesotho in late November 1979, said to involve police and members of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), a number of villagers from the Butha-Buthe area crossed the Caledon river northwards into South Africa during the period to mid-January 1980.

In a communiqué issued on Nov. 28, 1979, Chief Leabua Jonathan, the Prime Minister of Lesotho, blamed the disturbances on BCP "insurgents" who, he said, were armed and aided by South Africa. The insurgents were allegedly responsible for a series of incidents in recent years, including an attack on a police station near the town of Butha-Buthe on Nov. 17, 1979, in which Chief Lepata Mou, a leading figure in the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP), was one of two people killed.

A statement issued by the BCP on Dec. 8 (and signed by its exiled leader, Mr Ntsu Mokhehle) said that actions in Lesotho had been carried out by its guerrilla forces, the "Lesotho Liberation Army" (LLA), under whose leadership the Basotho people were said to have risen "to free themselves from Leabua Jonathan's illegal rule of repressive terror". (Chief Jonathan had implemented an effective coup in January 1970 when it became apparent that his party had been defeated in general elections by the BCP—see 23865 A. Prominent BCP leaders were imprisoned or went into exile after an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Chief Jonathan's regime in 1974—see 26354 A; 26682 C; 27068 A—although two opposition leaders, including Mr Gerald Ramoreboli of the BCP, were appointed to the Cabinet in 1975—see 27532 C. For establishment in 1973 of a nominated National Assembly, see 26212 A.)

Mr Mokhehle said on Dec. 14 that the LLA had 65 Libyan-trained guerrillas and 500-1,000 other men in training in secret mountain camps. The BCP, which was considered to be a socialist anti-apartheid organization, denied allegations that its struggle was supported by South Africa (and further claimed that 15 of its members had been arrested by the South African police and handed over to the Lesotho Government in February 1979, since when they had apparently disappeared).

With regard to the villagers leaving Lesotho, a report in *The Times* of Jan. 11, 1980, said that 771 people from the Butha-Buthe area (109 men, 244 women and 418 children) were sheltering at a camp near Bethlehem in the Orange Free State province of South Africa; the report said that some 500 had crossed the Caledon river from Lesotho before Christmas, and that "a steady trickle has continued".

Whereas the South African Government had in December sought assistance for the people at the camp from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (in connexion with which a UNHCR investigative mission visited the camp on Feb. 22, 1980), the Lesotho Government refused to regard them as refugees, asserting that they were free to return, that they had been abducted or induced to flee by BCP militants, and that the South African Government had provided transport. On the other hand Mr P. Molahloe, a BCP spokesman at the camp, said that the villagers had fled after attacks by the Lesotho Police Mobile Unit, in which an estimated 80 people had been killed, the fighting having allegedly begun when police attacked a secret BCP meeting on Nov. 26. (Reports in the Western press generally estimated the casualties at between 15 and 50 people killed.)

At a women's rally in the Lesotho capital of Maseru on Dec. 17, 1979, Chief Jonathan asserted his confidence in popular support for his regime; he indicated that he intended to call a general election (although without specifying a date) and that the support of the women of Lesotho would ensure victory for his BNP party. (On the other hand over 200,000 Basotho men employed in South Africa, representing one-sixth of the population of Lesotho, were thought to be mostly BCP supporters, according to *The Times* of Dec. 18, 1979.) Chief Jonathan later said (on Feb. 24, 1980) that the Lesotho National Assembly would consider at its next session a government-approved amnesty bill, under which exiled BCP leaders would be able to return to the country.

Following reports of renewed fighting between Lesotho police and BCP supporters on Feb. 23-24, 1980, the Lesotho Government sent a protest note to the South African Government, asserting that 300 men with South African weapons had crossed into Lesotho, and adding that South Africa's failure to prevent incidents of this kind amounted to a declaration of war. The South African Government categorically rejected the allegation that it was in any way responsible for attacks against Lesotho, and warned the Lesotho Government not to allow the increasing internal unrest to lead to a confrontation with South Africa.

In an earlier incident, the Lesotho Government had protested to the South African Government following the arrest by the latter of Mr Jinjiva Winston Nkondo on Dec. 12; Mr Nkondo, an alleged member of the banned African National Congress of South Africa, was in transit in South Africa after his Lesotho Airways flight had been diverted to Bloemfontein because of engine trouble.

While Chief Jonathan's regime maintained a critical attitude towards South Africa, relations had been based on "the principle of good neighbourliness" [see 26682 C], but had deteriorated in recent years (one factor being border and transit disputes in connexion with South Africa's establishment of an "independent" Transkei in 1976—see 28061 A; 28244 A—in addition to which there had allegedly been increasing harassment of Basotho workers employed in South African mines). Lesotho had latterly established diplomatic relations with a number of socialist bloc countries, notably with Cuba (on June 14, 1979) and, most recently, with the Soviet Union (on Feb. 1, 1980).



(*Carpress*)

Mr P. W. Botha, the South African Prime Minister, warned in June 1979 that it would be "playing with fire" for Lesotho to allow a Cuban presence in the country; he had given a similar warning one year previously, when a Cuban delegation visited Lesotho (although the Lesotho Government had denied at that time that diplomatic relations were to be established with Cuba). Sr Martín Mora Díaz, the Cuban ambassador to Mozambique, who was based in Maputo, presented his credentials in Maseru on Feb. 21, 1980, in his additional capacity as Cuban ambassador to Lesotho.

A new national currency, known as the maloti, was introduced by the Government of Lesotho on Dec. 7, 1979, its value being equivalent to the South African rand (which had hitherto been the currency of Lesotho and which was to continue in circulation alongside the maloti). Speaking on Jan. 19, 1980, at the inauguration of the newly-created Lesotho monetary authority, Chief Jonathan said that the launching of the maloti (which was first announced on May 9, 1978) reflected a commitment to give meaning to political independence, but he noted that the economic realities included the total encirclement of the country by the economically powerful state of South Africa. [For 1974 monetary agreement between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, see 27044 A.]—(Le Monde - Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Cape Times - IMF, Washington - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 28244 A*)

B. CAMEROON — Re-election of President - Alleged Human Rights Violations - Outbreak of Violence in Northern Village

President Amadou Ahidjo of Cameroon (55) was on April 5, 1980, re-elected for a fifth consecutive five-year presidential term; as the sole candidate (having been nominated unanimously on Feb. 17 at the third congress of the *Union Nationale Camerounaise*, the country's only political party) he was officially declared to have received 99.99 per cent of votes cast.

In his opening speech to the party congress on Feb. 13, President Ahidjo described allegations of widespread human rights violations in Cameroon as "lying propaganda" spread by self-exiled opponents of his regime. The French section of Amnesty International (the human rights organization) had on Feb. 9 asserted that there were some 200 political prisoners in Cameroon [see also 30044 A].

A government statement on Nov. 5, 1979, referring to "serious clashes" between villagers and security forces on Oct. 20-21 at the Arab village of Dolle (near the northern border with Chad), announced that a total of 30 people had been killed. Press reports had earlier indicated that a protest by villagers (over alleged embezzlement of funds for the construction of a school) had culminated in the killing of a number of gendarmes; the reports claimed that to suppress this apparent revolt a commando unit had been sent in and had allegedly conducted a systematic massacre, with casualties running into several hundreds.—(Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. 30044 A; 1975 Presidential Election 27113 B*)

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A. SOMALIA — Parliamentary and Local Government Elections - Appointment of New Cabinet and Party Bureaux Members - Growing Problem of Refugees

In parliamentary elections held in Somalia on Dec. 30, 1979, the 171 candidates nominated by the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), the country's sole legal political organization [see 27923 A], were elected to fill all the seats in the new People's Assembly. According to official figures announced on Jan. 1, 1980, a total of 3,985,838 votes were cast, of which 99.91 per cent supported the election of the SRSP candidates; there were in addition a small number of "no" votes and spoiled ballot papers.

Elections for a People's Assembly were required under the new Constitution of the Somali Democratic Republic adopted by the SRSP in January 1979 [see 29706 A] and approved in a national referendum in August [see 29877 B]. These elections (together with those held at the same time for the 1,074 members of the new district assemblies) were the first held in Somalia under the regime of Gen. Mohammed Siyad Barreh, who had assumed power in October 1969 [see 23672 A].

The Assembly (whose members, including 20 military personnel and six women, were elected for a five-year term) met on Jan. 26, 1980, and unanimously elected President Siyad Barreh as its president.

At a meeting of the SRSP central committee on Feb. 7, President Siyad Barreh announced the formation of a new Government, whose members are listed below:

Maj.-Gen. Hussein Kulmiye Afrah	Presidential Adviser on Government Affairs
*Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Ali Samater	Defence
*Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Suleman Abdulla	Commander of the National Security Service
*Col. Ahmed Hassan Musa ..	Agriculture
Mr Ahmed Habib Ahmed ..	National Planning
*Mr Abderrahman Jama Barreh ..	Foreign Affairs
*Mr Osman Jama Ali	Fisheries
*Brig.-Gen. Mahmud Gele Yusuf	Ports and Sea Transport
*Mr Ahmed Shire Mahmud ..	Justice and Religious Affairs
*Mr Adan Mohammed Ali ..	Education
*Mr Ahmed Ashkir Botan ..	Culture and Higher Education
Col. Mire Aware Jama	Youth and Sports
*Mr Hussein Abdulkadir Quasim	Water and Mineral Resources
Mr Mohammed Hawadleh Madar	Posts and Telecommunications
*Mr Mohammed Buraleh Ismail ..	Labour and Social Affairs
Mr Mohammed Ali Nur	Livestock and Forestry
*Mr Mohammed Ibrahim Ahmed	Commerce
Mr Abdullahi Ahmed Adow ..	Finance
Maj.-Gen. Abdulla Mohammed Fadil	Health
*Maj.-Gen. Jama Mohammed Ghalib	Local Government and Rural Development
*Mr Kenadid Ahmed Yusuf ..	Land and Air Transport
Col. Mohammed Umar Jes ..	Tourism
Mr Ali Khalif Ghaleyr	Industry
Mr Mohammed Adan Sheikh ..	Information and National Guidance
Brig.-Gen. Mahmud Nur Galal ..	Public Works
*Col. Abdi Warsama Isaq ..	Minister at the Office of the Presidency (responsible for social affairs)
Mr Mohammed Said Samantar Gaaliye	Minister at the Office of the Presidency (responsible for political affairs)

* No change.

Maj.-Gen. Afrah and Brig.-Gen. Samater had been Vice-Presidents since 1971 [see 24770 A]; Mr Mohammed Hawadleh Madar had been Minister of Public Works, and Maj.-Gen. Fadil had been a member of the economic development committee.

Also on Feb. 7, President Siyad Barreh announced a reshuffle of the bureaux within the SRSP, with new members and chairmen being appointed and additional bureaux being created.

Following an apparent marked increase in the number of refugees entering the country, a state of emergency was declared in September 1979, and appeals for international aid were made, notably by Maj.-Gen. Jama Mohammed Ghalib, the Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, who on Oct. 11 told the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva that an estimated $70,000,000 would be needed. [For refugee situation in March-April 1978, see page 28990.]

Maj.-Gen. Jama Mohammed Ghalib estimated that there were some 1,000,000 refugees in Somalia, of whom 331,000 were gathered in 21 designated refugee camps while the rest were scattered throughout the countryside; he added that a further 1,000 refugees were entering Somalia every day from the Ogaden area (in neighbouring Ethiopia), where he asserted that the native population of ethnic Somalis was being driven out in an Ethiopian effort to colonize the region with new settlers. The refugees consisted primarily of women and children, he said, since many of the men had been killed, while others remained to conduct the guerrilla struggle in the Ogaden [see pages 30016-17].

In a speech in Mogadishu on Oct. 21, 1979 (during ceremonies to mark the 10th anniversary of his regime's assumption of power), President Siyad Barreh asserted that Somalia had no expansionist aims, but he reiterated calls for self-determination for the Somali-speaking populations within neighbouring countries (there being Somali minorities in Djibouti and Kenya—see map on page 30016—as well as in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia). Signs of continuing hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia included reports by Mogadishu radio of Ethiopian air raids into Somalia on Nov. 29, 1979, and on Jan. 23 and Feb. 24, 1980.

As the refugee influx continued, Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, informed UN member governments on Feb. 11, 1980, that an estimated $120,000,000 was needed for assistance to refugees in camps in Somalia. An appeal to the international community to meet this requirement was launched by Mr Poul Hartling, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, on March 4 (by which time the UNHCR estimated that there were 600,000 refugees in the camps, as well as those outside camps whose numbers were given by the Somali Government as some 700,000).

The appeal for $120,000,000 of which two-thirds was for food and the remainder for such items as clothing, shelter, water and medicines, was based on the report of a UN interagency mission sent to Somalia in December 1979 at the request of the Somali Government. Meanwhile Mr Hartling had said in Geneva on Jan. 14, 1980, that the situation in Somalia represented "the worst refugee problem in the world"; taking account of the particular difficulties of assisting nomadic tribespeople not gathered into camps, he had estimated that UNHCR work in Somalia would require some $200,000,000, and had called for the overall UNHCR budget for 1980 to be increased to $500,000,000. (This compared with the budget of $234,000,000 approved by the UNHCR Executive Committee at its annual meeting in October 1979, when the amount allocated for Somalia had been $88,000,000.)

The UNHCR initiated an airlift of emergency supplies to Somalia on Jan. 23, financed by contributions from the European Community, while the World Food Programme on Jan. 30 approved grants totalling £3,300,000 to help meet refugee food needs for three months.

In view of the serious economic and financial difficulties which were being faced by the Somali economy and which had their origins in the prolonged 1973-75 drought [see 27379 A], the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced on Feb. 28, 1980, that it had approved a standby arrangement for the Government of Somalia authorizing purchases up to the equivalent of 11,500,000 special drawing rights (about $15,000,000) over the next 12 months in support of the Government's financial programme for 1980.

As a result of the drought, the IMF explained, government expenditures rose rapidly, agricultural exports—which accounted for 90 per cent of total exports—were affected, price pressures mounted, and the structure of the balance of payments weakened. During 1978-79 aggregate demand pressures intensified, mainly because of a marked expansion in public outlays, and at the same time foreign aid declined sharply and the situation was aggravated by political developments in the area.

The Government's programme for 1980 aimed at moderating both inflation and the prospective external imbalance; policies were being adopted to impose strict budgetary controls on all government expenditures, to moderate the growth of the money supply consistent with the aims of the programme, to raise the output of domestically produced food crops and to curtail the food import bill.—(Le Monde - Guardian - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - UN Information Centre, Geneva - IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. Referendum 29877 B; Constitution 29706; Cabinet 28978 A; Refugees page 28990; Conflict in Ogaden pages 30016-17; Economy 27379 A, 26392 A*)

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A. NICARAGUA — Cabinet and Junta Changes - 1980 Economic Plan - War Crimes Trials - Foreign Relations

The Cabinet formed in July 1979 following the overthrow of the Somoza regime by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) [see 30025 A] resigned on Dec. 4, 1979, to allow the five-member junta a free hand in reorganizing the Government with a view to accelerating the process of "national reconstruction". Among changes announced on Dec. 27, (i) more leading Sandinistas were brought into the Government; (ii) the Industry portfolio was divided into three (Industry, Internal Trade and External Trade); (iii) the ministries of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform were merged; and (iv) several new portfolios were created. The new or changed ministerial attributions resulting from the reorganization were as follows (the rest of the Cabinet being reappointed as listed on page 30025):

Sr Humberto Ortega Saavedra . .	. . National Defence
Sr Henry Ruiz	. . Economic Planning
Sr Jaime Wheelock Román . .	. . Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
Sr Fernando Guzmán	. . Industry
Sr Paul Atha	. . Internal Trade
Sr Alejandro Martínez	. . External Trade
Sr Carlos Coronel	. . Fisheries
Sr Carlos Zarruck	. . Mining
Sr Carlos Schutze.	. . Construction
Sr Alfredo César Aguirre . .	. . Minister for the International Reconstruction Fund

Sr Ortega Saavedra was one of the three commanders of the Sandinista People's Army and a member of the nine-man national directorate of the FSLN established early in 1979 to unite the three factions of the movement [see pages 30026 and 29806], he himself belonging to the *Terceristas* or Insurrectionaries faction. **Sr Ruiz**, also a member of the FSLN directorate, belonged to the radical Prolonged Popular War (GPP) tendency. **Sr Aguirre** was hitherto Secretary to the Junta, this post being abolished.

With the appointment of Sr Saavedra the Defence Ministry and the army command were merged in order to improve co-ordination in defence matters; two Deputy Defence Ministers were also appointed, namely Sr Eden Pastora Gómez, a leading Sandinista who had hitherto been Deputy Minister of the Interior [see 30025 A], and Sr Luis Carrión Cruz, a member of the FSLN and Army directorates representing the Proletarian Tendency. A new military force, the Sandinista Popular Militias, was created on Feb. 20 to assist the armed forces in emergencies.

A number of committees were also established to supervise various aspects of the economy such as fisheries and mining.

Sra Violeta Chamorro de Barrios, one of the five junta members, resigned on April 19 for health reasons, the Government stating that the move had no political implications. Her resignation was followed on April 22 by that of Sr Alfonso Robelo Callejas in protest that his party, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), had been allocated only one seat on the new Council of State which would convene on May 4 to take the place of a Parliament and to draft laws and a Constitution pending general elections [see page 30025]. The membership of the Council, announced on April 21, was dominated by the FSLN and its associated bodies such as the Sandinista defence committees (local neighbourhood associations).

Sr Rafael Córdova Rivas, a member of the Supreme Court, and Dr Arturo Cruz, hitherto the president of the Central Bank [see page 30025], were appointed to the junta on May 18. Prior to the resignation of President Somoza, Sr Córdova Rivas had been leader of the moderate Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL)—a component of the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) [see 29373 A and page 29807]—and Dr Cruz had been a member of the Group of 12, also part of the FAO [see 29373 A].

Sr Ruiz on Jan. 2 announced an economic plan for 1980 designed to restructure the economy which had been completely paralysed as the result of the 1978-79 civil war [see 30025 A; 29805 A]. The new plan envisaged sharp austerity measures, a reduction in public and oil expenditure, a construction programme, increased exports, and a reduction of the annual inflation rate from 40 per cent to about 20 per cent, as well as large-scale investments with a view to creating 90,000 new jobs (about 32 per cent of the workforce being currently unemployed).

The Nicaraguan Government had in December 1979 begun talks with its creditors on renegotiating the foreign debt, which totalled some $1,600 million. Nicaragua had previously said that it intended to honour most of its debts even though these were inherited from the Somoza regime [see page 30026].

The mining sector was nationalized under a decree published on Nov. 3, 1979 (as announced in July 1979—see page 30026); it was stated that all foreign companies (mainly US and Canadian concerns engaged in gold and silver mining) would be fully compensated. On Feb. 19 all unfarmed land and lands owned by people connected with ex-President Somoza were taken over by the Government.

By the end of 1979 the new regime in Nicaragua had been granted large-scale loans and food and emergency aid to assist with national reconstruction by countries including Venezuela, the USA, Mexico, West Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands as well as by the USSR, Algeria and Libya.

The UN General Assembly on Oct. 25, 1979, adopted without a vote a resolution (34/8) on the basis of a report issued by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America in which it expressed deep concern at the "grave economic situation of Nicaragua and the serious deterioration in the living conditions of the Nicaraguan people" and urged the provision of international assistance for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of that country.

The Food and Agriculture Organization on Jan. 11, 1980, approved a grant of $2,900,000 in emergency food aid from the World Food Programme to meet the urgent needs of small cotton growers in Nicaragua who had been unable to cultivate their land because of civil strife.

During a visit to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in March and April 1980 by Dr Moisés Hassan Morales, a junta member, and three cabinet ministers—Sr Tomás Borge Martínez (Interior), Sr Ruiz and Sr Ortega Saavedra—agreements were signed with the USSR on March 19 covering various aspects of trade and co-operation and of air travel, as well as a consular convention and a programme for relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the FSLN.

In February 1980 the Government appealed for financial support for a $20,000,000 literacy campaign among some 900,000 Nicaraguans. Commencing on March 24 and supervised by Sr Fernando Cardenal (the brother of the Culture Minister), the campaign was to be carried out by teachers, by students and secondary school children for whom there were currently no classes, and by foreign volunteers, notably Cubans, some 1,200 of whom were currently in the country in support of the literacy programme.

A further 1,000 Cubans were in Nicaragua as doctors, nurses and technicians, and an agreement was signed in February 1980 for the provision of $50,000,000 in Cuban aid to Nicaragua during that year.

The Government on Jan. 25 closed down the extreme left-wing daily *El Pueblo*, the mouthpiece of the radical Workers' Front (FO), whose armed members formed the People's Anti-Somozist Militias (Milpas); the Government claimed that the FO and Milpas were threatening production and provoking unrest in some areas by inciting workers to strike and to take over land. (In October, some 60 members of the FO had been reported to be under arrest.)

Furthermore, Sr Sergio Ramírez Mercado, a member of the junta, said on April 10 that the FO and the Communist Party (to which the FO was affiliated) would not be allowed to participate in the Council of State.

Trials of Former National Guards and Others

On Dec. 17, 1979, trials of former National Guards and others accused of crimes under the Somoza regime began before nine special tribunals. Sra Nora Astorga was appointed special prosecutor and three courts of appeal were established.

Although the 7,000 people involved (many of whose cases were dismissed before they came to court) were described as "war criminals", it had been stressed that there would be no death sentences and that prison sentences would not exceed 30 years (as laid down in the Statute on Rights and Guarantees for the Citizens of Nicaragua, issued by the Sandinista Government on Aug. 21, 1979—see 30025 A). It was envisaged that the trials would be completed within six months.

Because of the large numbers of defendants the length of each trial was restricted to one week. Those acting as judges were in many cases law students or leading Sandinistas, rather than professional judges who had formed part of the Somoza system. The defendants were in most cases soldiers from the ranks, since many of the higher-ranking officers had been able to escape out of the country or into foreign embassies.

The junta on Dec. 24 released over 70 prisoners as part of a Christmas amnesty, and on Dec. 28 it allowed some 180 people who had fled into embassies after the Sandinista takeover to leave the country freely.

The Minister of the Interior, Sr Borge Martínez, had admitted on Nov. 15 that there had been many abuses of power in Nicaragua since his Government took office, including some cases of torture and murder, but that this must stop because the revolution "was fought to end abuses and ill-treatment". He said that the Government understood the hatred felt by the people towards the National Guard, but that the revolution was a "profoundly human" one and Nicaragua could not treat its enemies that way, nor could it "abandon the basic moral principles for which so many people died".

On Jan. 15 Lt.-Col. Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero, the son of the former President, was formally accused in absentia of planning the murder of Sr Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the editor of *La Prensa* whose death on Jan. 10, 1978, marked the beginning of civil strife which culminated in civil war [see 29020 A]; 10 other people were accused of complicity in the crime.

Tension between Nicaragua and Honduras

Increasing tension was reported between Nicaragua and Honduras at the end of 1979 due to incursions over the border by anti-Sandinista forces believed to be made up of former National Guards who had fled north to Honduras. Repeated violations of Nicaraguan airspace by Honduran aircraft were also reported, while on one occasion Nicaraguan soldiers were arrested on Honduran territory where they were looking for pro-Somoza forces.

Sr Borge said on Nov. 7 that former National Guards had entered Nicaraguan territory but had been repulsed by the Army, and he announced the expulsion of the Honduran military attaché who he claimed was linked to "counter-revolutionaries". On the same day the Nicaraguan ambassador to Honduras, Sr Ricardo Wheelock Román, was recalled in protest at a series of incidents including violations of airspace and threats of force against the ambassador and the surrounding of the Nicaraguan embassy in Tegucigalpa by Honduran intelligence agents, while three Nicaraguan ships were also reported to have been detained by Honduras. Sr Borge warned Honduras on Nov. 12 that anti-aircraft weapons had been installed along their mutual border.

The Honduran Foreign Minister, Sr Eliseo Pérez Cadalso, visited Nicaragua on Nov. 9, and it was reported on Nov. 13 that Honduras had proposed handing over to Nicaragua any former National Guards known to be criminals.

Tension again increased in December (i) when a young Sandinista soldier was shot dead by Honduran troops from the Honduran side of the river separating the two countries, no response being received to Nicaraguan requests for an explanation; and (ii) when a few days later Honduran troops were reported to have attempted to attack the northern town of Somoto. However, after talks between military leaders of the two countries it was reported that troops had been drawn back from both sides of the border.

It was subsequently confirmed in February that the Honduran Army had captured 270 former National Guards in a training camp near the Nicaraguan frontier and that these had admitted to be waiting for weapons in order to enter Nicaragua.

Relations with Colombia and Mexico

Nicaragua on Dec. 12 claimed jurisdiction over a 200-mile continental zone which included the Caribbean islands of Roncador, Quita Sueño, Serrana, Providencia and San Andrés, ceded to Colombia in 1930 under the Barcenas-Meneses-Esguerra treaty and believed to contain oil reserves. The Nicaraguan Government on Feb. 5, 1980, unilaterally abrogated the treaty, but Colombia, which had on Dec. 20 repudiated the Nicaraguan claim as an "act of international treachery", said on Feb. 6 that it completely rejected the possibility of any dialogue with Nicaragua on this topic. On Feb. 7 it was reported from Bogotá that Colombian bases in and around San Andrés had been reinforced and a submarine and three warships assigned to the area.

President López Portillo of Mexico visited Nicaragua on Jan. 24, when an agreement was reached on the delivery of 7,500 barrels of oil per day to Nicaragua with effect from April 1980, as well as on Mexican aid in various fields including industry and mining.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Latin America Weekly Report - International Herald Tribune - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. 30025 A, 29805 A*)

A. SOUTH KOREA — Economic Developments - Devaluation of the Won - Large IMF Standby Arrangement

The political crisis which led to the assassination in October 1979 of President Park Chung Hee [see 30216 A] was itself intimately connected with the grave economic problems which South Korea was then facing and which led in early 1980 to the devaluation of the won and the approval by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of a large standby arrangement for South Korea. Unemployment, which affected 5 per cent of the labour force, and a continuing rapid rate of inflation were largely responsible for the political unrest experienced by the country in the summer and autumn of 1979. It was, moreover, the closure of a textile factory which led to a police attack on Aug. 11 on the Seoul headquarters of the (opposition) New Democratic Party [see page 30216], while the mid-October riots in Pusan and Masan [ibid.], although originating with student demonstrations, were joined by large numbers of the unemployed.

The country's money supply had increased by 40 per cent in 1977 and 25 per cent in 1978, largely because of South Korea's success in winning construction contracts in the Middle East, which had brought a flood of foreign exchange into the country. In consequence, the official cost of living index rose by 14.4 per cent during 1978, although the real increase in living costs was believed to be between 20 and 25 per cent.

To cope with this situation, the Government adopted a tight-money policy in the autumn of 1978, and on April 17, 1979, announced a series of measures aimed at controlling inflation and slowing the pace of industrialization. These included higher prices for transport, coal and utility services and a transfer of investment from heavy industries such as shipbuilding, machinery, and iron and steel to light industries producing consumer goods for the home market. Mr Shin Hyon Hwack, then Deputy Premier, stated that the Government would try to limit the increase in gross national product for 1979 to 9 per cent, compared with a provisional annual growth rate of 14.8 per cent in the first quarter.

The Government's deflationary measures were followed by a large number of bankruptcies, the most spectacular of which was that of the large Yulsan group, which had interests in shipping, electronics, construction, machinery and tourism. The head of the group, Mr Shin Sun Ho, who was alleged to have forged letters of credit to obtain bank loans totalling $300,000,000, was arrested in April 1979; the presidents of four of the country's five largest banks resigned, one being arrested; and opposition members of the Assembly alleged that Mr Shin Sun Ho had profited by the support of politically powerful figures in President Park's regime. Most of the companies forced into bankruptcy, however, were small and medium-sized enterprises.

The won was devalued by 16.6 per cent on Jan. 12, 1980, from 484 won to the US dollar to 580. Announcing this, Mr Lee Hahn Been, then Minister for Economic Planning, said that whereas in the past the exchange rate had been fixed against the dollar, it would be made more flexible to reflect fully the value of other major foreign currencies, and could be floated within 3 or 4 per cent up and down annually.

Major increases in bank interest rates were announced at the same time, interest on deposits being increased from 18.6 to 24 per cent, that on commercial bank loans from 19 to 25 per cent, and that on export support loans from 9 to 15 per cent. Mr Lee said that to counteract the inflationary pressure generated by the devaluation and higher interest rates the growth in the money supply would be limited to an annual rate of 20 per cent or less, and the Government would stabilize the price of food and daily necessities and create employment opportunities by financing a housing programme and improvements in public transport.

In a further currency move the link between the won and the US dollar was ended effective Feb. 27 and the won was instead linked to the IMF's special drawing right (SDR).

Shortly after the ending of the formal won-dollar link, the IMF announced on March 4 that it had approved a standby arrangement for South Korea, authorizing purchases of up to the equivalent of SDR 640,000,000—currently worth about US$835,000,000—over the next two years in support of the Government's economic stabilization programme.

South Korea, the Fund said, was currently faced with difficult economic problems. In 1979, after a decade and a half of strong performance in terms of economic growth, employment creation and balance of payments [see pages 28972-73], the South Korean economy experienced a sharp drop in growth, an acceleration of inflation and a deterioration in the balance of payments. The annual growth rate of real gross national product (GNP) fell from 13 per cent in the first quarter of 1979 to less than 4 per cent in the fourth quarter; the rate of increase of wholesale prices accelerated from 12 per cent in 1978 to 24 per cent in 1979; and the current account balance-of-payments deficit nearly quadrupled to US$3,900 million, or 6.4 per cent of GNP. To some degree, the fall in output growth reflected measures introduced to moderate domestic demand pressures in April 1979 [see above], but to a larger extent the adverse economic developments were caused by external factors—the sharp increase in oil prices, the weakening of external demand, and increased protectionism overseas. In addition, South Korea's exports had suffered over the last three years from a gradual erosion of competitiveness, mainly as a result of rapid wage increases and higher inflation in South Korea than its main trading partners experienced.

The principal objectives of the Government's programme were to curb domestic inflation while maintaining economic growth, to restore external competitiveness, and to strengthen the balance of payments.

The SDR 640,000,000 standby arrangement was to be financed to the extent of SDR 160,000,000 from the IMF's ordinary resources and as to SDR 480,000,000 from borrowed resources under the supplementary financing facility [see 29555 A], and represented 400 per cent of South Korea's quota with the Fund. (Newsreview, Seoul - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts — IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. Political Developments, 30216 A; Economic Developments, pages 28972-73*)

A. ARGENTINA — New Army Commander and Junta Member - Announcement of Plan for Return to Democratic Rule - Relations with Britain and Mexico

Gen. Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, the commander of the first army corps [see 29527 A], was appointed C.-in-C. of the Army and a member of the ruling military junta on Dec. 5, 1979, with effect from the end of the month, replacing in both these posts Gen. Roberto Eduardo Viola, who retired after holding these positions since August 1978 [see 29278 A]. Gen. Galtieri (53) was regarded as a moderate and had consistently expressed support for a return to democracy; his appointment marked the consolidation of control of the Government by moderates and entailed the retirement of three generals more senior than himself, all of whom were regarded as hardliners: Gen. Carlos Suárez Mason (Army Chief of Staff), Gen. Diego Urricarriet and Gen. Santiago Omar Riveros.

Maj.-Gen. José Antonio Vaquero, hitherto commander of the third army corps (since October 1979—see 30034 A), was appointed as the new Army Chief of Staff. Gen. Antonio Domingo Bussi was appointed commander of the third army corps and Gen. José Montes commander of the first army corps (succeeding Gen. Galtieri).

The military junta on Dec. 19 published a set of proposals entitled "Political Bases of the Armed Forces for the Process of National Reorganization", intended as a guide for extensive discussion with political and social leaders on an eventual return to civilian rule (although "subversive" and "corrupt" people would be excluded from the dialogue, as would partisans of class struggle or of collective ownership of means of production).

The proposals, which were announced by President Videla at a ceremony attended by the military junta and the Government, envisaged a way of life based on Christian principles, the family and private property and a political system with a President and a two-chamber legislature (such as had existed before the 1976 coup—see 27741 A).

President Videla said that laws to allow political parties to function would be enacted in 1980, and that one of the country's priorities was to produce "new natural leaders". The plan laid down, however, that demagogic and anarchist parties and those based on totalitarian ideology, class struggle or personality cults would be banned; moreover, a continuing supervisory role was foreseen for the military.

On the role of the military, the proposals stated: "The armed forces, in an institutionalized intervention in the Government, will have a role in making decisions on the conduct of national strategy, national security and defence of the Constitution". On political parties, the document said: "The political system has its support in currents of opinion channelled through large political parties characterized by unqualified adherence to the fundamental principles of the Constitution and the effective exercise of internal democracy." (President Videla said at a press conference on Dec. 13 that the Peronist party—the National Justicialist Movement—whose activities had been suspended in 1976 had no place in its present form in the country's future democratic regime.)

The proposals also envisaged a return to the 1853 Constitution, which had remained partially in force since the 1976 coup although the country's political system had been altered by the promulgation of a series of basic laws.

Argentina and Britain announced on Nov. 16, 1979, that they would resume diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. The two countries' ambassadors had been withdrawn in late 1975-early 1976 and relations reduced to chargé d'affaires level because of a dispute concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Las Malvinas), which was claimed by both countries [see 28405 A]. Britain subsequently appointed Mr Anthony J. Williams, hitherto ambassador to Libya, as its new envoy in Buenos Aires, while Argentina announced the appointment of Sr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, a former UN permanent representative regarded as an extreme nationalist, as its ambassador in London.

Talks on the Falklands resumed on April 28-30 in New York between representatives of the UK and Argentinian Governments, with a representative of the islands' Legislative Council also taking part for the first time. [For earlier talks, see 29062 A.]

After former President Héctor Cámpora was granted a safe conduct out of the country in November 1979 after living in the Mexican embassy in Buenos Aires since the 1976 coup [see page 30034], the Mexican Government on Feb. 22 announced the imminent withdrawal of its ambassador and consul from Buenos Aires because the Argentinian Government refused to grant safe-conducts to two other leading Peronists still in the embassy—namely, Sr Pedro Cámpora (the former President's son) and Sr Juan Manuel Abad Medina, the former secretary-general of the National Justicialist Movement.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Financial Times - Latin America Weekly Report - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. 30034 A, 29527 A; Statements on Future of Argentina 29061 A, 28587 A, 28869 B, 28340 A; Falkland Islands 29062 A, 28405 A*)

B. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE — Appointment of New Director-General

At a special session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) held in Geneva on April 28, 1980, M. Arthur Dunkel was unanimously chosen to succeed Dr Olivier Long as GATT's Director-General later in the year.

M. Dunkel (47) entered the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs within the Department of Public Economy in 1956; in 1973 he was appointed Switzerland's permanent representative to GATT and in 1976 he became delegate of the Swiss Federal Council for Trade Agreements; in 1978 he served as chairman of the United Nations Conference on a new Wheat Agreement [see page 29892].

Dr Long (65) had been Director-General of GATT since 1968 [see 22379 C; 22704 B], being most recently reappointed for a three-year term in 1977 [see 28176 B].

A protocol for the accession to GATT (as its 86th contracting party) of Colombia (which had previously acceded only provisionally) was signed in Geneva on April 17, 1980—a decision for accession having been taken by the contracting parties to GATT in a ballot during their annual session in November 1979; the signature was subject to ratification by the Colombian Congress, and Colombia would become a member 30 days after such ratification was notified. Mexico, on the other hand, which had also been negotiating for membership of GATT, decided in March 1980 (as announced on March 18 by President López Portillo) not to proceed with the negotiations, on the grounds principally that membership would conflict with the country's forthcoming overall development plan and because of dissatisfaction with certain of the proposed accession terms.—(GATT, Geneva - Financial Times - Latin America Weekly Report) (*Prev. rep. Director-General 28176 B; Membership, Colombian and Mexican Negotiations page 30110*)

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A. GUATEMALA — Incidents in Spanish Embassy - Severance of Diplomatic Relations by Spain - Other Internal Security Developments - New Defence Minister

The Spanish embassy in Guatemala was occupied early on Jan. 31, 1980, by about 27 Indian peasants who took the ambassador, Sr Máximo Cajal y López, and other people in the embassy hostage. Police subsequently stormed the building against the ambassador's wishes and a petrol bomb was thrown by the peasants, causing a fire in which 39 people lost their lives. The Spanish Government on Feb. 1 broke off diplomatic relations with Guatemala in protest at the conduct of the police and at the violation of a foreign diplomatic mission.

The only survivor apart from the ambassador (who escaped through a window with his clothes ablaze) was one of the peasants who was, however, kidnapped from hospital on Feb. 1 by a dozen armed men, his bullet-riddled body being later found on the university campus. In view of this, Sr Cajal on Feb. 2 left hospital, where he was undergoing treatment for burns and, in fear of his life, took refuge in the US embassy before returning to Madrid on Feb. 7.

Among those who died in the embassy were the first secretary, Sr Jaime Ruiz del Arbol, a number of Spanish and Guatemalan staff, Sr Eduardo Cáceres Lenhoff (Guatemalan Vice-President in 1970-74) and Sr Adolfo Molina Orantes (who had been Foreign Minister in the mid-1970s).

The Indians who occupied the embassy came from the department of El Quiché which had been under virtual military occupation since 1975 because of the presence there of left-wing guerrillas, notably the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and the Revolutionary Organization of the People at Arms (ORPA). In the second half of 1979 there had been increasingly frequent reports from the area of abductions, violent murders, sabotage and occupations of buildings, as well as confrontations between the Army and guerrillas, especially in the towns of Nebaj, Chajul, Cotzal and San Miguel Uspantán, where many people had disappeared (some of those occupying the embassy being thought to be relatives of the missing).

Indians from this region came to the capital in October 1979 to protest to Congress about the occurrences and received an assurance from the Quiché representative that the disappearances would be investigated. They returned in January 1980 after bodies believed to be of missing Uspantán peasants had been found, and they were involved in several unarmed actions before entering the Spanish embassy on Jan. 31, armed with machetes, petrol bombs and pistols, in support of a demand for the withdrawal of the military from their region and an official investigation into the disappearances.

A communiqué issued in Madrid after a special meeting of the Spanish Council of Ministers on Feb. 1 condemned Guatemala for "violating the most elementary norms of international law and the duty of each state to guarantee the immunity and the inviolability of foreign diplomatic missions" in "brutally" breaking into the embassy without Sr Cajal's permission. It stated that the Spanish Foreign Minister, Sr Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, had telephoned the Guatemalan Foreign Minister (Sr Rafael Castillo Váldez) on Jan. 31 and had told him that Spain did not want the Guatemalan police to enter the embassy since Sr Cajal felt that the matter could be resolved peacefully by negotiation. It also said that Sr Cajal repeatedly tried without success to contact the Guatemalan Foreign and Interior Ministers and the chief of police with the same message and that he had personally tried to prevail upon the police surrounding the embassy to withdraw.

In the foreign affairs committee of the Spanish Congress of Deputies on Feb. 7 Sr Oreja supported Sr Cajal's version of events and rejected allegations from the right-wing Spanish New Force (FN) party, led by Sr Blas Piñar, that Spanish embassies in certain Central American countries were involved in trying to overthrow the governments of these countries.

On Feb. 4 Spain called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to open an inquiry into the incidents, and on Feb. 9 demanded that the Guatemalan Government should punish those responsible for the intervention and pay Spain compensation for "moral and material damage". The Council of Foreign Ministers of the Andean Group countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) on Feb. 1 deplored the "acts of violence" in the embassy and expressed solidarity with Spain, as did the Governments of Mexico, Panama and Nicaragua.

Sr Castillo Váldez on Feb. 1 expressed deep regret at the occurrences and admitted that the police had acted "hastily", but on Feb. 2 the Guatemalan Government denied police brutality and called the deaths a "terrorist massacre".

At the funeral of about 30 of the victims on Feb. 2, two students were shot dead and two others abducted by the same group of men, while others were hurt in clashes with police.

Foreign embassies had been occupied in Guatemala City on two previous occasions, the first in September 1978 when the Swiss embassy was taken over by workers from a building materials factory [see 29731 A] and the second in June 1979 when the Mexican embassy was occupied by textile workers; in each case those involved were protesting against arbitrary dismissal, the matter being resolved peacefully when it was agreed to pay legal compensation.

Human rights organizations continued in 1979 and 1980 to protest at the deteriorating situation in Guatemala, and Jesuits in Guatemala in January 1980 issued a declaration which was published in a Guatemalan newspaper and which stated that 3,252 murders had been committed by "death squads" from January to October 1979 "with absolute impunity". It was subsequently announced in Rome on Feb. 13 that the order had on Jan. 23 received death threats from the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA—see 29731 A) against its 52 priests in Guatemala, and a government inquiry was opened into the activities of foreign Jesuits.

Amnesty International on Sept. 12, 1979, launched a worldwide campaign to draw attention to the situation in the country to coincide with Guatemala's anniversary of independence and stated in a report published on Dec. 5 that over 2,000 people had died or disappeared in the past 18 months as the result of kidnappings and political murders and that the Government was taking no steps to prevent such occurrences.

A report by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published on Sept. 15, 1979, said that the Government had "launched a campaign of systematic oppression to suppress opposition", and that this had provoked a "general climate of fear and demoralization and a recrudescence of clandestine opposition". Pinpointing Indians as the main victims, the report said that they were subject to "inhumane methods of conscription", were ejected from their land and were at the mercy of local money-lenders, and that many of them were "eventually physically eliminated with the help of military police". In view of events in Nicaragua [see 29805 A; 30025 A] and El Salvador [see 29763 A; 30045 A] change appeared inevitable in Guatemala, and although the ICJ did not believe revolution would be imported from neighbouring countries there were signs of a "pre-revolutionary" situation developing in the country.

Among those murdered in 1979-80, apparently by right-wing extremist groups, were student and trade union leaders and several more key members of the social democratic opposition group FUR (United Revolutionary Front) whose leader, Sr Manuel Colom Argueta, had been killed in March 1979 [see 29731 A]; they included Sr Abraham Rubén Ixcampari, a lawyer involved with the Quiché peasants, on Jan. 24, and Sr Jorge Everardo Jiménez, the FUR secretary-general in Quezaltenango, on March 5. Left-wing groups retaliated by kidnapping and murdering members of the armed forces and those associated with the Government.

The EGP, the ORPA and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) were in November 1979 reported to have united.

Gen. Aníbal Guevara, who had been appointed Chief of Staff when Gen. José David Cancinos Barrios was murdered in mid-1979 [see 29731 A], was appointed Minister of Defence on Jan. 15, 1980, *vice* Gen. Otto Spiegler Noriega. Gen. René Mendoza Paloma became the new Chief of Staff.

The Vice-President of Guatemala, Dr Francisco Villagrán Kramer, on Jan. 24, 1980, announced that he would resign because of the situation in Guatemala [see also page 29732] but in February withdrew his resignation after consulting "international personalities".—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Latin America Weekly Report - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. 29731 A*)

B. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY — Portugal becomes Member

Portugal became the 21st member of the International Energy Agency (IEA, set up in 1974 under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development—see 26845 A) following the unanimous approval of its application by the Agency's Governing Board on April 23, 1980.

With Portugal's admission, the membership of the IEA was as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Irish Republic, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. All the full members of the OECD were thus also members of the IEA with the exception of Finland, France and Iceland.—(IEA, Paris) (*Prev. rep. 29554 A*)

A. NEW HEBRIDES — Formation of Vanuaaku Pati Government following Constitutional Conference and Pre-Independence General Election - Internal Unrest following Regional Elections - Population Census

It was agreed in an exchange of notes signed in Paris by the British and French Governments on Oct. 23, 1979, that the jointly-administered condominium of the New Hebrides should become independent during 1980 under a constitution adopted at a conference held in Vila (the capital) in the previous month. A general election subsequently took place on Nov. 14 in the presence of United Nations observers in which the predominantly anglophone *Vanuaaku Pati* (VP) won 26 of the 39 seats in the Representative Assembly, the remaining 13 seats being won by the New Hebrides Federal Party (NHFP) which had been formed earlier in the year as an alliance of the territory's predominantly francophone "moderate" parties. All the members were elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and there was a turnout of about 80 per cent of the electorate.

The VP had refused to participate in elections to the previous Assembly in November 1977 [see 28963 A], but had subsequently accepted half the portfolios in a Government of national unity formed by Fr Gerard Leymang in December 1978 [see 29793 A].

On Nov. 29 the Rev. Walter Lini, the president of the VP, who had served as Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of Social Services in the Leymang Government, was elected Chief Minister by the votes of 26 members of the new Assembly, as against three votes cast for Fr Leymang. There were three abstentions, while seven members of the NHFP boycotted the election [see below]. Mr Lini appointed a Council of Ministers, composed exclusively of VP members, as follows:

* Rev. Walter Lini . .	. . Chief Minister and Minister of Justice
* Mr George Kalkoa	. . Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of the Interior
† Mr Donald Kalpokas	. . Education
Mr Kalpokor Kalsakau	. . Finance
† Mr Thomas Reuben	. . Natural Resources
Mr George Worek	. . Health
* Mr John Naupa . .	. . Transport, Communications and Civil Aviation
Mr Willie Korisa . .	. . Social Affairs
Mr Sethy Regenvanu	. . Lands

* Changed portfolio. † No change.

The new Representative Assembly, which enjoyed wider powers of internal self-government than its predecessor (the only remaining major areas of direct Franco-British responsibility being defence, currency and certain aspects of internal security), empowered the Council of Ministers to propose that full independence be achieved during the period May to July 1980 and that the country should be known after independence as Vanuatu (an alternative form of Vanuaaku—both meaning "our land").

Pre-election Developments - Constitutional Conference

As stated on page 29794, the formation of the Government of national unity under Fr Leymang represented the first stage in a series of proposed steps towards independence which had been outlined in August 1978 by the French Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories, M. Paul Dijoud.

During the first half of 1979 various difficulties arose in connexion with the drafting of an independence constitution, resulting in particular in a decision that the draft would not be put to a national referendum as envisaged in the Dijoud plan. However, by July-August 1979 a constitutional planning committee (in which all the islands' parties participated) had completed work on a final draft text, the adoption of which by the Council of Ministers enabled a constitutional conference to be held in Vila in September 1979 under the joint chairmanship of M. Dijoud and Mr Peter Blaker (UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs).

The conference concluded on Sept. 19 with the unanimous adoption of a constitution providing for the New Hebrides to become independent as a republic with an elected President as head of state, a unicameral legislature and a cabinet responsible to it headed by a Prime Minister. Provision was made for the independence of the judiciary, for the protection of fundamental human rights and for the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate complaints of maladministration.

The constitution stated that there should be three official languages —French, English and Bislama (a pidgin dialect)—and that Bislama should be the national language. The indigenous population (who were technically stateless under the condominium arrangements) would acquire New Hebridean citizenship at independence. Provision was made for the return of all alienated land to its traditional indigenous owners under compensation terms to be established by the legislature. There would be a council of chiefs, whose main function would be to safeguard and promote Melanesian customs and traditions and which would also have consultative functions in respect of legislation on certain matters, including land policy.

The most keenly debated issue at the constitutional conference was that of administrative decentralization, with the majority of the New Hebridean delegates proposing that this should be studied by a special commission which would make recommendations to the legislature, while a minority wished the powers of the regions to be defined at the conference and entrenched in the constitution. A compromise was therefore adopted whereby (i) a final decision on the matter would be taken prior to independence by the next Representative Assembly (i.e. that subsequently elected on Nov. 14, 1979—see above), and (ii) regional assemblies would be elected in the northern island of Santo (Espíritu Santo) and the southern island of Tanna [see map on page 29793] on the same day as the next general election, with powers to negotiate with the central Representative Assembly on the subjects to be devolved to them.

The final signature of the new constitution by the British and French Resident Commissioners (Mr Andrew Stuart and M. Jean-Jacques Robert respectively) on behalf of the administering powers took place on Oct. 5, 1979, after the members of the constitutional planning committee had travelled around the territory explaining its provisions to the people and seeking their views.

Regional Elections - Subsequent Disorders - Declaration of "Independent State of Vemarana"

The regional elections held in Santo and Tanna on Nov. 14, 1979, as agreed at the September constitutional conference were won by the VP, which obtained a majority of eight out of 15 seats in each Assembly. Upon their announcement on Nov. 19, these results were immediately contested by the strongly devolutionist "moderate" elements in these islands which had originally pressed for the establishment of the Assemblies, and serious disorders occurred as protesters threatened to expel residents from other islands who were claimed to have voted for the VP. In Santo the protests were led by the Nagriamel and Tabwemasana movements and in Tanna by the Kabiel and John Frum movements.

There were numerous outbreaks of violence on both islands, and local European residents alleged that the situation was exacerbated by the failure of the administering powers to order adequate police action, apparently because of disagreements between the British and French Resident Commissioners. On Santo (which was visited on Nov. 24 by Fr Leymang, Mr Lini and a number of other prominent political figures) the intimidation of "foreign" residents (i.e. from other New Hebridean islands) had particularly widespread effects in view of broadcasts by Mr Jimmy Stevens, the Nagriamel leader and honorary president of the NHFP, on an unlicensed radio station ("Radio Vanafo"), which caused hundreds of people to flee from their homes for fear of attack.

Western press reports attributed the disturbances to the manipulation of traditional movements by conservative political figures, "financial adventurers" and other elements opposed to the establishment of a strong central government in the New Hebrides. *The Guardian* of Nov. 22 reported allegations by Mr Lini that Nagriamel's long-standing secessionist campaign [see also 27724 A] in particular had the backing of US businessmen whose aim was to create "their own tax-haven country" in an independent Santo and who according to Prof. Yash Ghai (a British adviser to the constitutional planning committee) enjoyed the support of the French community on the island.

The Labour MP for Lewisham, West, Mr Christopher Price, said in the British House of Commons on Dec. 7, 1979, that Mr Stevens had "been associated in the past with unsavoury American interests which were attempting, not only in the New Hebrides but elsewhere in the Pacific, to create a gambler's tax haven and a refuge for criminals" and that land on Santo bought by French settlers had been resold to US citizens connected with an organization known as the Phoenix Foundation. Mr Price subsequently told the House on March 6, 1980, that he had been informed by Mr Blaker that 5,008.5 hectares of land on the islands of Gaua, Malekula (shown as Mallicolo

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in the map on page 29793) and Pentecost were currently owned by persons connected with the Phoenix Foundation, and that title to a further 3,498.5 hectares (mostly on Santo) was held by a US citizen who was suspected of being involved with the foundation.

The inaugural meeting of the Representative Assembly in Vila on Nov. 28 (by which time calm had been restored in Santo and Tanna) was boycotted by seven NHFP members elected in these two islands and in the islands of Aoba and Maewo, on whose behalf a statement was read by Mr Guy Prevot (the former Minister of Finance in the Leymang Government and the only person of all-French extraction to be elected to the new Assembly) alleging that "numerous and large-scale electoral frauds" had been perpetrated by the VP in the Nov. 14 general and regional elections.

The statement continued: "We have decided that when we have completed our investigations and within the time allowed by the law we shall lodge a complaint on the subject of these frauds with the Electoral Disputes Committee. . . . Until the committee has given its decision we feel it is our duty to refrain from participating in the work of the Representative Assembly."

At a meeting in Paris on Jan. 8, 1980, between Mr Blaker and M. Dijoud and a New Hebrides Government delegation led by Mr Lini which had travelled to Europe for preliminary discussions on post-independence development aid, the British and French Governments reaffirmed their "wholehearted support" for Mr Lini's Government and agreed to establish a joint security committee as part of an initiative "to smooth the path to independence and to counter all threats to the unity of the country". The Lini Government for its part undertook to enter into a dialogue with the leaders of the "custom movements" opposed to the Government "to ensure that ways might be found to safeguard and develop local traditions while preserving the essential unity of the country".

However, the Lini Government's attempts to open local negotiations with opposition leaders proved unsuccessful, and further acts of protest occurred, including the occupation by Nagriamel supporters on Jan. 28 of the office of the central Government's Agent in Santo Town (Luganville), which was followed by a declaration by Mr Stevens that Santo was now "the independent state of Vemarana".

The Financial Times of March 19 reported that the situation in Santo had recently reached "near anarchy", and that "the open hostility of some French officials" to the VP Government had been responsible for the inability of the latter to restore order, which had stemmed from an effective veto by the French authorities on the deployment of mobile police on the island. It was moreover stated in the same report that the proceedings of a commission which had been established to investigate opposition claims of electoral irregularities had been blocked by the resignation of the French-appointed vice-chairman, who had given no reason for his action.

Mr Blaker told the House of Commons on March 19 that since this "good article" in *The Financial Times* had been compiled "the position on Santo regarding law and order has improved", and the Government Agent in Santo Town had now been reinstated and had at his disposal "a combined Franco-British police group". Talks had moreover opened in London on March 19 between Britain and France and New Hebridean leaders regarding "the protection of the rights of the customary chiefs, the matter of decentralization of government powers and, in general, reassurance to the francophone minority in the New Hebrides". The talks were however "not intended to reopen the constitutional basis on which it is intended that the New Hebrides should be granted independence".

Mr Blaker added (i) that it was not his impression that there was a consensus among the "moderate" political elements in the New Hebrides on a demand for a confederation and (ii) that it was desirable that the "real fears" of the francophone community and the customary chiefs should be ventilated at this stage. He said that he had no evidence to suggest that recent events on Santo had been "exacerbated by outside interference", but that the US Government had nevertheless been contacted in connexion with the activities of some US citizens in the New Hebrides.

In early June the prospects of independence being achieved by the Lini Government's target date of July 30 were uncertain following a resurgence of separatist agitation on Santo (details of which will be given in a subsequent article).

Population Census

It was announced in late July 1979 that the total indigenous population of the New Hebrides had been recorded as 112,596 at a census held on Jan. 15-16 as part of the preparations for the holding of the pre-independence general election. In addition, there were estimated to be about 5,000 French citizens resident in the condominium, as well as about 1,500 citizens of Australia, New Zealand and other independent Commonwealth countries and about 460 citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. The only previous census, held in May 1967, had recorded a population total of 77,988, of whom 72,243 were indigenous New Hebrideans.—(Pacific Islands Monthly - Hansard - Survey of Current Affairs - Le Monde - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph) *(Prev. rep. 29793 A)*

A. EL SALVADOR — Continuing Internal Unrest - Disintegration of Junta and Government - Murder of Archbishop Romero

The civilian-military junta and largely civilian Government which took office following the overthrow of Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero on Oct. 15, 1979 [see 30045 A], threatened to disintegrate in the ensuing months due to its failure to halt not only acts of violence by extreme right-wing groups and the security forces but also left-wing activity, notably occupations of embassies and other public buildings. Nearly 800 deaths were reported to have occurred in the country from January 1980 to the end of March, when El Salvador moved closer to the brink of civil war with the murder of the country's most outspoken defender of human rights, Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdames.

Changes in Cabinet and Junta - Formation of Revolutionary Co-ordination by Mass Organizations

Two civilian members of the junta—Dr Guillermo Manuel Ungo (leader of the National Revolutionary Movement, MNR) and Sr Ramón Mayorga Quiroz (a prominent social democrat)—resigned on Jan. 2-3 together with all the civilians in the Cabinet, numerous government officials and four-fifths of the Supreme Court judges. These resignations followed the junta's failure to meet a cabinet ultimatum, issued on Jan. 1, calling on it (i) to show concrete proof of its willingness to carry out the political and economic reforms which it had promised on taking power [see 30045 A], (ii) to halt its "swing to the right" and take full control of the security forces, and (iii) to expel the third civilian member of the junta, Sr Mario Andino, on the grounds that he was partly responsible, as a member of the business community, for the alleged move to the right. Sr Andino consequently resigned on Jan. 4, leaving only the two military members of the junta, Col. Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez and Col. Adolfo Arnoldo Majano, in office.

In a communiqué issued on Dec. 28 over 20 ministers and government members had also accused the Defence Minister, Col. José Guillermo García (the sole military member of the Cabinet), of ordering troops to attack demonstrators, causing at least 40 deaths (including 25 in one incident involving strikers at a farm) in the last two weeks of 1979.

Sr Salvador Samayoa (35), the Education Minister and one of the first to resign on Jan. 2, announced on Jan. 8 that he was joining the "Farabundo Marti" Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) which had been responsible inter alia for kidnapping the South African ambassador, Mr Archibald Dunn, on Nov. 28, 1979 [see page 30047]. Mr Dunn remained in captivity and the FPL threatened to kill him unless anti-government statements were published in national and foreign newspapers.

(Sr Jaime Hill, who had been abducted by the People's Revolutionary Army, ERP, on Oct. 31, 1979—see page 30045—was freed on March 15 after his family paid for the publication of similar statements in foreign newspapers.)

After several days of talks with the military, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC—the main political force in the Government formed in October 1979) agreed to participate in a new junta and Government on condition that changes were made in the security forces, that a dialogue was begun with the left-wing organizations, and that representatives of private enterprise were excluded from the Government. Accordingly, three Christian Democrats—Sr José Antonio Morales Erlich (the party's president), Sr Héctor Dada Hirezi (Foreign Minister in the outgoing Government) and Sr José Ramón Avalos (a doctor)—joined the junta on Jan. 9. On the same day Col. Majano and Col. Gutiérrez presented a new programme of economic and social reforms in the fields of education, health and housing, undertook to organize elections "as soon as possible" and promised to begin a "constructive dialogue" with the left.

On Jan. 15 the junta announced the composition of a new PDC-dominated Cabinet, although no appointments were made at this stage to the Foreign Affairs, Labour, Development and Agriculture portfolios.

Sr Ovidio Hernández	Interior
Col. Rodolfo Girón	Health and Social Welfare
*Col. José Guillermo García	Defence
Sr Mario Solano	Justice
Sr Roberto Alvergue	Finance
Sr Oscar Menjívar	Economy
Sr Eduardo Colindres	Education
*Sr Hector Dada Hirezi	Planning
Sr Pablo Alvergue	Minister of the Presidency

* Member of previous Government.

In later changes, however, Sr Dada Hirezi resigned from the junta and the Government on March 3 and left for Mexico, being replaced on the junta by Sr José Napoleón Duarte, the former presidential candidate (in 1972) who returned from exile in October 1979 [see page 30047]. Sr Colindres and Sr Menjívar resigned on March 27 and left the country following the murder of Archbishop Romero [see below], and the deputy ministers of Agriculture (Sr Jorge Villacora) and Economy (Sr Roberto Solórzano) also left El Salvador in March-April. Sr Roberto Alvergue resigned at the end of April.

In the meantime three of the major mass organizations and their respective armed wings announced on Jan. 10 that they had united in a "revolutionary alliance", which also included the Communist Party (PCS), in active opposition to the governing PDC-military coalition. They were the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR, having the FPL as its armed wing), the Feb. 28 Popular Leagues (LP-28—having the People's Revolutionary Army, ERP, as their armed wing) and the Unified Popular Action Front (FAPU, whose armed wing was the Armed Forces of National Resistance, FARN).

This alliance became known as the Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses and announced its aims at the end of February as the overthrow of the current Government, the installation of a "democratic revolutionary government", the nationalization of the means of production, the banking and financial system and foreign trade, the creation of a new army, and the investigation of cases of missing persons dating back to 1972.

During a march on Jan. 22 in San Salvador to mark the unification of these organizations shots were fired from high buildings as the marchers approached the cathedral and many of them took refuge inside; in the ensuing shoot-out at least 22 people were killed and 135 wounded, and the National Guard subsequently cordoned off the University of El Salvador where 20,000 people had taken refuge. Several bombs exploded in the city during the following night.

The Attorney-General, Sr Mario Zamora Rivas (PDC), was shot dead on Feb. 23, apparently by the extreme right-wing White Warriors' Union (UGB).

Occupations of Foreign Embassies and Other Buildings - US Support for Junta - Announcement of Land Reform and Nationalization of Banks

Some of the major actions involving occupations of embassies and other buildings by mass organizations in early 1980 are described below. As a result of the threat posed to diplomats by such incidents, Britain announced at the end of January that its small diplomatic mission in San Salvador was closing, West Germany withdrew its diplomats on Feb. 7, and Israel withdrew its ambassador on Feb. 19.

The Panamanian embassy was seized on Jan. 11 by about 50 members of LP-28 who took six hostages including the Panamanian and Costa Rican ambassadors, respectively Sr David Pérez Ramos and Sr Alejandro Alvarado Pizza, and demanded the release of seven of their members who had been arrested in December 1979. All hostages were freed on Jan. 15 after the seven detainees were released.

On Feb. 5 over 30 members of LP-28 took 14 hostages at the Spanish embassy including the ambassador, Sr Víctor Sánchez Mesas y Juste, and demanded the release of a dozen LP-28/FAPU detainees, the severance of diplomatic relations between Spain and El Salvador and an investigation into human rights violations.

On the same day the Revolutionary Movement of Salvadorean Students (MERS—a component of BPR) occupied the Education Ministry, taking the Minister, Sr Colindres, and about 400 others hostage in support of various educational demands. Sra Julieta Otero de Colindres, the Minister's wife, and Srta Marina Morales Erlich, the daughter of one of the junta members, were among 15 people taken hostage by LP-28 at the Christian Democratic Party headquarters on Jan. 29, and 10 other hostages were seized on Feb. 7 by students at the national business school in a show of solidarity with MERS.

At the Spanish embassy, Sr Sánchez Mesas was freed on Feb. 12 and the hostages released progressively—the building finally being evacuated and the last two hostages allowed to leave on Feb. 18 following negotiations involving the Italian and Mexican ambassadors and a special envoy of the Spanish Government, Sr Pedro Bermejo, which resulted in a number of detainees being released and an investigation promised into the whereabouts of the others.

The siege of the Education Ministry ended peacefully on Feb. 12 after agreements were signed with the Minister of Education; however, in a subsequent LP-28 "victory march" through the streets a dozen people were killed in clashes. The PDC headquarters were stormed by police on Feb. 12 and several people arrested, four members of LP-28 and one policeman being officially reported killed (although eye-witnesses claimed that another policeman and three passers-by had also died).

The Panamanian embassy was again occupied by LP-28 on Feb. 13 and Sr Pérez and two others taken hostage in support of a demand for the release of those arrested on the previous day and for the bodies of their dead to be handed over to LP-28. The embassy was vacated on Feb. 14 (being briefly occupied for a third time on Feb. 28).

Among other occupations, farm workers took over Agricultural Development Bank branches in San Salvador, San Miguel and Usulután from Feb. 14 to 19, holding nearly 400 hostages; the BPR took over the foreign trade institute with 60 hostages from Feb. 15 to 19 in protest at the threatened closure of factories by multinational companies; and the Revolutionary Forces (Fur-30—a BPR component) stormed the (Jesuit) University of Central America (UCA) on Feb. 15, holding 30 hostages including the chancellor, a Spanish Jesuit, until Feb. 18.

United States officials stated on Feb. 11 that the USA was preparing an emergency aid package amounting to $49,800,000 for El Salvador to cover basic economic and social needs and to help stabilize the Government, and it was reported shortly afterwards that a small military package involving equipment worth $7,000,000 and military advisers was also under consideration. However, Archbishop Romero warned in a sermon on Feb. 19 that US military aid to El Salvador would only cause more blood to be spilt, and he said that he had written to President Carter asking him to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly in the country's affairs if he wished to help in the defence of human rights.

United States pressure was reported at this time to have averted a planned military coup, the US Administration having continued to express its support for the existing junta and its reform programme.

On Feb. 23 a State Department spokesman said that the US embassy in San Salvador had, on instructions from Mr Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, conveyed warnings to El Salvador's military leaders, landowners and business groups to the effect that (i) the USA supported the existing Government because of its declared commitment to reforms and human rights, (ii) that the USA was opposed to any attempt to change the Government and (iii) that the USA would cut off aid and actively oppose any Government which did not include civilians or which committed abuses of human rights.

In implementation of a land reform and nationalization programme announced on Feb. 11, the junta on March 6 nationalized 60 per cent of the country's best farmland with a view to distributing this to landless peasants. At the same time, to forestall any opposition to the reforms, it imposed a 30-day state of siege and suspended constitutional guarantees, announcing that troops had moved into 50 of the largest plantations to initiate the land reforms.

Some 1,250,000 people, or 80-90 per cent of the rural population, would, according to the junta, benefit from the reform, which envisaged an eventual limit of 247-370 acres of land per farm but provided in the initial stage only for the takeover of about 370 estates larger than 1,200 acres which would be turned into peasant cooperatives. Landowners were to be compensated in cash and government bonds.

Further stages of the land reform programme announced by the junta on April 28 were (i) the purchase of all uncultivated properties of less than 210 acres for distribution to peasants in

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small plots for a 30-year period, and (ii) the abolition of the share-cropping system by purchasing the land from its owners and offering it at a low price (not exceeding the rent currently paid) to the 150,000 peasant families who had hitherto worked it. A government spokesman said that 90 per cent of arable land was covered by the reform programme.

The implementation of the land reform programme led to serious clashes between troops and peasants, and on March 17 alone 53 people lost their lives (28 of these at an estate in Colima, north of the capital) in incidents connected both with the reform and with left-wing activity in the towns, including a general strike called by the Revolutionary Co-ordination as a sign of opposition to the Government. Gun battles also occurred at the University of El Salvador and armoured cars surrounded the campus throughout the night, but no casualty figures were released.

Amnesty International claimed on March 17 that the security forces had used the land reform as a pretext for taking action against peasants, causing the death or flight of hundreds, and that some 80 people had been killed in the (eastern) department of Cuscatlán alone since the announcement of the reform. The charges were dismissed by the junta on March 18, Sr Morales Erlich describing Amnesty International as a worthy but misinformed body which could not differentiate between repression and armed clashes. Col. Majano added that the security forces were under orders not to abuse their power and that two officers had been punished that week for ill-treating suspects.

There had been earlier reports of brutality against peasants in the northern Chalatenango department, where according to Amnesty International soldiers had lit fires around a village before entering it to murder and abduct the inhabitants; moreover, the Salvadorean human rights commission reported 50 disappearances in this area in one week of January alone.

The junta's March 6 announcement was followed up by the nationalization of banks (excluding foreign banks) and credit institutions, it being stated that employees would be entitled to 20 per cent ownership and private citizens to 29 per cent, and that no one family could have more than 1 per cent ownership or a share in more than one bank.

Assassination of Archbishop Romero - Formation of New Opposition Front

Archbishop Romero (63) was shot dead on March 24 as he celebrated a funeral mass in a hospital chapel in San Salvador. His assassin, apparently positioned outside the chapel door, escaped in a car and was believed by US embassy and Salvadorean church sources to have been a trained marksman—the newly-appointed US ambassador, Mr Robert White, expressing the opinion that right-wing Cuban exiles had been involved. The junta issued a statement condemning the assassination as "the most vile of crimes", urging the people to use its sorrow "to build the just, free and peaceful country he always fought for" and declaring three days of national mourning.

Mgr Romero was appointed Archbishop of San Salvador in 1977 at a time when right-wing organizations were taking action against Jesuit priests [see 28491 A]. Initially a conservative, he became increasingly outspoken in the interests of the poor and underprivileged and regularly criticized the Romero Government in his Sunday sermons [see also 28579 A; 29122 A; 29763 A]; while he was also critical of left-wing violence, he said that he understood the provocation which the people suffered [see page 29763]. Archbishop Romero enjoyed broad popular support but had received numerous death threats from the right, and on Feb. 18 the "Organization for Liberation from Communism" planted bombs which destroyed the transmitter of the radio station belonging to the archbishopric as well as publishing offices at the UCA. Mgr Romero had been nominated for the 1979 Nobel Peace Prize by a group of British parliamentarians [see page 29765].

On the day before his death Mgr Romero delivered a particularly outspoken sermon calling on soldiers not to shoot against their own countrymen or to obey orders "contrary to God's law". The armed forces spokesman, Col. Marco Aurelio González, described the sentiments expressed in the sermon as "criminal".

Mgr Romero's body lay in state in the Sacred Heart basilica before being transferred to the cathedral, where thousands attended a memorial mass on March 25. During the official public funeral conducted outside the cathedral on March 30 by the Archbishop of Mexico City and papal representative, Cardinal Ernesto Corripio Ahumada, at least 39 people were killed (some of them trampled to death) and 500 believed injured when a bomb exploded and shots were fired from the direction of the nearby National Palace, causing panic among the crowd and a gun-battle between armed members of the left and the security forces. Foreign prelates attending the ceremony took refuge inside the cathedral together with members of the crowd, and the Archbishop's coffin, which had lain on the cathedral steps during the funeral service, was hastily dragged inside the building.

Although the junta placed responsibility for the incidents with the left, claiming that they had planned to steal the Archbishop's body during the funeral, 26 foreign prelates attending the ceremony signed a statement on March 30 asserting that this represented a "false interpretation" and a "perversion of the facts"; that the firing and bombing had been initiated by troops in the National Palace; that the left-wing organizations had approached the cathedral "peacefully and respectfully" (although they had returned the fire); and that no attempt had been made to steal the body.

All traditional Easter processions and open air masses were cancelled in the capital following these incidents, and on April 5 the state of siege was renewed for a further 30 days. The United States evacuated all remaining dependants of US diplomats from the country, and on April 2 the US ambassador was recalled to Washington for consultations on the current situation in El Salvador.

Mgr Arturo Rivera y Damas (57), hitherto Bishop of Santiago de María (east of the capital) and Mgr Romero's closest friend, was appointed in April to succeed him as Archbishop of San Salvador.

In early April the Democratic Salvadorean Front (FSD) was established, comprising inter alia the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the "popular" faction of the PDC (which included Sr Dada, Sr Enrique Alvarez Córdova and other ministers from the first post-coup Cabinet), and various trade union, student and professional organizations. Later in April the FSD joined with the left in founding the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD) with Sr Alvarez Córdova as secretary-general and members of the BPR, FAPU, LP-28, the MNR and the (communist) National Democratic Union (UDN) on the Front's advisory committee.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Latin America Weekly Report - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. Internal Developments 30045 A*)

A. SWITZERLAND — Rejection in National Referendum of Separation of State and Church - Approval of Extended Crisis Powers for Government

In a national referendum held on March 2, 1980, the Swiss electorate rejected a popular initiative proposing the abolition of all existing links between the state and the major churches. Although only 34.4 per cent of the electorate of 3,900,000 went to the polls, 1,052,294 (78.9 per cent) voted against the proposal, and none of the 20 cantons or six half cantons produced a majority in favour of the motion, which attracted only 281,760 votes (21.1 per cent of the total).

The proposal (the 300th to be put to a national referendum since the foundation of the Swiss Confederation in 1848) would, if approved by the electorate, have meant the phasing out over a two-year period of all existing links between the churches and the state as well as the immediate cessation of the cantons' collection of religious taxes. Each canton had its own set of laws regulating these links, often providing funds for religious instruction in schools or collecting religious taxes on a voluntary or obligatory basis. Most cantons maintained links with the Roman Catholic and protestant churches, and some with the Old Catholics (who had broken away from the established Catholic Church in disagreement with the 1870 Dogma of Papal Infallibility). Most minor religious groupings, however, had no such financial links, and the cantons of Geneva and Neuchâtel maintained none at all.

On the same day the electorate also approved by 1,116,353 votes (86.0 per cent) to 181,264 (14.0 per cent) a constitutional amendment proposed by the Government which would give it full powers to take all necessary steps during peacetime crises to ensure the security of imports of raw materials (such powers applying hitherto only in time of war). All cantons and half cantons produced a majority in favour of the proposal.—(Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Referendums 29703 B; Lifting of Ban on Jesuit Order and on Establishment or Re-establishment of Religious Houses or Orders 25959 A, 25521 A*)

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A. INDIA — Congress (I) Victory in General Elections - Cabinet formed by Mrs Gandhi - Elections to State Assemblies - Dissolution of Nine State Assemblies - Split in Janata Party - Dismissal of Legal Charges against Mrs Gandhi - Disturbances in Assam and Other North-Eastern States - Other Internal Developments, January to April 1980

The general elections to the *Lok Sabha* (the Lower House of the Indian Parliament), which were held on Jan. 3 and 6, 1980, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Congress (I), led by Mrs Indira Gandhi. Polling took place in only 525 of the 542 constituencies, having been postponed in 12 of the 14 Assam constituencies and one of the two Meghalaya constituencies because of disturbances in those states [see pages 30255, 30256], in two constituencies in Orissa and West Bengal because of the death of candidates during the campaign (by-elections in these two constituencies subsequently being held on Feb. 24—see page 30327 below), and in two snowbound constituencies in Himachal Pradesh and Kashmir. The results are given below, together with the distribution of seats around the time of the dissolution of the *Lok Sabha* in August 1979. [For distribution immediately following the last general elections in 1977, see pages 28429 and 28606.]

	January 1980	August 1979
Congress (I) and allied parties		
Congress (I)	351	80
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	16	1
National Conference	3	2
Moslem League	3	2
Kerala Congress (Joseph group)*	1	2
Lok Dal (Janata Secular)	41	77
Janata Party and allied parties		
Janata Party	31	203
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	2	17
Akali Dal	1	8
Congress	13	56
Left Front		
Communist Party of India (Marxist)	35	22
Communist Party of India	11	7
Revolutionary Socialist Party	4	4
Forward Bloc	3	3
Kerala Congress (Mani group)*	1	—
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak	1	1
Sikkim Janata Parishad	1	—
Jharkhand Party	1	—
Independents	6	33
Others	0	18†
Vacancies	19‡	8

* The Kerala Congress split in July 1979 into two opposing groups [see page 30255].

† Including the two nominated members and the Speaker at dissolution.

‡ Including vacancies for two nominated members [see below].

Although the elections passed off peacefully in most constituencies, about 20 people were killed in clashes during the election campaign and the polling. In Uttar Pradesh three Harijans (Untouchables) were shot dead on Jan. 3, allegedly by Jats (high-caste farmers), and over 20 were reported to have been injured at Baghpat (where the Prime Minister, Mr Charan Singh, was the *Lok Dal* candidate) when Harijans were attacked to prevent them from voting. Three people were killed in Bihar on Jan. 6 when bombs which they were carrying to polling booths exploded prematurely.

Out of 354,024,081 electors a total of 56.8 per cent voted, compared with 60.5 per cent in 1977. (Polling took place in some states or union territories on Jan. 3 only, in some on Jan. 6 only, and in some on both dates.) The comparatively low turnout was attributed in part to a spell of exceptionally cold weather in the northern states; only 45 per cent of the electorate voted in Uttar Pradesh, but over 60 per cent in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, 81.89 per cent in Manipur and 88.78 per cent in Lakshadweep.

In contrast to the 1977 elections, when the undivided Congress was crushingly defeated in the northern states but (with its close allies) won a large majority of the seats in the four southern states [see page 28429], the Congress (I) made sweeping gains in all regions except the north-east. It won all the contested seats in Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Arunachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and Pondicherry; all but one of the contested seats in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Orissa, Punjab and Delhi; a majority of the seats in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh; and half the seats in Haryana and Manipur. In Jammu and Kashmir all but one of the contested seats were won by the National Conference and the Congress (I), which had formed an electoral alliance. The Congress (I) suffered its only serious defeats in West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, where it was opposed by alliances of left-wing parties headed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist)—CPI(M).



(*Carpress*)

The Congress (I) obtained about 42 per cent of the total vote, compared with the 34.54 per cent received by the undivided Congress in 1977. A major factor in ensuring its victory, however, was the split in the Janata Party which had occurred in July 1979 and resulted in the formation of the *Lok Dal* [see pages 29971-75].

In Uttar Pradesh, for example, where the Congress had failed to win a single seat in 1977, the Congress (I) won 51 of the 85 seats with 35.74 per cent of the vote, whereas the *Lok Dal* and the Janata Party together won only 32 seats with 50.94 per cent of the vote. On the basis of these results, it was estimated that if the Janata Party had remained united it would have won 70 of the seats in the state. The Congress (I) similarly benefited from the split in the Janata Party in the other northern states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Haryana and also in Delhi.

The main reasons for the swing to the Congress (I) were generally agreed to be the desire for a strong and stable government, after the internal dissensions which had split Mr Morarji Desai's Janata Government and its replacement by a caretaker Government without a parliamentary majority [see pages 29343-45; 29965, 29971-74]; the deteriorating law and order situation, as exemplified by the communal riots in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the attacks on Harijans, the mutinies in the police and the disorders in the north-eastern states [see pages 29351-53; 29969, 29970-71, 29978-79; 30255-56]; and the steep rise in the cost of living caused by an inflation rate which had reached 20 per cent by November 1979 [see page 29966]. In her election campaign Mrs Gandhi had concentrated on these three issues, whereas the other parties had raised questions which appeared irrelevant to the electorate, such as the Janata Party's demand for the impeachment of President Sanjiva Reddy and the economic proposals which were contained in the *Lok Dal*'s manifesto [see pages 29974; 30254].

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The Congress (I) was believed to have benefited especially from the support of the Harijans and the Moslems in the northern states, who had voted for the Janata Party in 1977 as a protest against the Congress's sterilization campaign [see page 28352] but had reacted against the communalism of the *Jan Sangh* section of the Janata Party and the "casteism" of the *Lok Dal*'s Jat supporters [see pages 29351-53; 29969, 29971]. Of the 116 seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes (i.e. Harijans) and Scheduled Tribes the Congress (I) won 79.

None of the opposition parties secured the one-tenth of the seats necessary for recognition as the official opposition in the *Lok Sabha*.

The *Lok Dal* emerged as the second largest party with 41 seats; 29 of these were won in Uttar Pradesh, whence Mr Charan Singh, the party leader, derived his main support, and the other 12 seats in Bihar, Haryana, Rajasthan and Orissa, but the party failed to secure a single seat in the southern and north-eastern states.

Apart from the Congress (I), the only national parties to strengthen their position were the two Communist parties, which fought the elections in alliance. The CPI(M), which became the third largest party in the *Lok Sabha*, won its 35 seats in West Bengal and Tripura, where it headed Left Front Governments [see pages 28754-55 and 29342 respectively], and in Kerala, where the Communist parties had formed the Left Democratic Front in alliance with the Congress and a number of smaller parties [see page 30255]. In addition to West Bengal and Kerala, the Communist Party of India (CPI) won seats in Bihar, Manipur and Uttar Pradesh. The Communist parties and their Left Front allies—the Revolutionary Socialist Party, Forward Bloc and Kerala Congress (Mani group)—together formed a bloc of 54 members in the *Lok Sabha*.

The Janata Party won only 31 seats, although it had put forward 420 candidates, more than any other party except the Congress (I). It achieved its main successes in Bihar and Maharashtra, with eight seats in each, its other seats being won in Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.

The election results were a disaster for the Congress, which won only 13 seats—four in Bihar, three in Kerala (where, as stated above, it fought the elections in alliance with the Communist parties) and one each in Andhra Pradesh, Kashmir, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Goa and Lakshadweep. Particularly humiliating was its failure to win a single seat in Karnataka, where its leader, Mr D. Devaraj Urs, was Chief Minister [see page 29975].

Details of the results in the individual states and union territories are given below. [For the results in the states in the 1977 elections see page 28430.]

Andhra Pradesh. Seats 42, Congress (I) 41, Congress 1. In 1977 the undivided Congress won 41 seats and the Janata Party one.

Mrs Gandhi, who also contested the Rae Bareli (Uttar Pradesh) seat, won the Medak seat by a majority of 219,124. Other successful candidates included Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, a former Chief Minister of the state (in 1971-73); Mr K. Brahmananda Reddy, a former president of the Congress, who had recently resigned as Minister for Industry in Mr Charan Singh's Government and joined the Congress (I) [see page 30253]; and Mr Kishore Chandra Deo, Minister of State for Steel and Mines, who was the only Congress candidate returned.

Assam. Seats 14, Congress (I) 2. As stated above, the elections were postponed in 12 constituencies. Mrs Rashida Haque Choudhury (Congress), Minister of State for Education, was among the unsuccessful candidates.

Bihar. Seats 54, Congress (I) 30, Janata 8, *Lok Dal* 5, Congress 4, CPI 4, Jharkhand 1, independents 2. In 1977 the allied Janata Party and Congress for Democracy, which later merged, won all the seats.

The candidates returned included Mr Jagjivan Ram, the Janata Party leader; Mr George Fernandes (*Lok Dal*), Industry Minister in the Janata Government, whose majority at Muzaffarpur was cut from 334,000 to 23,000; and Mr N. E. Horo, leader of the (tribal) Jharkhand Party. Among the *Lok Dal* candidates who lost their seats were Mr Shyama Nandan Mishra, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Fazlur Rahman, the Minister of Labour, and Mr Madhu Limaye, a general secretary of the party.

Gujarat. Seats 26, Congress (I) 25, Janata 1. In 1977 the Janata Party won 16 seats and the Congress 10.

The results in Gujarat caused considerable surprise, as in all the general elections since its creation in 1960 the state had never previously swung so completely in favour of one party, and the Janata Party had been expected to benefit by the local prestige of Mr Morarji Desai, a native of the state, although he did not seek re-election. The Surat seat, which he had held throughout his parliamentary career, was in fact won by a little-known Congress (I) candidate, who defeated both Mr Asoka Mehta, a leading Janata Party member and a former minister (1966-68), and Mr Hitendra Desai, the Congress Minister of Commerce, the latter forfeiting his deposit. Other well-known candidates who were defeated included Mr Piloo Mody (Janata) and Mr Manubhai Shah (Congress), a former minister (1956-67), who lost his deposit.

Haryana. Seats 10, Congress (I) 5, *Lok Dal* 4, Janata 1. The Janata Party had won all the 10 seats in 1977.

Three former Chief Ministers of the state were elected: Mr Bansi Lal (1968-75), Defence Minister in 1975-77, who had recently been admitted to the Congress (I) after being expelled from the undivided Congress in 1977 [see page 30254]; Rao Birendra Singh (1967), also of the Congress (I); and Mr Devi Lal (1977-79) of the *Lok Dal*. Defeated candidates included two former Janata ministers of state, Mr Chand Ram (Shipping and Transport), who stood as a Congress (I) candidate, and Prof. Sher Singh (Defence).

Himachal Pradesh. Seats 4, Congress (I) 3. Voting in the snow-bound Mandi constituency was postponed until June. The Janata Party won all four seats in 1977.

Jammu and Kashmir. Seats 6, National Conference 3, Congress (I) 1, Congress 1. Polling was postponed until June in the snowbound Ladakh constituency. In 1977 the Congress won three seats, the National Conference two and an independent one.

The National Conference and the Congress (I) fought the elections in alliance. Dr Karan Singh (Congress), the Education Minister, was re-elected, but Mr Mohammad Shafi Qureshi (Congress), the Tourism and Civil Aviation Minister, lost his seat. One National Conference candidate was returned unopposed [see page 30253].

Karnataka. Seats 28, Congress (I) 27, Janata 1. In 1977 the Congress won 26 seats and the Janata Party two.

Kerala. Seats 20, CPI(M) 6, Congress (I) 5, Congress 3, CPI 2, Moslem League 2, Kerala Congress (Mani group) 1, Kerala Congress (Joseph group) 1. In 1977 all the seats were won by the parties then composing the state Government, the Congress winning 11, the CPI four, the Moslem League two, the Kerala Congress two and the Revolutionary Socialist Party one.

The opposing parties had formed two electoral alliances: (i) the Left Democratic Front, which included the CPI(M), the Congress, the CPI and the Kerala Congress (Mani group), and (ii) the United Democratic Front, which included the Congress (I), the Moslem League and the Kerala Congress (Joseph group). The Left Democratic Front parties thus won 12 seats and the United Democratic Front parties eight.

Madhya Pradesh. Seats 40, Congress (I) 35, Janata 4, independent 1. In 1977 the Janata Party won 37 seats and the Congress, the Republican Party and an independent one each.

The successful Congress (I) candidates included Mr Vidya Charan Shukla, the former Minister of Information and Broadcasting in Mrs Gandhi's Government, who defeated both Mr Brijlal Verma (Janata), Communications Minister in Mr Desai's Government, and Mr P. L. Kaushik (*Lok Dal*), Minister of Information and Broadcasting in Mr Charan Singh's Government.

Maharashtra. Seats 48, Congress (I) 39, Janata 8, Congress 1. In 1977 the Congress won 20 seats, the Janata Party 19, the Peasants' and Workers' Party five, the CPI(M) three and the Republican Party one, the last three parties being allied with the Janata Party.

The Janata Party achieved its main success in Bombay, where it won five of the six seats. The one Congress seat was won by Mr Yeshwantrao Bulantrao Chavan, the Deputy Premier and Home Minister.

Manipur. Seats 2, Congress (I) 1, CPI 1. The Congress won both seats in 1977.

Meghalaya. Seats 2, Congress (I) 1. Voting was postponed in the Shillong constituency, where all the nominations had been withdrawn [see page 30253]. In 1977 the Congress and the Hill State People's Democratic Party each won one seat.

Nagaland. Seats 1, independent 1. An independent candidate won the seat in a straight fight from the United Democratic Front, the ruling party in the state, which had won it in 1977.

Orissa. Seats 21, Congress (I), 19, *Lok Dal* 1. The election in the Keonjhar constituency had been countermanded following the death of a candidate. In 1977 the Janata Party won 14 seats, the Congress four and the Congress for Democracy, the CPI(M) and an independent one each.

The one *Lok Dal* seat was won by Mr Biju Patnaik, Minister for Steel and Mines. He had a majority of less than 6,000, however, whereas 12 of the Congress (I) candidates won by majorities of over 100,000. Mr Rabi Ray (*Lok Dal*), the Health Minister, lost his seat.

Punjab. Seats 13, Congress (I) 12, *Akali Dal* 1. In 1977 the *Alkali Dal* won nine seats, the Janata Party three and the CPI(M) one.

The *Akali Dal* fought the elections in alliance with the Janata Party. Its defeated candidates included Mr Surjit Singh Barnala, Minister of Agriculture in Mr Desai's Government, whilst Mr Zail

Singh, a former Chief Minister of the state (1972-77), was among the Congress (I) candidates elected.

Rajasthan. Seats 25, Congress (I) 18, Janata 4, *Lok Dal* 2, Congress 1. The Janata Party won 24 seats in 1977 and the Congress one.

Mr Nathuram Mirdha, a Minister of State, who was the only candidate of the undivided Congress returned in the state in 1977, was the only "official" Congress candidate elected. The successful Congress (I) candidates included Mr Mohan Lal Sukhadia, a former Chief Minister of the state (1954-71).

Sikkim. Seats 1, Sikkim Janata Parishad (SJP) 1. The Congress candidate was returned unopposed in 1977. The SJP had been formed in 1977 [see page 29980 and also page 30329 below].

Tamil Nadu. Seats 39, Congress (I) 20, *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (DMK) 16, *Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (ADMK) 2, Moslem League 1. In 1977 the ADMK won 18 seats, the Congress 14, the Janata Party three, the CPI three and the DMK one.

Party alliances in the state had been almost completely reversed since the previous election. In 1977 (i) the ADMK was allied with the Congress, the CPI and the Moslem League and (ii) the DMK with the Janata Party; in 1980, on the other hand (i) the ADMK was allied with the Janata Party, the CPI and the CPI(M) and (ii) the DMK with the Congress (I) and the Moslem League [see also page 30253].

Tripura. Seats 2, CPI(M) 2. The Congress won one seat in 1977 and the Congress for Democracy the other.

Uttar Pradesh. Seats 85, Congress (I) 51, *Lok Dal* 29, Janata 3, CPI 1, independent 1. In 1977 the Janata Party won 71 seats and the Congress for Democracy 14.

The Congress (I) achieved some of its most striking successes in Uttar Pradesh, where in 1977 it had failed to win a single seat. Mrs Gandhi regained the Rae Bareli seat, which she had lost in 1977, by a 173,654 majority over the Janata candidate, all her 25 opponents forfeiting their deposits. Her son, Mr Sanjay Gandhi, was returned by a 128,545 majority at Amethi, where he had been defeated in 1977, and entered Parliament for the first time. Other successful Congress (I) candidates included three former Chief Ministers of the state, Mr Hemavati Nandan Bahuguna (1973-75), Mr Kamlapati Tripathi (1971-73) and Mr Narain Dutt Tiwari (1976-77).

Among the *Lok Dal* candidates Mr Charan Singh was returned at Baghpat by a 165,121 majority, and Mr Ram Kinkar (Minister of Works and Housing) was also elected. Mr Raj Narain, the party's vice-president, who had won the Rae Bareli seat from Mrs Gandhi in 1977, was defeated at Varanasi by Mr Tripathi, however. One of the three successful Janata candidates was the party president, Mr Chandra Shekhar.

West Bengal. Seats 42, CPI(M) 27, Congress (I) 4, Revolutionary Socialist Party 4, CPI 3, Forward Bloc 3. Voting was countermanded in the Serampore constituency, where a candidate had been murdered during the campaign [see page 30253]. In 1977 the CPI(M) won 17 seats, the Janata Party 11, the Congress for Democracy, Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Forward Bloc and Congress three each, and independents two.

In the 1977 elections the CPI(M), RSP and Forward Bloc were allied with the Janata Party and the Congress for Democracy, while the CPI was allied with the Congress. The 1980 elections, however, took the form of a four-cornered fight. The Left Front, consisting of the CPI(M), RSP and Forward Bloc, which had formed a Government in the state in June 1977 [see page 28754], was allied with the CPI and the *Lok Dal* with the Congress, whilst the Congress (I) and the Janata Party contested the elections without allies.

Mr Jyotirmoy Bosu, the CPI(M) leader in the *Lok Sabha*, was returned for the fourth time and Mr Tridib Chowdhury, the RSP leader, for the seventh time. Mr Prafulla Chandra Sen, the Janata leader in the state and a former Congress Chief Minister (1962-67), was defeated.

Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Seats 1, Congress (I) 1. The Congress won the seat in 1977.

Arunachal Pradesh. Seats 2, Congress (I) 2. In 1977 a Congress member was returned unopposed, the other seat being won by an independent.

Chandigarh. Seats 1, Congress (I) 1. The seat was contested by 39 candidates. Mr Krishan Kant (Janata), who had won it in 1977, took third place after the Congress (I) candidate and an independent.

Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Seats 1, Congress (I) 1. The Congress won the seat in 1977.

Delhi. Seats 7, Congress (I) 6, Janata 1. The Janata Party won all the seven seats in 1977. The only successful Janata candidate on this occasion was Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, the External Affairs Minister in Mr Desai's Government and former *Jan Sangh* leader, who defeated Mr C. M. Stephen, the Congress (I) leader in the previous *Lok Sabha*.

Goa, Daman and Diu. Seats 2, Congress 1, *Maharashtrawadi Gomantak* 1. The distribution of seats was the same as in 1977. In Goa the Congress fought the elections in alliance with the Congress (I).

Lakshadweep. Seats 1, Congress 1. Mr P. M. Sayeed, a minister of state, retained the seat.

Mizoram. Seats 1, independent 1. The independent, who was supported by five opposition parties, defeated the candidate of the ruling People's Conference in a straight fight. The seat had been won by an independent in 1977.

Pondicherry. Seats 1, Congress (I) 1. The ADMK had won the seat in 1977.

In accordance with the Constitution, President Sanjiva Reddy nominated Mr Frank Anthony and Mr A. E. T. Barrow to the *Lok Sabha* on Jan. 19 to represent the Anglo-Indian community.

Voting took place on Feb. 24 in the Keonjhar (Orissa) and Serampore (West Bengal) constituencies, where the elections had been countermanded because of the death of candidates, the former seat being won by the Congress (I) and the latter by the CPI(M). The number of Congress (I) and CPI(M) members thus rose to 352 and 36 respectively. The Congress (I) retained three seats for which by-elections took place on the same day, at Rae Bareli (Uttar Pradesh), which Mrs Gandhi had resigned while retaining the Medak seat, at Gulbarga (Karnataka), where the newly-elected Congress (I) member had resigned to enable Mr C. M. Stephen to contest the seat, and at Kheri (Uttar Pradesh), where the Congress (I) member had died.

Mr Bal Ram, a Congress (I) member from Punjab, was unanimously elected Speaker of the *Lok Sabha* on Jan. 22, and Mr G. Lakshmanan (DMK) Deputy Speaker on Feb. 1.

In contrast to its large majority in the *Lok Sabha*, the Congress (I) was in a minority in the Upper House, the *Rajya Sabha*, the distribution of seats in January being as follows: Congress (I) 69, Janata 45, Congress 43, *Lok Dal* 19, CPI 9, ADMK 9, CPI(M) 7, DMK 2, Moslem League 2, *Akali Dal*, Forward Bloc, RSP, Peasants' and Workers' Party, Republican Party, Kerala Congress, National Conference and Socialists 1 each, nominated 9, independents 12, vacancies 10. By the end of March, however, defections from other parties had brought the strength of the Congress (I) group to 101. (Details will be given in a subsequent article of the results of (i) the regular partial elections to the *Rajya Sabha* held in March-April 1980 and (ii) further elections following elections in late May to nine state Assemblies which had been dissolved in February—see below.)

Cabinet formed by Mrs Gandhi

Mr Charan Singh, who had submitted his resignation on Aug. 20, 1979, but had been asked by President Reddy to remain in office pending the elections [see page 29974], requested the President's permission to demit office as soon as possible on Jan. 9, 1980. After Mrs Gandhi had been unanimously elected leader of the Congress (I) Parliamentary Party on Jan. 10 President Reddy asked her to form a Government. Her cabinet list was announced on Jan. 14 as follows:

Cabinet Ministers

Mrs Indira Gandhi	Prime Minister
Mr Ramaswamy Venkataraman	Finance
Mr Zail Singh	Home Affairs
Rao Birendra Singh	Agriculture
Mr B. Shankaranand	Education
Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao	External Affairs
Mr A. B. A. Ghani Khan Choudhury	Energy and Irrigation
Mr Kamlapati Tripathi	Railways
Mr Vasant Sathe	Information and Broadcasting
Mr P. Shiv Shankar	Law and Justice
Mr Anant Prasad Sharma	Shipping and Transport
Mr Prakash Chandra Sethi	Works and Housing
Mr Janaki Ballav Patnaik	Tourism and Civil Aviation
Mr Bhishma Narain Singh	Parliamentary Affairs
Mr Pranab Kumar Mukherjee	Commerce

Ministers of State

Mr R. V. Swaminathan	Agriculture
Mr Jagganath Pahadia	Finance
Mr P. Venkatasubbiah	Home Affairs
Mr Yogendra Makwana	
Mr Nihar Laskar	Health
Mr Jaffer Sherif	Railways
Mr Katrik Oraon	Tourism and Civil Aviation

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The distribution of portfolios for which no ministers had been appointed was announced on Jan. 16 as follows: Mrs Gandhi—Defence; Mr Venkataraman and Mr Sharma (jointly)—Industry; Mr Sethi—Petroleum and Chemicals; Mr Mukherjee—Steel and Civil Supplies; Mr Patnaik—Labour; Mr B. N. Singh—Communications; Mr Shankaranand—Health and Social Security. Mr K. Parasaran was appointed Solicitor General on Feb. 27.

The majority of the new ministers had made their careers in state politics, and only Mr Tripathi and Mr Sethi had previously held cabinet rank. Mrs Gandhi did not include in her Cabinet several members of her previous Administration who had been elected to the new *Lok Sabha*, among them Mr Bansi Lal and Mr V. C. Shukla, whose activities during the emergency of 1975-77 had been severely criticized, and Mr Bahuguna and Mr Brahmananda Reddy, who had only recently joined the Congress (I) after a period of opposition to her. A number of her other former ministers, including Mr Jagjivan Ram, Mr Y. B. Chavan and Dr Karan Singh, now represented opposition parties in the *Lok Sabha*.

Mr Venkataraman (69) was a former Minister for Industry in the Tamil Nadu Government. **Mr Zail Singh** (63) was Chief Minister of Punjab in 1972-77, and **Rao Birendra Singh** (58) Chief Minister of Haryana in 1967. **Mr Shankaranand** (54), a former High Court judge, was a deputy minister in Mrs Gandhi's Government in 1971. **Mr Narasimha Rao** (58) was Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh in 1971-73 and general secretary of the Congress in 1974-77. **Mr Choudhury** (54) is a former member of the West Bengal Government. **Mr Tripathi** (76), the oldest member of the Cabinet, was Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1971-73, Minister of Shipping and Transport in 1973-75 and Railways Minister in 1975-77. **Mr Sathe** (54) is a former Socialist and trade union leader, and **Mr Shiv Shankar** a former judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. **Mr Sharma** (60), a former trade union leader, was Minister of State for Industry in Mrs Gandhi's previous Government. **Mr Sethi** (59) was a minister of state in Mrs Gandhi's Government from 1967 to 1972, when he became Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh. He returned to the Cabinet in 1975 as Minister for Chemicals and Fertilizers, and served as Minister without Portfolio in 1976-77. **Mr Patnaik** (53), a former journalist, was Minister of State for Defence in 1976-77. **Mr B. N. Singh** (46) was Congress (I) chief whip in the *Rajya Sabha* before entering the Government. **Mr Mukherjee** (42), the youngest of the new ministers, was Minister of State for Finance in 1974-77.

Following his return to the *Lok Sabha* in a by-election [see above], Mr C. M. Stephen was appointed Communications Minister on March 3. Four ministers of state were appointed at the same time, viz., Dr Charanjit Chanana (Industry), Mr Sitaram Kesari (Parliamentary Affairs), Mr C. P. N. Singh (Defence) and Mr Z. R. Ansari (Commerce). Mr Veerendra Patil was appointed Minister for Petroleum and Chemicals on March 7.

Mr Stephen (61), a trade union leader from Kerala, was Congress (I) leader in the previous *Lok Sabha*. **Mr Patil** was Chief Minister of Mysore (now Karnataka) in 1968-71. He opposed Mrs Gandhi as Janata candidate in the Chikmagalur by-election in 1978, but joined the Congress (I) in the following year [see pages 29345; 29976].

Elections to State Assemblies

Elections to the Legislative Assemblies were held simultaneously with the *Lok Sabha* elections in the state of Manipur and the union territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa and Pondicherry, and on Jan. 21 in Kerala. President's rule had been introduced in Pondicherry on Nov. 12, 1978, in Goa on April 28, 1979, in Arunachal Pradesh on Nov. 3, in Manipur on Nov. 14 and in Kerala on Dec. 5 [see pages 29979, 29977; 30255], and was lifted after the elections. Details of the election results and the new Governments are given under cross-headings below.

Manipur - Coalition Government formed by Mr Dorendra Singh

No party obtained an overall majority in the elections held on Jan. 3 and 6, the results for 59 of the 60 seats being as follows: Congress (I) 13, Janata 10, Congress 6, CPI 5, Manipur People's Party 3, Kuki National Assembly 2, CPI(M) 1, independents 19. Voting had been countermanded in one constituency, where a candidate had been murdered [see page 30256]. After the elections 18 of the 19 independents joined the Congress (I).

The Congress (I) leader, Mr Rajkumar Dorendra Singh, formed a three-man Ministry on Jan. 14 with the support of the Congress and the Manipur People's Party. Mr Dorendra Singh, then the Congress leader, had previously been Chief Minister in 1974-77 [see pages 26978, 27597, 28438]; he defected to the Janata Party in 1977 [see page 28755] and to the Congress (I) in 1979.

Arunachal Pradesh - Congress (I) Ministry formed by Mr Apang

No party obtained a majority in the elections held on Jan. 3, the results being as follows: Congress (I) 13, People's Party of Arunachal 13, independents 4. Defections after the elections brought the strength of the Congress (I) group to 21, however. The Congress (I) leader, Mr Gagong Apang, formed a three-member Ministry on Jan. 18, and appointed three more ministers on Jan. 27.

Goa - Congress Ministry formed by Mr Rane

The elections in Goa, held on Jan. 3, resulted in a victory for the Congress and the defeat of the *Maharashtrawadi Gomantak* Party, which had held power since 1963, the distribution of seats being as follows: Congress 20, *Maharashtrawadi Gomantak* 7, independents 3. Two of the independents were supported by the Congress. The former Chief Minister, Mrs Shashikala Kakodkar, was among the unsuccessful *Maharashtrawadi Gomantak* candidates. Mr Pratap Singh Rane, the Congress leader, formed a four-member Ministry on Jan. 17.

Pondicherry - Coalition Ministry formed by Mr Ramachandran

The elections held in Pondicherry on Jan. 3 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the DMK, the Congress (I) and the Moslem League, which had fought them in alliance, the results being as follows: DMK 14, Congress (I) 10, Janata 3, Moslem League 1, (CPI)M 1, independent 1. The ADMK, which had won the largest number of seats in the 1974 and 1977 elections, but without gaining an absolute majority [see pages 26480, 28754], failed to secure a single seat. Mr D. Ramachandran, the DMK leader, formed a six-member Ministry on Jan. 16, three of its members being drawn from the DMK and three from the Congress (I).

Kerala - Left Democratic Front Ministry formed by Mr Nayanar

The elections in Kerala, held on Jan. 21, resulted in a victory for the Left Democratic Front, led by the CPI(M), which won 93 of the 140 seats, the results being as follows: Left Democratic Front: CPI(M) 35, Congress 21, CPI 17, Kerala Congress (Mani group) 8, RSP 6, All-India Moslem League 5, Kerala Congress (Pillai group) 1; United Democratic Front: Congress (I) 17, Moslem League 14, Kerala Congress (Joseph group) 6, National Democratic Party 3, Praja Socialist Party 1; Janata 5; independent 1.

Mr E. K. Nayanar, the CPI(M) leader, formed a 17-member Ministry on Jan. 25, consisting of four representatives each of the CPI(M) and the Congress, three from the CPI, two each from the Kerala Congress (Mani group) and the RSP and one each from the All-India Moslem League and the Kerala Congress (Pillai group). The Ministry was the first in the state to include CPI(M) ministers since the resignation of Mr E. M. S. Nambudiripad's Government in 1969 [see 23798 A], and the first in which the CPI(M) and the Congress had co-operated.

Congress (I) Governments formed in Karnataka, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh

The Congress Government in Karnataka and the Janata Governments in Haryana and Himachal Pradesh were replaced by Congress (I) Governments in January and February. Details are given below.

Karnataka. Following the failure of the Congress to win a single seat in Karnataka in the general elections, the Congress Chief Minister, Mr D. Devaraj Urs, tendered his resignation on Jan. 7, stating that he did not wish to continue because the elections had shown that his party did not enjoy the confidence of the majority of the people. (Mr Urs had been Chief Minister of Karnataka—originally named Mysore—since 1972.) The Congress (I) leader in the Assembly, Mr R. Gundu Rao, formed a three-member Ministry on Jan. 12, eight more ministers and five ministers of state being appointed on Feb. 25 and 27. The new ministers included Mr Dharma Singh, who had resigned the Gulbarga seat in the *Lok Sabha* in favour of Mr C. M. Stephen [see above].

At the time of Mr Urs's resignation the Congress held 129 seats in the 225-member Assembly and the Congress (I) 47. Over 90 Congress members, including 12 of Mr Urs's ministers, and a number of Janata members subsequently defected to the Congress (I) group, however, bringing its strength to 153 by Feb. 27.

Haryana. The Chief Minister of Haryana, Mr Bhajan Lal (appointed in June 1979—see page 29970), and 37 other Janata members of the Assembly, including all but three of the ministers, defected to the Congress (I) on Jan. 22, bringing the strength of the Congress (I) group from eight to 46 in the 90-member Assembly. Mr Bhajan Lal afterwards told the press that he had always been "a Congress (I) supporter at heart". The three ministers who had not defected resigned on Jan. 23, stating that they could not work with "such an unscrupulous, treacherous, unprincipled and opportunist betrayer of the public confidence" as Mr Bhajan Lal.

Himachal Pradesh. The Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, Mr Shanta Kumar (appointed in June 1977—see page 28752), resigned on Feb. 14 after defections had reduced the strength of the Janata group in the 68-member Assembly from 54 to 30, a three-member Congress (I) Ministry headed by Mr Ram Lal being formed on the same day. Mr Kumar afterwards commented that the Janata Party was "paying the price for its failure to enact an anti-defection bill" [see page 29350].

The president of the Maharashtra Congress (I), Mrs Premilabai Chavan, stated on Feb. 2 that the party was prepared to admit Mr Sharad Pawar, the (Maharashtra Progressive Congress) state Chief Minister [see page 29976], if he would accept Mrs Gandhi's leadership. She admitted that the Congress (I) had tried to repeat the "Bhajan Lal experiment" in Maharashtra without success, and said that the party would not press for the dissolution of the Assembly.

The Sikkim Janata Parishad, the ruling party in Sikkim [see page 29980], changed its name on Jan. 11 to the Sikkim Parishad, and applied for recognition as the state unit of the Congress (I). It was announced on Feb. 27 that this had been granted.

The *Rajya Sabha* adopted on Jan. 30 by 80 votes to 75 an opposition amendment to the motion thanking the President for his address at the opening of Parliament, this being the first time that voting had taken place on a motion of thanks. The amendment expressed regret that the address did not take notice of "the disturbing attempts to engineer defections on a large scale in the Assemblies in the states under non-Congress (I) Governments and even to arbitrarily dissolve such Assemblies, in flagrant violation of all federal principles".

A non-official constitution amendment bill seeking to check defections was introduced in the *Lok Sabha* by Mr Madhu Dandavate (Janata) on March 28. [For earlier bill which was withdrawn in 1978, see page 29350.] The Law Minister, Mr Shiv Shankar, asked him to withdraw it so that the Government could bring forward a comprehensive bill on the subject, and denied that the Congress (I) had encouraged defections in Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Karnataka, contending that in those states the legislators had "bowed before the massive mandate" given to the Congress (I) in the elections. Mr Dandavate, however, said that he considered the bill necessary because politicians were losing their credibility, and cited the instance of a legislator who had crossed the floor 13 times. The bill was rejected by 138 votes to 42.

Dissolution of Nine State Assemblies

On the Cabinet's recommendation, President Reddy issued a proclamation on Feb. 17 dissolving the Assemblies and introducing President's rule in Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, in all of which the Congress (I) had won a majority of seats in the general elections although other parties controlled the Assemblies. The Gujarat Assembly, which had been elected in 1975 [see page 27366], was due to be dissolved in June [see also page 29977], but in the other eight states the Assemblies had been elected only in June 1977 or February 1978 [see 28752 A; 29341 A]. The Janata Party was in office in Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the *Lok Dal* in Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, the Progressive Democratic Front in Maharashtra, the *Akali Dal* in Punjab and the ADMK in Tamil Nadu. West Bengal and Tripura, where the ruling CPI(M) had won a majority of the *Lok Sabha* seats, and Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka, where defections had enabled the Congress (I) to take power [see above], were not affected by the proclamation; a Congress (I) Ministry had been formed in Andhra Pradesh in March 1978 [see 29341 A].

The Janata Government had in 1977 similarly dissolved the Assemblies in Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, where the Congress held office but had been decisively defeated in the general elections in that year, but not in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka and Maharashtra, where the Congress had won a majority or a large minority of the parliamentary seats. In all these states except Orissa and Uttar Pradesh the Assemblies had completed the five-year term for which they had been elected in 1972, but which had subsequently been extended to six years. The Government's action had been upheld by the Supreme Court [see page 28435].

The West Bengal Assembly adopted a resolution on Feb. 21 condemning the dissolution of the nine Assemblies as an "undemocratic and authoritarian act" which had "struck at the root of the federal structure of India envisaged under the Constitution". This was the first occasion since India became independent that a state legislature had formally condemned an action of the central Government.

The President's proclamation was approved by the *Lok Sabha* on March 26 and by the *Rajya Sabha* on the following day. An opposition motion calling for the revocation of the proclamation was defeated in the *Rajya Sabha* by 120 votes to 96, the DMK, the Moslem League and some independents voting with the Congress (I). It was announced on April 24 that elections would be held in the nine states on May 28 and 31.

The Delhi Metropolitan Council was dissolved by a presidential notification issued on March 21, whilst the Delhi Municipal Corporation was superseded for a year by a Home Ministry order issued on April 11. Both bodies had been elected in 1977 [see also 28752 A] and were controlled by the Janata Party.

Party Developments - Splits in Janata Party, Lok Dal and Communist Party

The Janata Party split in March, when Mr Jagjivan Ram and his followers left it, and again in April, when the former *Jan Sangh* group formed a new party called the Bharatiya Janata Party. The *Lok Dal* also split in April, when Mr Raj Narain broke away to revive the Janata Party (Secular), whilst a pro-Congress (I) section of the CPI formed the All-India Communist Party. Details of these and other party developments are given below.

Janata Party. The splits in the Janata Party arose from the long-standing controversy over the relations between the former *Jan Sangh* members inside the party and the Hindu communalist *Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh* (RSSS), which had been largely responsible for the earlier split in July 1979 and the fall of the Janata Government [see pages 29969, 29971, 29975]. The party's parliamentary board adopted on Feb. 26 a compromise formula whereby no Janata legislator or office-bearer should participate in the day-to-day activities of the RSSS. Later the same day, however, Mr Jagjivan Ram proposed in a letter to the party president, Mr Chandra Shekhar, that no party member should have any association with the RSSS. In reply Mr Chandra Shekhar accused him on Feb. 27 of going back on a decision to which he had agreed, whereupon he resigned the leadership of the Janata parliamentary party.

Mr Ram announced on March 7 that he had "dissociated" himself from the Janata Party, and would call a convention of his supporters to decide their future course of action. The convention, held in Delhi on March 29-30, "removed" Mr Chandra Shekhar and all other office-holders in the Janata Party, declared Mr Ram president of the "real" Janata Party, and empowered him to bring together "forces having faith in the Congress culture and those committed to socialism". Although on April 5 he ruled out the possibility of his party merging with any other, he announced three days later that he had joined the Congress, and on April 10 Mr Urs (the Congress president) nominated him to the party's working committee and parliamentary board.

Mrs Nandini Satpathy, the former Congress Chief Minister of Orissa (1972-73 and 1974-76), resigned from the Janata Party on Feb. 19, and joined the Congress on March 9 at the invitation of Mr Urs, who on April 17 appointed her president of the Orissa Congress. Together with Mr Ram and Mr Bahuguna, she had left the Congress in February 1977 to form the Congress for Democracy, which later merged with the Janata Party [see pages 28350; 28436].

The Janata Party's parliamentary board reaffirmed its decision of Feb. 26 on March 19 by a majority vote. This attempted compromise was rejected by both the former *Jan Sangh* members and the RSSS leadership, but was endorsed by the party's national executive on April 4 by 17 votes to 14. A convention of former *Jan Sangh* members and their supporters in the Janata Party held in New Delhi on April 5-6, at which 15 *Lok Sabha* and 12 *Rajya Sabha* members were present, formally broke with the Janata Party and formed a new party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, under the leadership of Mr A. B. Vajpayee, the former *Jan Sangh* leader and External Affairs Minister in the Janata Government. In a speech on April 6 he declared that "we are proud of our association with the RSSS", which he described as "a respectable body".

Lok Dal. Mr Charan Singh (president of the *Lok Dal*) expelled Mr Raj Narain, the party's executive or vice-president, from the party for six years on March 31 for repeated indiscipline and "anti-party activities". Mr Narain, however, declared the *Lok Dal* dissolved on the following day, and on April 3 a convention of his followers formed the Janata Party (Secular), thus reviving the *Lok Dal*'s original name [see pages 29971, 29975]. The new party consisted mainly of former members of the Samyukta Socialist Party from Uttar Pradesh, its best-known member, apart from Mr Narain, being Mr Ram Naresh Yadav, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1977-79. Although Mr Narain claimed that two members of Parliament had joined his party, one of them afterwards reaffirmed his support for Mr Charan Singh. Janata (S) supporters attempted unsuccessfully to take over the *Lok Dal* headquarters in New Delhi by force on April 5.

Congress. Two state parties in Maharashtra, the Progressive Congress and the Prajatantra Congress, merged with the Congress on

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March 4. The Progressive Congress had broken away from the Congress in July 1978 under the leadership of Mr Sharad Pawar, who formed a Progressive Democratic Front Government in alliance with the Janata Party [see page 29342], whilst the Prajatantra Congress, led by Mr N. K. Tirpude, had broken away from the Congress (I) in July 1979 [see page 29969]. Their merger with the Congress under the leadership of Mr Urs, who stated that the party would not enter into any electoral adjustment or alliance with the Janata Party in the Maharashtra elections, marked the end of the Progressive Democratic Front, which had ruled the state from July 1978 until the dissolution of the Assembly.

The Congress, the CPI and the CPI(M) agreed on April 12 to put forward common candidates against the Congress (I) in the forthcoming elections to nine state Assemblies and to campaign jointly.

Congress (I). Mr Swaran Singh, who had been president of the Congress from March 1978 until September 1979, when he was succeeded by Mr Urs [see page 29975], resigned from the party's working committee and parliamentary board on Jan. 30, and joined the Congress (I) on Feb. 19.

On May 1 Mr Bahuguna, who had been Finance Minister in Mr Charan Singh's Government until October 1979 but had then joined the Congress (I) and had been made a general secretary [see page 30253], announced that he had resigned as general secretary and also as a member of the Congress (I) parliamentary board and working committee, while on May 19 he announced his resignation both from the party and also from the *Lok Sabha*, explaining that in resigning from Parliament he was "only trying to set up an example of political morality, since I had won on the Congress (I) ticket".

Mr Dinesh Singh, who had been a Congress member of Mrs Gandhi's Cabinet from 1967 to 1971, who had joined the Janata Party in May 1977 after failing to secure re-election to the *Lok Sabha* [see page 28437] and who had subsequently become a member of the *Rajya Sabha*, announced in early May 1980 that he had joined the Congress (I).

When opening a new Youth Congress (I) headquarters in Lucknow on March 23, Mr Sanjay Gandhi announced that membership of the organization would in future be open only to those who had courted arrest and gone to prison during the period that the party was out of office.

Communist Party. Mr S. A. Dange, who had recently resigned the chairmanship of the CPI [see page 30253], said on Jan. 9 that the Indian people had chosen "well and wisely" in the general elections, which had been a crushing defeat for "the forces of destabilization and reaction". The party's national council, meeting in New Delhi on Feb. 1-5, accepted his resignation, and adopted by 100 votes to five a resolution rejecting Mr Dange's policy of support for the Congress (I) and calling for "unity of the left and democratic forces".

A number of Mr Dange's followers formed a new party called the All-India Communist Party at a conference held at Nagpur (Maharashtra) on April 12-13, under the leadership of his daughter, Mrs Roza Deshpande, and Mr Baburao Ranadive, formerly secretary of the Bombay CPI. Mrs Deshpande said that the new party would support the Congress (I), which represented the "national bourgeoisie" and was striving to strengthen democratic socialism, and would "seek the blessing" of Mr Dange, who had not attended the conference.

Reservation of Seats for Scheduled Castes extended

The Constitution (45th Amendment) Bill, which extended for another 10 years the reservation of seats in the *Lok Sabha* and the state Assemblies for representatives of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Anglo-Indians, was passed unanimously by the *Lok Sabha* on Jan. 24 and by the *Rajya Sabha* on the following day [see also page 29974]. The Constitution, which came into force on Jan. 26, 1950, originally provided for special representation for these sections of the population for a period of 10 years, which was extended for two further periods of 10 years by amendments adopted in 1959 and 1969 [see 17156 A; 23788 A]. As the amendment applied to the state legislatures as well as to the *Lok Sabha*, it required to be ratified by at least half the Assemblies before receiving the President's assent.

Dismissal of Charges against Mrs Gandhi and Mr Sanjay Gandhi - Abolition of Special Courts

The judges presiding over the two special courts set up for the trial of offences committed during the emergency of 1975-77 by persons holding high public or political offices [see pages 29967-68] both held in rulings given on Jan. 15 and Feb. 14 and 18 that the establishment of the courts was illegal and void. The two courts were abolished by an order issued by the Law Ministry on March 29.

Mr Justice Mangi Lal Jain ruled on Jan. 15 that the Janata Government's declaration setting up the special courts was unconstitutional, as it had not been signed or approved by the President, but only by the Ministers of Law and Home Affairs. He therefore sent back to a lower court a charge against Mrs Gandhi, Mr R. K. Dhawan (her former additional private secretary) and others of harassing four officials of the Ministry of Industry, and dismissed another charge of illegally detaining Mr Bhimsen Sachar and seven other persons [see page 29347]. A Delhi magistrate's court dismissed the charge of harassment of officials on April 9, on the ground that delay by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in filing it had exceeded the three-year limitation period from the time of the alleged offence.

Mr Justice M. S. Joshi, the presiding judge of the other special court, ruled on Feb. 14 that the court was unconstitutional on similar grounds to those given by Mr Justice Jain. He also held that the notification establishing the court had been issued by the Law Ministry on May 30, 1979, without proper authority, as the necessary notification allocating the business to the Ministry had not been issued until Sept. 20 and had not been given retrospective effect. He therefore ordered charges against Mrs Gandhi, Mr P. C. Sethi (the Minister of Works and Housing), Mr Dhawan and others of coercing business firms into donating 139 jeeps for the Congress's use in the 1977 election campaign to be returned to a lower court, which on April 15 dismissed the charges (the last of the cases brought against Mrs Gandhi) on the ground of lack of evidence.

On Feb. 18 Mr Justice Joshi returned to the sessions court the last case pending before the special courts, a charge against Mr V. C. Shukla of abusing his position as Minister of Information and Broadcasting to get election posters designed free of charge.

The Supreme Court on April 11 upheld the appeal by Mr Sanjay Gandhi and Mr Shukla against their conviction in the *Kissa Kursi Ka* case [see page 29966], holding that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt the existence of a criminal conspiracy between them. The three judges ruled, however, that the special courts were legal and constitutional, and that the enactment by which they had been set up was valid.

The CBI had previously dropped on Jan. 21 a charge against Mr Gandhi of illegal detention of 12 textile and customs inspectors [see page 29347], on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. A Delhi magistrate on Feb. 11 ordered the trial of Mr Gandhi and Mr Jagmohan (the former vice-chairman of the Delhi Development Authority) on charges of causing the illegal demolition of shops and houses [ibid.], but the Delhi High Court quashed proceedings in the case on Feb. 29 on the ground that the three-year limitation period had been exceeded. A criminal conspiracy charge against Mr Gandhi for influencing the Delhi Municipal Corporation to buy a chemical for purification of water from Maruti Technical Services, a firm which he controlled, was dismissed on March 17.

The CBI on Jan. 21 also dropped a charge against Mr Shukla of abusing his authority to get the Congress's election manifesto translated, and on March 14 likewise dropped a charge against Mr Sethi, Mr Dhawan and eight others of diverting large amounts of Congress funds and abusing their position as public servants.

The Delhi High Court on Feb. 15 quashed a charge against Mr Bansi Lal (the former Chief Minister of Haryana and Defence Minister) of having made a false report of theft to the police. All the remaining cases instituted against Mr Bansi Lal by Mr Devi Lal's (Janata) Government in Haryana were subsequently dropped by Mr Bhajan Lal, Mr Devi Lal's successor (who had joined the Congress (I) in January 1980—see above).

The Home Ministry on March 20 forbade all further distribution and sale of the Shah Commission's reports on excesses during the emergency [see page 29346], and ordered all unsold copies to be returned immediately. The passports of Mr Gandhi, Mr Sethi, Mr Shukla, Mr Bansi Lal, Mr Dhawan and four other persons accused of emergency excesses, which had been impounded by the Janata Government, were restored on Feb. 15.

Mr P. S. Bhinder, one of the accused in the Sachar detention case, who had recently been acquitted of a charge of murder, was appointed Commissioner of Delhi Police on Jan. 24. Mr Jagmohan was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Delhi on Feb. 17 (i.e. before the proceedings against Mr Gandhi and himself in the demolitions case had been quashed).

Mr R. D. Singh, director of the CBI, was sent on two months' leave on Jan. 27, and three deputy inspectors-general who had taken a leading part in the investigation of emergency excesses were subsequently transferred out of Delhi. One of the three officers concerned, Mr N. K. Singh, who had supervised the investigation of the *Kissa Kursi Ka* case, was arrested on Jan. 29 on a charge of kidnapping an employee of Maruti Ltd, but was later released on bail.

The Delhi High Court on April 29 granted anticipatory bail to Mr R. C. Sharma, a senior superintendent of police, directing that if he were arrested he should be released on personal recognizances and surety bonds of Rs 10,000 each. Mr Sharma alleged that over the past two months Mr P. S. Bhinder (the Commissioner of Delhi Police—see above) had repeatedly urged him to give false evidence against Mr Justice J. C. Shah, who had conducted the inquiry into emergency excesses. After he refused to comply, a false charge had been registered against him on April 14, and Mr Bhinder had told him that he could escape the consequences only by giving evidence against Mr Justice Shah.

Mr Justice Vaidialingam's Report on Allegations against Relatives of Mr Desai and Mr Charan Singh - Mrs Satpathy acquitted of Corruption Charges

A summary of the findings of Mr Justice C. A. Vaidialingam, who had been appointed by the Janata Government to inquire into allegations against relatives of Mr Morarji Desai and Mr Charan Singh [see pages 29344; 29966], was leaked on Feb. 3 to the United News of India agency. Following protests by the opposition, the Government released an official summary of the report on Feb. 5, the full text being published later. The Government's conduct in releasing a summary of the report before publishing it in full was strongly criticized by the press, which pointed out that it had created the misleading impression that Mr Justice Vaidialingam had held the accused persons guilty of actually committing the offences with which they were charged.

Mr Justice Vaidialingam pointed out in his report that he had had no powers to summon witnesses or to cause production of documents, and that the members of the *Rajya Sabha* who had made the allegations had all refused to co-operate with him on various pretexts. He had therefore been obliged to base his findings only on such facts as could be gathered from government files and reports and on the explanations offered by the persons against whom the allegations had been made. On this evidence he dismissed many of the allegations as baseless or outside his terms of reference.

He found that there was a prima facie case for an inquiry into the following charges against Mr Kanti Desai (Mr Morarji Desai's son): (i) that he had used his influence to have his own nominee appointed as chairman of the Board of Direct Taxes in 1978; (ii) that he had influenced the Government in 1977 to relax its policy on the import of polyester filament yarn and had helped a particular company to obtain a licence to import it; (iii) that his wife, Mrs Padma Desai, had put pressure on the income tax authorities to obtain a judgment in her favour; (iv) that he had used his influence to obtain a passport for a man who had subsequently left India owing Rs 60,000,000 in tax arrears.

The report also found that there was a prima facie case for an inquiry into the following charges against Mrs Gayatri Devi, Mr Charan Singh's wife: (i) that she had used her influence to interfere in a criminal case; (ii) that she had obstructed the transfer of an employee of the Uttar Pradesh Government; and (iii) that she and her son, Mr Vikram Singh, had obtained sums of money from young men by promising to find them jobs.

In reply to a question whether Mr Charan Singh had shown in his wealth tax returns a gift of Rs 10,000,000 donated to him by his supporters on his birthday in 1978, Mr Jagganath Pahadia (Minister of State for Finance) stated in the *Rajya Sabha* on March 11 that Mr Charan Singh had never filed any wealth tax returns.

Mrs Nandini Satpathy, the former Chief Minister of Orissa, was acquitted on March 21 of all the eight charges of corruption which had been filed against her [see page 28754].

Preventive Detention for Economic Offenders

The Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Essential Supplies Bill, which provided for preventive detention of black marketeers, hoarders and those hindering supplies of essential commodities, was passed by the *Lok Sabha* on Feb. 2 by 188 votes to 56, and by the *Rajya Sabha* on Feb. 4 by 101 votes to 87. Although the bill merely regularized the ordinance promulgated by Mr Charan Singh's Government on Oct. 5, 1979 [see page 29975], the *Lok Dal* and the Congress voted with the other opposition parties against it, maintaining that it might be used against trade union leaders on the plea that they were disrupting supplies of essential commodities, and that Mrs Gandhi's Government could not be trusted not to abuse its powers. The CPI(M)-led Governments of West Bengal and Kerala both stated that they would not enforce the bill.

Although prices fell slightly after the general elections, they rose again from the middle of January, and in the week ending Feb. 23 the annual inflation rate reached 25 per cent. During the first two months of the year the prices of essential goods increased by between 10 and 50 per cent, and the price of sugar nearly trebled. The Delhi police were reported to have seized large quantities of hoarded sugar, maize, wheat, cement, paraffin and other goods, and to have made many arrests.

Government Policy on Press and Broadcasting

The members of the commission appointed by the Janata Government to make suggestions on the future development of the press [see page 29350] tendered their resignation on Jan. 14. Mr Vasant Sathe, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, accepted their resignation on Jan. 28, stating that the Government wished to reconstitute the commission and to continue it on a more comprehensive set of terms of reference, and on April 9 appointed Mr Justice K. K. Mathew (a retired Supreme Court judge) chairman of the reconstituted commission *vice* Mr Justice P. K. Goswami.

Mr Sathe stated on Feb. 13 that the Government was seriously considering the revival of a single national news agency, but would consult executives and employees of the existing news agencies before it took a decision. [The four Indian news agencies had been merged in 1976 in the Samachar agency, but had been revived in 1978, when Samachar was abolished—see pages 27782; 29350.]

Mr Sathe told the *Lok Sabha* on March 11 that the Government had decided not to set up an autonomous body for All-India Radio and Doordarshan (the television service), as recommended by the Verghese Committee [see page 29350], as it could not "give up its responsibility to serve the people through the radio and television", but that it would restructure their administration to ensure "functional autonomy". A bill for the creation of an autonomous corporation to run the radio and television services had been introduced in the *Lok Sabha* by the Janata Government on May 16, 1979, but had not been passed because of the dissolution of Parliament.

Caste Conflicts

Two violent attacks were made by caste Hindus in February 1980 on Harijan villages in Bihar, where a similar incident had occurred in 1977 [see page 29352].

The first attack arose from the murder in October 1979 of a landlord of the Bhumibar caste, who had seized some village lands which had been allocated to landless labourers. During the night of Feb. 6-7 about 100 Bhumibars attacked and set fire to the Harijan village of Parasbigha, near Jahanabad (south-west of Patna), 12 people being shot dead or burnt alive. As a reprisal Harijans attacked the village of Dohia on Feb. 8, killing a woman, and a young man was killed in another clash on the following day.

The second attack similarly originated in the murder in December 1979 of a landowner of the Kurmi caste, who had seized smallholdings from Harijans, refused to pay wages in cash and set up an armed militia. About 500 Kurmis attacked and set fire to the Harijan village of Pipra, near Patna, during the night of Feb. 25-26, shooting 14 people and throwing them into the flames. The other villagers took refuge in a half-built house, where they used bricks and stones to keep the attackers at bay. A total of 62 people were charged in connexion with the attack on March 8.

The Home Minister, Mr Zail Singh, stated in the *Lok Sabha* on March 19 that the Government was considering issuing arms licences to Harijans to enable them to defend themselves against attack. The Bihar Government had decided in March 1979 to arm Harijans in 10 districts where atrocities had recently been committed on them, and the first group had begun weapons training in December.

Press comment agreed that the atrocities against Harijans in Bihar were largely a reaction to their increased militancy, which was attributed partly to the influence of Naxalites (Maoists), who had been active in the state during 1968-75 [see pages 23162; 24056; 24515; 26979; 27598], and partly to the fact that the reservation of places in schools, universities and the civil service for the Scheduled Castes had produced a class of educated Harijans who were able to supply leadership. Almost all the Harijans, however, were landless labourers dependent on seasonal employment, and except in a few states, such as West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, had not benefited from land reform legislation, which had been widely evaded; a survey in 1979 showed that 22 per cent of the rural population held 76 per cent of the land, almost the same proportion as in 1961. In Bihar the major beneficiaries from the reforms had been the intermediate or "backward" castes, such as the Kurmis, which had been the most violent in their resistance to Harijan demands.

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Alleged Misconduct by Police - Supreme Court's Order for Prison Reforms

As a result of a number of incidents in the early months of 1980, demands were made for a reform of police methods and procedures.

About 200 policemen were reported to have raided the village of Narainpur (Uttar Pradesh) on Jan. 14, killing two people, torturing men and raping women, after the villagers had complained that the police were detaining money which a local bus-owner had agreed to pay to the relatives of a woman who had been killed by his bus. After the case had been taken up by Mrs Gandhi the state Government made sweeping changes in the police administration.

In New Delhi police attacked on March 16 a procession of blind people who were on their way to present a petition to Mrs Gandhi, injuring about 50 of them and arresting 118. After opposition members had strongly protested in both Houses of Parliament, Mrs Gandhi on March 18 ordered an immediate investigation of police training methods, stating that there was "a need for a new orientation to their training so that they should not treat everybody as guilty".

On March 20 police assaulted a lawyer who tried to talk to a prisoner at the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gwalior, beat up other lawyers who intervened, struck a judge and threatened another with a gun. The Government subsequently asked the state authorities to hold a judicial inquiry presided over by a High Court judge from outside Madhya Pradesh.

In West Bengal police attacked and set fire to nine villages in the Islampur area on April 7, after two policemen had been beaten to death by villagers angered by the failure of the police to catch bandits who were harassing them. The West Bengal Government announced on April 16 that it had ordered a judicial inquiry into the disturbances. Senior police officials said that discipline in the force had been undermined by rivalry between the two police unions, one of which was supported by the Congress (I) and the other by the CPI(M).

The Supreme Court on Dec. 20, 1979, allowed a habeas corpus petition filed by a convict in Tihar prison, Delhi, alleging that another prisoner had been tortured. The court in its judgment ordered that "the state shall take steps to keep up to the standard minimum rules for treatment of prisoners recommended by the UN"; that district magistrates and sessions judges should visit prisons in their jurisdiction and afford effective opportunities for ventilating legal grievances; and that free legal services for prisoners should be promoted by professional organizations recognized by the court.

The Government on April 11, 1980, asked the states to carry out speedily a programme for the improvement of prison conditions, and especially of facilities for women and juvenile offenders, and criticized the slow progress in carrying out the decisions on this matter taken at a conference of Chief Secretaries of states in April 1979 [see page 29977]. In particular, it called for the provision of proper sanitation, drinking water and electricity in all prisons. It also pointed out that there were only three prisons in the country exclusively for women, and recommended that each state should aim at having at least one women's prison.

Alleged Attempt on Mrs Gandhi's Life

An apparent attempt on Mrs Gandhi's life was made in New Delhi on April 14, when a man threw a knife at her and was immediately arrested.

The arrested man, Mr Ram Bulchand Lalwani, who had come to the capital from Baroda (Gujarat), was remanded by the metropolitan magistrate on April 16 on a charge of attempted murder. After his defence counsel alleged that he had been beaten by the police to elicit a confession, the magistrate ordered that he should be medically examined. He was then taken to a hospital in Baroda, where shortly after his arrival he was stabbed by another patient but not seriously injured. The Baroda magistrate on April 18 instructed the Delhi police to have him examined by a psychiatrist, stating that he had serious doubts about his mental state, as he had published pamphlets in which he made wild allegations and used obscene language against the judiciary and national leaders such as Mr Morarji Desai.

The deputy mayor of Baroda (a Bharatiya Janata Party candidate in the forthcoming state elections), Mr Lalwani's brother and three other men were arrested on April 15 on the basis of an alleged confession by Mr Lalwani implicating them in the supposed assassination attempt as fellow conspirators. The Baroda magistrate, however, ordered their release on bail on May 1, on the ground that there was no evidence of a conspiracy and that the pamphlets written by Mr Lalwani showed that he was in the habit of making false allegations.

The metropolitan magistrate on May 5 ordered Mr Lalwani to be released on bail, stating that he "does not seem to have intended to make an attempt on the life of, or to even cause any bodily harm to, the Prime Minister", and that "simply throwing a knife without aiming at anyone cannot prima facie amount to making an attempt to kill anyone". He also criticized the police for having, he said, "overacted and overplayed the part assigned to it in its anxiety to earn laurels".

Disturbances in North-Eastern States

The disturbances in the north-eastern states continued throughout the first four months of 1980. Although the anti-foreign agitation died down in Meghalaya, Assam was declared a disturbed area on April 5 after repeated outbreaks of rioting had led to over 80 deaths; serious rioting also occurred in Manipur; and secessionist terrorists remained active in Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura.

The Home Minister, Mr Zail Singh, alleged in the *Rajya Sabha* on March 21 that some foreign powers wanted to create disturbances in the region; he stated in particular that arms recovered from the insurgents bore American and Chinese markings, and commented that the US ambassador, Mr Robert Goheen, had toured the north-east in 1979. Home Ministry officials moreover claimed on March 23 to have "definite information" that the US Central Intelligence Agency was "pumping money" into the region through Christian missionaries. Furthermore, according to unofficial reports, there had been a renewed flow of Naga and Mizo insurgents to China for training in guerrilla warfare, and the terrorists in Manipur had been trained in Tibet.

Details of developments in the individual states are given below.

Assam - Anti-foreign Agitation - Failure of Negotiations - Agitation in West Bengal against Assamese

The agitation in Assam against the alleged inclusion of foreigners in the electoral registers became increasingly violent in the early months of 1980.

Immigration of Moslem peasants from East Bengal (then part of British India) into Assam began early in the 20th century, and was encouraged by the landlords, who were suffering from a shortage of labour. After East Bengal became part of Pakistan a passport system was introduced in 1952 [see 12462 D], but immigration nevertheless continued, 220,690 illegal immigrants being detected during the decade 1951-60 and 192,339 in the following decade. The 1961 census [see 18084 A] questioned the citizenship of 222,000 persons, and in the following year tribunals were set up in districts containing large numbers of immigrants to examine their claims to citizenship. Although about 20,000 people were deported, landlords who relied on the immigrants for cheap labour and politicians who benefited from their votes often intervened on their behalf, and the tribunals largely proved ineffective. Mass immigration of Hindus and other non-Moslems took place in 1964 following communal riots in East Pakistan [see 20185 A].

About 1,100,000 refugees fled to Assam during the war in East Pakistan in 1971, and although most of them returned when Bangladesh became independent about 100,000 were believed to have remained. An agreement was subsequently signed providing that Bangladesh would not accept illegal immigrants who had entered Assam before March 25, 1971 (the date of the outbreak of war in East Pakistan), and would accept those who had entered after that date only if it was satisfied that they were Bangladesh citizens.

During the revision of the electoral registers in 1979 objections were lodged against 346,000 voters on the grounds of "doubtful nationality", and the ensuing controversy led to the fall of Mr Golap Borbora's (Janata) Government in September and the formation of a new Government headed by Mr Jogendra Nath Hazarika [see page 29976]. The new Chief Minister (of the freshly established Assam Janata Dal) found himself under pressure, on the one hand, from the All-Assam *Gana Sangram Parishad* (People's Struggle Council) and the All-Assam Students' Union, which demanded the exclusion of aliens from the registers and were supported by the Janata Party, and on the other from the Moslem members of his Government and from the Congress (I), Congress and CPI, on whose support he was dependent for his majority. As a compromise he asked the Union Government to define the term "foreigner", and announced that 18 judicial tribunals would be set up to examine the status of the alleged aliens. This compromise satisfied neither side; while the students continued their agitation, the Congress and the CPI withdrew their support from the Government, which fell on Dec. 9, President's rule being introduced [see page 30255]. As a result of the agitation voting for the *Lok Sabha* took place only in two constituencies in the Cachar district in the south of the state, where the majority of the population were Bengalis.

From Dec. 27, 1979, the students organized uninterrupted picketing of the oil pipeline headquarters at Narengi, six miles from Gauhati, the state capital. Two oil refineries had to be shut down in consequence, and as India was dependent on Assam for more than one-third of its total domestic output an acute shortage of diesel, petrol and other petroleum products developed throughout the country. The technical director of Oil India Ltd was stoned to death by a mob at Duliajan on Jan. 18, 1980, whereupon the police opened fire, five people being killed. In these and other disturbances in the state a total of 41 people were killed in the first three weeks of January.

Mrs Gandhi and Mr Zail Singh had talks with Assam student leaders in New Delhi on Feb. 2-6, at which it was agreed that foreign nationals resident in Assam should be detected and deported and their names removed from the electoral registers before elections were held in the state. During a visit to Assam on Feb. 23-25 Mr Zail Singh met local leaders and proposed that persons who had been included in the registers before March 25, 1971, should be entitled to remain. This formula was accepted by most of the political parties, but rejected by the students' organization, which contended that the basic year should be 1951. The students suspended their picketing of oil installations on Feb. 27, however, as it had caused a scarcity of petroleum products in Assam.

At a conference of leaders of all the political parties represented in Parliament and in the Assam Assembly held in New Delhi on March 1, Mrs Gandhi stated that additional Border Security Force personnel were being deployed on the Bangladesh frontier to check infiltration and identity cards with photographs introduced for Assam voters. The overwhelming majority of those participating approved accepting March 25, 1971, as the "cut-off date" to determine who should be regarded as a foreign national, but no formal position was taken on the matter to avoid a confrontation with the students. Mrs Gandhi accepted a suggestion that a high-power committee should be set up to deal with the economic problems of the north-eastern region.

At the end of the conference all those taking part issued an appeal for the speedy restoration of normal conditions in Assam to facilitate steps to deal with the problem of foreigners. Mrs Gandhi and Mr Zail Singh had more talks with student representatives in New Delhi on March 7-12, in the later stages of which leaders of the All-Assam *Gana Sangram Parishad* took part, but no agreement was reached.

The West Bengal units of the Youth Congress (I) and the *Chhatra Parishad* (the party's student organization) announced on March 19 that they would organize an economic blockade of Assam to make the Assamese students "realize the folly of their ways". The blockade began on March 24, when Bengali students squatted on the road to prevent lorries from entering Assam, which is linked with the rest of India by only a narrow strip of territory, and sat on the rails to prevent trains from leaving. Mrs Gandhi denied on March 26 that the Congress (I) had encouraged the blockade, but Mr Jyoti Basu, the CPI(M) Chief Minister of West Bengal, suggested on the same day that the Congress (I) was trying to create a law and order problem in West Bengal.

After the Youth Congress (I) had announced in Calcutta on March 27 that it would organize a mass march into Assam on April 6 to "restore good sense to the agitators", its campaign became increasingly violent. Many people were injured on March 29 in battles between the Youth Congress (I) and the police when demonstrators attacked the Indian Airlines office in Calcutta to force it to cancel all flights to Assam, and again on the following day when the Youth Congress (I) attacked Calcutta airport. An Assamese student leader gave warning on March 29 that if the blockade continued all Bengali families in Assam would also be blockaded and not allowed to buy even essential commodities. In response to appeals from the Government the Youth Congress (I) suspended the blockade on March 31, but declared that it would resume it if the Assamese did not accept the Government's terms.

Meanwhile the agitation in Assam was resumed, after being partially suspended during the Delhi talks. A general strike on March 26 brought the state to a standstill, and picketing of oil installations was resumed. Troops were called in to assist the police in the Hailakandi area of the Cachar district after rioting on March 31 in which two people were killed, and an indefinite curfew was imposed on the area.

Student leaders rejected on April 1 a suggestion by Mr Lallan Prasad Singh, the Governor of the north-eastern states, that 1967 should be the base year for the deletion of the names of foreigners from the electoral registers and 1971 the base year for deportation. A statement issued on the following day said that 1967 had been suggested as the base year because 1964 and 1965 had been peak years for the refugee influx, and the Government had issued instructions that the refugees should be registered freely as Indian citizens; the electoral registers for 1967 would therefore provide "the nearest definitive document which can be drawn upon to determine citizenship". The proposed compromise was strongly criticized by the opposition parties, which pointed out that they had agreed to 1971 as the base year at the March 1 conference.



(*Carpress*)

The entire state (except for the Cachar Hills district, which had been unaffected by the agitation) was declared a disturbed area for two months on April 5 under the Assam Disturbed Areas Act of 1955 and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958. (These acts were passed during the rebellion in Nagaland, which was then part of Assam.) Under the order the armed forces were empowered to assist the civil authorities against any threat to public order and if necessary to use their weapons; assemblies of more than four people and the carrying of arms were forbidden; arrests and searches might be made without a warrant; and no legal proceedings might be instituted against anyone exercising these powers without the Government's prior approval. President Reddy promulgated an ordinance on April 6 empowering the Governor to forbid strikes in essential public services. Mr Singh issued an order on the same day forbidding the transfer of land to persons not possessing Indian citizenship, and another on April 7 banning strikes in public services, railways, airways, oil refineries, banks and the armed forces and in movement of essential commodities.

After a private citizen had filed a petition contending that the order declaring Assam a disturbed area was unconstitutional, on the ground that it contravened provisions for civil rights and equality before the law, an Assam High Court judge on April 7 issued an interim 10-day stay on the order. The Supreme Court on April 16 refused to interfere in the stay, and advised the Government to challenge it before the High Court.

In defiance of the Government's order, mass civil disobedience began on April 6. Picketing of oil installations was intensified, and work in almost all government offices, banks and private businesses was paralysed by a strike on April 10. Thousands of people were arrested, but most of them were released within a few hours. Mrs Gandhi visited Gauhati on April 12 and attempted to persuade the student leaders to accept 1971 as the base year for deportation, but without success.

Troops and police attempted on April 19 to seize control of the oil pipeline headquarters at Narengi, but were forced to withdraw by thousands of demonstrators in spite of tear gas and baton charges in which about 100 people were injured. On the following day, however, troops and Central Reserve Police, who had replaced the local police, arrested nearly 3,000 pickets and succeeded in securing control of the pipeline headquarters. An indefinite curfew was imposed on Gauhati and many of the student leaders were arrested, while others went underground. A mass march on Narengi was turned back on April 21 by police using tear gas, but the attempt to reactivate the pipeline was frustrated by a strike of oil workers.

A five-day campaign of picketing of government offices, banks and other public institutions began on April 22, in defiance of a ban on demonstrations, and was assisted by an

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order issued by the Assam High Court that curfew passes should be issued to enable people to shop. Officials from Delhi took control of Gauhati radio station on April 24, after the Assamese-speaking staff had been accused of broadcasting biased news and commentaries in support of the agitation. The oil workers' strike had meanwhile created a severe shortage in the state; no petrol was available to private motorists, and electricity generating plants were unable to operate. Oil refinery workers ended their strike on April 30, but stated that they would not allow crude oil to leave the state.

The agitation was opposed by the All-Assam Tribal Youth League, representing the tribal peoples living in the plains of the Brahmaputra valley, a delegation from which presented a memorandum to Mrs Gandhi on April 4 asking for an amendment to the Constitution to extend to the plains tribes the safeguards already guaranteed to the tribes of the hill areas. The memorandum pointed out that although according to the 1971 census tribals constituted nearly 11 per cent of Assam's population, only one of the state's 14 seats in the *Lok Sabha* was reserved for the Scheduled Tribes, and asked for the eviction of unauthorized occupants from tribal land and the distribution of such land among landless tribals. Spokesmen for the League criticized "Assamese chauvinism", and described the agitation as aimed at perpetuating the domination of high-caste Assamese over the tribes, the original inhabitants of the state, on whom the Assamese language and culture had been imposed. [For earlier agitation among the plains tribes see page 23056. For 1971 census see 24608 B; 25468 B.]

Manipur - Terrorist Activities - Riots in Imphal

Acts of terrorism continued in Imphal, the capital of Manipur, during the first four months of 1980. Two people were killed on Jan. 8 in an attack on the home of a former minister in the state Government; two Assam Rifles personnel were shot dead on Feb. 29 and a civilian, believed to be a terrorist, killed in the ensuing exchange of fire; and a policeman was shot dead on March 26. Two policemen and two civilians were killed in an ambush about 20 miles from Imphal on April 15.

Two secessionist organizations were active in Manipur, the People's Liberation Army, a Maoist organization led by Mr Biseswar Singh, and the People's Revolutionary Army of Kungleipak. They drew their support from the Meteis, the tribal people of the plains who represent 60 per cent of the population of the state. Although the Meteis had been Hindus in religion since the 18th century, unlike the other tribal peoples of the north-east, who were mostly animists or Christians, *The Statesman* reported that many of them were destroying temples and images and rejecting Hinduism as "a faith that is unfortunately identified with New Delhi's cultural domination".

Mr Tulachandra Singh, one of the leaders of the People's Revolutionary Army, was captured in February, and subsequently issued a statement calling for suspension of insurgent operations pending negotiations with the state Government. A meeting of representatives of all the political parties in the state convened by the Chief Minister, Mr Dorendra Singh, issued on April 1 an appeal to the insurgents to abjure violence and to return to normal life.

Student organizations launched an agitation in April demanding the expulsion not only of Bangladeshis and Nepalese (the latter being mainly descendants of Gurkhas who were settled in the state after serving in the Indian Army), but also of Bengalis from West Bengal and Mizos. The agitation was widely believed to have been organized by the People's Liberation Army, although such suggestions were denied by Mr Dorendra Singh.

Demonstrators who attempted to disrupt high school leaving certificate examinations on April 17 set fire to two school buildings in Imphal, a student being killed when the police opened fire. As the rioting continued on the following day troops were called in to assist the police, and another person was killed in an exchange of fire. Although the state Government postponed the examinations on April 20, a three-day strike in Imphal called by student leaders led to battles between demonstrators and police on the following day; the town was cut off after a bridge was blown up, and police fired several times to disperse militants who were erecting roadblocks. After a woman was accidentally shot by the police in a clash on April 27, rioters attacked and set fire to the homes and shops of non-Manipuris on the following day, troops being called in and a 48-hour curfew imposed. Rioting continued on April 29, however, and over 3,000 members of minority communities had to be evacuated from their homes.

Mizoram - Withdrawal of Charges against Mr Laldenga - Continuation of Terrorist Activities

Mrs Gandhi on Jan. 31 ordered the withdrawal of charges of sedition and conspiracy against Mr Laldenga, the president of the Mizo National Front, who had been under house arrest in New Delhi since July 1979 [see page 29979]. Terrorist activities by the MNF were nevertheless intensified in the following weeks, six people being killed in an ambush on Feb. 27 and four others when a Border Roads Organization camp was attacked on March 20. Mr Makwana (Minister of State for Home Affairs) told the *Lok Sabha* on March 28 that since January violence in Mizoram had resulted in 18 deaths, and that posters had recently appeared demanding that non-Mizos should leave the territory.

Tripura - Terrorist Activities

Sporadic acts of violence attributed to the *Tripur Sena* [see page 30256] were reported from Tripura, including a two-hour exchange of fire between guerrillas and police on Feb. 25. The unrest among the tribal population was attributed to their resentment of Bengali immigration, which had reduced them to a minority in their own territory, and of the *Amra Bangali*'s opposition to the Left Front Government's attempts to protect the tribals' interests [see page 29980].

Resignation of Nagaland Government - Ministry formed by Mr Jamir

The ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) lost its majority in the Nagaland Assembly early in April, following the formation of an alliance called the United Legislature Party by the three opposition parties—the United Democratic Front (Progressive), led by Mr S. C. Jamir, the Congress (I), led by Mr T. A. Ngullie, and the Naga National Party (NNP), a new party formed on March 31 and led by Mr Hokishe Sema, Chief Minister in 1969-74. Mr Jamir, then the Deputy Chief Minister, had resigned on Oct. 5, 1979, after allegations of misuse of public funds had been made against him, and had subsequently formed the United Democratic Front (Progressive) with the support of defectors from the UDF.

After the opposition had claimed that defections had reduced the strength of the UDF group to 28, including the Speaker, in a House of 59 members (one seat being vacant), the Governor, Mr L. P. Singh, on April 13 summoned the Assembly to meet on April 18, to test whether the Government still had a majority The Chief Minister, Mr Vizol, resigned on April 18, however, without seeking a vote of confidence. Mr Jamir formed a three-member Government later the same day, the other two ministers being Mr Ngullie and Dr Setu Leigise, of the NNP. The Ministry was on April 28 expanded to a total strength of 11 members, but on May 1 the NNP and the UDF merged to form the Naga National Democratic Party, and four ex-NNP ministers subsequently resigned from the Government which was reduced to a minority position in the Assembly.—(The Hindu, Madras - The Statesman, Calcutta - Indian and Foreign Review - India Weekly - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30253 A; 1977 Elections 28429 A*)

A. CHINA — Representation of People's Republic in IMF and World Bank Group

It was announced (i) on April 17 that the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had decided that the Government of the People's Republic of China represented China in the Fund and (ii) on May 15 that a similar decision had been made by the Executive Directors of the World Bank in respect of China's representation in the World Bank Group, consisting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation. China had hitherto been represented in these bodies by the Republic of China (Taiwan).—(IMF, Washington - World Bank) (*Prev. rep. Chinese Representation in United Nations and Other UN Bodies 24941 A, 24988 A, 25079 A, 25264 B, 28716 A; US-Chinese Relations 29533 A*)

A. SWEDEN — Referendum on Nuclear Issue - Conditional "Yes" to Nuclear Energy Option - Serious Industrial Relations Crisis - Related Economic Developments

In a national referendum held on March 23, 1980, two proposals advocating a limited expansion of nuclear energy capacity and the continued use of nuclear power over a defined period were supported by 58 per cent of those voting, while 38.6 per cent backed a proposal for the phasing-out of existing nuclear power stations over the next decade. Although the referendum was not constitutionally binding, all the Swedish political parties had previously agreed to abide by its outcome in order to settle an issue which had been a major cause of political instability since the mid-1970s.

Plans drawn up by the then Social Democratic Government for a major expansion of nuclear generating capacity had been approved by the *Riksdag* (Parliament) in May 1975, but in September 1976 the Social Democrats had been defeated in a general election in which the nuclear issue had featured prominently [see 28056 B]. Under the succeeding centre-right coalition serious differences over nuclear policy had developed between the three participating parties, culminating in the resignation of the Government in October 1978 after the pro-nuclear Moderate (Conservative) and Liberal parties had opposed a demand by the anti-nuclear Centre Party for a referendum on the nuclear issue [see 29365 A].

Thereupon a minority Liberal Cabinet was formed which in March 1979 published an Energy Bill envisaging that Sweden would have a maximum of 12 nuclear power stations (including six already operational)—i.e. one less than originally proposed under the Social Democratic plan—and also providing for major new energy conservation measures to reduce Sweden's dependence on imported oil. Although the Liberal proposals were expected to have an easy parliamentary passage on the strength of Social Democratic and Moderate support, the serious accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in the United States in late March 1979 [see 30287 A] gave rise to renewed public concern over the safety of nuclear installations and in particular caused the Social Democrats to come out on April 4 in favour of a referendum to establish a definitive national view on the nuclear question.

Having been accepted by the Liberal Government, the referendum proposal was on June 6, 1979, approved by the *Riksdag*, which at the same time also adopted the non-nuclear clauses of the Energy Bill, the nuclear proposals being withheld from consideration pending the referendum verdict. Accordingly, the nuclear issue did not play a major part in the campaign for the general elections held in September 1979, which resulted in the reconstitution of the three-party centre-right coalition [see 30013 A].

Notwithstanding the considerable strength of anti-nuclear opinion in Sweden, the country's six existing operational nuclear power stations already made Sweden by far the world's largest per capita producer of electricity from nuclear plants. As shown in the accompanying diagram, Swedish per capita capacity in 1979 was nearly three times greater than that of the United States and more than four times greater than French or West German capacity.

The three alternatives put to the electorate in the referendum (as finally agreed on Dec. 17, 1979, after lengthy inter-party negotiations) each proposed the eventual phasing out of nuclear power generation in Sweden; however, whereas Alternative 3 backed by the Centre Party and the Communist Left specified that this should be done over the next 10 years and that no further reactors should be activated, Alternatives 1 and 2 supported respectively by the Moderates and by the Social Democrats and Liberals jointly proposed the use of a maximum of 12 reactors for their safe working life (estimated at 20-25 years).

Alternative 1, under the slogan "Energy for Sweden", provided for nuclear power to be phased out at a pace which would permit sufficient electrical power to be produced to safeguard employment and welfare. Pending the availability of renewable sources of energy, Sweden's dependence on oil would be reduced through the use of a maximum of 12 reactors, the eventual closure of which would be in an order determined by safety factors.

Alternative 2, using the slogan "Phase-out, but sensibly", incorporated the same text as Alternative 1 but carried the rider that the specified goals should be attained by means of vigorous energy conservation, restrictions on the use of electricity for heating in new housing, and an intensification of state-sponsored research and development into renewable energy sources; that production of electricity in oil- or coal-fired condensing plants should be avoided and greater stress given to environmental and safety aspects at nuclear plants; and that society should bear the main responsibility for the production and distribution of electrical power, with nuclear power plants and other future major electricity-producing plants being publicly-owned.

Alternative 3, which carried the slogan "Atomic power?—No thanks", envisaged the phasing out of all nuclear power within a maximum of 10 years and the implementation of a conservation plan for reduced dependence on oil on the basis of continued and intensified energy saving and promotion of renewable energy sources. Further expansion of nuclear power would be immediately discontinued and mining of uranium in Sweden prohibited; reactors which had already been activated would be permitted to operate only under stricter safety requirements and the remainder not taken into use; and reactors in operation would immediately be closed down if current or forthcoming safety analyses so required. Work against nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons would be intensified; no reprocessing of nuclear fuel would be allowed and the export of nuclear technology would cease. Employment would be increased through alternative energy production, greater use of domestic raw materials and more efficient energy conservation in industry.

Installed Nuclear Capacity Per Head, 1979



(*Economist*)

Participation in the referendum amounted to 74.3 per cent of the registered electorate, considerably less than the 90 per cent level recorded in recent general elections. The full result was as follows:

	Votes	Percentage
Alternative 1	880,464	18.7
Alternative 2	1,848,367	39.3
Alternative 3	1,815,083	38.6
Blank votes	153,492	3.3

Following the declaration of the referendum result, the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr Thorbjörn Fälldin (Centre Party), said on March 24 that his Government accepted the electorate's decision. At the same time he pledged that he would make every effort to promote alternative energy sources with the long-term aim of making nuclear power obsolete and unnecessary.

For the opposition Social Democrats, Mr Olof Palme (the party chairman and former Prime Minister), said (also on March 24) that the future orientation of the country's energy policy had been clearly established by the people and that it was now the responsibility of the Government and Parliament to act accordingly. Stressing that he was basically in agreement with the opponents of nuclear power and that the differences between the sides related only to the time-scale for the phasing out of nuclear power, Mr Palme added that it now was time "to start working on alternative energy forms" and also to give more attention to the economic, industrial and environmental problems confronting the country.

On March 27 the Government authorized the fuelling and activation of the country's seventh and eighth nuclear reactors (Ringhals III and Forsmark I, each with a capacity of about 900 megawatts)—this decision having been postponed in September 1978 shortly before the collapse of the previous three-party coalition [see 29365 A]. Moreover, on April 10 authorization was also given for the fuelling of the ninth and 10th reactors—Ringhals IV and Forsmark II (likewise with a capacity of 900 megawatts each). (For details of the location of Sweden's four nuclear reactor sites, see page 28057.)

In early May the Government presented a further Energy Bill to the *Riksdag* containing various measures relating principally to the use of 12 nuclear reactors as decided in the referendum. The Bill specified that steps to improve the safety of nuclear power stations should be implemented by 1985, including the formation of special safety committees at each plant and a reorganization of the Nuclear Power Inspectorate. It also set out guidelines for the development of new energy sources to meet the country's requirements after the eventual phasing out of nuclear power generation.

Country paralyzed by Strikes and Lock-outs - Economic Background - Settlement of Dispute

The most serious labour conflict in Sweden's history occurred in the first half of May 1980, when some 900,000 public and private sector workers (one in four of the labour force) went on strike or were locked out and the country was in consequence brought to a state of paralysis. The dispute developed after an 11.3 per cent pay demand by the trade union federation (LO) had been rejected by the employers' federation (SAF), which offered 2.3 per cent as proposed by a government-appointed mediator.

The SAF had initially maintained that there could be no real increase in wages in 1980 and had been supported in this view by the Government, which on March 27 announced a six-week price freeze and at the same time outlined a package of other measures (including tax concessions and food subsidies) which it would take if a labour market agreement could be reached on "largely unchanged terms". The unions in both the private and the public sectors responded by introducing a ban on overtime, while the SAF gave notice of a lock-out unless a settlement was reached. A compromise formula presented on April 29 by a mediator appointed by the Government (for a 2.3 per cent increase in 1980) was accepted by the SAF but rejected by the LO. Accordingly, on May 2 some 100,000 trade unionists went on strike and a further 750,000 were locked out by their employers; in addition, some 25,000 public sector workers, many in key areas such as public transport and communications, were also involved in strikes and lock-outs.

Labour market tensions over wages were exacerbated by certain underlying negative trends within the Swedish economy, which in the course of 1979 entered a new phase of serious difficulties after showing signs of recovery the previous year [see page 29366]. Although the level of unemployment had fallen to under 2 per cent of the registered labour force by the second half of 1979 (compared with nearly 3 per cent in mid-1978) and although the gross national product (GNP) increased by 3.8 per cent in 1979 (against under 1 per cent in 1978), the inflation rate rose sharply in late 1979, consumer prices increasing by 8 per cent in the six months to April 1980 compared with an average 7 per cent increase during 1979 as a whole and a rise of nearly 10 per cent between December 1978 and December 1979. Moreover, in a sharp deterioration of the country's external and internal positions (i) the current account balance-of-payments deficit rose to 11,000 million kroner in 1979 and was expected to increase to Kr 17,000 million ($3,900 million) in 1980, (ii) the foreign trade balance registered a deficit of Kr 4,600 million in 1979 (mainly due to higher oil prices) compared with a surplus of Kr 5,100 million in 1978 and (iii) the budget deficit rose to Kr 45,000 million in 1979 and was expected to increase to nearly Kr 58,000 million in 1980 (or 11 per cent of GNP).

The industrial crisis was eventually resolved on May 11 when the SAF was prevailed upon by the Government to accept a new compromise formula submitted by the mediator on May 9 for a 6.8 per cent increase in the private sector and for a 7.3 per cent increase in the public sector. This proposal was accepted by unions and employers in the public sector on May 11 and also by the LO on behalf of private sector workers, but was initially rejected by the SAF as inflationary and likely to cause unemployment and reduce competitiveness. However, after an emergency meeting of the Cabinet during the evening of May 11 had appealed for acceptance of the formula "in the interests of industrial peace", the SAF indicated its agreement, with the result that the strikes and lock-outs were called off from May 12.—(Royal Swedish Embassy, London - Swedish-International Press Bureau, Stockholm - Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Economist - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. 1979 Elections and Cabinet 30013 A; Nuclear and Economic Policy 29365 A*)

A. ROMANIA — General Elections - 12th Congress of Communist Party - Election of Party Officials - Opposition to Re-election of Mr Ceausescu as Party General Secretary - Cabinet Changes - Session of Grand National Assembly - Further Government Changes - Re-election of President Ceausescu - Appointment of State Council

Elections were held on March 9, 1980, for 369 seats in the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) and for 61,772 members of the people's councils, for terms of office lasting five and two and a half years respectively. Many of the constituencies for both the Assembly and people's councils elections put forward two or three candidates, all of whom had been nominated by the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front (SDUF, embracing the Communist Party and the various mass organizations). [For previous elections in 1975, see 27072 A.]

Out of a registered electorate of 15,631,351 a total of 15,629,098 (99.99 per cent) cast their votes. Of the latter 15,398,443 (98.52 per cent) voted in favour of the SDUF candidates; 230,611 (1.48 per cent) voted against; and 44 votes were declared invalid. Only 61,760 deputies were returned to the people's councils, new elections being ordered for 12 constituencies where none of the nominees had succeeded in gaining half plus one of the votes.

Of the 369 deputies in the new Assembly 192 were women, while the ethnic minority groups in Romania (mainly Hungarians and Germans) were represented by 47 deputies.

The Executive Political Committee of the Communist Party's Central Committee, meeting on March 11 under the chairmanship of President Nicolae Ceausescu (who was on March 9 unanimously re-elected as one of Bucharest's deputies of the Assembly), said that the election results expressed the Romanian people's "full support" for the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist Party and state and for the "decisions of the 12th congress of the Romanian Communist Party" [see below] which formed the basis of the electoral programme of the SDUF.

12th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party

The 12th congress of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was held in Bucharest on Nov. 19-23, 1979, and was attended by 2,656 delegates representing some 2,900,000 party members, and by 148 guests from 98 countries [see 26887 A for 11th RCP congress in 1974]. Among the countries represented was China, which sent a delegation headed by Gen. Ulanhu (a member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party) after having for the past 13 years sent only messages to gatherings of foreign Communist parties.

It was also noted that none of the East European countries was represented by its most senior party officials—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for example sending a delegation headed by its oldest Politburo member, Mr Arvid Pelshe (80).

On the first day of the congress's proceedings President Ceausescu, the General Secretary of the RCP, read a lengthy report by the Central Committee, some half of which dealt with the country's past and future economic performance and urged Romanians to achieve greater efficiency in all sectors of the economy and to accept further austerity measures, in particular with regard to energy conservation. On the subject of foreign policy the report underlined Romania's determination to play an active role in furthering détente and reducing the arms race and, while continuing to co-operate with the Eastern bloc countries, to determine its policies independently of the Soviet Union.

Dealing first with Romania's economic situation, Mr Ceausescu outlined the "remarkable results" achieved in fulfilling the current five-year plan (1976-80—see page 27786) and mentioned in particular the successful development of industrial production. Such achievements, Mr Ceausescu emphasized, were all the more significant in view of a drought lasting several years and an earthquake disaster in March 1977 which caused damage estimated at over $2,000 million [see 28298 A].

Mr Ceausescu nevertheless warned Romanians not to become "complacent" and not to forget the "shortcomings, difficulties and various mistakes which arose" during the past five years and which "caused results to fall short of our efforts and economic potential". He pointed out that "sufficient attention" was not being "devoted everywhere to the problems of economic efficiency and to reducing material and fuel consumption, while material-technical supply is still plagued by lack of co-ordination and failings", and agricultural production was also deficient in some areas. [Romania's poor economic performance had led to numerous cabinet changes since late 1977, while the depletion of Romania's oil reserves gave rise to increased petrol and fuel prices in 1979 and to restrictions on Romanian motorists and on the purchase of petrol in Romania by foreigners—see 29845 A and also 29702 A.]

Turning to the coming five-year plan (1981-85), Mr Ceausescu said that its implementation was dependent on greater exploitation of Romania's raw materials and domestic resources and on a reduction in imports. It was envisaged that in the five-year period there would be "proportionate and harmonious growth" in industry, agriculture and all other branches of the economy. Industrial production would grow at an average annual rate of 9-10 per cent, while overall agricultural production in the 1981-85 five-year plan period would be between 24½ and 27½ per cent higher than in the 1976-80 period.

With regard to energy, which was one of the most crucial issues facing the Romanian economy in view of the country's dwindling supplies of oil at home, Mr Ceausescu indicated that there would be a stringent economy programme with greater efforts to conserve fuel and to develop other sources of energy, including nuclear power, to make Romania self-sufficient within the next 10 years. [See below for creation of State Committee for Nuclear Energy.] While coal would continue to be a major source of power, oil and gas explorations were to be increased in the Black Sea where, Mr Ceausescu unexpectedly announced to the congress, there had recently been new finds of oil.

People's total incomes during the coming five-year plan were to be increased by 23-25 per cent; real average remuneration would go up by 16-18 per cent (20-25 per cent for agricultural workers), and the 1 : 5.5 ratio would be maintained between minimum and maximum remuneration in the economy. Mr Ceausescu promised that the output of consumer goods would rise by 60 per cent, and he also said that there would have to be a better correlation between the prices of basic products and finished goods on the basis of world market prices.

With regard to the party Mr Ceausescu stressed the importance of discipline and the implementation of the policies of the RCP and also pointed out shortcomings in party propaganda and in ideological, political and cultural activities, asking that standards be raised in this respect. Mr Ceausescu criticized the mass media as a whole, saying that while they had "carried out extensive activities", they "still fail to present the overall concrete reality" of aspects of Romanian life.

In the section of his report on foreign policy Mr Ceausescu said that Romania "bases its relations with all states firmly on the principles of full equality of rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty [and] non-interference in internal affairs". He said that Romania attached "great importance to strengthening . . . relations with the neighbouring socialist states" and mentioned the "particular importance we attach to our great neighbour, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union".

Mr Ceausescu added that Romania would "continue to act resolutely to develop co-operation with and to improve the activities of the CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or Comecon] on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual advantage, with a view to promoting the development of each national economy", while co-operation with other socialist countries would also be furthered. While emphasizing also that Romania would "consistently endeavour to fulfil its obligations" to the Warsaw Pact [see also 29529 A], Mr Ceausescu acknowledged the existence of "conflicts, contradictions and differences of opinion between various socialist countries" and called for "unity and solidarity among the socialist countries on the basis of the principles of scientific socialism, equality and mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs and mutually advantageous co-operation".

It was stated that co-operation with the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America had developed greatly in recent years and would continue to expand. At the same time Romania would further its relations with developed capitalist countries "regardless of social system", and in this connexion was developing "multilateral economic relations" with the European Community and had expanded its co-operation with the "non-aligned and neutral countries in Europe" (Romania having attended the 1979 Havana summit meeting of the non-aligned countries as a guest—see 30037 A) and also with the countries of North and Central America.

A major theme of the latter part of the report was the importance of disarmament and military disengagement and the imprudence of military expenditure which, Mr Ceausescu said, had persistently exceeded increases in national income in all parts of the world. In an effort to change this situation Romania had reduced its allocation for military spending in its budgets of 1979 and 1980, and Mr Ceausescu in his speech called on all nations to reduce their spending on arms by at least 10 per cent by 1985 and to use 50 per cent of the money saved to meet their own social needs and to use the other 50 per cent to support developing countries. (Earlier in 1979 Mr Ceausescu had, in an address to Romanian miners on Aug. 12, called for a 10-15 per cent reduction in military spending by all Comecon countries, having in Moscow the previous year refused to give Romanian approval to Soviet proposals for increased defence spending for the Warsaw Pact countries and for a unified command of the countries' national armies—see page 29847; 29529 A.)

Mr Ceausescu said that Romania, together with other socialist countries, "has advocated and is strongly advocating the simultaneous dismantling of . . . NATO and the Warsaw Treaty" and, while acknowledging that complete disarmament could not be a reality for some time to come, said that "even small-scale or symbolic measures for disarmament and reducing arms" were preferable to an arms race [see also 29529 A].

A major goal of Romania's foreign policy was to help bring about peace and security in Europe and in this respect Mr Ceausescu stressed the importance of the (1975) Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki [see 27301 A] but expressed his regrets that not enough had been done to "implement the documents adopted as a uniform whole". He said that it would be useful to organize a special conference on disarmament in Europe and welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw troops and equipment from East Germany [see page 30161].

Mr Ceausescu expressed his firm belief that all conflicts should be resolved through negotiations alone and called for all socialist countries to further this goal; he also advocated greater mediation by the United Nations in international disputes, in particular in the Middle East with a view to "solving the issue of the Palestinian people on the basis of their right to self-determination". The report said that Romania welcomed the beginning of talks between the Soviet Union and China and called on China and Vietnam to settle their differences [see also page 29872] on the basis of "peaceful negotiations" and "respect for the independence of all states". [For Romanian refusal in mid-1979 to sign a joint declaration by Comecon countries and Laos attacking China's policy in South-East Asia, see page 29847.]

The congress on Nov. 23 (the final day of its proceedings) unanimously re-elected Mr Ceausescu as RCP General Secretary for a further five-year term of office [for previous re-election in 1974 see 26887 A].

Mr Ceausescu's re-election as party leader had been opposed by a veteran party member, Mr Constantin Pirvulescu, who stated from the central rostrum shortly before the election of party officials on Nov. 23 that he would not vote for the re-election of the General Secretary. Mr Pirvulescu accused Mr Ceausescu of being undemocratic and of putting his personal interests before those of the party, and claimed that the congress was "nothing but a gathering of people agitating for the re-election of Mr Ceausescu" and "had ignored the real problems of the country". He further demanded that the Central Committee rather than the congress participants should decide on the appointment of the General Secretary.

Members of the congress prevented Mr Pirvulescu from finishing his attack; Mr George Macovescu, chairman of the Romanian Writers' Union and a former Foreign Minister, accused Mr Pirvulescu of being a "traitor to the party" while Mr Ceausescu, alluding to Mr Pirvulescu's association with the Soviet Union, branded him an "intriguer" and an "agent provocateur" who had "long been separated from the party and people" and had been living abroad. Mr Ceausescu added that "whoever this alien element spoke for, it was certainly not Romania's Communists", and pointed out that it was the congress and not such "instigators" as Mr Pirvulescu who took decisions on behalf of the party.

Mr Pirvulescu was stripped of his mandate as a Bucharest city delegate and was expelled from the congress. Romanian officials later said that no further action would be taken against Mr Pirvulescu; it was later reported in early December that he had entered hospital on Nov. 30 after "suffering a heart attack" and had been placed under strict security in a private ward.

Mr Pirvulescu (84) had spent most of the Second World War period in the Soviet Union where he became a commissar in the Red Army. After returning to Romania he became a member of the Politburo of the party (then the Romanian Workers' Party) in 1954 but was expelled from the party in 1960 in view of allegations of his involvement in a plot against the then Romanian leader, Mr Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej. After Mr Ceausescu took over as party leader in 1965 following the death of Mr Georghiu-Dej [see 20673 B], Mr Pirvulescu was rehabilitated and held a number of party posts until his nominal retirement in 1969. He remained, however, a member of the party's Auditing Commission.

Shortly before the elections on the final day of the 12th RCP congress, Mr Pirvulesscu had stood up to request permission to address the congress, saying that he had applied earlier but had been refused; Mr Ceausescu then invited him to speak to the delegates from the central rostrum.

Following the ejection of Mr Pirvulescu from the congress the re-election of Mr Ceausescu as party General Secretary took place unopposed. The congress then elected a new Central Committee of 408 members, of whom 245 were full members and 163 were candidate members, and which gave greater representation to women. The Central Committee had previously comprised 361 members but had been expanded in view of the increased membership of the RCP to over 2,900,000. Among the new Central Committee members was Mr Nicu Ceausescu, the 27-year-old son of the party leader (thus bringing to eight the total number of the Ceausescu family in the Committee).

The Central Committee then elected an expanded Executive Political Committee, comprising 27 full members and 18 candidate members (against 26 full and 15 candidate members previously), seven of the new members being women. The Executive Political Committee was composed as follows.

Full Members: Mr Nicolae Ceausescu, Mr Iosif Banc, Mr Emil Bobu, Mr Cornel Burtica, Mr Virgil Cazacu, Mrs Elena Ceausescu, Mrs Lina Ciobanu, Col.-Gen. Ion Coman†, Mr Nicolae Constantin†, Mr Constantin Dascalescu, Mr Ion Dinca, Mr Janos Fazekas, Mr Ludovic Fazekas†, Mrs Cornelia Filipas*, Mrs Alexandrina Gainuse*, Mr Petre Lupu, Mr Paul Niculescu, Mr Gheorghe Oprea, Mr Gheorghe Pana, Mr Ion Patan, Mr Dumitru Popescu, Mr Gheorghe Radulescu, Mr Leonte Rautu, Mrs Aneta Spornic*, Mr Virgil Trofin, Mr Ilie Verdet, and Mr Stefan Voitec.

Candidate Members: Mr Stefan Andrei, Mr Petre Danica*, Mr Miu Dobrescu, Mr Gheorghe Dumitrache*, Mr Petre Enache*, Mrs Eva Feder*, Mrs Suzana Gadea*, Mr Mihai Gere, Mr Nicolae Giosan, Gen. Ion Ionita‡, Mr Stefan Mocuta, Mrs Ana Muresan*, Mrs Elena Nae*, Mr Marin Radoi*, Mr Ion Stoian*, Mr Iosif Szasz*, Mr Ioan Ursu, and Mr Richard Winter.

* New member. † Former candidate member.
‡ Former full member.

Of the new full members Col.-Gen. Ion Coman (Minister of Defence), Mr Constantin (Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Committee) and Mr Ludovic Fazekas (Minister of Timber and Building Materials) had, as indicated above, hitherto been candidate members, Mr Constantin having been allocated this post as recently as March 1979 [see 29707 B]. Mrs Spornic had recently been appointed Minister of Education [see 29849 B]. Those who relinquished their duties as full EPC members were Mr Manea Manescu, who had resigned as Prime Minister in May 1979 on grounds of ill health [see 29707 B]; Mr Emil Draganescu, Minister of Tourism and Sport; Gen. Ion Ionita, a Deputy Premier who was demoted to being a candidate member; Mr Gheorghe Cioara, Minister of Electric Power since January 1979 when he had been relieved of his more senior portfolios of Deputy Premier and Minister of Industrial Construction [see 29527 B]; and Mr Iosif Uglar, who was also on Nov. 23 relieved of his post as a secretary of the Central Committee [see below]. (Shortly after the conclusion of the congress Mr Uglar, who was of Hungarian origin and who was understood to have disagreed with President Ceausescu over the latter's ethnic policies, was reported to have also been dismissed from the post of Chairman of the Committee for People's Councils' Affairs—see below.)

Among the new candidate members was Mrs Suzana Gadea, Chairman of the Council for Socialist Culture and formerly Minister of Education [see 29849 B]. Of those who lost their positions as candidate members, Mr Theodor Coman had been Minister of the Interior from March 1975 until September 1978 [see 29288 B] (his dismissal from the latter post being widely attributed to the defection to the United States in August that year of Lt.-Gen. Pacepa—ibid.); Mr Ion Iliescu was Chairman of the National Council for Water Resources [see 29849 B]; and Mr Vasile Patilinet was Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Geology, but was replaced in this latter post in December [see below].

Also on Nov. 23 the new Central Committee appointed nine secretaries as follows: Mr Nicolae Ceausescu (General Secretary), Mr Iosif Banc, Mr Virgil Cazacu, Mr Constantin Dascalescu, Mr Ludovic Fazekas, Mr Dumitru Popa, Mr Dumitru Popescu, Mr Ilie Radulescu and Mr Marin Vasile. The only change in the composition of the Central Committee Secretariat was the appointment of Mr Fazekas in place of Mr Iosif Uglar, who was at the same time relieved of his membership of the Executive Political Committee [see above]. [Mr Popa was subsequently replaced by Col.-Gen. Ion Coman—see below.]

The appointment of a 73-member Auditing Commission under the renewed chairmanship of Mr Vasile Vilcu was also announced on Nov. 23, while the Central Committee further appointed Mr Petre Lupu as Chairman of the Party Collegium, the First Deputy Chairman and the Deputy Chairman being elected by the Executive Political Committee on Nov. 27 as, respectively, Mr Mihai Dalea (who on Nov. 23 lost his post as a candidate member of the EPC) and Mr Andrei Cervencovici.

The Executive Political Committee met on Nov. 27 and announced the election of a new Permanent Bureau, which had been expanded from 11 to 15 members as follows: Mr Nicolae Ceausescu, Mr Stefan Andrei, Mr Iosif Banc, Mr Emil Bobu*, Mr Cornel Burtica, Mr Virgil Cazacu*, Mrs Elena Ceausescu, Mr Nicolae Constantin*, Mr Constantin Dascalescu*, Mr Paul Niculescu, Mr Gheorghe Oprea, Mr Ion Patan, Mr Dumitru Popescu*, Mr Gheorghe Radulescu and Mr Ilie Verdet. (*New member.)

Mr Manea Manescu was the only member of the Permanent Bureau not to be re-elected, having on Nov. 23 also been excluded from membership of the Executive Political Committee [see above].

Three of the new members were also secretaries of the RCP Central Committee, these being Mr Cazacu (a Deputy Premier until January 1979—see 29527 B); Mr Dascalescu (who had become Chairman of the Council of Economic and Social Organization in March 1978—see 28964 A); and Mr Popescu. Of the other two newcomers, Mr Bobu had been Minister of Labour and Chairman of the Central Council of the General Trade Union Conference since January 1979 [see 29527 B] and a member of the Executive Political Committee since 1974 [see 26887 A], while Mr Constantin, a Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Committee, had on Nov. 23 been elected a full member of the Executive Political Committee, having become a candidate member in March [see above and 29707 B]. (Mr Niculescu had become a member of the Permanent Bureau on March 7, 1978, coincidentally with his appointment as Minister of Finance—see 28964 A.)

1979 Cabinet Changes

Less than a month before the opening of the 12th RCP congress a presidential decree had been issued on Oct. 24 under which a number of changes were made in the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), this being the fourth major cabinet reorganization since January 1979 [see 29527 B; 29707 B; 29849 B].

The new appointments were as follows: (i) Mr Traian Dudas was replaced as Minister of Transport and Communications by Mr Vasile Bulucea; (ii) Mr Constantin Statescu ceded the Justice portfolio to Dr Justin Grigoras, hitherto President of the Supreme Court—Dr Grigoras being succeeded in this latter post by Mr Ion Salajan; (iii) Mr Petre Preoteasa, the first party secretary of Craiova, was appointed Minister, Secretary of State, First-Vice Chairman of the State Planning Committee; and (iv) Mr Constantin Nita relinquished his duties as Minister, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation and was replaced by Mr Alexandru Margaritescu, hitherto Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and International Co-operation. All outgoing ministers were said to have been given other, unspecified, duties. In addition, Mr Gheorghe Bobocea was succeeded as Procurator-General by Mr Nicolae Popovici (hitherto Deputy Minister of Justice).

Subsequent to the above changes it was announced in late November that Mr Iosif Uglar had recently been replaced as Chairman of the Committee for People's Councils' Affairs by Mr Ludovic Fazekas, hitherto Minister of Timber and Building Materials, who had on Nov. 23 also replaced Mr Uglar as a secretary of the RCP Central Committee and had become a full member of the Executive Political Committee to which Mr Uglar had not been re-elected [see above].

Under a further presidential decree issued on Dec. 13, Mr Vasile Patilinet, who had on Nov. 23 lost his post as a candidate member of the Executive Political Committee, ceded his portfolio of Mines, Petroleum and Geology to Mr Virgil Trofin, a Deputy Premier [see 29389 B] and full member of the Executive Political Committee. It was thought that the demotion of Mr Patilinet was due to delays in the extraction of coal, which had contributed to Romania's energy crisis.

Session of New Grand National Assembly - Formation of New Government - Re-election of President Ceausescu - Appointment of Assembly and State Council Officials

The first session of the new Grand National Assembly, elected on March 9, 1980 [see above], was held on March 28-29 and on the second day of its proceedings unanimously re-elected Mr Ilie Verdet to the office of Prime Minister. Mr Verdet then announced the composition of a new Council of Ministers in which the number of First Deputy Prime Ministers was increased from one to three and a new State Committee for Nuclear Energy was formed and which was approved by the Assembly as follows:

Mr Ilie Verdet	Prime Minister
†Mrs Elena Ceausescu	First Deputy Prime Ministers
Mr Gheorghe Oprea	
†Mr Ion Dinca . .	
†Mr Janos Fazekas	Deputy Prime Ministers
* Mrs Cornelia Filipas	
Gen. Ion Ionita	
Mr Paul Niculescu	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Mr Cornel Burtica . .	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation

Mr Nicolae Constantin	Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of State Planning Committee
Mr Ion Patan	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Technico-Material Supply and Control of Fixed Assets Administration
Mr Virgil Trofin	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Geology
Mr Angelo Miculescu	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry
Mr Stefan Andrei	Foreign Affairs
* Maj.-Gen. Constantin Olteanu	Defence
Mr George Homostean	Interior
Mr Neculai Agachi	Metallurgical Industry
Mr Ioan Avram	Machine-Building Industry
* Mr Gheorghe Caranfil	Chemical Industry
Mr Gheorghe Cioara	Electric Power
* Mr Dumitru Popa	Industrial Construction
Mr Vasile Bulucea	Transport and Telecommunications
* Mr Ion Florea	Timber and Building Materials
Mrs Lina Ciobanu	Light Industry
* Mrs Ana Muresan	Internal Trade
Mr Emil Bobu	Labour
Mrs Aneta Spornic	Education and Instruction
Mr Emil Draganescu	Tourism and Sport
Mr Eugen Proca	Health
* Mr Ion Ceterchi	Justice
* Mr Pantelimon Gavanescu	Youth Affairs and First Secretary of Central Committee of the Union of Communist Youth
Mr Ioan Ursu	First Vice-Chairman of National Council for Science and Technology
Mrs Suzana Gadea	Chairman of Council for Socialist Culture and Education
Mr Ludovic Fazekas	Chairman of Committee for People's Councils' Affairs
Mr Gheorghe Gaston Marin	Chairman of State Committee for Prices
Mr Ion Iliescu	Chairman of National Council for Water Resources
* Mr Cornel Mihulecea	Chairman of State Committee for Nuclear Energy‡
Mr Richard Winter	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of Technico-Material Supply and Control of Fixed Assets Administration
Mr Aurel Duma	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr Tudor Postelnicu	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of the Interior and head of State Security Department
Mr Alexandru Margaritescu	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation and head of International Economic Co-operation Department
Mr Dumitru Bejan	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation
Mr Petre Preoteasa	Minister, Secretary of State and First Vice-Chairman of State Planning Committee
Mr Gheorghe Petrescu	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of Machine-Building Industry
Mr Ion Stanescu	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of Industrial Construction
Mr Maxim Berghianu	Minister, Secretary of State at Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry and head of Food Industry Department
†Mr Mihail Florescu	Minister, Secretary of State at National Council for Science and Technology
Mr Cornel Onescu	First Vice-Chairman of Committee for People's Councils' Affairs
Mr Mihai Marinescu	First Vice-Chairman of Council of Economic and Social Organization
Mr Marin Vasile	Chairman of National Union of Agricultural Production Co-operatives

* New member of Council of Ministers
† Changed or reduced responsibilities. ‡ New portfolio.

Mrs Ceausescu, a chemical engineer by profession, had long been considered the most influential political figure behind the President. She had been a full member of the RCP Executive Political Committee since 1973 [see page 26572] and a member of that body's Permanent Bureau since 1977 [see 28316 B] and also headed the RCP Central Committee's commission on cadres. In addition, she had in mid-1979 become Chairman of the National Council for Science and Technology, an office with ministerial rank although it was not included in the March 1980 cabinet list. The former holder of this post, Mr Ioan Ursu, became First Vice-Chairman of that body.

Mr Dinca, the other new First Deputy Prime Minister, had hitherto been both a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industrial Construction (and also a member of the State Council). His successor in the former post, **Mrs Filipas,** was a vice-president of Romanian Radio and Television and had at the 12th RCP congress held the previous November become a full member of the RCP Executive Political Committee [see above]. **Mr Popa,** who replaced Mr Dinca as Minister of Industrial Construction, had on March 26 relinquished his post as a secretary of the RCP Central Committee, to which he had been reappointed in November 1979 [see above].

Mr Janos Fazekas, who had hitherto been concurrently Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Trade, retained only the former position. The new Minister of Internal Trade, **Mrs Muresan,** had become a candidate member of the RCP Executive Political Committee the previous year [see above].

Maj.-Gen. Olteanu, the new Minister of Defence, had the previous year been appointed to the RCP Central Committee, becoming at the same time head of the party's commission on armed forces and security. The former Minister of Defence, Col.-Gen. Ion Coman, had on March 26 been appointed a secretary of the RCP Central Committee in succession to Mr Popa who entered the Council of Ministers.

Of the other new appointments **Mr Ceterchi,** who took over the Justice portfolio from Dr Justin Grigoras (himself appointed less than six months earlier—see above), had formerly been a member of the State Council. **Mr Florescu** had hitherto been Minister of Chemical Industry.

Mrs Ciobanu, who was reappointed Minister of Light Industry, had formerly also been Chairman of the National Council for Women but this office was not listed in the new Council of Ministers announced on March 29.

Prior to the appointment of the new Council of Ministers, the Assembly had at the beginning of its session on March 28 unanimously re-elected Mr Ceausescu as President of Romania for a further five-year term in office, his re-election having been proposed on March 26 by both the RCP Central Committee and the SDUF. In accordance with the Constitution the President was, on March 29, also reappointed President of the State Council.

Other appointments to the State Council on March 29 were five Vice-Presidents (against three previously) and 19 members (13 previously) as follows (* denoting new member):

Vice-Presidents: Mrs Maria Ciocan*, Mr Petre Enache*, Mr Iosif Kovacs, Mr Gheorghe Radulescu and Mr Stefan Voitec.

Members: Mr Ioan Anton, Mr Constantin Arsene*, Mrs Iona Bratu*, Mr Silviu Curticeanu*, Mrs Tamara Dobrin, Mr Eduard Eisenburger, Mrs Alexandrina Gainuse*, Mrs Virginia Gemescu*, Mrs Stefania Ionescu*, Mr Mihalache Margean*, Mr Gheorghe Mihoc*, Mr Vasile Milea*, Mr Ferdinand Nagy, Mr Marin Nedelcu*, Mr Gheorghe Pana, Mr Gheorghe Petrescu, Mr Ioan Popescu-Puturi, Mr Vasile Vilcu and Mrs Elena Vladuc*.

Also on March 29 the bureau of the Assembly was elected under the continued chairmanship of Mr Nicolae Giosan (a candidate member of the RCP Executive Political Committee), while among six secretaries appointed by the Assembly was Mr Nicu Ceausescu, the son of the President, who had in November 1979 been elected to the RCP Central Committee [see above]. (Le Monde - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Financial Times - Guardian - Times - Romanian News, Bucharest - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 11th Communist Party Congress 26887 A; Party and Cabinet Changes 29849 B; Economic Situation 29845 A, 29707 B; Energy Policy 29845 A*)

A. CZECHOSLOVAKIA — Re-election of Dr Husak as President of the Republic

Dr Gustáv Husák (67), the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, was on May 22, 1980, re-elected President of Czechoslovakia for a further five-year term.

Dr Husák, who had held the post of President since taking over from Gen. Ludvik Svoboda in 1975 [see 27213 B], was unanimously elected by a joint session of the two houses of the Federal Assembly, and was sworn into office later the same day.—(Guardian - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. 27213 B*)

A. ECUADOR — Cabinet Changes - Publication of Five-year Plan - Diplomatic Relations with China and Albania

President Jaime Roldós Aguilera on Dec. 9, 1979, announced the composition of a reorganized Cabinet following the resignation of the previous Cabinet on Nov. 29. Just before the reorganization a new Defence Minister had been named after the incumbent, Gen. Rafael Rodríguez Palacios, had been killed in an air crash on Nov. 19.

In further changes in early 1980, (i) a new Interior Minister was appointed following the resignation of Sr Roberto Dunn Barreiro on Feb. 6 after student demonstrations against price increases had resulted in two youths being shot dead by police, and (ii) the Secretary-General of Public Information, Sr Fausto Molina, was killed in a car crash on March 23, no replacement being announced.

The membership of the Cabinet incorporating these changes was as follows:

Sr Carlos Feraud Blum	Interior
*Sr Alfredo Pareja Diezcanseco	Foreign Affairs
*Sr Fernando Aspiazu Seminario	Finance
Sr Germánico Salgado	Industry, Trade and Integration
Sr Antonio Andrade Fajardo	Agriculture
Sr José Corsino Cárdenas	Natural Resources and Energy
Sr Francisco J. Salgado	Labour
*Sr Galo García Feraud	Education and Sport
Gen. Marco Subía Martínez	Defence
*Sr Francisco Saa Chacón	Public Works and Communications
Sr Humberto Guillén Murillo	Health
Sr Mauricio Dávalos	Central Bank President
Sra Inés Arrata de Sorroza	Social Welfare
*Sr Alejandro Román	Secretary-General of the Administration

* No change.

The December cabinet changes were carried out in an effort to strengthen the position of President Roldós, who faced a challenge within his own party, the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) led by Sr Assad Bucaram, president of the CFP and of Congress [see also 29916 A]; the faction had formed an alliance in Congress with, notably, the Conservative Party, enabling Sr Bucaram to secure the passage of a series of controversial bills, many of which were, however, vetoed by President Roldós.

Among bills vetoed were (i) an amended electoral law which would have excluded from office anyone who left the party on whose list they had been elected and (ii) a proposal to make cabinet ministers liable to dismissal by a simple majority of Congress. A bill to revalue the sucre was withdrawn in August 1979 after the Finance Minister and the Central Bank president had expressed opposition to it. In a broadcast on Sept. 10 Sr Román, the Secretary-General of the Administration, accused "clearly identifiable sectors" in Congress of demagogy, intrigue and "subversion against the executive"—this broadcast giving rise to a call by some members of Congress for the removal of Sr Román.

In October 1979 four deputies were expelled from the CFP, reducing its representation in Congress from 29 to 25 seats. With this and an earlier redistribution of seats in August 1979 [see 29916 A], 65 of the 69 seats in Congress were occupied as follows: CFP 25, Democratic Left (ID) 12, Conservative Party (PC) 9, Popular Democracy-Christian Democratic Union (DP-UDC) 5, Radical Liberal Party (PLR) 4, Democratic Institutional Coalition (CID) 3, Social Christian Party (PSC) 2, Revolutionary Nationalist Party (PNR) 2, National Velasquista Party (PNV) 1, Democratic Popular Movement (MPD) 1, Popular Democratic Union (UDP) 1.

The DP-UDC, which had affiliated to the CFP for electoral purposes [see 29330 A], formally broke with the party on Oct. 2, 1979.

The Democratic Left was offered two seats in the December cabinet reorganization but refused them, undertaking instead to give support to President Roldós in Congress.

The Government in January 1980 published a five-year development plan drawn up by the National Development Council (Conade) chaired by the Vice-President of Ecuador, Sr Oswaldo Hurtado (DP-UDC). The broad aims of the plan were economic development (with a 6.5 per cent annual growth rate being predicted), the consolidation of democracy, social justice, a more just distribution of income, agrarian reform, and investments in health, education, housing and literacy programmes.

The Government invited comments on the plan from all sectors of the population including the political parties, the trade unions and the press and a number of suggestions were incorporated into it before its promulgation by President Roldós on March 8, 1980.

Ecuador and China established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with effect from Jan. 2, 1980. Relations were established with Albania in February.—(Latin America Political Report - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Bank of London and South America Review - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. 29916 A, 29729 A*)

B. DENMARK — Death of Cultural Affairs Minister - Consequent Ministerial Appointments

The Danish Prime Minister, Mr Anker Joergensen, announced the following changes in his minority Social Democratic Cabinet on Feb. 28 arising from the death in London on Feb. 16 of the Minister of Cultural Affairs, Mr Niels Matthiasen (55): (i) Mrs Lise Oestergaard was allocated the Cultural Affairs portfolio in addition to her existing responsibilities for development aid and Nordic affairs; and (ii) Mr Erik Holst (57) was appointed Minister of the Environment, responsibility for which had been held since the formation of the Government in October 1979 by Mr Ivar Noergaard, the Economy Minister.—(Royal Danish Embassy, London - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. 30029 A*)

Corrigenda and Addenda. Regarding the report on the Danish elections to the European Parliament of June 1979 published on page 29894 (i) the 2 per cent of the vote accredited to "Others" in the results table were in fact blank or invalid votes, and (ii) the 512 Greenland votes accredited to "others" were invalid votes. Furthermore, Mr Joergen Boegh, who was elected for the People's Movement Against the Common Market and who is identified on page 29894 as a Social Democrat, was in fact expelled from the Social Democratic Party together with other party members who stood on the People's Movement list.

In the report on the October 1979 Danish general elections and related developments published on pages 30029-30 (i) it is erroneously stated that the two members elected from Greenland joined respectively the Social Democratic and Socialist People's Party (SPP) groups in the Danish Parliament—the correct position being that one Greenland member re-elected on the *Atassut* list continued to co-operate with the Social Democrats in Parliament but not as a member of the party group and that the other member, who was newly elected on the *Siumut* list, followed his two predecessors in associating himself with the SPP but did not join that party's group; (ii) it is incorrectly stated that Mr Jens Risgaard Knudsen (Minister of Public Works) was appointed to ministerial office for the first time—Mr Knudsen having been Minister of Fisheries from October 1964 to early 1968 in two successive minority Social Democratic Cabinets; and (iii) it is incorrectly stated on page 30030 that the fifth government bill suspending the sale of previously rented flats constructed before June 1, 1966, was effective until Jan. 1, 1980—whereas in fact it was not subject to any time limit.

Moreover, contrary to what is implied on page 30029, the Schleswig Party (SP) did not cease to be represented in the *Folketing* in 1964 because of the introduction of the "2 per cent minimum clause", since the latter clause did not apply to the special position of the SP in southern Jutland (i.e. northern Schleswig). Having been represented in the *Folketing* from 1920 to 1943 the SP did not contest the 1943 or 1945 elections; after unsuccessfully trying to win representation in 1947, 1950 and April 1953, it returned to Parliament in September 1953 (with one seat) on the basis of the *kredsmandat* (district mandate) system whereby seats were available to parties which won a certain proportion of the vote in particular areas. Having in 1960 only narrowly retained its seat (with 8.2 per cent of the vote in southern Jutland), the SP saw its vote fall below the required level in 1964 (when it obtained 7.7 per cent). Thereafter the Schleswig Party was unrepresented until the 1973 elections, when it regained one seat in the *Folketing* in an electoral alliance with the Centre Democrats (which was not continued for the 1979 elections—see page 30029).

C. UNITED KINGDOM — Upgrading of Ministerial Responsibility for Civil Defence

It was announced on May 19 that ministerial responsibilities for civil defence had been transferred from Lord Belstead (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office) to Mr Leon Brittan, a Home Office Minister of State. The change was understood to reflect the increasing importance attached by the Government to the state of civil defence preparedness. (Daily Telegraph) (*Prev. rep. 30042 A*)

University of North Carolina

A. ITALY — Resignation of Government - Reappointment of Signor Cossiga as Prime Minister - Formation of Three-Party Cabinet - Other Internal and Economic Developments - Appointment of New Life Senator

Signor Francesco Cossiga, the Christian Democratic (DC) Prime Minister, submitted the resignation of his minority Government of Christian Democrats, Liberals (PLI) and Social Democrats (PSDI) on March 19, 1980, after the Socialist Party (PSI) confirmed on Feb. 28 that its 62 deputies would withdraw their tacit parliamentary support, on the basis of which the Government had been in office since August 1979 [see 29909 A]. The PSI had first announced its intention to withdraw support on Jan. 18 and had called on the Government to resign and make way for an "emergency" coalition including the Communist Party (PCI), but the party had postponed putting its decision into effect until the DC national council had on March 6 ratified the position adopted at the 14th DC national congress (held on Feb. 15-21) that no direct PCI participation in government would be accepted.

At the DC congress a resolution was approved, by almost 60 per cent of those present, ruling out an accommodation with the Communist Party in forming the next government. This marked a defeat for the reformist wing of the party led by the outgoing secretary, Signor Benigno Zaccagnini (and also including Signor Cossiga and the former Prime Minister, Signor Giulio Andreotti), who stated in a report to the congress that he was not opposed in principle to PCI participation in government but that a series of political contradictions (such as differences over aspects of foreign policy) prevented such participation at present. Signor Zaccagnini advocated a joint examination of existing problems by all parties, including the Communist Party, before any decision was made on the degree of Communist participation which could be envisaged.

Signor Cossiga tabled a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies for March 19 after PCI deputies had threatened to table a motion of no confidence in the Government. However, during the debate preceding the vote on March 19 it became clear that the Government would not be able to muster a majority, after both the PSI and the Republican Party (PRI) undertook to join the PCI in active opposition. Accordingly, the Prime Minister decided to submit the Government's resignation without a vote.

The Cossiga Government was formed in August 1979 on the basis of a PSI agreement to support it by abstention in Parliament, as a transitional measure only, in order to put an end to a lengthy government crisis which premature general elections in June 1979 had failed to resolve [see 29685 A; 29765 A]. Its consequent precarious parliamentary position, which was exacerbated by divisions within the DC itself, meant that Signor Cossiga resorted with increasing frequency to legislating by decree, giving rise to criticism that Parliament was being deprived of its right to initiate legislation. Furthermore, the months during which the Government held office were marked by a deteriorating economic and internal security situation, with the annual rate of inflation reaching 19.8 per cent by the end of 1979, the lira coming under increasing pressure, and sustained terrorist attacks resulting in numerous deaths by the end of the year and in early 1980 [see below].

Towards the end of 1979 the Government faced opposition from the trade unions (i) over its expressed intention to modify the wage indexation system (*scala mobile*), regarded by the Government as highly inflationary, by removing energy products from the list used to calculate increases and (ii) over its refusal to meet at this stage certain demands made by the unions for increased fiscal and social benefits. Brief general strikes (respectively of several hours and one day) were held on Nov. 21 and Jan. 15, while stoppages took place in the meantime in many individual sectors.

President Pertini immediately began contacts on March 20 with the political parties and on March 23 called on Signor Cossiga to try to form another government, insisting that he should move quickly so that Italy could continue to carry out her international responsibilities (notably as president of the European Community's Council of Ministers for the first half of 1980—in which context a Community summit scheduled for March 31-April 1 was postponed). Signor Cossiga began talks with political leaders on March 25, and the prospect of an early settlement of the crisis emerged almost immediately when Signor Bettino Craxi, the PSI secretary (who had been mandated by a narrow majority of the PSI central committee on March 22 to negotiate on PSI participation in a DC-led government), agreed with Signor Cossiga on March 26 on preliminary conditions for the return of the Socialist Party to government for the first time since 1974 [see 26957 A]. Moreover, on March 27 the PRI was invited to join the proposed new administration after it had warned that it would not support a purely DC-PSI government in Parliament either actively or by abstention.

The PSI formally agreed to join a three-party coalition Government on April 3, and on the following day the composition of a new Cabinet was announced after being approved by President Pertini earlier in the day. The Cabinet, which comprised 16 Christian Democrats, nine Socialists and three Republicans, contained several new portfolios, including that of European Affairs, and among key new appointments was Signor Emilio Colombo, the former Christian Democratic Premier, who became Foreign Minister. The membership of Italy's 39th Government since World War II, commanding 340 of the 620 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (DC 262, PSI 62, PRI 16) and 176 elective seats in the Senate (DC 138, PSI 32, PRI 6), was sworn in on April 4 as follows:

* Signor Francesco Cossiga (DC)	Prime Minister
* Signor Virginio Rognoni (DC)	Interior
Signor Emilio Colombo (DC)	Foreign Affairs
Signor Vincenzo Russo (DC)	Regional Affairs
* Signor Tommaso Morlino (DC)	Justice
Signor Giorgio La Malfa (PRI)	Budget
* Signor Massimo Reviglio (PSI)	Finance
†Signor Vincenzo Scotti (DC)	European Affairs
Signor Nicola Capria (PSI)	Extraordinary Intervention in the South
* Signor Filippo Maria Pandolfi (DC)	Treasury
Signor Lelio Lagorio (PSI)	Defence
†Signor Beniamino Andreatta (DC)	Minister without Portfolio
* Signor Massimo Severo Giannini (PSI)	Public Administration
†Signor Adolfo Sarti (DC)	Education
Signor Vincenzo Balzamo (PSI)	Scientific Research
Signor Francesco Compagna (PRI)	Public Works
* Signor Antonio Bisaglia (DC)	Industry and Trade
Signor Franco Foschi (DC)	Labour
Signor Enrico Manca (PSI)	Foreign Trade
* Signor Giovanni Marcora (DC)	Agriculture and Forestry
Signor Salvatore Formica (PSI)	Transport
†Signor Clelio Darida (DC)	Posts and Telecommunications
‡Signor Nicola Signorello (DC)	Merchant Navy
Signor Gianni De Michelis (PSI)	State Participation
Signor Aldo Aniasi (PSI)	Health
* Signor Bernardo d'Arezzo (DC)	Tourism and Public Entertainment
Signor Oddo Biasini (PRI)	Cultural Assets and Environment
Signor Remo Gaspari (DC)	Relations with Parliament

* No change. † Changed portfolio.
‡ Appointed on March 4 [see below].

The Government was completed by the appointment on April 5 of 56 secretaries of state (DC 33, PSI 18, PRI 5).

Signor Colombo (60) had long experience in government and in European Community affairs; he was Treasury Minister uninterruptedly (in eight different Governments) from 1963 to 1970—having previously held other portfolios since 1955—and Prime Minister from 1970 [see 24295 A] to 1972 [see 25179 A], after which he remained in the Government, mainly in the Treasury and Finance ministries, until 1976. A delegate to the European Parliament since 1976, he was elected its president in 1977 [see 28281 A] and held this post until 1979.

Signor Russo and **Signor Gaspari** held key positions in the DC party organization, Signor Gaspari having been deputy to Signor Zaccagnini. **Signor Sarti** had been Minister of Defence since Jan. 14, 1980 [see 30158 B], and had prior to that been Minister for Relations with Parliament. **Signor Lagorio** had for many years been president of the Tuscany regional Government [see also page 27339] until he was appointed a member of the PSI apparatus in Rome. **Signor Darida** [see also 30158 B] and **Signor Aniasi** [see page 27339] were former mayors respectively of Rome and Milan. **Signor La Malfa** was the son of the late Republican Party leader, Signor Ugo La Malfa, who died in 1979 [see 29685 A].

Signor Signorello, a former Minister of Tourism, had been appointed on March 4 after the incumbent Merchant Navy Minister, Signor Franco Evangelisti (DC), resigned earlier the same day. The latter's resignation had been demanded by various parties after he had admitted in the Rome daily *La Repubblica* on Feb. 27 that he had over the past 20 years received money from property dealers to finance the activities of his party faction, and claimed that other members of the DC and of the major political parties had also received funds from the same source (although the practice of

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receiving private funds for the financing of political parties had been banned under a law enacted in 1974—see also page 29223). The property dealers named by Signor Evangelisti were Signor Gaetano Caltagirone and his two brothers, Francesco and Camillo, who had left the country in February 1980 before warrants were issued for their arrest in connexion with extensive banking debts amounting to some L 500,000 million (about $600,000,000).

[Shortly afterwards, judicial investigations which had begun two years previously into the activities of Italcasse, the Italian central savings bank institute, led to the arrest on March 4-6 of 39 bankers and financiers connected with Italcasse on charges of lending bank funds, without the necessary guarantees, to political parties and individuals including the Caltagirones, who had failed to repay a sum of L 200,000 million ($240,000,000) loaned to them by the late managing director of Italcasse, Signor Giuseppe Arcaini. Arrest warrants were issued for 10 others, and on March 6 the passports of 44 people who had accepted Italcasse funds were impounded.]

The participation of the PSI in the new Government caused a split in the party, whose left wing, led by Signor Guido Signorile (deputy secretary), criticized Signor Craxi for settling for fewer important cabinet posts than the PSI had demanded at the outset. The PSI left wing also made it clear that they regarded the party's participation as a step towards the eventual inclusion of the PCI in government; Signor Craxi, on the other hand, regarded the new coalition as implying the continued exclusion of the PCI from power.

Signor Ricardo Lombardi, a member of the left-wing faction who became PSI president on Jan. 18 following the death of Signor Pietro Nenni on Jan. 1 [see below], resigned on March 13 on the grounds that Signor Craxi had taken party decisions without consulting him.

Signor Cossiga on April 14 presented his new Government's programme first to the Senate and then to the Chamber, its major emphasis being on law and order, control of inflation, the need for trade union co-operation with the Government to help the economy, and the need for the collaboration of all political parties to help end political violence. Following a debate which began on April 15, the Government won a vote of confidence in the Senate on April 17 by 178 votes (DC, PSI, PRI and the four South Tirol and Val d'Aosta senators) to 127 (PCI, PLI, PSDI, Radical Party and Italian Social Movement, MSI). In a corresponding vote in the Chamber on April 20 the voting was 335 votes to 271, following a similar pattern to that in the Senate.

During the debate the PCI warned that it would intensify its opposition to the Government, and in particular criticized the appointment of Signor Formica to the Cabinet. Signor Formica had been the first to make allegations in the recent scandal involving the state energy concern ENI [see below] and was himself subsequently accused of irregular practices during his time as treasurer of the PSI (although this was denied by the PSI, on whose behalf Signor Craxi sent a strongly worded letter to the PCI secretary, Signor Enrico Berlinguer, accusing him of trying to discredit the Socialists).

The ENI scandal came to light when it was alleged that the ENI had made irregular payments amounting to $115,000,000 to secure a contract for the purchase of 12,500,000 tonnes of crude oil from the Saudi Arabian state oil company Petromin. The contract was suspended in December 1979 by Saudi Arabia, and Petromin denied that any of its officials had accepted commission; at the same time the Italian Government suspended ENI's chairman, Signor Giorgio Mazzanti (who had been appointed in January 1979—see page 29685), while investigations took place.

Although a special committee of inquiry in February 1980 cleared Signor Mazzanti of any serious misconduct, it was announced following a cabinet meeting at the beginning of March that Signor Egidio Egidi had been appointed to replace him. However, Signor Egidi himself resigned at the end of April, before officially taking office, in disagreement with the choice of vice-chairman of the company and also accusing the new Minister for State Participation, Signor De Michelis, of trying to influence ENI policy against the national interest.

Election of New DC, PRI and Radical Party Officers

At a meeting of the DC national council on March 6 Signor Flaminio Piccoli (hitherto party president) was elected party secretary *vice* Signor Zaccagnini, who had first been elected in 1975 [see 27338 A] and who had announced in September 1979 that he would not seek re-election; Signor Arnaldo Forlani (Foreign Minister, 1976-79) was elected party president to replace Signor Piccoli, both men being opposed to the participation of the PCI in government.

The election of the party secretary had been placed in the hands of the national council by the February 1980 party congress in a reversal of the decision taken at the previous congress in 1976, when it had been agreed that the secretary should be elected by secret ballot at the congress [see page 27711].

On Sept. 23, 1979, Signor Giovanni Spadolini (Minister of Education in Signor Andreotti's last Cabinet—see page 29686) became political secretary of the Republican Party *vice* Signor Oddo Biasini, who had taken over ad interim on the death of Signor Ugo La Malfa in March 1979 [see page 29686]. Signor Bruno Visentini, a former Finance Minister in the 1974-76 Moro Government [see 26957 A], was elected president.

The Radical Party congress held in Genoa on Oct. 30-Nov. 4 elected as its new president M. Jean Fabre (a French subject) who had hitherto been secretary of the party [see 29504 B]; the latter post was assumed by Signor Giuseppe Rippa.

M. Fabre was at the time of his election in custody in France, where he had been arrested to serve a six-month sentence imposed two years previously for evading military service. However, M. Fabre's sentence was reduced to one month by a French court at the end of November and he was then discharged by the military authorities.

New Anti-terrorist Measures - Internal Security Developments

In response to an upsurge of violence the Government on Dec. 15, 1979, introduced with immediate effect a series of anti-terrorist decrees laying down mandatory life imprisonment for the murder of policemen, members of the judiciary, lawyers and union leaders; allowing police to hold suspects for 48 hours without charge or access to lawyers, and for a further 48 hours with a magistrate's permission; and increasing other police powers to search without warrant and tap telephones. At the same time the Government appointed Gen. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa as commander of the Milan Caribinieri with 25,000 men at his disposal and with broad responsibilities for the whole of northern Italy; the anti-terrorist squad which he had hitherto commanded [see page 29687] was disbanded, and a new national commission for public order and security was set up to co-ordinate data and operations. Another Carabinieri commander, Gen. Eduardo Palombi, was appointed prefect of Genoa.

The anti-terrorist decrees were approved retroactively by the Senate on Jan. 12 and by the Chamber of Deputies on Feb. 2 after the Government had been obliged to table a confidence motion to prevent Radical Party obstruction from allowing the decrees to lapse automatically when the 60-day deadline for their conversion into law expired. The motion was tabled under a parliamentary procedure devised in 1971 to stop filibustering, whereby a vote of confidence was held on the bill as a whole without consideration of amendments (some 7,000 of which had been introduced by the PR), and Signor Cossiga stressed that the motion was "technical" only. [For the similar use of this procedure in connexion with anti-terrorist decrees in 1978, see page 29055.]

On Feb. 2 the Government first won the vote of confidence in the Chamber by 522 votes to 50 with eight abstentions, and the Chamber then approved the decrees by 446 votes to 79. In each case the DC, the PSI and the PCI voted in favour, while the PR, the MSI and the extreme left voted against.

The most active terrorist group in Italy continued to be the extreme left-wing Red Brigades (BR) which had carried out the kidnapping and murder of the DC leader, Signor Aldo Moro, in 1978 [see 29053 A and below], and which was now thought to be working closely with Front Line, an extreme left armed "autonomist" group [see also page 29057]. During March and April 1980 concerted police operations and the confessions of captured BR and Front Line members led to large-scale arrests of members of the two organizations in Rome and the north; in Genoa, believed to be the nucleus of BR activity, four BR suspects were killed by police on March 28 in a raid on an apartment, in apparent retaliation for which gunmen burst into a DC meeting in Milan on April 1 and shot four people in the legs, including a DC deputy.

Among about 50 members of the Red Brigades in custody by April 1980 was Signor Prospero Gallinari, one of the movement's leaders who had been sentenced in absentia in 1978 to 10 years' imprisonment [see page 29224] and who was arrested on Sept. 24, 1979. Signor Franco Pinna, the BR's military chief, and three others suspected of involvement in the Moro affair were arrested by French police on March 29, 1980, in the Paris and Toulon areas.

Charges of involvement in the Moro affair were on April 24 dropped against Prof. Antonio Negri of Padua University, who had been in police custody since April 1979 [see page 29687]; however, Prof. Negri remained in detention to face charges in connexion with his membership of Workers' Autonomy, the successor organization to Workers' Power and also believed to have links with BR. The original charges were dropped after a BR member arrested on Feb. 19 gave detailed information about the organization of the BR in the north and told police that Signor Mario Moretti, one of the few BR leaders still at large, had organized the Moro murder and made the telephone calls to Signor Moro's wife of which Prof. Negri had previously been accused.

Signor Franco Piperno, a physics teacher at Cosenza University and a founder-member of Workers' Autonomy, was arrested by French police in August 1979 and extradited to Italy in October to face charges of involvement in the murder of Signor Moro and others.

Political disagreements resulted in the virtual dissolution by early March 1980, only a few weeks after it had begun work, of a special parliamentary commission set up to investigate the Moro affair and Italian terrorism in general.

The imprisoned BR leader, Signor Renato Curcio, and 13 other BR members already in gaol went on trial again on Oct. 14, 1979, on charges of insulting judges and inciting their followers to civil insurrection during their original trial in 1978 [see page 29224]. Signor Curcio received a further 10 years' imprisonment and the others were sentenced to terms of between eight and 10 years.

On the eve of another hearing concerning Signor Curcio and 16 others in connexion with alleged crimes committed between 1970 and 1976, Red Brigades shot dead a policeman in Rome on Nov. 27 (two others having been killed in Genoa on Nov. 21). A fourth policeman was shot dead in Rome on Dec. 7, three in Milan on Jan. 8, two in Genoa on Jan. 25 (by Front Line) and three on a Turin bus on March 24. A total of 18 policemen were injured on Jan. 19 when bombs destroyed two floors of a Rome police station.

In the latest terrorist incident against employees and executives of the Fiat motor company (which had hitherto been a BR target), Front Line terrorists on Dec. 11 burst into a Turin business school and shot five students and five lecturers in the legs; four of the lecturers were employed by Fiat and one by Olivetti. The attack was thought to have been in retaliation for Fiat's dismissal in October of 61 alleged troublemakers at the company's Turin plant and its subsequent decision to halt recruitment temporarily at Fiat plants, which had provoked anger from members of the autonomist unions (i.e. those not allied to the three major trade union federations).

In the first of a new series of attacks against the judiciary, BR on Feb. 12 murdered Signor Vittorio Bachelet (54), the deputy president of the Higher Council of the Magistrature and a leading Christian Democrat and Roman Catholic layman, on the Rome University campus where he taught. Subsequent attacks led to the death of the chief prosecutor of Salerno on March 16, of an appeal court judge on a Rome bus on March 18, and of a magistrate in Milan on March 19 (for which Front Line claimed responsibility).

In other (non-left-wing) acts of violence against public officials, the president of the Palermo appeal court, Signor Cesare Terranova, was murdered on Sept. 25 in what appeared to be a Mafia action, and the president of the Sicilian regional council, Signor Piersanti Mattarella (DC), was shot dead in Palermo on Jan. 6, 1980, by an extreme right-wing group.

Approval of 10-year Energy Plan - Energy Conservation Measures

At the beginning of 1980 the Inter-Ministerial Council for Economic Planning approved a 10-year energy plan designed to reduce Italy's heavy dependence on imported oil, mainly by introducing nuclear power on a larger scale and substituting coal for fuel oil. Investments of L 20,600,000 million (about $25,000 million) were envisaged for the construction of five twin-reactor nuclear power stations with an overall capacity of 10,000 megawatts (MW) (in Piedmont, Lombardy, Molise, Apulia and Friuli-Venezia Giulia), coal-fired plants with a capacity of 13,500 MW, hydroelectric plants (1,800 MW), turbogas stations (1,130 MW) and geothermal plants (100 MW).

Italy's two main nuclear suppliers—the state-owned Finmeccanica (with a licence for boiling-water reactors) and the Fiat conglomerate (with a pressurized-water reactor licence)—in February 1980 set up a joint company, controlled by Finmeccanica, to co-ordinate production for the construction of the new plants.

Italy already had one 850 MW boiling-water reactor functioning at partial capacity at Caorso, near Milan, and another twin reactor was under construction at Montalto di Castro (near Rome) with a potential capacity of 2,000 MW; three other small reactors had been functioning since the 1960s with an overall capacity of 600 MW. However, there was considerable pressure from the left and the trade unions against the expansion of nuclear power in Italy, in which context the Government in January 1980 staged a three-day conference in Venice in an effort to win over the anti-nuclear lobby.

At the end of December 1979 the Government raised the prices of petrol (by 9 per cent) and domestic fuel, increased electricity tariffs by 15 per cent, and also eased price controls on oil products to allow competition for scarce oil supplies in 1980, when Italy faced a 25 per cent shortfall in its oil import requirements. Petrol prices had already been increased in September and November 1979 and the issue of petrol coupons to tourists had been suspended; electricity tariffs had also gone up in September and Italy had been divided into six "heating zones", with restrictions being placed on the number of hours per day and days per year during which heating could be used.

To replace the cancelled Saudi Arabian oil contract [see above] Italy in December reached agreement with Venezuela on increased oil deliveries for 1980, which would be doubled to 5,000,000 tonnes; in return, Italian companies would participate in Venezuelan development projects.

Appointment of New Life Senator

President Pertini in January 1980 named Signor Leo Valiani (70) as a life senator *vice* the veteran Socialist Signor Pietro Nenni who, as stated above, died on Jan. 1 at the age of 88. The six other life senators were currently former Presidents Saragat and Leone, Signor Amintore Fanfani, Signor Eugenio Montale, Signor Cesare Merzagora and Signor Ferruccio Parri [see 29765 A].—(Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Economist - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - New York Times) (*Prev. rep. 30158 B, 29909 A, 29765 A, 29685 A*)

A. PHILIPPINES — Provincial, Municipal and Local Elections - Dismissal of Information Minister - Opposition Proposals for Transition from Martial Law

President Marcos's New Society Movement (NSM or KBL—see 29285 A) on Jan. 30, 1980, won most of the seats at stake in the first elections for provincial, municipal and local officials since November 1971 [see page 25582]. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the electorate of 22,800,000 went to the polls, all those over the age of 18 being eligible to vote; more than 16,000 posts including the governorships of the 73 provinces were at stake, and martial law restrictions on free debate were lifted for the duration of the electoral campaign (which began on Dec. 29, 1979).

The elections had been announced six weeks previously (on Dec. 15) by President Marcos, who had hitherto said only that he would call local elections some time during 1980-81.

The main opposition contender (in the absence of the Laban or People's Power party and the Liberal Party, both of which boycotted the elections in protest at the continuation of martial law) was the Nationalist Party (NP), on whose lists President Marcos came to power in 1965 [see 21182 A] and was re-elected in 1969 [see 23842 B]. This party won the mayoralty of Zamboanga City and seats in Cagayan de Oro and Davao (all on the southern island of Mindanao) and claimed victory in Pampanga province (central Luzon) and in Batangas province (south of Manila), but in both these areas vote-counting was suspended because of charges of irregularities on both sides. The Nationalist Party also won in one of the 13 municipalities of Metropolitan Manila (where the governorship, held by the President's wife, Mrs Imelda Marcos, was not up for renewal).

President Marcos had agreed to allow the Nationalist Party to take part in the elections on Jan. 13, two weeks after the campaign opened, but he later stated, on Jan. 18, that he would challenge any NP victory since he claimed that the party had been dismantled in 1978. This claim was rejected by the party leader, Mr José Roy.

A smaller opposition group, the National Union for Liberation (NUL) led by former President Diosdado Macapagal (1961-65) and including some Laban members, also presented about 900 candidates.

The NUL afterwards complained formally to the Commission on Elections that more than 500 vote-counters in San Fernando (Pampanga province) had been threatened at gunpoint by police and "armed thugs" when they refused to fill out falsified returns in favour of the government candidate and Solicitor General, Mr Estelito P. Mendoza, after early returns showed the NUL candidate, Mr José Lingad, to be leading. Mr Mendoza was later proclaimed Governor of Pampanga province.

Prior to the elections Mr Marcos had on Jan. 17 dismissed Mr Francisco S. Tatad, his Information Minister since 1968, after Mr Tatad supported a Nationalist Party list headed by Mr Rafael Villaluna in his home province of Catanduanes (off south-eastern Luzon) against the government candidate and incumbent Governor since 1967, Mr Vicente M. Alberto (a member of the dominant family in the area). At a press conference President Marcos described Mr Tatad (39) as a "spoilt brat in the Cabinet", and accused him of insubordination, inefficiency and enriching himself in office. His post was assumed by Mr Gregorio Cendana.

Mr Tatad said after the elections that he had met with massive opposition from the Government, and he charged in a statement on Feb. 2 that the NSM had been responsible for "vote-buying, widespread terrorism, intimidation and fraud".

President Marcos's son, Mr Ferdinand Marcos jr. (22), was elected Vice-Governor of Ilocos Norte (where Mrs Elizabeth Marcos Rocka, the President's sister, was re-elected Governor).

Five people were reported killed during the voting on Jan. 30 and 16 others during the electoral campaign.

A number of opposition groups, including the Liberal Party, the *Pusyon Bisaya* party (which won 13 seats in the interim National Assembly elected in April 1978—see 29285 A; 29380 A), the Mindanao Alliance (with one seat in the Assembly and one governorship), the NUL and the Concerned Citizens' Group of Zamboanga City, announced on Feb. 12 that they had united as a national opposition movement against President Marcos and the continuation of martial law.

Proposals from Mr Aquino on Transition from Martial Law

President Marcos said in an interview with the *Bangkok Post* published on Jan. 8 that he was ready to establish a "council of leaders" as proposed by the former Liberal senator, Mr Benigno S. Aquino (who at the time was at home on extended Christmas leave from prison—see 30193 A—where he returned shortly afterwards), in order to help the country out of a serious crisis. He added on television the following night that Mr Aquino himself (who had been in detention since the imposition of martial law in September 1972—see 25581 A; 29285 A) would be offered a seat on such a council, which had been envisaged in similar plans drafted by the administration for the establishment of a body to advise the President on world problems.

Mr Aquino said in an interview from his home on Jan. 8 that he had put his plan to Mr Marcos in October 1979 and that it entailed a three-year run-up to general elections; a national plebiscite would first be held in late 1981 to decide whether the people preferred a parliamentary or presidential system of government, general elections would take place late in 1982, and martial law rule would end on Jan. 1, 1983, when the new government took office. During this transitional period the "council of leaders" representing all sectors of society would advise President Marcos. Mr Aquino added on Jan. 10 that although he would prefer not to serve on such a council he would do so, if asked, on the minimum condition that a free press was established (as demanded by the former Liberal senator, Mr Lorenzo Tanada, whom Mr Aquino had proposed for membership of the council together with Mr José Diokno, also a former senator).

President Marcos later said, however, that he was disappointed by Mr Aquino's proposals, since they were based on the untrue assumption that he was ill (as had been widely rumoured) and that the Philippines would end up in chaos if he stepped down. He added that he was ready for talks to examine during the next 18 months whether martial law was still necessary and that he intended to call elections for 1984 at the latest.

At the beginning of 1980 President Marcos issued martial law decrees providing for the imposition of the death penalty on those supplying minors with dangerous drugs or importing, manufacturing or selling various controlled drugs in addition to narcotics, as well as for crimes of economic sabotage such as swindling, fraud or misappropriation of funds.—(New York Times - Financial Times - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - La Vanguardia, Barcelona) (*Prev. rep. 30193 A; 1978 Elections 29285 A, 29380 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Education (No. 2) Bill - Provisions and Enactment

The Education (No. 2) Bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons on Oct. 25, 1979, and enacted on April 3, 1980, dealt inter alia with school government, school admissions and parental choice, an assisted places scheme to allow pupils to attend independent schools, and greater discretion for local education authorities, particularly in respect of school meals and transport. The changes had been promised in the Conservative Party's general election manifesto [see page 29637] and in the Queen's Speech of May 15, 1979, opening the new Parliament [see 29705 A]. A previous Bill, removing the compulsion on local authorities and governors of voluntary schools in England and Wales to reorganize their schools on comprehensive lines imposed by the 1976 Education Act [see 28179 A], had received the Royal Assent in July 1979 [see 29940 A].

The main provisions of the Education (No. 2) Bill—which applied in most respects to England and Wales but not to Scotland—were as follows.

School Government. Every school would normally be required to have its own individual governing body containing at least two elected parents and two elected teachers, except that in a small school with less than 300 pupils there should be at least one elected teacher. The proportion of foundation governors on the boards of voluntary aided schools would be reduced from two-thirds to a majority of two on a board of up to 18 members and to a majority of three on a board of more than 18. These schools would also be required to have elected parent governors on their boards, although if one foundation governor was a parent they would be required to have a minimum of only one elected parent. The members of governing bodies of primary schools (hitherto managers) would be redesignated as governors.

School Admissions. The Bill laid down for the first time the statutory right of parents to express a preference about the school at which their child should be educated and a statutory duty on local education authorities (LEAs) to comply with that preference unless compliance would prejudice the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources, or (in the case of schools whose pupils were selected by ability) if compliance would be incompatible with the selective procedure of that school. LEAs would be required to publish their admission arrangements, including the number of pupils which they intended to admit to a school and the policy which they proposed to adopt on admissions to a school where there was a greater demand than the school could meet. Authorities would also be required to describe their arrangements for enabling parents to express a preference, and for appeals. In the event of a parent's preference not being satisfied, there would be an appeals procedure, comprising a committee with a majority of one of members who were either councillors or co-opted members of the LEA. The Bill also laid down that no one who had been involved in the decision would be allowed to sit on the committee, that the chairman must not be a member of the LEA (or a governor in the case of a voluntary school), that the committee must contain independent members, and that individual parents should have a right to be heard in person.

Assisted Places Scheme. The Government would enter into arrangements with a number of independent schools of high academic ability under which, in respect of a certain number of places at those schools, the Government would meet the fees (but not boarding charges)—on a means-tested basis—of children who had been selected for entry but whose parents could not afford the fees. The means of selection would remain a matter for the schools, and once the children had been selected the agreement to finance and the proportion of fees to be met would depend on a general, central means test.

School Meals and Transport. Under these provisions, which would also apply to Scotland, LEAs—hitherto required to provide school meals to a given standard and at a standard charge—would in future have the option (but no longer the obligation) to provide school meals, refreshment and milk, and might charge what they considered appropriate, with the right to remit charges in whole or in part; requisite provision would have to be made for children from families in receipt of supplementary benefit or family income supplement. LEAs would also be required to provide facilities in which refreshments could be taken. [For cost and provision of school meals, see below. For changes in provision of free school milk for pupils aged between seven and 11 years, see page 29083 and 24932 B; for discontinuation in 1968 of provision of free milk in secondary schools, see 22489 A and 22653 B]. Authorities, although still required to provide transport where they considered it necessary, would be allowed to charge for it, except that children in families on family income supplement or supplementary benefit living beyond the "walking distance" of two miles for a child up to the age of eight and three miles for a child over the age of eight from the nearest convenient school should be provided with free transport.

The Labour Government had, on Nov. 22, 1978, introduced an Education Bill which had likewise dealt with the question of school governors and with admissions policies and which had also, inter alia, made provision for the extension to all 16 to 19-year-olds—subject to affirmative parliamentary approval—of the scheme of education maintenance allowances. However, although the Bill had been read a second time in the House of Commons on Dec. 5, 1978, without a division, it had failed to receive the Royal Assent before the dissolution of Parliament on April 7, 1979 [see 29624 A].

Parliamentary Proceedings

The Education (No. 2) Bill was given a second reading in the House of Commons on Nov. 5, 1979, by 305 votes to 253 and in the House of Lords on Feb. 25, 1980, without a division.

Mr Mark Carlisle (Secretary of State for Education and Science), moving the second reading in the House of Commons, said that the Bill was consistent in its purposes with two principles of the Government: first, that of improving the standard of achievement in education by widening parental involvement in schools, by strengthening the influence of parents over the choice of schools in which their child would be educated and by widening the availability of the type of school to parents whose children were now being educated in the maintained sector. Secondly, the Bill was consistent also with the Government's principle to reduce the degree of central government control exercised over local authorities in the provision of services for which they were responsible. In particular, it was consistent in the belief that, by reducing those controls, it would be easier for the local authorities to achieve the economic savings for which the Government had asked.

The reason for the proposals on school government was that the Government believed that education should be shown to be a partnership both between home and school and between parent and teacher. The purpose of having elected teachers and parents on the governing body was that it would emphasize that partnership; the presence of parents, elected from among their number, would increase their involvement and interest in what went on within the school. However, the Government accepted that the major responsibility for running schools must rest with the LEA, and therefore the Bill did not attempt to lay down in detail either the number of members of a governing body or how that membership should be made up. Those were matters for LEAs and it was best to leave the maximum degree of flexibility to them to decide the suitable membership of a body taking into account the local services and the school's area.

On school admissions, Mr Carlisle said that they had to remember that the duty to educate a child was, in the end, a duty not of the LEA but of the parent. Therefore, parents should be given the widest possible decision about how that duty was carried out. The present position was both confused and confusing. Although the 1944 Education Act provided for children to be educated according to the wishes of their parents, there had never been provided any system by which those wishes should be heard. He continued: "I accept, of course, that in this area there cannot be absolute freedom of choice. Where a state service is established that is required to provide for all children living in an area and at the same time is required to exercise due consideration for the interests of both ratepayers and taxpayers, it is not possible to legislate for absolute freedom of choice. However, the fact that it is not possible to provide that absolute freedom of choice does not mean that one should not attempt to provide for the strongest choice possible." Parents would be free for the first time to express a wish that their children should be educated in a school in another LEA area, and the Bill provided for automatic recoupment between local authorities for children educated outside the area of their own education authority. In view of the establishment of a local appeals procedure, the individual appeal to the Secretary of State under Section 37 of the 1944 Act would be abolished. This was always a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation which gave a total advantage to a parent who chose deliberately to keep a child away from school against the parent who sent a child to school. Rights of appeal to the Secretary of State would be limited to those cases in which it was argued that the LEA was arguing unreasonably or failing to carry out its statutory duties under Section 99 of the 1944 Act.

Turning to the assisted places scheme, Mr Carlisle said that the setting up of the scheme was the clearest possible election commitment and mandate to restore to bright children of less affluent parents the opportunity to benefit from an education similar to that provided in the old direct-grant grammar schools. The latter gave a high quality academic education to children of ability, irrespective of the means of their parents, and the Conservative Party regretted greatly the decision to put an end to that scheme [in 1975—see 27475 A]. "But putting an end to the scheme," Mr Carlisle went on, "did not kill those schools. They remain. However, two-thirds of the 174 involved went independent and today remain independent schools [see also 27572 B]. They are, therefore, available only to those who can pay. We believe that the education opportunity provided by those and similar schools should be open to children of ability whose parents cannot afford to pay the fees that they charge. It is with that intention that we bring in this part of the Bill. The schools exist. That means of opportunity exists. That means of opportunity should be restored to able children whose parents are unable to meet the cost."

At its earliest, the scheme could not be introduced until September 1981 and could not, therefore, have any economic effect on expenditure either in the current financial year or in the following year. When it was introduced expenditure in the financial year 1981-82 would be about £6,000,000 and would not build up to its full amount of £55,000,000 to £60,000,000 at current prices until 1988. Furthermore, the money for the scheme would not be taken from the LEAs, but would be additional money provided by the Treasury for the purpose. This would amount at the start of the scheme to an additional 0.1 per cent of educational expenditure and, at its maximum, would involve between 1 and 2 per cent of educational expenditure and provide education for between 1 and 2 per cent of pupils who otherwise would be educated totally at the cost of the state.

With regard to school meals and transport, the purpose was to relax the statutory obligations on the local authorities to enable them to make considerable savings, in the belief that savings made in that way were better than those made by the reduction of educational provisions in the classroom. At present a local authority was required to provide a school meal for any child who wanted it. The meal must be of the type defined by central Government, with a nutritional value defined by central Government, at a charge laid down by central Government and with central government decisions over those who received it free of charge. As a result, the school meals service cost £400,000,000, or 7 per cent of the total education budget of LEAs. The Government believed that as a result of giving greater freedom to LEAs over the provision of school meals, while at the same time requiring them to provide meals to those whose parents were on supplementary benefits or family income supplement, a major saving would be made. The service would still be provided, but it would be a different type of service, simpler to produce and with exactly the same nutritional value as at present.

[In the Government's Public Expenditure White Paper (Cmnd. 7841) published on March 26, 1980, it was stated that net expenditure on school meals in 1978-79 was £433,000,000—with gross expenditure of £645,000,000 being only partly offset by £212,000,000 of income from charges. On average during 1978-79 each day 1,302,000 pupils received free meals out of the 5,844,000 meals served to pupils each day. While the school meal charge had been raised from 25p to 30p in the autumn of 1979 and was again raised to 35p in February 1980—see page 30154—the average cost for each meal in 1978-79 was 53.9p, including 16.7p representing the cost of the food itself and 24.6p the cost of kitchen and canteen staff.]

LEAs, Mr Carlisle said, were under a duty to provide transport free of charge for everyone who lived beyond what was called "walking distance"—i.e. two miles for a child up to the age of eight and three miles for a child over that age. That provision was made irrespective of the parents' income, while, at the same time, there was no duty to provide any form of transport for anyone who lived just within "walking distance", again irrespective of parental income. The present illogical situation worked unfairly and put certain children in a privileged position. Free school transport cost £100,000,000 in 1978-79 and would cost £130,000,000 in the coming year.

On the question of denominational schools in this context, Mr Carlisle said: "I recognize the anxiety of those attending denominational schools about our proposals. In the past LEAs have been relatively generous in providing free transport for those attending denominational schools when such schools are not the nearest appropriate establishment. Sometimes they have acted beyond their statutory duty. LEAs have a duty to provide free transport only to children travelling more than three miles to the nearest appropriate school and, on the whole, local authorities stick to that rule. If children choose to attend schools that are not the nearest appropriate schools, they have to pay. In the case of denominational schools, local authorities have invariably relaxed the rule, at their discretion, and allowed free transport to a school even when it is not the nearest appropriate school. I support denominational schools. What is more, I believe that the Bill's provisions strengthen and help them.

"The transport proposals are not intended to operate against denominational schools, nor do I believe they will be used in that way. When Parliament decides to empower a local authority to charge other parents it is reasonable that the same rule should apply to parents whose children attend denominational schools. It would be wrong to provide free transport to children who attend denominational schools while not providing free transport in similar circumstances to those who do not attend such schools. I hope that LEAs will be no less generous in their treatment of denominational schools than they are in respect of others. I hope that they will continue to provide transport to denominational schools. Our public expenditure provisions assume that a substantial element of subsidy for school transport will continue. The requirement to provide or not to provide is not in any way changed by the Bill. What is changed is the right that exists at present to charge those pupils going to denominational schools further than three miles away if there is a closer appropriate school. Since the requirement is not changed and since the type of procedure introduced is at the discretion of the local authority, it is wrong to suggest that this part of the Bill is a threat to the provision of denominational schools. In the past such schools have relied on the good sense of local authorities. They should feel able to do so in the future."

Mr Neil Kinnock, chief opposition spokesman on education, declared: "The Bill contains provisions not for the elevation of standards, not for the expansion of choice, not for the fulfilment of responsibility or for the pursuit of excellence. The Bill provides for a stagnation of standards, a negation of choice, an abdication of responsibility and a conspiracy against excellence. That is what is contained in this Bill and many other Government policies." Having promised that the assisted places scheme would be terminated at the end of the academic year in which the next Labour Government was elected, he said that he would use "all the influence that I can bring to bear on my party to secure a policy position which will bring about the abolition of the public schools and other forms of private education".

In the division eight Liberals and the two *Plaid Cymru* and two Scottish National Party (SNP) members voted with the opposition.

During the Bill's remaining stages in both Houses controversy centred on the school transport provisions.

During the report stage in the Commons on Feb. 13, 1980, an amendment, moved by Sir Nicholas Bonsor (Conservative), to delete the relevant clause was defeated by 302 votes to 279, with 12 Conservative backbenchers voting against the Government.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor said that his purpose was to leave the law as it stood. To change the law in the way the Government proposed would be ill conceived and inequitable. It would impose a charge on people with no way of avoiding it because it was a charge of fulfilling their statutory duty. They had a duty which they could not escape to send their children to state schools. In many cases that duty was already a heavy burden, and to add to it a further burden of finance would be wrong. Many village schools would have been fought for with far greater vigour had the parents concerned known that they would have to pay a charge to send their children to another school. People living in rural areas, working on the land or in small industries which could not afford high wages, would be hardest hit. Inequalities would exist with a wide variation of charge between one area and another. He would not oppose a proposal for a charge, provided that there was a limit, so that they could be satisfied that hardship would not be caused.

The amendment was also supported by all 11 Liberals, all the *Plaid Cymru* and SNP members, four Official Unionists and Mr Gerard Fitt (Socialist). Immediately afterwards the House approved without a division a government amendment providing that charges made by an LEA for school transport must be at a uniform rate not dependent on the length of journey or the school attended, although rates could differ according to the age of the pupils or whether the school was primary or secondary.

However, during the Bill's committee stage in the House of Lords on March 13 the transport clause was rejected by 216 votes to 112.

The Duke of Norfolk (Conservative), moving the rejection of the clause, said that he believed that there should be economies and retrenchment, and that education should take its share. The country needed serious measures to cut expenditure, but the Government's suggestion of charging for transport meant breaking a promise of free transport over the three-mile walking distance. Two groups would suffer unjustly. The first would be the people who lived in rural communities. Many village schools had been closed on the express promise that there would be free transport to the next village. If the Government proceeded they would find it hard to get agreement on closing down any more village schools. The villagers of England had written to him and to all peers expressing in no uncertain terms how they agreed to closures on that understanding and they could not understand why that promise should be ignored. Once bitten twice shy. They would not allow any more to be closed. The second group which would suffer were the denominational schools which had wide catchment areas. They had been sited for the population of their particular religion without any idea that there would not be free transport. He was not speaking for a selfish sectarian Roman Catholic attitude, but about church schools which gave extra support to the family life on which the nation depended for so much of its integrity.

Baroness Young, Minister of State for Education and Science, said that the Government had decided that savings must be made in the education budget and that those savings must come from the non-educational parts of that budget, namely meals, milk and transport. The Government wished to preserve the basic fabric of the education system, in particular the teacher numbers, believing that good teachers were central to the maintenance of educational standards in schools. The Association of County Councils had asked the Government to give power to LEAs to charge for home to school transport if they were to make the kind of economies the Government was asking. This was not surprising because the cost of free transport was an open-ended subsidy paid for by taxpayers and ratepayers. The cost of school transport had doubled between 1969-70 and 1978-79 from £67,700,000 to £128,400,000, the reason being the ever rising world price of oil. Because of the concern expressed when the Bill was debated in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State had moved an amendment to the effect that the charge to be levied could only be a flat rate charge [see above]. After the concern expressed in the second reading debate in the Lords [on Feb. 25] he had proposed another amendment, which would be re-tabled at the report stage, to limit the charge to two children in any one family. Under the Government's proposals, no family was going to have to pay an economic charge for transport. What they were being asked to pay was a contribution to the charge of being transported from home to school. A large national subsidy would still remain in 1980, totalling £100,000,000. The Government estimated that 80 per cent of this total would go in subsidies to the shire counties. As a generalization, this worked out at £100 per child receiving free transport.

Lord Butler of Saffron Walden (Conservative), the architect of the 1944 Act, said that he was convinced after a lifetime of service to education that his view on the Government's school transport proposals was the only course he could pursue. It was not being done for small political reasons. When it came to this saving of £20,000,000 or £30,000,000, he had had letters not only from mothers and fathers but also from education officers. There would be grave extravagance and waste of money if the Government's amendment was accepted. He very much doubted if there would be any saving. Transport was a vital part of the settlement of 1944, denominations and other partners involved in that settlement having been given an assurance that their children would be got to school. If he had brought into the Chamber all the letters he had received on this issue, it would have required a cabin trunk. He continued: "It just shows the state of disarray in the country on this occasion. I will say to the noble Baroness [Lady Young] that it may be wrong, but the fact is that, though she made really an excellent intellectual speech, this is not entirely an intellectual matter. Politics is not all intellect; politics is largely a matter of the heart, and people are feeling this deeply all over the country. One reason why that is so is that the rural areas are feeling neglected. They are losing their shops and post offices; they are having to drive to a town to get the ordinary necessities of life . . .; it is very regrettable but it is true." When they made up their minds he would say to the cross-bench peers: "You do not want to take a step this afternoon by retaining this clause which will create or maintain any bitterness in the settlement which we created between the churches and the state. I ask you to think of that. And to noble Lords who sit loyally, as I have done for so many years, to support the Government, I would say that the Conservative Party has always been strongest when it supported the rural areas."

The Bishop of London (Dr Gerald Ellison) said that this was for many a deep matter of conscience. The Church of England did not claim any particular privileges, but it recognized that the 1944 Act was an agreement between all the parties concerned in education, especially in the dual system. It was understood that children should go to the schools where they wished to receive their education. The conditions in that agreement should be observed. There were profound issues in the clause. One was the issue of justice. Was it right that because the child lived a long way from a school the parents should have to carry what might be a considerable expense in getting their child to school? It was a strange use of logic to say that justice should be restored by everybody having to pay. Logic should be restored by none of the parents having to pay. Dr Ellison concluded: "My other fundamental anxiety about this is one that has already been mentioned. I have always understood that it was one of the great prides of this country that, for those parents who wish their children to be educated free, that education shall be freely available to all of them. I cannot believe that it is credible to say that, if you happen to live outside the three-mile limit, therefore you should get free education so long as you pay for your children to go to school. That seems to me to be a complete negation of the vital principle that, if parents desire for their children free education, they shall have it."

Those voting for the rejection of the clause were Labour and Liberal peers, the Bishops of Derby, London, Peterborough and Rochester, and some Conservatives and cross-benchers including, in addition to the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Butler, Lord Boyle of Handsworth (a former Minister of Education), Lord Alexander of Potterhill (a former general secretary of the Association of Education Committees) and Lord Redcliffe-Maud (a former Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Education). Immediately after the vote the clause dealing with school transport charges in Scotland was deleted from the Bill without debate.

Mr Carlisle told the House of Commons on March 18 that, in view of the vote in the Lords, the Government had decided not to seek to reintroduce into the Bill the clauses relating to school transport charges.

He added: "As the House will also know, the Government decided last year that it was necessary for local authorities to reduce public expenditure and the rate support grant settlements for 1980-81 were made accordingly [see page 30155]. It was the request of the Association of County Councils that, in making these reductions, LEAs in England and Wales should be free, if they wished, to introduce charges for providing school transport. In view of the decision in [the House of Lords] last week, and the Government's acceptance of that decision, the option to charge is no longer open to local authorities. But this in no way removes the obligation on local authorities to achieve the needed reductions in expenditure in some other way."

Lady Young told the Lords during the Bill's report stage on March 25 that the number of schools expressing an interest in participating in the assisted places scheme was so far 468, comprising 120 former direct grant grammar schools, 338 independent schools, one other direct grant school and nine maintained schools.

All independent secondary and direct grant schools had been sent a letter on Dec. 6, 1979, and the Government believed that the response, which had been about 45 per cent, was very satisfactory. Provisional figures of the number of places offered totalled 5,894 for boys and 5,315 for girls, as well as 1,928 at mixed schools. It was the Government's intention that there should be equal numbers of places for boys and girls and that there should be a proper geographical spread of these places. Mr Carlisle had announced in the Commons on Feb. 13 that his present plan was to start the scheme in 1981 at a cost of £3,000,000 in the first financial year, building up over the period to 1983-84 and providing for the admission of about 6,000 pupils a year. Having considered the possibility of further public spending cuts in 1980-81, he had decided that rather than defer the introduction of the scheme, the right decision would be to introduce it in 1981 but at half the level that he had originally intended.

Having been given an unopposed third reading in the Lords on March 31, the Bill, as stated above, received the Royal Assent on April 3.—(Times - Guardian - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. Queen's Speech 29705 A; 1979 Education Act 29940 A; School Meals Charges page 30154*)

A. WEST GERMANY — Baden-Württemberg - Landtag Elections - Formation of The Green Party at Federal Level

Elections were held on March 16, 1980, to the *Landtag* (Parliament) of Baden-Württemberg, in which the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) retained its absolute majority despite the loss of three of the 71 seats which it had won in the last elections in 1976 [see 27812 B]. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) lost one seat in the election, while the Free Democrats (FDP) gained one seat. The extreme right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD) suffered a marked loss of support, while for the second time in recent political history an environmentalist group obtained more than the minimum 5 per cent of the total valid poll which was required by West German law for representation in a *Land* Parliament, winning six seats in the new assembly.

Die Grünen (the Green Party) had been formally constituted as a national political party at a conference held in Karlsruhe on Jan. 12-14, 1980, and attended by delegates from some 250 organizations. The new party comprised largely the membership of the *Grüne Aktion Zukunft* (Green Action Future, GAZ), the *Grüne Liste Umweltschutz* (Green List Ecology, GLU—see 29227 A; 29474 A) and the *Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutscher* (Action Group of Independent Germans, AUD), but also embraced other groups of widely varying political views.

The conference decided, at the instigation of several communist groups, to allow simultaneous membership of other political parties, and on March 22-23 a further conference approved an essentially left-wing party programme which called inter alia for the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Warsaw Pact military blocs, for the breaking down of large economic concerns into smaller units, for the introduction of a 35-hour working week and for the unlimited right to strike.

The development of this programme was surrounded by heated debate in which the chairman of the GAZ, Herr Herbert Gruhl, announced his wish not to be elected to the party's executive. Herr Gruhl had until the formation of the GAZ in July 1978 been a CDU representative in the *Bundestag* (Lower House of the Federal Parliament), remaining thereafter as an independent in the *Bundestag* [see also 29474 A], and was known to oppose left-wing influence in the environmentalist movement.

The party on March 23 elected a national executive comprising Herr August Haussleiter (the former chairman of the AUD), Frau Petra Kelly and Herr Norbert Mann.

On Oct. 7, 1979, the environmentalist *Bremer Grüne Liste* had also obtained more than the 5 per cent minimum in elections to the Bremen *Bürgerschaft* (Parliament), winning four seats in that body [see 30024 A].

Although the normal complement of the Baden-Württemberg *Landtag* was 120 members, a provision of the West German electoral law allowed the appointment of additional members in order to avoid anomalies in the distribution of seats. As a consequence of this provision, 124 representatives were elected in 1980, compared with 121 in 1976. Altogether 72.1 per cent of the 6,307,119 electorate voted on March 16, casting 4,512,861 valid and 37,153 invalid votes.

The official provisional results were as follows, with the (unrevised) 1976 results being given for comparison (CDU—Christian Democratic Union, SPD—Social Democratic Party, FDP—Free Democratic Party, *Die Grünen*—Green Party, DKP—German Communist Party, KBW—Communist Union of West Germany, EAP—European Labour Party, NPD—National Democratic Party).

	Seats		Percentage		Votes	
	1980	1976	1980	1976	1980	1976
CDU	68	71	53.4	56.7	2,407,843	2,573,063
SPD	40	41	32.5	33.3	1,468,789	1,509,944
FDP	10	9	8.3	7.8	374,577	353,720
Die Grünen	6	—	5.3	—	241,176	—
DKP	0	0	0.3	0.4	11,829	18,760
NPD	0	0	*	0.9	2,339	42,860
KBW	0	—	*	—	2,062	—
EAP	0	—	*	—	152	—
Others	0	0	0.1	0.9	4,094	37,920

* Less than 0.1 per cent.

The result was widely regarded as a personal victory for the CDU leader and *Land* Premier, Herr Lothar Späth, who had taken over the party's leadership after the resignation in August 1978 of Dr Hans Filbinger [see 30091 A], and equally as a defeat for the SPD *Land* chairman and parliamentary leader, Herr Erhard Eppler, whose strong personal opposition to the development of nuclear power in West Germany had formed a major element of the party's election programme although it contrasted with the firmly pro-nuclear attitude of Herr Helmut Schmidt, the (SPD) Federal Chancellor.

Herr Späth announced on March 25 a number of changes to his CDU Cabinet, as follows:

Herr Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder was appointed Minister for Culture and Sport *vice* Herr Roman Herzog, who became Minister of the Interior; Herr Guntram Palm, the previous Minister of the Interior [see 30091 A], became Minister of Finance; Herr Dietmar Schlee was appointed Minister of Labour, Health and Social Affairs *vice* Frau Annemarie Griesinger, who became Minister for Federal Affairs; and Herr Gerhard Weiser, Minister of Agriculture, was in addition appointed Deputy Premier.

Herr Rudolf Eberle (Economy), Herr Heinz Eyrich (Justice) and Herr Helmut Engler (Science and Research) retained their previous responsibilities, while Herr Robert Gleichauf (Finance) and Herr Eduard Adorno (Federal Affairs) left the Cabinet.

Herr Eppler announced on March 17 his resignation as SPD group leader in the *Landtag* (being succeeded in this post on March 19 by Herr Ulrich Lang), but said that he wished to continue in office as SPD *Land* chairman and as a member of the *Landtag*.—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. 1976 Landtag Elections 27812 B; Resignation of Dr Filbinger, Appointment of Herr Späth as Land Premier 30091 A; Other Cabinet Appointments 27812 B; 28956 A; Green Parties 29227 A, 29474 A, 30024 A*)

A. BELIZE — Formation of New Government by Mr Price following General Election - Earlier Cabinet Changes and Other Internal Political Developments - Natural Disasters - Developments since late 1977 in British Dispute with Guatemala over Belizean Independence

The centre-left People's United Party (PUP), led by Mr George C. Price (the Premier of Belize since its attainment of internal self-government in January 1964), was returned with an unchanged majority for its seventh consecutive term of office at a general election held on Nov. 21, 1979. The PUP obtained 51.8 per cent of the vote and 13 of the 18 seats in the House of Representatives, the remaining five seats being won by the right-wing United Democratic Party (UDP), which obtained 46.8 per cent of the vote. The Toledo Progressive Party (TPP) won 0.2 per cent of the vote, and spoiled papers accounted for the remaining 1.2 per cent.

At the previous general election in October 1974 a total of 12 seats had been won by the PUP and six by the UDP (then known as the United Democratic Front) [see 26914 B], but one UDP member had subsequently crossed the floor to join the PUP during 1976.

The 1979 general election was the first to be held since the reduction of the voting age from 21 to 18 years; it was reported that the majority of those benefiting from this provision voted for the PUP, despite the fact that their enfranchisement had been the result of strong pressure from the UDP. There was a turnout of about 90 per cent in the 1979 election, compared with 68 per cent in 1974.

The further PUP election victory surprised many observers in view particularly of the UDP's successes in local government elections held during the term of the outgoing House of Representatives. In the December 1977 council elections in Belize City (the country's former capital and its largest urban centre, housing nearly one-third of the total population of about 152,000) all nine seats had been won by the UDP (which had previously held six seats), and on Dec. 20, 1978, the UDP had won majorities on the councils of five of the country's seven remaining municipalities (only Benque Viejo del Carmen and Orange Walk Town remaining under PUP control).

The UDP, led by Mr Dean Lindo, had during these local elections attacked as "communist" the policies of the Price Government, and had personally criticized prominent members of the left wing of the PUP, including the then Attorney General and Minister of Economic Planning, Mr Assad Shoman. (Mr Shoman had since 1975—see page 27573—played a leading role in "internationalizing" the Price Government's campaign against Guatemala's obstruction of Belizean independence, and the UDP sought inter alia to link his contacts with Cuba in this context with his own political views. For recent developments on the independence question, see below.)

In the December 1978 municipal elections a vigorous local PUP campaign led by Mr Shoman failed to prevent the UDP from winning control of the town of San Ignacio, and Mr Shoman subsequently resigned from the Cabinet, reportedly after the more conservative elements within the PUP had indicated that they held him partly responsible for the party's poor electoral performance. The Minister of Trade, Industry and Consumer Protection, Mr Santiago Perdomo, resigned at the same time. In a consequent reallocation of responsibilities announced on Jan. 9, 1979 (i) the Premier took charge of the Ministry of Economic Planning; (ii) Mr Edwin Flowers was appointed Attorney General; (iii) Mr Guadelupe Pech was appointed Minister of Trade, Industry and Consumer Protection; and (iv) Mr Elijio Briceño was appointed Minister of Education and Housing *vice* Mr Pech.

During 1979 the PUP leadership sought to reduce the emphasis placed on the more left-wing views within the party and to stress those of its centrist majority, notably by making specific declarations favouring a mixed economy and opposing communism. The UDP nevertheless based its general election campaign on the slogan "Price supports communism", and promised in its election manifesto to encourage large-scale United States investment in Belize as part of a laissez-faire economic policy (whereas the PUP Government had sought to curb foreign investment in land).

The 1979 election campaign was fought largely on domestic issues, with the two main parties generally honouring an agreement which they had made in June 1978 [see below] to minimize party-political controversy over the question of independence (towards which the UDP had a more gradualist approach than the PUP, although both parties were united in their opposition to Guatemala's territorial claim). The two candidates of the TPP, Mr Alejandro Vernon and Mr Cecil Casimiro, who had in the past visited New York to express their party's pro-Guatemalan policy on the dispute at the United Nations, received less than 4 per cent of the votes cast in their constituencies in the (southern) Toledo District and lost their deposits.

Among the candidates of the UDP, Mr Lindo was defeated by Mr Said Musa (a lawyer closely associated with Mr Shoman on the left wing of the PUP), while the party's deputy leader, Mr Joshua Andrews, was defeated by Mr Shoman. Mr Lindo had accused the PUP of conducting a "smear campaign" against him by revealing his former association with the late Mr Jim Jones of the US People's Temple sect (for whose death in a mass suicide in Guyana see 29627 A). Among the PUP candidates, Mr Price was returned with a reduced majority (his opponent being the UDP chairman, Mr Manuel Esquivel), while the deputy leader of the PUP and Minister of Home Affairs and Health, Mr Carl L. B. Rogers, was narrowly defeated by the deputy mayor of Belize City, Mr Curl Thompson (although he was subsequently appointed a senator).

The distribution of portfolios in the new Government formed by Mr Price was as follows:

*Mr George C. Price	Premier and Minister of Finance and Development
†Mr Carl L. B. Rogers	Minister of Home Affairs and Leader of Government Business in the Senate
*Mr Louis S. Sylvestre	Energy and Communications
†Mr David L. McCoy	Labour, Social Services and Community Development
*Mr Florencio J. Marin	Agriculture and Lands
*Mr Frederick H. Hunter	Works
‡Mr Elijio Briceño	Local Government and Social Security
*Mr Guadelupe Pech	Trade and Industry
Mr Said Musa	Attorney General, Minister of Education and Sport and Ambassador for the Caribbean Community
Mr Assad Shoman	Health, Housing and Co-operatives
‡Mr Vernon H. Courtenay	Minister of State in the Premier's Office

* No change. † Partially altered responsibilities.
‡ Changed portfolio.

Following the electoral defeat of Mr Lindo, UDP MPs elected as the new Leader of the Opposition Mr Theodore Aranda, who had entered the House for the first time. Mr Aranda subsequently accused the PUP of having "stolen the election" and of having been "taken over by left-wing international agents", and said that the UDP would now consider using "any means necessary including non-democratic methods" to defeat the Government.

Natural Disasters

In early January 1980 northern Belize was declared a disaster area after several weeks of torrential rain had caused extensive flood damage. In an earlier natural disaster in mid-September 1978, Belize had been struck by hurricane Greta, which killed four people, destroyed a number of villages, almost wiped out the country's banana and grapefruit plantations while seriously damaging orange crops, and severely disrupted power, telecommunications and water supplies in Belize City and elsewhere.

It was announced in November 1978 that Britain would provide aid of up to £4,000,000, mainly for agricultural rehabilitation work and repairs to roads and bridges, in addition to the emergency assistance which had been given in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane at a cost of nearly £100,000.

The Independence Question - Developments since late 1977

As stated in 28617 A, a visit to Guatemala in July 1977 by the then UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Edward Rowlands, took place against a background of renewed military tension along the Belize-Guatemala border, and his talks on Guatemala's obstruction of Belize's attainment of independence by pressing its long-standing territorial claim to the colony resulted only in agreement to hold further talks at an unspecified date.

Among other developments in 1977 (i) Commonwealth heads of government established an eight-nation ministerial committee to assist in the settlement of the dispute [see page 28505]; (ii) the heads of government of Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela issued a declaration supporting Belize's right to self-determination [see page 28632]; and (iii) the vote on the United Nations General Assembly's December 1977 resolution (32/32) on Belize [see page 28841] showed a further decline in international support for Guatemala compared with the corresponding votes at the two previous sessions of the General Assembly [see pages 28617; 27573]. Of the six countries listed in (ii) above, only Costa Rica voted against Resolution 32/32 and only Colombia abstained from voting.

As described below, over the two-year period from late 1977 the US Government took an active role in contacts and negotiations between the parties concerned in the Belize independence question, although no substantive progress towards a settlement was made.

In November 1977 what were described as "confidential exploratory discussions to establish a basis for a further round of negotiations" were opened between British and Guatemalan representatives at United Nations headquarters in New York. The following month (on Dec. 9) the Foreign Ministers of Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Surinam and Venezuela held a meeting on the Belize question in Kingston (Jamaica) which was also attended by Mr Price (the Premier of Belize) and by a Mexican representative with observer status.

The Kingston meeting adopted a five-point declaration denouncing as "intolerable" the "frustration of the exercise of the right of the people of Belize to independence", calling for the "speedy attainment of a secure independence by Belize on the basis of self-determination and territorial integrity", and asserting that the Belizean Government should be "fully involved in all consultations and negotiations" on the issue.

On Dec. 15, 1977, Mr Rowlands visited Mexico City for talks whose aim was widely reported in the press to be to seek the Mexican Government's views on a proposal (which was subsequently officially acknowledged to have been put forward in the current round of Anglo-Guatemalan discussions—see below) that part of southern Belize should be ceded to Guatemala in return for Guatemala's acceptance of the independence of the remainder of the colony. (Mexico's involvement in the Belize question arose from its dormant territorial claim to the northern half of the colony, which was subject to reactivation "in the event of any change in the colony's status which is not in accordance with the right of its inhabitants to self-determination".)

On Jan. 12, 1978, Mr Rowlands made a one-day visit to Washington for discussions on Belize with the then US Secretary of State, Mr Cyrus Vance, reportedly to seek the co-operation of the United States in bringing its influence to bear on the Guatemalan Government over the Belize question. (See page 28618 for the US attitude towards this issue in mid-1977.) On Jan. 17 Mr Rowlands visited Barbados (which held the chairmanship of the Commonwealth committee on Belize), subsequently travelling to Jamaica for separate talks with that country's Prime Minister, Mr Michael Manley, and with Mr Price, who flew to Kingston for this purpose.

It was agreed at Mr Rowlands's meeting with Mr Price that they should hold further talks in London on Jan. 24, 1978, in which the then British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Dr David Owen, would also participate. Mr Price travelled to London via Miami, where he had a meeting with the US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr Terence Todman (who then travelled to Guatemala). The London talks, which were also attended by Mr Vernon H. Courtenay (then Belize's Minister without Portfolio and ambassador for the Caribbean Community) and Mr Assad Shoman, ended without any substantive agreement on Jan. 25, when a statement on the current situation was made in the House of Commons by Dr Owen.

Dr Owen said that "various proposals, including the possibility of territorial adjustments" had recently been discussed between Britain and Guatemala, although "no agreements had been made or would be made which were not subject to the approval of the people of Belize". The Belizean representatives at the London talks had "reiterated the position of their Government that negotiations should continue on the basis of the UN resolution and the territorial integrity of Belize". Mr Price had asked that any proposals for a settlement of the issue "should be put directly to the people of Belize" and that "the Commonwealth should be associated with this process of consultation", and Dr Owen had agreed to these requests. Both sides had agreed that their aim was "early and secure independence for Belize".

Dr Owen said that while the British Government had "no intention of agreeing to a sell-out" he thought that it was right for the question of territorial adjustments to be considered as one possible means of resolving a problem which "can either be just left alone or [which] has to be grappled with". If, however, the people of Belize rejected a solution on this basis, the country would "remain a crown colony" and Britain would "defend [its] territorial integrity".

On the United States role in recent developments, Dr Owen said: "In the past a point of some major disagreement with successive United States Administrations has been the question of Guatemala. I pay tribute to the fact that this Administration, particularly Secretary of State Vance, have taken a great deal of interest in the problem, recognized it and want to see it resolved. Their help and involvement in it have been recognized by all sides. If agreement could be reached, the fact that it would be underwritten by the United States would be one of the greatest safeguards for an independent Belize."

The Price Government's position at the London talks had been endorsed on Jan. 24, 1978, by the national executive committee of the British Labour Party, which had unanimously passed an emergency resolution calling upon the Callaghan Government to support the territorial integrity of Belize.

Following Dr Owen's statement, Mr Price held a news conference later on Jan. 25, 1978, at which he said: "Our message to Dr Owen was simple—no cession of territory." He revealed that during the previous six months the British Government had considered various proposals for the cession to Guatemala of an area of southern territory (including seabed territory) which had been progressively reduced in size over this period as follows: (i) for a total of about 2,000 square miles (comprising land south of the Monkey River, plus seabed territory); (ii) for a total of about 1,500 square miles (land south of the Rio Grande, plus seabed territory); and (iii) for a total of about 1,000 square miles (land south of the Moho River, plus seabed territory). (The total land area of Belize, including offshore islets, is about 8,866 square miles.)



(*Financial Times*)

Hitherto, Mr Price went on, the Belizean Government had acceded to Britain's request to maintain the confidentiality of these proposals, but he now felt that "a point had been reached where the British were not going to alter the latest proposal", which envisaged the cession of about 300 square miles of land (i.e. south of the Moho River) and of about 700 square miles of seabed territory between the Moho River and Ranguana Cay, thus giving Guatemala sovereignty over a sea access route to its Caribbean port of Puerto Barrios [see accompanying map]. Oil prospecting was currently in progress in the area in question, although no discoveries had so far been announced.

Mr Price said that he understood that the US Government in particular held the view that the dispute with Guatemala could only be settled on the basis of the cession of territory, but that his own Government felt that "cession of land will create problems, not solve them". He added that in view of the failure of the London talks to produce an acceptable basis for a settlement his Government would now seek guarantees for Belize's security "from Caribbean countries".

Notwithstanding the outcome of the London talks, it was announced on Jan. 26, 1978, by the then Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Sr Adolfo Molina Orantes (speaking at the conclusion of three days of "detailed talks" with Mr Todman), that Guatemala and Britain had agreed to reopen "formal negotiations" on Belize, this development being widely regarded as indicating that both countries wished to reach a settlement before the expiry of the term of office of the present Guatemalan Government at the end of June 1978. Mr Rowlands travelled to Washington on Feb. 1, 1978, for further talks with Mr Vance and what were described as "informal consultations" with Sr Molina. Mr Rowlands subsequently informed Mr Price that he had undertaken "a full review" of the situation with Sr Molina, in reply to which Mr Price reiterated his Government's position "that our sovereignty and territory are not for negotiation".

The Prime Ministers of the Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago issued a joint statement on Feb. 7, 1978, expressing their "mounting concern" over the Belize question following the "inconclusive" outcome of the London talks between Dr Owen and Mr Price and also their "strong objection" to any proposal that Belizean territory might be ceded to Guatemala. It was nevertheless indicated on the following day by Guatemalan Foreign Ministry officials who had travelled to London "to correct misrepresentations of the Guatemalan position" that agreement was still anticipated on the basis of a territorial adjustment, subject to clarification of a proposal made by Mr Rowlands during his recent talks in Washington with Sr Molina that undertakings be sought from various third countries to provide international guarantees for such an agreement.

The Foreign Ministers of the six Commonwealth countries listed above held further consultations on Feb. 22-23, 1978, in the Belizean capital, Belmopan, having been invited by Mr Price to hold a meeting on Belizean territory for the first time. Mr Price subsequently left Belize on March 9 for visits to Venezuela, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, during which he told a press conference in Georgetown (Guyana) that Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and "a Spanish-speaking Latin American state" had indicated their readiness to consider participating in "multilateral security arrangements which would defend the territorial integrity of an independent Belize". Mr Price added that his Government had ruled out the possibility of requesting military aid from Cuba in order to avoid the creation of "an unnecessary problem" in its relations with the United States.

On March 24, 1978, Mr Price travelled to Washington to inform Mr Vance of this proposal for a multilateral security force, it being reported that the Belizean Government's intention was that such a force should be stationed in Belize in place of the existing British garrison prior to independence, and that it should be strong enough to permit the attainment of independence without the prior conclusion of a negotiated settlement with Guatemala. (See below for the recent establishment of a Belize Defence Force.)

The Guatemalan Government announced in late April 1978 that a further round of Anglo-Guatemalan talks was scheduled to take place in May 1978, whereupon a special national convention of the ruling PUP was summoned in Belize at which delegates gave overwhelming support to a resolution calling upon the British Government to "stop immediately any discussions with Guatemala which include land cession as a means of settlement". The convention instead gave its support to "the alternative route to independence by concluding suitable security arrangements which will ensure the safety of the Belizean people and preserve the independence of Belize".

Sr Molina confirmed in mid-May 1978 that Guatemala was maintaining its demand for a territorial cession, adding that its other demands in the present round of talks included the establishment of a joint Guatemala-Belize military staff, joint consultations on Belize's external relations, and the integration of Belize into the Central American economic system [for which see also 28153 A].

On June 2, 1978, Dr Owen had a meeting in New York with Mr Price and Mr Lindo at which a "memorandum of understanding" was drawn up whereby (i) the British Government undertook to invite the Belizean Government and opposition to participate in all future talks or negotiations with Guatemala; (ii) Britain agreed to submit any agreement which was reached in such negotiations to a national referendum in Belize; and (iii) Mr Price and Mr Lindo agreed "to put the issue of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute above party politics and treat the search for a solution as a national objective".

On July 1, 1978, Maj.-Gen. Fernando Lucas García said on his inauguration as President of Guatemala *vice* Gen. Kjell Laugerud García [see 29148 B] that his Government would "not back down in the defence of our legitimate territorial rights, above all with respect to Belize", but that it would "also assume civilized attitudes in order to achieve a peaceful and negotiated solution, taking into consideration the interests of Belizeans . . . [and] without acting behind the back of the Guatemalan people".

The first exploratory talks on Belize between Britain and the new Guatemalan Government took place in New York in late September 1978, and involved delegations led by Dr Owen, Sr Rafael Castillo Valdés (the new Guatemalan Foreign Minister), Mr Price and Mr Lindo. A British spokesman said after the talks that the atmosphere had been "a little more hopeful" than at previous sessions. The talks were preceded by a meeting between Dr Owen and the Commonwealth committee on Belize.

On Nov. 29, 1978, the British Government released to the UN decolonization committee the details of new settlement proposals which had been presented to Sr Castillo with the approval of Mr Price and Mr Lindo at the September meeting, but which had so far met with no response from Guatemala.

These proposals envisaged principally (i) that, having achieved independence on the basis of its existing borders, Belize would undertake not to introduce any measures regarding its offshore jurisdiction in the Bay of Amatique which would have the effect of blocking Guatemala's sea access to its Caribbean ports; (ii) Belize would undertake not to enter into any pacts with third countries without the agreement of Guatemala (this being seen as a response to Guatemalan fears of Cuban involvement in Belize); (iii) Guatemala would be granted preferential customs treatment in respect of trade conducted through the port of Belize City (thus meeting the Guatemalan Government's claim that the economic development of its northern department of Petén depended on access to such a trade route); and (iv) Britain would finance the construction of a new highway from Guatemala through Belize to the Caribbean (thus fulfilling a treaty obligation dating back to 1859 which was the original basis of Guatemala's territorial claim).

The joint British-Belizean proposals were on Dec. 1, 1978, rejected by Sr Castillo, who was reported as saying that Guatemala would "now deal directly with Belize itself".

On Dec. 13, 1978, the UN General Assembly for the first time adopted without any votes against a resolution (33/36) urging a settlement to the dispute on the basis of Belize's "right to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity". The resolution, which also expressed "deep regret" at the failure of recent negotiations, was supported by 128 states (including Colombia and Costa Rica), with 12 abstentions (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Israel, Japan, Mauritania, Paraguay, Spain, the United States and Uruguay). Countries which were absent for the vote, in addition to Guatemala, included El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

No further talks had taken place on the Belize issue by the time it was considered again by the 34th session of the UN General Assembly. As stated on page 30224, Resolution 34/38 was adopted by 134 votes to none with eight abstentions on Nov. 21, 1979; Latin American countries which voted for the first time in favour of Belize's right to self-determination included Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Nicaragua, while those absent for the vote included Bolivia and Honduras.

Mr Price visited London on Jan. 15, 1980, for talks with Mr Nicholas Ridley (who had succeeded Mr Rowlands as the responsible Minister of State following the change of government in Britain in May 1979) during which the current prospects for reopening talks with Guatemala were reviewed. Diplomatic contacts subsequently took place, reportedly involving the Governments of Panama and the United States in addition to those of Belize, Britain and Guatemala, in preparation for the holding of a fresh round of exploratory talks, which took place in Bermuda in mid-May. Details of this new initiative to resolve the dispute will be given in a subsequent article.

Formation of Belize Defence Force

In accordance with a decision taken two years previously, a Belize Defence Force (BDF) was established on Jan. 1, 1978, drawing its initial strength from the Belize Volunteer Guard and the paramilitary Police Special Force, which were disbanded on that date. The recurrent cost of the BDF was borne by the Belizean Government, while much of the capital cost was borne initially by the British Government. It was not envisaged that the BDF would reach a strength sufficient to permit it to replace the British garrison in Belize.—(Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Hansard - Insight - Latin America Political Report - Latin America Weekly Report - Economist - UN Office of Public Information, New York - Ministry of Overseas Development, London - Belize Government Information Service) (*Prev. rep. 1974 General Election 26914 B; Anglo-Guatemalan Negotiations 28617 A*)

A. RELIGION — World Council of Churches - Termination of Membership by Presbyterian Church of Ireland

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Ireland approved on June 5 by 433 votes to 327 a motion terminating the Church's membership of the World Council of Churches (WCC). Membership had been suspended since November 1978 following the authorization by the WCC's executive committee in the previous August of a grant of $85,000 from the special fund of the programme to combat racism (PCR) to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe [see 29544 A].—(Irish Times) (*Prev. rep. 29544 A*)

B. UNITED STATES — Democratic Gain in Special Congressional Election

The Democrats won a seat from the Republicans in the US House of Representatives in a special election held on May 17 in the Louisiana district left vacant by the election in December 1979 of Mr David Treen (Republican) as Governor of the state [see 30084 E].

The result was as follows: Mr William Tauzin (Democrat) 61,996; Mr James Donelon (Republican) 54,924—Democratic majority 7,072.—(International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. 1979 Special Election 29688 A*)

A. WEST GERMANY — Internal Security Developments - Continuing Investigations into Left-Wing Terrorist Groups - Extradition and Trial of Frau Proll - Change in West Berlin Senate - Activities of Neo-Nazi groups - Foreign Extremist Groups - "Bugging" Issue

The West German police and intelligence services continued during 1979 and early 1980 to pursue their investigations into the activities of organized left-wing terrorist groups, resulting in a number of arrests and also in the conviction of numerous persons on charges relating to such activities.

At the same time there was a growth of criminal activity among certain extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups in the Federal Republic, and also an occasionally violent polarization of political attitudes among certain organizations of foreigners living in the Federal Republic, resulting sometimes in open clashes or other dangers to public security.

Left-Wing Terrorist Groups

Dr Horst Herold, the president of the *Bundeskriminalamt* (BKA—Federal Criminal Office) said in May 1979 that 39 persons, including 31 alleged "hard-core" terrorists, were currently wanted by police in the Federal Republic in connexion with terrorist offences, and that 75-100 persons were thought to make up a "second circle" of assistants to these terrorists, providing inter alia cars and accommodation. Dr Herold added that about 1,000 persons were at that time under "observation search" (*Beobachtende Fahndung*—see page 29489) on suspicion of contact with such organizations.

Although the press reported no further major attacks by such groups on prominent persons or organizations after the end of 1977, terrorists were held responsible for a continuing series of bank raids in the Federal Republic, and many members of such organizations were still believed to be active.

The first terrorist group to be recognized as such had been the "Red Army Faction" (RAF), or "Baader-Meinhof group", which was formed in about 1968 and which was led until 1972 by Herr Andreas Baader and Frau Ulrike Meinhof [see 25434 A; 25804 B; 26465 A; 27019 A; 27158 A; 28914 A]. The RAF was believed to have been restructured during 1973, however, following the arrest in 1972 of Herr Baader, Frau Meinhof and several other "hard-core" members [see 25434 A], being at first reportedly directed by the "Haag-Mayer group" formed around the legal practice of Herr Siegfried Haag [see below], but also diversifying into such groups as (i) the "June 2 Movement" [see 27158 A and also below], which was thought to include many RAF members; (ii) the "Revolutionary Cells", which were thought to have been responsible for some 70 bomb and arson attacks between 1973 and mid-1978; and (iii) a number of subsidiary groups. The federal police believed that there was a considerable degree of co-operation between these groups, and that several groups were often involved in any particular incident.

Among the major activities undertaken by such groups since 1973 were (i) the murder of Herr Günter von Drenkmann, the President of the West Berlin Supreme Court, in November 1974, in apparent retaliation for the death of Herr Holger Meins, a suspected RAF member, after a hunger strike in prison [see 27019 A]; (ii) the kidnapping in February 1975 of Herr Peter Lorenz, the Christian Democratic (CDU) leader in Berlin, which resulted in the release of five convicted terrorists [see 27158 A]; (iii) the armed occupation of the West German embassy in Stockholm during April 1975 with a view to securing the release of left-wing activists, resulting in the deaths of four persons including two diplomats [see 27261 A]; (iv) the murder in April 1977 of the West German Chief Federal Prosecutor, Dr Siegfried Buback, shortly before the end of the trial of Herr Baader, Frau Gudrun Ensslin and Herr Jan-Carl Raspe on charges of murder and attempted murder [see page 28917]; (v) the murder of Dr Jürgen Ponto, a prominent West German banker, in an apparent kidnap attempt in July 1977 [see pages 28917-18]; and (vi) the kidnapping and subsequent murder in September-October 1977 of Dr Hanns-Martin Schleyer, president of the West German Federal Union of German Industry (BDI) and of the Federation of German Employers' Associations (BDA), associated with the hijacking of a Boeing 737 jet, both in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the release of suspected or convicted terrorists [see pages 28918-21].

Particular features of the trials of suspected terrorists during this period (many of which were held in the specially secured courts at Stuttgart-Stammheim and Berlin-Moabit) were the defendants' frequent rejection of the entire proceedings, resulting in protests and disturbances which often led to their removal from the trials; an increasing tendency to use procedural objections as a means of delaying the trials; and the increasing difficulties experienced by the court-appointed defence lawyers (*Pflichtverteidiger*) who, though compulsorily summoned to represent the accused, seldom enjoyed their confidence and became increasingly subject to physical attack.

Trials of Alleged Members of "June 2 Movement"

The trial opened in Berlin-Moabit on April 11, 1978 of Herr Ralf Reinders (29), Herr Ronald Fritsch (26), Herr Till Meyer (34), Herr Gerald Klöpper (34), Herr Fritz Teufel (34) and Herr Andreas Vogel (26), all of whom were accused of membership of the "June 2 Movement", and of numerous crimes including the murder of Herr von Drenkmann, participation in 10 bank raids and involvement in the kidnapping in 1977 of the Austrian industrialist, Herr Walter Michael Palmers [see page 28923]. The trial was still in progress on Jan. 1, 1980, however, when the presiding judge ordered that numerous minor charges should be dropped in view of the time expected to be involved in hearing all of the 599 prosecution witnesses.

A court in Vienna had meanwhile, on Feb. 18, 1979, sentenced three Austrian citizens to terms of imprisonment for their involvement in the kidnapping of Herr Palmers. Herr Thomas Gratt (22), Herr Reinhard Pitsch (24) and Herr Othmar Keplinger (21), who had been arrested in Vienna and on the Swiss-Italian border in November 1977 [see page 28923], received prison sentences of 15 years, 6½ years and five years respectively.

The Berlin trial was interrupted on May 27, 1978, by the temporary escape of Herr Meyer from the top-security prison in Moabit where he was being held—this in turn leading to the resignation of the West Berlin Senator for Justice.

Herr Meyer's escape followed the entry into the prison of two armed women who, posing as lawyers, gained uncontrolled access to Herr Meyer and Herr Vogel, whereupon they overpowered guards and left the prison with Herr Meyer (Herr Vogel being confined in his cell when a guard slammed its door before he could escape).

Herr Meyer was recaptured on June 20 at a holiday resort in Bulgaria, having been recognized by a warder from Moabit prison who was staying there. His trial was resumed in West Berlin on June 27, being temporarily separated from that of the other five accused, and he rejoined the main proceedings on July 20.

Also arrested in Bulgaria with Herr Meyer were Frau Gabriele Rollnik (who had escaped from Moabit prison in 1976—see 28059 A), Frau Angelika Goder (28) and Frau Gudrun Stürmer (27), all of whom were subsequently charged with aiding his escape [see below].

The four suspects were arrested by a West German *Zielfahndung* (target search) squad, with the apparent co-operation of the Bulgarian authorities (which do not subscribe to Interpol), and were extradited to the Federal Republic on June 22. Herr Gerhart Baum, the Federal Minister of the Interior, on the same day publicly thanked the Bulgarian authorities for their assistance in the capture.

Frau Rollnik, Frau Goder and Frau Stürmer were on July 18, 1978, charged—together with Herr Klaus Viehmann (24), a bookshop owner who had been arrested on June 6—with belonging to a criminal association, with participation in numerous bank raids and with involvement in the kidnapping of Herr Lorenz and also of Herr Palmers. Frau Rollnik was further accused of involvement in the murder of Herr von Drenkmann. The four defendants' trial opened in West Berlin on Feb. 21, 1980.

Herr Meyer's escape led to increasing allegations in the West Berlin Senate that security provisions at Moabit prison had been severely inadequate, despite recent extensive modifications to the buildings, and the Senator for Justice, Prof. Jürgen Baumann (Free Democrat—FDP), announced on July 3, 1978, his resignation from office, being succeeded on July 6 by Herr Gerhard-Moritz Meyer (FDP), who had been Justice Senator in Hamburg from February 1977 until June 1978 [see 28420 A; 29227 A]. (Prof. Baumann's predecessor as Senator for Justice in West Berlin, Herr Hermann Oxfort, had in July 1976 also resigned over the escape from Moabit prison of four prisoners including Frau Rollnik—see 28059 A.)

A court in West Berlin on July 27, 1979, confirmed sentences imposed in June 1976 on six persons found guilty of the murder in 1974 of Herr Ulrich Schmücker, a former member of the "June 2 Movement" [see page 27020], after his implication of members of the group in terrorist activities. Frau Ilse Jandt (41) was thus sentenced to life imprisonment, while five persons who had been juveniles at the time of the murder received prison sentences of between four and eight years. The retrial of the accused had been ordered because of a procedural error.

Frau Sieglinde Hoffmann (35) and Frau Ingrid Barabass (29), who were both believed to be members of the "June 2 Movement", were arrested in Paris on May 5, 1980, together with three other women, following a raid by French police. Frau Barabass was suspected of involvement in the kidnapping of Herr Palmers and in several bank raids [see page 28923], and Frau Hoffman was wanted in connexion with the murder of Dr Ponto, having been also one of the four suspected terrorists arrested by Yugoslavian police in May 1978 but subsequently released [see page 29490].

The Federal Ministry of Justice confirmed on May 19 that an application had been made for the extradition of Frau Hoffmann and Frau Barabass to the Federal Republic, and that investigations into the activities of the other three women were also under way.

Trials of Lawyers

Herr Klaus Croissant, a lawyer who had on several occasions acted for the defence of members of the Baader-Meinhof group, was on Feb. 16, 1979, sentenced by a court in Stuttgart to 30 months' imprisonment after being convicted of supporting a criminal organization by abusing his status as a defence lawyer to carry messages between imprisoned terrorists and those still at liberty. Herr Croissant was also banned for a period of four years from practising as a lawyer. His appeals against both parts of the sentence were rejected by the Federal High Court in Karlsruhe on Nov. 14, but he was released from prison on Dec. 5, 1979, under a Christmas amnesty in Baden-Württemberg, having spent a total of 29 months in prison since his initial arrest.

Herr Croissant had first been arrested in June 1975 [see page 28923] and again in July 1976, but had on both occasions been subsequently released from investigative custody. Following his abortive attempt in July 1977 to obtain political asylum in France [ibid.], he was extradited in November 1977 to the Federal Republic where he was charged in Stuttgart with supporting a criminal organization by acting as its courier [see page 28924].

Two lawyers formerly employed by Herr Croissant were convicted by a court in Stuttgart on Jan. 31, 1980, of supporting a terrorist organization and of smuggling into Stammheim prison inter alia the guns with which two founder members of the Baader-Meinhof group, Herr Baader and Herr Raspe, killed themselves in October 1977 [see page 28920]. Herr Arndt Müller received a prison sentence of four years and eight months, while Herr Armin Newerla was imprisoned for 3½ years. Both were banned for five years from practising as lawyers [see also pages 28924; 29497].

A court at Stuttgart-Stammheim on July 11, 1979, sentenced Herr Siegfried Haag, a lawyer, and Herr Roland Mayer to prison sentences of 14 and 12 years respectively following their conviction on charges of leading a terrorist organization, the "Haag-Mayer group", which, according to the court's verdict, had been involved in the planning of the 1977 kidnapping of Dr Schleyer. The court also sentenced Frau Sabine Schmitz to 32 months' imprisonment for membership of the group.

Herr Haag, Herr Mayer and Frau Schmitz had been arrested in November and December 1976 [see pages 28924; 29497], and had been charged in September 1978 with the formation of the group.

Herr Haag was on Dec. 19, 1979, also sentenced by a court in Stuttgart-Stammheim to a further prison sentence of 15 years, to run consecutively with the earlier sentence, after his conviction on charges of obtaining weapons which were used in the 1975 attack on the West German embassy in Stockholm.

The trial commenced in Berlin on May 27, 1980, of Herr Hans-Christian Ströbele, a Berlin lawyer and former associate of Herr Croissant, who was accused of supporting a criminal association, particularly by establishing an "information centre" and conspirative communication systems for the use of RAF members. Herr Ströbele had been arrested together with Herr Croissant in June 1975 [see page 27264], but had been released from custody in August 1975 [see page 28924], being allowed to continue with his activities as a lawyer pending his trial.

Extradition of Frau Proll from United Kingdom - Conviction by West German Court and Subsequent Release

Frau Astrid Proll (32), one of the founder members of the Baader-Meinhof group, was on Feb. 22, 1980, convicted by a court in Frankfurt of armed bank robbery and of uttering forged documents, but was acquitted of the attempted murder of two police officers before her arrest in Frankfurt in February 1971 [see pages 28921; 29494], on suspicion of having inter alia driven the escape car used in the release from detention of Herr Baader in 1970 [see 25434 A]. Frau Proll was fined 4,500 Deutsche Marks ($2,600) and sentenced to 5½ years' imprisonment, the latter punishment being suspended in view of the fact that she had already spent a total of more than four years in investigative custody.

Frau Proll had originally been brought to trial in 1973 after two years in police detention, but her trial had subsequently been suspended due to her ill health. She had absconded from a sanatorium in 1974 and had made her way to England where she had in 1975 married a British citizen, Mr Robin Puttick, under an assumed name. Following her arrest in London in September 1978, she had attempted to contest a West German application for her extradition to the Federal Republic by claiming the right to British nationality through her marriage to Mr Puttick [see page 29494], and hence to immunity from extradition.

The Family Division of the High Court in London decided on May 8, 1979, that, although her marriage was legal, Frau Proll's use of an assumed name to obtain various documents constituted an offence under the Perjury Act. The president of the Family Division, Sir George Baker, consequently refused to make a formal declaration of her British nationality, and Frau Proll on June 19 formally withdrew her appeal against her extradition following an offer made to her by the Ministry of Justice in Hesse that she would be tried quickly and that she would be leniently treated if she could convince the court in Frankfurt of a sincere change of attitude towards terrorism. (Frau Proll had repeatedly asserted such a change since her arrest in England.) She was extradited to the Federal Republic on June 23, and her trial opened in Frankfurt on Sept. 19.

Having declined to call as a witness one of the two policemen on whom she was alleged to have fired (on the grounds that he was a counter-intelligence officer whose identity was to be kept secret), the Federal Prosecution asked the court to find Frau Proll not guilty of attempted murder following considerable doubt as to whether she had carried a gun at the time of the shooting incident. Herr Manfred Grashof, who had been with her at the time of the shooting and had since been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder [see page 28922], denied that she had fired a gun, and two counter-intelligence officers who had witnessed the incident also supported this account. Two other convicted members of the Baader-Meinhof group, Herr Horst Mahler and Frau Irene Görgens, refused to testify to the court and were both fined for contempt.

Further Developments concerning Suspected Left-Wing Terrorists

Details are given below of developments—including arrests and trials (in some cases outside West Germany)—relating to certain other persons suspected of involvement in left-wing terrorist activities.

Frau Elisabeth von Dyck (28), who was wanted in connexion inter alia with the murder of Dr Schleyer [see page 28921] and with the attack on the embassy in Stockholm [see page 28924], was shot dead by Bavarian police officers in Nuremberg on May 6, 1979. Frau von Dyck was said by police to have drawn a gun when confronted in her flat, which was later found to contain the fingerprints of five other suspected terrorists, Herr Christian Klar, Herr Rolf Heissler [see below], Herr Werner Lotze, Frau Monika Helbing and Frau Adelheid Schulz.

Herr Rolf Heissler (31), who was wanted in connexion with crimes including the murder of Dr Schleyer, and who was thought to belong to the "Haag-Mayer group", was arrested in Frankfurt on June 9, 1979, after being shot in the head by police officers.

Herr Stefan Wisniewski (26), who had been arrested in Paris in May 1978 and immediately deported to the Federal Republic [see page 29493], was on Nov. 5, 1979, charged by the Chief Federal Prosecutor, Dr Kurt Rebmann, with the kidnapping and murder of Dr Schleyer. No date was set for the trial, which was to take place in Düsseldorf. It was confirmed by the Rhineland-Palatinate Ministry of Justice on April 1, 1980, that Herr Wisniewski had on March 28 attacked a prison warder in an unsuccessful attempt to escape from the detention centre at Frankenthal (near Mannheim) where he had been held since his deportation. (He had in September 1978 already been sentenced to eight months' imprisonment for assaulting a judge and causing bodily harm—see page 29493.)

Herr Rolf-Clemens Wagner (35), who was also wanted in West Germany in connexion with the murder of Dr Schleyer, was on March 20, 1980, charged by the state prosecution in Zurich, Switzerland, with murder, attempted murder, robbery, blackmail and endangering life. Herr Wagner had been arrested on Nov. 19, 1979, shortly after a bank raid in the course of which a woman bystander had been killed and four persons, including two police officers, had been wounded. Three other attackers had escaped undetected. (Herr Wagner had been one of the four suspected West German terrorists who had been arrested in May 1978 by police in Yugoslavia, but who had subsequently been released following the failure of the Yugoslav and West German authorities to reach agreement on their extradition to the Federal Republic in exchange for eight Yugoslav émigrés living in the Federal Republic and wanted for alleged crimes in Yugoslavia—see pages 29490-93 and also below.) It was announced on Jan. 24, 1980, that the West German authorities had submitted an application for the extradition of Herr Wagner to the Federal Republic, although the Swiss authorities pointed out that, as in the case of another West German terrorist recently convicted by a Swiss court (Frau Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann—see pages 29493-94), Herr Wagner would be obliged to serve most of any sentence passed in Switzerland before becoming eligible for extradition.

Herr Knut Folkerts, who was likewise among those suspected of involvement in the murder of Dr Schleyer, was on Aug. 29, 1979, charged by the Federal Prosecution in Stuttgart with membership of a criminal association and with participation in the murder of Dr Buback; in an attempted rocket attack on the Chief Federal Prosecutor's office in August 1977 [see page 29493]; and in the armed robbery of weapons from an arms dealer in Frankfurt in July 1977. His trial opened in Stuttgart on May 20, 1980. Herr Folkerts had in December 1977 been sentenced by a Dutch court to 20 years' imprisonment for the murder and attempted murder of police officers [see page 28921] and had in October 1978 been extradited to the Federal Republic [see page 29493]. The Dutch authorities had, however, when allowing the extradition, stipulated that he should not be charged in connexion with the Schleyer murder case because of the political aspects of the associated blackmail attempt.

Frau Angelika Speitel, who was also suspected of involvement in the murder of Dr Schleyer, Dr Ponto and Dr Buback (police investigation of these cases being still in progress), was on Nov. 30, 1979, sentenced by the *Oberlandesgericht* (supreme *Land* court) in Düsseldorf to two terms of life imprisonment after her conviction on charges of the murder and attempted murder of police officers in the course of her arrest near Dortmund in September 1978 [see page 29495]. Frau Speitel, a former employee of Herr Croissant, and later of Herr Haag, was described by the prosecution as a particularly active member of the RAF.

Frau Kristina Berster (27), a former member of the Heidelberg "Socialist Patients' Collective" which had been closely involved with the early RAF, was arrested on July 16, 1978, at the Canadian-US border after attempting to enter the United States with a forged Iranian passport. Frau Berster had spent seven months in investigative custody in the Federal Republic during 1971, and had been due to stand trial, together with other members of the collective, on charges of belonging to a criminal organization, planning a bomb attack and using forged identity papers. A warrant had been issued for her arrest in April 1973 following her failure to appear for trial, and a new warrant issued in July 1973 had alleged also forgery and receipt of stolen goods. Frau Berster was sentenced on Feb. 9, 1979, to nine months' imprisonment for attempted illegal entry to the United States, following her conviction by a court at Burlington, Vermont. This period would normally have elapsed on Feb. 23 due to allowance of the time which she had already spent in custody, but she was further detained pending a decision on the West German authorities' request for her extradition to the Federal Republic. Frau Berster at first claimed political asylum in the USA, but returned voluntarily to the Federal Republic on Nov. 1, following the withdrawal during the previous month of a warrant for her arrest and of the request for her extradition.

Herr Borvin Wulf (40), who had in March 1977 been sentenced to 5½ years' imprisonment for a bomb attack in Hamburg in 1975 [see page 29496], but had subsequently been released pending an appeal against the verdict, was re-arrested in Norderstedt, near Hamburg, on March 17, 1979. Herr Wulf had disappeared after his conditional release, but the Federal Prosecution in Hamburg had ordered that he should complete the sentence following the failure of his appeal.

Frau Christine Kuby (22) was sentenced on May 2, 1979, to life imprisonment after being convicted by a court in Hamburg of the attempted murder of two police officers who had tried to arrest her while leaving a shop in Hamburg on Jan. 21, 1978. Frau Kuby, who was arrested shortly afterwards [see page 28921], claimed during her trial an allegiance to the RAF, and had been among the persons listed on Jan. 10, 1978, by the BKA as suspected of terrorist activities.

Frau Irmgard Möller and **Herr Bernhard Braun,** who were both regarded by the federal police as founder members of the RAF, were sentenced on May 31, 1979, to terms of life imprisonment and 12 years' imprisonment respectively after being convicted by the Heidelberg *Landgericht* (sitting in Stammheim prison for reasons of security —see page 28922) of crimes including a bomb attack at the United States European military headquarters in Heidelberg in May 1972, in which three persons were killed, and also an attack on a federal judge, Herr Wolfgang Buddenberg, in which his wife was injured [see page 25434]. Frau Möller had been arrested in July 1972 [see page 25435], and had in March 1976 been sentenced to 4½ years' imprisonment for membership of a criminal organization [see page 28922]. Herr Braun, who had been arrested in June 1972 [see page 25435], had received in August 1974 a 4½-year sentence for illegal possession of arms and membership of an criminal organization [see 27019 A].

The trial commenced in Düsseldorf on Aug. 6, 1979, of **Herr Norbert Kröcher** (29—the husband of Frau Kröcher-Tiedemann) and of **Herr Manfred Adomeit** (29), both of whom had been charged inter alia with conspiring with others during 1975 to kidnap the then Swedish Minister without Portfolio, Fru Anna-Greta Leijon [see pages 27262; 28917; 29366-67], following her authorization of the deportation to the Federal Republic of the five West German terrorists who had occupied the West German embassy in Stockholm.

The trial commenced on Karlsruhe on Oct. 3, 1979, of **Frau Brigitte Heinrich** (38), who was charged with stealing hand grenades and mines from Swiss army depots during 1973 and 1974 [see pages 29494-95] and with passing them to a subsidiary group of the RAF.

Frau Marion Folkerts (28), the sister-in-law of Herr Knut Folkerts and the wife of Herr Uwe Folkerts [see page 29496], was on Oct. 17, 1979, sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment following her conviction by the court in Stuttgart-Stammheim on charges of forging documents. A charge of belonging to a criminal association was not sustained against Frau Folkerts, who had in 1976 been arrested in France and deported to the Federal Republic [see page 29493].

The trial began on Feb. 28, 1980, in Düsseldorf of **Herr Christoph Wackernagel** (28) and **Herr Gerd Schneider** (31), both of whom were accused of belonging to a criminal organization and of the attempted murder of three Dutch police officers during their arrest in November 1977 in Amsterdam [see page 28921]. The two men had been extradited in October 1978 to the Federal Republic [see page 29493].

Herr Klaus Dorff (29) and **Herr Jürgen Tauras** (27), who had in 1978 been sentenced to 13 years' and 7½ years' imprisonment respectively for firearms offences and a series of bank raids [see page 29496], were submitted in Frankfurt on April 22, 1980, for retrial, following the ruling of the Federal High Court in Karlsruhe on Dec. 28, 1979, that their original trial had been improperly conducted. The Federal High Court ordered, however, that the additional charge of forming a criminal organization should now be preferred against them.

A 10-year prison sentence imposed in 1972 on a member of the RAF, **Herr Werner Hoppe** [see page 27261], was commuted on July 19, 1979, to a five-year suspended sentence in view of his poor health. Herr Hoppe, who had been arrested in 1971 at the time of the shooting of Frau Petra Schelm by police in Hamburg [see 25434 A], had been convicted on three counts of attempted murder, but had become seriously ill in prison and had been allowed an interruption of his sentence in February 1979 due to his continuing loss of weight. Earlier, the *Oberlandesgericht* in Frankfurt had on June 25, 1979, imposed prison sentences of 10-12 months on nine of the 11 persons who had on Nov. 6, 1978, forcibly occupied the Frankfurt offices of the German Press Agency (DPA) in order to protest at the conditions under which Herr Hoppe and Herr Karl-Heinz Dellwo (who had in 1976 received a sentence of life imprisonment for his involvement in the attack on the embassy in Stockholm—see page 28922) were being held. The court had interpreted the DPA occupiers' call for "the escalation of guerrilla activities" as open canvassing for a terrorist organization.

Extreme Right-Wing Groups

During 1979 and early 1980 the federal authorities adopted a series of measures against extreme right-wing organizations in West Germany, including the banning of the largest known neo-Nazi group, the *Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann* [see below] and the confiscation of considerable quantities of weapons belonging to such groups, as well as a number of prosecutions under the laws banning the propagation of national socialist ideas.

Although the national membership of known extreme right-wing groups fell slightly during 1979 from 17,600 to 17,300, and although in particular the National Democratic Party (NPD) continued to lose popular support (as evidenced in elections to *Land* parliaments), there had been a marked increase since 1976 in the number of reported offences by right-wing activists in the Federal Republic. A study published during July 1979 by the Federal Ministry of the Interior claimed that, whereas in 1977 a total of 616 such offences had been reported, the figure for 1978 had risen to 992; a subsequent estimate by the Ministry of the Interior assessed the total number of such offences during 1979 at some 1,500. Many of the offences involved the fly-posting of illegal racist or national socialist propaganda, or the wearing of Nazi uniforms or insignia, but an increasing number of acts of violence were also reported.

Two bomb explosions severely damaged television transmitters in Koblenz and Münster on Jan. 19, 1979, during the transmission of the American television series "Holocaust", which dealt with the treatment of Jews during the National Socialist era. One of the television companies concerned, Westdeutsche Rundfunk, had received several anonymous and anti-Semitic threats prior to the transmission.

The federal police announced on Jan. 31, 1979, the finding of an extensive hoard of weapons, explosives and national socialist propaganda during a raid on six flats in North Rhine-Westphalia. Five members of an unnamed right-wing group were arrested during the raid, which led police also to the discovery of some 600 kilograms of plastic explosive in another flat in Hesse.

A bomb severely damaged a hall in Stuttgart on Feb. 22, 1980, during an exhibition on the Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the "German Action Groups", which described the exhibition as "anti-German agitation".

Federal police on Jan. 30, 1980, confiscated an armoured vehicle, an anti-aircraft gun, large quantities of firearms and ammunition and other military equipment in a co-ordinated search of 23 premises in Bavaria, Hesse and Baden-Württemberg, following the banning on the same day of the "Hoffmann military sport group" (*Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann*) by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. No arrests were made.

The activities of the organization, which was believed to have some 400 members, included paramilitary manoeuvres at a castle near Nuremberg which, according to the Minister of the Interior, Herr Gerhart Baum, were an element in the formation of an illegal military unit.

The group's leader, Herr Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, had in 1977 received a suspended prison sentence for his involvement in attacks on left-wing students at Tübingen University, and had also in November 1979 been convicted of wearing Nazi insignia and an illegal uniform in public.

A court in West Berlin had earlier, on July 10, 1979, sentenced 10 persons to terms of imprisonment after finding them guilty of founding and running a national socialist party in the city between 1976 and 1978. The group's leader, Herr Wolfgang Rahl, was imprisoned for three years, while the other nine members of the group received prison sentences of between six and 14 months.

Eight members of an extreme right-wing group were sentenced in West Berlin on Nov. 4, 1979, to terms of between four and 14 months' imprisonment after being found guilty on a number of charges including violent assault, illegal possession of weapons and the propagation of Nazi ideas.

The Celle *Oberlandesgericht* on Sept. 13, 1979, imposed prison sentences of up to 11 years on six men after their conviction on charges of forming a terrorist neo-Nazi organization which had carried out a series of raids on banks and on military installations in the Federal Republic. The trial, which had taken place under conditions of strict security in Bückeburg prison, was the first in which members of a right-wing organization were found guilty of terrorist activity.

Herr Lothar Schulte and Herr Lutz Wegener, who received prison sentences of 11 years and eight years respectively, were found guilty of participation in seven raids on NATO military bases and of causing explosions. Herr Uwe Rohwer and Herr Klaus-Dieter Puls received sentences of nine years each for causing explosions, while Herr Manfred Börm received a seven-year sentence for membership of the organization. Herr Michael Kühnen, a former lieutenant in the Federal Army and the founder of another right-wing group, was found not guilty of belonging to the group but received a four-year sentence for wearing Nazi uniform and propagating racial hatred. The court's acquittal of Herr Kühnen on the charge of belonging to the organization was overridden, however, on Nov. 22, 1979, by the Federal High Court in Karlsruhe, which ordered that he should be retried. Herr Kühnen, Herr Schulte and Herr Wegener appealed against the Celle court's verdicts on Sept. 20.

Extremist Organizations among Foreigners in the Federal Republic

The Federal Ministry of the Interior published in October 1979 a report in which it claimed the existence of about 145 extremist organizations of foreigners in the Federal Republic with a total of some 93,000 members. The report had been prompted by growing public concern at increasingly frequent acts of violence particularly among Iranians and Palestinians in the Federal Republic, but also involving members of Turkish and Yugoslav organizations.

About 200 people, including some 70 policemen, were injured on Nov. 25, 1978, during a demonstration in Frankfurt which had been called by the Confederation of Iranian Students (CISNU) to protest at West Germany's alleged economic support for the (then ruling) Shah of Iran and his Government. (The West German Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr Otto Graf Lambsdorff, had in October 1978 expressed his country's support for the Shah—see page 29735.) During the demonstration about 7,000 students, including between 1,000 and 2,000 Iranians, attempted to storm the United States consulate-general, whereupon the apparently premeditated armed confrontations broke out.

Windows of the Frankfurt office of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) to which Dr Graf Lambsdorff belonged, were damaged in the early hours of Dec. 7, 1978, in an attack whose perpetrators left a message linking him with the Shah.

A further demonstration against the Shah took place in Hamburg on Dec. 10, 1978 (despite an official ban), having been called by CISNU as well as by various German left-wing groups, and resulted in six injuries. An earlier attempt to hold a similar (banned) demonstration in Mannheim on Dec. 3 had been prevented by the arrest of 49 people.

Two Palestinians, Mr Mohammed Hamade and Mr Salim Seyaan, were on July 20, 1979, each sentenced by the Passau *Landgericht* (sitting in Straubing prison, Bavaria, for reasons of security) to 2½ years' imprisonment for causing explosions and for entering the Federal Republic on April 27 with forged passports while carrying some 40 kilograms of explosives. Two Iranians arrested in connexion with the incident were each sentenced to four months' imprisonment after being found guilty of forgery and illegal entry. Mr Hamade had claimed during the trial to be a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Six Palestinians were on April 24, 1980, sentenced by a court in West Berlin to prison sentences of between two and 3½ years following their conviction on charges of conspiring to cause an explosion at a fuel oil depot in Lankwitz (West Berlin). A seventh person who had been freed pending his trial had disappeared after giving evidence against the other six accused.

In an earlier incident 12 people were injured, two of them seriously, in an explosion which occurred in the Lufthansa mail handling centre at the Rhine-Main airport near Frankfurt on April 3, 1979. The Federal Prosecutor's Office said on April 4 that the explosion had been caused by a parcel addressed to a person in Tel Aviv, Israel.

The West German news magazine *Der Spiegel* published in October 1979 an article in which it claimed that several suspected members of the PLO, including the four above-mentioned persons in Straubing prison, had been visited during their confinement by members of the Israeli secret service. The head of the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*—BND), Dr Klaus Kinkel, confirmed on Oct. 31 that Israeli agents had acted as interpreters in the interrogation of alleged PLO members, but stressed that the decision to allow this had been taken at a lower level without his knowledge; he added that Israeli intelligence had itself contributed to the arrest of the four persons in Straubing prison. The Syrian, Iraqi, Kuwaiti and Egyptian ambassadors to the Federal Republic were called on Oct. 31 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn to discuss the matter, while the Bavarian Minister of the Interior, Herr Gerold Tandler, said on Nov. 6 that 11 such interrogations had taken place in Bavaria, but stressed that it was the *Land* criminal investigation office and not the BND which had been present at all times during the interrogations.

Five of the six Palestinians held in West Berlin [see above] also claimed in November 1979, during their trial, to have been similarly approached by Israeli agents during their interrogation by the federal authorities.

The Federal High Court in Karlsruhe confirmed on Jan. 16, 1980, the six-month suspended sentence passed by a court in Cologne on Feb. 1, 1979, on Mr Stjepan Bilandzic, a Croatian nationalist, after his conviction on charges of illegal possession of arms [see page 29491]. The court thus rejected an appeal made by the Federal Prosecution on Feb. 9 against the leniency of the sentence, but upheld the prosecution's appeal against the acquittal of his brother, Mr Ivan Bilandzic, on similar charges, ordering that he should be retried.

Mr Stjepan Bilandzic had been one of the eight Yugoslav émigrés whose extradition had been requested in 1978 in return for the four West German terrorists held in Zagreb [see page 29490 and above].

Mr Ivan Ljubomir Dragoja, another exiled Croat whose extradition had been requested in 1978 by the Yugoslav authorities [see page 29491], was on Dec. 20, 1979, sentenced in absentia by a court in Sarajevo (Yugoslavia) to 15 years' imprisonment for the formation and leadership of a terrorist organization. (Five other men were sentenced by the court to terms of between five and 13 years' imprisonment for their membership of Mr Dragoja's organization.) The West German Federal Government had refused on Dec. 15 a renewed request for Mr Dragoja's extradition to Yugoslavia in view of its own continuing investigations into his activities.

The "Bugging" Issue

A special commission appointed in March 1978 by the *Bundestag* (Lower House of the Federal Parliament) to examine cases of illegal telephone tapping by the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*—MAD—see page 29009) presented its final report on April 11, 1980, in which it called for the general improvement of Post Office equipment and procedures to prevent such illegal monitoring. The report said, however, that no progress had been made in the search for the persons who had in January 1978 passed to a West German newspaper an illegal transcript of a 1976 telephone conversation between the leader of the (Bavarian) Christian Social Union (CSU), Herr Franz-Josef Strauss, and the CSU newspaper *Bayernkurier* [see page 29009].

Herr Günter Wallraff, a prominent West German writer and investigative journalist, issued a writ against the Federal Ministry of the Interior on Aug. 14, 1979, in which he alleged that his telephone had been illegally tapped by the Ministry in 1974.

Herr Wallraff had published extensive reports on the editorial practices of the West German newspaper *Bild Zeitung*, and claimed also to have uncovered evidence of unpublicized contacts between Herr Strauss and right-wing groups in other countries.

The Ministry of the Interior confirmed that Herr Wallraff's telephone had been monitored from March to May 1974, following his alleged contact with the suspected terrorist Frau Margrit Schiller, who was then still at large [see 26465 A], but maintained that the action had complied with the 1968 legislation on telephone tapping in cases of suspected danger to the national security [see page 23015], which legislation had, on Sept. 6, 1978, also received the approval of the European Court of Human Rights.—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - Guardian - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. Left-Wing Terrorism 29489 A; Foreign Groups 25434 A, 25579 A, 28175 A, 29489 A; Extreme Right-Wing Groups 25434 A; "Bugging" Issue 29009 A, 29489 A*)

A. UNITED STATES — Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act - Provisions and Enactment - Other Energy Legislation and Proposals

President Carter signed on April 2, 1980, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act imposing a tax on US oil producers to offset increased earnings caused by his decision gradually to decontrol the price of domestic crude oil, thus allowing it to rise to world petroleum levels.

Proposals to institute some form of windfall profit tax had first been put forward by President Nixon [see 26568 A] immediately following the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil price increase of 1973 [see 26224 A]; similar proposals had subsequently been advanced by both President Ford [see 26933 A] and President Carter [see 28478 A], but legislation including the 1978 National Energy Act [see 29452 A] had not incorporated any such tax.

Background to Legislation

The decision to decontrol domestic oil prices and to introduce the windfall profits tax had been announced by the President on April 5, 1979, in a nationwide television address.

In this address Mr Carter said: "Our nation's energy problem is serious and it's getting worse. We are wasting too much energy, we are buying far too much oil from foreign countries, and we are not producing enough oil, gas or coal in the United States. To control energy price, production and distribution, the federal bureaucracy and red tape have become so complicated it's almost unbelievable. Energy prices are high and going higher, no matter what we do. The use of coal and solar energy, which are in plentiful supply, is lagging far behind their great potential. The recent accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania [on March 28, 1979—see 30287 A] has demonstrated dramatically that we have other energy problems.

"What can we do? We can solve these problems together. Federal government price controls now hold down our own production and encourage waste and increasing dependence on foreign oil. Present law requires that these federal government controls on oil be removed by September 1981, and the law gives me the authority at the end of next month to carry out this decontrol process. In order to minimize sudden economic shock, I have decided that phased decontrol of oil prices will begin on June 1 and continue at a fairly uniform rate over the next 28 months. The immediate effect of this action will be to increase production of oil and gas in our own country. As government controls end, prices will go up on oil already discovered, and unless we tax the oil companies, they will reap huge and undeserved windfall profits. We must impose a windfall profits tax on the oil companies to capture part of this money for the American people. This tax money will go into an energy security fund, and will be used to protect low income families from energy price increases, to build a more efficient mass transportation system, and to put American genius to work solving our long-range energy problems."

Further details of the decisions were given in an energy fact sheet issued by the White House in conjunction with the President's speech.

On decontrol of prices the fact sheet stated: "Oil now under price controls falls into two basic categories: generally, lower tier, or old oil, which is defined as oil discovered and in production prior to 1973, and upper tier, or new oil, which includes all non-exempt oil found thereafter. Certain categories of oil are now effectively exempt from price controls, including oil from wells producing less than 10 barrels per day, Alaska North Slope oil production [see 28640 A] and oil from US-owned reserves such as Elk Hills national petroleum reserve in California [see pages 26226; 26933]. Approximately two-thirds of all domestically produced oil is now under price controls. The remaining one-third falls into one of the exemption categories. Lower tier oil now sells for about $6 per barrel, upper tier for about $13. [For OPEC prices then current, see pages 29986-90.]

"*The Decontrol Schedule.* As of June 1, 1979, newly discovered oil will be permitted to receive the world market price. While only a small amount of oil will be included in this category, at first, as new reserves are found and developed, newly discovered oil will contribute increasingly to US supplies. The Department of Energy has promulgated a rule under which, as of June 1, 1979, 80 per cent of all production from 'marginal' wells may be sold at the upper tier price. Marginal wells are those wells which produce below a certain volume of oil per day depending upon the depth of the well. . . . On Jan. 1, 1980, the remaining 20 per cent of production from marginal wells will be released to the upper tier price. Effective June 1, 1979, any incremental new production from wells employing specified enhanced recovery techniques (e.g. tertiary recovery) may receive the world price. Beginning on Jan. 1, 1980, producers who invest in enhanced recovery projects may release specified volumes of lower tier oil to the upper tier price in order to finance that investment. Beginning on Jan. 1, 1980, the upper tier oil price will increase in equal monthly increments until it reaches the world price on Oct. 1, 1981. The Department of Energy has today promulgated a rule under which, as of Jan. 1, 1980, lower tier oil will be permitted to decline at a rate of 3 per cent per month. Between June 1, 1979, and Jan. 1, 1980, the decline rate will equal 1½ per cent per month, a rate equal to the natural decline rate experienced by lower tier wells in 1978. . . . The President retains the authority to adjust price controls in any way necessary."

The fact sheet added that the windfall profits tax, to be levied at an average rate of 50 per cent, would apply to producer revenues (i) from the sale of uncontrolled oil which were attributable to any future OPEC price increases and (ii) from the sale of lower and upper tier oil which were attributable to decontrol.

Congressional Proceedings on Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act

The President's proposals were sent to Congress on April 26, 1979, and Bills providing for taxes of $277,000 million (60 per cent rate) and of $178,000 million (38 per cent rate) were passed by the House of Representatives by voice vote and by the Senate by 74 votes to 24 on June 28 and Dec. 17 respectively. The final version, incorporating a figure of $227,300 million—having been approved by a House-Senate conference committee on Feb. 26, 1980—was passed by the House on March 13 by 302 votes to 107 and by the Senate by 66 votes to 31 on March 27. The legislation's main provisions were as follows:

Tax Structure. The tax rate ranged from 30 per cent to 70 per cent of the windfall, defined as the difference between the selling price per barrel and a base price averaging between $12.81 and $16.55, adjusted annually for inflation, depending on the type of oil, the date when the well was first tapped, the method of production and the nature of the producer. The major oil companies, which marketed their own oil, would pay $204,770 million as against $22,530 million by the smaller independents, which did not transport or sell their own oil. The tax would begin to phase out in January 1988 or in the month after the total figure of $227,300 million had been collected, whichever was later.

Division of Revenues. This would be as follows: $136,400 million (60 per cent) would be set aside for business and personal tax reduction; $34,100 million (15 per cent) would be spent on energy development and mass transportation programmes; and $56,800 million (25 per cent) would be given to the poor to help with increased energy costs, with $3,150 being paid out in fiscal year 1981.

Other Energy Proposals and Legislation

Details are given below of other energy proposals submitted to Congress by President Carter in 1979 and of subsequent legislative action.

In response to increased oil prices by several OPEC countries [see 29981 A] and to the cessation of Iranian oil exports and the current political unrest in that country [see pages 29741-45] President Carter on Feb. 27, 1979, asked Congress for authority to order gasoline (petrol) rationing in an emergency, to impose temperature controls in public and commercial buildings, to close filling stations at weekends for private cars, and to restrict advertising lighting.

Although the two latter requests were rejected, legislation was signed on Nov. 5 giving the President authority to draw up a standby gasoline rationing plan and to implement it during an emergency.

Under the legislation, which had been drawn up in its final form by a House-Senate conference committee, the plan would take effect 30 days after its submission, unless rejected by a joint resolution of both Houses. The President could veto such a resolution, but his veto could in turn be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses. In the event of a 20 per cent or greater fuel shortage existing for 30 days the President could take the plan off its standby status and implement it, although either House could prevent such a move by a resolution of disapproval. However, if the shortage was less than 20 per cent, both Houses would have to give their positive approval. The legislation also laid down that motorists in each state should have the same percentage reduction in gasoline and that the standby plan must recognize the relative needs of users. The Bill had been passed by the Senate on Oct. 17 by 77 votes to 18 and by the House by 301 votes to 112 on Oct. 23.

Mr Carter had on July 10, 1979, signed a proclamation requiring that air conditioning in commercial, government, and most other public buildings be maintained at temperatures no lower than 78 degrees Fahrenheit (25.5 degrees Centigrade) for nine months from July 16. The order also required, at the risk of substantial penalties, that temperatures in such buildings must not be allowed to rise above 65 degrees Fahrenheit (18.3 degrees Centigrade) during the coming winter, and that water in commercial buildings must at all times be no hotter than 105 degrees Fahrenheit (40.5 degrees Centigrade). The Energy Department estimated that some 5,000,000 buildings using about one-quarter of all the energy consumed in the United States would be affected by the order, including offices, shops, factories, restaurants, theatres, markets, churches and warehouses. Excluded, however, were homes, hotel and motel rooms, elementary schools, hospitals and doctors' surgeries, nursery school and day care centres, and other health care facilities. Authority for the order had been given by the Senate on May 2 by 89 votes to three and by the House on May 10 by voice vote. A proclamation extending the temperature limitation programme for a further nine months to mid-January 1981 was signed by President Carter on April 15, 1980.

Two other proposals still requiring congressional action in May 1980—the creation of an energy security corporation to produce synthetic fuels and the establishment of an energy mobilization board to hasten the implementation of key projects—were announced by Mr Carter on July 15, 1979, and explained in detail in a fact sheet issued on the following day.

The energy security corporation would be an independent, government-sponsored organization with a congressional charter. Of its seven directors, the chairman and three other outside directors would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, while the remaining three would be the Secretaries of Energy and of the Treasury and the head of one other department. The corporation, whose charter would be for 12 years with the possibility of extension, would direct the investment of $88,000 million to produce 2,500,000 barrels per day of substitutes for imported oil by 1990. Its funds would come out of the receipts from the proposed windfall profits tax and its exclusive objective would be the development of domestic production capacity from coal liquids and gases, peat, biomass (alcohol fuels), shale oil, and unconventional natural gas. The legislation went to a House-Senate conference committee after the Senate had passed its version on Nov. 8 by 65 votes to 19. The House version, passed on June 26, 1979, by 368 votes to 25, was an amendment to the Defence Production Act, 1950 [see 10966 A], authorizing a programme of price supports for synthetic fuels costing a total of $3,000 million.

The three-member energy mobilization board would be authorized to designate certain non-nuclear facilities as critical to achieving the nation's import reduction goals and to establish binding schedules for federal, state and local decision making with respect to such projects. In the event of a federal, state or local agency failing to act within the specified time, the board would be empowered to make the decision instead, applying the appropriate federal, state or local law. The board would also have the authority to waive the procedural requirements of federal, state or local laws in order to expedite the development and construction of a critical energy facility. This legislation also went to a conference committee after the House and Senate had passed their respective versions on Nov. 1 by 299 votes to 107 and on Oct. 4 by 68 votes to 25.

The proposals for the security corporation and the mobilization board were part of a six-point energy plan announced by Mr Carter on July 15, 1979, the other points being as follows:

(1) The setting of a "clear goal" for US energy policy, involving the country never using more foreign oil than it did in 1977 and cutting its dependence on foreign oil by 50 per cent by the end of the next decade—a saving of over 4,500,000 barrels of imported oil per day.

(2) Import quotas for 1979 and 1980 would be set at levels below the ceiling of 8,500,000 barrels per day agreed at the Tokyo summit of major industrialized countries held on June 28-29, 1979 [see page 29993]. Mr Carter announced on July 16 that the 1979 quota would be 8,200,000 barrels per day.

(3) Congress would be asked to require that utility companies should reduce their use of oil by 50 per cent by 1990 and switch to other fuels, especially coal.

(4) The country would be asked to adopt a "bold conservation programme", including requests to Congress for mandatory conservation laws and standby authority to ration gasoline [see above], and the spending of an extra $10,000 million over the next decade to strengthen the public transportation system.

The President said on July 16 that the programme would cost about $140,000 million over a 10-year period and that the entire cost could be covered by the proposed windfall profits tax.

In a message to Congress on June 28, the President had proposed the creation of a solar bank to encourage the use of solar energy by means of subsidized loans, thus lessening the country's dependence on foreign oil.

The bank would be authorized to provide interest subsidies for home improvement loans and mortgages to finance the purchase and installation of approved solar energy systems. It would pay subsidies to banks and other lending institutions which would in turn permit them to make home improvement and mortgage loans for solar investments at interest rates below the prevailing market rate. Solar energy systems would be defined as any equipment which used either active or passive solar design and construction technologies—e.g. solar hot water heating, solar heating and cooling, passive solar design, or some combination of these. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in consultation with the Secretary of Energy would define the specifications for these systems. The interest subsidy would be set from time to time by the bank's board of directors, comprising the Secretaries of Housing and Urban Development, of Energy and of the Treasury, at the level which would best serve the purposes of accelerating the use of solar energy systems in residential and commercial buildings. The bank would be funded at $150,000,000 per year from monies provided from the energy security trust fund [see above]. Depending on the level of subsidy and the allocation of the solar bank's resources among home mortgages, home improvement loans and loans for commercial structures, the bank could assist well over 150,000 solar installations a year at this funding level.

The President also proposed the following tax credits: an additional 15 per cent investment tax credit for agricultural and industrial use of heat from solar energy; a 20 per cent tax credit, up to $2,000 per home, for passive solar systems in new homes; and a 15 per cent tax credit for the purchase and installation of airtight woodburning stoves for use in principal residences. In addition, gasohol (a mixture of gasoline and alcohol) would be permanently exempted from the federal gasoline excise tax.

The 1980 fiscal year Appropriations Bill for the Energy Department, approved by Congress on Nov. 9, 1979, and signed by Mr Carter on Nov. 27—i.e. in advance of final approval of the main windfall profit tax legislation—included a $20,000 million development fund for synthetic and alternative fuels and a $1,350 million programme to help the poor to pay their heating bills. Of the former, $19,000 million would be placed in a special energy security reserve fund in the Treasury, while the remaining $1,000 million would be earmarked for solar energy and conservation projects.—(New York Times - International Herald Tribune - US International Communication Agency) (*Prev. rep. 1978 National Energy Act 29452 A; Tokyo Economic Summit page 29993; 1980 State of Union Message 30245 A*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. SPAIN — Elections to Basque and Catalan Parliaments - Formation of Governments in Both Regions - Referendum in Andalusia - Cabinet Reorganization - Other Internal Developments

Elections took place in March 1980 to regional parliaments in the Basque region and in Catalonia as provided for in statutes of autonomy approved by referendum on Oct. 25, 1979 [see 30181 A]. In both cases regional nationalist parties won the largest numbers of seats but no party won an overall majority, while the major national parties—the (government) Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) and the (opposition) Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)—lost considerable support in each area compared with the 1979 general elections [see 29661 A].

Following the UCD's setbacks in these elections and sharp divisions within the UCD itself over the policies and leadership of the Prime Minister, Sr Adolfo Suárez González, the latter announced a reorganization of the Council of Ministers on May 2. A subsequent motion of no confidence tabled by the PSOE against the Government was, however, defeated on May 30. Details of these and other developments are given below.

Elections to Basque Parliament - Appointment of Regional Government

In elections held on March 9 in the Basque provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya the moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) won 25 out of 60 seats in the Parliament and two other more radical nationalist parties—*Herri Batasuna* (HB—United People) and Basque Left (EE)—won respectively 11 and six seats compared with only six for the UCD. The results for the parties obtaining seats in the Parliament were as follows (PSE/PSOE—Basque Socialist Party, AP—Popular Alliance, PCE—Communist Party):

	Votes	Percentage*	Seats
PNV	350,283	37.6	25
HB	152,162	16.3	11
PSE/PSOE	130,542	14.0	9
EE	90,064	9.7	6
UCD	78,310	8.4	6
AP	43,853	4.7	2
PCE	37,051	3.9	1

* Expressed as percentage of votes cast.

The remainder of the votes were won by smaller, mainly left-wing parties which, however, gained no representation in the Parliament. The abstention rate in the region as a whole amounted to about 40 per cent out of an electorate of 1,544,577—i.e. a similar percentage to that registered in the Basque provinces in the October 1979 referendum.

HB, which had hitherto refused to occupy its four seats in the *Cortes* (national Parliament) [see 29661 A] and had withdrawn from the local government institutions of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, but not Navarra [see page 30181], announced after the election that it would not sit in the Basque Parliament until an amnesty was proclaimed for some 200 prisoners belonging to the separatist organization ETA (*Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna*—Basque Nation and Liberty), to whose radical military wing, ETA(M), HB was linked.

The ETA called an informal ceasefire during the electoral campaign, although 18 people had already been killed as a result of ETA violence since the beginning of 1980. Gen. José Sáenz de Santamaría Tinturé was appointed to take charge of security in the Basque region during the electoral period and ordered that only municipal policemen (as opposed to Civil Guards) should patrol polling stations.

During the electoral campaign the politico-military wing of the ETA, ETA(P-M), claimed responsibility for launching an anti-tank grenade at the Prime Minister's residence (the Moncloa Palace) outside Madrid on Feb. 21, causing slight damage in the grounds. ETA(P-M) said that it possessed enough armaments to "dissuade" the Government from implementing autonomy plans for the Basque region and said that it would employ its weapons unless the Government (i) ordered an immediate referendum in Navarra on joining the Basque region [see page 30181], (ii) returned all Basque prisoners to Basque gaols, (iii) lifted the extra security measures in the region and (iv) ordered the immediate formation of the autonomous police force provided for in the Basque statute [see page 30182].

The Basque Parliament held its inaugural session on March 31 under the symbolic oak tree in Guernica (Vizcaya), the session being opened by Sr Jesús María de Leizaola, the former president of the Basque Government-in-exile (now dissolved—see page 30181).

Subsequently, at its first working session on April 9, Sr Juan José Pujana Arza (PNV) was elected president of the Parliament and Sr Carlos Garaicoetxea, hitherto president of the PNV and of the Basque General Council (which now ceased to exist), was elected unopposed in the second round of voting by 25 votes to 24 as Premier (*Presidente*) of the Basque Government, to be known in Basque by the traditional title of *Lendakari*. Sr Garaicoetxea said in a speech outlining the Government's programme that the economic crisis and political violence were the two main problems for the region and he expressed the hope that Navarra (his home province) would also join the autonomous Basque region in the future [see page 30181].

Sr Garaicoetxea said that the objectives of his Government ran the risk of "total frustration" if the escalation of violence persisted; the Basque Government must "dedicate a priority effort to pacification" and peace would, he said, be achieved either by "dialogue and reconciliation, which we must try regardless of everything", or by "the long and relentless road of systematically carrying out the law".

Sr Pujana Arza said in a speech that he hoped that in future the Parliament might expand to include Navarra and the three French Basque provinces [see map on page 28933].

HB, whose representatives were absent from the session, had on April 8 named as their spokesman in the Basque Parliament Sr Inaki Pikabea, a member of ETA(M) currently on trial on charges of terrorism.

Sr Telesforo Monzón, a Basque (HB) deputy in the *Cortes* against whom charges of defence of terrorism were being prepared [see page 30181], renounced his seat in the *Cortes* after being elected to the Basque Parliament.

Sr Xavier Arzullus was on April 16 elected as the new president of the PNV *vice* Sr Garaicoetxea.

Sr Garaicoetxea on April 24 announced the composition of the Basque Government comprising largely technocrats, many of whom had, like himself, trained at the Jesuit University of Deusto (Bilbao). The members of the Government were sworn in on April 29 as follows:

Sr Luis María Retolaza (Interior), Sr Pedro Luis Uriarte (Economy and Finance), Sr Pedro Echenique (Education), Sr Ramón Labayen (Culture), Sr Javier García Egocheaga (Industry), Sr Mario Fernández Pelaz (Labour), Sr Javier Aguirre (Health), Sr Carlos Blasco Imaz (Trade), Sr Javier Lasagabáster (Territorial Policy, Urbanization and Environment), Sr José Luis Robles (Transport, Communications and Naval Affairs), Sr Félix Ormazábal (Agriculture), Sr Carmelo Renovales Vivanco (Justice) and Sr Xavier Caño (Secretary-General).

Elections to Catalan Parliament

In the first elections to a Catalan regional Parliament since 1932, the moderate nationalist coalition Convergence and Union (CiU) on March 20, 1980, won 43 out of 135 seats, compared with 33 for the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC/PSOE)—hitherto the major political force in the region—and only 18 for the Catalan UCD (CC-UCD). The small Catalan Republican Left (ERC) made a strong showing with 14 seats and the Socialist Party of Andalusia (PSA) won two seats on the strength of the immigrant vote from the south. The results for the parties winning representation in the Parliament were as follows (PSUC—Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia):

	Votes	Percentage*	Seats
CiU	743,508	28	43
PSC/PSOE	597,667	23	33
PSUC	499,177	19	25
CC-UCD	284,729	11	18
ERC	238,245	9	14
PSA	70,827	3	2

* Expressed as percentage of votes cast.

Other parties such as Catalan Solidarity (SC), Left Nationalists (NE), Unity for Socialism (US), New Force (FN) and Left Bloc for National Liberation (BEAN) won the remainder of the vote but no seats in the Parliament. About 39 per cent of the total electorate of 4,358,888 abstained.

The Catalan Parliament convened for the first time on April 10 and elected Sr Heribert Barrera (63), the ERC secretary-general since 1976, as its president. The session was addressed by the outgoing Premier (*Presidente*) of the *Generalitat* (Catalan Government), Sr Josep Tarradellas (ERC), who said in a speech that the Parliament had "an enormous responsibility" not to divide the country and he congratulated "all the men and women . . . who made it possible to recover the freedom of Catalonia without violence".

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participate in the forthcoming presidential election on the grounds that the Parliament elected in November 1977 [see 28781 A] "no longer reflected the will of the majority of the Greek electorate". He further called on President Tsatsos to dissolve Parliament and call a fresh general election under Article 41 of the Constitution [see page 27455], which empowered the President, after consulting the advisory Council of the Republic, to dissolve Parliament "if it be not in harmony with popular feeling". (The full four-year term of the current Parliament did not expire until late 1981.) Subsequently, the pro-Moscow KKE "exterior" announced that it would not support Mr Karamanlis's candidacy—thus effectively ruling out the possibility of his election by a two-thirds majority in either of the first two ballots.

Mr Karamanlis on April 19 publicly confirmed for the first time that he would consider standing as a candidate for the presidency; at the same time he appealed to the opposition parties to allow a free vote by their deputies in the election so that it might be conducted without party-political controversy. Despite the rejection of this appeal by all the opposition parties, Mr Karamanlis on April 22 accepted his unanimous nomination by the New Democracy parliamentary group as the party's candidate for the presidency. No other candidate was formally nominated.

As shown in the following table, the election went to three ballots (held on April 23, April 29 and May 5 respectively), Mr Karamanlis being declared President-elect after obtaining the required three-fifths majority in the third round.

	First round	Second round	Third round
Required majority	200	200	180
Mr Karamanlis	179	181	183
Abstentions	92	93	93
Blank votes	15	13	12
"Write-in" votes	10	6	10

Abstentions in the three rounds were accounted for by Pasok deputies, while the blank votes were cast principally by the KKE "exterior" deputies. The casting of a limited number of votes for various "write-in" candidates was regarded as a symbolic gesture by the smaller opposition parties. One of the two additional votes for Mr Karamanlis in the second round was cast by a KDS deputy, Mr Dimitrios Kardaras, who was in consequence expelled from the KDS parliamentary group. At least two National Front deputies were understood to have supported Mr Karamanlis's candidacy.

Immediately after his election, Mr Karamanlis resigned as leader of the New Democracy party and as a member of Parliament. He was replaced in the latter capacity by Mr Evangelos Devletoglou (former Minister of Finance), the New Democracy candidate who had most narrowly failed to be elected in November 1977. The following day (May 6) Mr Karamanlis submitted his Government's resignation to President Tsatsos, who requested ministers to continue in office in a caretaker capacity pending the formation of a new administration.

Formation of New Government under Mr Rallis - Inauguration of President Karamanlis

The New Democracy parliamentary group (now comprising 175 deputies, because one former independent had joined the party during the course of the presidential election) met on May 8 to elect a new party leader by secret ballot. A total of 88 votes were cast for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr George Rallis (61) and 84 votes for the Minister of National Defence, Mr Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza (70), with three votes being blank.

Mr Rallis was regarded as a member of the party's moderate centre and Mr Averoff-Tossizza as a member of its conservative wing. Press reports quoted New Democracy deputies as saying that the decisive factor in Mr Rallis's election was his greater popular appeal to liberal voters in that area of the political spectrum where New Democracy's electoral support was most strongly challenged by Pasok and other parties. Supporters of Mr Rallis's candidacy included Mr Achilleas Karamanlis, the brother of the President-elect.

Major reforms which had contributed to Mr Rallis's reputation as a "progressive" included notably his decision in 1976 (as Minister of Education) that spoken Greek (*demotiki*) should be adopted as the country's official language in place of the "purified" artificial form (*katharevoussa*) created by scholars of ancient Greek two centuries previously, whose usage in education and administration had been the cause of long-standing controversy. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Rallis had subsequently been responsible for establishing the basis for closer relations between Greece and the Soviet Union and other communist countries [see page 30268].

Having been appointed Prime Minister on May 9, Mr Rallis proceeded to form a new Government, one of his main considerations in selecting ministers being to prevent an open split in the New Democracy party following the keenly contested leadership election. In this context, he was reportedly obliged to reappoint Mr Averoff-Tossizza as Minister of National Defence after the latter had refused to serve in the Cabinet in any other capacity. The full membership of the new Cabinet was as follows:

*Mr George Rallis	Prime Minister
†Mr Konstantinos Papakonstantinou	Deputy Prime Minister
*Mr Ioannis Boutos	Co-ordination
Mr Ioannis Paleokrassas . .	Minister without Portfolio attached to Ministry of Co-ordination
†Mr Konstantinos Stefanopoulos . .	Minister to the Prime Minister
*Mr Konstantinos Mitsotakis . .	Foreign Affairs
†Mr Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza . .	National Defence
†Mr George Stamatis	Justice
†Mr Christoforos Stratos	Interior
Mr Athanasios Taliadouros . .	Education and Religious Affairs
*Mr Miltiades Evert	Finance
*Mr Athanasios Kanellopoulos . .	Agriculture
†Mr George Kontogeorgis	Minister without Portfolio responsible for relations with European Community
Mr Andreas Andrianopoulos . .	Culture and Science
*Mr Stefanos Manos	Industry and Energy
Mr Stavros Dimas	Commerce
†Mr Konstantinos Laskaris . .	Labour
†Mr Spyridon Doxiades	Social Services
Mr Tzanis Tzanetakis	Public Works
Mr George Plytas	Planning and Environment
*Mr George Panayotopoulos . .	Communications
Mr Dimitrios Davakis	Public Order
Mr Ioannis Fikioris	Merchant Marine
†Mr Nikolaos Martis	Northern Greece

* Changed portfolio. †No change.

Major changes of responsibility included the assumption of the Foreign Affairs portfolio by Mr Konstantinos Mitsotakis (hitherto Minister of Co-ordination and previously the leader of the New Liberal Party—see 29076 A), and the appointment of Mr Ioannis Boutos (hitherto Minister of Agriculture) as Minister of Co-ordination (with overall responsibility for economic policy), assisted by three younger ministers—Mr Miltiades Evert (41, hitherto Minister of Industry and Energy), Mr Stefanos Manos (41) and Mr Stavros Dimas (39). Mr Kanellopoulos was formerly Minister of Finance and Mr Panayotopoulos Minister of Commerce.

Of the new ministers, **Mr Paleokrassas** and **Mr Dimas** had served as Under-Secretaries of State for Co-ordination in the Karamanlis Government formed in November 1977; **Mr Andrianopoulos** had been appointed Under-Secretary for Social Services in September 1976 and for Foreign Affairs in November 1977; **Mr Manos** had been appointed Under-Secretary for Public Works in November 1977 and had entered the Cabinet as Minister of Planning and the Environment (a newly created post) on March 14, 1980; **Mr Taliadouros** had served as Minister of Agriculture from November 1977 to May 1978; **Mr Plytas** had served as Minister of Culture and Science from November 1977 to September 1978; **Mr Davakis**, who had first been elected to Parliament in 1951 and had held various government offices under Mr Karamanlis between 1955 and 1963, had most recently held office as Under-Secretary for Defence from September 1976 to October 1977; **Mr Fikioris** had been Under-Secretary for Finance from September 1976 to October 1977; and **Mr Tzanetakis**, a former general secretary of the Greek National Tourist Organization, had been elected to Parliament for the first time in November 1977.

Ministers who left the Cabinet (in addition to Mr Karamanlis) were Mr Ioannis Varvitsiotis (Education and Religious Affairs), Prof. Dimitrios Nianias (Culture and Science), Mr Nikolaos Zardinidis (Public Works), Mr Alexandros Papadongonas (Communications), Mr Anastasios Balkos (Public Order) and Mr Emmanuel Kefaloyannis (Merchant Marine). Under-secretaries of state in the Karamanlis Government who were not reappointed by Mr Rallis included Gen. Ioannis Davos (Defence), who had resigned as Chief of the National Defence General Staff in January 1980 [see 30267 A]. Mr Achilleas Karamanlis was reappointed an under-secretary in the Prime Minister's Office, a post which he had held since 1974.

A motion of confidence in the new Government was passed by 180 votes to 115 on May 24 at the conclusion of a three-day parliamentary debate on its programme, which was virtually identical to that of the Karamanlis Government. Earlier, Mr Rallis had stated that his Government would pursue "a liberal, democratic and radical policy in accordance with the principles established by Mr Karamanlis as founder of the New Democracy party".

President Tsatsos (80) submitted his resignation from office on May 12 (i.e. some weeks before the expiry of his full term) and Mr Karamanlis (73) was sworn in as his successor on May 15 by the Primate of the Greek Orthodox Church, Archbishop Serafim.

Dissension within Orthodox Communist Party

During early 1980 ideological differences within the membership of the KKE "exterior" were exacerbated by the party leadership's support for the Soviet Union's intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan [see 30229 A], in opposition to which about 400 members left the party on March 14 and a further 68 on March 31. Those leaving the party accused it of pursuing domestic and foreign policies dictated "entirely by the Soviet Communist Party" and of repressing all internal criticism of these policies, and they indicated that they would now "seek co-operation" with the "Eurocommunist" interior wing of the KKE (formed following an earlier party split in 1968—see also page 26781) and with the EDA, although in the short term they would neither join another party nor form a new party.—(Greek Press and Information Office, London - Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - International Herald Tribune - Sunday Times - Economist) (*Prev. rep. Internal Developments 30267 A; Cabinet 29311 A; Presidency 27453 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — National Heritage Bill - Provisions and Enactment

The National Heritage Bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons on Nov. 21, 1979, and enacted on March 31, 1980, established a National Heritage Memorial Fund to preserve the countryside, historic houses and works of art. The legislation, which abolished the National Land Fund, had been foreshadowed in the Conservative Party's general election manifesto [see page 29637] and in the Queen's Speech of May 15, 1979, opening the new Parliament [see 29705 A].

[The National Land Fund had been created in 1946 by Mr Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the post-war Labour Government, from the sale of surplus war equipment to enable greater use to be made of the Inland Revenue's power to accept land in payment of estate duty—see page 7850. Although this power was subsequently extended to cover works of art, the Fund's original capital of £50,000,000 was reduced to £10,000,000 by the 1957 Finance Act on the recommendation of the House of Commons public accounts committee—see page 15483.]

The National Heritage Bill was given unopposed second readings in the House of Commons on Dec. 3, 1979, and in the House of Lords on Feb. 12, 1980.

Mr Norman St John-Stevas, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Arts, moving the second reading in the Commons, said that the National Heritage Fund would be vested in, and administered by, independent trustees appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment and himself. The existing institutions, museums and galleries, libraries, preservation trusts and the National Trusts would continue to be responsible for decisions on whether to seek or acquire particular property. The initiative would lie with them to decide whether to acquire, but in looking round for funds they would be able—in cases of outstanding importance to the national heritage—to obtain assistance from the fund. The trustees would have a large degree of independence, and it would be for them to decide their own working definition of the national heritage. They would be fully accountable to Parliament through the ministers who appointed them and through the Comptroller and Auditor General who would audit their accounts.

The Bill fulfilled the Government's commitment to maintain the existing system of acceptance of property in satisfaction of capital transfer tax and estate duty, subject to two changes. It was necessary to abolish the National Land Fund and to transfer responsibility for the system from the Treasury to the Secretary of State for the Environment and himself. The National Land Fund was expected to have £15,500,000 standing to its credit at the end of the current year, and when it was wound up the equivalent amount would be made available in the 1980-81 financial year divided between the National Heritage Fund and acceptance in lieu. Although a precise allocation was not possible at this stage, the new fund would have upwards of £12,000,000 in its first year. This would be in the nature of an endowment and it was not expected that the whole sum would be used in the first year or even the first few years. If a really big house or some other piece of property came along for consideration either by the trustees of the fund or for acceptance in lieu of tax and this exceeded, or would unacceptably deplete, the programmed expenditure, the Government would have to consider whether it would be possible to make the necessary funds available. The Government was not inflexible in these matters, although it could not give an open-ended commitment. It was an essential part of the Government's arts policy to encourage private patronage and sponsorship of the arts, and it was hoped that this new fund would attract private support as well.

Mr Andrew Faulds, opposition spokesman on the arts, said that the Conservative Party was to blame for depriving the National Land Fund of millions of pounds in 1957 and for the fact that the principle for which the fund was founded was lost from public view. There might be a need for special provision on occasion and, if a major house had to be bought to save the heritage, £20,000,000 could be involved. There must be a reasonable attitude to a contingency fund.

During the standing committee stage of the Bill the word "memorial" was added to the new fund's title to reflect the original purpose of the National Land Fund to preserve tracts of outstanding scenery as a memorial to those who gave their lives in the Second World War. Having passed its remaining stages in the Commons on Jan. 30, 1980, and in the Lords on Feb. 28, March 11 and March 17, the Bill, as stated above, received the Royal Assent on March 31.

In his budget statement on March 26, Sir Geoffrey Howe (Chancellor of the Exchequer) had said that the Finance Bill would include a provision to treat the National Heritage Memorial Fund for tax purposes as if it were a charity. The appointment was announced on April 16 of Lord Charteris of Amisfield, provost of Eton College and a former Private Secretary to the Queen, as chairman of the fund.—(Times - Guardian - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. Queen's Speech 29705 A*)

B. EAST GERMANY — Change in Council of Ministers - New Appointment to Politburo

Dr Werner Schmieder (53), formerly Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, was appointed Minister of Finance on June 4 in succession to Herr Siegfried Böhm, who had held this post since December 1966 [see page 22709] and who had died on May 5.

It had been officially reported on May 5 that Herr Böhm had died as a result of a serious accident; however, the Government refused to comment on West German press reports that Herr Böhm had in fact been shot by his wife, who had then taken her own life. An in memoriam notice published in the newspaper *Neues Deutschland* had referred to the deaths of both.

Herr Horst Dohlus (55) was on May 23 elected by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) to full membership of the Politburo, the strength of which was thus restored to 19, having been reduced to 18 by the death on Dec. 4, 1979, of Herr Friedrich Ebert [see 30248 A]. Herr Dohlus had been a candidate member of the Politburo since May 1976 [see 27875 A].—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Council of Ministers 29844 A; Politburo 29099 A, 30248 A*)

C. ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES — Government Changes - Lifting of Emergency - Application for UN Membership

In a cabinet reorganization in March 1980 (i) Mr Hudson K. Tannis was appointed Minister of External Affairs (a newly created post) while retaining his former responsibility for Tourism; (ii) Mr Arthur T. Woods, hitherto Speaker of the House of Assembly, was appointed Minister of Home Affairs *vice* Mr Tannis; and (iii) there was an exchange of responsibilities between Mr Grafton C. Isaacs (hitherto Minister of Communications, Works and Labour) and Mr Arthur F. Williams (hitherto Attorney General).

The state of emergency declared in December 1979 following an uprising on Union Island [see page 30180] was lifted on May 16, 1980.

The United Nations Security Council in February 1980 voted unanimously to recommend the acceptance by the General Assembly of an application for UN membership from St Vincent and the Grenadines (which had become independent in October 1979—see 30178 A).—(Insight - Guardian - UN Information Centre, London) (*Prev. rep. 30178 A*)

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rebel organizations wishing to join who would then be eligible for appointment to a rebel government-in-exile.

Mr Mohammad Babrak Zai, a former judge, was elected president of the supreme revolutionary council in Peshawar in May at a specially convened tribal meeting (*loya jirga*). Delegates from all areas of Afghanistan travelled to Peshawar to attend the *jirga*, which passed a number of "fundamental resolutions" designed to form the basis of a future Constitution. The *jirga* also agreed that all treaties signed after April 1978, notably the Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship under the terms of which Soviet troops had entered the country [see 29459 A; 29641 A; 30229 A], would be considered void.

The Egyptian Defence Ministry disclosed on Feb. 13 that some Afghan rebels were receiving training in Egypt before returning to Afghanistan armed with Egyptian weapons. Moreover, White House officials confirmed on Feb. 15 that the USA had in January begun supplying light arms to Afghan rebels, the CIA having been assigned to the mission.

Approval of Provisional Constitution

A document known as the Basic Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was ratified by the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan on April 13 and by the Revolutionary Council on the following day to serve as a provisional Constitution pending the drafting of a permanent document. (Afghanistan had had no Constitution since President Taraki abrogated the existing one after he came to power in April 1978—see 29037 A.) Its main provisions, guaranteeing respect for the Islamic religion, national traditions and human and democratic rights, are described below.

In the introduction the text stated: ". . . The process of leading Afghanistan from backwardness to social, economic and cultural progress under the leadership of the PDPA, the party of the working class and other toilers, will be in accordance with the aspirations of the broad masses of people and with the deep respect and strict observance of the national, historical traditions of our people and will adhere strictly to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam, with respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the policy of peaceful coexistence, friendship and co-operation with all the people of the region and the world."

Article 5 stated: "The sacred and true religion of Islam will be respected, observed and protected in the DRA, and the freedom to practise religious rites is guaranteed for all Moslems. The followers of all religions and faiths have complete freedom in the observation of their religious rites as long as this does not disturb the comfort and security of society. No subject may use religion for anti-national and anti-popular propaganda or as a tool for any actions against the interests of the DRA and the people of Afghanistan."

Article 6 said that the DRA would "protect and develop the best and most valuable cultural heritage and traditions of all the nationalities, tribes and ethnic groups in the country", while *Article 7* stated that all nationalities, tribes and ethnic groups would have equal rights and that the DRA aimed to eliminate inequality in the economic, social and cultural development of all regions in the country.

Foreign policy would be based on principles of peaceful coexistence and active and positive non-alignment and on the development of regional and international co-operation in accordance with state interests (*Art. 10*). The DRA would strengthen and broaden traditional friendship and co-operation with the USSR and extend co-operation and friendly relations with the countries of the socialist bloc (*Art. 11*) as well as making special efforts to strengthen relations with other Moslem nations (*Art. 12*), and working for the peaceful solution of unresolved issues among the nations of the region (*Art. 13*).

Other articles opposed colonialism, imperialism, Zionism and fascism (*Art. 14*); prohibited war propaganda and advocated world peace, total disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a just international economic order (*Art. 15*); and committed the DRA to respecting the UN Charter and the accepted norms of international rights (*Art. 16*) and to eliminating economic backwardness, raising living standards and providing literacy and educational programmes and adequate housing. Democratic rights guaranteed to Afghans, apart from the freedom to observe Islam or other religions, included freedom of speech and thought and the right to education, health and work (*Art. 28*).

The Basic Principles stated that a Grand National Assembly or Supreme Council (*Loya Jirga*)—the first to be officially convened since 1977 [see 28224 B; 28467 A]—would be the highest organ of state power, but that pending the election of the latter by free and direct vote the Revolutionary Council would hold supreme power. The Basic Principles specified the functions of the Revolutionary Council, its Presidium and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet).

The Basic Principles also provided for a new flag of black, red and green stripes to replace the all-red flag with a wheat and star emblem introduced by President Taraki [see page 29641], which would remain the emblem of the PDPA. The new flag was hoisted for the first time at a ceremony in Kabul on April 21.

Soviet-Afghan Agreements on Gas Deliveries and Trade - Approval of Afghan Budget

An agreement on deliveries of Afghan gas to the USSR to replace Iranian deliveries was signed by the two countries in Moscow on Feb. 1 (Iran having demanded a five-fold increase in the price for its gas—see also pages 29734 and 30147). [For 1967 Afghan-Soviet agreement on gas supplies in the period to 1985, see 25670 A.] A protocol on trade exchanges was signed on the same day, and a further agreement covering the supply of Soviet consumer goods to Afghanistan was signed in Moscow on April 2.

Tass subsequently reported on March 21 that gas shipments to the Soviet Union in 1980 would be 16 per cent greater than in 1979 and would amount to 2,500 million cubic metres; furthermore, Tass said that gas exports would account for 34 per cent of Afghanistan's national income in 1980 (compared with 21 per cent in 1979 and 15 per cent in 1978).

Afghan trade with the USSR was expected to be worth 550,000,000 roubles (£371,000,000) in 1980 (compared with only 324,000,000 roubles in 1979), it being reported that among other third-world countries outside the socialist bloc only India and Iraq had a volume of trade with the Soviet Union amounting to more than 500,000,000 roubles.

A new budget for the fiscal year beginning on March 21 was approved on March 16 by the Afghan Government and Revolutionary Council. Under the budget, some 30 per cent of revenues (equivalent to $200,000,000) would be in the form of foreign loans and grants, mostly from the Soviet Union since many Western countries and international organizations had suspended aid to Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet intervention; in addition, the Soviet Union would donate consumer goods, sugar and wheat to the value of $40,000,000 to Afghanistan.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Financial Times - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - Sunday Times - The Observer) (*Prev. rep. 30229 A*)

A. EFTA - SPAIN — Entry into Force of Multilateral Free Trade Agreement and Five Bilateral Trade Agreements

A multilateral free trade agreement between Spain and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which had been initialled on Dec. 7, 1978 [see 29436 B], and signed on June 26, 1979 [see 29920 A], entered into force on May 1, 1980, after ratification in 1979 by all seven EFTA members (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland) and, in February 1980, by the Spanish *Cortes* (Parliament).

The agreement gave Spain similar access to EFTA markets as that provided to the European Community market by agreements dating back to October 1970 [see page 24171] and would "reduce progressively and eliminate the obstacles to substantially all the trade between the EFTA countries and Spain" in conformity with GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) rules on free trade areas.

A mixed commission dealing with the application of the agreement met for the first time in Geneva on May 14 and agreed that the first stage of tariff reductions affecting Spain and EFTA countries should be put into effect as from July 1, 1980.

These involved a reduction of EFTA import tariffs on many Spanish industrial products by 60 per cent (30-40 per cent on certain items) and a reduction of Spanish import duties on many EFTA industrial products by 25 per cent (60 per cent on others); special conditions were laid down for Spanish-Portuguese trade, whereby the reduction in Portuguese duties on Spanish manufactured goods would initially be smaller (the maximum cut being 40 per cent) and Spain would lower its tariffs initially by 65 or 30 per cent according to the product in question.

Also on May 1, five bilateral agreements covering trade in agricultural products and taking into account the widely varying agricultural conditions and policies among individual EFTA states entered into force between Spain on the one hand and, on the other, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.—(EFTA Bulletin - La Vanguardia, Barcelona) (*Prev. rep. 29920 A, 29436 A, 28595 A*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. ZIMBABWE — Transitional Period as (Southern) Rhodesia Under British Administration - Implementation of Ceasefire - Elections for House of Assembly - Formation of Cabinet by Mr Mugabe - Assumption of Independence as Republic of Zimbabwe - Other Developments

In a ceremony in Salisbury on April 18, full independent status was conferred on the Republic of Zimbabwe, after a transitional period of some four months during which the country had been administered as the British dependent territory of (Southern) Rhodesia under the governorship of Lord Soames.

During the transitional period, pursuant to the agreements signed in London on Dec. 21, 1979, after the constitutional conference at Lancaster House [see 30165 A], (i) a ceasefire was implemented between nationalist guerrilla forces and the security forces of the former "internal settlement" Salisbury regime [see 29757 A], (ii) parliamentary elections were held, on Feb. 14 for White voters and on Feb. 27-29 for Black voters, in which an overall majority of seats was won by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) party, ZANU (PF), led by Mr Robert Mugabe, and (iii) Mr Mugabe on March 13 named a post-independence Government with a Cabinet which included two White members as well as Mr Joshua Nkomo and three other members of his party. (Mr Nkomo's party, formerly known as the Zimbabwe African People's Union—ZAPU—had formed the Patriotic Front alliance in conjunction with Mr Mugabe's ZANU; however, the two parties had contested the election separately, with the name "Patriotic Front" being assumed by Mr Nkomo's party.)

Details of these and other related developments during the period up to April 18, 1980, are given below.

Initial Process of Ceasefire Implementation

Under the ceasefire terms agreed at Lancaster House [see pages 30174-75] a period of seven days from Dec. 21 was allocated for the disengagement of opposing forces, the setting-up of 16 assembly points and 24 associated rendezvous points where the Patriotic Front (PF) guerrilla forces were to gather, and the deployment of the Commonwealth monitoring force (CMF). The CMF was deployed (i) in 45 two-man units through the command structure of the Rhodesian security forces, (ii) in units of 16 at the assembly and rendezvous points, and (iii) at designated border crossing points to monitor those returning unarmed from Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

The British, Australian, Fijian, Kenyan and New Zealand troop units comprising the CMF, which totalled 1,300 men, arrived in Salisbury from Dec. 20 to Dec. 26 and began their deployment, while a large-scale airlift of the necessary equipment and supplies was also undertaken (involving a number of transport aircraft provided by the United States).

Various incidents reported during this period included an attack on the former home of Mr Mugabe on Dec. 22 and the death in a car accident in Mozambique on Dec. 26 of Mr Josiah Tongogara, the commander of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA, the forces of Mr Mugabe's ZANU wing of the PF). The Salisbury regime's military headquarters continued to issue communiqués giving details of victims of hostilities, and notably alleging that elements within ZANLA would not accept the ceasefire.

Following initial reports that the attack on Mr Mugabe's former home in the Salisbury suburb of Highfields (in which two of Mr Mugabe's nephews were injured) had apparently been carried out by guerrillas of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA, the forces of Mr Nkomo's ZAPU wing of the PF), Mr Nkomo stated in London on Dec. 23 that the attack had actually been staged by supporters of Bishop Abel Muzorewa (the Prime Minister of the Salisbury regime). Mr Nkomo added that the attempt to incriminate his supporters was designed to create divisions within the PF, but that the PF had fought the war as an alliance and would fight the elections as an alliance as well. (For the subsequent decision by Mr Mugabe's ZANU wing to contest the elections as a separate party, see below.)

Mr Mugabe said in London on Dec. 27 that the continued presence of South African troop units within Rhodesia was a contravention of the ceasefire agreement [see pages 30173 and 30176, and also below]; he stated that unless the British Governor gave an explanation, the guerrilla forces could not be expected to report to the assembly places as required. Also on Dec. 27, three members of the CMF (all of them British Royal Air Force personnel) died in a helicopter accident; a British military spokesman later said that it was "90 per cent certain" that this accident had not involved shots fired at the helicopter, as had been alleged in some reports. The deployment of monitoring units to set up the assembly camps and associated rendezvous points was completed without other serious incidents, while the PF officers assigned to liaise with the CMF began arriving at Salisbury airport on Dec. 26. (The returning PF officials received enthusiastic welcomes from crowds gathered at the airport; among those arriving on Jan. 2 were Mr Rex Nhongo of ZANLA and Mr Lookout Masuku Mafala of ZIPRA.)

The ceasefire officially became effective from midnight on Dec. 28-29, while the following seven days (to midnight on Jan. 4-5, 1980) were designated for ceasefire implementation, notably involving the assembly of the PF guerrilla forces in the 16 camps. Despite reports of several incidents, and concern that a number of guerrilla units were allegedly considering rejecting the ceasefire, a total of 18,500 people had reported by the morning of Jan. 5 (a certain unofficial flexibility having been allowed in the deadline, following what Mr Nicholas Fenn, spokesman for the Governor, had described as a policy of "sensible treatment" for those still en route towards the assembly points at midnight). Amnesty arrangements were announced by Lord Soames on Jan. 5 providing for those guerrillas still in the bush to join those lawfully assembled, on condition that these late arrivals should surrender their weapons. The total number of those assembled on Jan. 11 was 20,860, of whom 15,240 were identified as forces of ZANLA and the remainder as forces of ZIPRA.

The majority of those reporting to the assembly places did so only in the final days of the designated seven-day period. Meanwhile the apparent slow start to the process had aroused concern over possible large-scale non-compliance, with this concern being reflected in broadcasts by Lord Soames and by PF leaders on Jan. 3, and also in the calls by the latter for an extension to the ceasefire deadline.

Lord Soames, in his "final urgent appeal" to the guerrillas on Jan. 3, emphasized that those who did not assemble would be unlawful. Mr Nhongo and Mr Dumiso Dabengwa, leaders of ZANLA and ZIPRA respectively, also agreed to make broadcasts on the same day urging their forces to comply with the assembly process, despite the Governor's rejection of calls by both PF wings for the extension of the ceasefire deadline. (Sir Anthony Duff, the Deputy Governor, had on Jan. 3 communicated this decision to Mr Enos Nkala, the treasurer of Mr Mugabe's ZANU and the senior party representative inside Rhodesia, who had recently been released from detention—see also pages 28198 and 27944; the British administration had also asked Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe to postpone on security grounds their intentions of returning to Rhodesia on the weekend of Jan. 4-5; in the event they returned on Jan. 13 and Jan. 27 respectively—see below.)

The assembly process was described as "a comparative success" on Jan. 6 by Maj.-Gen. John Acland, the British military adviser to Lord Soames and chairman of the ceasefire commission (which comprised the senior military officers of ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Salisbury regime's Rhodesian security forces—see pages 30172 and 30176). However, there was continuing concern over guerrilla forces remaining in the bush, particularly in view of the reported belief of the Rhodesian security forces that a large proportion of those in the assembly places were guerrilla collaborators rather than "hard-core" guerrillas.

Sources at the headquarters of the Rhodesian security forces were reported on Jan. 5 as stating that only some 5,000 "hard-core" guerrillas had been among those reporting to the assembly places, and that the remainder were guerrilla sympathizers, including women and youths (the so-called *mujibas* acting as messengers for the guerrillas), who had allegedly been given weapons with instructions to pass themselves off as guerrillas while the real fighting units remained hidden in the bush. (Maj.-Gen. Acland, on the other hand, said that the only practical criterion for identifying the guerrillas was the possession of weapons, and he added that those presenting themselves at the assembly points unarmed had not been included when numbers of assembled guerrillas were calculated.)

Bishop Muzorewa on Jan. 6, addressing a rally in Salisbury to launch the election campaign of his United African National Congress party (UANC—see below), called on Lord Soames to ban the parties of Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo from the forthcoming elections on the grounds that their guerrilla forces had not complied with the terms of the ceasefire agreement.

Mr Fenn said on Jan. 6 that the British administration accepted that "there had been some substitution of *mujibas* for guerrillas", but he declined to estimate the numbers involved; he emphasized that "the PF has clearly made a serious effort" to comply with the assembly process, though some guerrillas were still unaccounted for.

On behalf of ZIPRA, Mr Dabengwa said on Jan. 7 that the guerrillas assembled (numbering over 19,000 by this time) were now legal forces under the Governor's authority and could be called out by him to maintain ceasefire enforcement. Mr Dabengwa broadcast a warning to guerrillas still in the bush (whose numbers he estimated at 2,000-3,000) that "if you refuse our orders, you have placed yourself outside our control", and that ZIPRA was prepared to take the necessary action to enforce the ceasefire even "if it means a shoot-out with our own unruly elements".

Following reports that 400 members of a ZANLA guerrilla unit were refusing to surrender their weapons (as required under Lord Soames's amnesty announcement of Jan. 5) and that a confrontation with police units was imminent, Mr Nhongo on Jan. 7 intervened to order the guerrillas to surrender their weapons to the CMF before proceeding to an assembly point.

The Question of South African Troops in Rhodesia

Spokesmen for both wings of the PF criticized what they regarded as breaches of the ceasefire by the British Governor, in particular concerning the continued presence of South African troops inside Rhodesia.

The presence of South African troops had been officially acknowledged on Jan. 6 in a statement issued by Mr Fenn, in which he asserted that all South African units had left Rhodesia except for a small force guarding the railway at the border at Beitbridge [see page 30173]; he added that the presence of this latter force had been authorized by Lord Soames. The significance of the Beitbridge force (which reportedly numbered some 250 men deployed with artillery within a seven-mile radius of the railway bridge over the Limpopo river) was played down by the British administration, notably in a statement by Mr Fenn on Jan. 15 when he described it as "a single exception" to the Lancaster House agreement and dismissed as "preposterous" any claim that such a force could affect the holding of free and fair elections in Rhodesia. However, its presence on Rhodesian soil was regarded by the PF leaders as contrary to undertakings given by Lord Carrington, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary [see page 30174].

The South African troop presence at Beitbridge was discussed by the Commonwealth Southern Africa Committee [see page 30170] in London on Jan. 8 (following which Mr Shridath Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, conveyed to Lord Carrington the concern of the Commonwealth high commissioners), and by the "front-line states" at a meeting in Beira (Mozambique) on Jan. 10. Prior to this latter meeting (which was attended by Presidents Kaunda of Zambia, Machel of Mozambique, Nyerere of Tanzania and dos Santos of Angola and also by Vice-President Quett Masire of Botswana), President Machel had on Jan. 8 alleged that "South African forces continue to flow into Zimbabwe with the declared intention of thwarting the democratic process'. Moreover, on Jan. 11 Mr Mugabe claimed in Maputo that three to four South African troop units already in Rhodesia had been supplemented by some 20 truckloads of troops in the last two days, that the country was being encircled by South African troops, with British connivance, and that, even though his ZANU party would win the elections, they would then be left face to face with the South African forces.

A communique issued by the front-line states after their meeting in Beira demanded the immediate withdrawal of South African troops, whose presence at Beitbridge with Lord Soames's authorization was described as a "flagrant violation" of the Lancaster House agreement. President Nyerere, in a strong attack on the British Governor's handling of the ceasefire process, emphasized on Jan. 11 that Britain and not the PF was breaking the agreement, while on Jan. 13 he delivered an official protest to Mr Peter Moon, the British high commissioner in Tanzania (in which he also described as cold-blooded murder an incident in which Rhodesian security forces had killed seven guerrillas said to be on their way to an assembly point).

Meanwhile in Zambia President Kaunda said on Jan. 11 that Lord Soames was deliberately eroding the spirit and the letter of the Lancaster House agreement and he warned that British policies could lead to the breakdown of the ceasefire; he also denied allegations that Zambian soldiers were in Rhodesia, demanded the withdrawal of all South African forces from the country, and complained that Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo were being prevented from returning so as to give Bishop Muzorewa an advantage in the election campaign.

At the United Nations, the African group called for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss British handling of the transitional process in Rhodesia [see below], while President Moi of Kenya said on Jan. 14 that the Kenyan troop contingent of the CMF would be withdrawn unless South African troops left Rhodesian soil. On Jan. 21, at a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Mr Edem Kodjo, the OAU Secretary-General, called for a third-world "counter-offensive" against the British administration in Rhodesia, which he said had "duped" the OAU into believing that the Lancaster House agreement would lead to free and fair elections. Following this meeting, Mr Benjamin Mkapa, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, sought the diplomatic support of Dr Fidel Castro, the Cuban President and current chairman of the non-aligned movement, who issued a statement on Jan. 28 calling on non-aligned countries to demand an end to British violations of the Lancaster House agreement.

In the UK House of Commons on Jan. 16, Sir Ian Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal and government spokesman on foreign affairs, having made a statement on the implementation of the ceasefire and election preparations in Rhodesia, was pressed by members of all three main parties over the presence of South African forces at Beitbridge. In his replies he described the attention devoted to this issue as "greatly exaggerated"; referring to assurances given by him in the House on Dec. 18, 1979 (that there was "no question of the presence of foreign units or South African units in Rhodesia under the Governor"), he said: "I cannot accept that the presence just across the border of a small contingent of South African forces can be said to be a foreign involvement in Rhodesia."

It was subsequently reported (in *The Financial Times* of Jan. 25) that a three-man CMF contingent had been posted to Beitbridge to monitor the activities of the South African troops there. A joint communiqué issued by the British and South African Governments on Jan. 26 referred to "the political exploitation of the South African military presence on the Rhodesian side of Beitbridge" and stated that the force would be withdrawn "as soon as satisfactory substitute arrangements can be made by the Rhodesian security forces to safeguard the bridge". A statement issued from the Governor's office in Salisbury on Jan. 30 confirmed that "Rhodesian forces have today assumed responsibility for the protection of the Rhodesian side of Beitbridge".

Criticism continued to be expressed, notably by Mr Mugabe's party, concerning the alleged presence of other South African troop units within Rhodesia. While such allegations remained unconfirmed, the Western press reported that a number of South African troops (with equipment including helicopters and armoured cars) had left Rhodesia on March 8-9. In response to these reports, Mr Pieter (P.W.) Botha, the South African Prime Minister, said on March 12: "The British authorities were aware of the presence of South African men and equipment with the Rhodesian forces, particularly with a view to facilitating the arrangements for the holding of orderly elections. Immediately after the elections I announced that this assistance was being withdrawn."

United Nations Security Council Resolution

The UN Security Council met on Jan. 30 and passed on Feb. 2 a resolution noting that the withdrawal of South African troops from Beitbridge had been announced, and calling on the British Government to ensure "the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of any South African forces, regular or mercenary, from Southern Rhodesia". The resolution (which was passed by 14 votes to none, with Britain not participating in the vote) also called on the British Government to ensure full and impartial implementation of the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House agreement and to avert the danger of the collapse of this agreement by creating conditions which would ensure a free and fair election.

The resolution specifically called for (i) the speedy return of refugees and exiles, (ii) the release of all political prisoners, (iii) "the strict compliance by all the forces with the terms of the Lancaster House agreement and the confinement forthwith of the Rhodesian and auxiliary forces to their bases in conformity with that agreement", (iv) the according of equal treatment to all parties to the agreement and (v) the rescinding of all emergency measures and regulations inconsistent with the conduct of free and fair elections.

In a statement in the House of Lords on Feb. 6 (which was also read in the House of Commons by Sir Ian Gilmour) Lord Carrington said that the British Government regretted the "one-sided and absurdly selective" Security Council debate, and "felt it inappropriate to associate themselves in any way with a resolution which purported to reinterpret the agreements reached with the parties at Lancaster House".

Replying to questions on this matter, Lord Carrington described it as ironic that the British Government, which was trying in the most difficult circumstances to hold free and fair elections in Rhodesia, "should be lectured upon whether those elections are free and fair by countries in the UN Security Council which would not know a free and fair election if they saw one". With regard to the fact that the United States and France had been among the countries voting in favour of the resolution, he pointed out that the eventual form of the resolution was "very considerably toned down from that originally put before the Security Council, as a result of representation by those two countries and others", and he noted also the explanation of votes made by the United States, France, Norway and Portugal and by some other countries.

(Lord Carrington's statement also referred to the election campaigning under way in Rhodesia, to continuing concern over violent incidents, to investigation of ceasefire violations by the ceasefire commission, to large-scale intimidation of rural voters and the powers taken by the Governor to control this, and to the return of refugees from neighbouring countries. These and related developments are described below.)

Allegations of British Partiality - Assessments of Progress of Ceasefire

Lord Soames was strongly criticized—by Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo and their party spokesmen as well as by leaders of African countries (notably President Nyerere) and others—over the deployment of Rhodesian security forces for ceasefire enforcement, and over the activities of the security force auxiliaries (SFAs).

Following the confirmation by Mr Fenn on Jan. 6 that a general authorization had been given by the Governor for regular units of the security forces to assist police where necessary in maintaining law and order, it was alleged that this constituted a breach of the principle of equal status for the forces of both sides (and also that there was no adequate monitoring of security force activity in this connexion).

Under the Lancaster House agreement, the primary law enforcement agency was to be the existing Rhodesian police force (the British South Africa Police), acting on the authority of the Governor. However, as acknowledged by Mr Fenn on Dec. 31, security forces had been deployed as early as Dec. 30 along the Mozambique border to prevent guerrilla infiltration (while it was alleged in press reports on Jan. 2 that these units had in fact simply remained in operational deployment throughout, despite the requirement under the ceasefire process that they should be withdrawn to company bases on Dec. 28).

Protests over the deployment of the security forces were made by Mr Joseph Msika (the ZAPU secretary-general) on behalf of Mr Nkomo on Jan. 7, and by Mr Mugabe in a letter to Mrs Margaret Thatcher (the UK Prime Minister), the text of which was released in Maputo (Mozambique) on Jan. 8. Mr Mugabe's letter had also complained inter alia of the activities of the SFAs, who had originally been recruited in 1978 among the supporters of political leaders participating in the "internal settlement" arrangements—notably Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole (leader of the "internal" wing of ZANU, which participated in the April 1979 elections—see 29757 A)—but who had in 1979 been brought under the authority of the Rhodesian security forces [see 29437 A; 30069 A]. Mr Willie Musarurwa, the ZAPU publicity secretary, said on Jan. 9 that the SFAs (whose numbers were estimated at 25,000 following a recruitment programme in late 1979—see page 30070) were engaged in a campaign of intimidation on behalf of Bishop Muzorewa; he added that "if it comes to the crunch we will have to release our own men", in other words that the PF guerrilla forces might leave the assembly camps to counter the activities of the SFAs.

Assessments of the state of the ceasefire were made on Jan. 15 by Mr Fenn on behalf of the Governor, by Mr Mugabe (speaking in Maputo) and by Mr Nkomo (who had returned to Salisbury on Jan. 13).

Mr Fenn's statement emphasized the "formidable catalogue of progress" since British administration was established in Rhodesia on Dec. 12. The total number of people assembled in 14 camps was 21,370, while two camps in the west had been closed and any guerrilla forces reporting there had been transferred. However, Mr Fenn stated that numerous ZANLA forces had apparently rejected the ceasefire exercise and that "it is difficult not to conclude that their purpose is to intimidate the rural population". (The British administration refrained from estimating the number of guerrillas who had remained in the bush; Sir Ian Gilmour said in the House of Commons on Feb. 6 that an exact estimate was impossible but that there were "several thousand ZANLA guerrillas about", and the figure of 5,000 was frequently cited in newspaper reports.) Mr Fenn also said that ZANLA guerrillas had crossed the border from Mozambique in substantial numbers since the ceasefire date of Dec. 28, and that ZANLA had sent "a considerable number of non-combatants to assembly areas in the guise of insurgents".

Mr Mugabe, condemning alleged British violations of the Lancaster House agreement, referred in particular to the presence of South African troops, the free movement of the Rhodesian security forces and SFAs, and obstacles which he said had been placed in the way of his party's election campaign (including obstacles to his own return to the country, the fact that customs officials had prevented the entry into Rhodesia of posters and other campaign material described as "inflammatory", and problems over access to facilities such as telephones and transport for party use).

Mr Mugabe said that he would shortly be returning to Salisbury and hoped to have talks with Lord Soames, in the light of which he would assess the situation; he added that "if we are satisfied that the British are bent on dishonouring the agreement, there cannot be any question of our observing it". He described the conduct of the British Government as "downright dishonesty", and he claimed that the guerrilla forces, having "evacuated many places and left their positions to create favourable conditions for elections", were now being encircled by Rhodesian forces who had never actually observed the ceasefire requirement for them to disengage. Referring to points made in his Jan. 8 letter to Mrs Thatcher, he said that he had not received a formal reply but that a series of comments had been transmitted to him through the British embassy in Maputo, in which it was suggested that evidence of ceasefire violations by security forces and SFAs should be given to the British Governor for submission to the ceasefire commission. The presence of South African troops could not be defended on the grounds that they were few in number, Mr Mugabe said, since any number however small constituted a breach of undertakings given by Lord Carrington at Lancaster House; moreover, according to Mr Mugabe's own estimates, there were some 6,000 South African troops currently inside Rhodesia.

Mr Nkomo said that the ceasefire had "stood up quite well", although he listed three serious problems, namely the deployment of the security forces, the actions of SFAs (whom he described as an armed pro-Muzorewa political group) and the presence of South African troops. Despite these difficulties, he stated, the guerrilla war was completely over and everything should be done to maintain the ceasefire and to move on to complete peace. (Following a meeting with Lord Soames on Jan. 16, Mr Nkomo told a news conference that he would continue efforts to make the ceasefire successful, but he called for a substantial enlargement of the ceasefire monitoring force, and expressed particular concern over the activities of SFAs in the tribal trust territories.)

Bishop Muzorewa on Jan. 20 alleged that the Governor was failing to honour the Lancaster House agreements by tolerating intimidatory behaviour by guerrillas still in the bush, and he warned that his party could withdraw from the ceasefire unless these guerrillas were brought under control. Mr Sithole on the same day threatened to withdraw from the elections unless the Governor prevented further activity by the SFAs.

Election Timetable - Registration of Black Parties

The timetable for the elections was announced by Lord Soames on Dec. 28. Polling was to take place on Feb. 14 for the 20 seats on the reserved White voters' roll, and on Feb. 27-29 for the 80 seats on the common (Black voters') roll. The registration of parties for the latter was to be completed between Dec. 31 and Jan. 14 (it having previously been envisaged that registration was to be completed by Dec. 31).

Sir John Boynton, the British electoral commissioner, said (also on Dec. 28) that, in order to increase public confidence in the secrecy of the Black election ballot, all ballot papers would be transferred to Britain immediately after counting and would be destroyed after six months (unless required by the High Court in connexion with an election petition). Political parties would also be encouraged to provide their own agents at the polling booths, to prevent suspicion of irregularities, and voters would have their hands marked with indelible ink (to prevent double voting, there being no formal list of eligible voters as no registration process had been undertaken).

Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe separately announced on Jan. 2 that their parties would contest the elections independently of one another rather than jointly as the Patriotic Front. Mr Nkomo, who had earlier sought to preserve the alliance, indicated that his ZAPU party would contest the elections under the name Patriotic Front (ZAPU); he also emphasized his willingness to broaden the PF to include other "progressive forces" to further the interests of national reconciliation.

Ten Black parties completed formal registration by Jan. 14, submitting their chosen electoral symbols and paying $Rh 200 (about £135) cash deposit in respect of each of the eight electoral districts [see map overleaf] which they intended to contest. Mr Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party subsequently adopted a rooster as its symbol, after the original choice of party symbol (including a rifle) had been rejected by Sir John Boynton as inflammatory. The Patriotic Front (ZAPU) and Mr Sithole's ZANU party were also required to modify their symbols for the same reason.

The Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) led by Chief Jeremiah Chirau and formed in December 1976 [see page 28201] registered to contest six electoral districts but failed to nominate its candidates by the stipulated deadline of Jan. 21; ZUPO consequently did not participate in the election, and Chief Chirau announced in early February that he intended to support Mr Nkomo.



(*Financial Times*)

The nine parties contesting the common roll election were as follows (competing in all eight districts except where specified):

National Democratic Union (NDU) formed in early 1979 and led by Mr Henry Chihota.

National Front of Zimbabwe (NFZ) formed in November 1979 [see page 30069] and currently led by Mr Peter Mandaza. [See also below.]

Patriotic Front (ZAPU) led by Mr Nkomo.

United African National Council (UANC) led by Bishop Muzorewa.

United National Federal Party (UNFP) led by Chief Kaiser Ndiweni and formed in late 1978 [see page 29443] (contesting only five districts: Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South and Midlands).

United People's Association of Matabeleland (UPAM) led by Dr Frank Bertrand [see also page 29443] (contesting only the two Matabeleland districts).

*ZANU led by Mr Sithole.

*ZANU (PF) led by Mr Mugabe.

Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) led by Mr James Chikerema and formed in June 1979 [see page 29760].

*Mr Sithole's ZANU faction had sought a court injunction to prevent Mr Mugabe's party from using the name ZANU; Lord Soames, however, postponed any decision on this matter until after the elections.

The former leader of the NFZ, Mr Michael Mawema, had announced on Jan. 9 that he intended to disband the party and that he expected most of its officials to join the UANC; however, the party decided to contest the elections in its own right under new leadership, and the NFZ included in its list of candidates submitted on Jan. 21 the names of three leading dissident members of Mr Mugabe's ZANU who were at that time held in detention in Mozambique [see below].

When the parties submitted on Jan. 21 their lists of candidates for each electoral district, it was noted that Mr Nkomo (whose political support was thought to be based on the minority Ndebele people to which he belonged) had himself chosen to stand in the Midlands district rather than in Matabeleland itself. Mr Mugabe was standing in Mashonaland East (although he was a member of the Karanga group of the Shona people, centred in Victoria province) and Bishop Muzorewa was also standing in Mashonaland East (although his ethnic base was in Manicaland).

The Election Campaigns of the Major Black Parties

The Patriotic Front (ZAPU), the UANC and ZANU (PF) were generally regarded as the major parties in the contest for the 80 Black seats, and Western commentators, sharing the belief that none of these parties was likely to win enough seats to command an overall parliamentary majority, speculated on the various coalitions which might emerge in the post-election period. Some commentators also suggested that a few seats might be won by Mr Sithole's ZANU or by the ZDP, whereas the other minor parties were thought unlikely to be represented in the new House of Assembly.

The April 1979 elections for Black members of the House of Assembly [see 29757 A] under the 1978 "internal settlement" Constitution had been contested by the UANC, ZANU-Sithole, the UNFP and the NDU (as well as by ZUPO) but not by the other parties contesting the 1980 elections.

Details of the campaigns and manifestos of the three principal parties are given below.

UANC. The UANC campaign was officially launched by Bishop Muzorewa on Jan. 6 at a rally (attended by about 50,000 people) in Highfields, Salisbury. At this rally (and during his subsequent campaign) Bishop Muzorewa concentrated primarily on attacking the parties of Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, asserting that their policies would mean disaster for Zimbabwe and warning of impending civil war between rival guerrilla armies unless the UANC controlled the Government.

The UANC manifesto, published on Jan. 25, included promises of land reform, better housing, and free education and health services; the party campaign also featured warnings that a Mugabe or Nkomo regime would mean the nationalization of all aspects of life, and the effective destruction of the country. Repeatedly alleging that the elections were being distorted by the intimidatory actions of ZANLA guerrillas still in the bush, Bishop Muzorewa on Jan. 29 described as "cancerously biased" the criticisms of alleged intimidation by SFAs which were expressed by Mr Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian chairman of the Commonwealth Observers' Group (COG—see page 30170 and also page 30373 below).

The UANC campaign culminated in a four-day rally at the Zimbabwe Grounds at Highfields on Feb. 21-24, with Bishop Muzorewa addressing a crowd estimated at 50,000-75,000 on the last day of the rally and promising "peace, unity, reconciliation, rehabilitation and prosperity" under a UANC government.

Patriotic Front (ZAPU). Mr Nkomo's Patriotic Front (ZAPU) party emphasized in its campaign the themes of peace and reconciliation, with the apparent aim of projecting the image of Mr Nkomo as a veteran nationalist leader who would seek to build national unity despite past conflicts and ethnic diversity.

At a press conference on his return to the country on Jan. 13 Mr Nkomo (who was welcomed by an estimated 100,000-150,000 people at a rally at the Zimbabwe Grounds on the same day) called for racism, sectionalism and tribalism to be crushed, and he urged all forces to ensure that the ceasefire was not just a temporary suspension of hostilities but "a ceasefire that ends in independence, peace and tranquillity". At a rally in Bulawayo on Jan. 20 he told a crowd estimated at over 100,000 that there would be a place in an independent Zimbabwe for the country's White minority; on the other hand, on Jan. 31 Mr Musarurwa, the party's publicity secretary, denied that Mr Nkomo had obtained the support of Mr Ian Smith, the former Prime Minister. (Mr Smith had told White farmers earlier that day to impress upon their Black workers that "the Marxists will take everything they have", including their goats, cattle and chickens and even their children, and that, to prevent a victory by Mr Mugabe, "the best choice could be Nkomo". In the same speech Mr Smith also referred disparagingly to Bishop Muzorewa as having been "taken for a ride" by the British.)

ZANU (PF). The ZANU (PF) party campaign was set in motion by party representatives within the country, notably including Mr Nkala, who on Dec. 30 told a rally of some 50,000-80,000 people at Highfields that ZANU (PF) would fight the elections separately from Mr Nkomo's party [see above].

Mr Mugabe's return to the country was postponed on several occasions during January at the behest of Lord Soames. Official sources indicated that security considerations (in particular concern over possible clashes between scheduled political rallies and the crowds expected to gather to welcome Mr Mugabe) justified these postponements; however, press reports also suggested that Lord Soames was seeking progress on a number of issues before authorizing Mr Mugabe's return, including (i) alleged continuing guerrilla infiltration from Mozambique, (ii) the reported activities of numerous ZANLA guerrillas still in the bush engaging in intimidation of voters and hampering the election campaigns of rival parties, (iii) broadcasting by ZANU (PF) of what the Governor regarded as strident propaganda on the Voice of Zimbabwe radio station based in Maputo, and (iv) the imprisonment in Mozambique of 71 dissident members of Mr Mugabe's party.

Lord Soames on Jan. 24 appealed to President Machel to secure the release of these dissidents, and he rejected a proposal by ZANU (PF) officials in Maputo that the men should be kept under supervision (to prevent repetition of their alleged plots against Mr Mugabe's leadership in 1978). It was announced in Maputo the following day that the dissidents would be released, and this was duly done on

Jan. 28, after which 64 of the group flew to Salisbury on Jan. 29. The dissidents were primarily members of the Karanga ethnic group of the Shona people, and included Mr Henry Hamadziripi (who had been a member of Mr Mugabe's delegation at the Geneva talks in 1976—see page 28198), Mr Rugare Gumbo and Mr Mukudzei Mudzi. It was later reported (in *The Daily Telegraph* on Feb. 13) that 24 of the group had joined Mr Nkomo's Patriotic Front (ZAPU) and the rest had joined Mr Sithole's ZANU. (Lord Soames had on Jan. 30 issued an ordinance under which former detainees could register as candidates with existing parties, despite the expiry of the Jan. 21 nominations deadline, but could not form new parties for the forthcoming elections.) It had meanwhile been announced in Lusaka on Jan. 24 that some 300-400 people held in Zambian prisons, who were supporters of the UANC or of Mr Sithole's ZANU, had been released and would be repatriated to Rhodesia in time to participate in the elections.

A crowd estimated at over 150,000 gathered at Highfields on Jan. 27 for Mr Mugabe's return. In his speech, Mr Mugabe said that a ZANU (PF) victory would mean "no discrimination in terms of race or colour" or on religious grounds, and he added: "We will not seize land from anyone who has a use for it. Farmers who are able to be productive and prove useful to society will find us co-operative. There will not be any victimization or seizure of enterprises, and mining and industry should be promoted. We are not going to interfere with private ownership, but we will look at the profits that accrue. We would rather have profits ploughed back in this country." At an earlier press conference in Maputo on Jan. 21 he had declared that there would be "no vengeance" after a ZANU (PF) victory (adding that he intended to form a coalition with Mr Nkomo after the elections, and that he would accept the outcome of free and fair elections.) Mr Mugabe also said that a government led by him would pursue a policy of coexistence with South Africa and would not break off trade and transport connexions, although he would work against apartheid within the framework of the OAU.

The ZANU (PF) manifesto published on Jan. 27 affirmed "ideological belief in socialism" but recognized "the historical, social and other existing practical realities" and said that private enterprise would have to continue "until circumstances are ripe for socialist change". An agricultural settlement fund would be set up to promote land reforms, with peasant agriculture to be organized on a collective basis by voluntary agreement. In the industrial sphere, decentralization would be promoted by encouraging rural industries, while public investment would be undertaken in important sectors, with examination of state partnership in mining and with strong central control over the existing banking system. The manifesto also promised better housing and free education and health services, a policy of Africanization of the public services, police force and Army, and the restructuring of the judiciary to "get rid of reactionary and racist judges".

A notable feature of the UANC campaign, by contrast with those of the other competing parties, was the finance and equipment—including helicopters—available for electioneering purposes.

With no overall limit placed on election spending, the UANC reportedly received large-scale support from business sources both within the country and overseas, notably in South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom. The Patriotic Front (ZAPU) and ZANU (PF), on the other hand, claimed to be hampered by difficulty in obtaining telephones, typewriters and other essential equipment, as well as access to printing facilities and adequate transport. It was reported, however, that the Swedish Government had provided funds to these two parties, although a grant of £1,060,000 was described by a Swedish Foreign Ministry spokesman on Jan. 30 as the last part of a humanitarian aid programme and not a contribution for military or election purposes. In Britain, the Labour Party's national executive committee on Feb. 7 endorsed an appeal for contributions in equal measure to the Patriotic Front (ZAPU) and ZANU (PF).

Violent Incidents During Election Campaign

The election campaign was marked by a number of violent incidents, including attacks on election candidates and party officials as well as several acts of terrorism directed against civilian targets.

Attacks on political candidates included apparent attempts to assassinate Mr Mugabe on Feb. 5 and Feb. 10; following the first of these, a grenade attack on his home in Salisbury, Mr Mugabe alleged on Feb. 6 that the SFAs were responsible, while responsibility for the second (the detonation of a landmine under a convoy in which Mr Mugabe was travelling to Fort Victoria airport) was attributed by him on Feb. 11 to "the Rhodesian forces whom the Governor has chosen to deploy". Other ZANU (PF) party officials attacked included Mr Kumbirai Kangai, the party secretary for social welfare, who was injured on Feb. 5; Mr Mobile Chikwata, who was hurt in a petrol bomb attack (in which his wife and daughter were also injured) at his home on Feb. 8; and Mr Sango Tafirenyika, a local official of ZANU (PF) in Chipinga (Victoria district), who was killed together with his wife in a grenade attack on Feb. 12. Mr Oliver Saunyama, a candidate for Mr Sithole's ZANU, was shot dead in his car leaving his home in Salisbury on Jan. 22, after which Mr Sithole alleged that the attack had been part of a campaign by ZANU (PF) to eliminate political opponents. The body of Mr Francis Makombe, a reserve candidate for the Patriotic Front (ZAPU) in Victoria district, who had disappeared in late January, was found on Feb. 22 (after it had been alleged on Feb. 5 that he had been killed by ZANLA guerrillas—see below). The Salisbury home of Mr Ernest Bulle (UANC) was attacked on Feb. 14. Mr Mugabe on Feb. 17 cancelled a scheduled appearance at a rally in Bulawayo, reportedly for security reasons.

At the "Kilo" assembly point south-east of Bulawayo (one of two camps where both ZANLA and ZIPRA forces were assembled), a clash occurred on Jan. 22 between the two groups. Although the incident was resolved without casualties and the situation was restored following visits by senior ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders to the camp, there was speculation during the election—particularly on the part of UANC spokesmen—over the possibility that alleged hostility between ZANLA and ZIPRA might give rise to violent confrontation when the election results were announced.

The most serious terrorist incident occurred on Feb. 3 near Rusape (90 miles south-east of Salisbury) when a rocket attack on a bus killed 16 passengers and injured over 20. One of the attackers was also killed; matches and other items found on his body were of a type issued to guerrilla forces at the assembly camps, and it was alleged that the attack had been carried out by ZANLA forces (some 350 of whom had reportedly been missing from the assembly point "Echo"), although this was denied by Mr Mugabe on Feb. 4. In another incident on Feb. 3, a bus carrying supporters of Bishop Muzorewa was attacked and one woman was killed.

Following bomb attacks on two churches in Salisbury on Feb. 14, and the discovery of an unexploded bomb in the Roman Catholic cathedral in the city the following day, it was reportedly initially suspected that the bombs were part of an alleged ZANU (PF) anti-religious campaign (the cathedral bomb having been contained in a briefcase marked with party slogans). Mr Mugabe denied that his party was involved (as did Mr Nkomo), and Mr Justin Nyoka, a spokesman for ZANU (PF), asserted on Feb. 15 that the Rhodesian security forces were using "dirty tricks" in a crude attempt to discredit the party. This assertion was apparently substantiated when two men killed by a bomb explosion in their car on Feb. 14 (and suspected by police of having placed the church bombs, which were set off by timing devices) were identified in a Rhodesian military communiqué on Feb. 17 as Rhodesian security force personnel. Whereas the communiqué indicated that the men (reportedly members of the Selous Scouts unit) had been acting on their own initiative, Mr Mugabe on Feb. 18 alleged that the incident was "part of an ill-conceived plot to besmirch ZANU (PF)", intended to encourage the false belief that the party was anti-religious; the Governor's office issued no statement except to say that the matter was under investigation.

Further allegations of "dirty tricks" by the Selous Scouts were made on Feb. 25, after the Mambo Press offices in Gwelo were destroyed on Feb. 24 by a bomb explosion (which also killed two men, presumed to be the saboteurs). The press had been used to print the independent Catholic weekly newspaper *Moto*, which had recently resumed publication after a series of bans dating back to September 1974 [see 26806 A].

The ceasefire commission issued regular communiqués giving an account of incidents reported to the commission and accepted by it as constituting violations of the ceasefire; by Feb. 19 there had been 196 such incidents (with over 300 deaths in violent incidents since the beginning of the ceasefire on Dec. 28).

A total of 93 violations were formally attributed to ZANLA forces, with a further 35 occurring in former ZANLA operational areas, while 23 were attributed to ZIPRA forces and 11 more listed as occurring in former ZIPRA areas; two ceasefire violations were formally attributed to the security forces, 17 to bandits and 15 to unidentified persons.

The Question of Intimidation of Voters

Allegations were repeatedly made of intimidation of voters, particularly in rural areas. Lord Soames attributed the responsibility for this primarily to ZANU (PF), and in particular to several thousand ZANLA guerrillas said to have remained outside the assembly places.

A spokesman for Lord Soames, Mr Kieran Prendergast, said on Feb. 1 that "whatever the problems of ZIPRA and the auxiliaries, they pale into insignificance compared with the political intimidation and ceasefire breaches committed by renegade ZANLA personnel roaming through the tribal trust lands for the purposes of intimidation".

Lord Carrington in his statement on Feb. 6 [see above] described this intimidation as "the principal threat to fair elections", and he added: "In certain parts of the country it has been made impossible for even Mr Nkomo or Bishop Muzorewa to hold meetings. People have been told that if they do not vote according to the wishes of a party, the war will continue or they will be killed." (Lord Carrington also said in response to a question from Lord Gladwyn that "Mr Nkomo has scrupulously abided by the terms of the Lancaster House agreement", whereas the supporters of Mr Mugabe had not.)

Mr Mugabe, for his part, contended that it was the SFAs who most commonly engaged in intimidation, acting as a private political army on behalf of Bishop Muzorewa's UANC, and he asserted that the British administration was demonstrating its partiality in failing to tackle this problem and refusing to confine the SFAs to barracks.

In his speech on his return to the country on Jan. 27 [see above], Mr Mugabe warned the SFAs that ZANLA forces would "hit them hard" if they persisted in acts of "barbarism" and intimidation of ZANU (PF) supporters. He said that Lord Soames should have deployed the legal ZANLA forces under his command to enforce the ceasefire, but he added that "we will not dishonour the agreement, even if you will". After a meeting with Lord Soames on Jan. 31, Mr Mugabe repeated that his party was not yet "at breaking point" with regard to the operation of the ceasefire, although he said that he was "disillusioned by the lack of honesty displayed by the British".

Mr Nkomo in his speech on Jan. 13 on returning to the country [see above] proposed that the CMF be increased to over 5,000 men to ensure effective monitoring, including that of Rhodesian security forces and SFAs. Mr Peter Shore, the opposition spokesman on foreign affairs in the UK House of Commons, said during questions in the House on Feb. 6 that he believed that "an additional force of between 600 and 800 Commonwealth military observers could make a substantial difference" in monitoring bandit groups, elements of the guerrilla groups which had not reported, and elements of the SFAs who, he added, "are not under the same kind of supervision as other forces in Rhodesia". In reply Sir Ian Gilmour affirmed the Government's policy that no reinforcements to the CMF would be sought from Commonwealth countries unless requested by Lord Soames; he had stated in reply to an earlier question from Mr Shore that "the auxiliaries are, of course, monitored by the monitoring force", that any accusations laid against them were investigated and that "disciplinary action has been taken, and will continue to be taken, against them if they transgress what they should be doing", but that in many parts their activities (such as reopening schools) were not open to criticism.

Whereas Mr Nkomo had on Jan. 13 concentrated his attention on alleged ceasefire violations by security forces and SFAs—and had "unreservedly condemned" the killing by the security forces at Lupane (north-west of Bulawayo) on Jan. 10 of seven ZIPRA guerrillas—he repeatedly urged all guerrilla forces who had not yet done so to comply with the assembly process, and on Jan. 30 he called for an end to all ceasefire violations, by guerrilla forces as well as by the security forces and SFAs. In a broadcast on Feb. 3, he warned any ZIPRA forces still in the bush that drastic action would be taken against them unless they complied immediately with instructions to assemble lawfully.

During the first half of February Lord Soames took certain measures to limit the effects of political intimidation (particularly that allegedly conducted by supporters of Mr Mugabe).

After Lord Soames had called on Mr Mugabe to state publicly his commitment to the ceasefire and to free and fair elections (and after Mr Nkomo had made a statement to this end on Feb. 3), Mr Mugabe said in a televised press conference on Feb. 4 that (i) ZANLA forces lawfully assembled should not leave the assembly places, (ii) those still in the bush should surrender their arms to the CMF and report to the assembly places "or be subject to punishment", and (iii) the right of all parties to campaign peacefully should be respected.

Lord Soames on Feb. 5 published an ordinance under which he assumed powers to suspend individuals from campaigning, to restrict party meetings and to ban a party from contesting the elections in specified areas (these powers being additional to his power under existing emergency regulations to impose an overall ban on a party).

At a meeting of the electoral council on the same day, Lord Soames emphasized that it was "of the utmost importance that this wave of violence and intimidation should be turned back" and he added that "it would be intolerable for any party to gain electoral advantage from the use of such tactics". At a press conference after a meeting with Lord Soames also on Feb. 5, Mr Nkomo said that his party had been compelled to cancel meetings for security reasons in some former ZANLA operational areas (similar complaints having been made by Bishop Muzorewa). Referring to the abduction of Mr Makombe [see above], he said: "The word intimidation is too mild. This is terror. Something has got to be done." Mr Nkomo was accompanied by two party workers who said that they had been with Mr Makombe when they were attacked by ZANLA elements; although Mr Nkomo himself refused to comment on this allegation, he said that he had tried without success to discuss the matter with Mr Mugabe.

After the British election supervisors in the eight electoral districts had submitted a preliminary report to Lord Soames, identifying ZANU (PF) as the main source of "extensive intimidation" in rural areas, the leaders of all nine parties agreed at an electoral council meeting on Feb. 8 to sign a declaration committing themselves to campaign peacefully and without intimidation.

The report noted that ZANU (PF) intimidation was such that conditions for free and fair elections could not be said to exist in five of the eight electoral districts; the worst affected areas were reportedly Mashonaland East and rural parts of Manicaland and Victoria districts. "A good atmosphere" had been found in former ZIPRA areas, except where ZANLA forces had recently infiltrated into parts of Matabeleland South. Little evidence of intimidation by SFAs was reported, apart from some cases of "armed electioneering tactics" to ensure attendance at UANC rallies in Victoria district.

Amid growing controversy over the possibility of a partial or total ban being imposed on ZANU (PF), either of which (according to Mr Mugabe on Feb. 11) might provoke an exodus of ZANLA forces from the assembly points and the resumption of the war in Rhodesia, Lord Soames on Feb. 9 banned Mr Enos Nkala from campaigning, and on Feb. 13 published a further ordinance giving himself the power to abrogate the elections in areas deemed to be affected by intimidation.

Mr Nkala, who remained eligible as a ZANU (PF) candidate in Matabeleland South, announced his intention of disregarding the Governor's order (which was imposed after he had allegedly made speeches asserting that the war would be resumed unless his party won the elections).

Whereas on Feb. 13 Mr Mugabe described as "outrageously unconstitutional" the powers assumed by Lord Soames (which also included, under the Feb. 13 ordinance, the power to ban all public meetings in particular areas), Lord Soames referred to 22 of the country's 56 administrative districts in which he said that intimidation was at an unacceptably high level, and he warned that unless the situation improved within the next 10 days he might use his power to abrogate the elections in any or all of those areas. (In this eventuality the transporting of voters to other districts would also be prohibited, although a spokesman for the Governor accepted that nothing could be done about voters who were prepared to walk.)

ZANU (PF) was on Feb. 14 prohibited (under the ordinance of Feb. 5) from holding political meetings in the Triangle and Hippo Valley areas (near Chiredzi in the Victoria electoral district). It was reported on the same day that several of the party's officials had been arrested by police.

Mr Richard Hove, Mr Zimbashi Mbengwai and Mrs Julia Zvobgo, all ZANU (PF) parliamentary candidates, were among those arrested and detained on charges under the Law and Order Maintenance Act of aiding guerrillas and of failing to report their presence to the authorities; the High Court subsequently ordered that they should be released on bail on Feb. 23. In an earlier incident on Feb. 9 Mr Garfield Todd, the 72-year-old former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1953-58 (who had been a member of Mr Nkomo's delegation at the Geneva conference on the future of Rhodesia in 1976—see 28197 A) was arrested on similar charges, and was reportedly refused bail until the Governor intervened; the charges were dropped on Feb. 21.

Extension of State of Emergency - Position of Detainees Under Martial Law and of Political Prisoners

Lord Soames announced on Jan. 18 that he had on Jan. 11 signed a proclamation extending the existing state of emergency for six months (or until such legislation was superseded by the introduction of the new Constitution at independence).

The emergency regulations provided inter alia for people to be held without trial for periods of up to 30 days; it was subsequently revealed that the number of those detained in this way was 597 on Feb. 6 and 705 on Feb. 29.

Lord Soames had on Dec. 31 informed Mr Frank Judd of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa that he was taking steps to release political detainees, and also that the operation of martial law tribunals had been ended. (He also announced that he had commuted the death sentences passed on 11 Blacks convicted of murder; this decision was criticized by UANC spokesmen, by Mr Christopher Andersen, the former (White) Minister of Justice under the Salisbury regime, and by Mr Hector MacDonald, the Rhodesian Chief Justice, who on Jan. 17 upheld two other death sentences and stated that the exercise of the prerogative of mercy by the Governor should not be used as a means of implementing de facto abolition of the death penalty.)

A report published by the international human rights organization Amnesty International on Jan. 17 estimated that there were still 11,000 political detainees in Rhodesia, of whom 5,000 were held under martial law regulations and 6,000 had been convicted of political offences, in most cases by the now-suspended martial law tribunals. This figure was described by Lord Soames on the same day as absurdly high, and the number of martial law detainees was estimated by British official sources on Feb. 29 as 1,300.

With regard to those convicted of political offences, the amnesty announced by Lord Soames on Dec. 21 [see page 30176] did not apply; in implementing reviews of their sentences, Lord Soames was criticized for reliance on officials of the former Salisbury regime, with the review by the Director of Prisons Release Advisory Service recommending the release of only 54 prisoners, and an upgraded review body (consisting of the Secretary for Law and Order, the Secretary for Justice and the Attorney-General) recommending on Feb. 12 only 55 further releases. Lord Soames announced on Jan. 17, however, that the 81 detainees held under ministerial order at the time of his arrival in Rhodesia had all been released.

In another development, Mgr Donal Lamont, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Umtali who had been listed as a prohibited immigrant since his deportation in March 1977 [see page 28314 and also 30070], and who had been granted a 30-day permit when he returned to the country on Jan. 6, left Rhodesia on Feb. 6 having complained that restrictions were placed on his freedom whereas amnesties were granted to those who had committed and supported the illegal unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965. (After the matter had been raised in the UK Parliament, Lord Carrington said in the House of Lords on Feb. 25 that it would be for the new Government to make its own decisions regarding listed prohibited immigrants after independence, but that in the meanwhile anyone so classified was free to enter Rhodesia if they wished.)

Repatriation of Refugees

Following agreement at the Lancaster House conference that arrangements should be made to facilitate the return in the pre-election period of refugees from Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique (whose numbers were estimated by the Red Cross as over 20,000, 60,000 and 150,000 respectively), a meeting was held in London on Jan. 4 between the British Government and international refugee aid agencies (notably the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross). An appeal was then launched by the UNHCR on Jan. 14 to raise $22,000,000 to meet the costs of the repatriation programme, including transport and the creation of transit and reception centres; the Rhodesian police undertook the security screening of returning refugees to prevent the entry into the country of military personnel in civilian guise.

Botswana. Repatriation of refugees from Botswana under UNHCR auspices was carried out between Jan. 21 and Feb. 24, with the operation being reportedly completed by the latter date. In addition to 18,200 refugees whose return was assisted by this programme, several thousand others were reported to have walked back unassisted.

Zambia. Repatriation from Zambia began on Feb. 4 (after the Rhodesian authorities had rejected proposals for direct airlifts to Bulawayo and Salisbury). This operation, under which 4,295 people were repatriated by Feb. 24, was affected by allegations of police torturing suspected guerrillas during the screening process. Allegations of torture at the Gwaai River Mine reception centre began on Feb. 10, and included signed statements by several of approximately 100 men sent back to Zambia as guerrillas, who claimed that their admissions of having undergone military training were obtained under duress and after torture. Mr Nicholas Morris, the UNHCR chargé de mission in Salisbury, described the limited achievements of the Zambian repatriation operation as a disappointment, and its apparent shortcomings were also criticized by, inter alios, Zambian Government spokesmen and the Foreign Ministers of African countries at an OAU meeting in Addis Ababa on Feb. 15 [see also below]. It was reported that whereas the UNHCR sought to give priority to repatriating those refugees of voting age before the elections (and also thereby to allow heads of families to return and make arrangements within the country before being joined by dependants), the Rhodesian authorities had placed restrictions for security reasons on the number of men of military age admitted to the country each day.

Mozambique. Repatriation of refugees from Mozambique also made only limited progress before the elections, with a total of 10,938 people returning under UNHCR auspices by Feb. 24. In this instance delays were attributed to transport problems between remote refugee camps and the one point opened for crossing into Rhodesia (east of Umtali). The Mozambican authorities reportedly unsuccessfully proposed the opening of a second crossing point (on the Salisbury-Tete road) more accessible for refugees in Tete province.

International Criticism of British Administration - Concern over South African Attitude

At the 34th OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa, which ended on Feb. 15, the Foreign Ministers of 49 member countries passed a resolution condemning alleged British violations of the Lancaster House agreement and calling on OAU member countries and the international community to use their influence on Britain to ensure that free and fair elections were held.

The resolution accused Britain of manoeuvres and hostile propaganda against the two PF parties, reiterated the points covered in the UN Security Council resolution of Feb. 2, and also expressed indignation over reports of torture and harassment of returning refugees (calling for these reports to be investigated by the UN Secretary-General). Announcing its intention of meeting in the week following the announcement of the election results "to examine the conduct and results of the elections and in order to determine the position of the OAU", the Council of Ministers called on Britain to provide facilities for a team of OAU election observers (in response to which the OAU Secretary-General and two assistants were invited to witness the elections in the period Feb. 25 to March 1, although the British Government rejected a request that OAU observers should be allowed into Rhodesia a week earlier than this).

The OAU liberation committee on Feb. 18 criticized the decision by the British administration in Rhodesia (announced on Feb. 16) to use mine-protected armoured vehicles provided by South Africa for the distribution and collection of ballot boxes. Mr Hashim Mbita, the executive secretary of the liberation committee, speaking in Dar-es-Salaam, described this as a dangerous move with apparently sinister motives, allowing possible infiltration of South African troops or the introduction of stuffed ballot boxes to falsify election returns. (These criticisms were repeated in Zambian radio broadcasts, while President Kaunda affirmed in Lusaka on Feb. 19 that he had "irrefutable evidence to show that South African troops were invited into Rhodesia by the British Government" and that these troops could be used to support a coup if the PF parties won the elections.)

The World Council of Churches issued a statement in Geneva on Feb. 18 listing "disturbing" developments in Rhodesia, including the deployment of Rhodesian security forces, the fact that the SFAs had not been required to assemble and be monitored, and the extension of emergency powers and martial law regulations "which give unbridled powers to the security forces".

The statement, which accused Lord Soames of deliberately jeopardizing the Lancaster House agreement, warned that unless the British administration took control of the situation, the country faced a possible coup by Rhodesian forces or armed South African intervention.

Whereas the South African Government denied suggestions that South Africa would support or initiate a coup against a legally elected government, reports published in the South African press on Feb. 20 quoted military sources as suggesting the possibility of armed South African intervention in Rhodesia in certain circumstances.

(It was reported, however, that Gen. Peter Walls, the Commander of Combined Operations, made a secret visit to South Africa immediately prior to the beginning of polling, and that he strongly advised against any intervention in the event of an election victory by Mr Mugabe's party, although this outcome was said to be regarded with particular apprehension in South Africa.)

The Commonwealth Southern Africa Committee, at a meeting in London on Feb. 21, referred to a "crisis of confidence" arising from alleged discrimination by Lord Soames against ZANU (PF), and listed certain requirements which should be met to rectify this before the beginning of polling.

These points, conveyed in a message from Mr Ramphal to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, included the immediate withdrawal to barracks of the Rhodesian security forces and SFAs, and also the withdrawal of all South African forces and military equipment from Rhodesia. (Mr Ramphal had stated on Feb. 5 during a visit to Nigeria that the withdrawal of South African troops from Beitbridge had answered the main criticism against Lord Soames' administration, and he had added that at that time the progress which had been achieved balanced the other departures which he said had been made from the Lancaster House agreements.)

President Nyerere on Feb. 25 claimed that Britain was interfering to prevent an election victory by the PF parties, asserted that "the results that are going to be announced are going to be rigged", and stated that he would recognize the outcome only if, "in spite of the trickery", Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo were to emerge victorious.

Prof. Ishaya Audu, the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs, said in a newspaper interview (quoted in *The Guardian* on Feb. 25) that Mr Mugabe should be part of a post-election government, that "to keep him out of government is to continue the liberation war unabated", and that Nigeria would "support such a war morally and materially". However the front-line states, at a meeting convened on Feb. 26 by President Nyerere in Dar-es-Salaam and attended by Presidents Kaunda, Machel, Nyerere and Seretse Khama (of Botswana) and by Mr Pascual Luvualu (a prominent member of the political bureau of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Party of Labour), issued a joint communiqué which omitted any references to the allegations of ballot rigging or the possibility of supporting a continuation of the liberation war. The communiqué nevertheless strongly condemned Britain for violating the letter and the spirit of the Lancaster House agreement, and also called for a consolidation of the unity between the two wings of the PF. It also included denunciations of South Africa's "continued military presence" and of the latter's "declared intention to intervene in the event of a PF victory in the elections".

Administrative and Security Arrangements during Polling Period

A total of 657 polling stations were set up for the common roll (Black) elections on Feb. 27-29, while an information campaign was mounted through broadcasting, posters and the distribution of leaflets to emphasize the importance of participation in the voting and to give assurances that the ballot was and would remain secret.

The polling stations (nearly half of which were mobile units) were each staffed by a Rhodesian civil service presiding officer and between four and six polling officers; with the exception of urban polling stations in Salisbury and Bulawayo, each was also supervised by a British policeman (nearly 500 of whom had been flown to Rhodesia on Feb. 22 in accordance with an initiative by the British Government, announced by Sir Ian Gilmour in the House of Commons on Feb. 13 and designed to increase public confidence in the proper conduct of the voting). A total of 80 British election supervisors were also stationed around the country, with at least one in each of the 56 administrative districts. The original intention of allowing party agents to be present at polling stations was revised in the light of concern over intimidation, so that the party agents were present only when ballot boxes were opened each morning and resealed at the end of each day. The chanting of party slogans was also prohibited within the immediate vicinity of the polling stations.

Voters were asked to produce identification and evidence of age, but polling officers were instructed to use their discretion where this identification was not forthcoming. Voters were also required to dip their fingers into a bowl of colourless fluid, the presence of which would show up under infra-red light scanning machines if they should subsequently attempt to vote a second time.

Counting of votes began only after the end of polling on the final day, with a preliminary count recording only the total number of votes cast in each administrative district, after which the ballot papers were transported under escort to the eight provincial centres for the full count, with the results to be announced on March 4.

Security arrangements included the call-up of police (on Feb. 15) and of Rhodesian Army reservists (on Feb. 20), the prohibition of all political meetings between Feb. 27 and March 4 (under an order issued by Lord Soames on Feb. 25), and the establishment within the assembly points of small groups of Rhodesian security force personnel, whose presence was reportedly intended both to allow them to observe the assembled ZANLA and ZIPRA forces and to dissuade any attempted coup by the security forces (since the groups within the assembly points would then become de facto hostages of the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces).

This last measure followed concern over the effects of withdrawal of the CMF, which was scheduled to begin withdrawing "in substantial numbers" from March 3 (as confirmed by Mr Fenn on Feb. 26), although Mr Mugabe had on Feb. 14 asked the British administration to retain the CMF presence, as "a real deterrent to elements that might want to bring about a second UDI", until an integrated army had been created for the new Zimbabwe. (A statement issued by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Feb. 22 had referred to the "phased withdrawal of the Commonwealth force by independence, preserving flexibility to take account of developments on the ground", and had also indicated that the CMF could play "a successful liaison role in the period between elections and independence", but it was considered unwise for the CMF to undertake any commitments relating to the post-election period in view of its potential vulnerability and its unsuitability for active peacekeeping in the event of a breakdown of the ceasefire. Under arrangements announced by Mr Fenn on Feb. 29, the majority of the CMF personnel were to withdraw from the assembly points on March 3 and to leave the country two days later, while certain British members of the CMF would stay at the assembly points until March 8; some British military personnel would also remain in the country to fulfil training and liaison roles until independence—see also below.)

In initial moves towards the creation of an integrated army, joint training sessions (the importance of which had repeatedly been emphasized by Mr Nkomo throughout the election campaign) began under British supervision at a special new camp at Essexvale near Bulawayo on Feb. 25 between some 600 ZIPRA forces and Rhodesian security forces, while a similar scheme involving ZANLA forces began on March 3.

In response to a request from Lord Soames, assurances were given by Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo on Feb. 22 that all ZANLA and ZIPRA forces would remain at the assembly points after the elections, and directives to this effect were broadcast by commanders of both forces on Feb. 29. On March 1 Mr Nkomo and Mr Simon Muzenda, the vice-president of ZANU (PF), visited assembly points to repeat instructions to their assembled forces to remain in the camps.

Lord Soames on Feb. 18 announced that he would undertake a series of meetings with political party leaders to ensure that intimidation was reduced by the time of polling. At a meeting with Mr Mugabe on Feb. 25, Lord Soames reportedly said that he judged the situation to have improved sufficiently that he need not invoke his powers to ban any party or to abrogate elections in any area [see above]. Mr Mugabe for his part reportedly gave the assurances sought by Lord Soames that he would accept the election results even "if the impossible were to happen" and ZANU (PF) were not to emerge victorious. He also reportedly asked Lord Soames to remain in the country during a period after the elections (in the event of a victory by Mr Mugabe's party), to provide stability as the country assumed independent status.

Mr Mugabe on Feb. 27—the first day of polling for the common-roll seats—travelled to Mozambique (in a move described as surprising by Mr Fenn on behalf of Lord Soames); after consultations with President Machel, Mr Mugabe visited Tanzania and held talks with President Nyerere (and reportedly with a Nigerian Government representative) on March 1, returning thence to Salisbury on March 2.

Mr Mugabe's visit to Mozambique followed that of Gen. Walls, who had reportedly held secret discussions with Mozambican Government members in Maputo on March 23 (and who was also said to have had a secret meeting with Mr Mugabe at the latter's house on Feb. 26). A report in *The Guardian* on Feb. 29 indicated that Mr Mugabe's journey had been undertaken to reconcile alleged differences between Presidents Machel and Nyerere, and to persuade the latter to restrain his criticisms of the election process [see above] since Mr Mugabe was now anticipating a victory by his party.

Whereas ZANU (PF) was widely expected to obtain more seats than any other single party, and Mr Mugabe had on several occasions made it clear that he would seek to involve Mr Nkomo and members of the Patriotic Front (ZAPU) in a coalition government, speculation had arisen that in the event of no party securing an overall majority Lord Soames might not automatically invite the leader of the largest party to form a government, but might rather approach the leader whom he judged most capable of building a successful coalition. Mr Mugabe said on March 2, however, that if ZANU (PF) won the most seats Lord Soames would be "duty bound to call on me first".

Allegations of electoral irregularities were made before the announcement of the election results, notably by Bishop Muzorewa and also by Mr Musarurwa of the Patriotic Front (ZAPU).

Bishop Muzorewa said in a letter to Lord Soames on Feb. 29 that "the correct view of the electorate may not be demonstrated" because of intimidation, and on March 2 he also stated that there had been frequent cases of under-age voting, while Mr Musarurwa on March 2 accused the UANC of transporting voters between electoral districts and of organizing multiple voting.

Broadcasts were made on March 3 by Lord Soames and also by Mr Mugabe and by Gen. Walls, in which all three appealed for calm and respect for law and order when the election results were announced the following day.

Lord Soames said that each citizen should accept the result in an orderly manner and that "there must be no violent action or reaction of any kind". Mr Mugabe and Gen. Walls both called for obedience to the law and warned against giving credence to rumours and to trouble-makers, while Gen. Walls added that "anybody who gets out of line will be dealt with effectively and swiftly".

Reports on Elections by Observer Groups

The elections were observed by an 11-nation Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), as provided for in the Lancaster House agreement, and also by a group of 20 independent British observers appointed by the British Government to assist Sir John Boynton, the electoral commissioner. Other observers (of whom there were a total of 291) included a UK inter-party parliamentary group and observers from countries including European Community member states, Canada and Norway.

Members of the UN Security Council, meeting informally on Feb. 20 (and reportedly acting after an initiative by President Nyerere of Tanzania), proposed that a UN observer team should be sent to Rhodesia with an official mandate to observe the last stages of the election campaign and the actual polling. The British Government, however, pointed out for its part that the responsibility for bringing legal independence to Rhodesia lay with Britain, and that no provision was made in the Lancaster House agreements for a UN observer group, although "as a matter of courtesy" Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, was invited to send a personal representative to witness the elections.

The COG, which was to report through Mr Ramphal to the Commonwealth heads of government, arrived in Rhodesia on Jan. 24; its members (who with the inclusion of assistants and administrative staff numbered 63 in all) included prominent representatives from Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Ghana, Jamaica, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka under the chairmanship of Mr Rajeshwar Dayal (a former Secretary-General at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs). The 20 official observers appointed by the British Government (several of whom had had senior diplomatic experience in Africa) arrived on Feb. 11, while the nine members of the UK parliamentary group arrived on Feb. 17.

In response to an appeal from Sir John Boynton that observers should publish reports before the election results were announced, interim reports were published on March 2 by both the COG and the British official observers, sharing the broad conclusion that despite certain shortcomings the elections had been sufficiently free and fair to reflect the democratic wishes of the people.

The COG interim report referred to various factors which had "sustained or created conditions where political activity was not always devoid of violence, where freedom of movement, assembly and expression were restricted in varying degrees in parts of the country and where the performance of the publicly-owned media left much to be desired". It was a fact, the report stated, that intimidation had occurred and that it had not stemmed only from a single quarter; in the Group's view, certain official agencies had also been culpable. With regard to the functioning of the interim administration under the Governor, the report noted with regret "evidence of obstruction and a lack of a sufficient degree of impartiality in dealing with the interests of the different parties". However, the political parties had had "by and large an adequate, if not entirely unrestricted, opportunity to solicit the support of the electorate", and the electorate had shown a high level of awareness both of political issues and of the fact that the ballot was and would remain secret; it was the unanimous conclusion of the COG that "the election up to the end of polling can be considered to have been free and fair to the extent that it provided an adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner".

(The COG's final report, published on April 9, substantially confirmed these conclusions and stated that "in the extraordinary circumstances in which the elections were held we could hardly have expected to find the levels of administrative propriety and public rectitude associated with the concept of free and fair elections at their best", but that "in the event the degree to which they approached these levels is praiseworthy indeed". The final report noted that "the question of intimidation dominated the election"; it expressed the view that "intimidation by the guerrillas was by no means as widespread or as brutal as official spokesmen claimed", and criticized the high profile maintained by the security forces in many parts of the country. With regard to the SFAs, the report noted that "they were clearly identified in the public mind as a political army" and that it would have been "more politic" for the Governor to have confined them to camps; the failure to control them "was a major factor in the ensuing level of intimidation", since their activities, while not as bad as the charges against them claimed, were "very much worse than government spokesmen were ever prepared to admit".)

The UK parliamentary observers unanimously concluded (in their report on Feb. 29) that "the election result will fairly reflect the general wish of the Zimbabwean electorate": they found that the organization of polling had been efficiently and fairly carried out and that public understanding of the secrecy of the ballot had reduced the impact of intimidation.

In his own report on March 3, Sir John Boynton said that the level of intimidation, which had been a matter of serious concern in the first weeks of the campaign, had been reduced significantly after the assumption by the Governor of special powers (which he had not found it necessary to invoke).

Results of Elections to House of Assembly

In the election held on Feb. 14 for the 20 seats on the reserved White voters' roll, candidates of the Rhodesian Front (RF) party led by Mr Ian Smith were returned in all 20 constituencies (having been unopposed in 14). The results in the six contested constituencies were announced on Feb. 15, with the turnout ranging from 49 per cent to 60 per cent.

A total of eight independent candidates had been nominated in these six constituencies, which included the Southern constituency where Mr Ian Smith overwhelmingly defeated two liberal opponents. Nominations had not been made for this election either by the UANC (which had reportedly been considering entering its own White candidates) or by a White liberal party, to be called the Alliance Party, which had announced in December that it intended to contest the forthcoming elections.

Lord Soames announced the election results for the 80 Black seats on March 4. ZANU (PF) won 57 seats (thereby securing an overall majority in the 100-seat Parliament) while the PF won 20 seats and the UANC won three; the overall voting statistics are shown in the following table.

	Votes	Percentage of Valid Votes	Seats
ZANU (PF)	1,668,992	62.992	57
PF (ZAPU)	638,879	24.113	20
UANC	219,307	8.277	3
ZANU	53,343	2.013	0
ZDF	28,181	1.064	0
NFZ	18,794	0.709	0
NDU	15,056	0.568	0
UNFP	5,796	0.219	0
UPAM	1,181	0.045	0

There were in addition 52,746 spoilt papers in a total poll of 2,702,275, an estimated 94 per cent of the electorate.

In each of the eight electoral provinces, the allotted seats were divided among the successful parties in proportion to votes won, after those parties with less than 10 per cent of the votes had first been eliminated and their votes discounted. The province-by-province distribution of the seats won by the three parties concerned was as follows:

	ZANU (PF)	PF (ZAPU)	UANC
Manicaland	11	0	0
Mashonaland Central	6	0	0
Mashonaland East	14	0	2
Mashonaland West	6	1	1
Matabeleland North	1	9	0
Matabeleland South	0	6	0
Midlands	8	4	0
Victoria	11	0	0

There were mixed reactions among political party leaders when the election results were announced, with Mr Nkomo stressing that his party and Mr Mugabe's together had won an overwhelming majority of seats, while Bishop Muzorewa repeated his assertion that the elections had not been free and fair.

Mr Nkomo emphasized that the central point was that the results would bring independence to Zimbabwe, and he said that these results must be accepted by everyone. Mr Sithole congratulated Mr Mugabe on what he referred to as a "brilliant victory", while Bishop Muzorewa said that he had written to congratulate Mr Mugabe and to offer his co-operation, but that "I am already on record as saying that the election was totally and absolutely unfree and unfair and in no way demonstrated the true will of all our people in determining their own future". Mr Ian Smith indicated that he expected the new Government to take a pragmatic approach, despite Mr Mugabe's reputation as a Marxist, and that a mass exodus of the White population was unlikely.

The results were welcomed by African and Commonwealth leaders, while both the United States and the Soviet Union congratulated Mr Mugabe on his success; the South African Government, however, while accepting the outcome of the election, gave a strong warning to Mr Mugabe against allowing the country to be used as a base for attacks against South African territory.

Messages of congratulation and support were received by Mr Mugabe from, inter alia, the Governments of the five front-line states (i.e. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) and of Nigeria (the Foreign Ministers of these six countries having met in Lusaka in advance of the announcement of the election results in order to co-ordinate a possible joint response), as well as from Presidents Moi of Kenya and Binaisa of Uganda, and from Mr Shridath Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General. President Nyerere, referring to his earlier allegation that the British administration had manipulated the elections to favour Bishop Muzorewa, acknowledged that he had been proved wrong, and he added: "I am very pleased that I am wrong."

Mr Cyrus Vance, then the United States Secretary of State, issued a statement congratulating Mr Mugabe and expressing "the deepest appreciation and admiration" for the role played by the British Government. The official Soviet news agency, Tass, described the results as a crushing defeat for the "puppet" Muzorewa regime by the "Patriotic forces", but added a warning that the new state of Zimbabwe "is making its first steps in conditions of a growing danger of aggression from the racist regime of the South African Republic and its imperialist allies". Mr P. W. Botha, the South African Prime Minister, said that the result was a decision by the people of Rhodesia, who would have to "work it out for themselves and live with it", but he added: "Any neighbour which allows its territory to be used for attacks on or the undermining of South Africa and its security will have to face the full force of the Republic's strength." On the other hand Mr Sam Nujoma, the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), congratulated Mr Mugabe and expressed his hope that Zimbabwe would provide "material assistance and political and diplomatic support to the people of Namibia and South Africa to speed up the struggle for the liberation of all southern Africa".

A statement by Lord Carrington in the UK House of Lords on March 4 recorded the British Government's thanks to all concerned with the organization of the elections, and added that it was now Britain's task to assist in the orderly transfer of power to a stable Government (on an independence date to be fixed by the Governor).

Following an identical statement by Sir Ian Gilmour in the House of Commons, Dr David Owen (the former Labour Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary) and Mr David Steel (the leader of the Liberal Party) endorsed the view that the elections had been conducted freely and fairly and that congratulations were due to all concerned in their organization; these points were reiterated by members of the all-party parliamentary group which had travelled to Rhodesia to observe the elections. Sir Ian disagreed with the opinion expressed by several Conservative backbenchers (notably Mr Julian Amery) that Mr Mugabe's victory amounted to the betrayal of Bishop Muzorewa by the British Government, and that the election result was a victory for Marxism and a defeat for the West; he emphasized, on the contrary, that free and fair elections had successfully been held in pursuance of British Government policy, and he added that he had no evidence at all that Mr Mugabe was under the control of the Soviet Union.

After announcing the election results, Lord Soames held talks with Mr Mugabe and invited him, as leader of the party with an overall majority in the new House of Assembly, to form a government under which the country would assume its independence. Mr Mugabe emphasized in a broadcast on the evening of March 4 that the need for unity and reconciliation would be reflected in his government, which would be a Patriotic Front government including Mr Nkomo's party, and he indicated that he would consider White representation in the cabinet "so as to bring about a government that will be reassuring to all people of Zimbabwe". He also said that he had asked Gen. Walls to preside over "Operation Merger" (the formation of an integrated army), in conjunction with the ZANLA and ZIPRA army commanders; the appointment of Gen. Walls as head of the military high command was confirmed on April 16.

Mr Mugabe said that "the need for peace demands that our forces be integrated as soon as possible so that we can emerge with a single national army", and that in this process of integration "we shall also happily continue to enjoy the assistance of British military instructors" [see also below]. He also pledged respect for property rights and civil service pension rights, while urging those who expected "meaningful change" to exercise the necessary patience. (He had earlier told representatives of the business community in Salisbury that "we recognize that the economic structure of this country is based on capitalism, and that whatever ideas we have, we must build on that". Further indications that his Government would adopt a gradual approach to economic change included, on March 21, an interview with *The Times* given by Mr Maurice Nyagumbo, who had been appointed as Minister of Mines in the Cabinet announced on March 11—see below. Mr Nyagumbo emphasized "our desire to see continued private ownership in the mining sector", and he said that he believed in a competitive economy, and that "some countries in Africa made mistakes by carrying out nationalization when it was not necessary".)

Mr Mugabe also stated in his March 4 broadcast that relations with South Africa would be based on "a mutual recognition of the differences which exist between us", and that the realities of the situation made it essential that the two countries should coexist.

In a subsequent interview (quoted in the South African *Rand Daily Mail* on March 9) Mr Mugabe said that "we would want South Africa to regard us as her good neighbour in the same way that we intend to regard her as a good neighbour in the sense of the right of mutual coexistence between us". There would be no disruption of existing trade links, and South African tourists could continue to visit Zimbabwe, but the question of diplomatic relations would have to be considered, he said, while on the question of sporting links he indicated only that he would take account of guidelines established within the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Zimbabwe would oppose the policy of apartheid both diplomatically and morally, he said, and South Africa should act swiftly in making social changes, but with regard to guerrilla action against the South African regime Mr Mugabe was quoted as saying that "we do not expect to provide facilities for people who intend to fight an armed struggle". (*The Daily Telegraph* reported on March 14 that Mr Mugabe had sent a message to a business promotion organization, the South African Foundation, pointing out that stability in Zimbabwe should provide an incentive to investors and recognizing "the major presence" of South African investment, which he said would continue to be welcome without discrimination in the economy of Zimbabwe.)

Formation of Cabinet by Mr Mugabe

Having been asked formally by Lord Soames on March 4 to form a cabinet, Mr Mugabe held a series of consultations (including, notably, with Mr Nkomo on March 5) and announced on March 11 a cabinet list comprising 22 appointments, with portfolios distributed as follows:

Mr Robert Mugabe	Prime Minister and Defence
Mr Simon Muzenda	Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs
Mr Joshua Nkomo	Home Affairs
Mr Edgar Tekere	Manpower, Planning and Development
Mr Enos Nkala	Finance
Mr Simbi Mubako	Justice and Constitutional Affairs
Mr Richard Hove	Public Service
Mr Kumbirai Kangai	Labour and Social Welfare*
Mr Ernest Kadungure	Transport and Power
Dr Eddison Zvobgo	Local Government and Housing
Dr Sydney Sekeramayi	Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development
Mr David Smith	Commerce and Industry
Mr Dennis Norman	Agriculture
Mr Joseph Msika	Natural Resources and Water Development
Dr Nathan Shamuyarira	Information and Tourism
Dr Dzingai Mutumbuka	Education and Culture
Dr Herbert Ushewokunze	Health
Mr Clement Muchachi	Public Works
Mr George Silundika	Posts and Telecommunications†
Mr Maurice Nyagumbo	Mines
Mrs Teurai Ropa Nhongo	Youth, Sport and Recreation
Mr Emmerson Munangagwa	Minister of State in the Office of the Prime Minister

* It was announced on May 8 that the name of this Ministry had been changed to Labour and Social Services.

† It was announced on May 10 that this portfolio had been amended to include Roads and Road Traffic as well as Posts and Telecommunications.

It was reported that the Economy portfolio had been left open for Dr Bernard Chidzero pending his formal release from his United Nations post as Deputy Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The 22 appointments included 16 members of ZANU (PF), two Whites (Mr Smith and Mr Norman) and four members of Mr Nkomo's Patriotic Front party. Press commentators pointed out that three of these four (Mr Msika, Mr Muchachi and Mr Silundika) had been appointed to relatively minor ministries; moreover, Mr Nkomo's portfolio of Home Affairs (which he had reportedly secured after rejecting proposals that he should accept the largely titular position of President) was reduced in importance by the transfer of control over the tribal trust territories to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, and control over the Police Special Branch to the Minister of State in the Office of the Prime Minister.

Among 13 deputy ministers also appointed at the same time, 11 were members of ZANU (PF) and two were members of Mr Nkomo's Patriotic Front party.

The selection of the 16 ZANU (PF) ministers reflected the structure of the party's central committee (of which only Dr Shamuyarira was not a member) and its 10-member national executive, nine of whom—Mr Mugabe, Mr Muzenda (the party vice-president), Mr Tekere (the party secretary-general), Mr Kangai, Mr Kadungure, Dr Mutumbuka, Mrs Nhongo, Mr Munangagwa and Dr Ushewokunze—became cabinet ministers, the only exception being Mr Meya Hurimbo, the senior political commissar.

Mr Mugabe, born in 1925, had in the early 1960s been a member first of the National Democratic Party (the NDP, formed in 1959 by Mr Michael Mawema—see 17277 C) and then of Mr Nkomo's ZAPU (formed in December 1961 after the banning of the NDP—see 18530 A). He was twice detained before escaping to Tanzania in April 1963, and in July 1963 he joined with a group of former ZAPU members to form ZANU (under the leadership of the Rev. Sithole—see 19600 B), of which he became secretary-general. He was imprisoned in Rhodesia from 1964 to 1974, during which time he obtained several university degrees; in 1975-76 he emerged following a period of internal dissention within ZANU as the leader of an "external wing" based in Mozambique and committed to guerrilla struggle [see pages 27603 and 28045]. In October 1976 his ZANU wing formed the Patriotic Front (PF) alliance with Mr Nkomo's ZAPU [see page 28046]; although both groups then sent their own separate delegations to the Geneva conference [see 28197 A], the PF alliance remained in existence, opposing the so-called "internal settlement" after the failure of the Geneva conference [see 28941 A] and pursuing the guerrilla war until the Lancaster House agreements in 1979 [see 30165 A].

Mr Nkomo, born in 1917, was a prominent organizer of the Rhodesian African Railway Workers' Union and became in 1957 the president of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress. After this latter organization was banned in 1959 [see 17358 A] Mr Nkomo went to Britain; in October 1960 he was elected president of the NDP, but this party was itself banned in December 1961 [see 18530 A] after organizing a nationwide "plebiscite" against the terms of a constitution for Southern Rhodesia which had been drawn up at a conference at Lancaster House (London) but which was subsequently repudiated by Mr Nkomo in February 1961 [see 17919 A; 17956 A; 18381 A]. Mr Nkomo then formed ZAPU, which was in turn banned in September 1962 [see 19133 A]; Mr Nkomo was briefly imprisoned in the following year, and again in 1964, after which he was restricted to the Gonakudzingwa area [see 20457 B]. After 10 years under restriction and detention orders, Mr Nkomo was released on parole to attend a meeting in Lusaka (Zambia) in December 1974 between African heads of state, Rhodesian nationalists and emissaries from the Salisbury regime [see 26909 A]. Following this unsuccessful meeting, Mr Nkomo and other nationalist leaders agreed to merge their organizations into the African National Council led by Bishop Muzorewa [ibid.], but subsequent rivalries led to the election of Mr Nkomo in September 1975 as leader of an ANC "internal wing", in which capacity he held separate negotiations with Mr Ian Smith, the then Prime Minister of the Salisbury regime, which eventually ended in failure in March 1976 [see 27397 A; 27601 A; 27685 A]. After attending the unsuccessful Geneva conference [see 28197 A] Mr Nkomo opposed the "internal settlement" and pursued the guerrilla war, with his forces operating from bases in Zambia, until the eventual conclusion of the Lancaster House agreements in 1979.

Several cabinet posts went to long-standing ZANU members who had spent considerable periods in prison for their political activities; this group included **Mr Muzenda, Mr Nkala, Mr Nyagumbo, Mr Tekere** and **Dr Zvobgo**. Other veteran ZANU members were **Mr Munangagwa** (who had led one of the first armed guerrilla groups in 1964, receiving a death sentence from a Rhodesian court which was, however, commuted because he was so young) and **Dr Shamuyarira**, a journalist and political scientist who had left Rhodesia in 1964 after being charged with printing subversive statements [see page 20326]; Dr Shamuyarira was associated with the creation in Zambia in 1971 of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi) led by Mr Chikerema and purporting to seek unity between ZANU and ZAPU [see page 24963], but he had subsequently rejoined Mr Mugabe's ZANU.

Among the other ZANU (PF) members of the Cabinet, **Mr Hove** was a graduate of Bombay University and had been responsible for the party's external relations; **Mr Kadungure** had been one of the first group of guerrillas to cross from Mozambique into north-eastern Rhodesia in 1971; **Mr Kangai** had been the party's representative in the United States; **Mr Mubako** was a former editor of *Moto* [see above] who had studied law in Lesotho and Canada and had later taught law in Southampton (England); **Dr Mutumbuka** had obtained a doctorate from Sussex University and taught chemistry in Dublin before going to Mozambique to organize schooling among refugees; **Mrs Nhongo** was the party secretary for women's affairs and the wife of the ZANLA army commander, Mr Rex Nhongo; **Dr Sekeramayi** had been expelled from school for political activities and had then trained as a doctor in Sweden, Czechoslovakia and the UK before going to Mozambique in 1977; and **Dr Ushewokunze** had been a doctor in Gwelo before going to Mozambique where he became the party's chief medical officer.

Mr Msika and **Mr Muchachi** had been members of the ZAPU executive who had remained loyal to Mr Nkomo at the time of the creation of ZANU [see 19600 B]; since 1975 they had been respectively external affairs secretary and secretary-general of ZAPU. Mr Msika and **Mr Silundika** (who had lived in Zambia since 1963 and was the external publicity secretary of ZAPU) had both been members of Mr Nkomo's delegation at the Geneva conference in 1976 (which had also been attended by inter alios Mr Tekere as a member of Mr Mugabe's delegation and Mr David Smith as a member of Mr Ian Smith's delegation—see 28197 A).

Mr David Smith had become a successful farmer after emigrating from Scotland to (Southern) Rhodesia in 1946; he was a member of the RF party and had been Minister of Agriculture in Mr Ian Smith's Government from 1968 to 1976, when he became Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister [see 27601 A]. After being joint Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry in the transitional Cabinet appointed in April 1978 [see 29173 A], he had retained the Finance portfolio in Bishop Muzorewa's Cabinet in May 1979 [see page 29759], and had been a member of the Bishop's delegation at the Lancaster House conference. **Mr Norman** was a British-born farmer who emigrated to (Southern) Rhodesia in 1953 and who had been elected in July 1978 as president of the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union (later renamed the Commercial Farmers' Union).

Election of Senate and President

The election of members to the Senate took place on March 19, as follows:

(1) 14 senators were elected by the 80 Black members of the House of Assembly; 13 candidates nominated by ZANU (PF) were all elected (including Mr Nkala—who had failed to secure election to the House of Assembly in Matabeleland South—and also Mr Dennis Norman), together with Mr Msika who was one of eight candidates nominated by the Patriotic Front (ZAPU). Unsuccessful Patriotic Front (ZAPU) nominees included Mr Josiah Chinamano and Mr Willie Musururwa, respectively the party vice-president and publicity secretary, while none of the UANC nominees secured election.

(2) 10 senators were chosen by the 20 White members of the House of Assembly, who approved the 10 RF nominees (there being no other candidates). All those chosen were RF party members, and eight had been senators or MPs in the previous Zimbabwe/Rhodesian Parliament.

(3) 10 senators were elected by traditional chiefs, five of them by the Council of Chiefs of Matabeleland, the Midlands and Victoria Province (among them Chief Ndiweni and three other former senators) and five by the Mashonaland Council of Chiefs.

In addition to the 34 elective members of the Senate, six members were appointed by the Governor on April 11 on the advice of the Prime Minister (those appointed including Mr Garfield Todd).

The titular office of the presidency (for which Mr Nkomo had reportedly declined to be a candidate) was filled on April 11 when, in the absence of other nominations, the Rev. Canaan Banana was declared President-elect.

Mr Banana (44), who was nominated for the presidency by Mr Mugabe, was a Methodist minister and a member of the Ndebele people. As vice-chairman of the African National Council (the organization founded in December 1971 under the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa—see 25223 A), he had campaigned actively for rejection of the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement terms of November 1971 [see 24981 A, and also 25301 A for the report by the Pearce Commission in May 1972 that these terms were not acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole]. Despite the withdrawal of his passport, he left Rhodesia in May 1973 to study theology in the United States [see 25983 A]; on his return two years later he was detained until January 1976 and subsequently made subject to a restriction order [see pages 27404 and 27603], before being named by Bishop Muzorewa as part of the latter's delegation to the Geneva conference in October 1976 [see 28197 A]. During the conference he left Bishop Muzorewa's wing of the ANC and called on the Bishop to dissolve the organization and join Mr Mugabe's ZANU [ibid.]; returning to Rhodesia, he was again imprisoned in January 1977 [see page 28314], and remained in detention until shortly before Lord Soames arrived in Salisbury to take over as British Governor.

Pre-independence Arrangements

The following formal announcement on pre-independence arrangements was issued by Lord Soames on March 14: "At the request of the Prime Minister, Mr Mugabe, the British Government has agreed the Governor will continue to exercise his responsibilities in Rhodesia until midnight on April 17, when the Republic of Zimbabwe will become independent. Friday, April 18, will be Independence Day. In the meantime, ministers of the new Government will be working with their departments to plan the Government's strategy and to prepare for the implementation of its policies."

Although legislative and executive powers thus formally continued to reside with the Governor, Lord Soames made it clear that he would not take any decisions on matters of policy without the agreement of Mr Mugabe.

Opening of Protected Villages - End of Martial Law - Further Amnesties - Mr Mugabe's Appeal for End to Lawlessness and Industrial Unrest

It was announced by the Ministry of Home Affairs on March 12 that the gates of the so-called "protected villages" were to be left open forthwith, although their perimeter fences would not be dismantled and protection forces would remain in position for the time being.

Over 500,000 people were estimated to have been moved into the "protected villages" under the former Smith regime, to prevent contact between nationalist guerrillas and the rural population; of a total of 250 such "protected villages", nearly one-third had been opened under Bishop Muzorewa's "internal settlement" regime during 1979.

Martial law curfew restrictions continued in force until March 20, when Lord Soames signed an ordinance ending martial law forthwith; it was announced at the same time that existing convictions under martial law would have the same status as those imposed by ordinary courts.

Lord Soames on March 20 also signed an amnesty order covering all politically motivated offences in the period up to March 1, 1980.

It had been reported on March 17 that all save one of 1,279 detainees held under emergency powers had been released, including some 500 former auxiliary forces loyal to Mr Sithole [see 30069 A]; however, one detainee was to be charged with an offence under other non-emergency legislation. In an earlier development, Lord Soames had on March 11 pardoned and freed Mr Kenneth McIntosh, who then returned home to Scotland after having been imprisoned since 1974 on charges relating to revelation of Rhodesian methods of circumventing sanctions [see 26510 A; 26806 A; and also pages 27087 and 27404].

A spokesman for Lord Soames announced on April 9 that 13 members of the African National Congress of South Africa, imprisoned in Rhodesia since 1967-68, would be released under amnesty provisions.

Mr Mugabe on March 25 broadcast an appeal for an end to outbreaks of lawlessness and to industrial action by workers, several thousand of whom had gone on strike in the preceding week.

In his broadcast Mr Mugabe said that the Government's prime task was to ensure "the permanence of peace through the maintenance of law and order", and that "in achieving this objective it is the duty of the police to take whatever measures are necessary to stamp out lawlessness and violence and bring the offenders before the courts". He added that the time for retribution was over, and concluded by saying: "Let us set aside our differences once and for all and pull together."

(On March 18, after industrial action had begun at factories in Salisbury and Bulawayo, Mr Kangai, the newly-appointed Minister of Labour, had warned that precipitate action could cripple industry and damage the existing goodwill between the government, employers and employees, as well as delay the introduction of improvements in the position of workers. Demands for a shorter working week and higher wages should be pursued using existing dispute procedures, Mr Kangai said, under which strike action remained illegal. Those involved in the strikes included bus drivers in Bulawayo, shoe workers in Gwelo, textile workers in Gatooma, miners at the Wankie colliery and factory workers in and around Salisbury and Umtali; however, it was reported that normal working had been resumed in most places following Mr Mugabe's March 25 broadcast.)

Measures to Create an Integrated Zimbabwean Army

In parallel with the withdrawal from the assembly camps of the CMF personnel (the last of whom, some 90 British soldiers, left the country on March 16), arrangements were made both for joint training by former guerrilla and Rhodesian security forces, and for a reduction in the overall number of men under arms in the country.

(*The Financial Times* reported on April 22 that just before independence 28,300 guerrilla forces were assembled at the 11 remaining assembly points; some 6,000 of these had arrived from rural areas after the elections, and only a few hundred were thought to be still in the bush, where some had allegedly turned to brigandry. In addition some 2,000 ZANLA forces were due to return from Mozambique, while of 6,000-8,000 ZIPRA forces still in Zambia at the time of the elections 3,000 had returned by independence. The arrangements for the return of these ZIPRA forces, which had been announced on March 28 following a visit to Lusaka by Mr Dabengwa (the ZIPRA commander) on March 17, provided for them to proceed, with personal weapons, to a specially-created assembly camp at Gwaai River Mine; however a dispute apparently arose over their entitlement to retain weapons. On April 13 Mr Nkomo travelled to Lusaka and reportedly reassured ZIPRA forces that they need not fear discrimination against them in the creation of an integrated Zimbabwean army. Among the Rhodesian security forces, on the other hand, it was reported that the Selous Scouts unit and the Special Air Services unit were to be disbanded and that the SFAs were also to be demobilized. It was estimated that the Rhodesian Army totalled 15,000 regulars, about 20,000 territorials and 20,000-30,000 SFAs and members of other auxiliary units.)

Restrictions were imposed on March 24 on reporting of the progress of army integration under "Operation Merger". On the same day army conscription was ended "for the foreseeable future" and the annual military call-up commitment for White reservists was sharply reduced. According to a report in *The Guardian* on April 17, over one-third of the officers in the Rhodesian security forces had decided to leave when their contracts expired on April 30, as had 365 White police officers (while another 1,000 police officers were, according to this report, expected to resign at the end of the year). Mr Mugabe had announced on March 28 that the police force was to absorb 600 former ZANLA guerrillas who had been trained in police work in Yugoslavia and Romania, while several hundred ZIPRA personnel with Soviet police training were also thought to be seeking careers in the police force (which already numbered an estimated 40,000, including reservists, an anti-terrorist unit and an infantry-style support unit).

Although Maj.-Gen. Acland and his staff returned to the United Kingdom on March 20, a small British military training mission remained in the country, and it was announced on April 2 that a programme of British military aid would include attachments with the British armed forces for members of the Zimbabwean Army.

The Independence Ceremony

The independence ceremony, held in the Rufaro football stadium in Salisbury at midnight on April 17-18, was attended by delegations from nearly 100 countries and from the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Communities, the OAU, the UNHCR and the UN Council for Namibia. Also present, as guests of ZANU (PF) rather than of the Government, were representatives of four liberation movements—the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress from South Africa, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) from Namibia and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The UK delegation was led by Prince Charles and included Lord Carrington, with Lord Soames also present (before his return to the UK on April 18). Other guests included Dr Waldheim, Mr Ramphal, President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan and Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister (these last two taking the opportunity to meet for discussions relating to the situation in Afghanistan).

The ceremony began with the swearing-in of President Banana by Mr Hector MacDonald, the country's Chief Justice (who had announced on March 6 that he and two appeal court judges, Mr J. V. R. Lewis and Mr H. E. Davies, would shortly retire from office—see also page 30171). Mr Mugabe was sworn in as Prime Minister by President Banana; the British flag was then hauled down and the new Zimbabwean flag raised (by Mr Rex Nhongo, the ZANLA commander), and the constitutional instruments were presented by Prince Charles to President Banana.

The new Zimbabwean flag consisted of seven equal horizontal stripes of green, gold, red, black, red, gold and green; superimposed on this was a white equilateral triangle (whose base was at the hoist) in the centre of which was a red five-pointed star bearing, in gold, the Zimbabwe bird (an image found at the ancient Zimbabwe ruins from which the country's African name was taken).

Foreign Relations and Aid

Zimbabwe became on independence the 43rd member of the Commonwealth (Mr Ramphal having announced on April 9 that the country's application for Commonwealth membership had been approved unanimously by the existing members). Mr Mugabe said at a news conference on April 16 that Zimbabwe would pursue a non-aligned policy, while maintaining close ties both with Western countries (from whom substantial development aid would be sought) and with the Communist countries which had supported the guerrilla struggle.

In an interview published in *The Observer* (of London) on March 9 Mr Mugabe said with regard to China, Yugoslavia and Romania that "we will continue to maintain and deepen our alliance with those who have been our truest friends", whereas of the Soviet Union he said that "we will not deny them the right to come to a better relationship, but at the same time we cannot prompt them if they don't want to become our friends". (For reported Soviet emphasis on aid to Mr Nkomo's ZAPU wing rather than Mr Mugabe's ZANU wing of the PF alliance during the guerrilla war, see pages 29760 and 30072.) Mr Leonid Ilyichev, a Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Lusaka on March 26 and said that diplomatic relations would be established with Zimbabwe upon its independence, this being confirmed by an announcement on April 18. (It was noted that, while a Soviet delegation was present at the independence ceremonies, no invitations were sent to East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia or Vietnam, although Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia as well as North Korea, China and Cuba were all invited.)

The Israeli Foreign Ministry announced on March 28 that Mr Mugabe's Government had cancelled plans made under the Muzorewa regime for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and Israel.

Diplomatic relations were formally established on April 18 between Zimbabwe and a number of Western countries, including France, West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Zimbabwean Government's intention of establishing close relations with Britain had been made clear by Mr Muzenda in an interview with *The Times* on March 21, when he stated that "now that we have been decolonized we can start a new relationship with a clean slate".

Following talks in London on March 17-19 with inter alios Mrs Thatcher, Lord Carrington, Sir Geoffrey Howe (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Mr Neil Marten (Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs with special responsibility for overseas development), Lord Soames announced on March 20 that Britain would provide £7,000,000 in immediate aid for reconstruction in Zimbabwe.

A programme of British development assistance to Zimbabwe, totalling £75,000,000 in commitments over a three-year period, was announced in the House of Lords on April 15 by Lord Carrington, who stated that the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) would send a mission to make recommendations as to how this assistance should be directed.

Lord Carrington explained that "because of the marked extent to which the aid programme is already committed over the next two years" the Chancellor of the Exchequer had agreed to make available from the public expenditure contingency reserve £8,000,000 in 1980-81 and £7,000,000 in 1981-82, while there would also be military training assistance, funded from the UK defence budget.

Dame Judith Hart, the former Minister for Overseas Development in the previous (Labour) Government, issued a statement on April 15 describing the proposed British aid programme as "meagre", while in the House of Commons on the same day Mr Shore questioned the wisdom of announcing the size of the aid programme before the aid requirements of Zimbabwe had been assessed. Mr Shore referred to assessments of Zimbabwe's needs made in 1977 in connexion with the Anglo-US settlement proposals advanced in August of that year (which had envisaged, in addition to bilateral aid, the establishment of a Zimbabwe Development Fund with a minimum target approaching US$1,000 million—see pages 28646-47). *The Guardian* on April 16 reported preliminary estimates by the UNHCR that Zimbabwe would need US$140,000,000 immediately for reconstruction alone.

US aid to Zimbabwe of $15,000,000 in the current fiscal year to Sept. 30, 1980, was announced on April 14, this amount being in addition to a similar sum already contributed towards refugee repatriation and rural reconstruction, and it was anticipated that $25,000,000-$30,000,000 would be allocated to Zimbabwe in the 1980-81 US aid budget.

M. Claude Cheysson, the European Community Commissioner responsible for development co-operation policy, said during a visit to Salisbury on April 1-2 that Community aid (in addition to contributions already made towards the refugee programme) would concentrate on transport and communications development in southern Africa. (Mr Mugabe saw M. Cheysson on April 2, having just returned from a meeting in Lusaka of representatives of southern African countries, designed to seek means of reducing South Africa's economic predominance in the region, at which it had been decided to give high priority to development of transport and communications networks.)

European Community aid would be provided under the framework of the Lomé Convention [see page 29423], to which Zimbabwe was shortly to accede (according to a statement by M. Cheysson on April 2); the preferential trading aspects of this Convention already applied to Zimbabwe, allowing duty free access for exports including tobacco, coal and steel, under a temporary one-year trade permission granted at Britain's request by the Community's Council of (Foreign) Ministers in Brussels on Jan. 15 (and approved by the European Parliament on Jan. 18).

Mr Fenn announced on March 19 that a team of senior staff from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) would visit Salisbury at the request of Mr Mugabe's Government; it was later announced (on May 2) that the BBC team, having spent three weeks in the country from March 29, had submitted to Dr Shamuyarira (the Information Minister) a report and recommendations for the reorganization and improvement of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Company (ZBC).

Dr Shamuyarira said on March 29 that Zimbabwe was no longer a European country and that it was going to be "a Black man's country"; rapid and drastic reorganization of the press and broadcasting was necessary, he said, to provide objective and balanced reports reflecting the country's new alignment with Black states to the north rather than with South Africa. Although Dr Shamuyarira on March 14 reportedly asked existing members of the board of governors of the broadcasting services to remain in their posts at least until independence, certain changes were implemented in broadcasts, including (with effect from March 16) the ending of the regular transmission of the South African Broadcasting Corporation's morning news bulletin; it was also reported (in *The Daily Telegraph* on April 8) that Dr Shamuyarira had issued a directive instructing broadcasters to use the word "terrorist" only to refer to "persons committing violence against civilians" and not to describe "groups fighting for independence in Africa".

UK Legislation

The UK Parliament approved a number of orders in council relating to the accession of Zimbabwe to independence and Commonwealth membership, and to the ending of sanctions.

The Southern Rhodesia (Legal Proceedings and Public Liabilities) Order, dealing with certain consequences of the lapse of Section 2 of the 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act, and the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution of Zimbabwe) (Elections and Appointments) Order, which gave authority for the Governor to take the steps necessary to conduct elections and to appoint a Prime Minister and other ministers who could assume office on independence, were approved without division by the House of Commons on Jan. 17 and by the House of Lords on Jan. 22 [see page 30175]. (The latter order was subsequently amended to simplify the procedure whereby the House of Assembly and the Senate could elect a President, without the need to hold prior meetings to elect a president of each house.)

Following the successful application of Zimbabwe to become a member of the Commonwealth, the Zimbabwe (Independence and Membership of the Commonwealth) (Consequential Provisions) Order was laid before Parliament on April 16; the Order, which amended certain provisions of the Zimbabwe Act [see page 30176] to take account of the country's Commonwealth status, was approved without a division by the House of Commons on May 7 and by the House of Lords on May 13.

Lord Carrington announced in the House of Lords on April 15 (in his statement relating to UK aid—see above) that the Government would extend existing amnesty provisions to cover breaches of the laws imposing sanctions against Rhodesia; this measure was described by Mr Shore as "a serious mistake". When the Southern Rhodesia (Sanctions) (Amnesty) Order was debated in the House of Commons on May 7, Mr Richard Luce (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) made clear the Government's view that no useful purpose would be served by further raking over the past, and he added: "Now that an amnesty has been granted to the other categories of offender, it is only right that it should be extended to the one remaining category so that we may close this chapter." Mr Shore, on the other hand, said for the opposition that an amnesty for British sanctions breakers did not "serve any process of reconciliation" but simply "allows those who have defied and cheated successive British Governments to get away with it". The Order was approved by 136 votes to 87, those in favour being 134 Conservatives and also Mr John Dunlop (United Ulster Unionist) and Mr James Kilfedder (Ulster Progressive Unionist), while those voting against were 80 Labour members, six Liberals and Mr Dafydd Wigley (*Plaid Cymru*). The Order was approved by the House of Lords on May 13 by 83 votes to 23.

Lord Carrington had stated on April 15 that there were in any case no prosecutions pending for sanctions offences, while one appeal which was pending in this connexion had been determined by May 7.

For the decision by the Attorney General on December 19 that no prosecutions would be undertaken on the basis of the findings of the Bingham Report, see page 30177. For details given in November 1978 of prosecutions for breaches of sanctions, see page 29440.

In connexion with a claim by the Lonrho company that it suffered millions of pounds of damage, from an alleged conspiracy between oil companies and the then illegal regime in Rhodesia to maintain oil supplies despite sanctions and by means other than Lonrho's Beira-Umtali pipeline [see also page 27685], the House of Lords on April 29, 1980, told lawyers for Shell and British Petroleum that they need not answer Lonrho's claim to see the oil companies' submissions and evidence to the Bingham inquiry. The Government had previously declared that disclosure of the documents of the Bingham inquiry would be contrary to the public interest.

Currency and Reserves

The Reserve Bank in Salisbury announced on March 8 the termination of the existing dual exchange rate system whereby the Rhodesian dollar had a fixed parity against the South African rand and floating parity against other currencies. The establishment of floating parity against all currencies meant an effective revaluation of 3.9 per cent against the rand. The Reserve Bank on April 11 issued an assets and liabilities statement, the first since 1965, showing gold reserves of $Rh 42,000,000 and total gold and foreign currency reserves of $Rh 198,500,000. (Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Cape Times - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Sunday Times - Observer - Review of International Affairs, Belgrade - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - Economist - Hansard - Commonwealth Secretariat, London - UN Information Centre, London) (*Prev. rep. 30165 A*)

A. UNITED STATES — Reinforcement of Naval Presence in Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea - US-Oman Co-operation Agreement - Establishment of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

Towards the end of 1979 the increasingly tense situation in the area of the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf led to strenuous US efforts to conclude agreements with countries bordering the region on the development of bases on their territory, while in the light of the Iranian hostage crisis from November 1979 [see 30205 A] and the large-scale despatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in December 1979 and January 1980 [see 30229 A], concentrations of US naval forces were sent to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. During the course of 1979 the United States had meanwhile been proceeding with the establishment of a "rapid deployment force" designed for use anywhere in the world at short notice.

Following the evacuation of Indo-China, the United States did not have any major permanent bases west of the Philippines (where US forces were stationed principally at Clark Field and Subic Bay—see page 30194); in the early 1970s, however, agreement had been reached with the United Kingdom for the development of US facilities on Diego Garcia (part of the British Indian Ocean Territory) [see 24400 D; 26570 A; 27323 A; 27871 A]. (For the termination of US port facilities in Bahrain in 1977, see 28538 C.)

The Soviet Union, for its part, had in 1974 concluded a treaty of friendship and co-operation with Somalia [see 26650 A; 26931 A] and had developed base facilities at the Somali port of Berbera [see also 27323 A]; however, in November 1977 [see 28760 A] Somalia had abrogated the 1974 treaty on the grounds of the Soviet Union's support for Ethiopia—a Soviet-Ethiopian treaty of friendship and co-operation being subsequently concluded in November 1978 [see 29435 C]. [Longstanding collaboration between the Soviet Union and South Yemen led to the conclusion of a similar treaty of friendship and co-operation by these two countries in October 1979—see page 30199.]

The situation in the Horn of Africa was understood to have been one of the principal factors leading to the suspension in early 1978 of talks on the limitation of armaments in the Indian Ocean held between the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow in June 1977, in Washington in September 1977 and in Berne in December 1977 and February 1978. [In 1971 the United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution 2832 (XXVI), designated the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace—see page 25132—although the United States and the Soviet Union were among a large number of countries which abstained. The essence of this 1971 declaration was reaffirmed annually by the UN General Assembly throughout the remainder of the 1970s; at the 1979 session of the General Assembly, Resolution 34/80 A inter alia expressed the hope for the implementation of the 1971 declaration and urged the Soviet Union and the United States to resume their talks without delay—see page 30222.]

Strengthening of US Naval Presence - Military and Economic Agreement with Oman

The maintenance of a US naval presence in the Indian Ocean in 1979 was first marked by the departure from Subic Bay in early March of a task force which headed for the area of the Arabian peninsula following the outbreak of fighting between North and South Yemen [see page 30198]; in mid-October 1979 a naval battle group led by the aircraft carrier *Midway* entered the Indian Ocean and, shortly after the seizure of the US hostages in Tehran, carried out "long scheduled" manoeuvres with British (and also Australian) naval units [see page 30207]. [For earlier US plan at the end of 1978 to send a carrier force to the Arabian Sea in view of the unsettled situation in Iran, see page 29739.]

Meanwhile, in the light of the generally deteriorating security situation in the region following, in particular, the decision of the provisional Iranian Government of Dr Mehdi Bazargan in March 1979 that Iran should no longer play the role of "policeman" in the Gulf area [see page 30148], Oman sent representatives in mid-September to a number of countries bordering the Gulf suggesting that some international force including US participation should be entrusted with ensuring the freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz (between Oman and Iran at the mouth of the Gulf—see map on page 30240).

In an address to the New York Council on Foreign Relations on March 6, 1980, Dr Harold Brown, the US Secretary of Defence, reviewed the US naval presence in the area and added that three B-52 sea surveillance and three airborne warning and control (AWACS) missions had been flown in the Indian Ocean area (it having been reported in January that American AWACS missions had been mounted from Egypt); that a Marine amphibious unit would arrive in the Arabian Sea later in the month [see below]; and that tactical aircraft had been deployed there even earlier—for example F-15 fighters and AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia as part of the US response to the threat to North Yemen.

A major reinforcement of the US presence in the Arabian Sea took place in March 1980 with the despatch of a task force including some 1,800 Marines and associated helicopters and tanks; this force arrived in Subic Bay from Hawaii on Feb. 12 and after exercises left the Philippines on March 1, visited Phattaya in Thailand and was deployed into the Indian Ocean in mid-March to join ships of the US Navy already there [for description of which see page 30235].

A summary of the position at the end of March was given by Mr Robert Komer, US Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, addressing the foreign affairs committee of the House of Representatives on April 2.

In support of President Carter's policy (set out in his State of the Union address to Congress on Jan. 23, 1980—see page 30245) that an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the USA and that any such assault would be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force, the United States already had "a significant presence in the Indian Ocean area", Mr Komer said. The Middle East Force which operated in or near the Persian Gulf had been expanded, and "we have otherwise increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean" which at present included two carrier battle groups.

"We have recently shown that we can assemble two carrier task forces in the Arabian Sea rather quickly—within a couple of weeks," he went on. "We could get land-based air strength even more quickly. The first aircraft could reach the region in hours, and the first wing could be operational in a matter of days. That requires access, but given a serious contingency it is I think a reasonable assumption that we would be granted the necessary access as well as the necessary overflight and refuelling privileges.

"Land forces are more difficult, because they involve the movement of supporting equipment and supplies. But we do have army units in a high degree of readiness which can, with their equipment, be lifted by air in a short time—about a week for a light brigade, about two weeks for a light division. And Marine amphibious units from outside the region could move into the region in two weeks or less. Support and sustaining supplies which could be required for these units if they were committed would begin moving almost immediately by sea."

On the question of "regional facilities", Mr Komer said: "The viability of this military policy depends critically on our access to facilities in the area. We do not seek permanent garrisons or sovereign base areas as existed in the past colonial era. Instead we are seeking co-operation with friendly states. For example, we have entered into negotiations with Oman, Kenya and Somalia to expand our access to their facilities. . . . Access to facilities in several countries, as opposed to just one or two, stems from the need to increase our politico-military flexibility while building on already existing arrangements. . . . The network concept which we have developed for the region is centred around Diego Garcia, where we expect to expand our facilities greatly in consultation with the United Kingdom. In essence, we are establishing a regional network of facilities capable of supporting alternate levels of US military presence while improving local states' abilities to defend themselves. . . .

"We are seeking agreement to use the following facilities: in Oman, to use and improve their air facilities at Seeb, Thumrait and Masirah and the ports in Mutrah and Salalah (Mina Qaboos and Mina Raysut respectively); in Kenya, to increase US air and naval use of facilities in Mombasa, Embakasi and Nanyuki; in Somalia, the use of Berbera airfield and port and Mogadishu airfield and port for US air and naval use."

A visit had been paid in December 1979 to Oman, Somalia and Kenya by Mr Robert Murray, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs [see page 30208], and a further visit was made in February 1980 by Mr Reginald Bartholomew, director of politico-military affairs at the State Department, who also held discussions in Saudi Arabia and who had visited London in late January.

Diplomatic notes were exchanged in Muscat (the capital of Oman) on June 4, 1980, providing for co-operation between Oman and the United States in economic development, trade and security "designed to enhance the ability of Oman to develop its economy and to safeguard its territorial integrity and to foster peace and security in the region".

The US State Department spokesman, Mr Hodding Carter, announcing the conclusion of the agreement on the following day, explained that its purpose was to "strengthen our ability to contribute to the stability and security of the region in the face of Soviet military expansion" but that it was "not directed against any state in the region". Under the agreement the United States would obtain land and naval facilities "similar to those enjoyed by other friendly countries", but Mr Carter stressed that the USA did not intend to "seek permission to station any military units in Oman"—i.e. anything "self-contained, able to operate in a military way on its own". There were currently no US military personnel stationed in Oman other than defence attaché personnel at the US embassy, but a "small number of additional US military personnel" might be required in connexion with the sale of weapons or with US access to military facilities. The United States was, Mr Carter said, to provide Oman with certain items "appropriate to its defence", and it was anticipated that US assistance would be in the form of meeting certain air, land and coastal defence items.

Establishment of Rapid Deployment Force

The establishment of a force of over 100,000 men which was not committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and which could be sent at short notice anywhere in the world was first generally made public at a press conference on June 21, 1979, by Gen. Bernard Rogers, who was relinquishing his post as US Army Chief of Staff upon his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Mr Hodding Carter, spokesman for the State Department, said on the same day that there had been no decision to deploy such a force, but Dr Brown confirmed on June 24 that a force had in fact been established and that his Department was improving airlift and sealift capacity to that "we can get the special units to various places distant from the United States and, in some cases, distant from Europe, rapidly". At a press conference on Sept. 17 Gen. Edward Meyer (Gen. Rogers's successor as Army Chief of Staff—see 29796 C) stated that soon in the coming fiscal year (starting on Oct. 1, 1979) a mobile strike force would be "well on its way toward reality", and that once established it would carry out training exercises which would "indicate to the world that we do have the capability of projecting power".

In an earlier reference to "power projection" in the Defence Department's annual report for the fiscal year 1979 (beginning on Oct. 1, 1978), Dr Brown had told the armed services committee of the House of Representatives on Feb. 2, 1978, that "the geographical conditions that would permit the conduct of amphibious operations and air support exist in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Korea as well as [in the NATO area], and as the power projection capabilities of the Soviets expand it is essential that we have the mobile power at sea to anticipate or respond to their actions and to operate against bases they might have or establish".

Details of plans to "cope with crises outside . . . Europe" were set out by Dr Brown on Dec. 13, 1979, in testimony before the Senate armed services committee in which he described the principal features of the defence budget for the 1981 fiscal year (beginning on Oct. 1, 1980) and some of the highlights of the defence programme for the next five years.

"We are," he said, "undertaking two major initiatives to help us cope with crises outside of Europe.

"The first will be a force of maritime pre-positioning ships that will carry in dehumidified storage the heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine brigades. These ships would be stationed in peacetime in remote areas where US forces might be needed. Though not designed for the Marines' traditional mission of amphibious assault landings against enemy opposition (a capability we mean to continue, using other ships), they would be able to debark their equipment over the beach if no port were available. The Marine personnel (and other equipment not well suited to pre-positioning) would be airlifted to marry up with their gear, and be ready for battle on short notice.

"The other major initiative will be the development and production of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft able to carry army equipment, including tanks, over intercontinental distances. These aircraft would be used initially to deliver the outsize equipment of the advance forces necessary to secure air bases or the ports or beaches needed by the maritime pre-positioning ships to deliver their heavy gear. After the initial phases, they would assist in additional deployments, resupply and, if needed, in inter-theatre movements."

At a news conference on Dec. 14, Dr Brown further stated that a rapid deployment force would be for use "not only in the Middle East but [in] various other parts of the world", and that the first step would be the establishment of a joint task force, including all elements of the US military, which would be located at Fort McDill Air Force base at Tampa (Florida)—the headquarters of Readiness Command—and would carry out planning for any and all contingencies of a nature which might require rapid deployment of forces.

Military elements which would be available to make up such a force would include all units not already committed to NATO in Europe or to South Korea, and could thus include the bulk of the US Marine Corps and substantial elements of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The rapid deployment force could be as small as a battalion or as large as an army corps, depending on the situation encountered.

At a press conference at McDill Air Force base on Dec. 27, Dr Brown further explained that among the army units included in the rapid deployment forces were the 82nd airborne division and the 101st air assault division; that by 1983 maritime pre-positioning ships would be available to carry new heavy equipment for the first of an eventual three Marine brigades to be so equipped; that one objective was to cut the deployment time for the first substantial combat unit by at least a factor of two and perhaps by a factor of three from what it was at present; that "the initiatives that I have mentioned will cost about $10,000 million over the next five years"; that a joint task force headquarters at McDill would be subordinate to Readiness Command; that the responsibilities of the joint task force would also include operation of the rapid deployment forces, and that the commander of the joint task force would become the deployed forces' operational commander if a deployment was mounted and would, in that case, report either to the unified and specified commander of all US forces in the area or else (under certain circumstances) directly to headquarters in Washington; and that Maj.-Gen. Paul Kelly (deputy chief of staff for requirements and programmes at Marine headquarters) had been nominated as commander of the new rapid deployment joint task force and had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general.

President Carter, in the foreign policy section of his written State of the Union message to Congress on Jan. 21, 1980 [see also 30245 A], said further that in response to the Soviet military presence in Cuba [see 30085 A] and the "proxy rule of Cuba on behalf of the USSR", and in support of the rapid deployment force, the United States was "substantially increasing" its ability to monitor Cuban and Soviet/Cuban activities; had established a Caribbean joint task force headquarters which "improves our ability to respond to events in the region"; was increasing regional military exercises; and was "intensifying assistance to countries in the region that are threatened by Soviet or Cuban intervention".

The rapid deployment joint task force headquarters at Fort McDill officially became operational on March 1, 1980.—(New York Times - International Herald Tribune - US International Communication Agency) (*Prev. rep. Defence Policy 30117 A, pages 29959-60; US-Iranian Crisis 30205 A; Situation in Afghanistan 30229 A; UN Resolution on Indian Ocean page 30222*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — District Council Elections in England and Scotland

Polling took place on May 1 in elections to the 36 metropolitan and 103 of the 296 non-metropolitan district councils in England and also to all 53 district councils in Scotland, resulting in each case in considerable gains by the Labour Party. No elections took place in London or in Wales. The last district elections in England (and also in Wales) had been held in May 1979 [see 29728 A], those in Scotland in May 1977 [see 28428 C] and those in the London boroughs in May 1978 [see 29051 A].

According to figures compiled by the Press Association for the 177 districts where the elections were strictly comparable with the previous round, gains and losses were recorded as follows:

	Gains	Losses
Labour	509	33
Conservative	43	436
Liberal	102	27
Scottish National Party	11	103
Independents	20	61
Others	6	31

In England, one-third of the seats were up for election in 26 of the metropolitan and 102 of the non-metropolitan districts, while the full councils were renewed in 10 metropolitan districts and in one non-metropolitan district (Great Yarmouth).

In the metropolitan districts Labour gained control of Birmingham, Bolton, Bradford and Oldham from the Conservatives; won Kirklees (West Yorkshire), Leeds, Rochdale and Walsall, where no party had been in control; and gained overall control of Wolverhampton, where it had held power with the Mayor's casting vote. The Conservatives also lost overall control of Calderdale (West Yorkshire) and Dudley (West Midlands), while the Liberals gained eight seats in Liverpool. Following the elections, Labour had overall control of 27 councils and the Conservatives of six; no party was in control of the other three.

In the non-metropolitan districts Labour gained Hyndburn (Lancashire), Oxford, Preston, Tamworth and Worcester from the Conservatives, and won overall control of Amber Valley (Derbyshire). The Conservatives also lost overall control of Great Yarmouth, Rushmoor (Hampshire), Shrewsbury and Atcham, and York, while gaining overall control of West Oxfordshire through the defection of two independents. The Liberals gained Adur (West Sussex) from the Conservatives and won overall control of Hereford.

In each of the 53 Scottish districts the full councils were renewed.

Of the 18 councils gained by Labour, one each (Kyle and Carrick, and Inverclyde) had been held by the Conservatives and the Liberals respectively, two (Clackmannan and Falkirk) had been held by the Scottish National Party (SNP), while in the other 14, including Aberdeen, Dundee and Glasgow, no single party had been in overall control. Labour also gained overall control of Hamilton, where it had held power by the Provost's casting vote.

The Conservatives also lost overall control of Edinburgh and Angus, while independents lost overall control of Nithsdale. The SNP, in addition to losing control of Clackmannan and Falkirk, lost seats to Labour in Clydebank, Cumbernauld and Kilsyth, Cunninghame, East Kilbride, Strathkelvin and West Lothian, where it had been the largest single party, and in Glasgow.

Party strengths in the four Scottish cities became as follows: **Aberdeen**: Labour 27; Conservatives 13; Liberals 8. **Dundee**: Labour 25; Conservatives 17; others 2. **Edinburgh**: Conservatives 31; Labour 25; SNP 2; Liberals 2; independents 2. **Glasgow**: Labour 58; Conservatives 11; Liberals 3.

Party strengths on the Scottish district councils following the elections were: Labour 498, Conservatives 232, SNP 56, Liberals 39, independents and others 296. Of the 53 councils, Labour had overall control of 24, independents of 18, and the Conservatives of five, while in the remaining six no party was in control.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - The Scotsman, Edinburgh) (*Prev. rep. 1979 English Elections 29728 A; 1977 Scottish Elections 28428 C*)

B. AUSTRIA — Re-election of Dr Kirchschläger as President

Dr Rudolf Kirchschläger (65), the President of Austria since 1974 [see 26616 A] and previously Foreign Minister (from 1970), was on May 18, 1980, reappointed for a second six-year term of office after obtaining 79.9 per cent of the valid votes cast in the national presidential election held on that date. Voting was compulsory, and 91.6 per cent of the electorate went to the polls, of whom 7.3 per cent submitted invalid votes.

Dr Kirchschläger, who subscribed to no political party, had been nominated by the Socialist Party (SPÖ) in July 1979; the opposition People's Party (ÖVP) had decided in September 1979 to present no presidential candidate of its own due to what was termed its satisfaction with Dr Kirchschläger's performance of his presidential duties.

The Freedom Party (FPÖ) candidate, Herr Willfried Gredler (a former ambassador to West Germany and since 1978 ambassador to China), obtained 16.9 per cent of the valid votes cast on May 18, while Dr Norbert Burger, the national leader of the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party (NDP), gained 3.2 per cent of the votes.

The nomination of Dr Burger, who described himself as a "German Austrian", caused widespread protest among left-wing groups in Austria, and a demonstration against his candidature took place on May 6 in Vienna following the ruling of the National Electoral Council that he was eligible to stand for President.

Dr Burger had in earlier years been a prominent activist among German-speaking groups particularly in Italy, and had on several occasions been convicted by Italian courts of right-wing terrorism in the South Tirol province (Trentino-Alto Adige region) of northern Italy. He had received in 1966 a 28-year prison sentence and in 1970 a term of life imprisonment for acts including attacks on Italian soldiers (both sentences being passed in absentia—see pages 23847-48; 24224 A), his appeal against the first sentence being rejected by the Milan Appeal Court in 1968 and subsequently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Rome in 1971 [see 24747 A]. Dr Burger had also been sentenced by an Austrian court in 1968 to eight months' imprisonment after expressing on West German television his approval of violent actions by German speakers in South Tirol. He had, however, been acquitted by another Austrian court in 1967, despite his own free admission of guilt, of obtaining explosives in order to cause explosions in South Tirol [see page 23848]—this acquittal having resulted in protests by the Italian Government—and by a West German court in 1970 of conspiring to use explosives for criminal purposes [see 24224 A].

Dr Kirchschläger began his new term of office on May 20. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin) (*Prev. rep. 1974 Presidential Election 26616 A*)

C. FINLAND — Election of Mr Väyrynen as Chairman of Centre Party

At a national conference of the Centre Party (KP), which was one of the four parties comprising the centre-left coalition formed in May 1979 [see 29754 A], Mr Paavo Väyrynen (33), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was on June 14 elected chairman of the party in succession to Dr Johannes Virolainen (66), the Speaker of the *Eduskunta* (Diet) since 1979 and former Prime Minister, obtaining 1,737 votes compared with 1,611 cast in favour of Dr Virolainen.

Mr Väyrynen, deputy chairman of the party since 1972, had been Minister of Education from November 1975 to September 1976 [see 27559 A], becoming thereupon Minister of Labour [see 28082 A] until his appointment in May 1977 as Minister of Foreign Affairs [see 28425 A]. Dr Virolainen had been chairman of the Centre Party, and of its predecessor, the Agrarian Party [see 21036 B], since June 1964 [see 20345 A]; he had held ministerial office almost continuously since 1950 and had been Prime Minister from 1964 to 1966.

Speaking at the KP conference on June 15, Mr Väyrynen (who was regarded as a close associate of President Kekkonen) expressed his wish for the broadening of the governing coalition after the next general elections in 1983.—(Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Political Parties 30099 C*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. UNITED KINGDOM — 1980-81 Budget - 1980 Public Expenditure White Paper - Increased National Insurance and Social Security Benefits - Social Security Legislation - Other Economic Developments and Statistics

The budget for the financial year 1980-81 was introduced in the House of Commons on March 26 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe. On the same day the Government's expenditure plans for the period 1980-81 to 1983-84 were published as a White Paper (Cmnd. 7841)—the plans for the year 1980-81 alone having been published on Nov. 1, 1979 (Cmnd. 7746—see 30151 A).

Public Expenditure White Paper

After recalling that in Cmnd. 7746 the Government's objectives had been set out as being (i) to bring down the rate of inflation and interest rates by curtailing the growth of the money supply and controlling government borrowing, (ii) to restore incentives and (iii) to plan for spending which was compatible both with the objectives for taxation and borrowing and with a realistic assessment of the prospects for economic growth, the White Paper noted that plans for 1980-81 had been reduced since November 1979, and said that the continuing growth of the money supply, which required the corrective action announced on Nov. 15 [see page 30154], together with worsening economic prospects generally, showed the need for further reductions in planned expenditure.

The savings indicated in the White Paper would be "increased by the reduction under negotiation in the net contribution of the United Kingdom to the European Community"; the White Paper showed "what would be the full estimated net cost to the United Kingdom if the present arrangements were continued, a sum which would rise to £1,550 million by 1983-84", while the projection took account of forecasts by the European Commission which assumed that expenditure from the Community budget would not be constrained by the 1 per cent limit on Community value added tax (VAT) revenue, and also that agricultural support expenditure would continue to increase at the rate of previous years; although the Government did not accept either of these assumptions, it was not at this stage possible to make reliable projections of the different outcomes which could result if the 1 per cent VAT limit was sustained.

The following table shows public expenditure plans for the period from 1980-81 to 1983-84 (at 1979 survey prices); figures for the period 1974-75 to 1979-80 (expected outturn) are given on page 30151, although those in the present White Paper differed slightly from those given in the Cmnd. 7746 as a result of revised estimates of outturn.

	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84
	(£ million at 1979 survey prices)			
(1) Central government	51,665			
(2) Local authorities	17,470			
(3) Certain public corporations	916			
(4) Expenditure on programmes ..	70,051	68,600	66,900	66,400
(5) Contingency reserve	1,000	1,200	1,500	2,000
(6) Debt interest	3,500	3,500	3,300	3,000
(7) Total public expenditure before shortfall and special sales of assets ..	74,551	73,300	71,700	71,400
(8) Expenditure on programmes and contingency reserve (4 + 5)	71,051	69,800	68,400	68,400
(9) Net overseas and market borrowing of nationalized industries	−50	−300	−300	−500
(10) Special sales of assets..	−500	−50	−50	−50
(11) Planning total	70,501	69,450	68,050	67,850
(12) General allowance for shortfall ..	−1,000	−750	−750	−750
(13) Planning total after shortfall ..	69,501	68,700	67,300	67,100
(14) Percentage change on previous year	−0.6	−1.2	−2.0	−0.3

In 1980-81, the combined effect of the changes announced in Cmnd. 7746 and those made since was to reduce expenditure by about 5½ per cent (£4,000 million at 1979 survey prices) below that planned by the Labour Government in Cmnd. 7439 (published on Jan. 17, 1979—see 29821 A). The present Government was determined not merely to halt the growth of public expenditure but progressively to reduce it. The reduction achieved in 1980-81 was only the beginning of a trend which provided for a level of public expenditure in 1983-84 about 4 per cent lower than the expected outturn in 1979-80. The reduction under negotiation in the net contribution to the European Community would bring a further saving. Even without allowing for this, expenditure in 1982-83 (the last year covered by Cmnd. 7439) would be 11½ per cent (or nearly £9,000 million at 1979 survey prices) lower than planned by the previous Government. The biggest reductions in 1982-83 from the plans of the previous Government were in the housing programme (£3,290 million at 1979 survey prices), the industry, energy, trade and employment programme (£1,490 million), the provision for net borrowing by the nationalised industries (£1,150 million) and the education programme (£970,000,000), while provision for defence and for law and order was increased (by £260,000,000 and £30,000,000 respectively).

The following table shows total public expenditure by programme for the years 1979-80 (revised estimate) to 1983-84 (i.e. excluding contingency reserve and debt interest); for figures for the years 1974-75 to 1979-80, see page 30151. The figures for total programmes for 1980-81 to 1983-84 correspond to line 4 in the previous table [see above].

	1979-80	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84
		(£ million at 1979 survey prices)			
Defence	7,723	7,997	8,240	8,490	8,740
Overseas aid and other overseas services:					
Overseas aid	794	779	730	680	680
EEC contributions*	919	1,024	1,150	1,300	1,500
Other overseas services ..	432	406	400	400	400
Agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry	944	877	920	900	890
Industry, energy, trade and employment	2,969	2,992	2,390	1,910	1,760
Government lending to nationalized industries	1,900	700	300	−150	−550
Roads and transport	3,073	2,910	2,780	2,690	2,690
Housing	5,372	4,700	3,840	3,250	2,790
Other environmental services ..	3,273	3,192	3,040	2,920	2,880
Law, order and protective services	2,446	2,530	2,600	2,670	2,700
Education and science, arts and libraries	9,654	9,225	9,010	8,850	8,670
Health and personal social services	9,067	9,186	9,230	9,410	9,500
Social security	18,890	19,354	19,800	19,500	19,600
Other public services	1,014	976	990	950	940
Common services	1,047	1,066	1,070	1,080	1,120
Northern Ireland	2,200	2,136	2,110	2,070	2,070
Total programmes	71,716	70,051	68,600	66,900	66,400

* Forecasts for 1980-81 to 1983-84 based on existing arrangements [see above].

The principal changes for 1980-81 compared with the figures given in November 1979 were increases of £122,000,000 for industry, energy, trade and employment, £65,000,000 for social security and £24,000,000 for EEC contributions, while the main reductions were of £378,000,000 for housing, £200,000,000 for government lending to nationalized industries, £116,000,000 for agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry and £65,000,000 for defence. [The 1980-81 housing figure was thus now £672,000,000 lower than the revised estimated outturn for this programme in 1979-80.]

The 1980-81 Budget

The following table shows Consolidated Fund revenue and expenditure for 1978-79 (outturn), 1979-80 (budget forecast and outturn) and 1980-81 forecast, the figures being taken from the Financial Statement and Budget Report, 1980-81 published on March 26 and from the Treasury's details of central government transactions published on April 11.

	1978-79	1979-80		1980-81
	Outturn	Budget Forecast	Outturn	Forecast
		(£ million)		
Revenue				
Inland Revenue	24,080	26,590	28,153	32,860
Customs and Excise	13,835	18,250	18,036	24,000
Vehicle excise duties	1,113	1,148	1,145	1,411
National Insurance surcharge ..	1,914	2,952	2,987	3,509
Broadcasting receiving licences	337	383	422	535
Interest and dividends	267	310	273	300
Miscellaneous	1,542	1,380	3,315	2,800
Total revenue	43,088	51,013	54,331	65,415
Expenditure				
Supply services	45,763	52,658	53,774	64,765
National debt service	3,222	3,850	4,143	4,950
Northern Ireland	765	883	987	1,136
Payments to European Communities, etc.	1,669	1,937	2,007	2,301
Contingencies Fund	32	—	50	—
Other services	18	43	46	23
Total expenditure	51,469	59,371	61,007	73,175
Deficit met from National Loans Fund	8,381	8,358	6,676	7,760

Supply Services

Further details of supply services for the year 1980-81 (forecast) were given in the Financial Statement and Budget Report as follows, together with the budget forecast and the provisional outturn for 1979-80 (the latter figure being subsequently slightly adjusted from an overall total of £53,600 million to £53,774 million after the end of the financial year—see Consolidated Fund table above).

	1979-80 Budget Forecast	1979-80 Estimated Outturn	1980-81 Forecast
	(£ million)		
Defence	8,463	9,008	10,668
Overseas services	1,291	1,246	1,391
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry	644	663	725
Trade, industry, energy and employment	3,078	3,142	4,150
Government investment in nationalized industries	1,044	1,232	648
Roads and transport	1,491	1,529	1,700
Housing	3,020	3,018	3,422
Other environmental services	411	394	465
Law, order and protective services	1,562	1,579	1,988
Education and libraries, science and arts	2,105	2,124	2,656
Health and personal social services	7,681	8,009	10,582
Social security	6,011	6,105	7,276
Other public services	1,311	1,379	1,676
House of Commons administration	—	11	11
Common services	1,489	1,446	1,530
Northern Ireland	924	862	982
Rate support grant, financial transactions, etc.	11,633	11,853	14,742
Total	52,158	53,600	64,612
Revised and supplementary provision (net)	500	—	153
Total Supply Services	52,658	53,600	64,765

National Loans Fund

Loans from the National Loans Fund in 1978-79 and 1979-80 are shown in the following table, together with budget forecasts for 1979-80 and 1980-81.

	1978-79 Outturn	1979-80 Budget Forecast	1979-80 Outturn	1980-81 Forecast
		(£ million)		
Nationalized industries	−562	275	644	800
Other public corporations	382	623	821	1,044
Local and harbour authorities	313	974	762	915
Private sector	−3	−3	−4	−3
Within central government	86	100	60	149
Total	216	1,969	2,283	2,905

After aggregating the Consolidated Fund deficit met from the National Loans Fund and net loans from the National Loans Fund [see tables above], other National Debt service payments and interest on loans and profits of the Issue Department of the Bank of England, etc., and transactions on other funds and accounts, the central Government's borrowing requirement was forecast at £9,313 million in 1980-81, compared with a revised requirement of £8,084 million in 1978-79, an original budget forecast for 1979-80 of £9,564 million (£8,643 million including the actual receipts from the special sales of assets) and an outturn for 1979-80 of £8,165 million.

Summary of Budget Changes

The principal tax changes as announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his budget statement or in the Financial Statement and Budget Report are summarized below under cross-headings.

Income Tax. (1) Single person's allowance and maximum wife's earned income relief to be increased from £1,165 to £1,375 and married allowance from £1,815 to £2,145; additional personal allowance for single parents from £650 to £770; age allowance from £1,540 to £1,820 for the single person and from £2,455 to £2,895 for the married; and age allowance income limit from £5,000 to £5,900.

(2) Lower rate of 25 per cent on the first £750 of taxable income (introduced in 1978—see page 29080) to be abolished, and 30 per cent basic rate band to be extended to £11,250 (previously £10,000).

(3) Structure of higher rates of income tax to be as follows:

Tax Rate (per cent)	Taxable Income Bands 1979-80 (£)	Taxable Income Bands 1980-81 (£)
40	10,001-12,000	11,251-13,250
45	12,001-15,000	13,251-16,750
50	15,001-20,000	16,751-22,250
55	20,001-25,000	22,251-27,750
60	over 25,000	over 27,750

(4) Threshold for investment income surcharge to be raised from £5,000 to £5,500.

(5) Provisions requiring an annual revision of personal allowances in the light of changes in the prices index [see page 28558] to be extended to income tax higher rate bands and investment income surcharge threshold.

(6) Rate of tax relief for life assurance premiums to be reduced from 17½ to 15 per cent from the year 1981-82.

(7) Tax relief on covenants in favour of charities to be extended to higher and additional rates of income tax, and minimum qualifying period of covenants to be reduced from "over six years" to "over three years".

Income Tax and Corporation Tax. 100 per cent capital allowances to be available for expenditure on the construction (i) of industrial or commercial buildings in new "enterprise" zones and (ii) of small industrial buildings (the latter over the next three years).

Corporation Tax. "Small companies" rate for financial year 1979 to be 40 per cent (42 per cent hitherto) and limit for that rate to be raised from £60,000 to £70,000 and limit for marginal relief from £100,000 to £130,000.

Petroleum Revenue Tax. Rate to be increased from 60 to 70 per cent for chargeable periods ending after Dec. 31, 1979.

Capital Gains Tax. Threshold to be increased from 1980-81 from £1,000 [see page 29080] to £3,000 (£1,500 for most trusts).

Development Land Tax. Charities to be exempt in respect of disposals of an interest in land made on or after March 26, 1980; exemption for disposals of an interest in land within an enterprise zone within 10 years of the zone being so designated.

Capital Transfer Tax. Upper limit of nil rate band for both death and lifetime transfers to be raised from £25,000 to £50,000; small gifts exemption to be increased from £100 to £250; and exemption for transfers on death or within a year of death to charities to be raised from £100,000 to £200,000.

Stamp Duties. Level below which transfers of property (other than stocks and shares) were not liable to stamp duty to be raised from £15,000 to £20,000 from April 6, 1980.

Regulator Power. Existing power introduced in 1961 [see 18045 A] to be amended so as to remove the need for annual statutory renewal.

Value Added Tax. Registration limit to be raised from £10,000 to £13,500 per annum; deregistration limit to be raised from £8,000 to £12,500 where future turnover was concerned and to £13,500 where past turnover was concerned.

Alcoholic Drinks. Duties to be raised by the equivalent of about 2p per pint on beer, 8p on a bottle of table wine and 50p on a bottle of whisky.

Hydrocarbon Oils. Rates of duty to be increased by about 1.9p per litre (equivalent to about 10p a gallon including VAT) on light hydrocarbon oil, petrol substitutes and spirits used for power methylated spirits; by 0.8p per litre on heavy hydrocarbon oil for use as road fuel (about 4p a gallon including VAT); by 0.95p per litre on gas for use as road fuel; and by 0.11p per litre (effective rate) on rebatable oils (except kerosene used other than as aviation fuel). Zero rate of VAT to cease to apply to lubricating oils from May 1.

Tobacco. Duty on tobacco to be increased equivalent to a rise of about 5p on the price of a typical packet of 20 king-size cigarettes (including VAT); similar increases for cigars and a rather smaller increase for pipe tobacco.

Gaming Licence Duty. From Oct. 1, 1980, new duty to be levied at the rate of 2½ per cent of the first £250,000 of gross gaming yield (stakes less winnings), plus 5 per cent of the next £500,000, plus 10 per cent of the next £1,750,000, plus 20 per cent of the remainder of the gross gaming yield.

Bingo Duty. Rate to be increased from 5 per cent of stakes to 7½ per cent of stakes plus 3/37 of any amount by which the total value of the prizes won in each week exceeded stakes after deduction of the duty payable.

Gaming Machine Licence Duty. Duty to be restructured, with the abolition of the duty on penny machines (and, with it, the holiday season licence for such machines) but an increase in the duty on jackpot machines usually found in clubs.

Vehicle Excise Duty. Annual rate to be raised by 20 per cent (from £50 to £60) on cars and by about 30 per cent on goods vehicles over nine tons unladen weight, with other rates increased accordingly.

Non-fiscal measures announced by Sir Geoffrey included the following:

Supplementary Deposits. The Bank of England's supplementary special deposit scheme (the "corset"—see page 29090)—whereby banks had to make special non-interest-bearing deposits with the Bank of England) would not be further extended when it expired in mid-June 1980 [see page 30154].

Money Supply. The target range for the growth in the money supply as measured by "sterling M3" (for definition see pages 28363-64) would continue for the 14 months from mid-February 1980 to mid-April 1981 at an unchanged annual rate of 7-11 per cent [see pages 29825 and 30154].

Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. A PSBR of not more than 4 per cent of national income in 1980-81 was appropriate, implying a money figure of not more than about £8,500 million.

Social Security Benefits. The main social security benefits were to be raised—further details being given on the following day by Mr Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Social Services [see page 30401 below]. In addition (i) as already announced [on Dec. 17, 1979—see below] employers would (from April 1982) have the responsibility for the payment of a minimum level of sick pay during the early weeks of sickness, thus bringing the bulk of sickness payments into tax through pay as you earn; (ii) at the same time benefits paid to the unemployed would be brought into tax; (iii) short-term benefits and invalidity benefits would at the next uprating be increased by 5 percentage points less than would fully reflect forecast price movements; (iv) earnings-related supplement would be withdrawn in 1982; (v) child benefit would go up from £4 to £4.75 a week in November 1980; and (vi) in calculating supplementary benefit for strikers' families it would be assumed that the striker was himself providing £12 a week either in strike pay or in some other way, and tax refunds would be taken fully into account when assessing needs.

Prescription Charges. National Health Service prescription charges would go up in December to £1 from the level of 70p to which they were being raised in April [see page 30153]. (For increase from 20p to 45p in July 1979, see page 29826.)

The Budget Speech

The text of Sir Geoffrey's speech is given below.

Retrospect

"In my budget statement last June [see 29821 A] I said that the economic situation that we inherited was a difficult one. I stressed that it would take time to check, and then to reverse, Britain's long-run economic decline—time, and resolute commitment to the right strategy, for a period of years ahead. It is important for that strategy to reflect the right lessons of years of disappointing economic performance.

"Even in the 1950s and early 1960s our economy was lagging behind those of our competitors. But it was a period of low inflation and rising growth rates. Seen in retrospect, that period was something of a golden age. That was not, of course, the feeling at the time. From the mid-1960s onwards we became impatient to throw the resources of Government into efforts to do better, quicker. In rapid succession, we had a national plan for faster growth, devaluation, incomes policies, recurrent bouts of intervention in industry—and much else.

"The increased scale of government borrowing from the mid-1970s, as compared with the 1950s and 1960s, is an example of the impatience to which I have referred. Governments became increasingly addicted to deficit spending. This was particularly true of the United Kingdom at the time of, and after, the first world oil crisis [of 1973-74—see 26224 A; 26355 A]. Memories of the monetary and inflationary implications of what the Government then did are still vivid.

"Eventually, it began to be recognized, as indeed the Leader of the Opposition said in 1976, that we could no longer spend our way out of recession. But although that break-through of realism has begun, the change in attitude has not got far enough. Not everybody has yet accepted that public expenditure cannot go on growing while the economy stagnates.

"Those years of often hectic government action were equally notable for other things that did not receive the attention they deserved. As well as misjudging the importance of money supply and its proper control, we often paid no more than lip service to the role of private enterprise and to the importance of economic change as an agent of prosperity. Successive Governments acknowledged the need to reduce the power and privilege of organized labour. But in the event, its ability to damage the economy has increased.

"The outcome is familiar to us all. Our underlying rate of growth has become steadily weaker. At the same time, we have come almost to tolerate inflation at rates that would have horrified an earlier generation.

"The measures taken following the agreement with the International Monetary Fund [IMF] in 1976 [see 28181 A] provided a brief respite.

"The public sector borrowing requirement [PSBR] fell, monetary growth declined and pay settlements moderated. The inflation rate came down in 1977 and 1978. But the lesson was not well enough learnt. The money supply was again allowed to expand too fast, partly through excessive intervention in the foreign exchange markets. Fiscal policy was eased and the situation deteriorated again.

The Recent Past. "During the 18 months to last June the underlying growth rate of sterling M3 [for definition see pages 28363-64] was nearly 15 per cent a year [see also page 30154]. That compares with the much more modest rate of about 8 per cent in the year after the IMF measures. The incomes policy of the previous Government had collapsed. Earnings also grew by at least 15 per cent a year. Not surprisingly it was consumer spending that gained most from this combination of monetary expansion, tax cuts and high pay settlements. In the year before the election the volume of consumer spending rose by more than 5 per cent a year. That was much too good to last.

"There was, indeed, a big price to pay for that short burst of apparent prosperity. Production failed to respond to the surge in demand and imports, especially of manufactures, rose sharply. The current balance of payments, in surplus after the IMF agreement and helped by North Sea oil, moved back into deficit and inflation moved sharply upward.

"Last year we made an important start on tackling that inheritance. We set about reducing the rate of monetary growth. We achieved large reductions in dangerously oversize public spending plans. We reduced the share of government spending and borrowing in the nation's output. And when, last November, the money target looked like being exceeded, we acted promptly and decisively.

"We have removed many unnecessary controls and obstacles to enterprise and individual effort. We have removed controls on pay, prices, dividends and foreign exchange, which can now be used freely to acquire productive assets overseas to the benefit of our exports and invisible earnings alike. My first budget switched the tax burden from earnings to spending and greatly reduced oppressive tax burdens on enterprise.

"But during the year that has just ended we have had to contend with a further major increase in world oil prices [see 29981 A] and with a substantial rise in the price of other commodities. The strength of sterling has to some extent cushioned their impact on domestic inflation. Even so, the price of oil and other inputs to manufacturing industry has risen by 41 per cent since the beginning of 1979.

"The rise in the oil price has also had severe effects on the world prospect generally. The outlook in the coming year is for a significant slow-down in growth and a worsening of inflation everywhere. The year-on-year increase in consumer prices in OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries rose from about 10 per cent, on average, in mid-1979 to 14 per cent by the beginning of 1980.

"Every major country is demonstrating its determination to resist this inflation by adopting a firm monetary and fiscal policy. The inevitable immediate result is lower output and higher interest rates. Since early last summer rates have risen by six percentage points, on average, in the major industrial countries. This is much the same as in the United Kingdom over the same period. The increase has been even more marked where the dollar is concerned. Between May last year and the end of last week Euro-dollar three-month rates rose by over 8 per cent to 19 per cent.

The Immediate Prospect. "That is part of the background against which to judge the poor short-term economic outlook for the United Kingdom. The Treasury projections published today suggest that output may fall in 1980 by up to 2½ per cent. This is more or less in line with outside forecasts.

"It is important to understand the significance of this recession. There are some who argue, or at least seek to imply, that it is an entirely avoidable development, which need not be inflicted upon the British economy. Others seem almost happy to suggest that, so far from being avoidable, this recession is no more than a foretaste of much worse to come. Some uniquely critical pessimists contrive to convey both impressions at the same time.

"The right view to take is that it is, in part, a consequence of the weakness in world demand, in part a consequence of our own inflation—still well in excess of the money supply target—and in part, perhaps most of all, a consequence of the long-run decline of our economy. These influences are not insuperable. We can most certainly get through the difficult year or two that lie immediately ahead. The important thing is not to allow the difficulties to prevent us setting our feet on the right long-run path.

The Government's Medium-term Financial and Monetary Strategy - The Monetary Target

"This is one of the reasons—though by no means the only one—why I intend to consolidate the start that I made last year by publishing today the Government's financial and monetary strategy for the medium term. . . .

"This strategy is by no means to be confused with a national plan for it is concerned with only those things—very few of them—that the Government actually have within their power to control. The strategy sets out a path for public finance over the next few years. At its heart is a target for a steadily declining growth of the money supply. That is set alongside policies for government spending and taxation, which will underpin that objective.

"It will be clear from what I have already said that the Government continue to regard the fight against inflation as the first priority. It is an illusion to suppose that we have any real choice between defeating inflation and some other course. It is quite wrong to suppose that inflation is something with which only Treasury ministers need be concerned. So long as it persists, economic stability and prosperity will continue to elude us. So long as it persists, social coherence will also elude us. Nothing, in the long run, could contribute more to the disintegration of society and the destruction of any sense of national unity than continuing inflation.

"Inflation sets worker against worker, employer against employee, and sometimes even Government against their own employees. The violence of the picket lines and last winter's examples of hospital patients denied supplies, and of the dead denied burial [a reference to industrial action taken by public sector workers in early 1979—see page 29593] would have been unthinkable 20 years ago. They reflect the social disintegration caused by inflation. That is one of the reasons why the conquest of inflation is so important.

"Monetary policy has an essential role to play in the defeat of inflation. Other countries recognize this very clearly. They recognize, too, that sustained monetary restraint is not an easy, automatic or painless solution. But they are convinced that it is essential. They are struggling to get back towards more balanced budgets, as we must. They recognize, as we must, that inflation cannot persist in the long run unless it is accommodated by an excessive expansion of money and credit. That is at the heart of what 'monetarism' means in practice. It is a great pity that its practical, commonsense importance has been so confused by arid, theoretical dispute. Certainly the word 'monetarism' should never have become a term of political abuse—least of all for use by those who have in the past claimed to make a virtue of practising it.

"It is an illusion to suppose that there is any real alternative to the strategy that I have outlined. Some commentators seek to blame our present difficulties on the pursuit by Government of unnecessarily tough policies. That is totally to misunderstand the position. Britain's present difficulties are so deep-seated and serious as to make tough policies inescapable. Relaxed monetary and budgetary policies might bring higher output—even higher living standards—in the very short run, though even that is questionable, but in reality they would simply fuel fresh inflation. Such policies would inevitably undermine the confidence of financial markets, industry, and consumers. The action that would then be necessary to deal with the ensuing crisis would, equally certainly, destroy jobs and cut living standards still further.

"Restraint of the growth of money and credit is, then, essential, and it needs to be maintained over a considerable period of time in order to defeat inflation. That underlines the importance of the medium-term financial strategy.

"That strategy, as I have said, sets out a four-year path for monetary growth, public spending and tax policies. I shall deal first with the monetary targets. By 1983-84, the last year covered by our spending plans, the target rate of growth of money supply will be reduced to around 6 per cent—just half the rate of growth over the past year.

The Monetary Target for 1980-81. "In keeping with that medium-term monetary objective, the target range for the growth of sterling M3 in the period to mid-April 1981 will be 7 per cent to 11 per cent at an annual rate. The base for this will be the most recent published figures. The target will thus relate to the 14 months from mid-February this year.

"I am glad to say that monetary growth has already begun to slow down. In the first four months after the budget sterling M3 continued to grow at the excessive rate—over 14 per cent—that we inherited. But in the succeeding four months it fell to an annual rate of 10 per cent. Moreover, in the earlier period sterling M3 growth had been below that of other measures of the money supply. Currently, however, all the other measures, M1, total M3 and the various indicators of wider liquidity, are growing less rapidly than sterling M3. The narrow measure, M1, actually fell over the last four months. So the turndown in the growth of sterling M3 probably understates the extent to which the measures in the last budget and those that I took in November have already brought monetary growth under control.

"This year's target will consolidate the substantial slowdown in the underlying rate of growth. At the same time the Governor [of the Bank of England—Mr Gordon Richardson] and I have agreed that the supplementary special deposit scheme—generally known as the 'corset'—should not be extended beyond mid-June, when the present guideline ends [see page 30154]. One of the effects of the corset has been to encourage the development of credit channels just outside the banking system, such as the purchase of bank acceptances by the private sector. This process will be reversed to some extent when the corset ends. So sterling M3 will be swollen as earlier distortions unwind.

"The increase in sterling M3 on this account will not, however, signal a change in underlying monetary conditions. The scale of this exceptional increase cannot be precisely measured or predicted, and we shall need to assess its effect both as it occurs and when the target is rolled forward in the autumn. If, as I hope, it can be accommodated within the target that I have just announced, that will point to a further slowing down of monetary growth.

"By any standards this is a firm monetary policy. But it is an essential response to the inflation rate. As I have shown earlier, there is nothing unique to this country about what I have proposed. Other countries faced with similar problems have adopted similar remedies, as is shown by the determined measures introduced in the United States a fortnight ago [on March 14].

Monetary Control. "It goes without saying that to accompany these policies we need to have efficient methods of monetary control. We already have the means to meet our medium-term objectives. The Green Paper on monetary base control, which I laid before the House last week [on March 20—Cmnd. 7858], will provide a basis for public discussions of how to improve control over short periods. The Governor [of the Bank of England] and I hope to hear a wide range of views before deciding whether any further changes should be made.

"The recent pressure on companies has resulted in a strong demand for bank lending which has contributed to the upward pressure on both money supply and short-term interest rates. I am sure that banks and their customers would be well advised, in the difficult economic conditions foreseen, to be cautious about the scale of their lending and borrowing. When the growth of bank lending falls back, this will add to the downward pressure on interest rates from today's measures.

The Fiscal Stance

The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. "But it is not intended to achieve this reduction in monetary growth by excessive reliance on interest rates. The Government's financial strategy, therefore, plans a substantial reduction over the medium term in government borrowing as a percentage of national income. The relationship between the budget deficit and the growth of money supply is not a simple one. It is erratic from year to year. But there can be no doubt of its importance, or that government borrowing has made a major contribution to the excessive growth of the money supply in recent years. The consequence of excessive borrowing has been high nominal interest rates and, in capital markets, the crowding out of business by the state. This has held back investment. From now on, however, given the shape of the Government's plans for public spending, the budget deficit should be reduced progressively to between 1 per cent and 2 per cent of output. This would be a little below the average in the 1960s.

"During a recession, of course, it is widely recognized that the budget deficit is increased by low tax receipts and high government spending. Some increase in the ratio of the PSBR to the national income may be consistent with the maintenance of a given monetary target and without itself requiring increases in interest rates, but in practice public sector borrowing has been too high during the last two years, as experience has shown. That lesson, and the continuing high inflation rate, make a big cut in the underlying deficit imperative this year.

"In 1977-78, following the agreement with the IMF, the PSBR as a percentage of output was 3¾ per cent of national income. In 1978-79, after the last Government's relaxation of policy it rose to 5½ per cent. In money terms the latest estimate is just over £9,000 million.

"Despite the expectation of recession, experience shows that it would be wrong to keep the actual PSBR at its current level as a percentage of national income. This could not be reconciled with the monetary target or with the counter-inflationary objectives of the medium-term strategy. We must not make the mistake of promising to correct the underlying weakness at some time in the future but failing to take the necessary steps today.

"The monetary target that I have announced for the coming year will involve a substantial further slowdown in underlying monetary growth. If we are to meet that target without putting too much of the burden on interest rates, a PSBR of not more than 4 per cent of national income in 1980-81 is appropriate. This would imply a money figure for the PSBR next year of not more than about £8,500 million.

"Today's proposals will leave the total yield from taxation not much changed. Taking account of the effect of inflation over the past year and of the Government's public spending decisions, this represents a tightening of the budgetary stance. Indeed, in the absence of the substantial cuts in public spending since my last budget, a very large increase in the burden of taxation would have been unavoidable.

Fiscal Policy in the Medium Term. "The Government's spending plans are published today in the public expenditure White Paper [Cmnd. 7841—see above]. They are essential to the financial strategy. The path that we can now plan contrasts very sharply with past experience and intentions. We are not making panic cuts affecting the next year or two, leaving the long-term trend unaltered. We are not just reducing planned increases. The level of spending is actually planned to fall steadily throughout the next four years. Without these economies, a coherent policy to reduce inflation would be unattainable.

"Over the next few years receipts of taxes and royalties from North Sea operations will make an increasing contribution to government revenue. Even so, the growth of revenue over the medium term is broadly dependent upon the growth of national output. This is conditioned by the growth of productivity, the growth of the world economy, and the speed with which we reduce inflation. Since the first oil crisis in 1973 there has been a worldwide decline in rates of economic growth. The growth of output in the United Kingdom has been less than half its previous rate, in spite of the contribution of North Sea oil. The recent rise in oil prices makes it unwise to assume that world and UK output will expand faster over the next few years than in the past five.

"The projections for tax revenue in the medium-term strategy, therefore, rest on the fairly cautious assumption that after the recession forecast for 1980 the economy will grow by an average of only 1 per cent a year up to 1983-84. This will undoubtedly seem rather modest. The economy should be capable of growing faster than this. But we must learn from recent history. In the past, Governments have almost always based their spending plans on improbably high growth rates, which were well above those achieved. To plan spending on over-optimistic growth assumptions can involve actions that, in the event, prevent that forecast growth being achieved. We should take credit for improved growth performance only once we have firm evidence that it has taken root.

"So in preparing projections of the future of the economy, we must adopt a cautious approach. The Government cannot dictate the rate of growth of output. It is only as inflation subsides that there will be secure foundations for sustainable growth. The 1 per cent a year that we are assuming is the same rate as was achieved in the years 1973 to 1979. We cannot prudently assume that we shall do better over the next few years, though we have every reason to hope that we can. The sooner inflation comes down, the faster the rate of growth we can achieve within the monetary framework.

Overcoming Inflation

"A firm monetary policy, as the past year has shown, contributes to a strong exchange rate. Furthermore, sterling now has some of the characteristics of a petro-currency. A strong exchange rate plays an important part in diminishing inflationary pressures, but at the same time it obliges UK industry to restrain costs and improve its competitiveness. That requires a fundamental change in attitudes.

"Over the past years we have sunk into an unquestioning 'cost-plus' mentality, where the impression is given that whatever wage increases are agreed can simply be passed on to customers. But exporters have been learning that their prices must be related as closely to their competitors' prices as to their own costs. The same lesson has to be learnt in pay negotiations. Just as exporters must base their prices on what their customers will pay, so pay settlements must be based upon what companies can afford, while remaining competitive.

"There is a need for much greater public awareness of the link between pay increases, price inflation and unemployment. This subject has already been discussed in the forum of the National Economic Development Council [NEDC], and we shall be returning to it again at future meetings. The more pay settlements can be moderated, the lower the transitional costs of the fight against inflation in terms of bankruptcies, lost production and reduced employment.

"It is still a widespread, if tactit, assumption in too many places that if wages and prices go up fast the exchange rate will fall before long and restore any loss of competitiveness. This rests, not unreasonably, on repeated experience. But the authorities are no longer in a position to engineer a major reduction in the exchange rate in order to bail out those who have sought and granted excessive pay claims. Even if we could do this, it would create more inflation before long.

"It is not only in collective bargaining and selling overseas that we must move away from a blind attachment to cost plus and the idea of full protection against RPI [retail price index] movements. The problem goes far wider than that. There are many parts of our economic life where it is right to take some account of inflation, but a very damaging rigidity has grown up in how we do it. For example, until recently public spending programmes were controlled entirely in volume terms, without regard to changes in their costs. With cash limits an important step was taken away from an increasingly harmful practice. Again, it has been assumed that the real value of all social security benefits must always be maintained, whether production and incomes go up or down. This places the entire burden of adjustment on the working population. They, for their part, have responded by pressing for the income tax system to be fully indexed and by adding to their demands for higher wages. Inevitably, a substantial part of the burden of adjustment then falls on profits, and so on jobs.

"So long as inflation persists there has to be some measure of price protection in relation to social benefits and taxation in a civilized society, but full protection for some is possible only at the expense of others. The proposals in this budget recognize both the need to offset some of the effects of inflation and the fact that it is impossible to maintain the real value of all personal incomes when total national income is likely to fall.

"If we are to master inflation the adjustments required of all of us are difficult but perfectly feasible. We should beware of the fashionable but misleading parallels with what happened in 1974 and 1975. They are merely a recipe for self-fulfilling pessimism.

"After the oil price increases of 1973-74 our inflation went on rising for two years, reaching a peak year-on-year rate of 26 per cent in the autumn of 1975 [see pages 27332; 28026]. The oil price increases in the second half of 1979 have been just as large, but this time we have a good chance of seeing our inflation rate decline in the latter part of 1980. Monetary growth is now under better control. Unlike then, we have no backlog of inflation in the system, caused by earlier falls in sterling. There are encouraging signs of realism in private sector wage settlements. This is clear, for example, from information provided by the CBI [Confederation of British Industry] data bank and from evidence of settlements linked to genuine productivity deals. The underlying rate of inflation over the last six months is well below the present year-on-year rate.

"Projections of growth and tax revenue can only be illustrative and imprecise, but those published today show that for the first time the Government of the day have coherent policies for money, tax and spending over the medium term. There should be scope simultaneously to reduce government borrowing and to lower taxes, including progress towards a 25 per cent rate of income tax. Publication of this strategy will assist decision-makers throughout the economy to work with the grain of government policy, understanding the limits that it imposes and the opportunities that it presents. This strategy is the best foundation for higher growth, fuller employment and a return to rising living standards.

Public Expenditure

"At the heart of the medium-term strategy is the need to return to a sensible level of public spending and to see taxes and government borrowing reduced. The spending plans that this Government inherited were too high, and were set to grow considerably faster than production. Most aspects of public spending are worth while if the nation can afford them, but too often we have endorsed plans for rising expenditure that we cannot afford. In the last 20 years the ratio of public expenditure to GDP [gross domestic product] has risen by a quarter.

"It would be all too easy for that ratio to go on rising indefinitely unless we addressed ourselves to fundamentals. That is what we have done in what has been the most far-reaching review of medium-term expenditure plans since they began 20 years ago. This review is crucial to the strategy, crucial to success in reducing the PSBR, lowering interest rates, and bringing down inflation—and crucial if we are to find room for lightening the tax burden and so to provide scope and encouragement for enterprise and initiative.

"The results are set out in the public expenditure White Paper published today. Publication of plans for expenditure at the same time as those for taxation has long been widely favoured. The happy coincidence of the two on this occasion is mainly due to the time needed to review inherited expenditure plans fully, but it has enabled me to present together the Government's strategy for expenditure, taxation and the money supply in a way not attempted by my predecessors. One other result of this coincidence is that I have an unusually large number of tax and expenditure proposals to announce in this speech. . . .

"The plans in the White Paper show, for the first time ever, a progressive reduction in total expenditure throughout the lifetime of a Parliament. By 1982-83 they will be over 11½ per cent below those inherited from the previous Government. This reduction works out at over £11,000 million at today's prices. Expenditure in 1983-84 is planned to be about 4 per cent lower, in real terms, than in 1979-80. The effect will be a marked shift in the burdens imposed by the Government and in the balance between the public and private sectors. Above all, we shall have set the volume of public spending on the right course. We shall be creating a climate much more favourable to economic growth.

"In the coming year, 1980-81, the reduction from the amount that our predecessors planned to spend is over £5,000 million at today's prices—roughly equivalent to the revenue raised by an extra 7p on the basic rate of income tax. Since the [public expenditure] White Paper published in November [see 30151 A], further net reductions of over £900,000,000 have been decided for the coming year. The Government have thought it prudent, however, to set aside £325,000,000 of this for the Contingency Reserve. It should not be necessary to spend all that. These decisions reduced planned spending in 1980-81 by at least £575,000,000 at current prices. Special sales planned for 1980-81 remain at the £500,000,000 mentioned in the November White Paper. That compares with the £1,000 million target for 1979-80 announced in my budget last June. In the event, a total very close to £1,000 million has been raised in that way.

"In today's circumstances, any Government would have to check the size and growth of public spending. This does not mean, and has not meant, that public expenditure should be cut indiscriminately. Our choices have been guided by the belief that the Government should provide efficiently and realistically those services that they alone are able and best fitted to provide. The role of the state can sensibly be reduced where it has taken over what private initiative can better achieve, and where it has been reducing incentives, increasing bureaucracy and distorting markets.

Defence, and Law and Order. "Only the state can provide adequately for the defence of its citizens against external and internal threats. The armed forces and police need to be strengthened and improved. Expenditure on defence, and law and order, therefore, is planned to grow—defence by 3 per cent a year, in real terms, up to the end of the period, and law and order by 2½ per cent a year.

Health - Increase in Prescription Charge. "Spending on health will continue to grow exactly as planned by the last Government, at about 2 per cent a year over the period. The cost of this increase will be partly offset by increases in charges, including in particular a £1 prescription charge, from next December. These charges will yield in total about £30,000,000 in a full year. . . .

Support for Industry. "But support from the taxpayer for private and nationalized industries is reduced.

Housing. "Provision for housing is reduced. This reflects both the local authorities' own reduction in building programmes and what the nation can afford in public sector housing investment and subsidies.

Education. "The reduction in the education programme reflects a fair and sensible response to falling school rolls and a continuation of the economies to be made in 1980-81. Whilst the number of pupils is expected to fall by about 13 per cent between 1979-80 and 1983-84, spending on schools is planned to fall by only about 6 per cent. So spending for each pupil will increase, in real terms.

Overseas Aid. "The aid programme is also reduced, but remains substantial. It will now be in line with what a country in our present circumstances can afford.

Social Security. "Social security presents particular problems. This programme has been responsible for three-quarters of the total increase in programmes since 1973-74. This Government, no less than their predecessors, are committed to maintaining a social security structure that protects the weakest and most vulnerable in our society. But social security is now one-quarter of total public expenditure and still growing. It cannot be exempt from measures to restrain its growth where these can reasonably be made. Notwithstanding the changes that the Government are making, spending on social security is still expected to increase by nearly 4 per cent between 1979-80 and 1983-84. I shall return to this area in more detail in a few moments.

Civil Service. "There are those who sometimes speak as if all our problems with public expenditure could be solved by reducing bureaucracy while leaving subsidies and services untouched. The process of securing economy cannot be as painless as that. It is easy to forget that the entire cost of the civil service represents only one-fifteenth of public expenditure.

"Even so, that expenditure represents a substantial cost. At the beginning of this Administration the civil service was larger by 40,000 than when we left office. Between 1974 and 1979 local government manpower had increased by over 200,000. Total public service manpower had increased by nearly half a million. It is no criticism of public servants to say that this could not go on. If it were to continue, by 1983 over one-fifth of the labour force would be employed in the public service.

"Action has already been taken. The last Government made financial provision for a civil service of 748,000 at the end of this month. By April 1, 1981—12 months hence—the civil service will be smaller than that by at least 50,000. I cannot yet predict what the size of the civil service will be by the end of the present Parliament, but we have made a good start.

"The revenue departments, I am glad to say, have been playing their full part in this process of reduction. The numbers employed in the revenue departments had grown from 87,000 in 1970 to 113,000 when we took office. At that rate, by the year 2000 there would be 175,000 tax collectors, which is more than there are soldiers in the Army. That process of expansion is now being reversed. In 12 months' time the staff of the revenue departments will be over 10,000 fewer than when we took office—a reduction of about 8½ per cent. The staff savings from my budget last year amounted to about 1,400, and the tax measures that I am proposing this year will in themselves enable me to make eventual net savings of 1,700 staff in my departments.

Local Authority Manpower. "The Secretary of State for the Environment [Mr Michael Heseltine] and other ministers have been taking steps that will help local authorities to reduce their manpower. There is now less detailed interference by central Government—fewer circulars and returns—and a large number of statutory controls are being removed. But, as [Mr Heseltine] pointed out on Monday [March 24], progress has been disappointingly slow. The planned reductions in expenditure imply a substantial reduction in local authority staff over the next four years. The local authorities must now give high priority to achieving just that.

Public Sector Pay. "The reductions that I have so far described are in the volume of public spending. We must also pay full regard to what it costs. Some of the reasons were eloquently explained to the House by [Mr Denis Healey] on Jan. 25 last year, when he was still Chancellor [during a debate on the economic situation—see page 29593].

"On that occasion [Mr Healey] made an assumption that earnings in the 1978-79 pay round might increase by 15 per cent. He said that this assumption, which he described as pessimistic, would increase the cost of central government and local authority services by £1,000 million each in 1979-80 and raise the costs of the nationalized industries by nearly £1,000 million. 'Faced with such increases,' he said, '. . . the Government would be compelled to seek reductions in the volume of public expenditure.' He emphasized that this would inevitably increase unemployment.

"We now know that [Mr Healey's] assumption about the likely growth in earnings proved all too true. Moreover, his own Administration left behind some large postdated cheques. The Clegg awards [i.e. those recommended by the standing commission on pay comparability under the chairmanship of Prof. Hugh Clegg—see pages 29599; 29830] are expected to cost something like £2,000 million in 1980-81 and the full-year effect of other comparability awards in the civil service will add a further £1,000 million to that.

Cash Limits. "Public services and employment cannot escape the effects of inflation. Cash limits are the crucial instrument for ensuring that the costs of public expenditure do not run out of control. For central government expenditure most of the cash limits for 1980-81 are contained in the parliamentary estimates, published today. As already announced, they are based on provision for current cost increases of 14 per cent. When the estimates were being prepared this seemed an adequate allowance for inflation between 1979-80 and 1980-81.

"The projection that I am publishing today suggests, in line with those of most outside forecasters, that inflation may be a point or two higher. To increase the provision in the cash limits to accommodate the higher forecast of cost increases would be wrong. That would simply be to condone and encourage inflation. The difference between the provision in the cash limits published today and full provision for the inflation now forecast would be about £700,000,000. There should be scope to absorb such higher costs through greater efficiency. It will not be easy. But the unacceptable alternatives would be to cut services or increase taxes.

External Factors - Contribution to European Community Budget. "In an important respect the reductions announced today are not complete. This country carries a heavy burden of government payments overseas: first, spending on defence, especially the British Army of the Rhine; second, our net contribution to the European Community; and, third, overseas aid. Relative to our GNP [gross national product] we spend more across the exchanges on defence than any of our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] partners; we make far the largest net contribution to the EEC [European Economic Community] budget; and our aid programme is larger than those of the United States, Japan or [West] Germany. One result of the growth of these transfers has been to offset a large part of our substantial private sector earnings on invisible account of the balance of payments.

"Of these transfers overseas the fastest growing and least justified has been our large net contribution to the Community budget. Although ranking seventh out of the Nine in GNP per head, we are now making the largest net contribution. The latest estimates by the European Commission again show that our net contribution is much larger than [West] Germany's, whose GNP per head is twice that of the United Kingdom, and that most—if not all—of the other five countries with a higher GNP per head than ourselves are net beneficiaries of the budget. We also transfer substantial resources to our partners outside the budget through the artificially high prices imposed by the Community's agricultural policy.

"The White Paper figures make no allowance for the reductions we are negotiating in the United Kingdom's net contribution to the budget of the European Community. Pending a satisfactory conclusion to those negotiations, they include the full estimated costs under present arrangements. If those arrangements are not changed, the likely costs will rise to more than £2,000 million at today's prices by 1983-84. A successful outcome to the negotiations is therefore of the highest importance to our medium-term fiscal and monetary strategy and to the success of our attack on inflation. The Government's determination to redress the present unacceptable situation has, I feel certain, the support of the entire House.

Social Security

"I have already stressed the scale and importance of the social security programme. In the coming year it will absorb a quarter of public spending and cost about £20,000 million—which works out at no less than £1,000 a year for every household in the country. Its volume has grown by about 50 per cent in the last 10 years, allowing both for inflation and the switch from family allowances and child tax allowances to child benefit. That rate of growth is more than three times the 15 per cent increase in GDP over the same period. Some of this growth is accounted for by an increase in the number of beneficiaries, particularly the elderly. But much of it has come about not through any conscious decision but because the level and scope of benefits have been improved in anticipation of a growth in output which has not been achieved. It is a striking example of the nation's capacity for spending money before it has been earned.

"Any effort to curb the growth of public spending must, therefore, include this programme. One must recognize the differences between its various components. The programme covers a big range of benefits and beneficiaries. Any changes must reconcile the need, which we all recognize, to protect the most vulnerable members of society with the need to ensure that scarce resources are distributed in a way which does not unduly inhibit the creation of wealth. Standards of living and the benefits people are willing to finance must depend on a healthy, growing economy.

Retirement Pensions. "Any civilized society has a special obligation to those who have completed their working life. The standard rate of retirement pension will accordingly be increased next November by £6.15 to £43.45 for a married couple and by £3.85 to £27.15 for a single person. These increases fully reflect the Government's estimate of the rise in prices between the last uprating and the next. In addition, a £10 Christmas bonus will again be paid. Moreover, we propose substantial extra help for poorer consumers with their fuel costs next year. Much of this will go to the elderly. . . .

Supplementary Benefit and Other Payments. "Again, any civilized society should provide a safety net below which a poor person's standard of living should not fall. We can all debate what is the proper level. Should it be a relative level or, as [Lord] Beveridge had contemplated [in his 1942 report on social insurance], an absolute level, which seeks to meet the basic needs of a person and his family? These are difficult questions. The answers are not made any easier by the fact that the supplementary benefit scheme covers so many varied circumstances, with more than 3,000,000 beneficiaries at any one time, ranging from the old and infirm to healthy young people capable of work. But clearly no action we take should be at the expense of the really weak and needy. Accordingly we propose that supplementary benefit rates, too, will be increased next November in line with the projected level of prices. A large part of the additional help with fuel costs which I have just announced will also go to supplementary benefit recipients, particularly the old and those with young children.

"Besides the old and the poor there are others with special needs. One-parent families face particular problems. We propose that the additional payment to them should go up from £2.50 to £3 per week —an increase of 50 per cent since the government came into office. The disabled also face special difficulties. The mobility allowance will therefore go up by £2.50 per week to £14.50 per week next November—again an increase of nearly 50 per cent since we came into office. The family income supplement scheme will be improved so as to extend help to a further range of low income families where the bread winner is in work. These families will also benefit from the fuel help scheme.

Proposed Changes in Treatment of Short-term Benefits. "This demonstrates our determination to look after the elderly and the needy. But there is another aspect of the social security programme. The Government and the vast majority of the British people want hard work and initiative to be properly rewarded and are vexed by disincentives to work. One of the biggest problems is the lack of balance between social security benefits and incomes in work.

"As my predecessor so often reminded this House, the net extra reward to a low earner from going out to work can be so close to the benefits he can get when on social security as to extinguish his incentive to find or stick to a job. Indeed, there are people whose incomes out of work exceed what they could reasonably expect to get when in work. There is undoubtedly widespread and justified public concern about this disincentive. It is doubly demoralizing: first, to those directly affected; and, second, to the large numbers around them, who quite reasonably see such provisions as unjust as well as harmful to the proper workings of the economy.

"This is a complicated problem which cannot easily be resolved, but the Government are determined to tackle it. We intend to start with tax. Successive Administrations have always intended that short-term social security benefits should form part of a person's taxable income, in the same way as pensions and widow's benefits always have. The 1948 legislation [i.e. the National Insurance Act] said they should be taxable. It is only fair that a man who in the course of the year derives his income partly from work and partly from social security benefits should pay as much tax as a similar man who has earned the same total income. So far the administrative difficulties have always appeared insuperable. Now we are going to act.

"First, we have the scheme, which the Secretary of State for Social Services [Mr Patrick Jenkin] announced before Christmas [in a written parliamentary answer on Dec. 17, 1979], whereby employers would have the responsibility for the payment of a minimum level of sick pay during the early weeks of sickness. This will bring the bulk of sickness payments into tax through PAYE [pay as you earn]. This scheme should be operating from April 1982. Secondly, we intend to bring benefits paid to the unemployed into tax at the same time. This will be done in such a way that in general the claimant will neither receive refunds nor suffer deductions of tax until he is back at work. We are also considering how best to bring into income tax at an early date the remaining short-term benefits, and invalidity benefit, which, primarily for administrative reasons, are at present untaxed.

Short-term and Invalidity Benefits - Limited Uprating and Abolition of Earnings-related Supplement. "But we do not have to wait until 1982 to do something about this problem. Subject to the approval of Parliament, these short-term benefits and invalidity benefit will, at the next uprating, be increased by 5 percentage points less than would fully reflect forecast price movements. In addition, the entitlement formula for earnings-related supplement [ERS, introduced under the 1965 National Insurance Act—see 21558 A] to these benefits will be altered from January 1981 so as to reduce the proportion of earnings reflected in benefit. None of these benefits comes within the tax net at present. What I am now proposing takes account of the general agreement by successive Governments that they should.

"The ERS scheme itself has been diminishing in worth and effectiveness over recent years. Redundancy payments are now more generous, and the development of the employers' sick pay scheme means that ERS is much less needed than formerly. Of the unemployed, only about 10 per cent to 15 per cent are in receipt of ERS at any one time. All in all, the Government would find it difficult to justify its retention. We therefore propose that the state provision of short-term benefits should in future be on a flat-rate basis and that ERS should be withdrawn in 1982, with no fresh claims being taken from the beginning of that year.

Inquiry into Index-linked Public Sector Pensions. "The large increases in the social security programme over the years reflect in part the heavy cost of automatically indexing the value of benefits in an open-ended way. One aspect of this is the system of index-linked pensions in the public sector, which includes those payable to retired ministers and members of Parliament. Serious doubts have been raised as to whether adequate allowance is made for the value of present pension arrangements in settling public sector pay. The Government intend, therefore, to set up an independent inquiry into that question.

Child Benefit. "I come now to child benefit, where a judgment is needed how far the impact of inflation should be offset. I have already explained the general problem that has to be faced in relation to both benefits and taxation. The Government propose that this benefit should be raised in November from £4 to £4.75 per week for each child. For nearly all basic taxpayers, this increase of 18¾ per cent in child benefit will ensure that they are better off than they would have been if child tax allowances and family allowances had continued and had been uprated in line with prices—and people who pay no tax at all are substantially better off,

"Child benefit is, of course, paid in respect of every child in the country, regardless of the parents' circumstances. The increase that I have just announced will add over £400,000,000 to public spending in a full year. An extra 10p per child per week would cost nearly £60,000,000 a year. I have no doubt that in all the circumstances I have done everything that is reasonable to match the claims of those who are entitled to child benefit with those other recipients of social security. . . .

Social Security Payments to Strikers' Families. "[On April 15, 1969] one of my distinguished predecessors said: 'We need to facilitate the smooth working of the process of collective bargaining in industry and to help to prevent the occurrence of unnecessary and damaging disputes, of which we have seen all too much recently, and which are totally incompatible with our economic objectives.' That is what Mr Roy Jenkins [then Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Labour Government] said in 1969, when [in his 1969 budget speech—see page 23341] he announced the then Government's intention to press ahead with their proposals, *In Place of Strife*. Eleven years later, little indeed has changed, except for the worse. I shall refer today to only one aspect of this self-inflicted industrial damage. The social security payments that a striker may claim on behalf of his family can be one of several factors that sometimes tilt the balance of industrial power against employers and responsible union leadership alike. These payments have helped to sustain some very damaging strikes. The sums involved can sometimes be substantial. During the present steel dispute, for example, such payments have so far amounted to over £8,000,000. That figure would be enough, for example, to pay the full-year cost of another 50p a week on the one-parent premium or an extra £1 a week on mobility allowance. Payments to strikers are widely and understandably resented and we have carefully considered how best to change present procedures.

"Supplementary benefit for strikers' families will not be withdrawn altogether, but once Parliament has passed the necessary legislation we intend that assessments for benefits will assume the striker to have provided £12 per week himself, whether in strike pay or in some other way. Strikers' tax refunds will continue to be taken into account in assessing needs. Until now, part of the tax refund—equivalent to £4 per week—has been disregarded. In future regard will be had to the full refund. We propose, too, that when benefits paid to the unemployed are brought into tax, benefits paid to strikers' families shall be taxed similarly.

"This is an overdue reform. The Government believe that it is entirely fair to assume that strikers have made some provision for their families' financial support, either through their union or by some other means. It can hardly be denied that unions need to accept fuller responsibility for supporting their members when on strike than some of them have done recently. This change will make an important contribution to restoring the balance that has so long been lacking in our industrial relations.

Summary. "After the changes announced today, the social security budget will still be higher, in real terms, in each of the next four years than it was last year. These changes reflect new and responsible priorities, such as are inevitable in a period in which resources are scarce. Successive Governments share credit for the welfare state, but social security cannot be regarded as exempt from re-examination and entitled always to take absolute priority over spending on defence, the police, hospitals or schools—or over the need for proper control of public spending as a whole. Once that fact is recognized, there can be no denying the case for modest economies in this programme.

The Tax Balance

"The tax measures that I am about to announce are consistent with the medium-term strategy and the overall budgetary framework. They also take account of the changes in the balance of the economy that have come about over the last year. Many are made necessary only by the impact of inflation upon the tax system. . . .

"Three developments in particular have influenced me: high pay settlements, high oil prices, and the high exchange rate. Together, those developments have swung the balance strongly in favour of consumers and against companies, in particular against those companies facing competition from overseas, whether in home or overseas markets. Consumers have lost something as a result of the increase in oil prices. But the great majority have more than made up for this by big pay increases and the benefit they have received from income tax cuts, the high exchange rate and lower prices for imported manufactures. In 1979 average personal after-tax incomes increased by 20 per cent while the profits of companies not engaged in North Sea operations fell by over 5 per cent in money terms, and, of course, by much more in real terms.

"In deciding the balance of my tax changes I see a stronger case for reducing the real burdens on companies and small businesses than on private individuals. Of course, not all companies have lost out. The oil companies are making large windfall profits. The banks are gaining from high interest rates. Some of these are in a position to contribute more by way of taxation. The financial position of most sections of business will be eased as interest rates come down. So far as tax changes are concerned, I shall concentrate the limited funds available to me on encouraging enterprise and on relieving specific pressures which are particularly damaging or unfair.

Company Taxation

Taxation of North Sea Oil. "The Government's objective in taxing North Sea oil operations must be to strike a balance between the nation's claim to a share in the profits from this national resource and the right of those engaged in the risky business of oil exploration and development to a fair return on their efforts. Since my last budget, world oil prices have increased dramatically. North Sea oil prices, which follow world prices, have risen by more than half, from about $20.70 to about $33.75 a barrel.

"This substantial change has greatly favoured the oil companies. I therefore propose, for chargeable periods ending on June 30 next and subsequent periods, to increase the rate of petroleum revenue tax [PRT] from 60 per cent [effective since Jan. 1, 1979—see pages 29823, 29827] to 70 per cent. At the same time, I propose to rectify some anomalies in the PRT rules concerning transfers of North Sea interests between oil companies and the taxation of gas. These are changes that the industry has requested. I also propose to introduce special PRT provisions for fields that span the median line between the United Kingdom and the Norwegian continental shelves.

"I have one further proposal on PRT. It relates to the collection of tax. The PRT structure gives companies very early relief for capital expenditure. This means that PRT is not collected until some considerable time after a field has come on stream. The increases in oil prices have greatly strengthened the industry's cash position. I am satisfied that PRT payments can in future be made somewhat earlier. The Petroleum Revenue Tax Act 1980 [see pages 30154-55] went some way in that direction. I now propose to go slightly further. We shall require companies which are liable to PRT for the chargeable period to June 30, 1981, to make at the beginning of March 1981 an advance payment for that chargeable period at a rate of 15 per cent based on 1980 liabilities. Advance payments for later chargeable periods will be made in the same way but not necessarily at the same rate. These advance payments will be offsettable against normal payments of PRT.

"In total, the changes in oil company taxation are expected to bring in an extra £535,000,000, making a total of petroleum revenue tax, corporation tax and royalties for 1980-81 of rather over £4,000 million. We are thus ensuring that the nation as a whole secures a proper share of North Sea profits this year.

"North Sea oil adds to national income mainly through increased government revenues and oil company profits. Though the sums of money are large, we must not exaggerate them. Even in the years of peak production later this decade, no more than 6 per cent of GNP is expected to come from the North Sea—equivalent to perhaps two years of the kind of economic growth we achieved in the 1950s and 1960s. This makes it all the more important that we should use the oil wisely, with an eye to our long-term economic interests. In particular, we should take the opportunity offered by the growth of oil revenues to bring the level of public sector borrowing steadily down, and this is what our medium-term strategy envisages.

Banks. "In recent weeks there has been a good deal of comment about the profits declared by the clearing banks. Some represent a 'windfall' to the banks, which arises from the combination of high interest rates and the fact that interest is not paid on current accounts. The windfall element is not a sign of enterprise or efficiency, as the banks themselves recognize. But it is equally irrational to attribute these profits to some wickedness on the part of the banks. They need the major part to strengthen their capital base, which would otherwise have been eroded by inflation. There could, of course, be a case in principle for a special tax related to the windfall element in these profits, and I shall be considering that further. However, it has not yet been established that such a tax is either practical or entirely desirable in today's conditions.

Leasing. "Leasing, in which the banks have been heavily involved, has grown rapidly in the past few years. Underlying that growth has been the 100 per cent capital allowance, which leasing companies can claim on assets bought for leasing. The present rules apply to equipment leased to UK industrial and commercial companies, which would qualify in their own right for these tax incentives if they were to purchase the equipment for themselves. I do not propose any changes in transactions of that kind. Leasing finance of that sort has become an important—in many cases an essential—source of finance for investment in manufacturing industry. However, under the present tax rules these 100 per cent allowances apply to all leased equipment. Thus, leasing effectively extends the benefits of tax incentives to certain users—such as overseas companies, certain public bodies in the UK, and consumers—who would not qualify for tax incentives if they had purchased the equipment themselves.

"I propose to end those anomalies. As from June 1 expenditure on leasing involving these users will normally qualify only for 25 per cent tax allowances. There will be transitional provisions for leased television sets. Though the extra revenue in 1980-81 will be negligible, the saving in a full year will be over £200,000,000.

"These provisions will replace, from June 1, the stopgap provision for foreign leasing which I proposed on Oct. 23, when announcing the abolition of exchange control [see page 30154]. They will also include measures to end the growing abuse of leasing by individuals for tax avoidance purposes. However the Motability scheme for leasing cars to disabled people will continue to benefit from the existing provisions.

Company Liquidity. "I have already referred to the difficult problems that many companies will be facing in the coming year, with great pressure on their liquidity. I have considered how far it would make sense for the Government to help them by major tax reductions. Such help could be provided only at the expense of much higher personal taxation or higher borrowing and thus higher interest rates. I believe that the greatest service which I can perform for business is to reduce the burden of financing the public sector and thus to get down interest rates. I have, therefore, given precedence to that objective.

Corporation Tax and Stock Relief. "However, there is, as I observed last June, a clear need to re-examine the corporate tax structure. I have already undertaken that there will be full consultation before changes are made. I understand that the accountancy profession will be publishing its new standard on current cost accounting later this month [published on March 31]. We will, therefore, publish a Green Paper later this year, reporting the results of our general review of the present corporation tax provisions.

"Meanwhile, I do not think that it would be right to change the rate of corporation tax or to make major changes in its structure. But I do propose one important concession to help companies which face a particular difficulty. A number of businesses in manufacturing, and certain areas of distribution, are concerned about the recovery charges which they will face as a result of reductions in stock levels likely to arise either because of the general pressure on liquidity, or in some cases as a result of the steel strike.

"I propose, therefore, to allow a substantial part of the stock relief recovery charge consequent on a reduction of stocks to be deferred for one year. This change will be subject to certain conditions, dependent on the extent to which stocks are financed on trade credit. The new relief will be given for business accounts ending after 1979-80. The cost is estimated at £210,000,000 in 1980-81 and a further £125,000,000 in 1981-82. While further relief is justified in the cases to which I have referred, there is criticism that the present stock relief may confer an unjustifiable advantage in certain circumstances. This is a complex matter on which detailed consultation will be needed, but my intention is to legislate next year in respect of accounts on which tax will generally be payable on Jan. 1, 1982. This will give enough time for consultation.

Redundancy. "I propose another modest measure affecting business taxation. I intend to provide relief for redundancy payments in excess of the statutory minimum paid when a business stops trading.

Indirect Taxation

"I turn now from companies to my other proposals for finding extra revenue. I begin with the indirect taxes. Last June I took an important step in implementing a change in the tax structure that everyone knew to be necessary. I carried out a substantial switch in the balance of taxation from direct to indirect taxes. I do not intend to go further in that direction this year. But I do intend to ensure that the real yield of indirect taxation is not eroded. Inflation can all too easily have that effect.

VAT. First, I shall deal with value added tax [VAT]. Without the extra revenue from last June's budget changes, it would have been quite impossible this year for any Government to avoid either much larger cuts in public spending or big increases in income tax. This is the first year in which the full yield of the 15 per cent rate will be available. The yield will be some £12,450 million in 1980-81. I propose no change in the 15 per cent standard rate of VAT. I am, however, making a number of technical changes to ease the administrative burdens borne by small businesses—about which I shall have more to say later.

"There have been signs that some large companies may have been delaying their VAT payments to the Exchequer. This must be corrected at the earliest opportunity. Customs and Excise are already taking steps, with my approval and within the existing law, to reduce the attractions of delay. But more needs to be done. I shall, therefore, be asking the House to raise the maximum penalty for late payment. My proposal is that it should be expressed as a proportion of the tax at stake. In practice, that will raise the penalty for only the larger companies. For them the existing maximum penalty, of £100 plus £10 a day, is clearly inadequate.

"I also propose to remedy an anomaly in the coverage of VAT. Lubricating and certain other oils are currently zero-rated, without any real justification. We shall be laying an order to charge them at the full rate from Thursday May 1. That will yield an additional £12,000,000 in 1980-81 and £17,000,000 in a full year.

"I want also to inform the House today of my decision on one of the options for staff savings in the Customs and Excise. Concern has been expressed by a number of my hon. Friends and by representative business organizations at the possibility that we might withdraw the facility of monthly returns for those VAT traders who are entitled to claim repayments. I have carefully considered representations about the effect on business cash flow, and I do not intend to pursue that option any further.

Excise Duties. "This year most of the additional revenue I need from the indirect taxes must come from the excise duties. Because they are applied to a physical quantity, the real value of their yield declines in times of inflation. A number of them have not been increased since early 1977 and many have been declining in real value over a much longer period. Accordingly, taking the duties as a whole, I am proposing increases which will reflect the impact of the last year's inflation and keep the real yield roughly constant.

Alcoholic Drinks and Tobacco. "I start with the duties on alcoholic drinks and tobacco, which were last increased three years ago. I propose from midnight tonight to increase the duties on drinks by amounts which, including VAT, represent about 2p on the price of a typical pint of draught beer, 8p on a bottle of table wine and 50p on a bottle of whisky. The tobacco duty will be raised with effect from midnight on Friday. Including VAT, the increase will represent 5p on the price of a typical packet of 20 king-size cigarettes. There will be consequential increases for most other alcoholic drinks and tobacco products, but rather less than the full amount on pipe tobacco. . . .

Betting and Gaming. "Next come betting and gaming. I do not propose any changes in the general betting duty or the pool betting duty. But the Government have been persuaded by some of the criticisms of the present duty on casinos made by the Royal Commission on Gambling [in its report Cmnd. 7200 published on July 12, 1978]. That duty depends heavily on rateable value. It is not an equitable tax, and the more profitable casinos are seriously undertaxed. From Oct. 1, therefore, the present duty will be replaced by one related more closely to the profitability of casinos, and designed to produce about two and a half times as much revenue in a full year. At about the same time, the duty on bingo will be increased from 5 per cent to 7½ per cent. Provision will also be made in the Finance Bill for restructuring the duty on gaming machines. We intend to remove the duty on penny machines, and propose to increase the revenue from the very profitable jackpot machines usually found in clubs. . . .

Vehicle Excise Duty. "I turn now to vehicle excise duty [VED]. Our predecessors announced their intention to abolish the duty on cars and other petrol-driven vehicles. They proposed to make good the revenue loss by increasing the tax on petrol. As the House will recollect, after carefully reviewing the arguments, we decided that that was not a sensible change to make [see page 29827]. Even if the tax had gone, the need for a vehicle register would have remained. That is essential to the police and for vehicle control. Much of the form-filling would have continued unabated. We decided that it was much better to keep the vehicle excise duty, but to achieve staff savings by streamlining its administration, along the lines which the Minister of Transport [Mr Norman Fowler] has already proposed. As part of that, he is announcing today that from October, four-monthly licences will be replaced by six-monthly licences. From August a stamp-saving scheme will be introduced to help motorists to budget for payment of this tax.

"If the duty is to remain, we should be wrong to allow inflation to go on eroding its real value. Because of doubts about its future, the rates of this duty have remained unchanged since 1977 [see page 28358]. I therefore make no apology for proposing increases in the duty on most vehicles of about 20 per cent, and on the heaviest lorries of about 30 per cent this year. As a result, the annual duty on cars will increase by £10, to £60. The larger increase on the heaviest lorries will reflect the high road costs which they impose on the community. These changes will produce an estimated additional yield of £240,000,000 a year, but will still leave the vehicle excise duty lower in real terms than after the last increase in 1977.

"I have one further small change to announce in vehicle excise duty. Electric vehicles at present play only a small part in road transport. However, they are much cleaner and quieter than vehicles powered by internal combustion engines, and they could bring big future energy savings. Because we want to encourage their further development, I propose to abolish vehicle excise duty on them. The cost in 1980-81 will be less than £2,000,000.

Road Fuel Duties. "In my budget last June, I stated that there was a continuing case for measures that would help us to conserve oil. The price of petrol in the United Kingdom remains well below that in any other EEC country. If we are to ensure that our oil resources are not wasted, a duty increase is justified this year.

"If we had decided, as the last Government had in mind, to replace VED progressively by higher petrol taxation I should have been obliged to consider increasing the price of petrol by at least 20p a gallon. That would have been necessary simply to replace the revenue formerly provided by VED. To match the VED increase I have announced would have taken the figure to 24p a gallon—and higher still if the present petrol duty were itself maintained in real terms.

"Since we are retaining the VED, such large increases are not needed. Instead, I shall be increasing the duty on petrol, from 6 p.m.

tonight, by the equivalent, including VAT, of 10p a gallon. For the past three years the rate of duty on derv [diesel fuel] has been higher than that on petrol. I have decided that we can no longer justify that differential, which has borne heavily on commercial and industrial users. Taking account of VAT, the increase in the duty on derv will be about 4p a gallon. That will mean that once again the duties on petrol and derv are the same. . . .

Rebated Oil. "I also propose to raise the duty on heavy oil other than derv by about ½p a gallon from 6 p.m. tonight. . . . I have decided not to increase the duty on burning oil and on domestic paraffin, which are the oils most commonly used in the home.

Summary. "These VAT and excise duty changes will raise additional revenues of £1,260 million in 1980-81 and £1,305 million in a full year. They do not imply any real increase in indirect taxes as compared with 1979-80. The immediate impact effect on the RPI will be just over 1 per cent, but in the longer run these excise duty changes, by contributing to the reduction of the budget deficit, will help to ensure that inflation is brought down and stays down.

Fringe Benefits. "As I have explained, I do not believe that I should be justified in allowing the real costs of motoring and road transport to fall simply as a result of inflation. But if it is right in principle for road users to face a constant fiscal burden, it would not be fair to disregard the increasing unreality of the income tax charge levied on those who are partly sheltered from rising costs because they have a company car available for private use. The scales of benefit charged to income tax have been allowed to fall well behind any reasonable measure of true values. The present figures barely cover the current cost of tax, insurance and maintenance. That is unfair to the great majority of individuals who have to bear the full cost of car ownership, not to mention those who cannot afford to run a car at all.

"I propose, therefore, to increase by some 20 per cent the scale figures that are used for measuring the benefit of a company car for tax purposes. This change will be effective from April 1981. At the same time, there will be one modest relief. The qualifying annual mileage for business use, above which a reduced rate of tax is charged, should be reduced from 25,000 to 18,000 miles a year. In the light of our widespread consultations last year, I believe that these changes will generally be recognized as fair.

"I have also been considering whether I ought to take action to charge tax on the value of petrol provided by employers for private use by their employees. This would present severe administrative problems, both for employers and for the Inland Revenue. Even so, I shall feel bound to contemplate action next year, if the provision of free petrol continues to spread at anything like its present rate.

"As the burden of income tax is reduced, I would hope to see a decline in the provision of benefits in kind. It is consistent with that view for me to impose a reasonable charge to income tax on benefits which remain.

"In that spirit, I approach one area this year that has so far escaped the eye of my predecessors. I refer to the provision for employees of items such as suits of clothing and television sets. I propose to double, from 10 per cent to 20 per cent, the proportion of the value of such objects taken as a measure of the annual taxable benefit. And I shall impose an effective charge where the items concerned are subsequently acquired by the employee for less than true value. I am also taking steps to increase from 9 per cent to 15 per cent the rate of interest used to measure the value of beneficial loans to employees, and to raise to £200 the limit below which the benefit of such loans is not charged to tax.

"Fringe benefits are charged to tax only if the employee earns more than a certain amount, now £8,500. The case for abolishing that threshold has been pressed upon us. I have asked the Inland Revenue to consult employers and others about the administrative problems that might be involved in such a change.

Income Tax

"I now turn to my main proposals for income tax. The cuts that I made last year were an important start on reducing the oppressive burden of direct taxation. At every income level, taxpayers now retain a significantly larger share of their incomes, which they are free to spend or save as they choose. I intend to do more in the future, but at a time when output is falling and we are making further heavy cuts in public expenditure I cannot afford to protect income taxpayers fully from the effects of inflation. This, then, must be a year of consolidation.

"At first sight that would suggest increases in the personal allowances which fall some way short of the rise in prices during 1979, but this would have a number of undesirable effects. It would lower the starting point of income tax in real terms, compared with a year ago. It would increase the number of taxpayers. It would narrow the gap between tax thresholds and the main social security benefits, and it would impose particularly heavy burdens on those with the smallest incomes. All those effects would be most undesirable.

"Given the limited scope available, I have considered how to avoid these consequences. I mean to do so by adopting an alternative approach. I propose to increase the main income tax allowances by 18 per cent or so, which is in line with the rise in prices and in conformity with the indexation requirement of the 1977 Finance Act [see pages 28558, 28560]. This will bring substantial relief to all taxpayers. But in order to afford this I intend to remove the lower rate band of taxation, levied at 25 per cent on the first £750 of taxable income [introduced in 1978—see page 29080]. This combination will protect the position of the very poorest taxpayers whilst ensuring that basic rate taxpayers receive some, though not complete, protection from the rise in prices."

After referring to some of the main changes in allowances and their revenue cost, Sir Geoffrey continued: "I cannot this year make any further reductions in the income tax rates, so the basic rate will remain at 30 per cent and the higher rates will also remain unchanged. . . .

"I am in no doubt that it is right, in a year when difficult choices have to be made, to concentrate on raising the tax thresholds for everybody, as I have proposed, by about 18 per cent. I am also in no doubt that it is necessary to abate the tax reductions that follow from that change by the abolition of the lower rate band. Taken together, these changes are equivalent to an effective increase in tax reliefs of 11 per cent for a married couple and rather less than that for single taxpayers. The 18¾ per cent rise in child benefit implies a broadly comparable annual rate of increase—about 11 per cent—over its April 1979 level.

"Next, I come to higher-rate taxpayers. Given the substantial improvements last year it would not be appropriate to give major relief to higher-rate taxpayers this year. However, our progressive income tax system operates in such a way that those who pay tax at higher rates experience sharply increasing tax burdens in times of inflation. In the ordinary course it would be right to increase the higher-rate threshold and bands by the same proportion as the increase in personal allowances. That would imply 18 per cent this year. But this year the improvements in personal allowances are partially offset by abolition of the lower rate band.

"That change will have only limited significance for those on higher incomes, so I have decided not to raise the higher-rate thresholds fully in line with inflation, as I have done for the main personal allowances, but to put them up by only about 11 per cent. That is, as I have explained, broadly equivalent to the total net increase in tax reliefs that I have proposed for married couples paying tax at the basic rate.

"In money terms the threshold for the higher rates will be raised to £11,250 and the threshold to the top rate of 60 per cent to £27,750. There will be corresponding increases at the intervening points. So far from making the rich richer, these restricted improvements will result in an increase in the real burden of income tax for the higher-rate taxpayer. The cost of increasing the higher-rate thresholds is £100,000,000 in 1980-81 compared with a cost of £140,000,000 if they had been fully indexed. I am also limiting this year's increase in the threshold to the investment income surcharge to 10 per cent, that is, to £5,500. However, with a view to consistent treatment in future years I shall include provisions in the Finance Bill that should ensure, with effect from next year, that the higher-rate thresholds and bands, together with the investment income surcharge threshold, are covered by indexing legislation in the same way as the main personal allowances.

"For the typical married couple with two children the net effect of my budget changes will be to increase their weekly income by £2.68 per week from November. For a single man with the same earnings the increase will be 49p per week. . . .

Other Income Tax Proposals. "I am proposing two other small income tax changes that have long merited action.

"I propose to exempt from tax any payments made to holders of certain gallantry awards, such as the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal. These will in future be treated in the same way as annuities payable to holders of the Victoria Cross and George Cross.

"I want also to do something more for widows in the difficult time immediately following bereavement. I therefore propose to increase the present single allowance that widows receive for the tax year in which they are bereaved. The addition for that year will, at its maximum, bring the single allowance for widows up to the level of the married allowance.

Taxation of Husband and Wife. "We have also been reviewing the treatment for tax purposes of husband and wife. This is a complex and important subject. I am grateful in particular to the Equal Opportunities Commission for the light which its publications have shed on this aspect of sex discrimination. . . . As I have observed, it is easier to define the problems than to find the answers. Certainly, radical changes should not be made in haste. I propose, therefore, to issue later this year a Green Paper on this subject. I hope that it will stimulate further constructive debate, leading us ultimately to acceptable solutions.

Promoting Private Endeavour

"Although, as I have just explained, this is not a year in which sweeping reductions of income tax are possible, that need not prevent our making sensible reforms in the tax system wherever the opportunity offers.

"I have frequently drawn attention to the extent to which the tax system has woven itself deeply into the fabric of national life. Tax has been piled upon tax, often with little regard for their interaction. The accidental effects of this tax onslaught have often been as damaging as the direct consequences.

"This Government came to office pledged to bring more simplicity and consistency to the tax system. We have already undertaken a series of major reviews. . . . This year I have progress to report in three important areas where I believe that fiscal reform can encourage private endeavour—in connexion with housing, the national heritage and voluntary organizations.

Housing. "We wish to encourage the private provision of housing as well as wider home ownership. Home ownership adds to the quality of life. Private provision of housing means we can save public resources for other areas where a private sector alternative is not available.

"My first proposal is designed in particular to help first-time buyers. I have received representations from many quarters about the burden of stamp duty on house purchasers. Difficulty in acquiring a new home restricts the mobility of labour. Those at the lower end of the market—mainly young couples—particularly deserve help. I do not think that these considerations justify us in making, this year, an increase in the mortgage interest relief ceiling, which I propose to maintain at £25,000. However, I think that it would be right to raise the starting point for stamp duty on transfers of property by £5,000 to £20,000 [for 1974 increase to £15,000 see page 26471]. The limits for reduced rate bands will be similarly increased, by £5,000, so that the full 2 per cent rate will now be reached at £35,000. . . .

"Too many homes are under-occupied, or even standing empty. This is often a direct, even if unintended, result of rent control: sometimes, it is a consequence of planning policies, which the Secretary of State for the Environment is improving. There are also fiscal obstacles to the economic use of the available stock of property. I intend to deal with one of these this year. I propose a new and additional relief from capital gains tax to help people who let part of their homes. At present, these house-owners, when they come to sell, can find themselves unexpectedly faced with a capital gains tax charge. This change will encourage letting, and contribute to the better use of the housing stock.

The National Heritage. "Next, the national heritage. The House has already passed a Bill to set up the National Heritage Fund [see 30361 A]. The Finance Bill will include a provision to treat it for tax purposes as if it were a charity. The fund will be set up with an initial amount of about £12,000,000 at its disposal. The Government will in future make an annual contribution to the fund, including the amount needed for the continuation of the acceptance in lieu system. But we should also do more to make it possible, both today and in the future, for owners of historic houses to look after their properties on behalf of the nation as a whole. The last Government took a similar view and introduced provisions to assist owners to set up maintenance funds for the support of their houses. But that scheme proved to be so restrictive that it has scarcely been used.

"I intend, therefore, to recast substantially the maintenance fund provisions. If we are going to adopt this method of encouraging the preservation of our heritage—I believe it is the right one—then it is only sensible to make it work. Our fresh proposals will apply to the maintenance of buildings, historically associated contents, gardens, and land of historic, scenic and scientific interest. The overriding condition will, of course, be that the public should have reasonable access. These measures are intended to cement a bargain between those who have to bear the cost of maintaining the national heritage and the people as a whole.

Voluntary Effort. "The third way in which we aim to assist private action this year is by providing tangible government support for the widespread and often unsung voluntary effort that goes on at every level of our national life.

"It is important to do all we can to help charities and to stimulate private benefactors and helpers. A partnership between Government and voluntary effort can be the best way of meeting many pressing social needs, particularly when state spending has to be cut back. With this in mind, I have given careful consideration to the fiscal recommendations of the Goodman committee and of the National Council of Social Service. [The Goodman committee on charity law under the chairmanship of Lord Goodman had been set up by the National Council of Social Service and had reported on Dec. 8, 1976.]

"I propose to double—to £200,000—the capital transfer tax exemption for bequests to charities, and to exempt wholly from development land tax all future disposals of land by charities. Income tax relief for payments to charities made under deeds of covenant, which has hitherto been limited to the basic rate of income tax, will be extended to the higher rates, subject to a ceiling of £3,000 a year. A minor stamp duty easement on deeds will be made. In response to representations, I am reducing the period for tax relief on deeds of covenant from seven years to four years. These measures, which will cost £30,000,000 in a full year, are designed to provide the right conditions for substantial growth in the important partnership between voluntary service and the rest of the community.

Encouraging Personal Investment

"I turn now to an area where the tax system can be used to involve the individual more closely in the workings of the economy. I refer to proposals which will encourage direct personal investment in the stocks and shares of British industry. In the last 20 years, the proportion of the equity of British companies held in direct individual ownership has been almost halved. This is a trend I should like to reverse.

"It is generally agreed that share ownership and profit sharing can help in developing employees' understanding of, and commitment to, business and industry. I believe that share ownership can also spread a wider understanding of the role of risk-taking and initiative in the economic system.

"I have two sets of proposals to make. First, I propose to make more generous the provisions which the last Government introduced two years ago to encourage profit-sharing [see page 29084]. In passing, I would note that those provisions were based upon proposals originally put forward by the Secretary of State for Energy [Mr David Howell]. They attracted all-party support. I propose to raise from £500 to £1,000 a year the value of shares allocated to any one employee which can qualify for tax relief; to reduce from five years to two the period after which employees can sell their shares; and to cut from 10 years to seven the period after which they can draw them out free of income tax.

"Second, I propose to reintroduce legislation similar to that which Lord Barber [then Chancellor of the Exchequer] introduced in 1973 enabling employees to be given options to buy shares in their companies without incurring liability to income tax [see page 25952]. This scheme will have links, as in 1973, to a scheme for contractual savings. These measures will help to fulfil our promise to encourage employee share ownership and provide the incentive to save and build up capital.

"There is one anomaly in the field of life insurance which I propose to put right. The rate of life insurance relief used to be equivalent to half the basic rate of income tax. It has recently got out of line and I propose to restore the relationship by reducing it to 15 per cent. Because of the practical problems posed for the life insurance industry, the change will not take effect until April 6 next year. Steps will also be taken to deny life assurance premium relief to certain short-term bonds. This change will take effect from today.

"Before I leave discussion of the capital markets I should add that I propose that traded options, which at present are anomalously treated as wasting assets for capital gains tax purposes, should in future be treated on the same basis as share warrants.

"I hope that these measures will help to encourage the wider direct ownership of shares, by altering the relative attractions of investment through the institutions and through more direct means.

The Enterprise Package

"I come now to a series of measures which are intended to increase the wealth-creating vitality of our economy. That means giving greater encouragement to the processes of economic change, and improving incentives to the enterprise sector. For the mainspring of economic vitality it is now widely agreed that we must look to private initiative, widely dispersed and properly rewarded. In truth, enterprise means jobs.

Capital Taxation. "I start with capital taxation, which is widely regarded, and rightly so, as a severe discouragement to those seeking to build up a business and pass it on to the next generation. We have, as I promised last year, subjected capital taxation to a thorough review. Representations from a large number of bodies have confirmed that the damage done by these taxes in their present form is out of all proportion to their yield.

"There is, of course, a place for capital taxation, including, in particular, a charge on death. But change is needed. What I can do this year must be constrained by our financial position. I am, therefore, proposing changes which will be of particular help to smaller businesses. This is an earnest of our determination to make futher progress when economic conditions permit.

"First, the march of inflation over the years has brought far too many estates into charge to the capital transfer tax. This is a particular burden on the small business, when it passes from one generation to another, whether on death or by life-time transfer. I propose, therefore, that the threshold for the capital transfer tax should be increased to £50,000 [from the level of £25,000 effective since October 1977—see 28693 A]. This will exempt from the tax at least two-thirds of the estates which would otherwise have been liable; and up to 400 fewer staff will be needed than if we had left the threshold unchanged.

"A reduction in the scale of rates above the new threshold, however much that is needed, is not possible at the moment: nor are other changes I should like to have made. I am, however, making one or two minor changes designed to reduce administration.

"In the case of the capital gains tax, I am fully conscious of the impact inflation has had. It can rightly be argued that the tax often falls on what are no more than paper gains. Proposals for indexation or tapering as a means of meeting this problem have been put forward on many occasions in the past. I have had both proposals re-examined but the conclusion to which I have come is that both would result in an unwelcome increase in the cost of administration—for taxpayers as well as for the Revenue—while reducing the yield of the tax to negligible proportions.

"I cannot, however, leave matters as they are. I propose, therefore, to replace the present £1,000 exemption—which is progressively withdrawn above £5,000 [see page 29084]—by a straightforward allowance of £3,000. This change, which will operate from April 6, will remove from tax half the cases at present liable, and at a reasonable revenue cost, it will reduce staff requirements by 300. As a corollary of this new proposal, there will be an exemption for the first £1,500 of gains for trusts: and investment and unit trusts will now be exempted from the tax, although investors in such trusts will remain liable if their own gains in the year exceed the new exemption limit.

"Finally, I propose to remove the present double charge on gifts, which arises from the overlap between capital transfer tax and capital gains tax, by providing roll-over relief for the latter. This has been a particular source of grievance and one on which representations have been received from a large number of people. . . .

"I realize that these necessarily limited changes will fall short of what many people had hoped for, but I must ask for patience in present circumstances. Meanwhile, the benefit the present changes give to the small business should not be under-estimated. Because of the 50 per cent relief [see 28693 A]—which will remain, as will the comparable relief for agriculture—a person transferring a business worth £100,000 will pay no capital transfer tax if there are no other assets. We would, of course, have liked to bring similar help to businesses of all sizes. My proposals do give some measure of relief to everybody, but this year most assistance goes to small businesses.

"As I have already indicated, there have been extensive consultations on capital taxation before the budget. We propose to continue that process. There are, in particular, certain specialized areas, such as settled property, which require very detailed consideration.

Development Land Tax. "I now turn to another tax which can inhibit development—the development land tax. In my last Budget, I reduced the rate of this tax to 60 per cent and increased the exempt slice to £50,000. I said then that there would be no further reduction in the rate and no early increase in the exempt slice. That remains the position. Representations have, however, been made to me from many quarters that the tax inhibits development because of uncertainty about the amount of tax chargeable which can normally be ascertained only once development starts. It is important to remove obstacles of that kind if we are to make the best use of our resources. I propose to deal with this point, and the necessary legislation will be added to the Finance Bill at an appropriate stage. There will also be a number of other detailed improvements. All these changes are designed to free the market and to encourage development.

De-mergers. "Taxes are stifling independent enterprise in other ways as well. For many years, the fashion both in Government and in industry was to favour mergers and amalgamations. No doubt mergers have brought advantages in some cases, but it is now quite clear that the fashion for industrial elephantism was greatly exaggerated. I believe that there are cases where businesses are grouped together inefficiently under a single company umbrella. They could in practice be run more dynamically and effectively if they could be 'de-merged' . . . and allowed to pursue their own separate ways under independent management. The present tax rules can in practice effectively discourage de-mergers of that kind, by charging the assets of the 'de-merged' company to advance corporation tax and income tax as distributions.

"I propose to bring forward, during the passage of the Finance Bill, measures to ease the tax charge on distributions of that kind, subject to certain safeguards, and where they are concerned solely with the genuine splitting off of independent trades within the corporate sector. . . .

Specific Measures to encourage Small Businesses. ". . . Any business, but particularly the new small business just starting up, needs somewhere to operate. An imaginative and helpful new venture in recent years has been the development of estates of small industrial workshops for separate letting to small businesses. I propose to bring in a small workshops scheme which will enable industrial buildings allowances at the rate of 100 per cent to be claimed on the construction of small industrial buildings. The scheme will run for three years, and will simplify the present administrative arrangements. I shall also make provision for industrial buildings allowance to be given on the construction of industrial buildings rather than on their first lettings. In addition to my own proposals, the Secretary of State for the Environment intends to consult on relaxation of planning controls over changes of use as between light industry and warehousing for small units. The Secretary of State for Industry [Sir Keith Joseph] intends to make £5,000,000 available to build 1,000 new nursery factory units in assisted areas in co-operation with the private sector.

"New businesses, and particularly new small businesses, also need capital. Many people with capital to invest might be ready to back enterprising ventures if they knew that losses could be offset against taxed income, instead of only against capital gains. I propose that, through a new venture capital scheme, losses on equity investment in unquoted trading companies, incurred after April 5, 1980, may be set off against income.

"Next, I propose to relax the conditions for tax relief for interest paid on money borrowed for investment in, or lending to, a close company. The present rules require an investor to have worked for the greater part of his time in the company's business. I propose to abolish that condition, and thus provide added incentive for outside investment in small firms.

"Just as important as attracting new capital from the outside is the generation of new capital from the inside, in the form of profits which are retained in the business. The tax system has now contained for more than 50 years a series of provisions under which a close company may be required to justify the amount of profits which it wished to retain in the business, undistributed. Following last year's reduction in the rate of income tax, I now propose important changes, including the abolition of the apportionment of trading income both of close trading companies and of members of trading groups. . . .

"However, if small companies are to generate the funds to finance their expansion, they must first earn profits and then be left with sufficient of those profits after payment of tax. Better profits must come through improved efficiency and greater productivity. That is a matter for industry itself and not for Government. But Government can help by reducing the tax burden. I propose, therefore, to cut the small companies rate of corporation tax to 40 per cent [from 42 per cent]—that is no less than 12 points below the full rate of 52 per cent [introduced in 1974—see page 26477]—and at the same time to raise the qualifying limits to £70,000 for the full relief and £130,000 for the marginal relief [from £60,000 and £100,000 respectively—see page 29828].

"My next proposal is designed to help the unincorporated small business. It is important that the self-employed should be able, with tax assistance, to make adequate provision for their retirement. I am, therefore, raising the limits on retirement annuity relief. The normal percentage of earnings qualifying for tax relief will rise from 15 per cent to 17½ per cent, and the ceiling on the premiums qualifying for relief will also be abolished.

Other Changes. "I also propose some minor measures affecting business taxation. Following consultations with industry, I propose that the costs of raising business loan finance should be allowed for tax purposes. Relief will also be given for pretrading expenses of a business, provided that these expenses would have been allowable if the business had been trading when they were incurred. Certain changes will also be made in the tax deduction scheme for the construction industry—the 714 scheme—which will lighten the administrative burden of the scheme and change certain features which at present operate harshly.

"As the last element in my package to help small businesses. I am making certain changes in the arrangements for VAT, in order to ease the administrative burden. I propose that from midnight, the registration threshold for VAT should be increased from £10,000 [see page 29080] to £13,500. The de-registration limit will also be increased from June 1. At the same time, I shall be increasing from £50 to £250 the relief from payment of tax on stocks and assets when a person de-registers. . . .

". . . Taken together [these measures] . . . will cost about £160,000,000 in a full year.

Enterprise Zones

"Finally, I come to an idea which is intended to pioneer a new, and more adventurous, approach to the whole question of industrial and commercial renewal. There are some parts of our economy, most notably in the older urban areas, where more and more public authority involvement seems to have led to less and less fruitful activity. The planning process has all too often allowed, even caused, whole areas at the heart of some of our most populous cities to be laid to waste for years, even decades.

"Even when plans are finally made the public purse is often unable to provide the funds, or the enterprise, to match the planners' aspirations. And when private initiative might have been ready to stir, it has generally been stifled by rules and regulations and by a tax system which pays no regard to these special problems.

". . . A little less than two years ago [on June 26, 1978] I put forward a proposal for trying to bring new life back to these areas of urban dereliction. The idea was not politically partisan, for my thinking had taken place in parallel with that of the distinguished Fabian, Prof. Peter Hall. Quite independently, we had concluded that there was much to be said for the establishment in these man-made wildernesses of what I have called enterprise zones. I am, therefore, pleased to announce today action by the Government which will transform into reality the idea which I then put forward.

"We are proposing to establish, in the first instance, about half a dozen enterprise zones, with the intention that each of them should be developed with as much freedom as possible for those who work there to make profits and to create jobs. Each will cover perhaps 500 acres. Within these zones two major tax incentives will be available—first, 100 per cent capital allowances for both industrial and commercial buildings; and secondly, complete relief from development land tax.

"But fiscal concessions are only part of what is needed. These zones will, therefore, enjoy the following additional benefits—100 per cent derating of industrial and commercial property: a drastically simplified planning scheme; exemption from the scope of industrial training boards—with consequent exemption from industrial training levies; accelerated handling of applications for warehousing free of Customs duty; minimal requests from Government for statistical information and abolition of the remaining industrial development certificate procedures.

"I hope and believe that an imaginative experiment along these lines may succeed where conventional policies have proved inadequate. No one can doubt the need for change from present arrangements. In far too many of our towns and cities today, and for far too many businesses, particularly small and new ones, the gap between a productive idea and a foreseeable profit has widened into a chasm of red tape. That red tape all too often stands between a young school leaver and the prospect of a job.

"Even before this proposal had any official status there was no lack of interest in the idea. The Government will consult local authorities and other interests before decisions on individual areas are made. Fuller details will be found in the policy document which is being issued this evening. There could not be a better time for making a fresh start of this kind.

Conclusion

"In the decade that lies ahead Britain has the opportunity to follow a more hopeful path. We have ended the 1970s with a society that is becoming less tolerant because we live with an economy that has been growing no richer. The 1980s can be very different.

"The disappointments of the last decade spring from illusions that have persisted too long; the illusion that we can pay ourselves what we have not earned; the illusion that Governments may go on borrowing when they dare not tax; and, most foolish of all, the illusion that we can somehow strike our way to higher living standards. The essential condition for success in the 1980s is that we should turn our back on those illusions and that we should have the courage over a period of years to carry through the realistic policies to which there is no alternative.

"In this budget I have tried to set those policies in a strategy for the medium term. Nothing will be easy in the years immediately ahead, but beyond that the strategy offers hope of real success. It is a strategy for the defeat of inflation by the re-establishment of monetary control. It is a strategy for the restoration of prosperity by the encouragement of enterprise.

"Politics is not only the art of the possible; it is also the art of the necessary. The strategy outlined in this budget is designed to do what is necessary and so lay foundations for the success which is well within the grasp of the British people."

Direct Effects of Changes in Taxation

The direct effects of the principal changes in taxation announced in the budget, both in 1980-81 and in a full year, are shown in the following table. In 1980-81, of the main revenue categories, the total income tax effect of the proposed changes would amount to a reduction in yield of £1,188 million, while the net increase in excise duties yield would be £1,013 million; the corresponding totals for a full year would be £1,687 million and £1,058 million respectively.

	1980-81	Full Year
	(£ million)	
Income Tax		
Increase in single and married allowance . .	−1,630	−1,994
Increase in additional personal allowance . .	−10	−12
Increase in age allowance and income limit	−169	−211
Abolition of lower rate band	+748	+901
Increase in higher rate threshold	−58	−106
Changes in further higher rate thresholds . .	−40	−86
Other changes (net)	−29	−179
Income Tax and Corporation Tax	−210	+175
Corporation Tax	−20	−35
Petroleum Revenue Tax	+535	+163*
Capital Gains Tax	negligible	−70
Capital Transfer Tax	−62	−130
Stamp Duties	−75	−85
Value Added Tax	+7	+7
Excise Duties		
Light oil etc.	+450	+450
Heavy oil for use in road vehicles	+55	+55
Rebatable oil duty	+50	+50
Tobacco products	+180	+195
Spirits	+40	+40
Beer	+190	+205
Wine and made-wine	+40	+40
Cider and perry	+3	+3
Gaming licence	nil	+9
Gaming machine licence	negligible	+1
Bingo duty	+5	+10
Vehicle Excise Duty	+238	+238
Bus Fuel Grants†	−3	−3
Other changes (net)	negligible	−11
Total	+235	−380

* Petroleum revenue tax +£335,000,000 net; corporation tax −£172,000,000 net.

† As a consequence of increases in road fuel duties.

Increases in National Insurance and Other Social Security Benefits - Social Security Legislation

As announced by Sir Geoffrey Howe in his budget speech, national insurance and other social security benefits were to be increased from November. Details of the principal changes (weekly rates)—effective from the week beginning Nov. 24, 1980—were announced by Mr Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Social Services, on March 27 as follows (for previous increases effective November 1979, see page 29831):

Long-term Benefits (principally retirement and widows' pensions): from £23.30 to £27.15 (single person) and from £37.30 to £43.45 (married couple)—an increase of 16½ per cent—with increases from £23.30 and £37.30 to £26.00 and £41.60 respectively for the standard rate of invalidity pension (11½ per cent, reflecting the fact that this latter pension is not taxable, as explained by the Chancellor in his budget speech). No change would be made in the amount of earnings which a pensioner might receive without deduction from his or her pension under the "earnings rule"—i.e. £52 a week [see page 29831].

Short-term Benefits (principally sickness and unemployment benefits): from £18.50 to £20.65 (single person and maternity allowance) and from £29.95 to £33.40 (married couple)—i.e. about 11½ per cent.

Industrial Injuries Benefits: from £21.25 to £23.40 (single person) and from £32.70 to £36.05 (married couple)—a rise of about 10 per cent.

Supplementary Benefits: ordinary rate—from £18.30 to £21.30 (single person) and from £29.70 to £34.60 (married couple); long-term rate—from £23.70 to £27.15 and from £37.65 to £43.45 respectively—increases ranging from about 14½ to 16½ per cent. The long-term rate was now aligned with the national insurance long-term benefit rate, under the provisions of the Social Security Act [see below].

Child Benefit: from £4.00 to £4.75 (18¾ per cent); premium for first or only child in certain one-parent families to go up from £2.50 to £3.00.

Other Benefits. Increases were also announced for, inter alia, war pensions, the non-contributory invalidity pension (from £14.00 to £16.30), the mobility allowance (from £12.00 to £14.50) and the family income supplement (from £13.50 to £17.00 in the maximum weekly amount for a one-child family and from £56.00 to £67.00 in the "prescribed amount" for a family with one child, representing the income below which family income supplement was payable).

Other Aspects of Changes. (i) The 15 per cent rate of earnings-related supplement on earnings in excess of £30 a week, first introduced in 1966 and paid with short-term incapacity, unemployment and widowhood benefits [see 21558 A] would be reduced to 10 per cent from January 1981 and would come to an end in January 1982. (ii) The "linking" rules—whereby spells of unemployment or sickness not separated by more than 13 weeks counted as one period of interruption of employment—would be altered so as to reduce the "linking period" to six weeks, and moreover benefits would not be paid for spells lasting three days or less. (iii) From April 1981 unemployment benefit would be reduced, pound for pound, for those occupational pensioners (who had retired and taken a pension) whose pensions exceeded £35 a week. [These three measures, together with the "freezing" of the £52 earnings rule limit—see above—and other measures announced by Sir Geoffrey Howe, were incorporated in the Social Security (No. 2) Bill—see below.]

Social Security Act

The Social Security Bill was published on Nov. 29, 1979, and was read a second time in the House of Commons on Dec. 20, providing principally (i) for changes in calculating increases in pensions and other long-term benefits; (ii) for the reform of the supplementary benefit scheme; (iii) for the abolition of the Supplementary Benefits Commission (SBC, set up in 1966—see 21558 A) and the establishment of a new Social Security Advisory Committee; and (iv) for the extension of equal treatment to men and women in social security.

(1) As announced in the 1979 budget on June 12, 1979 [see pages 29827 and also 29831], the Bill discontinued the statutory link between pensions (and other long-term benefits) and earnings. Under the existing system [see 28490 B], since 1976 such benefits had been increased at least in line with the movement of earnings or prices, whichever was the greater. In future (Mr Jenkin explained during the second reading debate), although the new Bill contained a guarantee for pensioners against rising prices, the Government would decide each year, in the light of the economy and of other spending priorities, how to honour this pledge. Moreover, there would be "rather more flexibility" to fix the exact date at which increases would take effect.

(2) A new legal and administrative framework was established for the supplementary benefit scheme, providing inter alia for clearer rules of entitlement, the spelling out of a claimant's rights and obligations and the transfer (i) from the SBC to supplementary benefit officers—who would be wholly independent of ministers—of the determination of individual claims and interpretation of rules, and (ii) to ministers of the SBC's policy-making role.

(3) The long-term supplementary benefit rate would be aligned with the long-term national insurance rates (the former having over time become somewhat higher than the latter). The qualifying period for the long-term supplementary benefit rate would be reduced from two years to one.

(4) School leavers' entitlement to supplementary benefit would be deferred until a fixed date around the beginning of the next school term; instead of this supplementary benefit for the school leaver himself or herself, parents would get an extension of child benefit or national insurance benefits through the holiday.

(5) The Supplementary Benefits Commission (and the corresponding body in Northern Ireland) and the National Insurance Advisory Committee would be merged into a single Social Security Advisory Committee, responsible for advising the Secretary of State and also the Department of Health and Social Services in Northern Ireland on supplementary benefits, on the whole range of national insurance benefits and on child benefit and family income supplement. Membership of the new body would include representatives of both sides of industry and of the chronically sick and disabled, and also of the special interests of Northern Ireland.

(6) Equal treatment for men and women receiving social security would include provisions for women to be able to claim for children irrespective of the husband's earnings (effective November 1984) and for a married woman to claim an increase in short-term national insurance benefit for her husband and children if the husband's earnings were less than the increase in benefit being claimed for him (effective November 1983); and also for a woman as well as a man to claim for a couple in respect of supplementary benefits, subject to the continued aggregation of their requirements and resources (effective November 1983).

The bill received its second reading in the House of Commons on Dec. 20, 1979, by 312 votes to 255; two Official Unionists (OUP) voted with the Government while Liberal, Scottish National Party, *Plaid Cymru* and Democratic Unionist members, together with Mr Gerard Fitt and Mr James Kilfedder, voted with the Labour opposition. [Mr Fitt, formerly SDLP, now sat as "Socialist"—see page 30313; Mr Kilfedder now sat as Ulster Progressive Unionist—see page 30314.]

During the committee stage in the House of Commons a large number of amendments were proposed by the Labour opposition, and on Feb. 25 the House approved by 307 votes to 252 a "guillotine" motion prescribing the timetable for the remaining stages. The report stage was subsequently held on March 18 and 19, and on the latter date the Bill was read a third time by 300 votes to 253.

In the course of the committee stage the Government accepted an amendment by Mr Tom Benyon (Conservative) making the maternity grant non-contributory, with effect from a date to be appointed (subsequently stated to be November 1982). (The maternity grant had stood at £25 since 1969.)

In the House of Lords the Bill was given a second reading on April 1; certain minor government amendments were made during the committee and report stages and were agreed to by the House of Commons on May 22, and the Bill was enacted on May 23.

Social Security (No. 2) Act

The changes in entitlement to certain social security benefits—involving a net expenditure saving of £270,000,000 in 1981-82 and £480,000,000 in 1982-83—as announced by Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Jenkin on March 26-27 were incorporated in the Social Security (No. 2) Bill which was published on March 28 and which contained the following principal provisions.

(1) The (untaxed) short-term sickness, industrial injury, maternity allowance, unemployment and invalidity benefits would in November 1980 be uprated by five percentage points less than the uprating applicable to the (taxed) long-term benefits; the limited uprating would also cover the increases for adult dependants paid with these benefits but not the increases paid for children. Power was also made to repeat the "5 per cent" provision by affirmative resolution in either or both of the 1981 and 1982 upratings (it being the intention that thereafter the short-term benefits would be subject to tax under the PAYE system).

(2) The earnings limit for retirement pensioners would be "frozen" at £52.

(3) Effective September 1980, fewer than four consecutive days of incapacity for work would not constitute a period of interruption of employment for the purposes of entitlement to benefit under the 1975 Social Security Act, and any two periods of interruption of employment—whether they were periods of unemployment or incapacity—would not link to form one period of interruption of employment if they were separated by a period of more than six weeks.

(4) The earnings-related supplement which was at present added to unemployment and sickness benefit and to maternity and the widows' allowance would be reduced from 15 to 10 per cent from January 1981 and abolished in January 1982.

(5) From April 1981 unemployment benefit payable to pensioners aged 60 or over who were receiving an occupational pension of over £35 a week would be abated, so that for benefit to be extinguished a single man on flat-rate benefit would have to have an occupational pension in 1981 of £55.70 a week (£66.40 a week for a married man).

(6) The existing entitlement to supplementary benefit for the family of a person on strike would be reduced by £12 a week, and the "disregard" of the first £4 of tax refund would be removed (although the disregard of the first £4 of a wife's earnings and of the striker's own earnings from any part-time work—currently £2 with an increase to £4 in November 1980—would remain). The £12 figure would go up automatically in line with prices.

The Bill was read a second time in the House of Commons on April 15 by 299 votes to 244. Voting with the Labour opposition were the Liberals, the OUP, SNP, *Plaid Cymru* and Mr Fitt and Mr Kilfedder.

Mr Jenkin, explaining the reduction of supplementary benefit for strikers' families, said on April 15 that the reduction in the amount to be paid applied to trade unionists and non-unionists alike and applied to anyone who was out of work as a result of his involvement in a trade dispute at his place of employment; the £12 reduction would be matched by a corresponding disregard of strike pay received by the man up to the £12 level.

When the national assistance scheme was established in 1948 there was an understanding between the Government of the day and the Trades Union Congress that unions would not expect to have resort to national assistance in the event of trade disputes. However, after the change in the scheme in 1966 which replaced discretion with a legal entitlement to supplementary benefit the position changed "pretty dramatically", and from then on it became regarded as acceptable and proper for those on strike to have recourse to supplementary benefits if they were otherwise eligible.

Referring to specific recent industrial disputes, Mr Jenkin said that in the 1972 coal miners' strike [see 25184 A] £5,500,000 was paid out in supplementary benefit and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) paid no strike pay at all, nor did it pay strike pay in 1974 [see 26359 A; 26425 A] when over £4,000,000 was paid by the taxpayer; in the firemen's strike in 1977 [see pages 29248-49] £1,250,000 was paid out in supplementary benefit, the Fire Brigades Union paying no strike pay despite having assets of over £1,000,000; in the Ford Motor Company strike in 1978 [see page 29422] the unions paid strike pay but nevertheless over £1,250,000 was paid out in supplementary benefit although the combined assets of the unions involved were worth over £85,000,000; in the road haulage dispute in 1979 [see page 29593] the Transport and General Workers' Union paid only £6 a week strike pay despite having assets of £37,000,000 and a total of £500,000 was paid out as supplementary benefit; and in the recent strike in the steel industry the two main unions involved —the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation and the National Union of Blastfurnacemen—paid no strike pay at all despite having assets of over £11,000,000, and taxpayers had to find over £9,000,000 for strikers' families.

The right source of support for strikers and their families, Mr Jenkin said, was their unions; the Bill did not seek to impose a direct obligation on the unions, but a man who decided to go on strike must be presumed to have made provision to cover most of his family's needs either by membership of a union or by having set aside sums for this purpose.

A guillotine motion setting out a timetable for the later stages of the Bill was approved in the House of Commons on May 6 by 301 to 246, and the report stage and third reading took place in the Commons on May 21.

The Bill was read a second time in the Lords on June 2 and after passing its remaining stages was enacted on July 17.

Economic Statistics

Reserves

Britain's official reserves, which stood at $22,719 million at the end of December 1979 [see page 30155], rose in each of the following five months to stand at the end of May at $28,284 million (following a revaluation of the reserves in March—see below), although they fell by $112,000,000 in June to $28,172 million.

Details of the movements in this period are given in the following table, which shows the end-month level of the reserves in terms of US dollars and in sterling if converted at the market rate of exchange at the end of the month in question. Also shown are the net accruals of foreign currency borrowing by the public sector under the exchange cover scheme [see page 26309].

	Change ($ million)	End-month level ($ million)	Foreign currency borrowing (net) ($ million)	End-month exchange rate for sterling ($)	End-month level (£ million)
January	+987	23,706	−252	2.2672	10,456
February	+229	23,935	−139	2.2745	10,523
March	+204	24,139	−45	2.1640	11,155
March (revalued)		26,963			12,460
April	+1,045	28,008	−48	2.2550	12,420
May	+276	28,284	−16	2.3450	12,061
June	−112	28,172	−103	2.3570	11,952

The following special transactions took place affecting the monthly reserve figures, although the Treasury pointed out in the relevant press statements that the figures given were not to be taken as an indication of the extent of market transactions during the month.

(1) In January special transactions comprised (i) a scheduled repayment of $83,000,000 of the IMF oil facility drawing [see page 28079]; (ii) receipts of $392,000,000 from a distribution of special drawing rights by the IMF (the second of a three-stage distribution—see 29543 A); (iii) a valuation increase of $341,000,000 arising out of the quarterly "roll-over" of the swap of 20 per cent of Britain's gold and dollar reserves for European currency units (ECUs) with the European Monetary Co-operation Fund [see pages 29833 and 30011]; and (iv) a valuation increase of $80,000,000 as the IMF restituted some of its holdings of the UK's original gold contribution at the old official price of about $42 an ounce—this being the last of four such restitutions which were agreed in August 1975 [see 27435 B and also 29543 A].

(2) In March the gold and non-dollar foreign currency elements of the reserves were revalued on a market-related basis. While such a procedure had been instituted in 1979 [see page 29833], certain modifications were made in the March 1980 revaluation (to apply also to future valuations) whereby (i) gold was valued at 75 per cent of the average London fixing prices over the three months preceding March 31, or 75 per cent of the final fixing price on March 31, whichever was the less, and (ii) special drawing rights and foreign currencies were valued at average exchange rates over the preceding three months, or the actual rates on March 31, whichever was less.

(3) In April (i) a further $80,000,000 of the IMF oil facility drawing was repaid and (ii) there was a valuation increase of $931,000,000 arising out of the quarterly roll-over of the ECU swap.

(4) In June there was a repayment of $12,000,000 representing the half-yearly instalment on long-term North American loans.

Balance of Payments

Provisional figures were published on June 5 of the balance of payments for the first quarter of 1980; these are shown below, together with revised figures for the previous three quarters.

	1979 April-June	1979 July-Sept.	1979 Oct.-Dec.	1980 Jan.-March
	(£ million)			
	Seasonally adjusted			
Visible balance..	−486	−493	−745	−723
Invisible balance	+129	+410	+34	+306
Current balance	−357	−83	−711	−417
	Not seasonally adjusted			
Current balance	−527	+88	−516	−586
Investment and other capital transactions..	+919	+432	−122	+105
Balancing item..	+366	−222	+608	+879
Balance for official financing	+758	+298	−30	+398
Allocation of IMF special drawing rights*	—	—	—	+180
Official financing†:				
Changes in official reserves‡	−68	−152	+116	−346
Other official financing ..	−690	−146	−86	−232

* See 29543 A.

† Valued in sterling at the rates of exchange at which transactions occurred.

‡ Drawings on reserves +; additions to reserves −.

The following revised figures were also published on June 5 of the balance of payments for the whole of 1979, together with figures for 1977 and 1978.

	1977	1978	1979
		(£ million)	
Visible balance	−2,239	−1,493	−3,312
Invisible balance	+2,015	+2,257	+993
Current balance	−224	+764	−2,319
Investment and other capital transactions	+4,406	−3,697	+1,779
Balancing item	+3,179	+1,807	+2,251
Balance for official financing	+7,361	−1,126	+1,711
Allocation of IMF special drawing rights	—	—	+195
Official financing†:			
Official reserves‡.. .	−9,588	+2,329	−1,059
Other official financing ..	+2,227	−1,203	−847

* See 29543 A.

† Valued in sterling at the rates of exchange at which transactions occurred.

‡ Drawings on reserves +; additions to reserves −.

External Position of Sterling

The external position of sterling, as measured by the weighted effective exchange rate index (Dec. 21, 1971 = 100), which had closed on Dec. 31, 1979, at 70.2 [see page 30155], strengthened generally in the first part of January 1980 to 72.3 on Jan. 21, reflecting in part a dramatic rise in the price of gold and a weakness of the US dollar, but fell back somewhat later in the month in the light of unfavourable forecasts of inflation and the prolongation of the steel strike. In early February, however, the rise continued and for most of that month the rate was around 73.0. There was a further weakening to 71.7 on March 4 following financial and monetary measures taken by the US and Japanese authorities, and for the rest of March the rate fluctuated between about 72.0 and 72.9. In the latter part of April there was another rise to 73.8 on April 25 and despite a decline in early May the rate rose to 74.7 by May 27—the highest point since the spring of 1975—and although it fell temporarily in early June it closed on June 30 at 74.4.

In terms of the US dollar, sterling rose from $2.22 at the end of December 1979 to over $2.28 in mid-January and to around $2.30 in mid-February. Following the US measures in early March and further measures in mid-March the sterling rate dropped to about $2.16 by the end of that month but rose once more during April and May to a peak of $2.37 in late May; although there was a moderate decline in June to about $2.33 it improved by the end of the month to about $2.36.

Minimum Lending Rate

The Bank of England's minimum lending rate (MLR), which had been raised to a record 17 per cent in November 1979 [see page 30154], was reduced on July 3, 1980, to 16 per cent, and on the following day the clearing banks' base rate was similarly lowered to 16 per cent.

Retail and Wholesale Prices

The retail price index (Jan. 15, 1974 = 100), which had stood at 239.4 in December 1979, rose to 245.3 in January 1980, to 248.8 in February, to 252.2 in March, to 260.8 in April (about one-third of the April increase being due to the effect of budget measures), to 263.2 in May and to 265.7 in June. The year-on-year increase widened from 17.4 per cent in November and 17.2 per cent in December to 21.9 per cent by May but fell back to 21.0 per cent in June.

The tax and price index introduced in August 1979 [see page 30156], based on January 1978 = 100, rose from 119.8 in December 1979 to 133.6 in June (17.4 per cent above the June 1979 level).

As regards wholesale prices (1975 = 100), the index for materials and fuel purchased by manufacturing industry rose from 187.5 (revised) in December 1979 (26¼ per cent higher than a year earlier) to 202.3 in April 1980 (26 per cent above the April 1979 level) but dropped back to 201.3 in June (a 20¾ per cent year-on-year rise); in February the year-on-year increase was around 29 per cent. The index of home sales of manufactured goods (1975 = 100) rose from 183.4 (revised) in December 1979 (15¾ per cent higher than in December 1978) to 201.0 (provisional) in June (about 17½ per cent higher than in June 1979).

Unemployment

The seasonally adjusted level of unemployment (excluding school leavers) in Great Britain (i.e. excluding Northern Ireland), which had stood at 5.2 per cent in December 1979 (having remained at or around this level for the whole of the second half of that year—see page 30156), increased in the first half of 1980 to 5.4 per cent in January, 5.6 per cent in February, 5.7 per cent in March, 5.9 per cent in April, 6.0 per cent in May and 6.2 per cent in June, when the total was 1,467,400—the highest total since comparable records were instituted in 1948. In Northern Ireland the corresponding seasonally adjusted unemployment rates rose from 10.6 per cent in December-January to 11.6 per cent by June (67,100). The seasonally adjusted rate for the whole of the United Kingdom rose from 5.4 per cent in December 1979 to 6.3 per cent by June (1,534,500).

The "crude" unadjusted level of unemployment (including school leavers), which had stood in December at 1,292,040 (Great Britain) and 1,355,458 (United Kingdom), rose, despite slight reductions in March and again in May, to 1,586,645 and 1,659,676 respectively in June (most of the June increase being accounted for by school leavers).

The following special employment measures for 1980-81 were announced in the House of Commons on Feb. 14, 1980, by Mr James Prior, the Secretary of State for Employment, who recalled that in June 1979 [see page 29831] certain changes had been made in existing programmes in order to focus them more sharply on areas and groups with special employment needs and to reduce public expenditure.

(1) The size of the youth opportunities programme [see pages 28560; 29088] would be expanded from 210,000 entrants to between 250,000 and 260,000 in 1980-81, with the number of filled places rising to 100,000-105,000.

(2) The community industry scheme [see page 27705] would be maintained at the current level of 6,000 filled places and the special temporary employment programme [see page 28560] would be maintained at 12,000-14,000 filled places.

(3) The small firms employment subsidy [see pages 28363; 29088], which he described as the least cost-effective of the special employment measures, would close for applications on March 31, 1980.

(4) The temporary short-time working compensation scheme [see page 29831], which reimbursed employers for up to six months for payments made to employees on short time as an alternative to redundancy, would continue to operate throughout the country on the existing basis.

(5) The job release scheme [see page 28025] would be extended for a further year; while it would continue to be open to women aged 59, for men who were not disabled the age of eligibility would revert from 62 to 64; disabled men would continue to be eligible from the age of 60 and would be replaced, wherever possible, by an unemployed disabled person.

Wage Rates and Earnings

The index of basic weekly wage rates for manual workers in all industries and services (July 31, 1972 = 100) rose from 323.4 (revised) in December 1979 (17.6 per cent above the December 1978 level) to 353.8 (provisional) by June 1980 (19.4 per cent higher than a year previously); over the same period the basic hourly wage rate for all industries and services rose from 325.7 (revised) in December (a year-on-year increase of 17.7 per cent) to 356.5 (provisional) in June (a rise since June 1979 of 19.5 per cent).

The index of average earnings (January 1976 = 100) for employees in Great Britain in all industries and services rose from 165.1 (revised) in December 1979 (an increase of 19.7 per cent since December 1978) to 174.8 (provisional) in April 1980 (21.2 per cent higher than in April 1979).—(Hansard - Cmnd. 7841 - Financial Statement and Budget Report, 1980-81 - Treasury Press Office - British Business - Department of Employment Gazette - Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. 30151 A; 1979-81 Budget, Social Security Benefits, Employment Programmes 29821 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Glasgow, Central By-election

Polling took place on June 26 in a by-election at Glasgow, Central, caused by the death on April 30 of the Labour member, Mr Thomas McMillan (61). Labour retained the seat with a reduced majority, the result of the by-election being as follows:

McTaggart, Robert (Labour)	4,902
Paterson, Gil (Scottish National Party)	2,122
*McCurley, Anna (Conservative)	707
*MacKenzie, John (National Front)	148
*Watson, Graham (Scottish Young Liberal)	134
*Mellor, David (Ecology Party)	45
*Kean, Donald (Social Democratic Party)	10
No change. Labour majority	2,780

* Forfeited deposit.

Figures at the general election in May 1979 [see page 29716] were: Mr Thomas McMillan (Labour) 8,542; Mr Farouq Saleem (Conservative) 1,937; Mr Stephen Bird (SNP) 1,308—Labour majority 6,605. Mr McMillan had represented the Glasgow, Central Constituency since 1966.

The Labour candidate polled 60.8 per cent of the votes in the by-election against 72.5 per cent at the general election; the SNP candidate 26.3 per cent against 11.1 per cent; and the Conservative candidate 8.8 per cent against 16.4 per cent. The other four candidates polled an aggregate of 4.1 per cent, and there was a 42.8 per cent poll, compared with 59.5 per cent at the general election.

Mr McTaggart (35) was a pipe-work planner at Govan shipyard.—(Times - Daily Telegraph) (*Prev. rep. By-election 30244 A*)

B. NORWAY - SOVIET UNION — Extension of Barents Sea Fishing Agreement

The Norwegian-Soviet provisional agreement on fishing in the disputed "grey zone" of the Barents Sea, which had last been renewed on July 1, 1979 [see 29939 A], was extended for a further year on July 1, 1980.—(Norwegian Information Service, Oslo) (*Prev. rep. 29939 A*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. **LIBERIA — Military Coup and Death of President Tolbert - Establishment of People's Redemption Council and New Cabinet - Trials and Executions of Officials of Tolbert Regime - Suspension of Constitution - Failure of Alleged Counter-Coup - Reactions of African States**

In a military coup in Monrovia in the early morning of April 12, 1980, President Tolbert of Liberia was killed and his Government was overthrown by a "People's Redemption Council" (PRC) consisting of junior military personnel under the leadership of Master Sgt. Samuel Kanyon Doe.

Whereas the coup itself was unexpectedly mounted by a group in the lower ranks of the Army (principally non-commissioned officers), active political opposition to President Tolbert's Government had been developing in the preceding months. Leaders of a newly-formed People's Progressive Party (PPP), who had been imprisoned after an alleged coup attempt in March and who were due to face trial on April 14, were immediately released by the PRC on April 12 and several of them were appointed by Master Sgt. Doe as members of the new Cabinet (which also included members of another former opposition group, the Movement for Justice in Africa—Moja).

Emergence and Suppression of Opposition Party prior to Coup

The registration of the PPP as a political party (and the only legal party of opposition to President Tolbert's True Whig Party, which had been in power since the 1870s) was officially recognized on Jan. 8, 1980, in accordance with a Supreme Court decision of Dec. 24.

Mr Gabriel Baccus Matthews, the PPP leader, was previously leader of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL); along with other PAL members, he had been arrested in connexion with the riots in Monrovia in April 1979 which followed a proposed increase in the price of rice [see 29732 A], but he was released under an amnesty two months later [ibid.]. In an interview published in the magazine *West Africa* on Feb. 18, 1980, Mr Matthews described the PPP as a party of loyal opposition committed to achieving change either in conjunction with or in spite of the True Whig Party; he claimed that the PPP had mass support from workers, students and rural peasants, and described its ideology as African socialism rather than Marxism.

After alleging that PPP activists were being subjected to official harassment and arrest, Mr Matthews held a rally in Monrovia on March 7 at which he called for the resignation of President Tolbert and Vice-President Bennie Warner and for a general strike in support of the creation of a governing coalition embracing all parties. The Government responded, however, by ordering a police occupation of the PPP headquarters on March 8 and the arrest of party leaders (including Mr Matthews, who surrendered the following day after seeking refuge in the Vatican embassy). President Tolbert announced on March 10 that a group of detainees (including Mr Matthews) would be tried in connexion with what he asserted had been an attempted coup on March 7.

President Tolbert said on March 14 that his Government would act against left-wing opponents, in keeping with the laws of Liberia but "in such a way that they will never rise again". It was subsequently reported that a number of detainees had been freed in an attack on a police station by PPP supporters on March 15, and that 13 more had been released on April 10 on orders from Mr Joseph Chesson, the Minister of Justice (who had succeeded Dr Oliver Bright in 1979), but that 76 others were to face trial on April 14 and that a number of other suspects were wanted by police. The human rights organization Amnesty International issued a statement in London on April 9 describing as "an open invitation to political murder" an alleged offer by Mr Chesson of rewards for the capture, dead or alive, of 19 wanted men and one woman.

At a press conference organized by Moja on March 17 in Monrovia, Dr Togba-Nah Tipoteh, the Moja leader and former professor of economics at the University of Liberia, criticized what he described as a government witch-hunt involving widespread and indiscriminate arrests. While referring to the PPP strike call as "at best infantile and rather ridiculous", he said that the Government's reaction was contributing to the destabilization of the country's social, economic and political institutions; he criticized in particular the alleged arrests of members of the armed forces. At a subsequent meeting on March 30, a statement was issued by Moja calling for the removal of existing legislation covering sedition, and for the abolition of presidential emergency powers granted by the Liberian Congress in April 1979 [see 29732 A], which had been renewed on March 28, 1980, for a further year.



(*Le Monde*)

The Moja statement also called for the abolition of property qualifications for voters, a measure which was then under discussion in the National Legislature (and which was reportedly supported by President Tolbert); it was alleged that the property qualification had not been enforced so long as election candidates were entered only by the True Whig Party, but that it had been revived for the Monrovia mayoral elections in which Dr Amos Sawyer had been entered as an opposition candidate by Moja. [For postponement of the latter elections until June 1980, see 30084 B.]

Overthrow of Tolbert Regime - Initial Actions of People's Redemption Council

President Tolbert was shot early on April 12 as junior army personnel took over the Executive Mansion in Monrovia; he was buried three days later in a mass grave along with 27 other victims of the coup. A radio broadcast on the day of the coup announced that Master Sgt. Doe was the new head of state and Chairman of the "People's Redemption Council". A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed and airports were declared closed, and political prisoners held under the Tolbert regime [see above] were immediately released.

Mr William Richard Tolbert was born on May 13, 1913, the son of a former American slave from South Carolina who had become a prosperous Liberian coffee and rice grower. (The Republic of Liberia had been established in 1847 by former American slaves who had begun to settle there in the 1820s. Known as "Americo-Liberians", and comprising less than 5 per cent of the total population as against the 95 per cent who came from the country's 16 indigenous tribes, the descendants of the settlers continued to dominate the economic, social and political life of Liberia, notwithstanding the introduction under the Tolbert regime of certain liberal reforms and "campaigns against poverty".) He entered the House of Representatives in 1943, and in 1951 he was chosen as Vice-President by the then President William Tubman, on whose death he became President in July 1971 [see 24772 C and also 25052 A]. He was elected for a second presidential term in October 1975 [see 27436 A], at which time the voters also approved a constitutional amendment fixing the presidential term of office as eight years only; President Tolbert would thus not have been eligible to seek re-election in 1983 [ibid.]. He was elected for a one-year term as President of the Organization of African Unity at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Monrovia in July 1979 [see 29840 A]. He was from 1965 to 1970 president of the Baptist World Alliance.

Master Sgt. Samuel Kanyon Doe (28) was a member of the Krahn ethnic group indigenous to eastern Liberia; he had been among a group of soldiers who had recently received training from a United States military mission in Monrovia.

In a televised speech broadcast on April 13, Master Sgt. Doe announced that captured officials of the former Government (who were publicly exposed in Monrovia) would face trial by a military tribunal on charges of corruption, treason and violation of human and constitutional rights. The minimum pay of soldiers and civil servants was increased immediately to $250 and $200 per month respectively.

Also on April 13 Master Sgt. Doe announced the formation of a Cabinet, as follows:

Mr Gabriel Baccus Matthews	Foreign Affairs
Mr Chea Cheapoo	Justice
Maj. Perry Zulu	Finance
Maj. Samuel Bennie Pearson	Defence
Dr George Boley	Minister of State for Presidential Affairs
Mr Oscar Quaih	Local Government
Dr Togba-Nah Tipoteh	Planning and Economic Affairs
*Mr Gabriel Tucker	Public Works
Lt.-Col. Fred Blay	Labour, Youth and Sports
*Mr Loseni Dunzo	Action for Development and Progress
Mr Gabriel Nimley	Information
First Lt. Alfred Suah	Agriculture
*Dr Kate Bryant	Health
Maj. Joseph Douglas	Commerce
Col. Emmanuel Gwegby	Social Affairs
Mr William Nebo	Lands and Mines
Dr Henry Boima Fahnbulleh	Education

* Member of previous Cabinet.

As regards the three ministers who retained the portfolios which they had held under the Tolbert regime (Mr Tucker, Mr Dunzo and Dr Bryant), it was officially explained that there was no evidence on which to bring corruption charges against them. Other cabinet members were military personnel and members of PPP and Moja (one of whom, Dr Fahnbulleh, had been sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment on treason charges in 1968 but had been released by President Tolbert in 1971—see 25052 A).

Master Sgt. Doe said in a speech on April 14 that the new regime would aim to create a society based on justice and human dignity, without discrimination and without the widespread corruption which he described as a principal reason for the overthrow of President Tolbert.

Whereas in the initial announcement of the coup on April 12 Master Sgt. Doe had said only that "rampant corruption and continuous failure by the Government to effectively handle the affairs of the Liberian people left the enlisted men no alternative", he gave a more specific exposition in his April 14 speech of grievances against the Tolbert regime; these included human rights violations and alleged maltreatment of prisoners, high unemployment (which he claimed exceeded 50 per cent but which was more generally estimated at 20-30 per cent), housing shortages and high costs of basic foods.

In other announcements on April 14, Mr Nimley (the new Information Minister) denied rumours that President Tolbert's son Adolphus had been among those killed in the coup and stated that he was still at large [see also below], but that the former President's wife Victoria and his brother Frank were among those in custody. Reports also indicated that an artillery commander, named as Mr Isaac Jerwor and described as a member of the PRC, had been among those killed in an attempted counter-coup by soldiers under a commando leader, Maj. William Jerbo (for whom a police search was later mounted—see also below).

Mr Cheapoo (the new Justice Minister) announced on April 14 that the military tribunal (originally scheduled to begin hearings that day) had postponed until April 16 the beginning of trials of officials of the former regime.

This postponement followed international appeals for clemency and for the avoidance of a policy of vengeance, such appeals having been made by inter alios Mr Edem Kodjo, the Secretary-General of the OAU, and by spokesmen for the United States and other governments.

Consolidation of Military Authority - Trials and Executions of Former Regime Officials - Suspension of Constitution

Master Sgt. Doe issued instructions to soldiers on April 15 warning that they would be shot if they did not return to their units, and prohibiting any further parading of captured officials in public. After several arrests had been made to re-establish order, three soldiers and one civilian charged with killing and looting were executed by firing squad "as an example" on April 17.

A curfew remained in force, although the country's airports were reopened on April 16. While several hundred people charged with minor offences were released from detention on April 16, a number of senior army officers were arrested for allegedly conspiring against the new Government.

Mr Matthews (the new Foreign Minister) met with diplomatic representatives in Monrovia on April 17 and gave assurances that Liberia would seek to maintain friendly relations and would honour existing international commitments.

Following the appearance before a military tribunal of eight former government ministers and six other former government and True Whig Party officials, 13 of these 14 were publicly executed by firing squad on April 22.

Those accused faced charges of treason, rampant corruption, maladministration of government and gross violation of human and constitutional rights. The military tribunal, comprising five officers under the chairmanship of Lt.-Col. Frank Senkpeni, apparently also conducted the prosecution case, while no defence lawyers were allowed. It was reported that the defendants generally agreed that the previous regime had been corrupt, but that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against themselves.

Those executed were Dr Cyril Bright (formerly Minister of Agriculture), Mr Joseph Chesson (Minister of Justice), Mr Cecil Dennis (Foreign Minister), Mr David Franklin Neal (Minister for Economic Planning), Mr James Phillips (Finance Minister until August 1979—see 29930 B), Mr John Sherman (Minister of Commerce, Industry and Transport), Mr E. Reginald Townsend (Minister of State for Presidential Affairs and chairman of the True Whig Party), Mr Richard Henries (Speaker of the House of Representatives), Mr Charles King (a member of the House), Mr Frank Tolbert (the brother of President Tolbert and President of the Senate), Mr James Pierre (Chief Justice), Mr Frank Stewart (Budget Director) and Mr Clarence Parker (treasurer of the True Whig Party). The only one of the 14 defendants not executed on April 22 was Mr Johnny McClain (appointed as Minister of Information in November 1979—see 30084 B) who was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Both the procedure of the military tribunal and the conduct of the public executions gave rise to widespread international criticism.

Reports from press correspondents who witnessed the executions included accounts of an undisciplined crowd of soldiers and civilians taunting the condemned men, in particular the first nine to die, who were tied to stakes without being offered blindfolds, and who were shot first with rifles and then with several rounds from machine guns; four of the corpses were then cut down and the remaining four condemned men were tied in their place and shot.

The executions were carried out despite appeals for clemency by international leaders, including (on April 18) Dr Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General. The International Commission of Jurists issued a statement on April 23 describing both the trials and the executions as violations of all accepted international norms; among those calling on April 23 for an end to the executions were the Foreign Ministers of the OAU member countries, who were meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, in preparation for an OAU economic summit conference and who reportedly observed one minute's silence in memory of Mr Dennis (the executed former Liberian Foreign Minister).

It was reported that the death sentences had been passed by the PRC, apparently overruling verdicts of not guilty said to have been passed by the military tribunal on Mr Parker and Mr King. (The tribunal was also said to have recommended death sentences only for Mr Townsend, Mr Henries, Mr Tolbert and Mr Pierre, and prison sentences for the other eight.)

The military tribunal resumed hearings on April 23 with Mr Burleigh Holder (formerly Minister of National Security) and Mr Edward Kesselly (formerly Minister of Local Government, Rural Development and Urban Reconstruction) among the accused.

Master Sgt. Doe said on April 22 the PRC would decide when the situation in Liberia had returned to normal, and would judge when elections should be held and power returned into civilian hands.

An editorial in the official newspaper *New Liberian* (subsequently renamed *The Redeemer*) had commented on April 17 that "there was a lot to be done to set the ship of state on an even keel" and that the new Government had ruled out holding elections for at least three years.

Master Sgt. Doe had also stated in his press conference on April 22 (when he was introduced as head of state, Chairman of the PRC and also President of the OAU—but see below) that he had attempted to arrest President Tolbert on the morning of the coup, but that the latter had resisted arrest and had therefore been shot.

The suspension of the Constitution, the imposition of martial law and the suspension of habeas corpus were announced on April 25, and all legal and executive power was vested in the PRC (which, it was widely observed, exercised effective control over government policy, with the Cabinet's role being in practice advisory). Master Sgt. Doe also announced on the same day a series of army promotions, notably for PRC members.

The membership of the PRC had been listed by the Monrovia newspaper *Weekend News* on April 23 as consisting of seven sergeants, eight corporals and two privates, with Master Sgt. Doe as its Chairman, Sgt. Thomas Weh Syen as co-Chairman and Cpl. Nathan Poldiear as spokesman. Cpl. Poldiear was among those promoted on April 25, when he became a brigadier-general, as did Staff Sgt. Thomas Quiwonkpa, a 26-year-old PRC member who was described as Commander-General of the Army.

Mr Cheapoo announced on April 25 that a People's Supreme Tribunal would be appointed, but that the military tribunal would remain in existence for the trials of officials of the former regime. He said that over 80 people would face charges for treason and corruption but that all other detainees would be released; however, it was reported that the Justice Ministry order to this effect was overruled by the PRC. (The magazine *West Africa* reported on June 9 that there were over 500 detainees still in prison, of whom only about 100 were due to stand trial, but that the remainder were officially regarded as posing a potential threat to the regime and would only be released gradually over a long period.)

In response to international pressure, Master Sgt. Doe announced on April 29 that the military tribunal would continue its work but that there would be no more executions resulting from the trials.

His statement said: "Largely as a result of the executions our Government began receiving pleas for clemency from many parts of the world. These included African heads of state, the United Nations, the Catholic Church, Amnesty International and others. While our people are happy with the work of the tribunal, they feel that the executions so far are now enough to set an example about what happens to those who commit high treason."

He added that 101 people were still to be tried, and that Mrs Victoria Tolbert had been released but would remain under house arrest. Plans for auditing the accounts of the country's 25 public corporations were to go ahead, but foreign nationals in control of certain of these corporations would no longer be kept under house arrest (as they had been since April 25).

Failure of Alleged Counter-Coup Attempt - Other Developments

Mr Bennie Warner, the former Vice-President of Liberia, who had been attending a conference of Methodist bishops in the United States at the time of the coup, was on April 29 reported to be in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) organizing opposition to the new military regime.

Mr Warner reportedly said that he initially sympathized with the aims of the coup but that he had been repelled by the executions and imprisonments. He was alleged to be seeking to contact Maj. Jerbo, for whom Liberian police had launched a search on April 20 (and who was killed by a Liberian border guard on May 8 when he was attempting to escape by canoe to Sierra Leone).

Brig.-Gen. Quiwonkpa announced on May 18 that seven recently-promoted high-ranking army officers had been arrested for taking part in an attempted coup which had been uncovered on May 14, it having earlier been reported that Maj. Douglas (the new Minister of Commerce) had been arrested in connexion with this attempted coup.

Mr Rufus Darpoh, the editor of *The Redeemer*, and three other members of the staff of the newspaper, were briefly detained for questioning on May 5 after the publication of a reader's letter criticizing extravagant behaviour such as the use of the former Government's luxury limousines by PRC members. This criticism (which referred also to "over-enthusiastic" demonstrations by members of the Krahn ethnic group) was repeated by student leaders, who drew up a list of demands including free education and land redistribution and the creation of a people's advisory council to assist the PRC. A proposal that government members should declare their financial assets was reportedly later accepted by the PRC (according to *West Africa,* which on June 9 reported a number of allegations of corruption against members of the new military Government).

With regard to economic policy, Dr Tipoteh said on June 5 that the Government remained committed to free enterprise and the protection of the right to private property, as well as to an open investment policy to encourage local and foreign investment, although emphasis would also be given to integrated rural development with the focus on agriculture.

Dr Tipoteh also announced on June 5 the lifting of temporary restrictions imposed on banking and financial transactions immediately following the coup, and he confirmed that the official currency would continue to be the Liberian dollar which was on a one-to-one parity with the United States dollar.

(Liberia's foreign debts were reported to total $700,000,000, with a budget deficit of at least $40,000,000 in the current year; there had recently been substantial capital outflows because of political instability, and extremely heavy expenditure had been incurred in connexion with the OAU summit conference in Monrovia in 1979. Liberia's exports, principally iron ore, rubber, coffee and timber, had been adversely affected by a deterioration in terms of trade; following a 3 per cent fall in export earnings in the year ended June 1979 compared with the average for the previous two years, the International Monetary Fund had, as announced on Dec. 17, 1979, reached agreement with the Tolbert Government for a Liberian purchase equivalent to 20,500,000 special drawing rights (about US$26,500,000) under the Fund's compensatory financing facility. (The Fund estimated that during the 12-month shortfall period to June 1979 the volume of Liberia's iron ore exports had increased but that the value had dropped 14 per cent below the average of the two preceding years, while earnings from coffee exports were 42 per cent lower, mainly reflecting a 37 per cent fall in prices.)

Maj. Perry Zulu stated on May 7 that "the Government of Liberia wishes to assure all shipowners, bankers, financial and shipping institutions that the present Government fully supports the existing Liberian maritime and corporate programmes".

Mr Gerald Cooper, the Liberian Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, reaffirmed in London on June 11 that Liberia had no intention of interfering with the operation of its existing "open registry" or "flag of convenience" system, under which a quarter of the world's shipping tonnage was registered, and which brought the country an income of $13,500,000 in 1979.

Reactions of African and Other States to Liberian Coup

Whereas the Libyan Government had recognized the new Liberian military Government immediately following the coup, Mr Matthews was on April 25 denied entry to Lagos (Nigeria) after he had travelled there for a special summit conference of the OAU, and Master Sgt. Doe was on May 28 excluded from a summit conference of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Lomé (Togo); however, Mr Matthews made visits during May to a number of African countries, while Master Sgt. Doe paid a visit to Guinea on May 23.

Master Sgt. Doe, having arrived in Conakry (Guinea) for an official visit, travelled with President Sékou Touré of Guinea to Lomé on May 28, but was excluded from the conference hall after a discussion between other leaders attending the ECOWAS conference. After his return to Monrovia he announced on May 30 that "events at the recent summit in Lomé, at which our participation was questioned, pose challenges to our sovereignty", and he added that Liberia was to withdraw its ambassadors from the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone as well as its representatives from certain African organizations, while the Nigerian Government was to be asked to make a significant reduction in the size of its diplomatic mission in Monrovia.

Among countries visited by Mr Matthews was Ethiopia, where on May 21-22 he had meetings with inter alios Lt.-Col. Mengistu, the Ethiopian head of state. Mr Richard Moose, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, arrived in Monrovia on June 1 for a four-day visit; earlier reports had referred to the arrival in Liberia during May of a US military training mission consisting of 12 army instructors.

Liberian soldiers forcibly entered the French embassy in Monrovia on June 14 and captured Mr Adolphus Tolbert, who had reportedly taken sanctuary there since April 15. M. Louis Dollot, the French ambassador, delivered a protest on June 15 over what was described by the French Government as "a blatant and unacceptable violation of the status of diplomatic missions and international customs".—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - Le Monde - Economist - West Africa - IMF, Washington - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 30084 B; Internal Unrest 29732 A*)

A. SWEDEN — Government Changes

The following changes in the composition of Sweden's three-party coalition Government were announced on June 26: (i) with effect from July 31 Mr Rolf Wirtén, hitherto Labour Minister, took over the Budget portfolio from Mr Ingemar Mundebo, who left the Government to become Governor of Uppsala county; (ii) Mr Wirtén was succeeded by Mr Ingemar Eliasson, hitherto Under-Secretary of State for Labour; and (iii) the Foreign Minister, Mr Ola Ullsten, was given the additional post of Deputy Prime Minister (which he had previously held in the latter stages of the 1976-78 three-party coalition—see 28927 A). Those affected by the changes were all members of the Liberal Party, the smallest of the three coalition partners. (Swedish-International Press Bureau, Stockholm) (*Prev. rep. 30013 A*)

A. UNITED STATES — 1980 Presidential Election - Democratic and Republican Candidatures - Presidential Primaries

Primary elections took place between February and June in 35 states and the District of Columbia to choose delegates to the Republican and Democratic Party conventions in July and August respectively. Compared with 1976, when there were 29 state primaries [see 27863 A], the following six states held primary elections for the first time: Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi (Republican only), New Mexico and South Carolina (Republican only). In addition, both parties held primaries for the first time in Puerto Rico, although the electorate of this US commonwealth was not allowed to vote in the presidential election itself. Party delegates from the other 15 states of the Union were elected in party caucuses and statewide conventions.

By the end of the primaries it had become clear that President Carter and Mr Ronald Reagan, a former Governor of California, were virtually certain of being nominated as Democratic and Republican candidates respectively, while Mr John Anderson, a Republican member of the House of Representatives, had indicated his intention to continue his campaign as an independent candidate.

Although President Carter and Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts were the only major contenders within the Democratic Party, a considerable number of Republicans, besides Mr Reagan, declared their intention of seeking their party's nomination, including principally Mr George Bush, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Mr John B. Connally, a former Democratic Governor of Texas and Secretary of the Treasury under President Richard Nixon; Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, Republican vice-presidential candidate in 1976; Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, minority leader in the Upper House; and Congressmen John Anderson and Philip Crane of Illinois.

Former President Gerald Ford, who had been defeated by Mr Carter in the 1976 election [see 28125 A], announced on March 15, 1980, that he had decided not to seek the Republican nomination in the interests of party unity. His decision followed two weeks of intense speculation, sparked off by a press interview in which Mr Ford had said that he would run if asked to do so by a "broad-based group in my party".

Other candidates who participated in the primaries included for the Democrats, Governor Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown of California (one of the major contenders in 1976—see 27863 A; 27973 A) and Mr Lyndon LaRouche, a former chairman of the US Labour Party, and for the Republicans Mr Harold Stassen (73), a former Governor of Minnesota, who had first sought his party's presidential nomination in 1944.

For biographies of Mr Carter, Mr Reagan and Governor Brown see 27863 A, and for that of Senator Dole see 28037 A. Biographies of the other principal candidates are given below.

Senator Kennedy, younger brother of the late President John F. Kennedy and Senator Robert F. Kennedy, was born in Boston on Feb. 22, 1932, and graduated from Harvard College and the University of Virginia Law School. Having served as a private in the US Army from 1951 to 1953, he helped to manage his brother's successful presidential campaign in 1960 and was himself first elected to the Senate in 1963. He was assistant majority leader in 1969-71.

Mr Bush was born in Milton (Massachusetts) on June 12, 1924, and took an economics degree at Yale University. After service in the Pacific during the Second World War as a naval carrier pilot, he went into the oilfield supply and royalty business in Texas, becoming a co-founder and first president of the Zapata Off-Shore Company. Having been elected to the House of Representatives for Texas in 1966, he gave up his seat to run for the Senate in the 1970 congressional elections but was defeated by a Democrat. Thereafter he was successively US permanent representative at the United Nations (1970-73), chairman of the Republican National Committee (1973-74), head of the US liaison office in Peking (1974-75) and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (1975-76).

Mr Connally was born in Floresville (Texas) on Feb. 27, 1917, studied at the University of Texas, and served in the US Navy in 1941-46. A prominent lawyer and businessman, he was Secretary of the Navy under President Kennedy in 1961, Governor of Texas (1963-69) and Secretary of the Treasury (1971-72). He joined the Republican Party in May 1973 [see 25945 A].

Senator Baker was born in Huntsville (Tennessee) on Nov. 15, 1925, and graduated from Tulane University (New Orleans) and the University of Tennessee College of Law. A former partner in a law firm in Knoxville (Tennessee), he was elected to the Senate in 1966 and became minority leader in 1977 [see page 28247].

Representative Anderson (58), a liberal Republican, was first elected to Congress in 1960 and since 1969 had been chairman of the House Republican Conference, the third ranking party position in the House.

Representative Crane (47), a conservative Republican, was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1968.

Presidential Primaries

The 1980 primary elections were held as follows: Puerto Rico (Republican) on Feb. 17; New Hampshire on Feb. 26; Massachusetts and Vermont on March 4; South Carolina on March 8; Alabama, Florida and Georgia on March 11; Puerto Rico (Democratic) on March 16; Illinois on March 18; Connecticut and New York on March 25; Kansas and Wisconsin on April 1; Louisana on April 5; Pennsylvania on April 22; Texas on May 3; District of Columbia, Indiana, North Carolina and Tennessee on May 6; Maryland and Nebraska on May 13; Michigan and Oregon on May 20; Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky and Nevada on May 27; California, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota and West Virginia on June 3.

The results of the 37 primaries, in terms of preference votes for the principal presidential candidates and the allocation of delegates, are given below. (In some cases, although candidates had announced their withdrawal from the contest for their party's nomination, their names remained on the ballot in certain subsequent primaries. Moreover, in some states the preference votes did not themselves directly determine the allocation of delegates, which took place in caucuses or by other means. Although the allocation of delegates is shown below as announced following the primaries in question, changes in commitment to individual candidates were subsequently announced in certain instances.)

New Hampshire. Final returns showed that, of the Democratic candidates, Mr Carter had received 53,648 votes (49 per cent); Senator Kennedy 41,687 (38 per cent); and Governor Brown 10,706 (10 per cent). In addition, votes of 2 and 1 per cent respectively were recorded for Mr LaRouche and Mr Richard Kay, a lawyer from Cleveland (Ohio). Of the 19 Democratic delegates, 10 went to Mr Carter and nine to Senator Kennedy, Governor Brown having failed to secure the 15 per cent of the vote required for a share. The Republican vote was as follows: Mr Reagan 72,816 (50 per cent); Mr Bush 33,527 (23 per cent); Senator Baker 18,970 (13 per cent); Representative Anderson 14,483 (10 per cent); Representative Crane 2,624 (2 per cent); Mr Connally 2,255 (2 per cent); and Senator Dole 607 (less than ½ per cent). In addition, there were 380 "write-in" votes for Mr Ford. Of the 22 Republican delegates, Mr Reagan won 13, Mr Bush five, and Senator Baker and Representative Anderson two each.

Massachusetts. The Democratic results were: Senator Kennedy 586,557 (65 per cent); Mr Carter 260,089 (29 per cent); Governor Brown 31,435 (4 per cent); no preference 19,571 (2 per cent). Senator Kennedy won 77 of the 111 delegates and Mr Carter 34. Of the Republican votes, 124,239 (31 per cent) went to Mr Bush; 123,055 (31 per cent) to Mr Anderson; 115,280 (29 per cent) to Mr Reagan; 19,434 (5 per cent) to Senator Baker. In addition, Mr Connally, Mr Crane and Mr Ford received 1 per cent each, there were 618 "write-in" votes for Senator Dole, and "no preference" voters totalled 2,271 (1 per cent). Of the 42 delegates, 14 went to Mr Bush, 13 each to Mr Anderson and Mr Reagan, and two to Senator Baker.

Vermont. Of the Democratic votes, Mr Carter polled 28,708 (74 per cent) and Senator Kennedy 9,913 (26 per cent). On the Republican side, Mr Reagan received 19,536 votes (31 per cent), Mr Anderson 18,851 (30 per cent), Mr Bush 14,024 (23 per cent), Senator Baker 7,954 (13 per cent), Mr Crane 1,227 (2 per cent) and Mr Connally 872 (1 per cent). No Democratic delegates formally bound to a candidate were allocated and no Republican candidate reached the 40 per cent threshold needed for the allocation of the 19 delegates at stake. This meant that all Vermont delegates would be chosen at state party conventions. Senator Baker announced on March 5 that he was ending his campaign for the Republican nomination.

South Carolina. In the Republican primary, in which registered Democrats and independents were also eligible to vote, Mr Reagan polled 78,854 votes (54 per cent), Mr Connally 43,040 (30 per cent), and Mr Bush 21,458 (15 per cent). Mr Reagan captured all 25 delegates, having carried all six of the state's congressional districts. There was no Democratic primary, the party's delegates being chosen by party caucuses. Mr Connally announced on March 9 that he was withdrawing his candidature.

Alabama. The Democratic results were: Mr Carter 190,088 (82 per cent); Senator Kennedy 31,344 (13 per cent), Governor Brown

9,312 (4 per cent). On the Republican side Mr Reagan polled 146,041 votes (70 per cent) and Mr Bush 53,232 (26 per cent).

Florida. Of the Democratic votes, Mr Carter polled 629,235 (61 per cent); Senator Kennedy 232,946 (23 per cent); Governor Brown 50,434 (5 per cent). In addition, there were 97,388 no preference votes (9 per cent). The Republican results were principally: Mr Reagan 319,429 (57 per cent); Mr Bush 165,834 (30 per cent); Mr Anderson 51,725 (9 per cent).

Georgia. The final Democratic vote was: Mr Carter 338,309 (88 per cent); Senator Kennedy 32,422 (9 per cent); Governor Brown 7,318 (2 per cent); no preference 4,128 (1 per cent). The Republican results were chiefly: Mr Reagan 146,852 (73 per cent); Mr Bush 25,283 (13 per cent); Mr Anderson 17,856 (9 per cent).

[In Alabama, Florida and Georgia Mr Carter won 181 delegates and Senator Kennedy 26, of which 23 were in Florida. Of the Republican delegates, Mr Reagan captured 105 and Mr Bush nine, all in Alabama. Senator Dole announced the withdrawal of his candidature on March 15.]

Illinois. The Democratic results were principally: Mr Carter 758,455 (65 per cent); Senator Kennedy 349,395 (30 per cent); Governor Brown 39,101 (3 per cent). Of the Republican votes, Mr Reagan polled 538,204 (48 per cent); Mr Anderson 412,379 (37 per cent); Mr Bush 122,689 (11 per cent). In a separate ballot for the election of Democratic delegates Mr Carter won 138, with a further 27 guaranteed at a later election, and Mr Kennedy 14. Of the Republican delegates, 39 went to Mr Reagan, 26 to Mr Anderson, four to Mr Crane and two to Mr Bush, while 21 were uncommitted.

Connecticut. For the Democrats Senator Kennedy received 47 per cent of the preferential votes (98,626), Mr Carter 41 per cent (87,166), Mr LaRouche 3 per cent (6,484), and Governor Brown 3 per cent (5,360). In addition, there were 13,308 uncommitted votes (6 per cent). The Republican results were principally: Mr Bush 70,222 (39 per cent); Mr Reagan 61,371 (34 per cent), Mr Anderson 40,520 (22 per cent). Mr Kennedy took 29 Democratic delegates to Mr Carter's 25, while the Republican delegates were shared as follows: Mr Bush 15, Mr Reagan 14, Mr Anderson six.

New York. Of the Democratic votes, Senator Kennedy polled 574,636 (59 per cent) and Mr Carter 399,836 (41 per cent). The delegate count was 164-118 in Mr Kennedy's favour. There was no Republican preferential vote, but of the 116 delegates elected, Mr Reagan won 75 and Mr Bush six, while the remaining 35 were uncommitted.

Kansas. The Democratic results were principally: Mr Carter 108,651 (57 per cent); Senator Kennedy 60,649 (32 per cent); Governor Brown 9,362 (5 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 178,068 votes (63 per cent), Mr Anderson 51,504 (18 per cent), and Mr Bush 35,412 (13 per cent). Mr Carter won 23 Democratic delegates and Mr Kennedy 14, while of the 32 Republican delegates, 20 went to Mr Reagan, five to Mr Anderson, four to Mr Bush and three to "None of the Names Shown".

Wisconsin. For the Democrats Mr Carter polled 349,299 votes (56 per cent); Senator Kennedy 187,490 (30 per cent); Governor Brown 77,372 (12 per cent). The Republican results were: Mr Reagan 361,643 (40 per cent); Mr Bush 274,985 (31 per cent); Mr Anderson 247,109 (28 per cent). Mr Carter won 48 Democratic delegates to Mr Kennedy's 26, and Mr Reagan 28 Republican delegates to Mr Anderson's six. Mr Bush did not win any delegates, because they were allotted by congressional district on a winner-take-all basis. Governor Brown announced his withdrawal as a candidate on April 1.

Louisiana. Of the Democratic votes, Mr Carter polled 199,221 (56 per cent) and Mr Kennedy 80,594 (22 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan received 31,256 votes (74 per cent) and Mr Bush 8,066 (19 per cent). Of the 51 Democratic delegates, Mr Carter won 39 and Mr Kennedy 12, while Mr Reagan took 29 of the 31 Republican delegates, the other two being uncommitted. Mr Bush won no delegates because he failed to achieve the necessary minimum of 25 per cent of the popular vote in any of the state's eight congressional districts.

Pennsylvania. The Democratic results were: Senator Kennedy 732,476 (46 per cent); Mr Carter 722,652 (46 per cent); no preference 92,545 (6 per cent). Of the Republican votes, Mr Bush polled 617,425 (53 per cent) and Mr Reagan 526,017 (46 per cent). Of the 185 Democratic delegates, Mr Kennedy won 94 to Mr Carter's 91, while the 83 Republican delegates chosen in a separate election were shared as follows: Mr Reagan 35, Mr Bush 17, uncommitted 31. Mr Crane withdrew his candidature on April 17 and Mr Anderson announced on April 24 that he would continue his campaign as an independent, while remaining a member of the Republican Party.

Texas. For the Democrats Mr Carter polled 766,704 votes (56 per cent); Senator Kennedy 310,701 (22 per cent); Governor Brown 35,727 (3 per cent). In addition, there were 256,240 uncommitted votes (19 per cent). The Republican results were: Mr Reagan 262,420 (51 per cent); Mr Bush 241,961 (47 per cent); uncommitted 7,856 (2 per cent). While the 152 Democratic delegates were due to be chosen by caucuses between May 3 and June 21, the Republican delegate count was 62-18 in Mr Reagan's favour.

Indiana. The Democratic results were: Mr Carter 396,911 (68 per cent); Senator Kennedy 191,882 (32 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 413,419 votes (74 per cent); Mr Bush 91,175 (16 per cent); Mr Anderson 55,857 (10 per cent). While Mr Carter obtained 53 delegates to Mr Kennedy's 27, all 54 Republican delegates were won by Mr Reagan.

North Carolina. For the Democrats Mr Carter polled 519,062 votes (70 per cent) and Senator Kennedy 131,432 (18 per cent), while there were 68,189 no preference voters (9 per cent). The Republican results were principally: Mr Reagan 115,505 (67 per cent); Mr Bush 37,217 (22 per cent); Mr Anderson 8,762 (5 per cent). Mr Carter won 56 delegates to Mr Kennedy's 13, and Mr Reagan 30 to Mr Bush's 10.

Tennessee. The Democratic results were principally: Mr Carter 218,588 (75 per cent); Senator Kennedy 52,915 (18 per cent); uncommitted 11,026 (4 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 140,236 votes (74 per cent); Mr Bush 33,909 (18 per cent); Mr Anderson 8,487 (4 per cent). Of the 55 Democratic delegates, Mr Carter took 44 and Mr Kennedy 11, while Mr Reagan won 24 Republican delegates to Mr Bush's eight.

Maryland. For the Democrats Mr Carter polled 47 per cent of the preferential vote (221,656) and Senator Kennedy 38 per cent (178,517), with uncommitted voters taking 10 per cent (44,714). In the Republican primary Mr Reagan polled 79,116 votes (48 per cent); Mr Bush 66,756 (41 per cent); and Mr Anderson 15,540 (10 per cent). Mr Carter won 32 delegates to Mr Kennedy's 26, while Mr Reagan and Mr Bush captured 15 each.

Nebraska. The Democratic results were principally: Mr Carter 71,634 (47 per cent); Mr Kennedy 57,528 (38 per cent); uncommitted 15,858 (10 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 154,955 (78 per cent); Mr Bush 31,200 (16 per cent); and Mr Anderson 11,745 (11 per cent). Mr Carter won 14 delegates and Mr Kennedy 10, while Mr Reagan took all 25 Republican delegates.

Michigan. The Republican results were principally: Mr Bush 339,278 (57 per cent); Mr Reagan 188,968 (32 per cent); and Mr Anderson 49,127 (8 per cent). Mr Bush took 53 delegates to Mr Reagan's 29. In the Democratic primary, in which neither Mr Carter nor Senator Kennedy participated, 53 per cent of the votes were uncommitted, the remainder being shared between Governor Brown (34 per cent) and Mr LaRouche (13 per cent). The Democratic delegates had been chosen during April in a series of caucuses, in which Mr Kennedy won 71 to Mr Carter's 70.

Oregon. For the Democrats Mr Carter polled 199,607 votes (58 per cent); Mr Kennedy 110,178 (32 per cent); and Governor Brown 33,106 (10 per cent). The Republican results were: Mr Reagan 165,984 (54 per cent); Mr Bush 105,541 (35 per cent); and Mr Anderson 30,791 (10 per cent). Mr Carter won 26 delegates to Mr Kennedy's 13, while Mr Reagan took 18 and Mr Bush 11. The latter announced the withdrawal of his active candidature on May 26.

Arkansas. In the Democratic primary Mr Carter defeated Senator Kennedy by 266,694 votes (60 per cent) to 78,016 (18 per cent), and took 23 delegates to the Senator's five. There was no Republican primary.

Idaho. The principal Democratic results were: Mr Carter 31,393 (62 per cent); Senator Kennedy 11,145 (22 per cent); uncommitted 5,824 (12 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 111,609 votes (83 per cent); Mr Anderson 13,093 (10 per cent); and Mr Bush 5,437 (4 per cent).

Kentucky. Of the Democratic vote, Mr Carter polled 160,288 (67 per cent); Mr Kennedy 54,876 (23 per cent); and uncommitted voters 19,157 (8 per cent). The Republican results were principally: Mr Reagan 78,450 (83 per cent); Mr Bush 6,848 (7 per cent); and Mr Anderson 4,843 (5 per cent).

Nevada. The Democratic results were: Mr Carter 25,159 (38 per cent); Mr Kennedy 19,296 (29 per cent); uncommitted 22,493 (33 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 39,352 votes (83 per cent); Mr Bush 3,077 (7 per cent); and uncommitted voters 4,965 (10 per cent).

[In Kentucky and Nevada Mr Carter won 43 delegates and Senator Kennedy 15, while Mr Reagan took all 27 Republican delegates in Kentucky and 29 out of 38 in Idaho and Nevada. The Democratic delegates in Idaho were chosen by district caucuses.]

California. Of the Democratic vote, Senator Kennedy polled 1,474,086 (45 per cent); Mr Carter 1,235,925 (38 per cent); and uncommitted voters 375,417 (11 per cent). The Republican results were: Mr Reagan 1,996,698 (81 per cent); Mr Anderson 341,210 (14 per cent); Mr Bush 121,632 (5 per cent). Mr Kennedy won 167 delegates to Mr Carter's 137, while Mr Reagan took all 168 Republican delegates.

Mississippi. Mr Reagan was unopposed in the Republican primary and won all 22 delegates. There was no Democratic primary.

Montana. The Democratic results were: Mr Carter 64,510 (52 per cent); Senator Kennedy 46,471 (36 per cent); uncommitted voters 14,030 (11 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 66,960 votes (87 per cent) to Mr Bush's 7,448 (10 per cent). Mr Carter won 10 delegates and Mr Kennedy nine, while Mr Reagan took all 20 Republican delegates.

New Jersey. Of the Democratic vote, Mr Kennedy polled 312,410 (56 per cent); Mr Carter 208,836 (37 per cent); uncommitted voters 23,861 (4 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 22,760 votes (81 per cent); and Mr Bush 48,468 (17 per cent). Mr Kennedy won 68 delegates and Mr Carter 45, while Mr Reagan took 55 Republican delegates and Mr Bush two.

New Mexico. For the Democrats Mr Kennedy polled 72,616 votes (46 per cent) and Mr Carter 66,060 (42 per cent). The Republican results were principally: Mr Reagan 37,614 (64 per cent); Mr Anderson 7,161 (12 per cent); Mr Bush 5,830 (10 per cent). Mr Kennedy won 11 delegates to Mr Carter's nine, while Mr Reagan took all 22 Republican delegates.

Ohio. The main Democratic results were: Mr Carter 603,138 (51 per cent) and Senator Kennedy 521,857 (44 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 689,926 votes (81 per cent) and Mr Bush 164,471 (19 per cent). Mr Carter won 84 delegates and Senator Kennedy 77, while Mr Reagan took all 77 Republican delegates.

Rhode Island. For the Democrats Senator Kennedy polled 25,938 votes (68 per cent) and Mr Carter 9,634 (26 per cent). The Republican results were principally: Mr Reagan 3,689 (71 per cent) and Mr Bush 942 (18 per cent). Senator Kennedy won 17 delegates to Mr Carter's six, while Mr Reagan took 11 Republican delegates and Mr Bush one.

South Dakota. The Democratic results were: Mr Kennedy 32,625 (48 per cent) and Mr Carter 31,065 (46 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Reagan polled 72,510 votes (82 per cent); Mr Anderson 5,600 (6 per cent); Mr Bush 3,667 (4 per cent). Senator Kennedy won 10 delegates and Mr Carter nine, while Mr Reagan took all 22 Republican delegates.

West Virginia. For the Democrats Mr Carter polled 195,052 votes (62 per cent) and Mr Kennedy 119,933 (38 per cent). The Republican results were: Mr Reagan 114,601 (86 per cent) and Mr Bush 19,270 (14 per cent). Mr Carter won 21 delegates to Mr Kennedy's 13, while Mr Reagan took five of the 18 Republican delegates, the rest being uncommitted.

District of Columbia. The Democratic results were: Senator Kennedy 38,688 (62 per cent) and Mr Carter 23,095 (37 per cent). For the Republicans Mr Bush polled 4,849 votes (71 per cent) and Mr Anderson 1,952 (29 per cent). Mr Kennedy won 11 delegates to Mr Carter's eight, while all 14 Republican delegates went to Mr Bush.

Puerto Rico. The result of the Republican primary held on Feb. 17, 1980, was as follows: Mr Bush 112,947; Senator Baker 69,791; Mr Connally 2,039; Mr Benjamin Fernandez (a California businessman) 1,822; Mr Stassen 589; and Senator Dole 457. In addition, there were 58 "write-in" votes for Mr Reagan. In the Democratic primary on March 16 Mr Carter received 52 per cent of the vote to Senator Kennedy's 48 per cent. Mr Carter won 21 delegates and Mr Kennedy 20, while all of the 14 Republican delegates were won by Mr. Bush.

At the end of the primaries it was estimated that, including delegates so far chosen in caucuses and at state conventions, Mr Carter had won 1,964 delegate votes, 298 more than the 1,666 needed for the Democratic nomination, while on the Republican side, where 998 votes were needed for nomination, Mr Reagan had secured 1,463 votes. Following a meeting with Mr Carter at the White House on June 5, Senator Kennedy with an estimated 1,239 delegate votes, announced that he had every intention of continuing as a candidate for the Democratic nomination. Mr Anderson formally announced his independent candidacy for the presidency on July 1.—(New York Times - International Herald Tribune - US International Communication Agency) (*Prev. rep. 1976 Presidential Candidates and Primaries 27863 A*)

A. POLAND — Cabinet Change

It was announced on June 23, 1980, that Mr Adam Glazur (47), Minister of Building and the Building Materials Industry since 1975 [see 27235 A], had been recalled from this post on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, Mr Edward Babiuch (for whose appointment in February see 30297 A). Mr Glazur was succeeded by Mr Edward Barszcz (52), who had hitherto been Mayor of Cracow.—(Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 30297 A*)

B. NETHERLANDS — Cabinet Changes Following Dispute over Financial Policy

The Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr Andreas van Agt, on March 4, 1980, appointed Mr Alfons van der Stee, a Christian Democrat (CDA) and previously Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and of Antilles Affairs, as Minister of Finance in succession to Mr Frans Andriessen (CDA), who had resigned on Feb. 20 during a cabinet dispute over the Government's economic strategy. Mr Gerrit Braks (CDA) was on March 4 appointed Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, while Mr Van der Stee retained his Antilles Affairs portfolio.

Mr Van Agt's Government, which had been formed in December 1977 by the coalition of his CDA with the (right-wing liberal) Party of Freedom and Democracy (VVD) [see 28837 A], had faced a steadily worsening national economic situation since its assumption of power, caused to a large extent by increases in the price of imported crude oil. Whereas the national foreign trade deficit for 1977 had been 3,300 million guilders, the figures for 1978 and 1979 were 6,200 million and 7,200 million guilders ($3,750 million) respectively, with a monthly peak of 1,600 million guilders in December 1979. Bank rate was raised on five occasions during 1979, moving from 6.5 per cent in May to 9.5 per cent on Nov. 29, and the rate of consumer (retail) price increases continued to rise, reaching a level of 5.6 per cent during the year ending January 1980 according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which in March 1980 published a prediction that the level would reach 6½-7 per cent during the current year. Gross national product (GNP) rose by 2.6 per cent during 1979 and gross domestic product (GDP) by 2.9 per cent; however, the OECD expected only 0.5 per cent growth in GDP during 1980, and no growth in private consumption. Unemployment would, according to the OECD, remain at its 1979 level of about 5½ per cent of the working population. The deficit of 11,113 million guilders (nearly $6,000 million) planned in the national budget for 1980 (presented on Sept. 18, 1979) was expected to represent some 4 per cent of the gross national income.

Mr Andriessen favoured a reduction of 4,000 million guilders ($2,100 million) in government spending in the 1981 budget due for presentation in September 1980, whereas the Minister for Social Affairs, Mr Willem Albeda (CDA), maintained that no more than 2,000 million guilders should be cut. The Cabinet voted on Feb. 19 in favour of Mr Van Agt's compromise proposal to cut 3,000 million guilders ($1,575 million), whereupon Mr Andriessen presented his resignation on Feb. 20, describing the adopted measures on Feb. 25 as vague and short-sighted and alleging that half of the planned savings were purely technical and would have no effect on the economy. Mr Adriaan Nooteboom, the Secretary of State for Finance, also resigned on Feb. 20, being replaced on April 14 by Mr Marinus van Amelsvoort.

The Government's decision to make the spending cuts immediately preceded its publication on Feb. 21 of a set of economic proposals relating to current wage negotiations between trade unions and employers, whereby certain tax concessions would be offered to the lower paid in return for the agreement of the trade unions to forgo their claims for a 1-2 per cent increase in real incomes during 1980. The Government also proposed the limitation or suspension of the index-linked, six-monthly wage revision.

The proposals met with strong opposition from the trade unions, however, and some 500,000 workers engaged on March 4 in various forms of industrial action.

The Government had earlier announced on Jan. 10 a two-month suspension of all wage increases, and had on Feb. 19 presented a bill (i) extending the term of effect of this suspension until April 12 unless the unions agreed with management on the level of real wage increases for 1980, and (ii) providing for the introduction of government wage controls if no agreement was reached.

Accordingly, following the failure of talks held on Feb. 28 between the Government, employers and trade unions, the Second Chamber (Lower House) of the States-General approved on March 6 a "salary law" empowering the Government until the end of 1981 to intervene in wage negotiations and limiting the July wage revision by the removal of fuel prices from the index upon which it was based. The planned reductions in public spending were also approved by the Second Chamber, receiving the unanimous support of both coalition parties. (Financial Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 29748 B; Economic Policy 28574 A*)

A. HAITI — Cabinet Reorganization - Release of Political Leader - Influx of Haitian Refugees into United States

In a major reorganization of the Cabinet announced on April 23, 1980, President Jean-Claude Duvalier replaced seven out of 14 ministers and created a new Ministry to the Presidency to which he appointed his close collaborator, Mr Henri P. Bayard. The membership of the new Cabinet was as follows:

Mr Frantz Medard	Interior and Defence
*Mr Georges Salomon	Foreign Affairs and Worship
Mr Henri P. Bayard	Presidency
Mr Ulysse Pierre-Louis	Labour and Social Affairs
Mr Jean-Marie Chanoine	Co-ordination and Information
Mr René Destin	Agriculture and National Resources
*Mr Alix Cinéas	Public Works, Transport and Communications
*Mr Hervé Boyer	Finance and National Economy
Mr René Charles	Public Health and Population
Mr Emmanuel Bros	Commerce and Industry
Mr Roc Raymond	Justice
*Mr Raoul Berret	Planning
*Mr Fritz Pierre-Louis	Mines and Energy
*Mr Joseph Bernard	National Education
*Mr Théodore Achille	Youth and Sports

* No change.

Of the ministers who lost their posts, Gen. Claude Raymond (Interior and Defence), Mr André Dumel (Commerce and Industry), Mr Paul Saint-Clair (Agriculture and National Resources) and Mr Jean Narcisse (Co-ordination and Information) had been appointed on Nov. 13, 1979, as part of a strengthening of "hard-line" elements within the Cabinet, from which Mr Bros had at the same time been removed as Minister of Finance [see 30036 A]. Mr Bayard had been Minister of Mines and Energy from November 1978 until losing this post in a reshuffle in April 1979 [see 29732 B] and had earlier been Minister without Portfolio [see 28442 A].

Mr Sylvio Claude, who had been arrested on Aug. 30, 1979, after forming the Christian Democratic Party of Haiti [see 30036 A] and who had since been held without charge and placed in a mental hospital in the last week of April 1980, was released in early May. According to the independent Radio Haiti-Inter on Feb. 28, Mr Claude and 16 other political prisoners had begun a hunger strike. (Mr Gérard Résil, the manager of another radio station who had also been arrested in August 1979—ibid.—after a broadcast by Mr Claude, had been released shortly thereafter.)

On May 27 President Duvalier married Miss Michèle Bennett, whose previous husband had been the son of Mr Alix Pasquet, a rebel captain who was killed in an abortive attack on the presidential palace in 1958. [It was this attack which prompted President François ("Papa Doc") Duvalier, the father of the incumbent head of state, to create the National Security Volunteers VSN—usually known as the Tontons Macoute.] The marriage was opposed by Mrs Simone Duvalier, the President's mother, who was identified with the "hardline" faction within ruling circles.

Influx of Haitian Refugees into United States

A drought which ruined the vital pea crop and caused a severe famine in the remote north-west of Haiti, which had already been devastated by Hurricane David in early September 1979 [see 30091 B], led to an unprecedented increase in the numbers of Haitian boat refugees arriving in southern Florida (USA) in early 1980 to escape starvation. The Miami immigration authorities reported that 2,300 Haitians had arrived in the first three months of the year (1,400 in March alone), compared with 1,800 for the whole of 1978 and 2,500 for 1979. President Duvalier in April announced steps to prevent any more refugees leaving Haiti and ordered that the "instigators" of the exodus should be tracked down by the security forces.

The refugees, most of them destitute Blacks, were temporarily housed in prisons, army barracks and hostels but the United States refused them legal asylum on the grounds that they were economic and not political refugees. Demonstrations and rallies were held in Miami on April 26 as part of a campaign to bring pressure to bear upon President Carter to grant the refugees legal status (in which case they would be liable for federal rather than local assistance) before May 15, when the new US Refugee Act of 1980 came into force. Among the main features of this Act, which made certain changes in the immigration laws, were (i) a revision of the definition of a refugee to give equal treatment to people from non-communist and communist countries; (ii) the removal of the President's power to direct the Attorney-General to grant mass asylum to refugees; and (iii) provision for the determination of an annual ceiling on the number of refugees allowed permanent resettlement in the USA.

Without legal refugee status the Haitians faced enforced repatriation; some 600 had already thus been repatriated in 1979 and had reportedly been maltreated, imprisoned and in some cases killed on their return.

The Inter-American Human Rights Commission in a report published in Washington on April 22 claimed that President Duvalier had not carried out the promises to improve human rights in Haiti which he had made on coming to office in 1971 [see 24599 A]. It called on the Government to stop human rights abuses including torture, arrests and killings, to punish those responsible and to improve the economic and social conditions of the people.—(Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Latin America Weekly Report - US International Communication Agency) (*Prev. rep. 30036 A, 29732 B*)

B. UNITED KINGDOM — National Health Service (Invalid Direction) Bill - Provisions and Enactment

The National Health Service (Invalid Direction) Bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons on March 4 and enacted on March 20, indemnified five commissioners appointed in August 1979 by Mr Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Social Services, to perform the functions of the Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham Area Health Authority, the members of which had been suspended by Mr Jenkin after they had refused to cut spending in accordance with the cash limits laid down by the previous Labour Government. The High Court had ruled on Feb. 25, 1980, that Mr Jenkin had acted unlawfully in appointing the commissioners.

Background to Legislation

During the financial year 1978-79 it had become clear that the Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham Area Health Authority (AHA), which covered an area consisting of a mixture of teaching hospitals, older community hospitals, and a wide spread of community services, was greatly exceeding its authorized expenditure. Therefore, Mr David Ennals, Mr Jenkin's predecessor, wrote to the authority in December 1978 pointing out that it was estimated that it had spent £5,300,000 in excess of its authorized cash limits, and requiring it to bring its expenditure under control immediately.

Although the authority felt that the reduction would have a serious effect on health services, it complied with the Secretary of State's requirements and by June 1979 had taken the necessary steps to ensure that its expenditure in 1979-80 would be held to the 1977-78 level in real terms. However, this improved position was changed by the increased rate of VAT (value added tax) announced in the Budget of June 1979 [see page 29823], and it soon became apparent to the authority that still further measures would be required to reduce expenditure. Having passed a resolution asking for additional funds, the authority was told on July 24 by Dr Gerard Vaughan, Minister for Health, that AHAs' cash limits would not be increased to cover the effects of inflation, although there would be increases in respect of the costs of pay settlements. [For a description of the Government's policy on cash limits, see page 29830.]

On July 30 the Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham AHA passed by 19 votes to seven a resolution that there should be no reduction in patient activity levels below those obtaining in 1977-78 without the express authorization of the authority, and that no reduction in services or staff to accommodate the underfunding of the inflation allowance for 1979-80 and the increased VAT for 1979-80 would be made without the express authorization of the authority. The resolution was followed on Aug. 1 by a direction made by Mr Jenkin under Section 86 of the National Health Service Act, 1977 [a consolidation measure enacted on July 28, 1977].

The direction read: "The Secretary of State . . . considering that the [AHA] has failed adequately to control and adjust its expenditure for the financial year ending on March 31, 1980, and that in the absence of immediate action to secure such control and adjustment the resources available to that authority will be insufficient to enable it to continue to provide the services required under the said Act but that the authority will not take the necessary action, and that there is thereby created an emergency in which to ensure the continuing provision of those services it is necessary that the functions conferred on that authority by virtue of the said Act shall instead be performed by a body or persons able and willing to secure that the authority's expenditure is contained within the resources available to it, hereby directs that while this direction remains in force all functions conferred on the [AHA] by virtue of the [1977 Act] shall, to the exclusion of that authority, be performed by the South-East Thames Regional Health Authority." The direction was varied on Aug. 6, the names of the five commissioners being substituted for the South-East Thames Regional Health Authority.

[AHAs were established under the National Health Service (Reorganization) Act, 1973, with responsibility for the planning and development of health services in the area, in consultation with the relevant local authority and with the regional health authority—see 25753 A; 25995 A.]

Mr Justice Woolf ruled in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court on Feb. 25, 1980 (upon an application by the London borough councils of Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham), that Mr Jenkin had misdirected himself as to the true effect of the emergency powers outlined in Section 86 of the 1977 Act, and had failed to exercise his discretion properly in deciding to use them.

Dealing with the advice given to Mr Jenkin, Mr Justice Woolf said that the primary remedy under the Act, and the one which had to be used unless there was an emergency, was to issue directions to an AHA under Section 17 which, if not complied with, could lead under Section 85 to the authority being declared in default and its members replaced. The advice ruled out specific directions under Section 17 because of the lack of local knowledge in the Department of Health and Social Security, and ruled out a general direction because there was no reason to suppose that the authority would be willing to adopt measures already rejected. However, the advice did not refer to the great advantage of directions under Section 17 even if they were in general terms, namely, that they placed a specific duty upon the authority to obey them. While the concern expressed about the general attitude of the authority and the danger of a general direction allowing time to pass away were understandable, what was not mentioned was the possibility that, in addition to a general direction, it was open to the Minister to make a specific direction to the authority requiring them to approve the proposals, which they had rejected, within an extremely limited time. If such a direction was not acted upon, then immediately the time had passed the authority could be declared in default and replaced. That would be a much more satisfactory solution than making use of the powers under Section 86 and it would not deprive the area from having its affairs managed by the persons representing its interests.

The final advice indicated that the emergency, which the Minister was satisfied existed, was one which he envisaged as possibly continuing into the following financial year and even longer. He was, by implication, advised—and accepted the advice—that, because of the difficulty of specifying a duration, he could give a direction of unspecified duration which would continue until he decided that it should no longer do so. Such advice was in direct conflict with Section 86, which expressed the Minister's power as being "to direct that during the period specified by the directions". While there was no requirement as to the manner in which the period was to be specified, there was no justification for not having a period which was delimited in some way. The Section was intended to give the Minister an additional reserve power to take steps over a period, limited in time, to deal with a particular crisis. It was not intended that it should be used to take over all the functions of the authority for an unlimited period so as to control financial affairs in the area. If the Minister was not aware that the action he took under Section 86 could only be for a specified period, he did not understand the nature of the direction he was making. If he had appreciated its true nature, he might or might not have made a direction. Further, if he only had power to make a direction for a specified period and he made one for an unspecified period, the direction was invalid.

Although, Mr Justice Woolf concluded, the Minister had not acted unreasonably, the advice on which he had acted was seriously misleading in that it ruled out directions under Section 17 which would have made emergency action under Section 86 unnecessary and in wrongly advocating a direction of unspecified duration which could be revoked when he thought that the time was ripe. In consequence he had failed to give proper consideration to the possibility of a Section 17 direction and misdirected himself on the true effect of Section 86. Accordingly, he failed to exercise his discretion properly and the direction was vitiated by his failure. He also made a direction of unspecified duration which he had no power in law to make.

Mr Jenkin told the Commons on March 3 that he had decided not to appeal against the High Court judgment, and that the members of the Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham AHA would comply with cash limits in future.

Mr Jenkin said that on Feb. 27 he had had a meeting with Mr Stanley Hardy, chairman of the authority, who had told him that the soundings which he [Mr Hardy] had taken among members of the authority led him to believe that the authority would in future accept its responsibility to comply with cash limits. On the following day he received a letter from the solicitor for the borough of Lewisham, writing on behalf of the three London boroughs who were the applicants in the court case, which stated that his clients would not object to the commissioners remaining in a purely caretaking role until March 31, 1980. The letter envisaged that the authority, on resuming control from April 1, would have freedom of action to review decisions taken by the commissioners, but accepted that the authority's expenditure should stay within cash limits.

Mr Jenkin went on: "The House will, I know, recognize the importance of these expressions of intent and the recognition they imply of the position which it was always my intention to sustain. In these circumstances, I thought it right to invite members of the authority to meet me last Friday [Feb. 29] to review the position, and I am grateful to the many members who at such short notice attended the meeting. The discussion took place in a helpful and constructive atmosphere. For their part, the members present, nearly two-thirds of the total membership, unanimously assured me that they will be prepared to accept an obligation to keep the authority's expenditure within cash limits. For my part, I assured them that on that basis they would be free to review any of the decisions taken by the commissioners, and, moreover, that during the short caretaker period up to March 31 the commissioners would not initiate any changes of major significance. I saw the commissioners' task as preparing for an orderly handover to the members of the authority, taking only such routine decisions which were essential to maintain services in the meantime.

"It seems to me that this would be a not unsatisfactory outcome and I have accordingly decided not to appeal against the judgment of Mr Justice Woolf, but instead to arrange for the members of the authority to resume their functions from April 1 next. The solicitors for the three councils may seek a formal order from the court within the next day or so. Since the judgment effectively declares invalid the directions I gave last August, legislation will be necessary to regularize the position over the past seven months and to give immediate backing to the status of the commissioners up to the end of this month. The Government is therefore laying a Bill before the House to give legal effect to the decisions and actions taken under the directions from Aug. 1, 1979, up to and including March 31, 1980."

Parliamentary Proceedings on National Health Service (Invalid Direction) Bill

The Bill was given unopposed second readings in the Commons on March 11 and in the House of Lords on March 18.

Mr Jenkin, moving the second reading in the Commons, said that the Bill provided that the instrument which purported to be a direction given by him with respect to the functions of the authority "shall have effect and be deemed to have had effect as if it had been a valid direction under Section 86 of the National Health Service Act 1977" for the period between Aug. 1, 1979, and March 31, 1980. The effect would be that every action of the commissioners, or of those acting on their behalf, would be as legal and binding as if they had been validly appointed by a lawful direction under the Act. The remit of the five commissioners had been abundantly clear: to bring the area's spending within the cash limits for 1979-80 in such a way that the area could reasonably expect to abide by whatever limits might be imposed for the following year. In February the commissioners had been on course to ensure that the area's spending would be within the cash limits in this financial year, within £100,000 either way. They were in no doubt that the underlying rate of spending would still need to be cut back in 1981 if the threat of overspending was to be permanently removed.

Mr Stanley Orme, chief opposition spokesman on social services, said that the opposition would not divide the House against the Bill, because they wanted to get the AHA back in its legitimate office. On cash limits, while Mr Jenkin might lay down limits for the coming year, it would be wrong if the limits for the current year imposed by the commissioners should have to be carried by the returning AHA. Having made a mistake of this magnitude, the Government ought to put money in to put this right. It was not good enough for Mr Jenkin to reiterate his apology and say he was wrong. He had a responsibility to many of the people who had been disadvantaged and to the hospitals which had been affected. If he wanted to wipe the slate clean, he had got to take action which would reimburse and assist the rehabilitation of this AHA. If they resumed office in a bloody-minded sense and there was conflict, this matter would not be resolved.

Having passed its remaining stages in the Commons on March 13 and in the Lords on March 20, the Bill, as stated above, received the Royal Assent on the latter date.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. 1973 National Health Service (Reorganization) Act 25753 A, 25995 A; Cash Limits page 29830*)

A. HUNGARY — 12th Congress of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party - Changes in Politburo and Secretariat of Central Committee - General Elections - Cabinet Changes

The 12th national congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) took place in Budapest on March 24-27, 1980, and was attended by 767 delegates representing the 812,000 party members as well as delegations from 35 other countries including the Soviet Union, Cuba and Vietnam. Particular emphasis was placed during the proceedings on the analysis of the country's recent economic performance and on the prospects for the period up to 1985, and on the reaffirmation of Hungary's economic, political and defence links with the Soviet Union.

At the end of the congress on March 27 Mr János Kádár was re-elected as First Secretary of the HSWP Central Committee, and a number of changes were made to the membership of the Politburo and secretariat of the Central Committee.

Following general elections to the National Assembly which were subsequently held on June 8, a number of changes were also made to the composition of the Council of Ministers, including the reallocation of the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture and of the chairmanship of the National Planning Office, as well as the removal of two of the six Deputy Prime Ministers.

Recent Economic Developments

The HSWP congress was dominated by the economic difficulties affecting the Hungarian economy, and by the measures recently announced by the Government for the reduction of the country's trade deficit through in particular the gradual reduction of subsidies on imported energy sources and raw materials, which would, by raising production costs, encourage enterprises to adopt a more flexible and market-orientated pricing system and to improve both quality and efficiency of production. Enterprises which had caused a net loss to the state through their inefficient use of subsidised imports would, it was expected, be forced to close in the face of increased competition, and up to 250,000 people were expected to be redeployed between 1980 and 1984 as a result of such closures.

A series of measures designed to reduce the level of such subsidies on raw materials, and thus also the tendency to export at uneconomic prices, were introduced throughout 1979 [see page 29846], and on Jan. 7, 1980, a further set of price adjustments were announced. While certain items, including clothing, were reduced in price on Jan. 7 by up to 30 per cent, aluminium goods rose in price by up to 90 per cent and consumer durable goods by up to 60 per cent, leather goods by 20-30 per cent and most repairs and services by 20 per cent. On April 2 petrol prices were raised by 11-30 per cent, depending on grade, taxi fares by 30 per cent while building timber prices were increased by 37 per cent.

Following a meeting of the HSWP Central Committee in December 1979, figures were released on Dec. 10 showing that national income had risen during 1979 by only 1-1.5 per cent, compared with the expected 3-4 per cent; that industrial production had risen by 2.8 per cent, compared with the expected 4 per cent; and that there had been no increase in agricultural production, whereas an increase of 3-3.5 per cent had been planned. Inflation, the report said, had reached an annual rate of 9 per cent, compared with the anticipated level of 5 per cent, and wages had risen by 7.5-8 per cent, where a 1 per cent increase had been planned. The poor grain harvest in 1979 and a general deterioration in external trade conditions were the main factors blamed by the report for these difficulties, although it also criticized the alleged slowness of the Hungarian economy to adapt to changed world conditions. It added, however, that the level of exports during 1979 had risen by 13 per cent, while imports had increased by only 3 per cent.

Dr Lajos Faluvégi, the then Minister of Finance, said during a parliamentary debate in January 1980 that the national economic growth during 1980 was planned to be 3-3.5 per cent, and that a slight drop in real income levels was also anticipated in view of the expected overall retail price rise of 3.7 per cent (although Western economists expected the price rises to be more extensive). Dr Faluvégi added that the Government had ordered a thorough economic supervision of 31 enterprises and 22 large agricultural complexes.

A preliminary report issued by the HSWP Central Committee on March 22, 1980, said that the number of active wage earners in the country had decreased since 1976 by more than 100,000 persons, but that national income during the period of the fifth five-year plan (1976-80) had so far increased by an annual average of 4.1 per cent, compared with the envisaged annual rate of 5.4-5.7 per cent. Industrial production during the whole period (i.e. up to the end of 1980) now seemed likely to increase by 24-25 per cent, compared with the planned 33-35 per cent.

National Congress of the HSWP

The 12th national congress was opened on March 24, on which day Mr Kádár presented the HSWP Central Committee's report.

Mr Kádár stressed in his speech the achievements of the national economy in working towards the goals set by the fifth five-year plan, but noted also a growing level of public criticism of "negative phenomena" such as the country's extensive bureaucracy which, he said, resulted in the "often lengthy and sometimes soulless handling of affairs". He called for the reorganization of management and for the more efficient use of resources through economies in the use of energy and raw materials, adding that better use could be made of production capacities by extending shift systems in industry.

Outlining the country's economic strategy up to the end of the sixth five-year-plan for 1981-85, Mr Kádár said that the period would be characterized by the slowing of national economic growth and the stabilization of the trade balance due to the planned reduction in imports. The selective industrial development of the country would, he said, be accompanied by the introduction of pricing systems based on world market values. He offered no specific figures relating to the 1981-85 plan, preferring to wait until the current plan expired at the end of 1980, but said that an increase of 15-17 per cent in national income seemed attainable between 1981 and 1985.

Mr Kádár regretted the recent fall in the national birth rate, speaking of the need to encourage three-child families, and compared the current total of 5,083,000 active workers with the 5,627,000 pensioners, mothers at home with young children and others supported by the state.

Mr Kádár also spoke at length of the support of the Hungarian Government for international détente. He regretted the deferment of the United States' ratification of the treaty with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation (SALT II) signed in June 1979 [see 30117 A], and called for the suspension of the December 1979 decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy a system of new medium-range missiles in Europe [see 30159 A]. He accused the Chinese leadership of "co-operating with the extremist, aggressive circles of international imperialism" which, he said, were currently waging a comprehensive anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda campaign in connexion with the recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan [see 30229 A], and he spoke of the "indissoluble friendship" between the Hungarian and Soviet peoples, describing the Soviet Union as "the mainstay of the cause of human progress" and its leader, Mr Leonid Brezhnev, as an "outstanding fighter for the cause of peace and progress".

Mr Kádár called on the HSWP in the coming years to extend its links with the population and to encourage discussion at all levels, but stressed that writers and artists who in their criticism "offended good taste and hurt the socialist way of life" would find no outlet for their works. The HSWP, he said, should also improve its internal discipline and remove any of its cadres or leaders who proved unable to satisfy the higher requirements now being made of the party.

Mr Kádár's address was followed by that of **Mr Janos Brutyo**, the chairman of the HSWP central control committee, who told the congress that 8,000 HSWP members had been dismissed from the party and 30,000 disciplined since the 11th congress in 1975.

Mr Andrei Kirilenko (speaking for the Soviet Communist Party) referred to the high level of co-operation which existed between Hungary and the Soviet Union. While outlining the Soviet Union's assistance in assuring Hungary's oil and natural gas supplies, Mr Kirilenko also spoke of the increasing importance to be attached to nuclear power, in the light of which the Soviet Union was currently assisting in the construction of a nuclear power station in Hungary at Paks (on the Danube, south of Budapest).

Mr Kirilenko, like Mr Kádár, expressed his support for détente and demilitarization in all areas of the world, citing the recent withdrawal of a contingent of Soviet troops from East Germany [see page 30161] as a token of good faith, and stating also that Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan when all aggression from the US, China and Pakistan had ceased.

The proceedings on March 24 concluded with addresses from **Sr Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado**, a member of the Politburo of the

Cuban Communist Party, and from **Mr Le Van Luong**, a member of the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Mr György Lázár, the Hungarian Prime Minister, told the congress on March 25 that the decision to move away from the purely quantitative export goals of the fifth five-year-plan had been taken by the Central Committee in December 1978; the rising cost to the Government of subsidizing the import of raw materials for inefficient use in the production of goods for export had diminished net profits and worsened the balance of payments, while the measures taken in 1979 had, he said, started trends towards the improvement of the balance [for earlier deterioration in the balance of trade, see 29684 B]. "We cannot be satisfied with poor quality work and uneconomic production methods", Mr Lázár said, adding that "we must gradually discontinue the practice of artificially protecting enterprises which operate inefficiently".

Following Mr Kádár's concluding speech on March 27, the congress went into closed session to elect the 127 members of the Central Committee who, having been elected, met to elect inter alia the Politburo and Secretariat as follows.

Politburo. Mr György Aczél, Mrs Valéria Benke, Mr Sándor Gáspár, Mr Ferenc Havasi (new), Mr János Kádár, Mr Mihály Korom (new), Mr György Lázár, Mr Pál Losonczi, Dr Lászlo Marothy, Mr Lajos Mehes (new), Mr Károly Németh, Mr Miklós Ovári and Mr István Sarlós.

Secretariat. Mr János Kádár (First Secretary), Mr András Gyenes, Mr Ferenc Havasi, Mr Mihály Korom, Mr Károly Németh and Mr Miklós Ovári (all re-elected).

Mr Jenö Fock (Prime Minister from 1967 to 1975—see 27195 A), Mr Béla Biszku (a former secretary of the Central Committee—see 29050 B), Mr Dezsö Nemes (editor-in-chief of the HSWP newspaper *Népszabadság*), Mr Antal Apró (president of the National Assembly) and Dr István Huszár (a Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Planning Office) were removed from the Politburo but re-elected to the Central Committee. Of the three new members of the Politburo, Mr Mehes was first secretary of the Budapest city party committee while Mr Havasi and Mr Korom had both been members of the Secretariat since 1978 [see 29050 B], having previously served as a Deputy Prime Minister and as Minister of Justice respectively.

Mr Sándor Borbély and Mr Imre Györi were not re-elected to the Secretariat (of which they had been members since 1976 and 1974 respectively—see 28154 D; 26584 A), and were not replaced. It was announced on April 10, however, that Mr Borbély had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Hungarian workers' militia.

Parliamentary and Local Elections

National elections were held on June 8 for the 352 seats in the Hungarian National Assembly (of which only 15 were contested by more than one candidate). All official candidates had been nominated by the Patriotic People's Front (the communist mass organization), and these obtained 99.3 per cent of the valid votes cast. The only candidate in one Budapest district died before the election, and in Bekes county no candidate obtained sufficient votes for his election; these two seats were filled, however, in by-elections held on June 14.

Elections were also held on June 8 for some 55,000 seats in local government assemblies, and all official candidates were similarly sponsored by the Patriotic People's Front, obtaining 99.2 per cent of the valid votes. By-elections were held in 21 constituencies on June 14, when 97.3 per cent of the relevant electorate voted, casting 97.9 per cent of the valid votes for the official candidates.

Constitutive Session of New Assembly - Changes in Membership of Council of Ministers

The newly elected National Assembly convened on June 27, when Mr Pál Lozonczi was reappointed for a further term of five years as Chairman of the Presidential Council (i.e. head of state).

The Assembly then approved a new Council of Ministers proposed by Mr Lázár and incorporating the following changes:

Dr Lajos Faluvégi, previously Minister of Finance, became a Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Planning Office *vice* Mr István Huszár; Mr István Hetenyi became Minister of Finance; Mr Gyula Széker retired as a Deputy Prime Minister and became Chairman of the Technical Development Committee (*vice* Mr Lénárd Pál, who had succeeded Dr Miklós Ajtai in 1978); Mr István Horvath became Minister of the Interior *vice* Mr András Benkei (who had held the post since 1963); Mr Jenö Vancsa became Minister of Agriculture and the Food Industry *vice* Dr Pál Romány; and Dr Imre Pozsgai, Minister of Culture, took on the additional post of National Education which had hitherto been held by Dr Károly Polinszky.

The composition of the new Council of Ministers was as follows:

Mr György Lázár	Prime Minister
Mr György Aczél	Deputy Prime Ministers
Mr Janos Borbándi	
Mr József Marjai	
* Dr Lajos Faluvégi	Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of National Planning Office
Dr Vilmos Sághy	Trade
† Dr István Horvath	Interior
Dr Emil Schultheisz	Health
Dr Kálmán Ábrahám	Construction and Town Planning
Mr Lajos Czinege	Defence
Dr Imre Markoja	Justice
Mr István Soltész	Metallurgy and Machine Industry
Mrs Etelka Keserü	Light Industry
Mr Árpád Pullai	Transport and Posts
‡ Dr Imre Pozsgai	Culture and National Education
Mr Péter Veress	Foreign Trade
Mr Frigyes Puja	Foreign Affairs
† Mr Jenö Vancsa	Agriculture and the Food Industry
Dr Ferenc Trethon	Labour
Dr Pál Simon	Heavy Industry
† Dr István Hetenyi	Finance
* Mr Gyula Szekér	Chairman of the Technical Development Committee

* Changed portfolio. † New appointment.
‡ Took additional portfolio.

Dr Horvath (45) was elected a member of the HSWP Central Committee in 1970, and was a member of the Presidential Council from 1971 to 1975. **Mr Vancsa** (52) worked in the management of state farms before becoming Deputy Minister of Agriculture and the Food Industry in 1972. **Dr Hetenyi** (54), an economist, held several posts in the National Planning Office from 1949 onwards.

Mr Huszár was on June 27 appointed chief director of the Central Committee's Institute for Social Studies.—(Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Le Monde - Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 11th HSWP Congress 27098 C; Central Committee Appointments 29050 B; Economic Developments 29845 A; Cabinet 27984 A, 28154 D, 28484 B, 29050 B, 29684 B*)

A. NETHERLANDS — War Criminals - Retrial and Sentencing of Mr Pieter Menten

A Rotterdam court on July 9, 1980, sentenced the Dutch art dealer, Mr Pieter Nicolas Menten (81), to 10 years' imprisonment for complicity in the murder of between 20 and 30 Poles, most of them Jews, in 1941 in what is now the Soviet Ukraine. Mr Menten was also ordered to pay a fine of 100,000 guilders ($50,000).

A previous 15-year sentence imposed on Mr Menten by an Amsterdam court in 1977 [see 28832 B] was quashed by the Dutch Supreme Court in May 1978. After fresh hearings later in that year Mr Menten was on Dec. 4, 1978, allowed to go free on the basis of a legal technicality, even though his part in the murders had not been in dispute [see 29467 A].

The Supreme Court on May 22, 1979, ordered the retrial of Mr Menten (a diabetic), who was placed under house arrest and who lodged an appeal for the postponement of his trial on health grounds. On Sept. 24, 1979—the day before the trial was due to begin in Rotterdam—Mr Menten was declared mentally and physically unfit to stand trial and the Rotterdam court accordingly suspended proceedings indefinitely, Mr Menten remaining under house arrest pending confirmation of the decision.

The Supreme Court on Feb. 5, 1980, upheld an appeal by the public prosecutor against the Rotterdam court's decision to suspend the trial, and ordered proceedings to be resumed. The retrial began on May 13, again in Rotterdam, the court having earlier rejected a defence appeal that a new medical examination should determine whether the defendant was fit for trial. Those testifying for the prosecution included Mr Dirk Menten, the defendant's brother whom Mr Pieter Menten claimed had been the person truly responsible for the crimes.

Mr Menten, who was not in court when the sentence was passed, was taken to the Scheveningen prison hospital on July 11.—(Times - International Herald Tribune - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin) (*Prev. rep. 29467 A, 28832 B*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Resignation of Members of National Enterprise Board - New Appointments - Disagreement over Position of Rolls-Royce Ltd - Activities of NEB - Industry Bill, Provisions and Enactment

The entire membership of the National Enterprise Board (NEB) resigned on Nov. 20, 1979, following disagreement with the Secretary of State for Industry, Sir Keith Joseph, over the role of the Board and in particular over the future of its Rolls-Royce Ltd subsidiary. A new NEB chairman and other members were appointed on Nov. 21, together with a new chairman of Rolls-Royce, and Sir Keith Joseph stated that upon enactment of the Industry Bill which was currently before Parliament he would direct the NEB to transfer its shareholding in Rolls-Royce to himself.

The NEB had been set up under the 1975 Industry Act [see 27063 A; 27621 A]. The Rolls-Royce aero-engine interests had come into public ownership following the financial collapse of the former Rolls-Royce Ltd in 1971 [see 24677 A; 26008 A] and had been transferred to the NEB in early 1976 shortly after the inauguration of the latter [see page 28544]. Rolls-Royce continued to be the NEB's second largest individual subsidiary after BL Ltd (formerly British Leyland —see 27677 A; 28544 A). (In the course of 1979 the NEB's equity investment in BL and Rolls-Royce increased from £695,520,000 to £844,950,000 and from £203,000,000 to £234,000,000 respectively—see also page 29679 where details are given of the NEB's financial duties in respect of these two companies and in respect of its other investments.)

The tension between the NEB and Rolls-Royce began to become severe in mid-October 1979, when Sir Leslie Murphy, then chairman of the NEB, in presenting the Board's half-yearly results on Oct. 16, said that Rolls-Royce ought to adopt "a more stringent application of financial disciplines". The suggestion that the members of the NEB were threatening to "resign en masse" was raised in parliamentary questions in the House of Commons on Nov. 12, and the whole Board did in fact announce their resignations on Nov. 20 following a brief meeting with Sir Keith Joseph.

The membership of the Board as at April 1979 was: chairman—Sir Leslie Murphy (formerly deputy chairman of Schroders Ltd); deputy chairman—Mr Richard Morris (formerly a director of Courtaulds Ltd); members—Mr David Basnett (general secretary of the General and Municipal Workers' Union), Mr Alistair Frame (joint deputy chairman and chief executive, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation Ltd), Mr John Gardiner (chief executive, Laird Group Ltd), Mr John Lyons (general secretary, Engineers' and Managers' Association), Mrs Caroline Miles (an economic and industrial consultant), Lord Scanlon (formerly president, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers), Sir Leslie Smith (chairman, BOC International Ltd) and Sir Jack Wellings (chairman and managing director, The 600 Group Ltd). Mr Basnett's term of office had, however, expired on Nov. 19.

A statement was made in the House of Commons by Sir Keith on Nov. 21, when he announced the names of the new chairman (Sir Arthur Knight) and other members of the NEB; confirmed that Sir Kenneth Keith (now Lord Keith of Castleacre) would be succeeded as chairman of Rolls-Royce by Sir Frank McFadzean (Sir Kenneth having already indicated earlier in the month that he wished to retire after holding the post for seven years—see page 26010); and stated that when the Industry Bill was enacted the NEB's shareholding in Rolls-Royce would be transferred to himself.

Sir Keith said: "I have had in recent months to consider the relationship between the NEB and Rolls-Royce in the light of evidence of some friction over a considerable period. I have concluded that the friction is not a passing problem of personalities or a difference of opinion on the management of the company but is inherent in the relationship and would tend to survive a change of management.

"Rolls-Royce is a company of a scale and importance such that the supervision of its board by another board, however eminent and accomplished, is bound to give rise to strain.

"Moreover it is a company with which inescapably Government have exceptionally close connexions and where important decisions lie directly with Government.

"I therefore decided that in view of these two considerations, from which there is no escape, it would not be right to paper over the cracks but would, rather, be right to plan to remove the source of the difficulty.

"Clause 2 of the Industry Bill now before the House will give me power to direct the NEB to transfer its shareholdings in Rolls-Royce to the Secretary of State, and I told the NEB of my intention to make such an order as soon as the Bill becomes law. This decision was in no sense whatsoever a reflection on the members of the NEB or their staff. Rather, it is a judgment that the role they had been given in relation to this major company was, in the last analysis, not an appropriate one.

"When I expressed to the NEB my intention I was told categorically that were I to adhere to my proposal all the members of the Board would resign. I was asked to reconsider. This I did.

"Yesterday I told the Board that I did adhere to my proposal. The House knows that the chairman, Sir Leslie Murphy, and all the members of the NEB have resigned from their posts. I have accepted their resignations with regret. The Board was composed of distinguished people from business and trade unions who co-operated together to serve the country with dedication. I hope this form of co-operation will become possible in the new Board.

"The NEB has, as the House knows, important disposals to arrange and other continuing tasks to perform. It will have a catalytic investment role especially in connexion with advanced technology and increasingly in partnership with the private sector, as well as its regional and small firms roles."

After announcing the names of the new chairman, deputy chairman and five members, Sir Keith went on: "I am deliberately leaving some places vacant. I have today written to the TUC [Trades Union Congress] about this.

"The House will wish to know that, following the recent announcement that Sir Kenneth Keith wishes to retire from the chairmanship of Rolls-Royce after seven years' service, Sir Frank McFadzean has indicated his willingness to accept appointment as chairman."

The new members of the NEB were as follows:

Chairman: Sir Arthur Knight (62), who had recently announced his forthcoming retirement as chairman of Courtaulds Ltd.

Deputy Chairman: Sir John King (chairman of Babcock International).

Members: Mr (now Sir) Robert Clayton (technical director of the General Electric Company); Mr Alex Dibbs (deputy chairman of the National Westminster Bank); Mr George Jefferson (chairman and chief executive of the dynamics division of British Aerospace); Mr Dennis Stevenson (chairman of Peterlee and Newtown Aycliffe new towns) and Mr John Caines (secretary to the NEB). (It was subsequently announced on Nov. 23 that Mr Jack Emms, chief general manager and a vice-chairman of Commercial Union Assurance, was also to be a member. The TUC general council, however, agreed on Nov. 28 to put forward no names for appointment to the Board. Mr Caines ceased to be a member of the Board on April 3, 1980, having been succeeded as secretary on April 1 by Mr Brian Willott.)

Sir Frank McFadzean (64) was formerly chairman of Shell Transport and Trading and of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and also formerly chairman (and earlier chief executive) of British Airways.

It was also subsequently announced on Dec. 10 that Mr Ian Halliday, finance director of Leslie and Godwin (Holdings) (Lloyds insurance brokers) was to be chief executive of the NEB effective Feb. 1, 1980.

The House of Commons on Nov. 26 held a debate on an opposition motion moved by Mr John Silkin (chief opposition spokesman on industrial matters) condemning the action of the Government on Rolls-Royce which "forced the unanimous resignation of the NEB" and deploring the "damage done to Britain's industrial reconstruction by the Government's policy". The motion was rejected by 312 votes to 256 and the House then approved a government wording welcoming the Government's decision on Rolls-Royce, expressing appreciation of the services of the members of the NEB who had recently resigned, welcoming the appointment of a strong new Board to carry forward the work of the NEB and the intention to make further appointments, and endorsing the Government's determination to strengthen the role of private capital in industrial reconstruction. Liberal, Scottish National Party and *Plaid Cymru* members supported the Labour opposition, while four Northern Ireland MPs (Mr John Dunlop, Mr James Kilfedder, Mr James Molyneaux and Mr Enoch Powell) voted with the Government.

In the course of his speech during the debate Sir Keith Joseph said that the choice facing the Government had been that on the one hand there was the decision of the Rolls-Royce board to resign if it were left under the supervision of the NEB and on the other the categoric assurance by the NEB that if a decision to separate the two boards were made its members would all resign. Sir Keith also stated (i) that it was his "earnest hope" that sooner rather than later Rolls-Royce would go into the private sector and (ii) that the BL board had made a case to him to be treated in the same way as Rolls-Royce, although he did "not in any way commit myself to giving it the same answer as was given to Rolls-Royce".

Draft guidelines for the NEB were announced on Dec. 11 which inter alia laid down that the Board should "exercise their powers with a view to disposing to private ownership, as soon as practicable, if necessary by stages, all of their securities and other property and their subsidiaries' securities and other property". In deciding the timing, price and other conditions on which greater private financial involvement might be obtained in a particular case, the Board should have regard to the interests of the company but they should not refrain from making a disposal merely to help the Board meet their financial duties. As regards investments, "before acquiring securities or making loans the Board shall satisfy themselves that the requirements of the company concerned could not be met appropriately by other sources of finance, and making any such investment shall do so only in conjunction with private investment".

BL's 1980 Corporate Plan and Financing Requirements

Plans by BL (which was the NEB's largest single subsidiary—see above) for streamlining the company's operations and accelerating model programmes were outlined by the chairman, Sir Michael Edwardes, on Sept. 10, 1979, involving over the next two years a reduction of 25,000 in the present workforce of some 160,000 and the closure of 13 plants.

A report by the NEB on BL's plans had earlier been published on April 2, 1979, in which it had been confirmed that a total of £375,000,000 was being earmarked as additional funds for the company (including the £150,000,000 whose provision had been announced that day—see above and page 29679); this total would bring the NEB's overall funding of BL to £975,000,000 and "so complete the provision of funds for BL envisaged by the Ryder plan" [of 1975—see 27677 A].

While a meeting of senior BL shop stewards overwhelmingly rejected the outline plans on Oct. 13, the executive of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions decided on Oct. 16 to recommend broad acceptance, and in a ballot of employees conducted by the company the plan was on Nov. 1 approved by 106,062 votes to 15,541.

The Government's approval of BL's 1980 corporate plan and its decision to provide additional funds were announced by Sir Keith Joseph in a statement in the House of Commons on Dec. 20.

The plan, he said, envisaged a requirement for £297,000,000 of public funds in 1980, with a further £133,000,000 between 1981 and 1983. These two sums together represented "the £225,000,000 balance of the original Ryder £1,000 million, plus £205,000,000 to meet the cost of redundancies and closures under the management's restructuring programme". The company sought approval at the present stage for only its 1980 requirements. The Government had decided to fund the plan up to the end of 1980-81 by the provision of £150,000,000 in equity form, with an additional facility on which BL would be entitled to draw on evidence of need up to a maximum of a further £150,000,000. In addition, the Government accepted the BL board's request for conversion to equity of £150,000,000 of loans provided in 1977. The Government would also be looking to BL to contribute to funding needs from its internal resources, including the disposal of assets where this made commercial sense. To the extent that the plan called for funds going beyond the Ryder £1,000 million, clearance from the European Commission would be necessary.

In a letter to Sir Keith dated Dec. 19, Sir Michael Edwardes had said that if shortfalls in performance placed the achievement of the plan in jeopardy, the BL board considered that they would have no option but to abandon the plan; he continued: "In particular if there is a significant shortfall in cash flow, whether due to major disruptions through internal or external strikes, or to delays in any of our programmes for investment and launch of new products, restructuring and redundancies or for improving productivity and working practices, or to any other cause internal or external, the board will abandon the plan."

Sir Keith stated in a written parliamentary answer on April 18, 1980, that he had directed the NEB to provide BL with the funding set out by him on Dec. 20, and the provision of £75,000,000 to BL in the form of subscription by the NEB for new equity was announced on May 30.

Disruption was caused at numerous BL plants in November 1979 after the company had on Nov. 19 dismissed Mr Derek Robinson, who was leader of the unofficial BL shop stewards' committee and was employed at the Longbridge (Birmingham) plant, for his part in publishing a document following the ballot of employees which, it said, called for disruptive action in opposition to the corporate plan.

Immediately the dismissal was known, stoppages occurred at BL plants, involving an estimated maximum of 46,000 workers (including those laid off). The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), of which Mr Robinson was a member, instructed its members on Nov. 27 to return to work and decided to institute an enquiry into the matter, while the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), which had made the strike of its members official, suspended the action on the following day. After completing its inquiry the AUEW on Feb. 6, 1980, decided that Mr Robinson had been unfairly dismissed and called official strike action unless he was reinstated; BL refused to comply with the demand for reinstatement, but AUEW members at the Longbridge plant decided on Feb. 20 by an estimated ten-to-one majority on a show of hands against strike action in order to secure his reinstatement. Mr Robinson was on May 12 refused leave by an industrial court to make a claim of unfair dismissal, the grounds for this refusal being that the claim had been submitted after the expiry of the statutory time limit.

It had previously been announced on May 17, 1979, that BL and the Honda Motor Company of Japan had reached agreement on the nature of a joint project, involving a licensing arrangement for Jaguar Rover Triumph (part of BL) to manufacture a new car being developed by Honda. It was intended that the Honda-designed car would be manufactured by Jaguar Rover Triumph; that BL would have exclusive rights to sell it in Britain and the rest of the European Economic Community member states, through the BL dealer network; and that production would begin from mid-1981. Honda would also produce the same model at its plant in Japan for sale in countries outside the EEC under its own brand name. Following the Government's approval of the 1980 BL corporate plan, the agreement was formally signed in Tokyo on Dec. 27.

NEB Activities

In the course of the period from May to December 1979 the following new acquisitions or investments were made by the NEB (which in addition made further investments in certain companies in which it already had an interest). [For earlier investments see pages 28544-45 and 29677-79.]

ASR Servotron. The NEB announced in mid-August that it had subscribed £18,000 for 26 per cent of the ordinary shares and £300,000 for cumulative redeemable preference shares in ASR Servotron in order to enable the company to establish a manufacturing subsidiary which would produce permanent magnet motors. [A receiver and manager was subsequently appointed to the company on May 23, 1980—see below.]

CIC Investment Holdings. A new company—Gladecrown—in October acquired the name and operating subsidiaries of the Cambridge Instrument Company (itself an NEB subsidiary—see pages 27624; 28545; 29678). The old company—renamed CIC Investment Holdings (in which the NEB held 93 per cent of the equity)—acquired a 25 per cent share in the new company, with Gladecrown (representing private sector investors) subscribing for the remaining 75 per cent.

Doyce Electronics. As announced on Dec. 17, the NEB made an initial investment of £80,000 giving it 25 per cent of the enlarged ordinary share capital and 100 per cent of the preference share capital in Doyce Electronics which was formed in 1972 and which designed and manufactured a range of digital electronic test equipment for petrol and diesel engines; a further £36,667 was earmarked for investment in 1980 in the form of additional preference shares.

Exelarc Engineering. Under an arrangement announced in October, the NEB subscribed for 70,000 £1 ordinary shares in Exelarc Engineering which fabricated stainless steel for canteen equipment and architectural metal work. Bamford Hall Holdings, which had acquired Exelarc in August 1978, was subscribing for additional ordinary shares which would bring its holding similarly to £70,000, so that Exelarc would be equally owned by it and the NEB.

Innotron. It was announced on June 6 that the NEB was investing £278,000 in Innotron, which was developing a new design of gamma counter for medical diagnosis. The NEB's investment comprised £44,000 for 37.7 per cent of the initial ordinary share capital, up to £200,000 for cumulative redeemable preference shares and a secured loan of £34,000; of the remaining ordinary shares 25.9 per cent would be held by Oxford Instrument Group and the rest by certain individuals. At Dec. 31, 1979, the NEB holding represented 29 per cent of the equity.

INSAC/Aregon. The activities of the INSAC group (the NEB's computer software subsidiary—see page 28545) were separated (as announced on Nov. 19, 1979) into INSAC Products and INSAC Viewdata (the latter being on Feb. 1, 1980, renamed Aregon Group). It was announced on March 3, 1980, that INSAC Products had acquired the US Altergo Software Inc, while in July 1979 the US Global Data Corporation had also been acquired by INSAC.

James Howorth and Company (Holdings). Under the Sapling scheme of assistance to smaller companies with growth potential [see page 29678], the NEB in July acquired 21.4 per cent of the enlarged equity of James Howorth (a company specializing in advanced air engineering) and subscribed for 80,000 cumulative redeemable preference shares at a total cost of £116,000.

Microform Communications International. The NEB announced on June 14 that it had acquired for £310,000 a 28 per cent stake in Microform Communications International, manufacturer of a small portable microfilm reader; another 44 per cent of the equity was owned by Norton Warburg Investments, and the NEB was in addition subscribing for £165,000 of cumulative redeemable preference shares.

Momex (UK). The NEB in December 1979 invested £20,115 in Momex (UK), established to encourage the export of mechanical handling equipment to Venezuela, the NEB holding 28.9 per cent of the equity in the company.

Muirhead Office Systems. Nexos Office Systems—a wholly owned NEB subsidiary formed in January 1979 [see page 29678]—announced on Sept. 19 that it had entered into an agreement with Muirhead Data Communications whereby the latter formed a new subsidiary (Muirhead Office Systems) to develop computer-related facsimile systems; the NEB would have a 25 per cent share in the equity of the new company at a cost of £210,000 and was also making available £250,000 in the form of a loan.

Q1 (Europe). It was announced on Aug. 15 that the NEB was to invest up to £5,000,000 in a joint venture company with Q1 Corporation of New York which would undertake in the United Kingdom a substantial part of Q1's overall research and development effort and manufacture microcomputer-based office equipment for sale throughout Europe. The NEB's initial £2,000,000 investment by way of 250,000 £1 ordinary shares and 260,000 £1 non-voting ordinary shares gave it just over 50 per cent of the equity.

Sonicaid. As announced in early July, the NEB was to invest £297,000 for nearly 30 per cent of the equity of Sonicaid, manufacturer of advanced ultrasonic medical diagnostic equipment; the remaining equity would be held by Barclays Merchant Bank and Mr Ronald Cowan, the founder of the company in 1963.

Thermax. It was announced at the beginning of May 1979 that agreement had been reached in principle on an NEB investment of £700,000 to help expand the operations of Thermax, a major manufacturer of automotive and appliance safety glass. The NEB financing would take the form of £350,000 of redeemable preference shares and a £350,000 medium-term loan facility.

Yates Duxbury. The NEB announced on May 31 that it was to purchase 50 per cent of the equity of Yates Duxbury and Sons (hitherto a Tootal subsidiary) for £1,750,000—the remainder of the enlarged capital being held by Tootal. The investment was designed to help rationalize the British fine paper-making industry.

Developments in early 1980 included the following:

Barlin Consumer Products. The NEB in April 1980 subscribed for a maximum of 50,000 redeemable £1 participating preference shares in Barlin Consumer Products (manufacturers of electrical convector heaters and traditional fuel effect fires), with the right to convert 5,000 of these shares into ordinary shares, while under a buy-back arrangement the convertible shares might be purchased by the other shareholders.

Baviscrown. The NEB in February 1980 acquired at par a 94 per cent holding in the equity of Baviscrown for £155,000 and subscribed for £400,000 cumulative participating redeemable preference shares. This new company was formed to purchase from Sinclair Radionics (73.3 per cent owned by the NEB—see also page 28545) the separate Sinclair Electronics subsidiary; directors of Sinclair Electronics owned the remaining 6 per cent holding in Baviscrown. The NEB's £7,800,000 investment in Sinclair Radionics was written off. Sinclair's "microvision" miniature television and calculator businesses had been sold in August to Binatone International.

British Underwater Engineering. British Underwater Engineering—an NEB subsidiary [see page 29677]—announced on May 20, 1980, that it had acquired an 86.6 per cent holding in R. R. Chapman (Sub-Sea Surveys), which had itself hitherto been an NEB associated company [see page 28545] and in which executive directors would continue to hold the remaining 13.4 per cent.

Technalogics Computing. In March 1980 the NEB announced an investment of 4,000 £1 ordinary shares and 40,000 £1 cumulative redeemable preference shares in Technalogics Computing, established to finance the manufacture and marketing of TECS intelligent computer terminal systems. The other shareholders in the company were Technalogics Ltd with 4,000 ordinary shares and Sapling Enterprise [see page 29678] with 1,100; Rigby Electronics [ibid.] had an option to acquire 900 ordinary shares.

During 1979 and early 1980 the following NEB associated companies were placed in receivership:

(i) British Tanners Products, in which the NEB held a 50 per cent share [see page 29677]—joint receivers and managers appointed on July 20, 1979; (ii) J and P Engineering [ibid.]—receiver appointed on March 28, 1980; (iii) Mayflower Packaging [ibid.]—receiver appointed in December 1979; (iv) Technical Resources (Equipment), in which the NEB had a 24.5 per cent share [see page 29678]—went into receivership in September 1979; (v) Vicort of London [ibid.]—receiver appointed in February 1980; (vi) ASR Servotron [see above]—receiver and manager appointed in May 1980.

In addition, the NEB in September 1979 sold its ordinary shares in Pakmet International [see page 28545] for £3,000 (representing a loss of £44,000) and a receiver was appointed to the company in December 1979; the NEB retained its preference share holding.

It was announced on June 30, 1980, by Herbert Ltd, the machine tool company which came into government ownership in 1975 [see page 27624] and was transferred to the NEB as a wholly owned subsidiary early in 1976 [see page 28544], that active negotiations were under way for the sale of its various remaining factories (in Coventry and Birmingham) and that protective redundancy notices were being issued to 1,343 employees under the 1975 Employment Protection Act.

Following the injection of an additional £10,000,000 in 1978 [see page 29678] a further £8,300,000 was provided on March 30, 1979, bringing total NEB investment in Herbert at the end of 1979 to £44,470,000 (written down to £33,400,000 as being the book value of net assets at Dec. 31, 1979). However, the company incurred a pretax loss of over £5,000,000 in 1979, and provision of £10,600,000 was made in the NEB's 1979 accounts for estimated losses arising from closures or disposals. It was subsequently indicated that the NEB would not make any more finance available, and on Jan. 29, 1980, the company stated that it was planning a reorganization involving some 700 redundancies and certain disposals, which were completed or were put well in hand over the following months.

As announced on July 19, 1979 [see pages 29831-32], it was the Conservative Government's policy that the NEB should realize some £100,000,000 through the sale of assets in the 1979-80 financial year. However, during the second reading debate on the Industry Bill in the House of Lords on Feb. 18, 1980 [see below], Viscount Trenchard (Minister of State, Department of Industry) said that there was "no longer the same pressing need for the NEB to realize £100,000,000 from disposals in the current year"; although it was a matter for the NEB to decide, having regard to the interests of the company and the taxpayer, he expected that there would be further disposals before too long.

ICL. The NEB on Dec. 17, 1979, sold its 25 per cent stake in International Computers through placement on the market, the total received for the 8,342,250 shares in question being about £38,000,000. The Government had originally acquired a holding in ICL in 1968 [see page 24742], and had subsequently increased its share of the equity [see pages 28545 and 29678].

Hird Brown. The NEB's holding in the Hird Brown electronics company, acquired in April 1978 [see page 29677], was redeemed following the sale of the company to Ransome Hoffman Pollard in September 1979.

Fairey Engineering. It was announced on May 1, 1980, that, subject to government approval, an offer of about £24,000,000 had been accepted for the sale to Doulton and Co. Ltd (a subsidiary of S. Pearson and Son) of the issued share capital of Fairey Holdings (acquired by the NEB in 1978 for £18,000,000—see 29402 B); the main rival for the purchase of Fairey had been Hambros Bank, which had initially in February 1980 offered £19,500,000. The Government's consent to the sale was given on May 15, and the price eventually agreed on June 27 and finalized on June 30, following a revision of Fairey's profit forecast, was approximately £22,000,000.

Ferranti. The NEB announced on May 23, 1980, that it had decided shortly to dispose of its remaining 50 per cent holding in Ferranti, the electronics and computer group. (The Government had originally acquired 62.5 per cent of the Ferranti equity in 1975—see page 27624—and this had been taken over by the NEB early in 1976 shortly after the Board's establishment—see page 28544; the holding had been reduced to 50 per cent in 1978—see page 29678.) Following this announcement, with the possibility that the whole 50 per cent might be acquired by a single purchaser, concern was expressed in various quarters that the company should retain its independence (the rest of the equity being owned as to 19 per cent by the Ferranti family and trusts associated with it and the remaining 31 per cent by others) and also that the company's Scottish operations in particular should not be endangered. A debate was held in the House of Commons on June 18 on an opposition motion expressing the opinion that any sale which threatened the wellbeing of the company and the security and future employment prospects of its 17,000 employees would be contrary to the national interest; this wording was rejected by 307 votes to 240, and the House then approved by 305 votes to 239 a government amendment welcoming the Government's intention that the NEB's shareholding should be sold as soon as practicable, "having regard to the interests of the company, the taxpayer and other such considerations as the Government may draw to the Board's attention". Liberal and Scottish National Party members and also Mr James Kilfedder (Ulster Progressive Unionist) voted with the Labour opposition, while the Official Unionist Party and Mr John Dunlop (United Ulster Unionist) voted with the Government.

Under arrangements announced on June 30 the NEB's 50 per cent holding would not be sold as a single block but 10,240,000 shares (about 48 per cent of the total equity) would be placed with institutional investors at a price of 530p each (compared with a then ruling market price of 597p—i.e. an 11¼ per cent discount) and the remainder (2 per cent of the total equity) would be retained for Ferranti employees under an appropriate scheme. The 10,240,000 shares to be placed would normally be registered in the name of the National Westminster Bank as nominee for a period of two years, during which time purchasers would undertake not to transfer the beneficial rights in these shares. The placing would realize a total of £54,300,000, compared with a sum of about £6,940,000 which represented the original cost of the 50 per cent shareholding in 1975 (£8,670,000 for the overall 62½ per cent stake). These arrangements were confirmed by Sir Keith Joseph in the House of Commons on July 1, when he stated that he had given the NEB the relevant directions under the 1975 Industry Act, and the placing was completed on the same day.

In order to meet the future needs of Rolls-Royce, the NEB took the lead in 1979 in setting up a new plant to manufacture titanium granules, and development of such a plant started at Shotton, in North Wales; the NEB originally had a 62.5 per cent stake in the project (the remainder being held principally by Rolls-Royce and also by IMI), but with the bringing to an advanced stage of negotiations for the sale of the NEB holding to the private sector it was announced on March 14, 1980, that Rolls-Royce was being invited to acquire the NEB's holding on terms to be negotiated (in view of the decision that shares in Rolls-Royce itself should be transferred from the NEB—see above).

In the financial year ended Dec. 31, 1979, according to the annual report and accounts published on May 6, 1980, the NEB and its subsidiaries—excluding BL and Rolls-Royce—showed an operating loss of £9,900,000 on a turnover of £212,900,000, while the share of profits of associated companies amounted to £19,000,000; after allowing for net interest payable, taxation, minority interests and £17,200,000 of extraordinary items (principally provisions for estimated losses arising from closure or disposal in respect of certain companies, less £8,900,000 profit on sale of shares in International Computers—see above), there was an overall loss of £16,000,000. The return on capital employed for the NEB and its subsidiaries (excluding BL and Rolls-Royce) was 4.8 per cent. These figures are not directly comparable with those given in the 1978 report and accounts [see page 29679] because the earlier figures included BL and Rolls-Royce and also Ferranti (which in September 1978 ceased to be an NEB subsidiary and instead was treated as an associated company—see page 29678).

Pre-tax losses of £122,200,000 and £58,400,000 were recorded in 1979 by BL and Rolls-Royce respectively, compared with pre-tax profits of £1,700,000 and £11,700,000 respectively in 1978. After allowing for taxation, minority interests (BL only) and extraordinary items, there were net overall losses in 1979 of £144,500,000 by BL and of £62,900,000 by Rolls-Royce (as against a net loss of £37,700,000 by BL and a net profit of £7,200,000 by Rolls-Royce in 1978).

Industry Bill

The Industry Bill, designed to implement the Government's policy towards the NEB and also to carry out other aspects of industrial policy, was introduced in the House of Commons on Oct. 23, 1979, but was not enacted until June 30, 1980—i.e. after the end of the 1979-80 financial year.

The main provisions of the Bill as originally published were as follows.

(1) The NEB, together with the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies (SDA and WDA, set up under legislation in 1975—see pages 27622-23) would have the new function of "promoting the private ownership of interests in industrial undertakings by the disposal of securities and other property held by [them]". The NEB's statutory function of extending public ownership into profitable areas of manufacturing industry would be abolished, as would the functions of the NEB, the SDA and the WDA of promoting industrial reorganization and of promoting industrial democracy in their subsidiaries. The NEB would not, however, be required to sell any of its holdings immediately, although all of them would be sold as soon as practicable.

(2) The NEB and the Agencies would be enabled to transfer securities and other property to the Secretary of State, who might also direct the NEB and the Agencies to make such a transfer and to prescribe its terms.

(3) Payments might be made in reduction of public dividend capital (pdc—see page 27065) so as to enable the NEB and the Agencies to surrender to the Consolidated Fund the receipts from the sale of shareholdings which were purchased by means of pdc.

(4) The financial limit of the NEB would remain at £3,000 million and those of the SDA and WDA at £500,000,000 and £250,000,000 respectively. (The 1979 Industry Act—see 29676 B—had made provision for the NEB's limit to be raised by order to not more than £4,500 million and those of the SDA and WDA to £800,000,000 and £400,000,000 respectively. See also below.)

(5) The financial powers of the NEB and the Agencies would be reduced—the power of the NEB to acquire shares in any company without the consent of the Secretary of State being lowered from £10,000,000 to £5,000,000 and the corresponding powers of the SDA and WDA being reduced from £2,000,000 to £1,000,000.

(6) The maximum number of NEB board members would be reduced from 16 to 12. The Secretary of State might nominate persons to be appointed as chief executives of the NEB and of the Agencies. (This latter provision was withdrawn by the Government during the report stage—see below.)

(7) The powers of the Secretary of State to direct the NEB and the Agencies to use his powers under Sections 7 and 8 of the 1972 Industry Act [see page 25407] to give selective financial assistance would be abolished.

(8) The power in Section 4 of the 1975 Industry Act [see 27063 A; 27621 A] enabling the NEB and the Agencies to furnish technical assistance overseas would be abolished (these powers never in fact having been used).

(9) The English Industrial Estates Corporation, set up in its present form in 1960, would be given the same industrial estate functions as were held by the SDA and WDA in Scotland and Wales, including powers both to permit private sector involvement in the Government's factory-building programme and to facilitate a greater degree of self-financing.

(10) Statutory provision was made for the withdrawal of regional development grants in the "intermediate areas" [see page 29831].

(11) The provisions of the 1975 Industry Act relating to planning agreements and disclosure of information would be abolished.

The Bill was read a second time in the House of Commons on Nov. 6 by 307 votes to 250. Three Official Unionists voted with the Government and the Liberals, SNP, *Plaid Cymru* and Mr James Kilfedder (Ulster Unionist) with the Labour opposition.

The Bill was not amended during the committee stage, but during the report stage on Feb. 6-7, 1980, government amendments were approved (i) providing that the Secretary of State might by order provide for the £3,000 million financial limit for the NEB to be reduced to not less than £750,000,000 and (ii) enabling the boards of the NEB, the SDA and the WDA to appoint their own chief executives with the approval of the Secretary of State.

Explaining the first of these amendments on Feb. 6, Sir Keith Joseph said that at the same time the borrowing powers of the Secretary of State would be increased in relation to companies taken over by him from the NEB, provided that the aggregate financial limits of the NEB and the Department of Industry should not exceed £3,000 million. It was the Government's intention, he said, that Rolls-Royce should be transferred from the NEB after the Bill became law. The possibility could also not be ruled out that BL would be dealt with in the same way, but no decision or commitment of any sort had yet been made. The transfer of either or both of these companies would have important implications for the NEB's statutory financial limit. Apart from BL and Rolls-Royce, it was not the Government's intention that the Department of Industry should acquire other shareholdings from the NEB simply in order to reduce the size of its investment portfolio; that would be "quite inconsistent with the Government's policy that the NEB should promote the private ownership of its holdings".

Among unsuccessful amendments was one (defeated by 292 votes to 239 on Feb. 6) seeking to provide that any direction given by the Secretary of State to the NEB or either of the Agencies to transfer property to him, or any other such transfer by the NEB, SDA or WDA, should be by statutory instrument requiring parliamentary approval by resolution.

The Bill was given an unopposed reading in the House of Lords on Feb. 18, 1980.

During the committee stage amendments were agreed on April 29 restoring to the 1972 Industry Act provisions removed by the 1975 Act requiring (i) that assistance given under Sections 7 or 8 of the 1972 Act in the form of loan or share capital should be given in that form only if the Secretary of State was satisfied that it could not, or could not appropriately, be given in any other way and (ii) that Section 8 assistance should be given only when it could not, or could not appropriately, be provided other than by the Secretary of State.

The above and certain other Lords amendments were agreed to by the House of Commons on June 18, and the Bill was enacted on June 30.—(NEB Annual Report and Accounts - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - Hansard - Trade and Industry/British Business) *(Prev. rep. 29676 B; Government's Industrial Policy pages 29831-32, 30153)*

A. COLOMBIA — Siege of Dominican Republic Embassy - Municipal and Provincial Elections - Diplomatic Relations with China

A two-month siege of the Dominican Republic embassy in Bogotá, which began on Feb. 27 with the seizure of 57 hostages in the embassy by 16 members of the Colombian left-wing guerrilla organization M-19, ended without bloodshed on April 27 when the guerrillas were flown to Cuba together with the remaining 12 diplomatic hostages. Of the other 45 persons originally taken hostage, (i) all 15 women (among them the Costa Rican ambassador) were released on Feb. 28-29, (ii) the Uruguayan ambassador escaped on March 17, (iii) 23 were released at intervals during the siege, including the Austrian ambassador on March 6, and (iv) four ambassadors and two Colombian citizens were released at Bogotá airport on April 27.

Throughout 24 rounds of negotiations which involved two Colombian Government representatives, one guerrilla and one hostage (the Mexican ambassador), President Turbay Ayala refused to accede to the guerrillas' main demands (which were subsequently reduced) for the release of 311 political prisoners and the payment of a ransom of $50,000,000. The deadlock in the talks was broken a week before the eventual end of the siege when Cuba offered its good offices and an aircraft to transport the guerrillas to Havana; also instrumental was the entry into the talks of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IHRC) of the Organization of American States (OAS), which agreed to observe trials of political prisoners currently in progress in Colombia.

M-19 (April 19 Movement) emerged in the early 1970s following a split in the National Popular Alliance (Anapo) of the former populist President, Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-57), and took its name from the date of April 19, 1970, when the General was defeated in presidential elections by Dr Misael Pastrana Borrero [see 24825 A]. The movement subsequently gravitated away from the right-orientated populist nationalism of Anapo towards a leftist stance and by the late 1970s was regarded as a Marxist organization.

Its first operation, in January 1974, was the theft from a museum outside Bogotá of the sword and spurs of Simon Bolívar ("The Liberator"); its later acts included kidnappings and murders [see 28055 A; 28667 A; page 29278] and the theft on Jan. 1, 1979, of 5,000 weapons from an army arsenal [see 29584 A]. During 1979 the armed forces carried out concerted action against M-19 and claimed at the end of the year that the movement had been virtually eliminated, 219 suspects being placed on trial before a military court in accordance with a new security statute [see 29584 A; 29277 B]. M-19's leaders, Sr Carlos Toledo Plata (a doctor and former Anapo parliamentarian) and Sr Jaime Bateman Cayón, regarded M-19's aim to be the achievement of a democratic and, ultimately, socialist state by political means.

The ambassadors seized at the embassy on Feb. 27, where a reception had been in progress to celebrate the Dominican Republic's Independence Day, were those of Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Mexico, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The papal nuncio and the Bolivian chargé d'affaires as well as other diplomatic personnel and ordinary citizens were also taken hostage. The guerrilla commando, consisting of 10 men and five women, was led by "Commandante Uno" (who later identified himself as Sr Rosemberg Pabón Pabón, a former university professor from Cali) and originally consisted of 11 men and five women; however, one of the guerrillas was killed in shooting at the beginning of the action, in which three policemen, a civilian and the Paraguayan vice-consul were injured.

Negotiations were carried out in a van parked in the embassy grounds and involved two Colombian Foreign Ministry representatives (Sr Ramiro Zambrano and Sr Camilo Jiménez), one guerrilla (believed to be Srta Mary Brigel) and the Mexican ambassador, Sr Ricardo Galán Méndez. M-19's original demands, which had also included the withdrawal of security forces from around the embassy and the publication of a guerrilla communiqué in the internal and foreign press, were eventually reduced to the payment of a ransom of $10,000,000 and the release of 28 prisoners. President Turbay Ayala insisted that any such releases would contravene the Constitution, but on March 12 he appointed a team of nine lawyers to investigate ways of accelerating the trial of 219 M-19 detainees which had been in progress since the end of 1979 and which was due to go on for another year.

An IHRC team entered Colombia on April 21, at the request of M-19 and at the invitation of the Government, to investigate charges of torture and arbitrary arrests, and on April 22 the team went into the embassy for the first of several sessions of talks. The Cuban ambassador also arrived at the embassy on April 24, as did two private negotiators who were believed to have arranged for the payment of a ransom of $2,500,000.

After accepting assurances that the M-19 trials would be monitored by IHRC observers, the guerrillas on April 27 left for the airport in two buses together with the remaining 18 hostages; 12 diplomats, including the papal nuncio, accompanied the aircraft to Havana after the other six hostages (two Colombians and the Egyptian, Venezuelan, Dominican Republic and Israeli ambassadors) had been freed at the airport.

In Havana Sr Pabón claimed that the operation had been a success because it had shown the world that repression and torture existed in Colombia. President Turbay Ayala said on April 27 in a broadcast that the outcome of the action showed that "a problem of this magnitude can be resolved in a peaceful way" and that it had left the guerrillas with "the satisfaction that they had done all they could for the [imprisoned] members of their organization and full of hope about the honest conduct of Colombian justice". He invited them to lay down their arms and to "use their intelligence and their energies in the service of Colombia".

During the embassy siege Amnesty International on April 1 submitted a report to the Colombian Government prepared on the basis of a visit paid to Colombia in January by a three-member team. Among its recommendations made public on April 16 (despite a request for secrecy by Colombia for the duration of the embassy occupation) were (i) that the state of siege which had been in force almost interruptedly for some 30 years [see 27314 A; 28055 A] should be ended and (ii) that the trial of civilians by military courts should cease. Amnesty International's report said that 33 torture centres specializing in 50 different kinds of torture existed in Colombia and that the state of siege had resulted in "an almost permanent suspension of the guarantees that protect human rights in the Colombian Constitution".

In other major security developments, (i) Mrs Teleri Jones (a British subject) and her son Owen (16) were kidnapped from their ranch near the Venezuelan border on Jan. 5, apparently by the (Castroite) National Liberation Army (ELN), which called on Mr Cyril Jones to pay a ransom of $214,000; and (ii) a US Peace Corps worker, Mr Richard Starr, who had been kidnapped on Feb. 14, 1977, by the (pro-Soviet) Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) was freed on Feb. 11, 1980, after a US news reporter had borrowed the money to pay a ransom of $250,000.

Municipal and Provincial Elections

In elections held on March 9 to 8,600 municipal council seats and 406 seats on provincial legislatures, the ruling Liberal Party obtained about 1,800,000 votes and the Conservative Party about 1,100,000. Some 80 per cent of the electorate of 14,000,000 abstained from voting, despite calls from the Government that voters should go to the polls to demonstrate their faith in the democratic process to the guerrillas then holding the Dominican Republic embassy.

Diplomatic Relations with China

Diplomatic relations were established at ambassadorial level between Colombia and China with effect from Feb. 7, 1980, the former recognizing the Government of the People's Republic as the sole legal government of China.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - New York Times - Financial Times - Beijing Review) *(Prev. rep. 29584 A; Election of President Turbay Ayala 29204 A, 29277 B; Municipal and Provincial Elections 29048 A, 28055 A)*

A. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION — Spring Ministerial Council Meeting - Meetings of Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group - Naming of United Kingdom Sites for Cruise Missiles - NATO Military Appointments

The spring ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, attended by the Foreign Ministers of the 15 NATO member countries, was held in Ankara on June 25-26. The following communiqué (cross-headings inserted) was issued at the conclusion of the meeting:

International Situation. "In reviewing the international situation, ministers noted with concern that the past six months have been overshadowed by developments which challenge the foundations of stability in the world. The rules which govern relations between states are defined in the United Nations Charter: the violations of these rules have led to tensions which are prejudicial to the understanding and trust which ought to govern relations between states. Ministers underlined the opposition of their Governments to threat or use of force and they reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. They considered it particularly important in present circumstances to reaffirm their determination to work together for the achievement of the fundamental ideals and aims of the Atlantic Alliance: national independence, security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this connexion they underlined the importance of close political consultation within the Alliance.

Afghanistan. "Ministers expressed their deep concern at the continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces [see 30362 A; 30381 A]. This occupation of a traditionally neutral and non-aligned country of the Third World has aroused the resistance of the Afghan people, led to the flight of about a million refugees and has been condemned by the overwhelming majority of the international community in resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Commission, the Islamic Conference and other bodies. They regard as unacceptable this armed intervention and the attempt to crush the national resistance of the Afghan people by massive military force, and they note that the arguments used by the Soviet Government to justify its actions are totally unconvincing. Reaffirming the words of the UN General Assembly resolution of Jan. 14, 1980 [see page 30237], adopted by 104 votes, ministers stressed the need for 'immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan' and urged the Soviet Government to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country and the rights of the Afghan people freely to determine their future.

"Ministers noted that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan carried with it very serious implications for the general strategic situation. By using its own military forces directly to impose its will, this time on a non-aligned country, the Soviet Government has clearly demonstrated its readiness to exploit opportunities to shift the balance of forces in its favour. It has thus given rise to grave concerns about its future intentions and is threatening the security of a region which is vital for world peace and stability. While recognizing that the security of the region is primarily the concern of the countries there, ministers welcomed the fact that members of the Alliance are, by reason of their relations with those countries, in a position to make a contribution to peace and stability in the region.

"Ministers agreed that the international crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the Allies. It is vital that the Soviet Government should be left in no doubt as to the extremely grave view which the Allies take of this situation which jeopardizes world peace. Ministers reaffirmed that there could be no question of accepting a fait accompli resulting from the use of force. Afghanistan should be neither a pawn nor a threat for anyone. They stressed the need for a political settlement which must necessarily provide for the total and immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces so as to enable the Afghan people to decide on its future peacefully with complete freedom and without any outside pressure. The recent announcement that some Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Afghanistan would only be of interest if it were the beginning of a total withdrawal. Ministers welcomed the important role which the Islamic Conference and the non-aligned movement have assumed in the search for a political solution. Ministers noted that while there had been various proposals formulated or inspired by the Soviet Union, including the ideas advanced in the declaration of the Warsaw Pact states of May 15, 1980 [see page 30384], none of them had addressed the basic issues and all would subject the national independence and right of self-determination of the Afghan people to restrictions unacceptable in international law."

[The Soviet Government had announced on June 22 that "some army units whose stay in Afghanistan is not necessary at present" were being withdrawn to Soviet territory in agreement with the Afghan Government.]

Détente. "Ministers noted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had done serious damage to détente, to which they reaffirmed their attachment. They restated their willingness to work for the improvement of East-West relations and their wish to keep open the channels of communication between the countries of East and West, so as to make their views clear, to prevent misunderstanding, to facilitate a resolution of the present crisis, and to foster constructive co-operation, as circumstances permit. They reaffirmed, however, that détente cannot be pursued in one region of the world regardless of developments in another. Moreover, they agreed that restoration of a co-operative relationship must be based on a foundation of mutual confidence, and this has been shaken by recent Soviet actions. It will need to be rebuilt by positive action on the part of the Soviet Government to live up to the peaceful intentions which it professes.

Growth of Soviet and Warsaw Pact Forces. "In addition to the concern created by the invasion of Afghanistan, ministers noted that, despite Warsaw Pact statements that they did not seek military superiority, there was no sign of any slackening of the substantial rate of growth in the quality, readiness and strength of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces which threaten to increase the present military disparities, particularly in Europe. Ministers, therefore, re-emphasized their Governments' resolve to take all necessary steps individually or collectively to maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the full spectrum.

"They reaffirmed that more effective use of resources through co-operative equipment programmes and increased standardization and interoperability of weapons systems was a key element in conventional force modernization and they noted with satisfaction further progress in this respect. They reaffirmed too that they would continue to work through the transatlantic dialogue towards more balanced relations among the European and North American Allies in armaments development and production and towards heightened availability and quality of new defence equipment. In this connexion ministers welcomed the work of the conference of national armaments directors. They also commented on the importance of the work of the independent European programme group [formed in December 1975—see 27539 A] and the progress they expected of it. They re-emphasized the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialized members of the Alliance in the course of improving armaments co-operation. Ministers also stressed the significance of maintaining the technological advantages which NATO members possess.

Arms Control and Disarmament. "In parallel with the efforts of their Governments to maintain and strengthen their defence capabilities, ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the pursuit of effective, balanced and verifiable measures of disarmament and arms control. They nonetheless noted that the prospects for success will depend on the restoration of international confidence and stability. Ministers emphasized that their Governments wished to avoid a competitive arms race, but the substantial reductions in the level of forces which they seek will only be possible if negotiations are based on a genuine willingness to achieve undiminished security for all participants and if the Warsaw Pact countries are convinced of the determination of the Allies to maintain an adequate level of defence capabilities. They devoted particular attention to the various initiatives of members of the Alliance in the area of arms control. They noted that these proposals had not met with a positive response. Ministers reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to play their full part in the current disarmament work of the committee on disarmament in Geneva as well as of the UN disarmament commission and other UN bodies. They underlined the importance they attach to the frequent and active consultations which take place on arms control and disarmament questions within the context of the permanent machinery of the Alliance.

SALT II Treaty. "Ministers reaffirmed their support for the SALT II treaty [see 30117 A] which represents a significant contribution towards curbing the arms race and to ensuring the security of the Alliance and the stability of East-West relations. They expressed regret that the current international crisis had delayed until now the process of ratification of the treaty. Ministers expressed the hope that circumstances would make possible its ratification by both sides at the earliest opportunity. They hoped that the continuation of the SALT process on the basis of further close consultations within the Alliance would make possible further reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field between the United States and the Soviet Union and create a favourable climate for progress in other fields of arms control.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. "The ministers of the countries participating in the negotiations [in Vienna] on MBFR [see page 27815] affirmed the continued importance of progress in those negotiations as a means of achieving a more stable force relationship in central Europe on the basis of genuine parity in military manpower in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and a combined common collective ceiling on ground and air force manpower for each side. The determination of Western participants in those talks to achieve progress and to come to early results was demonstrated by their presentation in Vienna in December 1979 of important new proposals for an interim Phase 1 agreement and associated measures as part of the programme of arms control initiatives approved by those ministers earlier in December 1979 [see page 30162]. These proposals, which thus far remain unanswered by the East, are the most recent substantive proposals advanced in the Vienna talks. They provide a realistic framework for achieving a first negotiated result, including the reduction and limitation of United States and Soviet ground force manpower in the area on the basis of agreed data on these personnel, and associated measures which would aid verification of reductions and limitations, increase military stability, enhance mutual understanding of the military posture and activities of the other side, and diminish the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

"These ministers noted the expression in the recent declaration of the Warsaw Pact states [see above] of a desire for more rapid progress in the Vienna talks. They called on the Warsaw Pact states to give concrete expression to this statement through practical movement on the data issue and through an early, constructive and substantive Eastern response to the Western proposals of December 1979.

Helsinki Final Act. "Turning to the process initiated by the [1975] Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE], ministers noted that, in this field also, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had seriously affected the confidence necessary for progress. They recalled that in the CSCE Final Act [see 27301 A] the participating states had declared their intention to conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of the principles guiding relations between themselves. It was therefore a matter of particular concern that the Soviet Union had acted and was still acting in Afghanistan in a manner violating the principles to which it had committed itself at Helsinki at the highest level. Ministers also deplored the increased suppression in certain countries of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the harassment, imprisonment, internal exile and banishment of those who strive for implementation of the Final Act. They expressed their concern that, despite some positive developments, implementation in the field of human contacts remained uneven. They also noted with regret the lack of progress towards the freer flow of information.

"Against this background ministers considered the approach to the forthcoming CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid [see 28957 A]. They stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Final Act. They agreed that the emphasis must be placed on full implementation of its principles and provisions. Therefore, Allied representatives at Madrid will engage in a thorough, frank and measured review of implementation with a view to stimulating improvement. Ministers noted that the prospects for progress at Madrid, and in particular for the consideration of new proposals, would be influenced by the course of this review and would depend on the international situation at that time. With this in mind, and recognizing the importance of the CSCE process for promoting contacts and negotiations between participating states, ministers agreed to continue to develop a balanced group of proposals and remain prepared to discuss and to take account of concrete proposals for balanced and significant progress in all fields of the Final Act which may be advanced by other participants.

"Ministers reviewed the various proposals that have been developed so far in the field of CBMs [continental ballistic missiles] and of certain aspects of security and disarmament. In this connexion, ministers recalled their agreement at the North Atlantic Council meeting of December 1979 to work towards the adoption during the Madrid CSCE meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE, as proposed by the Government of France, on militarily significant and verifiable CBMs, applicable to the entire continent of Europe, this means including the whole of the European part of the Soviet Union [see page 30162]. They expressed the hope that circumstances noted above would permit concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting. They noted that work was continuing in the Alliance on CMBs related to military activities which would accord with these prerequisites. They agreed to continue their common efforts in this area, while recognizing that present circumstances required the Council in permanent session to evaluate developments on a constant basis.

Berlin and Germany. "Ministers examined developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole since their last meeting in December 1979. They expressed satisfaction with the working of the quadripartite agreement of Sept. 3, 1971 [see 24813 A], and agreed that the situation in and around Berlin has continued relatively quiet. They underlined the fundamental importance of an undisturbed climate in Berlin and on the access routes for the maintenance of security and stability in Europe. Ministers noted with satisfaction the conclusion of the agreements and arrangements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on April 30, 1980. They welcomed the favourable effects which these will have, particularly for Berlin."

[These agreements provided for improved facilities for transit traffic between West Germany and West Berlin. For 1978 agreement see page 30058.]

"In connexion with the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Bonn and Paris Conventions [see 14237 A], ministers recalled that these conventions enabled the Federal Republic of Germany to become an equal member of the North Atlantic Alliance, laid the foundations for its close co-operation, based on mutual trust, with the partners in the Alliance and contributed thereby to the strength of the Alliance and to the preservation of peace and security in Europe. They took this opportunity to recall also the importance for the improvement of the situation in Europe and of the treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union [1970—see 24143 A], Poland [1970—see 24345 A], Czechoslovakia [1973—see 26365 A] as well as with the German Democratic Republic [1972—see 25621 A]. Recalling that these treaties did not affect the rights and responsibilities of the four powers relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, they reaffirmed their support for the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

Mediterranean. "Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the Council in permanent session to continue its consultations on this subject and report to them at their next meeting.

South-Eastern Flank. "Ministers noted that the recent developments in South-West Asia have brought even more sharply into focus the great strategic importance of the south-eastern flank for the security of the Alliance and for the overall balance of power in the region, the maintenance of which is essential for international stability. Ministers therefore stated that the urgency of strengthening the economic and defence postures of these member countries has further increased. In addition ministers stressed, in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the importance of the initiatives undertaken to strengthen the cohesion of the south-eastern flank. In this connexion, ministers also stressed that in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the restoration of full and undiminished solidarity between the member countries concerned takes on a special significance. The ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey [see also 27987 A; 29936 A] and expressed the hope that they would pursue their joint efforts for a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries.

Alliance Economic Co-operation and Assistance. "Ministers reviewed the particular problems faced by the economically less advanced member countries in the light of a report by the Secretary-General. Noting that in the present circumstances the need for a clear demonstration of Allied solidarity is even more important, ministers reaffirmed their attachment to the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and their continued political support for the process of enhancing the economies of those countries. In this context they reiterated the urgent need for an increase in financial assistance and economic co-operation from the Allies which are in a position to do so, through the appropriate bilateral and multilateral channels. They welcomed the efforts being made to find a solution to Turkey's economic problems [see 29500 A and also pages 29921-23], recognizing time was necessary for the current efforts to become fully effective and that they would need to continue over a number of years.

NATO Science Programme. "Ministers recalled the welcome they gave at their spring session in 1979 [see 29911 A] to the intensified consideration being given by the science committee to the possibilities of reducing scientific and technological disparities between member countries through co-operative activities. They endorsed the establishment of a special five-year programme, 'Science for Stability', proposed by the science committee, to strengthen the scientific and technological capabilities of Greece, Portugal and Turkey by means of co-operation with scientific institutions in other countries of the Alliance and thereby contribute to the economic development of these three countries. The modalities of implementation of this programme will be decided by the Council in permanent session.

Middle East. "With respect to the Middle East, ministers reaffirmed the importance of a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They reviewed the situation in the area including the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in developing their mutual relations. Ministers believed that such a settlement should ensure the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to live within secure, recognized and guaranteed boundaries, as well as the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Ministers affirmed that all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people, should participate in a negotiated settlement. Ministers considered that [UN] Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 [of 1967 and 1973 respectively—see pages 25029 and 26197], together with the principles stated above, should form the framework for such a settlement. They deemed it essential that this framework should be accepted by all the parties concerned.

World Economic Problems. "Within the context of their discussion of the need for enhancing global stability and security, ministers called upon all countries to assume their share of the responsibility for seeking solutions to world economic problems and for contributing to the economic and social progress of the developing countries in order to bring about a more equitable international economic system. They observed that positive results from the proposed global round of negotiations within the UN concerning raw materials, energy, trade, development and monetary and financial questions would serve the interests of developing as well as developed countries.

Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces. "Ministers of countries who participated in the decision of Dec. 12, 1979, to pursue the two parallel and complementary approaches on long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) modernization and on arms control involving TNF [see 30159 A], having received a report on progress in TNF arms control discussions, welcomed the repeated efforts of the United States, based on full consultations among the Allies concerned, to engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations in the SALT III framework aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet and United States land-based LRTNF consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. In particular, these ministers supported the United States readiness to engage in preliminary exchanges on such limitations without precondition or delay as a useful starting point for negotiating on TNF in the SALT III framework. These ministers regretted that the Soviet responses do not contain anything which would constitute practical measures designed to restore a balanced situation. Neither has the Soviet Union so far shown any willingness to enter into serious negotiations or even to engage in preliminary exchanges. They noted that, although there have been some indications that the Soviet Union recognizes that SALT III could be the appropriate forum for negotiations involving TNF, the Soviet Union continues to repeat, most recently in the Warsaw Pact declaration [see page 30384], unrealistic and unacceptable preconditions which would perpetuate inequality.

"These ministers therefore once again called on the Soviet Union to respond promptly and positively to the United States offers to negotiate and to enter into preliminary exchanges without any preconditions before the ratification of the SALT II treaty. These ministers expressed their concern about Soviet preponderance in LRTNF systems deployed to date, and noted that the systems deployed have already reached a dangerously high level. In addition to its existing force of 450 SS-4 and SS-5 LRTNF [i.e. medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles], the Soviet Union has at present deployed approximately 450 warheads on 150 SS-20 launchers [i.e. new intermediate or limited range ballistic missiles—see also page 28965]. The SS-20 deployments are continuing at a rapid pace. The Soviet Union is in the process of deploying for its SS-20 force alone more warheads than are planned for the entire modernization programme agreed to in December 1979. By contrast, deployments in Allied countries will not begin until late in 1983.

"These ministers pointed out that it was the need to preserve the Alliance's deterrent capability against the background of existing disparity in LRTNF in favour of the Soviet Union which gave rise to the decision of their Governments to modernize LRTNF, and that the continuing Soviet deployments of new SS-20 missiles will further increase that disparity.

"These ministers further noted that the modernization programme was deliberately restrained as compared with the qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities. In this regard, they also noted that the withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral part of the LRTNF modernization and arms control decision has begun; they recalled that the new LRTNF warheads decided upon on Dec. 12, 1979, would be accommodated within the reduced level. These ministers recalled their statement of Dec. 12, 1979, that arms control, by constraining the Soviet build-up, can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente. Ministers reiterated that the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results achieved through negotiations."

Meeting of Defence Planning Committee

Afghanistan had also been discussed at a ministerial meeting of the defence planning committee (DPC) in Brussels on May 13-14, which was attended on the latter date by Foreign as well as Defence Ministers. The relevant sections of the committee's communiqué were as follows:

"Ministers expressed their concern that for the first time in the post-war era the Soviet Union had used military force to impose its will on a non-aligned country of the Third World and in a way which affected the overall strategic situation. Ministers denounced this use of force which jeopardizes international peace and stability and strikes at the principles of the UN Charter, and called for the total and immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan must be free to shape their future without outside interference.

"Ministers further agreed that the stability of regions outside NATO boundaries, particularly in the South-West Asia area, and the secure supply of essential commodities from this area are of crucial importance. Therefore, the current situation has serious implications for the security of member countries. The altered strategic situation in South-West Asia warrants full solidarity and the strengthening of Allied cohesion as a response to the new challenges. Ministers recognized that maintenance of the special relationships of Allies with the regional countries are in the interests of the West as well as of the countries of the region.

"It is in the interests of members of the Alliance that countries which are in a position to do so should use their best efforts to help achieve peace and stability in South-West Asia, taking into consideration the interests of the regional countries and the value of their political co-operation. The burden, particularly in so far as defence measures are concerned, falls largely upon the United States which has already taken steps to enhance its effectiveness. Ministers noted that this commitment, which in certain circumstances might substantially increase, could place additional responsibilities on all Allies for maintaining levels and standards of forces necessary for defence and deterrence in the NATO area. Ministers agreed on the need for ensuring that at the same time as the United States carries out the efforts to strengthen defence capabilities for South-West Asia described above, Allied capabilities to deter aggression and to defend NATO Europe are also maintained and strengthened."

The ministers concluded the meeting by endorsing NATO force goals for the period 1981-86.

Nuclear Planning Group

A meeting of the nuclear planning group (NPG) was held in Bodo (Norway) on June 3-4, the following Defence Ministers being present: Mr Charles Poswick (Belgium), Mr Gilles Lamontagne (Canada), Mr Poul Soegaard (Denmark), Dr Hans Apel (West Germany), Signor Lelio Lagorio (Italy), Mr Willem Scholten (Netherlands), Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway), Sr Adelino Amaro da Costa (Portugal), Mr Ahmet Ihsan Birincioglu (Turkey), Mr Francis Pym (United Kingdom) and Dr Harold Brown (United States). Greece was represented by its permanent representative to NATO, Mr Nicolas Athanassiou. Portugal was represented at a ministerial meeting of the NPG for the first time.

The following communiqué was issued at the conclusion of the meeting:

"Following a briefing by the US Secretary of Defence, ministers discussed strategic policy and planning concerning central strategic and theatre nuclear forces in support of the Alliance. Against this background, ministers noted the continuing importance of improving the effectiveness of the full spectrum of Alliance forces, i.e. conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear forces, and of maintaining the essential linkage between these elements of the NATO triad. Ministers concluded their discussion of policy and planning by reaffirming the NATO strategy of flexible response and forward defence.

"Ministers took stock of the implementation of the integrated decision on LRTNF modernization and arms control taken by Foreign and Defence Ministers on Dec. 12, 1979. Ministers re-emphasized, as was done at the recent DPC meeting [see above], their concern that the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 missiles and Backfire [medium-range bomber—see page 30123] was continued unabated, further increasing the already existing disparity in LRTNF in favour of the Soviet Union. Moreover, ministers noted with concern the continued retention of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missile launchers. This, coupled with the continuing deployment of SS-20 missiles, might lead to an even larger Soviet superiority in LRTNF in the mid-1980s than previously anticipated. Ministers underlined that NATO's LRTNF modernization programme was a deliberately restrained one compared with the existing capability and continuing growth of Soviet nuclear forces facing the Alliance. Ministers noted that the implementation of the modernization decision is moving ahead, with an initial operational capability in Europe anticipated towards the end of 1983.

"Ministers regretted that the Soviet Union had rejected two offers by the United States to conduct serious negotiations on arms involving LRTNF and was instead advancing unacceptable preconditions, which would perpetuate inequality, to any negotiations or even preliminary arms control exchanges. Ministers called on the Soviet Union to respond positively and accept without delay the repeated offer by the United States, following consultations within the Alliance, to negotiate verifiable limitations on United States and Soviet LRTNF in accordance with the decision of Foreign and Defence Ministers on Dec. 12, 1979.

"In this connexion, ministers also noted a progress report on the work of the special consultative group on arms control [see page 30161] involving theatre nuclear forces which supports the United States negotiating effort. This group meets regularly within the Alliance. Ministers reiterated their support for early ratification of SALT II.

"Ministers also noted that the withdrawal of 1,000 US nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral part of the LRTNF modernization and arms control decision has begun. They recalled that the new LRTNF warheads decided upon on Dec. 12, 1979, would be accommodated within the reduced level.

"Ministers were informed of progress by the NPG's high level group on fulfilling its mandate to examine the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole.

"Ministers reviewed consultation procedures in NATO crisis management exercises. They reiterated the importance of continuing to practise such procedures and noted ways in which they might be further developed in future exercises.

"Ministers also considered the future NPG work programme as summarized by the Secretary-General. They decided to hold their next meeting in autumn 1980 at NATO headquarters in Brussels."

Naming of UK Sites for Cruise Missiles

Mr Pym told the UK House of Commons on June 17 that the 160 ground-launched cruise missiles to be deployed in Britain under the LRTNF modernization programme would be stationed at two existing military establishments.

Mr Pym said: "The missiles will be stationed at two existing military establishments, the US Air Force standby base at RAF Greenham Common in Berkshire, and RAF Molesworth, a disused airfield in Cambridgeshire, currently used by the US Air Force for storage purposes. Greenham Common will be the main operating base for the cruise missile units in the UK and will house six flights of cruise missiles. Molesworth will house four flights. It is planned that the first units will deploy at Greenham Common in 1983. The factors affecting the decision stemmed from the prime operational need to bring the first missiles into service as soon as possible. The choice had therefore to concentrate on establishments already in defence occupation which had sufficient space available and as many as possible of the basic facilities, in particular adequate accommodation, road communications, and access to training areas and suitable dispersal areas. Many different locations for stationing have been very carefully studied, but the two bases chosen proved to be the most suitable in the light of the considerations to which I have just referred.

"The deployment of the ground-launched cruise missile force will generate very little aircraft movement at either of the bases, probably no more than a few a month. As to ground movements, it will be necessary from time to time to practise the deployment of the launcher and its support vehicles to dispersed sites away from the base. These exercises will be along preplanned routes and will take place after consultation with the local authorities concerned. No live missiles or warheads will be carried on exercises at any time and no missile test flying will take place in this country. The missiles will be stored in purpose-built shelters in conditions that fully meet the UK's very stringent safety standards—standards that have proved themselves effective since the inception of a nuclear capability in Britain. As part of the security arrangements, we shall be contributing 200 British personnel towards the guard forces for the bases and dispersal deployments.

"I am having an information folder prepared, covering all aspects of the basing of cruise missiles in the UK. Copies will be placed in the library [of the House of Commons] and will also be sent to the local authorities in the areas concerned. The information folder will also be available to those members of the public living in the areas of these sites who wish to know more about the reasons underlying these decisions. I am notifying the local authorities concerned about the deployment, and their views on the environmental and social aspects of the arrival of the cruise missile units will be taken into account to the fullest possible extent. They will of course be consulted in due course on the detailed building plans.

"The total cost to the UK of the whole modernization programme throughout the Alliance will be of the order of £16,000,000. As I made clear in the House on Dec. 13 [1979], the 160 cruise missiles to be based in the UK are an integral part of a programme to deploy 572 US missiles in a number of European countries. The Alliance-wide support for the new system and its widely spread deployment throughout Europe is a clear expression of the determination of NATO as a whole to preserve its security. The Soviet Union has developed a large and expanding capability in long-range theatre nuclear forces which directly threatens the whole of Western Europe. In view of the markedly increasing threat we face, the Alliance has decided that it is essential to modernize its own theatre nuclear forces which are ageing and becoming increasingly vulnerable. At the same time, the Government, and the Alliance, remain fully committed to the parallel arms control approach which was agreed in December as part of the modernization decision. As the House will be aware, the Soviet Union has rejected repeated offers by the United States to negotiate, and has maintained its obviously unacceptable demand that NATO should abandon its modernization programme as a precondition for negotiation. However, we shall continue to try and persuade the Russians to come to the table and play their part in a genuine negotiation.

"The instability in the world today and the growing military strength of the Warsaw Pact countries require us to be exceptionally vigilant. NATO's unanimous decision on theatre nuclear modernization was taken for the continuing security of the whole Alliance, and the UK is determined to play her full part."

Replying to Mr William Rodgers, chief spokesman of the opposition Labour Party on defence, Mr Pym said that the political decision on the use of the missiles required a joint decision by the US and UK Governments.

NATO Military Appointments

Adml. Günter Luther, formerly Chief of Staff of the West German Navy, succeeded Gen. Gerd Schmückle (West Germany) on April 1, 1980, as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe [see page 29144].

Air Marshal Sir Keith Williams was appointed on June 17, 1980, to succeed Air Chief Marshal Sir David Evans as Commander-in-Chief UK Air Forces on Sept. 15, 1980.—(NATO Information Department, Brussels - Times - International Herald Tribune - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. 30159 A*)

A. BELGIUM — Resignation of Government following Dispute over Regional Assembly for Brussels - Formation of New Cabinet

Dr Wilfried Martens, the Belgian Prime Minister, submitted the resignation of his coalition Government to King Baudouin on April 9, 1980, following the failure of two attempts to secure the approval of the Senate (Upper House of the Belgian Parliament) for the Government's proposals concerning the devolution of certain powers to a regional parliamentary assembly in Brussels, the national capital. The issue of devolution—a longstanding source of controversy—had already led to a series of political crises in the course of which the proposed timescale for the necessary constitutional changes had been substantially altered [see 30249 A].

Dr Martens on May 18 formed a new coalition Government which included the two Liberal parties, the *Parti réformateur et libéral* (PRL—see below) and the *Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang* (PVV), as well as the (Walloon) *Parti social chrétien* (PSC) and *Parti socialiste belge* (PSB) and the (Flemish) *Christelijke Volkspartij* (CVP) and *Belgische Socialistische Partij* (BSP)—the last four of these parties having comprised Dr Martens's most recent coalition Government after the withdrawal in January 1980 of the French-speaking Democratic Front (*Front démocratique francophone*—FDF) [see page 30250]. The new coalition commanded 177 seats in the 212-seat Chamber of Representatives (Lower House).

The *Parti réformateur et libéral* was formed on June 23, 1979, by the amalgamation of the *Parti pour la réforme et la liberté de la Wallonie* (PRWL) and the *Parti libéral* (PL) of Brussels, following the May 1979 decision of the two parties to unite [see 29751 C]. (Although the title *Parti de la réforme et de la liberté*, as given on 29751 C, was at first agreed, the party was constituted on June 23 as the *Parti réformateur et libéral*, whereupon Mr Jean Gol was elected as its chairman.)

Failure of Proposals for Constitutional Reforms - Resignation of Government

The Government's difficulties arose from the need to secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate for the passage of constitutional reforms relating to the establishment of regional assemblies in the (Dutch-speaking) Flemish and (French-speaking) Walloon regions of Belgium and in predominantly French-speaking Brussels—these proposals being based on the so-called "Egmont pact" [see 28458 C; 29179 A; 29376 A] which had been agreed in March 1978.

Whereas the desirability of such a devolution was generally agreed, and whereas the establishment of the proposed bodies for Flanders and Wallonia had hitherto caused little controversy, the composition and powers of the proposed assembly for Brussels had for some years been the subject of heated disagreement among the country's linguistic groups. Flemish parties such as the CVP, to which Dr Martens belonged, had consistently maintained that the proposed assembly for Brussels would give unduly extensive powers to the 44 per cent of the population who were French-speaking. Such arguments had led to the withdrawal of the FDF from the coalition and to the postponement on two occasions of important stages in the transitional process in order to allow the Government to concentrate on the country's increasing economic and industrial difficulties [see page 30249].

When the Government's revised proposals for the introduction of regional autonomy were presented to the Senate in late March 1980, the clauses relating to the proposed assembly for Brussels were rejected, obtaining only 117 of the 176 votes cast (i.e. one vote less than the two-thirds majority required). Four CVP senators voted (on March 26) against the Government and five abstained, following a resurgence of demands within the CVP that adequate safeguards for Dutch speakers should be built into the proposed legislation for the Brussels assembly.

Dr Martens immediately held talks with the leaders of all four coalition parties and on April 2 resubmitted the proposals, having stressed that he would regard a second defeat as a vote of no confidence in his Government. However, the proposals were again rejected on April 2, when six CVP senators voted against the disputed clauses and two abstained.

Dr Martens on April 3 tendered the resignation of his Government to King Baudouin, but was asked by the King to attempt a reconciliation within the coalition. On April 9, however, following the failure of further talks, the Government's resignation was accepted, although it undertook to continue in a caretaker capacity until a new administration had been appointed.

Formation of Six-Party Coalition Government

On April 12 King Baudouin appointed Mr Willy Claes (BSP), a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Affairs, as *informateur* to investigate possibilities for the formation of a new government. Mr Claes completed his inquiries on April 17, whereupon King Baudouin asked Dr Martens to attempt the formation of a broad-based coalition including the Flemish and French-speaking Liberal parties (PVV and PRL) as well as the four Flemish and French-speaking Christian Social and Socialist parties which had, since the removal of the FDF from the coalition, comprised the previous Government.

Although the Liberal parties had not been widely expected to co-operate with the two Socialist parties, it was agreed by all parties that, unless a new coalition could be formed, it would be necessary to call a general election in June (i.e. only 18 months after the previous elections in December 1978—see page 29504).

Dr Martens consequently began negotiations with the six party leaders on April 18, and on April 26 it was announced that a new agreement had been reached whereby Flanders and Wallonia were to progress towards financial autonomy, whereas Brussels was to retain its present status and its three-member executive [see 30249 A and below] until a permanent decision on its new regional assembly had been made. Following the approval of these proposals by all the six party leaders, it was further announced on May 8 that, although the national Government would continue provisionally to collect property and other taxes, Flanders and Wallonia would, from Jan. 1, 1982, receive increasingly large proportions of these monies until they achieved full regional control of property, road, gaming and other taxes on Jan. 1, 1987, by which time they were to have evolved the capability for full financial autonomy. It was intended, said Dr Martens, to reach a decision on the future status of Brussels by 1982.

The agreement reached by the six parties also included commitments to further reduce government expenditure in addition to the public spending cuts already announced by Dr Martens in October 1979 [see page 30249], and to postpone further any decision on the stationing of a new system of nuclear missiles on Belgian territory as part of the country's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defences. (Belgium had already, in December 1979, requested a six-month period of consideration on this matter—see pages 30159-60.)

Dr Martens began discussions on the allocation of portfolios on May 16, and on May 18 presented a Cabinet in which the six parties were represented as follows: CVP seven ministers and two secretaries of state; PSB six ministers and one secretary of state; PSC five ministers and one secretary of state; BSP four ministers and one secretary of state; PVV three ministers and two secretaries of state; and PRL two ministers and two secretaries of state.

The new Cabinet, which was approved on May 18 by King Baudouin, was composed as follows:

Ministers with National Responsibilities

Dr Wilfried Martens (CVP)	Prime Minister
* Mr Guy Spitaels (PSB)	Deputy Prime Minister and Transport
†Mr Herman Vanderpoorten (PVV)	Deputy Prime Minister and Justice and Reform of Institutions
* Mr Willy Claes (BSP)	Economic Affairs
* Mr José Desmarets (PSC)	Scientific Planning and Policy
†Mr Robert Henrion (PRL)	Finance‡
* Mr Jos Chabert (CVP)	Public Works
†Mr Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb (PSC)	Foreign Affairs
†Mr Charles Poswick (PRL)	Defence
* Mr Alfred Califice (PSC)	Public Health and the Environment
Mr Albert Lavens (CVP)	Agriculture and the Middle Classes
†Mr Herman de Croo (PVV)	Posts and Telecommunications and Pensions
* Mr Luc Dhoore (CVP)	Social Security
* Mr Gaston Geens (CVP)	Budget
Mr Robert Urbain (PSB)	Foreign Trade
Mr Marc Eyskens (CVP)	Development Co-operation
Mr Roger de Wulf (BSP)	Employment and Labour
†Mr Elie Deworme (PSB)	Public Service
†Mr Philippe Moureaux (PSB)	Interior and Reform of Institutions

Ministers with Community and Regional Responsibilities

Dr Marc Galle (BSP) Mrs Rika de Backer-van Ocken (CVP) †Mr André Kempinaire (PVV)	Flemish Community Affairs
* Dr Willy Calewaert (BSP)	National Education (Flemish)
Dr Michel Hansenne (PSC)	French-speaking Community Affairs
Mr Jean-Maurice Dehousse (PSB)	Walloon Regional Affairs
Mrs Cécile Goor (PSC)	Brussels Regional Affairs
* Mr Guy Mathot (PSB)	National Education (French-speaking)

Secretaries of State

†Mr Freddy Willockx (BSP)	Finance
Mr Paul Akkermans (CVP) Mrs Rika Steyaert (CVP) †Mrs Lucienne Herman-Michielsens (PVV)	Flemish Community Affairs
†Mr Albert Demuyter (PRL)	French-speaking Community Affairs
†Mr André Bertouille (PRL) †Mr Pierre Mainil (PSC)	Walloon Regional Affairs
†Mr August de Winter (PVV) Mr Guy Cudell (PSB)	Brussels Regional Affairs

* Changed portfolio or responsibility. †New appointment.

‡Mr Henrion resigned on June 30 for reasons of health, being succeeded by Mr Paul Hatry (PRL).

The four regional executives also appointed by King Baudouin on May 18 are set out below, and together comprised all the ministers with community and regional responsibilities and all the secretaries of state with the exception of Mr Willockx (Secretary of State for Finance). [For the establishment of these executives in July 1979, see page 30249.]

Flemish Executive. Mrs de Backer-van Ocken (president), Dr Calewaert, Mr Kempinaire, Dr Galle, Mr Akkermans, Mrs Steyaert, Mrs Herman-Michielsens.

French Community Executive. Dr Hansenne (president), Mr Mathot, Mr Demuyter.

Walloon Regional Executive. Mr Dehousse (president), Mr Mainil, Mr Bertouille.

Brussels Regional Executive. Mrs Goor (president), Mr de Winter, Mr Cudell.

Mr Geens, who in addition had responsibilities in the field of Dutch education, was also a consultative member of the Flemish executive, and Mrs Steyaert and Mr Demuyter held similar posts in the Brussels regional executive.

Mr Vanderpoorten (57) was Minister of the Interior from 1966 until 1968 [see 21323 A; 22823 A] and Minister of Justice from 1973 to 1977 [see 25816 A; 28458 C]; he was elected to the European Parliament in June 1979 [see page 29894]. **Mr Henrion** (65) was Minister of Finance from 1966 to 1968 [see 21323 A]. **Mr Nothomb**

(44) was chairman of the PSC from 1972 until October 1979 [see 29940 C] except for the period 1976-77 [see 28091 A]; he was elected president of the Chamber of Representatives in April 1979 and a member of the European Parliament in June 1979 [see page 29894]. **Mr Poswick** (55) was Minister of Defence from 1966 to 1968 [see 21323 A]. **Mr de Croo** (43), the PVV fraction leader in the Chamber of Representatives, was Minister of (Dutch) National Education from 1974 until 1977 [see 26533 A; 28458 C]. **Mr Deworme** (48), a teacher, had been since December 1979 an indirectly elected member of the Senate (from the region of Namur, south-east of Brussels). **Mr Moureaux** (41), who was the only member of the new Government to hold no seat in the Belgian Parliament, was principal adviser to the chairman of the PSB, Mr André Cools. **Mr Kempinaire** (51) was Secretary of State for Foreign Trade from January to October 1973 [see 25816 A; 26259 A], becoming Secretary of State and subsequently Minister of the Public Service during 1976 [see 28091 A; 28176 A], before resigning with the Government in April 1977 [see 28458 C]. **Mr Hatry** (51) was a former managing director of the Belgian Petroleum Federation.

A government statement based on the six-party agreement summarized above was presented to Parliament by Dr Martens on May 20. On May 23 the Chamber of Representatives approved a motion of confidence in the new Government, 151 delegates voting in favour of the motion and 29 against. (Keesings Historisch Archief, Amsterdam - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Guardian - Financial Times) *(Prev. rep. Formation of Previous Coalition 29679 A; Cabinet 29940 C, 30249 A; Regionalization Plans, Economy 30249 A)*

A. ENVIRONMENT — Signature of Protocol on Control of Landbased Pollution Discharges into Mediterranean - Entry into Force of Baltic Convention

At a conference in Athens on May 12-17 organized by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and attended by representatives of 15 of the 18 states bordering the Mediterranean, a protocol was signed on the protection of the Mediterranean against pollution from landbased sources, it being agreed to eliminate the discharge of toxic pollutants and to control the discharge of less noxious substances by means of special permits. The protocol, which needed to be ratified by at least six states before it entered into force, was the third to be signed as adjuncts to the 1976 Barcelona convention on the control of pollution in the Mediterranean [see 27675 B; 29011 A]—the other two covering dumping of toxic substances in the Mediterranean and action against oil spills.

Based on the 1975 Mediterranean action plan [see 27012 A], the draft protocol had been submitted to a Monaco conference of Mediterranean nations in 1978 [see 29011 A], where little progress was made largely because of fears that the control of landbased pollution would restrict industrial development. However, broad agreement was finally reached at a meeting in Geneva in June 1979.

Those who attended the Athens conference were Algeria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia (and also the European Community); Egypt and Syria did not attend, nor did Albania, which had been consistently absent from meetings on Mediterranean pollution. Of those attending, Algeria, Israel, Turkey and Yugoslavia did not sign the protocol immediately but undertook to do so shortly, and Egypt and Syria were also expected to sign. The European Community, which had ratified the Barcelona convention, also became a party to the protocol on behalf of the Nine.

The protocol stated that signatories should "take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and control pollution of the Mediterranean Sea caused by discharges from rivers, coastal establishments or outfalls, or emanating from any other landbased sources on their territories". Prohibited substances, which were listed in an annex [see below], should be progressively eliminated from wastes, and signatories would also be expected to adopt common guidelines, criteria or standards for (i) the length, depth and positioning of outfall pipelines, (ii) wastes requiring special treatment, (iii) the quality of seawater necessary for the protection of human health and sea-life, (iv) the control and progressive replacement of products and installations causing significant pollution, and (v) the emission of certain substances defined in the annex. In applying these common standards, account would be taken of countries' geographical and physical characteristics and the "economic and social imperatives of the developing countries".

The protocol also provided for the systematic monitoring of pollution levels, for the exchange of scientific and technical information and for assistance in training for developing countries, and called for co-operation among states affected by each other's pollution.

The annex to the protocol consisted of a "black list" and a "grey list" of substances as laid down in the Barcelona convention [see 27675 B]. The "black list" of prohibited substances included mercury, DDT, cadmium, oils and persistent synthetic materials, radioactive wastes and carcinogenic agents. The "grey list" of substances whose release should be controlled included zinc, copper, lead, titanium, arsenic, silver, crude oils and hydrocarbons, pathogens, non-biodegradable detergents and disease-causing micro-organisms. Among the criteria to be used for allocating substances to one list or the other were their toxicity, persistence and accumulation in the food-chain.

The programme, to be enforced by individual governments, would cost an estimated $1,000 million per year and would take 10 to 15 years to yield tangible results.

At an earlier meeting in Geneva on Feb. 5-10, 1979, all the Mediterranean nations except Albania agreed to take over the burden of financing the Mediterranean action programme, thereby allowing UNEP to divert its financial resources to other threatened seas. Thus, UNEP would pay only one-quarter of the $6,400,000 necessary to finance studies based on the action programme for 1979-80 (it being envisaged that UNEP aid would cease altogether in 1981); another quarter would be contributed by UN agencies such as the World Health Organization and the World Meteorological Organization; and the remaining half would be paid by the Mediterranean nations themselves. France would contribute the largest amount (a quarter of the overall programme cost but 46 per cent of the total Mediterranean nations' contributions) and Italy and Spain the second and third largest amounts.

It was announced in May 1980 that Barcelona would become the headquarters of the Secretariat for the Mediterranean Action Plan, previously situated in Geneva.

Entry into Force of Baltic Convention

Immediately following the entry into force on May 3, 1980, of the 1974 Helsinki (Baltic Protection) Convention [see 26482 A] the first meeting took place in the Finnish capital of the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, established under the convention. Concluding that the chances of saving the Baltic from excessive pollution were now improving, the Commission issued a recommendation that ships carrying oil or chemicals should be under constant control with effect from Jan. 1, 1981, it being laid down that tankers over 20,000 tonnes and chemical carriers over 1,600 tonnes would have to report their entry into the Baltic and their position at regular intervals to one of a chain of ground stations.

Since 1974 the Baltic nations (Denmark, Finland, East Germany, West Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union and Sweden) had almost totally banned the use of DDT and had forbidden the dumping of waste into the sea, and the new secretary-general of the Commission, Mr Aarno Viopio, said that the next target was the banning of PCB (a chemical widely used in the electrical, paper, plastics and paint industries) and subsequently of mercury. Like the Mediterranean, the Baltic suffered severe pollution because there was little tidal movement and the towns bordering it (particularly Leningrad and Copenhagen) discharged their sewage directly into it; however, the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Alexei Kosygin, informed the Commission meeting by telegram that after 1981 the Soviet Union for its part would discharge no more untreated waste into the Baltic.—(Times - Guardian - European Commission, Brussels - Le Monde - La Vanguardia, Barcelona) *(Prev. rep. Mediterranean 29011 A; Baltic 26482 A)*

B. COMOROS — Cabinet Changes - Resignation of Ambassador to France

Following the formal resignation of the Cabinet on July 7, 1980, President Ahmed Abdallah of the Comoros announced on July 12 the reappointment of Mr Salim Ben Ali as Prime Minister. The revised Cabinet announced on the same day included two changes: Mr Abderemane Mohamed became Minister of Justice and Information, and Mr Ali Mohamed became Minister of Muslim Affairs.

It was announced in Paris on July 22 that Mr Saïd Ali Kemal, the ambassador of the Comoros to France, had resigned his post after having previously declined to accept the Justice portfolio in the new Cabinet. He reportedly commented in his letter of resignation to President Ahmed Abdallah that the President was seeking to pass on to him the responsibility for dealing with embarrassing problems concerning political prisoners in the Comoros.—(Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) *(Prev. rep. 29484 A)*

A. ZAÏRE — Government Reorganization - Internal Political Changes - Agreement with International Monetary Fund on Economic Stabilization Measures - Rescheduling of Overseas Public and Commercial Debts - Foreign Relations - Withdrawal of African Security Force from Shaba Province - Military Co-operation with Belgium, France and China - Alleged Human Rights Violations - Student Dissent

In a government reorganization announced on Jan. 18, 1980, President Mobutu made numerous changes and new appointments, as a result of which the Executive Council (Cabinet) was composed as follows (with any previous portfolios shown in parentheses):

*Mr Bo-Boliko Lokonga Monse Mihambo	First State Commissioner
*Mr Nguza Karl I Bond	Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation
*Mr Mafema Nga Nzeng	Territorial Administration
Lt.-Gen. Babia Zongbi Malobia	National Defence and Veterans' Affairs
Mr Nyembo Shabani (Special Tasks of the President)	Agriculture and Rural Development
Mr Kamitatu Massamba	Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism
Mr Elebe Ma Ekonzo	National Guidance, Culture and Arts
Mr Namwisi Ma Nkoy	Finance and Budget
Mr Pay-Pay Wa Kasige	National Economy, Industry and Trade
Mr Mozagba Ngbuka (Energy)	Mines
Mr Mananga Ma Phoba	Energy
Mr Betyne Ngilase	Public Works and Territorial Development
Mr Mushobekwa Kalimba Wa Katana (Public Works)	Transport and Communications
Mr Matadi Wamba	Lands
Mr Djelo Yempenge	Higher Education and Scientific Research
*Mr Mvuendi Mabaki Ntu	Primary and Secondary Education
Dr Kalume Lusaikwa Mulamba	Public Health and Social Welfare
*Mr Atiwiya Masikita	Labour and Social Security
Mr Tokwaulu Bolamba	Posts and Telecommunications
Mr Kubanangidi Badianjile	Sports and Leisure
Mr Kafitwe Wa Pa Boa	Justice
Prof. Mulumba Lukoji (Lands)	State Investment Holdings

* No change.

President Mobutu himself relinquished the portfolio of National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, but retained responsibility for Territorial Security.

A total of 31 secretaries of state were also named, as well as regional commissioners for Zaïre's eight regions; for the Shaba region, the new commissioner was Mr Mandungu Bula Nyati, a former Mayor of Kinshasa, *vice* Cdr. Mambu Nsenga who became the Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces. Other military appointments included those of Gen. Singa Boyenge Mosambay as Chief of Defence Staff (replacing Lt.-Gen. Babia) and Rear Adml. Limponda Wa Botende as head of the newly-created Military Household at the Presidency. Mr Mpase Nselenge Mpeti was appointed head of the newly-created private cabinet at the office of the President, while Mr Angelete Galenji became Attorney General and Mr Mungulu Tapangame became chief public prosecutor. Mr Sakombi Inongo became secretary-general of the youth wing of Zaïre's sole and ruling party, the *Mouvement populaire de la révolution* (MPR).

Mr Kamitatu Massamba's appointment to the Executive Council followed his return to the country in October 1977 from France, where he had been living in exile since 1970. A former cabinet minister in the Adoula Governments in 1961-64 and briefly Minister of External Affairs in the Kimba Government of 1965, he had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment in 1966 for his part in an alleged plot to overthrow President Mobutu [see page 21457] but he had been freed in an amnesty announced in November 1967 [see 22958 A].

Following this government reorganization, it was announced that Brig. Wabali Bakitambisa and Mr Mungul Diaka, the outgoing members of the Executive Council responsible respectively for Posts and Telecommunications and for Higher Education and Scientific Research, had been implicated in cases of fraud and maladministration (which also involved the head of the Zaïrean national airline and the heads of airport and customs administration). President Mobutu stated on Jan. 28 that Mr Mungul Diaka and his family and entourage had fled to Brazzaville (Congo) after a judicial inquiry into the affair had begun. (For previous charges against Mr Mungul Diaka in 1972, see 25147 A; 29612 A.) In an earlier incident Mr Tepatondele Zambite, the former State Commissioner for Agriculture who had been placed under house arrest in January 1979 [see 29506 A], was in August 1979 condemned to 20 years' imprisonment with hard labour after he and three accomplices had been convicted on charges of embezzling public funds.

In an opening speech to a special session of the National Legislative Council, President Mobutu on Feb. 4, 1980, delivered a "message to the nation", in which he outlined a number of political and economic reforms.

Constitutional revisions included the dissolution of the MPR executive secretariat and the replacement of elected members of the MPR political bureau [see 28825 A], when their terms expired in 1982, by presidential nominees. Rights of interpellation in the National Legislative Council would be restricted by the requirement that advance notice should be given of questions to the Government. The constitutional changes were approved by the National Legislative Council on Feb. 14 by 204 votes to 33 with six abstentions.

President Mobutu also stated categorically on Feb. 4 that "so long as I live there will never be a bi-party or multi-party system in Zaïre". He said that the MPR was the ideal framework for safeguarding national unity and that "all the conditions necessary for the exercise of democracy" existed within the party, which would remain the country's only political organization. (Speculation over the possible recognition of an official opposition had been encouraged by Mr Jean Tshombe's visit to Zaïre in January 1980 for a meeting with President Mobutu. Mr Jean Tshombe was the son of the late Mr Moïse Tshombe, the former Katangan secessionist leader and Prime Minister of Congo-Léopoldville—as Zaïre was then known—from July 1964 until shortly before Gen. Mobutu's coup in November 1965—see 21071 A; 21137 A; 23460 A.)

Other measures announced by President Mobutu included the convening in the near future of round table discussions between all concerned with exports of Zaïre's major products (notably coffee and also copper, cobalt and other minerals); these discussions, he said, would establish "new conditions for sales more acceptable and profitable to the Republic of Zaïre". The country's police and security services would also be reorganized, he announced, and on April 21 he signed ordinances replacing the existing National Documentation Centre by a National Intelligence Service (SNI) with responsibility for external security, and a National Research and Investigations Centre (CNRI) with responsibility for internal security. The SNI and the CNRI would each be headed by an administrator-general with the rank of state commissioner and with ex officio membership of the National Security Council (which had been created in March 1979—see 29612 A).

Economic Stabilization Programme - Other Economic Measures - Foreign Assistance

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced on Aug. 28, 1979, a standby arrangement authorizing Zaïrean purchases up to the equivalent of 118,000,000 special drawing rights (SDRs)—about US$153,000,000—over 18 months, conditional upon the fulfilment by Zaïre of an agreed short-term economic stabilization programme covering the period July 1, 1979 to Dec. 31, 1980.

The IMF, which had in May 1978 sent an advisory mission to work with the central bank (the Bank of Zaïre) [see 29506 A], commented that over the last four years the economy of Zaïre had been characterized by large external imbalances, declining trends in production and a high rate of inflation, while the terms of trade had deteriorated as a result of declining world copper prices [see also page 29451]. Domestic demand, however, had been stimulated by an expansionary financial policy and a rapid build-up of foreign debt. Since budgetary expenditures had increased far more rapidly than receipts, the Government had had to rely heavily on monetary financing, largely from the central bank, which (together with a weakness in foreign exchange management and sharply rising debt service obligations) had caused a rapid deterioration in the underlying balance-of-payments position; the deficit, the IMF commented, could only be financed by accumulation of external payments arrears.

The short-term stabilization programme, designed to achieve a marked reduction in the budget deficit requiring bank financing, had been agreed between the IMF and the Government following extended discussion (details of the package having been made known in March 1979). It provided inter alia for increased central bank control over foreign exchange transactions (in connexion with which there had been widespread allegations of corruption), stricter collection of taxes, the adoption of an incomes policy and the deceleration of credit expansion. Zaïre was to continue a flexible exchange rate policy, in accordance with which the currency, the zaïre, was on Aug. 27 devalued by 25 per cent from SDR 0.50 (the parity fixed in January—see 29506 A) to SDR 0.375; a further 30 per cent devaluation, to a parity of SDR 0.2625, was announced on Feb. 23, 1980. The stabilization programme also provided for arrangements to be negotiated with Zaïre's creditors for an orderly reduction in external payment arrears. However, provision was included for essential imports to be guaranteed, if necessary on a credit basis. (This last provision was in recognition of the need for food imports, a drought in western provinces having given rise to widespread hunger, while the country was also affected by a cholera epidemic which had spread from eastern to northern provinces and which had, according to a report in *The Daily Telegraph* on Sept. 7, 1979, killed an estimated 3,500 people.)

The Consultative Group for Zaïre, comprising nine major industrialized countries (Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) as well as the IMF, the World Bank and the European Commission, met with the Government of Zaïre in Brussels on Nov. 28-29, 1979, for its third conference on financial and economic assistance to Zaïre. [For conferences in 1978, see pages 29131 and 29506.] The Consultative Group agreed that its member governments should provide balance-of-payments assistance totalling $121,000,000 in 1979 and $207,000,000 in 1980, in addition to the IMF credits (and aid from countries not at the meeting, such as Saudi Arabia).

Mr Nguza Karl I Bond, in his speech to the conference on Nov. 28, surveyed changes implemented in Zaïre which, he said, had made the country a fully credible international partner. Besides the stabilization programme and economic management reforms, he emphasized domestic political reconciliations (which included the appointment to the Government of himself—see 29612 A—and of Mr Kamitatu Massamba—see above) and improved relations with neighbouring countries, notably Angola [see below].

The conference deferred consideration of Zaïrean proposals for medium-term foreign investment, pending agreement on rescheduling of existing external debt [see below]. It was noted that the agreed level of assistance (which was welcomed by the Government of Zaïre) nevertheless left a substantial shortfall against an anticipated balance-of-payments deficit of over $400,000,000 in 1980.

Drawings under the IMF standby arrangement were suspended in January 1980 after it emerged that Zaïre's 1979 budget deficit had reached 561,000,000 zaïres (then $280,000,000) compared with an agreed target limit of 350,000,000 zaïres. An IMF mission visited Kinshasa in January to review the country's performance and to consider possible revised criteria for the continued operation of the standby arrangement in 1980.

In another development, the Government withdrew existing banknotes (except those for the lowest denomination of one zaïre) between Dec. 25 and Dec. 31, 1979. A limit on the amount of new notes issued to each individual and business, designed to eliminate hoarding and black market profits, was reportedly widely circumvented by black market dealers and corrupt officials, although individual small savers were said to have suffered (and in the eastern town of Mbuji-Mayi the bank building was burned down and a bank official killed). Zaïre's borders were closed during the operation (although Mr Aimé Betou, an exiled opposition leader, alleged that the border closure was attributable to a coup attempt by soldiers at Kisangani in Shaba province).

The Consultative Group for Zaïre held a fourth meeting in Paris on May 28-29, 1980, and agreed to recommend increases in aid, which would be further discussed at another meeting in the near future.

Rescheduling of Zaïre's External Public Debt

Arrangements were negotiated with foreign government and commercial bank creditors to reschedule the repayment of Zaïre's external public debt, which on June 30, 1979, amounted to an estimated $3,650 million in addition to $1,100 million of arrears (according to a report prepared by Western banks for the Bank of Zaïre).

Representatives of the governments of Zaïre's major creditor countries (the "Paris Club"—see page 28287—which now comprised 14 countries with the addition of Abu Dhabi, Australia and Norway to the previous 11) met in Paris on Dec. 11-12, 1979, and agreed to recommend to their respective governments a rescheduling of debts falling due up to the end of 1980. Debt already rescheduled at previous Paris Club meetings [ibid.], of which about $400,000,000 reportedly remained unpaid, would be paid as to one-third in June 1980 and as to the remainder in January 1981. Arrears of debt of less than one year's maturity which fell due before June 1979 would be paid over five years in rising annual instalments, while between 80 and 90 per cent of unpaid debt of over one year's maturity falling due between 1978 and 1980 (understood to amount to about $1,000 million) would be rescheduled over 10 years with a four-year grace period. The rescheduling was conditional on fulfilment by Zaïre of economic targets for 1979 and 1980 agreed with the IMF. Creditor countries also agreed in principle to examine at a later date Zaïre's debts falling due in 1981 and 1982, on condition that agreement was reached with the IMF on an economic programme covering this period.

The Government of Zaïre signed in Paris on April 23, 1980, an agreement with representatives of 122 commercial bank creditors, providing for rescheduled repayment of syndicated loans totalling $434,000,000. The Bank of Zaïre paid in mid-May 1980 its first obligation under this agreement, a sum of $58,000,000 representing all interest arrears as at Jan. 31, 1980, and 10 per cent of arrears of principal repayments. A further 14 per cent of principal arrears would be paid in stages over four years. The remainder of principal arrears, and the debt falling due after Jan. 31, 1980, was rescheduled for 10 years, with a five-year grace period for repayments of principal.

The Financial Times reported on May 28, 1980, that Zaïre's debt service payments due in 1980, taking into account the rescheduling agreements, nevertheless totalled $470,000,000, compared with $120,000,000 actually paid in 1979.

Foreign Relations

Presidents dos Santos of Angola, Mobutu of Zaïre and Kaunda of Zambia, at a meeting in Ndola (Zambia) on Oct. 12, 1979, signed a trilateral non-aggression pact pledging an end to support for one another's dissident opponents.

A statement issued by the MPR in Kinshasa on Oct. 27 announced that in accordance with this agreement Angolan opposition leaders would be required to leave Zaïre, and it was announced on Nov. 13 that Mr Holden Roberto (the leader of the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*—FNLA—who was based in Zaïre and who was a brother-in-law of President Mobutu) had left for Senegal the previous day.

The trilateral agreement also included a declaration on co-operation, particularly in the field of transport. The Transport Ministers of the three countries had earlier met with European Community representatives (in Lumumbashi in April) and had sought £53,000,000 in aid for repairs and renovation on the Benguela railway. This railway, formerly an important outlet through Angola for exports from Zaïre and Zambia, had been closed since 1975 [see 27537 A and also 29307 A; 29501 A] and attempts to reopen it (such as those made following discussions in Kinshasa in February 1979, after which Zaïre had despatched a trial consignment of manganese by this route on April 2) were reportedly endangered by the continuing operations of dissident Angolan forces of UNITA (the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*, led by Dr Jonas Savimbi—see 29501 A).

The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and Zaïre (which had been suspended by Zaïre in 1977—see page 28400) was announced in Havana on Aug. 8, 1979.

Among a number of countries visited by President Mobutu in March 1980 were Romania (where he and President Ceaucescu signed on March 19, 1980, a treaty of friendship and co-operation) and China (on March 24-31, 1980, where he held talks with inter alios Chairman Hua Guofeng, the Chinese Prime Minister, and Mr Deng Xiaoping, the senior Deputy Premier).

It was reported on Feb. 7, 1980, that Zaïre and Egypt had signed in Kinshasa a technical military co-operation agreement providing for the exchange of expertise and the reciprocal training of personnel.

Following the withdrawal of 250 Belgian paratroopers sent to Zaïre in February 1979 [see 29506 A], President Mobutu said in an interview with *Le Monde* on March 21, 1979, that Belgium was to train 3,000 Zaïrean infantrymen, while 3,000 paratroopers would be trained by France and 3,000 commandos by China, within the terms of existing agreements on military co-operation.

These newly-trained Zaïrean forces replaced the African security force [see page 29130], which consisted principally of Moroccan and Senegalese troops and which was withdrawn from Shaba province in August 1979, United States transport planes being provided to fly the men home.

It was reported in Rwanda in June 1979 that 11 Belgians had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between one and 10 years for their involvement in an alleged attempted coup against President Mobutu in February of that year. (It had been reported from Brussels on Feb. 15, 1979, that the despatch of the Belgian paratroopers to Zaïre at that time was intended to help prevent an attempted coup involving mercenaries in Rwanda and exiled opponents of President Mobutu.)

Some 300 French paratroopers of the 11th parachute division, reportedly the nucleus of a new French long-range intervention force, were flown to Kinshasa in September 1979 to take part in joint manoeuvres on Sept. 12-19 with the newly-trained Zaïrean units in Shaba province.

President Mobutu announced on Feb. 4, 1980, that Zaïrean troops were being sent to guard the border with the Congo, where it was claimed that a camp had been identified in which were said to be 800 Cuban forces and nearly 3,000 Zaïrean dissidents. Subsequent reports alleged that the Congolese Government (which denied the presence of Zaïrean dissidents in the country) had put a stop to preparations by such groups for an attack on Zaïre.

Alleged Human Rights Violations - Closure of University following Student Demonstrations

A report by the international human rights organization Amnesty International, published on May 20, 1980, estimated that there were about 1,000 political detainees in Zaïre, many of them held indefinitely without trial despite official amnesties. Several hundred people had died in detention in 1978 and 1979 as a result of torture or starvation, the report alleged, in addition to those executed (sometimes summarily without trial) on criminal or political charges.

According to Amnesty International, the Zaïrean Government had denied allegations of torture and inhuman conditions, and "showed signs of trying to improve its human rights record" by punishing officials for mistreating prisoners; nevertheless, the report concluded, there was "evidence that gross and flagrant violations continued to be committed in times of political crisis".

The report was described by Mr Nguza Karl I Bond on May 21 as an unreasonable attempt to influence the forthcoming meeting of the Consultative Group for Zaïre [see above]. President Mobutu had earlier claimed (in Paris on March 11) that Amnesty International had congratulated him on his regime's record, but an Amnesty official on the following day expressed surprise over this claim and pointed out that the organization had on the contrary sent to the Zaïrean Government a 20-page dossier giving detailed allegations of political imprisonment, torture and executions.

In earlier developments, President Mobutu announced on Oct. 15, 1979, the release of 18 former senior army officers, seven of whom had been condemned to death in connexion with an attempted coup in 1975. The International Federation for Human Rights claimed in Paris on Nov. 8, 1979, that over 200 people aged 17-21 had been massacred by Zaïrean troops in July at a youth camp in Eastern Kasai province in the east of the country. After promising an international investigation into these allegations, the Zaïrean Government later claimed that the incident in question was a clash between gendarmes and diamond smugglers, in which three people had died. The International Federation for Human Rights repeated on Feb. 25, 1980, the call for an international investigation.

The National University at Kinshasa and several other educational institutions were closed on April 19 and thousands of students were evacuated from the university campus by soldiers, after three days of demonstrations over conditions and inadequate levels of government support. The demonstrations followed a month-long strike by students, and had been preceded on Jan. 22 by rioting at the Institute for Applied Technology in Kinshasa.—(Le Monde - Times - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 29612 A; Economy, Foreign Relations 29506 A*)

A. MAURITANIA — Abolition of Slavery - Introduction of Islamic Law - Withdrawal of French Troops - Changes in Armed Forces and Security Forces

In a move towards resolving racial problems in Mauritania the ruling Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) announced on July 5 that slavery had been officially abolished in order to "elevate the country to its natural correct place among the advanced nations". The formation was also announced of a commission composed of Moslem jurists, economists and administrators to consider the award of compensation to former slave-owners.

Describing slavery as one of the biggest problems affecting Mauritania, and as an obstacle to national independence and social equality, the CMSN said that a document setting out the facts on slavery had been drawn up and presented to the ulema (Moslem jurists and interpreters of the Koran), a majority of whom had concluded that, although slavery was generally lawful under Islam, the Government had the right to emancipate slaves.

The slaves referred to were the Black or mixed-race Haratine, the descendants of freed Black slaves, who had adopted Moorish (Arab-Berber) customs and the local Hassaniya Arabic dialect and who, although technically emancipated, continued to perform servile work and, in many cases, to be regarded as the property of their Arab-Berber employers. Moreover, the exodus in recent years from the countryside to the towns (which had more than doubled the urban population to 70 per cent of the national total) meant that Haratine were working land in the south owned by absentee landlords; accordingly, the abolition of slavery was seen as a first step towards a land reform granting greater rights to those who worked the land.

The position of the Haratine and the racial situation in Mauritania, characterized by conflict between the Black Africans and the dominant Arab-Berbers [see 29674 A], led to unrest involving Haratine in early 1980 in Nouakchott (the capital) and other areas. Tracts were distributed by the clandestine "Free Man" movement, which denounced the ruling armed forces as having a "shady racist side" and maintained that the Haratine were "oppressed because of the colour of their skin". As a consequence, a number of Haratine leaders were arrested and tried in the town of Rosso (south of Nouakchott and near the border with Senegal).

While Black Africans made up about one-third of the population and the Arab-Berbers (including the Haratine) the remainder, it was estimated that there were almost as many Haratine as Black Africans. Thus if the two sectors joined forces—as the Senegal-based opposition Mauritanian Democratic Union (UDM) had already urged—the ethnic base of the country's ruling class was likely to be undermined.

Some racial tension had been defused in October 1979 when the CMSN announced that French would continue to be taught in schools for the next six years, although Arabic would remain pre-eminent as the "national language of unity". The progressive "Arabization" of the country started by President Mokhtar Ould Daddah (President from 1960 until his overthrow in 1978—see 29256 A) had led to discontent among the Black African population.

On Feb. 24, 1980, the CMSN introduced Islamic law to deal with crime which, it said, modern law had not proved itself able to curb. The establishment of a special Islamic court was approved by the Government on March 7, presided over by a magistrate of Moslem law assisted by two counsellors and two ulemas.

Withdrawal of French Troops - Changes in Armed and Security Forces

At the request of the Mauritanian Government, France in May 1980 withdrew a paratroop unit and about 100 military instructors which had been stationed in Mauritania since late 1979 to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country in the face of Morocco's occupation of the former Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara [see 29917 A]. The request for the withdrawal was regarded as a sign of worsening relations between France and Mauritania since Lt.-Col. Khouna Ould Kaydalla took power from President Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Ahmed Louly in January 1980 [see 30272 A].

The Kaydalla regime was understood to believe that France not only opposed its independent policies but also wished to restore to power former President Ould Daddah (1960-78), who in October 1979 had been allowed to fly to France for medical treatment, reportedly in exchange for French agreement to give military support to the then regime. French involvement in disturbances at May Day rallies in Nouadhibou was suspected by the Kaydalla regime, an appeal for the overthrow of which was made from Paris in June 1980 by a newly-formed Mauritanian Democratic Alliance.

Apparently in order to forestall any attempts to change Mauritania's Government by means of a coup, the country's leaders in May made a number of arrests of former ministers and also reinforced security measures around people under house arrest. The latter included Mr Hamdi Ould Mouknass, a former Foreign Minister under President Ould Daddah [see 29256 A] on whose behalf Amnesty International had made representations to Mauritania to allow him to leave the country for medical treatment.

In changes in the armed forces and security forces carried out in April 1980 at the same time as a new Minister of the Interior was appointed [see 30272 A], Lt.-Col. Kaydalla consolidated his position by appointing Lt.-Col. Moaouia Ould Sidi Mohamed Taya as Army Chief of Staff *vice* Lt.-Col. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah and Cdr. Yall Abdoulaye as the new head of the gendarmerie *vice* Lt.-Col. Taya.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Le Monde - West Africa - Africa Confidential) (*Prev. rep. 30272 A, 29925 A, 29674 A; Overthrow of President Ould Daddah 29256 A*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. SAUDI ARABIA — Measures taken against United Kingdom following UK Broadcast of Television Film - Associated Developments in Other Countries - Subsequent Normalization of UK-Saudi Relations

Relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia deteriorated during April and May 1980 following the transmission on April 9 on the British independent television network of a dramatized documentary film entitled "Death of a Princess". The programme, which was co-produced by Associated Television (ATV) and which dealt with the events leading to the execution in 1977 of a Saudi princess and of a Saudi Arabian student, was felt by the Saudi Arabian Government and by numerous other Moslem authorities to be deeply offensive to members of the Moslem faith and to the Saudi royal family in particular. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, twice extended his personal regrets to the Saudi Arabian authorities (although no official government apologies were made), but on May 1 the British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mr James Craig, was recalled to London at the request of the Saudi Arabian Government. Consequently considerable uncertainty was caused as to the stability of economic relations between the two countries (Saudi Arabia being Britain's most important Middle Eastern export market, buying some £900,000,000 worth of British goods during 1979 and supplying the United Kingdom with oil and other goods to the value of almost £1,100 million).

The British press had reported in January 1978 that Princess Misha, the granddaughter of Prince Mohammed ibn Abdul Aziz (the elder brother of King Khaled), had been publicly executed by firing squad in Jeddah the previous year after being accused of adultery. Mr Musleh al-Shaer (a cousin of the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Lebanon, Gen. Ali al-Shaer), who was described as her lover, had, according to the reports, been beheaded immediately afterwards. The Saudi Arabian embassy in London had confirmed the reports on Feb. 1, 1978, adding that the couple had been convicted by an Islamic court and had been executed in accordance with Islamic law.

Princess Misha had studied in Beirut (Lebanon) after the breakdown of an arranged marriage with one of her cousins, and had met Mr al-Shaer while at the American University in Beirut. Early press reports suggested that the couple had returned to Jeddah but had been arrested shortly after their arrival and taken to the royal palace where they were tried for adultery.

A statement by a Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesman on Jan. 26, 1978, describing the deaths as a "tragedy" but the episode as "exceptional" provoked strong protests from the Saudi Arabian Government, and following representations from the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Dr David Owen, then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, sent an undisclosed personal message in reply.

The two-hour television film giving a fictionalized version of the events leading up to the executions had been jointly produced by ATV (who financed half of the project), and by Dutch, Japanese, Australian, New Zealand and two United States television companies, the United Kingdom broadcast being the first transmission of the programme. The Saudi Arabian authorities had already protested over certain scenes in the film before its April 9 screening, and the British chargé d'affaires in Jeddah, Mr John Gray, was summoned on April 3 to see the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, who informed him of his "deep concern" at ATV's intention to broadcast the programme. Mr Craig (who was on holiday at the time) was recalled to London on April 4, returning on April 5 to Jeddah with a letter to Prince Saud from Sir Ian Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal and spokesman in the House of Commons on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Meanwhile, Lord Carrington sent a personal telegram on April 5 to King Khaled in which he expressed his "deep regret" at the ATV decision to continue with the April 9 broadcast of the programme. The Government repeatedly said, however, that any attempt to stop its transmission would have constituted an infringement of the freedom normally exercised by the mass media in the United Kingdom.

After the broadcast, Mr Nagi Sadiq Mufti, the chargé d'affaires at the Saudi Arabian embassy in London, issued a statement on April 11 describing the film as "an unprincipled attack on the religion of Islam and its 600,000,000 people and on the way of life of Saudi Arabia, which is at the heart of Islam". The film was thought to have caused particular offence through its implied criticism of the rights and roles of women in Saudi Arabian society, and by its suggestion that the limitations imposed on women by Islam were not uniformly adopted by all classes.

Moslem women in Saudi Arabia are officially barred from most forms of employment, from driving cars, from studying in the company of men, from social contact with men except when accompanied by a chaperone, and from travel abroad except in the company of a husband, brother or father. An attempt by the Government in 1977 to amend the last-mentioned restriction was strongly opposed by religious authorities and was abandoned, while an order by Prince Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, the First Deputy Prime Minister, published in early May 1980 in the Saudi newspaper *Al Jazirah*, also barred all foreign study by Saudi Arabian women. (The same order called for a general limitation of foreign study by all Saudi Arabian students in view of the need to protect "the pure Islamic way of life" from the "damaging influence" of other cultures.)

Political Consequences for Saudi Arabian Relations with United Kingdom and Other Countries

Although it was generally denied by the Saudi Arabian authorities that the ATV showing of the film was the direct cause of any sanctions against the United Kingdom, it was widely felt by the British press that the developments listed below resulted from the diplomatic strains arising from the broadcast.

Mr Craig was on April 23 summoned to Riyadh, the national capital, where he was told by Prince Fahd of the following decisions taken on the previous day by the Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers:

(i) Saudi Arabia was to postpone indefinitely the appointment of its new ambassador to the United Kingdom (the previous ambassador, Sheikh Feisal al-Hegelan, having been transferred in June 1979 to a similar ambassadorial post in Washington); (ii) the United Kingdom was correspondingly asked to withdraw its ambassador to Saudi Arabia until further notice; and (iii) the state of economic relations with the United Kingdom was to be reviewed.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued on April 23 a statement regretting the decisions, and expressed the hope that normal relations would quickly be restored between the two countries, but pointed out again that the British Government exercised no control over broadcast material. Mr Craig returned to London on May 1.

It was confirmed by British Government officials on April 23 that King Khaled had cancelled plans for a state visit to the United Kingdom during June 1980 (although the visit had not at that time been officially announced). It was also confirmed on April 24 that a visit to Saudi Arabia by Mr Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Defence, and by members of the House of Commons select committee on foreign affairs had been cancelled at the request of the Saudi Arabian Government.

Although Mr Cecil Parkinson, Minister of State for Trade, said on April 25 that British businesses should continue and expand their trading activities in Saudi Arabia despite the current diplomatic difficulties, some concern was expressed in the United Kingdom that British companies would be placed at a disadvantage when submitting tenders for any Saudi Arabian Government construction contracts arising from the third five-year development plan (which was published on May 5). Dr Suleiman Abdulaziz as-Salayem, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Commerce, said on May 1 that, although no formal instructions had been issued to government departments regarding the allocation of contracts to British companies, he expected the current diplomatic difficulties to affect the commercial relationship of the two countries to some extent.

British Airways confirmed on May 8 that Saudi Arabia had decided not to permit supersonic flight over its territory by Concorde aircraft on the London-Bahrain-Singapore route, for reasons of noise. British Airways had on April 27 completed a three-week trial period of supersonic flight over Saudi Arabia after being refused permission for such flight over Lebanon (which had also complained of noise). Consequently, said British Airways, flights would be resumed over Lebanon at subsonic speed. [The Concorde service to Bahrain had been inaugurated in January 1976—see 27817 A.]

Although broadcasting rights to the film had already been sold in many parts of the world, the strength of the Saudi Arabian Government's reaction to the ATV transmission of the film raised serious doubts in several countries as to the advisability of similar transmissions, it being widely felt that favourable diplomatic and economic relations with Saudi Arabia were particularly desirable in view of the increasing general reliance on Saudi Arabian oil supplies which had resulted from the recent restriction of Iranian oil exports. Nevertheless, by the end of June 1980 the film had been shown in the Netherlands, the United States and Israel as well as the United

Kingdom, whereas decisions not to broadcast it were made in Malaysia, West Germany, Finland, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand and Australia.

The Dutch broadcasting company NOS transmitted the programme on April 16, although the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior had twice requested that it should not be shown following strong protests made by the Saudi Arabian embassy in The Hague. It was subsequently announced on April 18 that the embassy had refused entry visas for two NOS journalists wishing to travel to Saudi Arabia to report on reactions to the film.

The programme was broadcast in the United States on May 12 by most of the 240 Public Broadcasting System (PBS) stations, despite protests from the Saudi Arabian embassy and from the Mobil Oil Corporation, (a major financial contributor to PBS and also a participant in the Arabian American Oil Company—Aramco), which had taken out newspaper advertisements appealing to PBS to reconsider the decision to broadcast. It was announced on May 15 that two Moslem lawyers had initiated legal proceedings against ATV, PBS and the San Francisco television network, alleging the "malicious" transmission of "defamatory and sacrilegious" material, and demanding that damages totalling some $20,000 million should be paid to a fund for the propagation of Islam.

The Israeli television network broadcast the film on June 16 with an accompanying discussion programme.

The Malaysian Government announced on April 26 the banning of the film, following a corresponding request from Saudi Arabia. The film was also rejected on April 30 by the Finnish television network, "for reasons of foreign policy", while both major West German television companies and the Danish state television network rejected it because of its allegedly poor quality. (Denmark subsequently agreed with Saudi Arabia during May on the purchase of a quantity of Saudi Arabian oil, but accepted in the contract the right of Saudi Arabia to cancel the agreement if the Danish Government or any of its agencies behaved in a manner detrimental to Saudi Arabia.)

The Eastern Media company of Japan, which had bought the broadcasting rights for the Far East, said during June that the film was unlikely to be shown in Japan due to pressure exerted on Japanese television companies by the Government. (Japan had obtained 28.4 per cent of its 1979 oil imports from Saudi Arabia, and had during April 1980 agreed with Saudi Arabia on the joint development of a $2,000 million petrochemical plant at Al Jubayl on the Gulf, in return for which Japan was also to receive a guaranteed crude oil supply of up to 200,000 barrels per day from Saudi Arabia.)

The state television networks in Australia and New Zealand both decided during early July not to broadcast the programme following government representations to this effect, while it was made available in Sweden only in the form of video cassettes, and was not broadcast on the television network.

Lord Carrington addressed on May 22 a meeting of British businessmen and others connected with Middle Eastern trade, at which he described the film as "deeply offensive", but rejected suggestions that his earlier comments had constituted a government apology to Saudi Arabia. He added: "We shall be doing all we can to bring about a reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. We may need to ask them to be more understanding about our way of life. We shall certainly need to be more understanding about theirs."

At the end of a two-day visit to Jeddah Mr Douglas Hurd, Minister of State in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, announced on July 28 that an agreement had been reached with the Saudi Arabian Government whereby (i) a Saudi Arabian ambassador was to be appointed to the United Kingdom; (ii) Mr Craig was to resume his duties in Jeddah, probably during August; and (iii) a special joint committee on cultural relations was to be set up by the two countries, reporting to their respective Governments and comprising diplomats and other experts from both countries. It was stated that the agreement would be finalized on Aug. 26 during a visit to Saudi Arabia by Lord Carrington.—(Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Times - Sunday Times - Financial Times - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. External Relations 30247 A*)

A. THE COMMONWEALTH — New Head of Commonwealth Foundation

It was announced on June 18 that Commonwealth governments had appointed Mr Ric Pritchard Throssell (57) as director of the Commonwealth Foundation *vice* Mr G. W. St J. Chadwick. Mr Throssell had since 1976 been an Assistant Secretary in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. (Commonwealth Secretariat, London) (*Prev. rep. 21126 B*)

B. JORDAN — Death of Prime Minister - Appointment of Rimawi Cabinet - New National Consultative Council - Diplomatic Relations established with Cuba

The Jordanian Prime Minister, Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, died in Amman on July 3 of a heart attack, after holding the premiership (and also the Foreign Affairs and Defence portfolios) for less than seven months. He had been appointed on Dec. 19, 1979, in succession to Mr Mudar Badran, who had led the Jordanian Government since July 1976 [see 28000 A].

Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, who was 41 at the time of his death, had studied philosophy and international relations at the American University in Beirut and in the late 1950s had come into conflict with the Jordanian authorities over his membership of an Arab nationalist movement. After serving as an assistant to the Chief of the Royal Court in 1964-65, he was successively Minister of Information and Culture (1965-67), ambassador to the United States (1967-72), United Nations ambassador (1972-76) and Chief of the Royal Court (1976-79), having succeeded Mr Badran in the last-named post.

Immediately after Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf's death, King Hussein announced the appointment of the Deputy Premier and Agriculture Minister, Dr Kassem Rimawi, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. At the same time the King appointed a new Cabinet with the same personnel as that formed in December 1979, when only six outgoing ministers had been reappointed and when the new ministers had included the first woman ever to be appointed to a Jordanian cabinet.

Structural changes in the Rimawi Cabinet, the full composition of which is given below, included the appointment of a separate Minister of Foreign Affairs (responsibility for which had previously been held by the Prime Minister).

Dr Kassem Rimawi	Prime Minister, Defence
*Mr Marwan al-Kassem	Foreign Affairs
Mr Najib Irshayat	Justice
Mr Ali al-Bashir	Interior
Mr Umar an-Nabulsi	Labour, Reconstruction and Development
Mr Salem al-Mesadeh	Finance
Mr Man Abu Nuwwar	Public Works
Dr Mohamed Nuri Shafiq	Education
Dr Mohamed Addoub al-Zabn	Communications
*Mr Kamel al-Charif	*Waqfs*, Islamic Affairs and Holy Places
*Dr Said Tall	Information
Dr Zuheir Malhas	Health
Mr Jamal ash-Sha'ir	Municipal and Rural Affairs
Mr Muwaffaq al-Fawwaz	Tourism and Antiquities
Mr Tahir Hikmat	Culture and Youth
Mrs Inam al-Mufti	Social Development
Dr Jawad al-Anani	Supply
Mr Ali an-Nusur	Industry and Trade
*Mr Soleiman Arar	Agriculture, Minister of State for Prime Minister's Affairs
*Mr Ali as-Suhaimat	Transport, Minister of State for Prime Minister's Affairs
*Mr Hassan Ibrahim	Minister of State

* Member of Badran Cabinet.

Dr Rimawi (62), a Palestinian born on the West Bank and educated at Cairo University, had been Minister of State for Municipal and Rural Affairs in 1965-67 and in April 1967 had been elected president of the House of Representatives (the Lower House of the then Jordanian Parliament). **Mr al-Kassem** had previously been Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. **Mr Arar,** who had hitherto held only the post of Minister of State for Prime Minister's Affairs, took over in addition the Agriculture portfolio previously held by Dr Rimawi.

At the end of the two-year term of the National Consultative Council established in April 1978 to act as a quasi-parliamentary body [see 29049 A], King Hussein on April 20, 1980, issued a royal decree appointing a new 60-member Council under the presidency of Mr Ahmed Mahhud at-Tarawinah. The latter succeeded Mr Ahmad al-Lawzi, a former Prime Minister (1971-73) who had replaced Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf as Chief of the Royal Court in December 1979.

Diplomatic Relations with Cuba

The Jordanian Cabinet on Sept. 23, 1979, ratified an agreement providing for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba at ambassadorial level.—(Le Monde - Times - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 28339 D, 28000 A; NCC 29049 A*)

A. NUCLEAR ENERGY — Conclusion of INFCE Conference - Endorsement of Fast-breeder Reactors - Developments in Nuclear Waste Reprocessing - British, French and US Nuclear Programmes - Use of Nuclear Technology in Third-World Countries - IAEA Developments - Reduction of Italian Participation in Eurodif

Developments in certain controversial fields of nuclear technology, such as the use of fast-breeder reactors and the reprocessing of nuclear waste, are described below together with general nuclear developments in Western Europe and the USA and also in some third-world countries with increasing access to sophisticated nuclear technology.

The world's leading nuclear nations in terms of installed generating capacity were the USA, Japan, West Germany, the USSR, France, Britain, Sweden, Canada and Spain. In terms of projected capacity the French programme was the largest in Western Europe. [For diagram showing per capita installed nuclear capacity in 1979, see 30335 A.]

Endorsement of Fast-breeder Reactors in Final Report of INFCE Conference

At the conclusion of two years of studies the 46 countries and five international organizations participating directly in the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation (INFCE) programme completed their work at a final conference in Vienna on Feb. 25-27, 1980. Since the organizing conference in Washington in October 1977 [see 29025 A], eight working groups within the INFCE had produced reports on various aspects of nuclear technology and its application which were amalgamated into a lengthy document to be submitted to the governments of the participant nations (among them the USSR) as a basis for the development of individual national nuclear policies and co-operation in related fields.

In its final report the conference strongly endorsed the development and use of fast-breeder reactors (i.e. plutonium-based energy systems which effectively reduced the net usage of uranium required) and was seen as having thereby undermined one of President Carter's major aims in initiating the INFCE programme. This had been to reduce the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation by gaining international support for a ban on the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium (which can be used to make nuclear weapons) for use in fast-breeders, whose commercial development he also sought to restrain [see page 28479; 28481 A; and below].

However, since a consensus also emerged from the conference that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be responsible for supervising the storage of plutonium which was not needed for an individual country's research and fast-breeder requirements, the US chief delegate, Mr Gerard Smith, told the conference on Feb. 25 that the USA was "prepared to work co-operatively for an effective international plutonium storage regime". In the context of such a storage plan it was envisaged that new institutions should be set up to tighten safeguards and distribute supplies.

Conceding that there was "no question that over the long term breeders could extend uranium resources in a dramatic way", Mr Smith said that the USA was investing heavily in the fast-breeder and "in assessing the feasibility and the economic and proliferation implications of its technology" [see below]; however, he added that the breeder was not without its "costs, risks and uncertainties".

It was the unanimous view of the conference that there was little economic sense in recycling plutonium through present-day reactors (as opposed to fast-breeders), as envisaged in several countries at the commencement of the study. However, the conference believed that the construction of fast-breeders by West European countries, the USA and Japan would be technically feasible by the year 2000 and that this would lead to "nuclear power deployment for all practical purposes free from uranium-supply constraints".

The conference adopted two outlines for the growth of nuclear power outside the Communist bloc, and sought to match these with the world's known and probable uranium supplies. It concluded that if the non-Communist nations wanted to achieve a "high-growth" target of 1,650 gigawatts [1 gigawatt = 1,000 megawatts (MW)] of power from nuclear reactors by the year 2005, the "substantial deployment" of fast-breeder reactors would become necessary "shortly after" the year 2000. Taking an alternative "low-growth" target (whereby the non-Communist nations would install only 1,100 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by the year 2005), the report warned that even then uranium supplies would not last beyond the year 2025 without a switch to fast-breeders.

Among the advantages of the fast-breeder noted in the conference's final report were (i) fewer radioactive releases into the environment in the form of gaseous and liquid effluent, (ii) less occupational exposure for employees than with present-day reactors, (iii) less thermal pollution because, with the breeder operating at a higher temperature, its thermal efficiency was higher, and (iv) less nuclear waste to be disposed of.

The conference also concluded that effective safeguards already existed to prevent the misuse of peaceful nuclear technology, including fast-breeders, for military ends; stressing that the only realistic way to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons was by an agreement not to develop them, it urged that practical safeguards should be applied in a "consistent and predictable way" which would not discourage the peaceful development of nuclear technology. In this connexion, Sir Hermann Bondi (Chief Scientist at the UK Department of Energy), who was Britain's chief delegate, told the conference that "misapplication of the civil nuclear cycle" was not the only nor even the most likely route to the development of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, Dr Walter Marshall, deputy chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and one of INFCE's 22 co-chairmen, expressed the view that international trading in plutonium as a nuclear fuel, backed up by international safeguards and supervision, could help to control the spread of nuclear weapons in that most countries would have no incentive to build fast-breeders if they were guaranteed a generous price for their spent fuel. He added that fast-breeders were not a prolific producer of plutonium, yielding it more slowly than some present-day reactors.

UKAEA figures for comparative net maximum production of plutonium per 1,000 MW/year of reactor operation were as follows: Magnox (magnesium alloy) 617 kilogrammes (kg), Candu (Canadian-designed reactors) 493 kg, pressurized water reactors (PWR) 270 kg, fast-breeders 190 kg, advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGR) 173 kg.

The conference recognized in its final communiqué that its findings had strengthened the view that (i) nuclear energy was expected to increase its role in meeting the world's energy needs and should be widely available to that end, (ii) effective measures should be taken to minimize the danger of nuclear proliferation without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and (iii) effective measures should also be taken to meet the specific needs of developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

US and French Fast-breeder Programmes

Whereas France, Britain, Japan and the USSR had already pressed ahead with fast-breeder development programmes, in the United States President Carter had on taking office indefinitely postponed the development of the Clinch River (Tennessee) fast-breeder plant [see 28478 A; 29025 A]. On the other hand, the final abandonment of the project continued to be opposed by Congress, which also allocated funds for the development at Hanford (Washington state) of a 400-MW fast-breeder reactor known as the fast flux test facility (FFTF).

The only one of its kind in the world, the FFTF was designed to test fuel and key component parts for commercial fast-breeders. It had been under construction by Westinghouse since 1970 and by the time of the final INFCE conference had "achieved criticality", i.e. was ready for operation. A sum of $70,000,000 had been allocated in the US energy budget for the operation of the FFTF in 1980-81. Using fuel enriched with 25 per cent plutonium, the FFTF would be capable of carrying out about 50 experiments simultaneously and would depend largely on sophisticated robot technology for most aspects of its operation by 1984.

Coinciding with the final INFCE conference, the French state-owned electricity authority Electricité de France (EDF) announced plans on Feb. 26, 1980, to consolidate its world lead in fast-breeder technology by building two more plutonium-fuelled reactors by 1985, each with a capacity of 1,500 MW.

Described as "economic prototypes", these would be in addition to two existing experimental breeders in the Rhône valley of which the larger, known as Super-Phénix, was currently under construction at Creys-Malville, near Lyons, and was due to come into operation in 1983 with a capacity of 1,300 MW; the smaller breeder, Phénix, having a 250 MW capacity, had been producing power since December 1973 at Marcoule. Both existing reactors were financed by a French-

Italian-West German consortium in which EDF had a 51 per cent interest.

Violent clashes between police and anti-nuclear demonstrators at the Super-Phénix site in July 1977 had led to the death of one man, to 100 people receiving injuries (some of them serious) and to several people being sentenced to short prison terms. After this the French Government on Nov. 9, 1977, set up a committee of information on electronuclear energy, chaired by Mme Simone Veil (then Minister of Health), to inform the public about aspects of the Government's long-term energy programme.

At the level of the European Community, attempts to establish a concerted position on the development of fast-breeders had been "indefinitely abandoned" by mid-1978 [see page 29520] in the light of serious differences between member-states.

Developments in Nuclear Waste Reprocessing in Britain, West Germany and France - The Windscale Inquiry

On the basis of a report published on March 5, 1980, by the UK Health and Safety Executive, the Under-Secretary of State for Energy, Mr Norman Lamont, on the same day announced approval for plans to transport plutonium nitrate from the 250-MW prototype fast-breeder reactor at Dounreay (Caithness, on the north coast of Scotland) to the major British centre for reprocessing irradiated fuel at Windscale (Cumbria, in north-west England) for recycling and eventual return to Dounreay. The Executive's report concluded that risks to the public of transporting waste under the UKAEA's scheme were substantially lower than those common in industrial operations, transport and everyday life. (At the time of the announcement it was reported that at Dounreay the UKAEA was close to achieving the world's first demonstration that spent fuel from a fast-breeder could be refined and returned to the same reactor in a full cycle.)

The scheme involved the transport of plutonium nitrate solution in special containers holding 250 litres along 10 miles of road from Dounreay to the port of Scrabster; the transport of the vehicle in a specially fitted ship to Workington (Cumbria); and finally a short road journey of 20 miles to Windscale. It was envisaged that seven journeys a year would be made.

The report assessed the chances of an accident severe enough to break the container in a place where the public could be harmed as one in a million in a year, and the chance of someone inhaling plutonium and dying as the result of such an accident as one in 100,000,000. Furthermore, the report claimed that if the special containers were lost in the heavy seas off north-west Scotland their recovery could be effected within 28 days.

In response to the environmentalist lobby which said that the contents of the shipments could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and which asked why the plutonium could not be stored at Dounreay, the UKAEA on March 5 said that new fuel-making facilities at Dounreay would "take several years and considerable expenditure" to produce.

The discovery in 1976 of a leak of radioactive water from a storage silo at Windscale was a major factor in the decision by the British Government to hold a fullscale public inquiry in 1977 into plans by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL, set up in 1971 under the Atomic Energy Authority Act—see 24668 C) to build a large new thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) at Windscale at a cost of £600,000,000. However, although the report on the inquiry (prepared by Mr Justice Parker and published on March 6, 1978) recommended that the plans should go ahead [see below], continuing leaks from the silo and also from other sources gave rise to grave concern, and by the end of 1979 some 20,000 gallons of contaminated water were estimated to have escaped from the silo.

The leak was first discovered in October 1976 in a silo storing the remains of magnesium alloy cladding (which is stripped from the spent fuel brought to Windscale and stored as heavily contaminated fragments underwater in the silo). Attempts to pinpoint the source of the leak failed, partly due to the fact that investigations were hampered by the high level of radiation around the silo wall.

A report published on Feb. 28, 1980, by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) of the Health and Safety Executive said that no immediate action needed to be taken to halt the radioactive leakage, since there was "no present danger and therefore no need for urgent or immediate action to safeguard workers on the site or the public".

Although 50,000 curies of the 3,000,000 in the silo had escaped (a curie being a measurement of quantity of a radioisotope), the leak rate had dropped by half from its daily level of 1.5 cubic metres at June 1978, and it was felt that the leaking substance would not spread beyond the site over the next few years. However, the seepage should be closely monitored and plans prepared for emergency action, while at the same time methods should be developed without delay to retrieve the contents of the silo and then the silo should be emptied. The report suggested that the leak could have begun as early as 1972.

A summary is given below of the recommendations made at the conclusion of the Windscale inquiry, which took place from June 14 to Nov. 4, 1977, and which reached affirmative conclusions on the following questions posed: (i) whether oxide fuel from UK reactors should be reprocessed in the UK at all, (ii) whether reprocessing should begin at Windscale and (iii) whether the plant should be double the size required for the UK's spent fuel and should be used to reprocess foreign fuel.

Under question (iii) Mr Justice Parker stated that a start on the THORP project and "the receipt of foreign fuel for reprocessing" would do "something to relieve the pressure on non-nuclear-weapon states to develop their own facilities". It would also "demonstrate that this country intends to honour at least the spirit and, as I think, the letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" (i.e. the NPT, concluded in July 1968—see 22787 A; 27409 A), which could strengthen that treaty. The disadvantages were clearly outweighed by the advantages, but the one substantial objection was that "the separation of plutonium and its supply to non-nuclear-weapon states will put them nearer to the bomb". However, since this would not happen for some 10 years, and since a refusal to accept foreign fuel would be in breach of the spirit if not the letter of the NPT and would put pressure on these states to produce their own plutonium long before they received any from THORP, it could not be seen as an overriding objection.

Recommendations. (i) Consideration should be given to charging an independent person or body with vetting security precautions at Windscale and during the transit of plutonium from the plant, as well as with reviewing the adequacy of such precautions from time to time; (ii) BNFL should devote effort to developing a plant for the safe removal and retention of krypton 85 (radioactive gas); (iii) more permanent arrangements for the whole-body monitoring of local people should be instituted; (iv) some consideration should be given to including some wholly independent body or person with environmental interests in advising central Government on fixing radiological protection standards; (v) a single inspectorate should be responsible for determining and controlling radioactive discharges; (vi) specific discharge limits should be set for each significant radionuclide, with the onus being placed on the operator to show that a discharge could not practicably be avoided before any limits were laid down; (vii) there should be more monitoring of atmospheric discharges; (viii) BNFL should do more to ensure that safety precautions and operating procedures at Windscale were sufficient for all eventualities, were strictly observed and were continually rehearsed; (ix) those required to take action under the Windscale emergency plan should be fully aware of their responsibilities; (x) fuel flasks should continue to be delivered to Windscale by rail as far as possible; (xi) outline planning permission for THORP should be granted without delay.

The construction of the new Windscale facilities was approved in a House of Commons debate on March 22, 1978, by 186 votes to 56. Subsequently, Mr Peter Shore, then Secretary of State for the Environment in the Labour Government, announced in a written reply on May 8, 1978, that the Government had accepted the Parker report's recommendations. A special development order granting planning permission was approved in the Commons on May 15, 1978, by 224 votes to 80.

On both occasions a number of Labour backbenchers and Conservatives voted against the Government, together with members of the Liberal, Scottish National and Scottish Labour parties and *Plaid Cymru*, while other Conservatives (and one Ulster Unionist) supported the Government.

Shelving of West German Plans for Reprocessing Plant

West German plans to construct a large nuclear waste reprocessing plant at Gorleben (Lower Saxony) with the capacity to treat 1,500 tonnes of spent fuel a year had been shelved when the (Christian Democratic Union) Lower Saxony Government on May 16, 1979, announced its refusal to allow such a plant to be placed on its territory. Dr Ernst Albrecht, the Lower Saxony Premier, acknowledged that the decision was mainly political and that, even if all the health risks inherent in a reprocessing plant were eliminated, the question remained whether "construction of such a facility is indispensable". At the same time Dr Albrecht said that exploratory drillings could go ahead with a view to radioactive waste being stored in underground salt domes, provided that the area was shown to be suitable. (Over the following year these drillings were persistently disrupted by anti-nuclear demonstrators, who on several occasions poured concrete into the bore-holes.)

The Gorleben plant would have had storage capacity for 3,000 tonnes of spent fuel, facilities for fabricating about 14 tonnes of plutonium per year, and underground storage facilities in the salt domes for 30-40 tonnes of highly-active waste per year, 1,600 drums of medium-active waste per year, and 50,000 drums of low-active waste per year. It was intended to provide for the satisfactory disposal of spent fuel in line with West German nuclear development laws and to reduce the dangers of accidents or hijacking in the transport of nuclear waste around the country.

French Decision to return Reprocessed West German Fuel - Accident at French Reprocessing Plant

The French and West German Governments confirmed on May 16, 1979, that an agreement had been signed under which France would return to the Federal Republic the German-owned plutonium which had been produced at the fuel reprocessing plant at Cap La Hague (on the northern Cotentin peninsula, near Cherbourg). France had hitherto refused to return the fuel processed under contract without firm guarantees that it would be used only for peaceful purposes, despite provisions in the Euratom Treaty (which France was seeking to renegotiate) that nuclear fuel should be allowed to move freely among Community member states under the sole supervision of the European Commission.

The La Hague plant, which was owned by Cogema (the Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires), went temporarily out of action on April 15, 1980, after a fire in its transformer system disrupted the electricity supply on which safety filters, alarms and other protection equipment depended. Although the plant resumed operations just over a week later, the nuclear workers' union at the plant, which had criticized safety precautions there for some years, claimed that contamination levels in some parts of the factory were 4,000 times the accepted level. It also alleged that operations had been resumed with undue haste so as to prepare for the arrival of a controversial shipment of Japanese nuclear waste which, as a result of delays in the development of British reprocessing facilities because of the Windscale inquiry [see above], had been transferred from Britain to La Hague.

In an earlier accident at the plant in January 1980, pipes carrying radioactive waste under the sea burst and had to be repaired twice.

US Plans for Disposal of Radioactive Waste

In a message to the US Congress on a proposed "comprehensive radioactive waste management programme", President Carter on Feb. 12, 1980, asked for approval of one or more interim disposal sites pending a choice of a permanent site, possibly by 1985, in which the burial of highly radioactive waste could commence in the 1990s. President Carter said that he was cancelling a research project for burying military nuclear waste in a salt mine in New Mexico but that the site would remain on the list of possible permanent disposal places.

British Plans to introduce Pressurized Water Reactor despite Three Mile Island Accident - Other British and French Nuclear Developments

Nuclear energy plans announced by the UK Secretary of State for Energy, Mr David Howell, on Dec. 18, 1979, for the decade beginning in 1982 made provision (i) for the probable commissioning in 1982 of Britain's first pressurized water reactor (PWR) with a capacity of 1,100 MW and (ii) for at least one new nuclear power station a year to be ordered in that decade, over which period total capacity for these reactors would be built up to 15,000 MW, with the choice of reactor being decided "in due course".

The decision to install at least one PWR was taken notwithstanding controversy over this type of reactor which had intensified following a serious accident in March 1979 at the US Three Mile Island nuclear power station near Harrisburg (Pennsylvania) involving a Babcock and Wilcox PWR [see 30287 A], although it was envisaged that the British PWR would be a Westinghouse reactor with various safety and other modifications.

Mr Howell told the House of Commons on Dec. 18 that the National Nuclear Corporation (NNC—see below) would, in consultation with the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), prepare a case on the safety of the PWR for submission to the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) of the Health and Safety Executive; that statutory consent would be needed to build the power station [probably close to an existing nuclear power station at Sizewell, Suffolk]; and that a public inquiry would be held to scrutinize the plans. Offering the view that "what went wrong at Harrisburg had most to do with procedures and much less to do with the integrity of the PWR", Mr Howell submitted to the House four reports from, respectively, the NII, the CEGB, the UKAEA and the NNC, all of which supported the position that a PWR could be safely and satisfactorily operated in Britain if extra safeguards and design modifications were incorporated.

In his Dec. 18 statement Mr Howell said that the authorization given by the previous Government making provision for the CEGB and the South of Scotland Electricity Board each to order one advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) remained valid.

The then Secretary of State for Energy in the Labour Government, Mr Tony Benn, had announced on Jan. 25, 1978, that two more AGRs should be ordered as soon as possible with a view to their being operational by 1987, and that the option of adopting the PWR system in the early 1980s should be developed in order to avoid exclusive commitment to any one system. He had also announced the abandonment of work on the steam-generated heavy-water reactor (SGHWR) system at the suggestion of the UKAEA.

Following the Conservative victory in the May 1979 general elections the new Government moved towards concentrating on a single reactor system, and even after Mr Howell's December statement to the House of Commons the future of the two AGRs appeared to be in doubt, mainly due to reduced electricity demand forecasts and financial considerations. However, it was confirmed in April 1980 that work should proceed on the construction of the two reactors at Heysham (Lancashire) and Torness (East Lothian).

Two AGRs were already in operation at Hinkley (Somerset) and Hunterston (Scotland), and three others were expected to enter into operation as follows: Dungeness B (Kent) 1981, Hartlepool 1982 and Heysham A 1982. Those planned at Torness and Heysham (Heysham B), costing nearly £3,000 million overall, were expected to be on load in 1986. Nine Magnox (magnesium alloy) reactors were already in operation throughout the country with a total capacity of over 5,000 MW.

Also in his Dec. 18 statement, Mr Howell announced that in order to strengthen the NNC and the Nuclear Power Company (its operating subsidiary), their boards would be brought together into a single-tier structure with full responsibility for the affairs of the company and that the supervisory management agreement between the NNC and the General Electric Company (GEC) would be terminated.

It was subsequently announced on April 24 that Mr Denis Rooney, an executive vice-chairman of British Insulated Calendar Cables (BICC), had been appointed to succeed Lord Aldington as chairman of the NNC with effect from July 1, 1980.

The NNC had been the sole nuclear power contractor in the UK since June 1973. Hitherto a three-tier organization, its shareholders were the UKAEA (35 per cent), the GEC (30 per cent) and British Nuclear Associates, a consortium of contractors (35 per cent).

The French Government, whose nuclear programme utilized the same basic types of PWRs as the Three Mile Island plant although with a different design (manufactured by Framatome under licence from Westinghouse), decided in April 1979 after the Harrisburg accident that there were to be no modifications to its programme and that, in fact, increased investment by EDF would mean that 55 per cent of France's electricity needs could be met by nuclear power by 1985.

In 1979 France had 15 nuclear power stations in operation; in addition, more than 30 others were under construction at that time and there were plans for a further nine to be built between 1980 and 1985. By June 1980 nuclear generators accounted for 21.6 per cent of the country's electricity production, compared with 17.5 per cent 12 months previously.

In October 1979 EDF's plans to begin loading two nuclear power stations (at Tricastin in the south-east and at Gravelines in the north between Calais and Dunkirk) with enriched uranium were held up by trade union pickets protesting at the existence of hairline cracks and other faults in the metal components at the plants. Loading subsequently began after the French Government in February 1980 approved their entry into operation on the basis of plans set in motion by the Ministry of Industry to develop automatic detection and repair machinery to operate inside radioactive areas.

From 1978 onwards there was strong opposition among local people to the construction of a 5,200-MW nuclear power station at Plogoff on the Pointe du Raz (south-western Brittany). A public inquiry which began on Jan. 31, 1980, had to be conducted in specially installed vans in Plogoff because local inhabitants refused to allow the town hall to be used; throughout the inquiry there were daily organized demonstrations and frequent clashes with police, but the inquiry, concluded on March 4, ruled that construction of the station should go ahead.

Further Developments at Three Mile Island - Eruption of Mount St Helens Volcano near Largest US Nuclear Plant

More than a year after the accident at Three Mile Island, efforts to release radioactive krypton 85 gas trapped inside the plant began on June 28, 1980, at the decision of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); however, the attempt was halted after four minutes when warning instruments indicated that there was an unacceptably high level of harmful gamma rays in the gas. Officials said that the fault was with the instruments, which could not distinguish between different kinds of rays, and stressed that the level of radiation coming out with the gas (which was diluted with pumped air) was very low.

Thousands of people had voluntarily left the area the week before the venting, and attempts by local residents to halt the release of the gas had been rejected by the NRC. The venting was resumed on June 30 and was expected to last throughout July.

A seven-month study conducted for the NRC concluded in January 1980 that another hour's delay in closing down the leaking valve at Three Mile Island could have led to the actual melt-down of the reactor core (i.e. to the "China syndrome"), but that even this would not have been a major disaster, since the reactor building was probably sound enough to contain it; however, the precautionary evacuation of local residents would have been necessary. Reiterating calls made in the Kemeny report (on Three Mile Island) for a tightening of safety procedures, the latest report did not, however, recommend a shutdown of plants or a moratorium on the construction of new ones.

Later in January a consortium of Ohio electricity utility companies cancelled plans to build four nuclear plants, which would have supplied half of Ohio's electricity needs, on the grounds of uncertainty over safety regulations following the Harrisburg accident.

The US Government was meanwhile re-evaluating the safety of the largest nuclear power plant in the United States—the 1,130-MW Trojan pressurized water reactor situated in Oregon state, about 40 miles north of Portland—because of its proximity to the Mount St Helens volcano which began to erupt on May 18, 1980, leaving some 50 people dead or missing. The Trojan plant had already been closed at the time of the eruption for refuelling and refitting, and the NRC said that modifications to strengthen the plant to allow it to withstand greater seismic stress must be undertaken before it could reopen.

Mount St Helens, situated 33 miles north-east of the Trojan plant and dormant since 1857, had become active on March 27 and subsequently erupted on May 18 in an explosion detected up to 100 miles away which blew off the summit and sent a cloud of gas and ash 60,000 feet into the air. Washington state was declared a disaster area on May 21 and 2,000 people were evacuated from the area near the mountain before further major eruptions took place on May 25 and June 12. Large quantities of fine volcanic ash blanketed communities to a depth of several feet in parts of Washington, Idaho and Montana, and the ash was blown eastwards right across the United States, reaching as far as Maine in the north-east and Georgia in the south-east.

Nuclear Power in Developing Countries

By January 1980 the following eight countries in the developing world had commercial nuclear power plants either in operation, under construction or firmly on order: Argentina, Brazil, India, South Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines and Taiwan.

India had three plants in operation and five under construction; South Korea had one in operation and four under construction; Pakistan had one in operation; the Philippines had one under construction [see page 30194]; and Taiwan had two in operation and four under construction. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are dealt with below.

A further 28 IAEA members classified by that organization as developing countries were (in early 1980) at the stage of carrying out studies into the possible use of nuclear energy.

These countries were Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Latin America - Argentinian and Brazilian Nuclear Programmes - First Nuclear Plant planned for Cuba - Mexican Developments

In Latin America, ambitious nuclear programmes in Argentina and Brazil gave both these countries the means of producing their own nuclear devices, although both maintained that they wished to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes only. Neither country had signed the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty or the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [see 22505 A].

Argentina. An agreement was signed in Buenos Aires in May 1980 between the Argentinian Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and the West German concern Kraftwerk Union (KWU—a subsidiary of Siemens) for the delivery to Argentina of a 600-MW heavy-water reactor for the $1,500 million Atucha 2 project (near Buenos Aires), due to come on stream in 1987, as well as for the transfer of West German technology and the establishment of a joint engineering concern (in which the 25 per cent KWU share would gradually be phased out). West Germany announced on June 9 that an export licence for the reactor had been granted.

Atucha 2 was the first of four 600-MW nuclear power stations which, it was announced on Feb. 12, 1979, were to be built in Argentina by 1997, together with a heavy-water plant to supply the reactors. It had been disclosed on Oct. 1, 1979, that the Swiss firm Sulzer would supply the latter plant, work on which was due to start in 1980 near Arroyito (Neuquén department, in the west of the country) with the aim of producing an annual output of 250 tonnes of heavy water from 1984 onwards. The Swiss sale was strongly opposed by the USA on the grounds that it would "significantly enhance" Argentina's capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but Switzerland said that it had adhered strictly to international rules on the sale of nuclear equipment with military potential and announced on June 13, 1980, that permission for the export of the plant had been granted.

Argentina planned to have 4,000 MW of nuclear capacity by the year 2000. Atucha 1, which was the first operative nuclear power station in Latin America, came on stream in 1974 with a capacity of 345 MW, and a second 600-MW plant currently under construction by Atomic Energy of Canada at Embalse (Córdoba department, in central Argentina) was due to come on load in 1981. Argentina had 27,000 tonnes of proven uranium reserves and had the industrial capacity to produce its own fuel rods for natural uranium systems using heavy water. Moreover, Argentina had disclosed in October 1978 that construction was about to start on a fuel reprocessing plant at the Ezeiza atomic centre outside Buenos Aires for completion in the early 1980s.

The contract for the supply of reactors to Argentina was originally to have been awarded to Canada, whereby Candu heavy-water reactors would have been delivered (at considerably lower prices than that associated with the KWU contract), together with fuel and heavy-water plants. The reallocation of the contract was attributed to Canada's policy, introduced since the explosion of an Indian nuclear device in 1974 using Canadian technology [see 26585 A], of demanding stringent guarantees and conditions that nuclear equipment delivered under existing contracts would be used for peaceful ends only. (Canada's policy also placed in doubt the future of contracts with countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Japan, Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania for the delivery of reactors, as well as a 910-tonne sale of uranium to Switzerland, which was suspended by Canada in 1977. For suspension of Canadian nuclear co-operation with Pakistan in 1976, see page 28303.)

In the course of negotiations over the contract the West German Government had also initially objected to Argentina over the lack of safeguards, but it was announced in Bonn on March 27, 1980, that talks in Buenos Aires had been concluded successfully.

Agreements on nuclear co-operation and the joint exploration of hydroelectric resources were among 10 signed during a visit to Argentina by President Figueiredo of Brazil on May 14-17, 1980. Argentina already had bilateral nuclear agreements with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, and in 1977 became the first Latin American country to export nuclear technology when it agreed to supply Peru with an experimental reactor [see page 28342].

Brazil. The Brazilian programme, envisaging an installed nuclear capacity of 10,600 MW by 1990 to supplement an installed 200,000 MW of hydroelectric power by that year, continued to run into difficulties over cost and controversy over the location of the plants [see 29315 A]. The estimated overall cost of the programme had risen from $10,000 million to $13,000 million, while the projected cost of Angra 2—the first of a potential eight reactors planned under a June 1975 agreement with West Germany [see 27250 A]—had increased from $1,000 to $1,570 per installed kilowatt due to the expense of adapting the project to geological faults on the site (near

Rio de Janeiro) which had also led to lengthy delays in the programme.

Angra 1, a 626-MW PWR supplied by Westinghouse, was due to come into operation in 1981, while Angra 2, a 1,245-MW PWR, was scheduled for operation in 1985. Angra 3 (also 1,245 MW) was planned for the same site, but alternative locations were under consideration for the remaining West German reactors.

Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in implementing the programme, the West German-Brazilian agreement was reaffirmed in a communiqué published at the end of a visit to Brazil in April 1979 by Herr Helmut Schmidt, the Federal Chancellor.

Cuba. In Cuba work was due to begin in 1980 on the Caribbean's first nuclear plant at Cienfuegos (on the south Cuban coast) using Soviet-designed pressurized water reactors (most of Cuba's current energy needs being met by Soviet oil in exchange for Cuban sugar). An agreement was signed in Moscow in May 1980 for Cuban-Soviet co-operation in building a nuclear research centre in Cuba to seek peaceful ways of using nuclear energy to help the Cuban economy, and the IAEA Board of Governors on April 28, 1980, approved a nuclear safeguards agreement between Cuba and the IAEA along the lines of other such agreements between non-nuclear-weapon states which were not party to the NPT.

Mexico. In Mexico, which was considering developing a nuclear power industry (having proven uranium reserves of 8,828 tonnes, with possible reserves as large as 225,000 tonnes), the first nuclear plant at Laguna Verde (Veracruz state) was due to be completed by 1982, when the first of two 654-MW boiling-water reactors would come on stream (the second in 1983).

Two agreements were signed on May 19, 1980, between the French Commissariat à l'energie atomique (CEA) and its Mexican counterpart on co-operation in the prospecting and exploitation of uranium and on basic research and joint projects.

Chile. It was reported from Santiago on May 16, 1980, that a 500-MW nuclear power plant was to be built in Chile (which already had two research reactors).

Uruguay. The Organization of American States was reported on May 14, 1980, to have allocated $180,000 to Uruguay for nuclear research and development, which would enable it to supplement its existing hydroelectric projects [see 30084 A]. Chile and Uruguay had in July 1979 signed an agreement on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the training of Uruguayan scientists.

Purchase of Nuclear Technology by Iraq - French Nuclear Co-operation Agreements with Sri Lanka and UAE

In the late 1970s and in early 1980 the Iraqi Government concluded a number of agreements for the purchase of nuclear technology, mainly from countries relying on Iraq for a large percentage of their oil supply. Although Iraq had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as safeguards agreements with the IAEA, these developments gave rise to fears that the Iraqi Government intended to use the nuclear technology for military purposes.

Under an agreement signed in January 1980 **Brazil**, which purchased some 40 per cent of its oil imports from Iraq, undertook to sell Iraq raw and slightly-enriched uranium as well as equipment and construction services for building nuclear reactors. According to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry the agreement also covered the surveying of resources, uranium prospecting and mining, safety studies and the exchange of expertise; it stressed the support of both countries for the principle of non-proliferation and committed them to informing the IAEA of developments regarding safeguards.

The US Administration in March 1980 accused **Italy** of supplying Iraq with sensitive technology which, it said, included a "hot cell" [a specially shielded laboratory for handling radioactive substances in which it was possible to extract plutonium] large enough to allow Iraq to produce sufficient plutonium to make a nuclear weapon in about a year's time. The US also expressed concern that the number of Iraqi scientists being trained in Italy would enable Iraq to set up its own nuclear programme in the future without outside assistance. However, Italy said on March 19 that the laboratory, for studying uranium and other substances, was being supplied as part of a deal negotiated in 1976-77 after consultation with US officials; that it was completed in early 1980 as the start of the implementation of the deal, which also covered laboratories for studying medical and agricultural uses of nuclear energy; and that only about 15 Iraqi scientists were being trained in Italy. The Italian officials added that Italy (which imported about one-third of its oil from Iraq—see also pages 26409 and 26756) wished to take into account the expectations of third-world countries which were relying on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

France, which had agreed in 1976 to supply Iraq with an Osiris-type research reactor, also undertook in March 1980 to supply 72 kilogrammes of 93 per cent enriched (i.e. weapons-grade) fuel, since the newly-developed French low-enrichment (7 per cent) fuel, known as "caramel", was not yet sufficiently advanced and was not acceptable to Iraq. Some 600 Iraqi technicians were also being trained in France. The delivery of the Osiris reactor was postponed to 1981 after the construction plant at Seyne-sur-Mer where its components were being built was sabotaged on April 6, 1979, Israeli secret agents being suspected. A senior Egyptian scientist working on the Iraqi programme was subsequently murdered in Paris on June 14, 1980, and the two incidents were linked in the press as part of an Israeli campaign to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although Iraq refused to sign trilateral agreements with France and the IAEA on safeguards, letters exchanged between France and Iraq were published in September 1979 by the IAEA, stating that Iraq would provide the IAEA with design information on its nuclear facilities "as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility" and would notify the IAEA of "any unexpected transfer into Iraq of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards . . . if the shipment exceeds one effective kilo".

On March 27, 1980, the Portuguese national energy commission (DGE) confirmed that **Portugal** (which imported over 40 per cent of its oil from Iraq and expected a 3,000,000-tonne shortfall for 1980) had negotiated the sale of an unspecified amount of non-weapons-grade processed uranium to Iraq in exchange for oil and trade.

Nuclear co-operation agreements were also signed between France and, respectively, the United Arab Emirates (on March 6, 1980) and Sri Lanka (on April 10, 1980). For cancellation in 1978 of French contract for sale of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan, see pages 29700-01.

Release of US Uranium Fuel to India

As part of US efforts to consolidate relations with India in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis [see 30229 A], President Carter on June 19 by executive order authorized the export of 40 tonnes of uranium fuel for use at the Tarapur nuclear power station, near Bombay, notwithstanding a unanimous recommendation by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on May 16 that the export licences should not be granted. President Carter faced opposition over the decision from Congress, which had 60 days in which to prevent the shipment by a simple majority of both Houses.

The US Government had agreed to furnish India with uranium fuel supplies for 30 years under an agreement signed in 1963 [see 19563 A], but India's explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device [see 26585 A] had led to controversy in the United States over whether it should adhere to the agreement in the absence of Indian accession to the NPT or acceptance of international safeguards on all its nuclear facilities [see 27872 A; page 28260]. Under the terms of the 1978 US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act [see 29025 A] the acceptance of safeguards by India had been made a condition for the continued supply of US fuel after March 1980.

President Carter had previously overruled a decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in April 1978 to ban the export of eight tonnes of nuclear fuel to India on the grounds that preventing the sale would "seriously undermine our efforts to persuade India to accept full-scope safeguards" on its nuclear facilities. Since then little progress had been made on the question of safeguards, and on Jan. 31, 1980, the new Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, declined to rule out the possibility of "peaceful nuclear experiments" being carried out in India.

IAEA Conference in New Delhi - Exclusion of South Africa

At the commencement of the 23rd regular session of the IAEA which was held in New Delhi from Dec. 4 to 10, 1979, and was attended by delegates from over 80 countries and from international organizations, a resolution to bar the South African delegation from participation in the current conference was approved by 49 votes to 24 with nine abstentions. (In 1977 South Africa had been deprived of its seat on the IAEA Board of Governors.)

The Third World was strongly represented at the conference, during which developing-country delegates expressed criticism of certain aspects of IAEA policy.

In particular, the then Indian Prime Minister, Mr Charan Singh, accused the IAEA of trying to force smaller states to accept restraints on their nuclear industries which the nuclear powers themselves were not prepared to accept, and of continuing to "put obstacles in the way of developing countries which are trying, very often at considerable sacrifice, to develop indigenous facilities for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy". Mr Singh said that, in the name of non-proliferation, there were even moves to institute measures aimed at limiting nuclear fuel cycle activities to a few so-called "safe and secure locations'', which would place a vast majority of countries at a ''permanent economic and technological disadvantage''.

Mr Singh reminded the conference of the IAEA's aims, which were to raise by international co-operation the contribution which atomic energy made to the peace and wellbeing of all nations. He said that the IAEA's supervisory functions to prevent horizontal proliferation [i.e. an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon nations] were important but less so than its task of increasing the use of nuclear power; furthermore, while measures were being taken to prevent such a horizontal increase, the nuclear arms race [vertical proliferation] was not slowing down.

Reduction of Italian Participation in Eurodif - Decision by Iran to retain 10 per cent Share - Cancellation of French and West German Reactor Contracts for Iran and of French Contract for China

The Italian interests in the French-led uranium enrichment consortium Eurodif [see 27171 A]—the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and AGIP-Nucleare—began negotiations in May 1980 with a view to reducing their joint 25 per cent share by 9 per cent. Accordingly, later in May the French shareholding (owned directly or indirectly by Cogema, the Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires) was increased from 42.8 to 51.8 per cent and the Italian share correspondingly cut from 25 to 16 per cent. The Belgian and Spanish participants in Eurodif retained their respective shares as follows: Société belge pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium (Soben) 11.1 per cent; Empresa Nacional del Uranio, SA (ENUSA) 11.1 per cent.

Following uncertainty early in 1980 over whether Iran wished to retain its 10 per cent holding in Eurodif (through the French-Iranian company Sofidif—see 27171 A), it was agreed between the two countries in mid-June that Iran would buy only a reduced amount of uranium from Eurodif's plant at Tricastin (south-eastern France) but would retain its share in the capital. At least 10 of the nuclear plants which the deposed Shah of Iran had intended to build were to have been fuelled by Eurodif.

The Iranian Government had previously announced on April 9, 1979, that two nuclear plants which were being constructed by Framatome of France on the Karun river in south-west Iran had been firmly abandoned [see page 29746]. Subsequently, after Iran indicated that it might terminate a contract with the West German firm Kraftwerk Union for the construction of two nuclear reactors at Bushire on the Persian Gulf, KWU on July 31, 1979, announced its own decision to terminate the contract. Construction work on the partially completed reactors had been suspended in January 1979, and KWU stated on terminating the contract that it had acted because of Iran's failure to pay $450,000,000 which was overdue from 1978 for work completed.

It was announced from Peking on July 16, 1979, during a visit by the French Minister of Industry, M. André Giraud, that China had decided not to go ahead with the purchase of two 900-MW pressurized water reactors from France which it had ordered the previous year [see 29502 A]. China gave as its reason for the cancellation an adjustment of its economic objectives.—(UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London - Times - Guardian - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Financial Times - IAEA, Vienna - US International Communication Agency - Trade and Industry/ British Business) (*Prev. rep. Three Mile Island 30287 A; Convention on Nuclear Terrorism 30099 D; Nuclear Developments in Spain page 30185, Italy page 30343, Sweden 30335 A, Comecon Countries 29845 A*)

A. ANTARCTICA — Signature of Convention on Conservation of Marine Living Resources - New Soviet Base in West Antarctica

At a meeting in Canberra (Australia) from May 7 to 20 attended by 15 countries and by observers including the European Community, a convention was signed on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, particularly krill, by regulation of their commercial exploitation.

The convention provided that an international commission would be established with its headquarters in Hobart (Tasmania) to supervise the preservation of marine life and especially to study the food-chain of Antarctic fish and bird life and to recommend measures to protect the species. Moreover, the region to which the convention applied was established as extending beyond the 60° South latitude defined by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty [see 17159 A; 18171 C; and map on page 28275] so that the new boundary coincided roughly with the Antarctic Convergence, a natural biological boundary where warm and cold waters meet, separating distinct marine communities.

The countries which reached agreement on the convention (a draft of which had been drawn up at a conference two years earlier in Canberra—see 29354 B) were the 12 original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States) together with Poland, which is a consultative member, and East and West Germany, both of which had acceded to the treaty and were major harvesters of krill.

It was reported that the Netherlands (also an adherent to the treaty) and South Korea had been refused permission to attend the meeting on the grounds that they were not engaged in ''substantial research'' in the area [a condition for the participation of later signatories of the treaty in decision-making], and that a grouping of 80 conservation organizations including Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund and known as the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition had also been excluded.

A consultative report called *The Management of the Southern Ocean*, prepared by the International Institute for Environment and Development and published on May 16 to coincide with the Canberra meeting, issued a warning that the high cost of krill harvesting meant that it was unlikely to become a major food source for the world. The report also claimed that even low krill catches could have disastrous consequences for other fish, seals, penguins and whales which depended on it for food, and that the draft convention was inadequate, although its recognition of the need to preserve the ecosystem as a whole was important.

On the inadequacy of the draft convention the report maintained that its call for fish and other resources to be kept at levels which would ensure their maximum growth was scientifically untenable; that the system of taking decisions by consensus would mean that few would in fact be taken; and that the linkage of the convention to the Antarctic Treaty was questionable because of the latter's legal ambiguities and exclusive nature. The report said that the convention must be acceptable to the whole international community, since otherwise non-signatories might fish the area independently without recognizing the terms of the convention.

It was disclosed by a Soviet shipping newspaper in March that the USSR had set up a new Antarctic base on Cape Burks in the (unclaimed) Hobbs Coast section of Marie Byrd Land. The base was the first on the coast of West Antarctica and the seventh Soviet base in the Antarctic.—(Times - Financial Times - Economist - New York Times - Australian Information Service) (*Prev. rep. 30042 B*)

B. ALBANIA - Government Changes

At a meeting of the Presidium of the Albanian People's Assembly on April 26 a number of changes in the Council of Ministers were approved as follows:

(1) Mr Mehmet Shehu was relieved of his duties as Minister of Defence, to which he had been appointed in 1974 [see 26856 A], in view of his ''heavy concurrent responsibilities as Chairman of the Council of Ministers'' (Prime Minister). The new Minister of Defence was Mr Kadri Hazbiu (a cousin of Mr Shehu), who had been Minister of the Interior (and thus head of national security) since 1954 and who was also a long-standing member of the Politburo of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA). Mr Hazbiu was replaced by Mr Fecor Shehu, hitherto a Deputy Minister of the Interior.

(2) Mr Xhafer Spahiu was relieved of his responsibilities as Minister of Industry and Mining because of ill health and was replaced by Mr Prokop Murra (a secretary of the PLA Central Committee). Mr Spahiu, who had been allocated this portfolio in 1976 [see 28130 A], had formerly also been a candidate member of the PLA Politburo, a secretary of the PLA Central Committee and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

(3) Mr Esma Ulqinaku was appointed Minister of Light and Food Industries *vice* Mr Kristaq Dollaku, who had been appointed to this position in 1977 [see 28308 D].

Mr Mehmet Shehu had held the premiership since 1954 [see 13764 A for appointment] and was widely regarded as the most important political figure in Albania after Mr Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the PLA.—(Financial Times - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Changes in Council of Ministers 28824 A; Death of Politburo Member 30135 A*)

University of North Carolina Greensboro

A. GHANA — Inauguration of Elected Civilian Government under New Constitution following Period of Rule by Armed Forces Revolutionary Council - Other Internal Political Developments, late 1978 to mid-1980 - The Economic Situation

Ghana returned to civilian rule on Sept. 24, 1979, after a period of military government inaugurated by the coup of Jan. 13, 1972 [see 25115 A]. The basic framework for the transition was established by the Government of Gen. Fred W. K. Akuffo (promoted a full general with effect from Jan. 1, 1979), who had displaced Gen. Ignatius K. Acheampong as chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) on July 5, 1978 [see 29335 A], and who subsequently progressively modified his initial opposition to the reintroduction of a multi-party democratic system upon the military's withdrawal from politics (which was then scheduled for July 1, 1979).

The postponement of the transition from the date originally scheduled followed the overthrow of the Akuffo Government on June 4, 1979, by a junior officers' and other ranks' coup resulting in the establishment of an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the chairmanship of Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings, which undertook to carry out a purge of corrupt elements, especially in the armed forces, before finally handing over power to a civilian regime. There was, however, no postponement of the imminent parliamentary and presidential elections, which commenced later in June. The AFRC relinquished office in September 1979 after taking wide-ranging and controversial actions—including the execution of Generals Acheampong and Akuffo and a number of other leading figures after secret trials—whose repercussions constituted one of the major problems facing the incoming civilian Government, which in addition was faced with a continuing grave economic crisis.

Details of these and other developments in Ghana since late 1978 are given below.

Legalization of Party Politics - Other Developments in November-December 1978

The holding on Nov. 17, 1978, of non-party elections for 64 district councils (as announced on Sept. 29—see page 29337) was immediately preceded by the submission to the SMC of the recommendations of the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) which had been reconstituted in August [ibid.] after its original establishment by the Acheampong Government in April [see page 29069]. Subsequently, on Nov. 30, Gen. Akuffo announced that the SMC had decided to lift the ban on party political activities in Ghana with effect from Jan. 1, 1979, and that it remained the intention of the SMC to hand over power to a form of "transitional (interim) national government".

Gen. Akuffo added that "all the political parties which eventually come into being will have to come together in Parliament and present a national front for the purpose of fighting together to establish a firm and sound political and economic foundation for the future", and also announced that a Constituent Assembly would be inaugurated in the near future to debate the CDC's recommendations.

The main features of the Nov. 17 district council elections had been (i) the election of a number of nationally known politicians (who had stood on the assumption that the membership of the Constituent Assembly would probably be based on these elections) in circumstances which were seen as indicating that local party organization was still in existence and that the electorate still voted along party lines, and (ii) an exceptionally poor turnout—estimated to be as low as 10 per cent in some urban areas—which was seen as an indication of the negligible public impact of a campaign in which overt party activities were strictly banned.

The new local government system inaugurated after the elections was designed to achieve a clear separation of day-to-day executive functions from the policy-making functions of the elected representatives.

Many of the principal recommendations of the CDC were similar to those of the ad hoc committee on union government which had reported to the Acheampong Government in October 1977 [see 29063 A]. In particular, it recommended the retention of the proposal that the fundamental structure of the state should be based on a separation of powers similar to that obtaining in the United States, with executive power vested in a directly elected President.

In putting forward proposals for a transitional period of "national government", as required by the terms of reference laid down by the Akuffo Government, the CDC recommended that while political parties should not be proscribed they should not be permitted to sponsor candidates in any elections held during the first four years following the reintroduction of civilian rule, and that the question of whether party-political elections should be held after that time should be decided by the electorate in a referendum held during the third year of civilian rule. The professional bodies which had agreed to nominate representatives to the CDC had given almost unanimous endorsement to its report, it being stated by a spokesman for the Association of Professional Bodies that "realism and compromise" were necessary in the present circumstances. (For the Bar Association's refusal to participate in the work of the CDC, see page 29337.)

A decree published on Dec. 7, 1978, provided for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly of 120 members, of whom 64 would be elected by the new district councils, 29 would be nominated by the SMC and 27 would be nominated by bodies representing various national interest groups, including employers and trade unions. In an address on Dec. 21 to the inaugural session of the Assembly (which was chaired by Mr Justice Vincent C. Crabbe and which included about 20 members of the CDC as SMC nominees), Gen. Akuffo called upon its members to submit to the SMC by April 16, 1979, constitutional proposals "based on the traditions and customs of the country and able to stand the test of time" under which "the executive would be strong enough to govern effectively, but without authority to trample on individual liberties and the other organs of state".

A political parties decree published in mid-December 1978 proscribed all 14 parties which had existed prior to the military coups of 1966 and 1972, and prohibited the use of the name, symbol, slogan or colours of any of these parties when the ban on political activities was lifted at the end of the month. The use of symbols, slogans and colours used during the March 1978 union government referendum was also prohibited, as was the formation of parties based on a tribal, regional, professional or religious affiliation.

The decree also provided that public employees and members of the armed forces were barred from standing for election without first having submitted their resignation, and former members of the National Liberation Council (set up after the 1966 coup—see 21273 A), the National Redemption Council and the SMC who wished to stand for election were required to declare their assets to a commission of inquiry (which was subsequently established under the chairmanship of Mr Justice E. N. P. Sowah).

On Dec. 30 the SMC published the names of 105 persons, including many former senior politicians, who were disqualified from holding elective or other public office on the grounds that adverse findings had been made against them by various inquiries set up after the 1966 and 1972 coups. Those listed were not, however, barred from participating in party political activities. One of those immediately affected by this measure was Mr Kwaku Boateng (a former minister under President Nkrumah), who became ineligible to serve in the Constituent Assembly (to which he had been nominated by the SMC).

The SMC subsequently established a review tribunal chaired by Mr George R. M. Francois (an Appeal Court judge) in early February 1979 to consider petitions by persons claiming to have been unfairly treated by the inquiries concerned.

Lifting of State of Emergency - Release of Detainees and Amnesty

Gen. Akuffo announced on Dec. 31, 1978, that the SMC had decided to lift with effect from the following day the state of emergency which had been declared on Nov. 6 following widespread industrial unrest in protest at the effects of the Government's economic policies [see pages 29339-40]. This decision had, he said, been taken "in a spirit of goodwill which the Government hoped would animate the formation and organization of political parties".

The declaration of the emergency and the subsequent opening of a recruitment drive to replace government employees who had been threatened with dismissal had resulted in an early return to work by most of those on strike. It was announced on Dec. 8 that a general review was to be undertaken of public sector pay.

Earlier, on Nov. 16, 1978, Gen. Akuffo had announced that, in order to "promote national reconciliation", the SMC had ordered the immediate release of all those still imprisoned for plotting to overthrow the Acheampong Government, and on Dec. 20 he announced an amnesty for all Ghanaians who had left the country for political reasons or because of their alleged involvement in subversive activities.

Also in December 1978, a committee was established to investigate all external loans contracted by the Ministry of Finance between June 1977 and July 1978. Of the committees of inquiry which had been set up in September 1978 [see page 29339], that investigating the affairs of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) heard evidence in December from a former senior CMB employee of his involvement in an operation by the Acheampong Government to use the profits from certain sales of rice to finance the campaign in favour of union government prior to the March 1978 referendum. However, the Akuffo Government gave no indication that it intended to lay any charges against Gen. Acheampong himself in connexion with this or other allegations, although he remained in detention, apparently well treated, at the end of 1978.

It was widely believed in Ghana that the Government was unwilling to accede to demands for a full-scale investigation into the record of the Acheampong Government partly because this could set a general precedent for punitive action against members of the military who had held government office and partly because of the personal position of senior members of the present Government who had previously held office under General Acheampong.

IMF Standby Arrangement - British and West German Loans

The Akuffo Government's economic stabilization programme was in January 1979 supported by a 12-month International Monetary Fund standby arrangement in the second credit tranche authorizing purchases up to the equivalent of 53,000,000 special drawing rights. An IMF announcement of Jan. 10 described the aims of the Government's programme as to "reduce the rate of inflation by about one-half by September 1979 from the 100-125 per cent that prevailed during the 12 months ended June 1978" and to "correct price distortions, strengthen Ghana's balance of payments and lay the basis for sustained growth of production and exports".

It was further announced on Feb. 15, 1979, that the IMF had approved an interim disbursement to Ghana equivalent to SDR 11,136,000 from its Trust Fund for developing countries [see page 27882].

The British Government had earlier agreed in October 1978 to make an interest-free loan of £20,000,000 to Ghana, of which £5,000,000 was made available immediately for the import from Britain of vital spare parts and raw materials. Other major aid donors included West Germany, which in November 1978 extended loans totalling about 70,000,000 Deutschemarks (then equivalent to about £18,705,000).

Cabinet Changes - Formation of Political Parties - Report of Constituent Assembly

The Attorney General and Commissioner (Minister) for Justice, Dr Gustav G. Koranteng-Addow, was dismissed on Jan. 2, 1979, and replaced by Mr Austin N. E. Amissah (a retired Appeal Court judge). Also on Jan. 2 Mrs Gloria A. Nikoi (hitherto senior principal secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was appointed Commissioner for Foreign Affairs *vice* Col. Roger Felli upon the latter's retirement from the armed forces.

Dr Koranteng-Addow was dismissed after making a speech criticizing the lifting of the ban on party politics on the grounds that Ghanaians lacked the "political maturity" to operate a multi-party democracy. Previously he had been closely identified with the Acheampong Government's union government programme, notably through his chairmanship of the ad hoc committee on union government, and his resignation had been demanded by the Bar Association in August 1978 [see page 29337]. [For subsequent criticism of Dr Koranteng-Addow by commission of inquiry, see below.]

There was a vigorous resumption of party political activities from Jan. 1, 1979, onwards, and a deadline of Jan. 31 was fixed for parties to apply to the Electoral Commission for certificates of registration. Provisional certificates were granted on that date to a total of 19 parties, most of which subsequently received full certificates. However, following further consideration by the Electoral Commission (to which registered parties were required to submit evidence of a nationwide branch network by March 27 and to declare their assets by March 30) the registration of about half of these parties was cancelled in April 1979, and as a result of this action and of various party mergers the final total of parties contesting the forthcoming elections was reduced to six.

Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly had in mid-February 1979 endorsed the central recommendation of the CDC that Ghana should have a directly elected executive President (rejecting by 73 votes to 43 an amendment proposing a largely ceremonial head of state who would appoint a Prime Minister, as under the 1969 Constitution).

Parliamentary and presidential elections were accordingly initially scheduled for May 15 and June 15 respectively, but were subsequently rescheduled to be held simultaneously on June 18 in order to allow adequate time for electoral arrangements to be made and also to prevent the voting pattern in the presidential election from being influenced by the parliamentary results.

At a meeting in late March 1979 between Gen. Akuffo and representatives of a recently formed Association of Registered Political Parties (later renamed the National Consultative Association of Political Parties), 13 parties requested the postponement by six months (i.e. until Jan. 1, 1980) of the planned date for Ghana's return to civilian rule in order to permit a longer period of party organizing and campaigning before elections were held. Gen. Akuffo said however that the SMC intended to adhere to the promised date of July 1, "otherwise we shall be letting the country down".

The six parties which nominated candidates for the June 18, 1979, elections by the closing date of April 24 were as follows.

Action Congress Party (ACP). This party was led by a barrister, Col. Frank G. Bernasko, who had retired from the armed forces in 1975 [see page 27545] after serving in the Acheampong Government since January 1974 (with responsibility for Agriculture and subsequently for Cocoa Affairs) and who enjoyed a measure of personal popularity in the Cape Coast area. The party's general secretary was Dr Kofi N. Awoonor, a poet and university lecturer who had been convicted in 1976 of aiding an opponent of the Acheampong Government [see page 28394].

The ACP was described by its founders as the party of the "progressive intelligentsia" whose aim was to offer the country "a new leadership imbued with the highest ideals of probity". Col. Bernasko's selection as the party's presidential candidate was approved by the Sowah Assets Commission, and Mr Attoh Okine was nominated as his running-mate for the vice-presidency.

People's National Party (PNP). The PNP was founded by a number of former members of the late President Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP), including Mr Imoru Egala and Mr Kojo Botsio, both of whom had held ministerial office under President Nkrumah. Mr Egala was initially named as the party's interim chairman and presidential candidate despite his inclusion among those listed as disqualified from holding public office, but withdrew as presidential candidate after it had become apparent that the Francois Review Tribunal [see above] was unlikely to uphold his appeal against this ban (the dismissal of the appeal being subsequently announced in September 1979). Nana Okutwer Bekoe III (also known as Mr James Quartey) was subsequently elected chairman of the PNP, and Dr Hilla Limann (who had been nominated by Mr Egala despite opposition from some other leading members of the party) was elected as its presidential candidate.

Dr Limann (45) was a career diplomat who had resigned as counsellor at Ghana's permanent mission in Geneva (where he had served in the Ghanaian delegations to several international conferences) to join the PNP upon its formation in January 1979. He had previously served on the constitutional commission which had drafted proposals for the 1969 Constitution. The PNP elected as his running-mate for the vice-presidency Dr J. W. S. de Graft-Johnson, an internationally known engineering professor who was currently the director of the Building and Road Research Institute in Kumasi and a member of the Constituent Assembly inaugurated in December 1978.

The PNP was widely regarded as the successor party to the CPP, although its manifesto emphasized its intention to pursue "progressive" policies in general terms rather than a commitment to doctrinaire socialism, and advocated a pragmatic approach to the country's economic and other problems. A number of leading radical socialists who criticized the founders of the PNP for adopting what was regarded as a conservative brand of Nkrumahism initially joined the People's Revolutionary Party, formed by Mr John Hansen to "fight for the total eradication of capitalism in all forms from Ghanaian society", but agreement was subsequently reached on a merger between the two parties.

Popular Front Party (PFP). The PFP was founded by a number of former members of the late Dr Kofi Busia's Progress Party (PP), including Mr Victor Owusu and Mr Joseph H. Mensah, both of whom had held ministerial office under Dr Busia (and both of whom were among those disqualified from holding public office). Mr Owusu was nevertheless elected as the party's leader and presidential candidate, his candidacy being subsequently confirmed when the Francois Review Tribunal upheld his appeal against disqualification. (Mr Mensah's appeal was also upheld.) Alhaji Yakubu Tali was elected as the party's chairman and vice-presidential candidate.

The PFP adopted moderate social democratic policies closely based on those of the PP, and advocated inter alia the pursuit of a pro-Western foreign policy and the encouragement of foreign investment in Ghana. Mr Owusu expressed his support for an early currency devaluation as the first step towards solving the country's economic problems. The PFP's election campaign was notably well-organized and well-funded in comparison with those of other parties.

Social Democratic Front (SDF). This party came into being as a result of a merger between the National Democratic Front (sponsored by the Trades Union Congress) and the Social Democrats (founded by Alhaji Abubakar Alhassan). The SDF elected as its leader and presidential candidate Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, who had held ministerial office under the National Liberation Council established after the overthrow of President Nkrumah and who had subsequently served as general secretary of the National Alliance of Liberals (the main opposition party under the Busia Government). Alhaji Mahama's candidacy was approved by the Sowah Assets Commission [see above]. Prof. Mawuse Dake was elected as the SDF's vice-presidential candidate.

The Trades Union Congress leadership stated that the TUC had decided to sponsor a political party "as a form of self-protection" in view of its past experience first as a wing of the CPP under President Nkrumah (which had led to arrests of trade union leaders after the 1966 coup) and later as a politically neutral body under the Busia Government (which had placed it in a weak position to oppose that Government's policies). It was however pointed out that the SDF was not being financed by union funds. The SDF's election campaign was based on radical socialist policies.

Third Force Party (TFP). This moderate centre party was founded by Dr John Bilson, a Kumasi medical practitioner whose "Third Force" movement to oppose union government had been banned by the Acheampong Government in April 1978 [see page 29068]. Dr Bilson was the party's leader and presidential candidate, with Mr J. K. Kportugbe as his running-mate for the vice-presidency.

United National Convention (UNC). The UNC was founded by, inter alios, a number of former ministers in the Busia Government, including Mr William Ofori-Atta, Mr N. Y. B. Adade and Mr Reginald R. Amponsah. Unlike the PFP it did not seek to present itself as a successor party to the PP but rather as a new broadly-based centre party evolved from the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ) which had taken a leading role in opposing the Acheampong Government's union government proposals [see 29063 A]. Other founder members of the UNC included academics, businessmen, professional people and students. Mr Ofori-Atta, who had not been disqualified from holding public office and had never been the subject of rumours of corruption, was elected as the party's leader and presidential candidate.

A central feature of the UNC's election strategy was to promise "clean" government under Mr Ofori-Atta's leadership and the avoidance of any return to past political practices. (See page 27546 for references by a commission of inquiry into corruption to the poor public reputation of Ghana's established politicians.) In view of this stance there was considerable debate within the party over the role which should be taken by Mr Ofori-Atta's former colleagues in the leadership of the PMFJ, Lt.-Gen. Akwasi A. Afrifa (the former head of state) and Mr Komla A. Gbedemah (the former leader of the National Alliance of Liberals), in the light of controversial aspects of their past careers, and both men were excluded from the party leadership.

Lt.-Gen. Afrifa's nomination for the position of vice-presidential candidate was withdrawn, and the party instead elected Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu (who had served as Commissioner for Local Government in the Akuffo Government—see page 29338) as Mr Ofori-Atta's running-mate. Alhaji Iddrisu's candidacy was approved by the Sowah Assets Commission, which also approved Lt.-Gen. Afrifa's nomination as a UNC parliamentary candidate.

Negotiations which were held between the PFP and the UNC with a view to a merger between the two parties on the basis of their similar approach to fundamental policy issues ended inconclusively, largely because of the UNC's refusal to accept a leadership associated with past political controversies.

Independent Presidential Candidates. In addition to the six candidates nominated by political parties, the following four independent candidates were nominated for the presidential election: (i) Mr Mark Diamond Addy (who had originally formed a New Nation Party which was subsequently dissolved); (ii) Alhaji Imoru Ayannah (who had been imprisoned by the Acheampong Government for plotting its overthrow—see page 27096 and 26314 A, where his name is given as Ayarna); (iii) Dr R. P. Baffour (the chairman of the Integrated Iron Commission and a former vice-chancellor of Kumasi University of Science and Technology); and (iv) Mr Kwame Nyanteh.

Report of Constituent Assembly

The Constituent Assembly convened in December 1978 was adjourned indefinitely on May 16, 1979, after presenting to the Akuffo Government on the previous day a final report proposing numerous amendments to the draft constitution prepared by the CDC [see above]. While endorsing the basic government structure proposed by the CDC, the Assembly did not provide for any transitional restrictions on the operation of multi-party democracy, and adopted a number of provisions intended to safeguard democratic institutions in the light of the country's recent political history.

As described below in the section outlining the principal provisions of the Constitution as finally promulgated, these included an absolute ban on legislation to establish a one-party state (whereas the CDC had proposed to permit such legislation subject to endorsement by referendum) and an assertion of the citizen's right to resist any attempt to abolish the constitutional order. At the same time, however, the Assembly proposed that there should be an indemnity in respect of the coups of 1966 and 1972 and the subsequent periods of military government.

In an explanatory note attached to its report, the Assembly stated that its "fundamental amendments to the [CDC] proposals" (i.e. in respect of party-political activities) had been made in the light of (i) the lifting of the ban on party-political activities with effect from Jan. 1, 1979, and (ii) "the specific request made by the Chairman of the SMC to the Constituent Assembly on Dec. 21, 1978, that the Assembly should produce a permanent and lasting constitution which will stand the test of time as opposed to the transitional interim proposals". The wording of the latter phrase was seen as implying that the Assembly did not expect the Government to pursue the proposal for the formation of a "national front" by all the parties in Parliament which had been included in Gen. Akuffo's announcement on party politics of Nov. 30, 1978 [see above].

Other Pre-Coup Developments - Action against Gen. Acheampong - The Economic Situation

It was announced in a decree published by the SMC on May 1, 1979, that Gen. Acheampong had been released from "preventive custody", but that he had been dismissed with ignomony from the Army without retirement benefits, stripped of his military rank and confined to his home village of Iraboum, some 178 miles from Accra. He was also prohibited from entering any military establishment on pain of five years' imprisonment.

The decree stated that these measures had been taken against the former Head of State in view of various acts of economic and administrative misconduct against the state and people of Ghana, including (i) the "grave distortion" of orderly economic and financial planning through "personal interference" in these areas; (ii) the granting of import licences and public contracts to friends; (iii) the authorization of an excessive growth in the money supply [see page 29339]; and (iv) the negotiation of "dubious foreign loans to the detriment of the state".

As regards the matter of external loans, it was announced at the same time that the relevant committee of inquiry (which had been established in December 1978—see above—and had subsequently held hearings under the chairmanship of the newly-appointed Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Mr Austin Amissah) had found evidence of "wilful conduct . . . highly prejudicial to the interests of the state" on Mr Acheampong's part.

In a White Paper outlining the committee's findings and accepting most of its recommendations, the Akuffo Government disqualified Mr Acheampong and his former Commissioner for Finance, Dr Anthony Appiah, from holding public office, and severely criticized the role played as Attorney General by Dr Koranteng-Addow, who submitted his resignation as an Appeal Court judge "on health grounds" shortly after the publication of the White Paper. [For Dr Koranteng-Addow's dismissal from the Government in January 1979, see above.]

It was stated in the White Paper that the Akuffo Government had decided (i) not to pursue negotiations opened by the Acheampong Government in an irregular manner with a M. Gafoor, "the alleged president" of a Paris-based institution who had claimed to be in a position to arrange a US$1,000 million loan to Ghana, and (ii) to abrogate an agreement concluded in May 1978 with Phoenix Finance International of Jersey (Channel Islands) for a loan of 100,000,000 Swiss francs, none of which had so far been disbursed to Ghana despite the transfer to the company of promissory notes for 800,000 Swiss francs as an "insurance fee" (whose recovery would now be sought through legal proceedings).

The SMC's decision to take action against Mr Acheampong by decree rather than by prosecuting him in the courts was widely criticized in Ghana, in particular by leading members of the PFP, the UNC and the ACP, some of whom accused the Akuffo Government of seeking to avoid damaging disclosures which might be made during a trial and of confining Mr Acheampong to his home village in circumstances which would make it easy for him to flee the country.

The Economic Situation - Currency Reform

During the first half of 1979 there were indications that the economic measures introduced by the Akuffo Government, including the major devaluation of the cedi in mid-1978 [see page 29339], were taking effect, and official estimates were subsequently published giving the annual rate of price inflation as 79 per cent in mid-1979, compared with 104 per cent in mid-1978. However, attempts to control the pricing and distribution of basic commodities were largely unsuccessful, and many items continued to be unobtainable or available only at prices which were vastly inflated relative to the wages of the bulk of the population. It was subsequently reported by *The Financial Times* of July 4, 1979, that the Government had undertaken to relax the enforcement of price controls as a condition of the IMF standby arrangement announced some months earlier [see above].

The main economic initiative taken by the Akuffo Government in early 1979 was a currency reform designed (i) to eliminate illegal currency holdings outside the country (representing mostly the proceeds of smuggling) and (ii) to reduce excess liquidity following increases in the money supply of 28 per cent in the first half of 1978 and 34 per cent in the second half. All borders and ports were closed on March 9, 1979, when it was announced that all banks would close on March 12 and would reopen on March 13 to effect the currency reform by March 26 (when the borders would be reopened); during this period cash holdings of old cedis would be exchanged by the banks for new cedis at the rate of seven new for 10 old in respect of amounts up to 5,000 old cedis and five new cedis for 10 old in respect of larger amounts. Bank deposits made prior to the announcement were not affected.

The currency reform was largely responsible for falls of nearly 3 per cent in the money supply and 19 per cent in the volume of currency in circulation during the first half of 1979, but the Government nevertheless came under strong criticism regarding various aspects of its implementation, which was marked by a dislocation of trade, with many small businesses either remaining closed, refusing to accept old cedis, or sharply increasing their prices during the changeover. Arrangements for the establishment of special large-scale money-changing centres and for the distribution of the new currency to rural areas were made only after it had become apparent that the banks were unable to administer the operation effectively, it being reported that at least five people had died in massive queues outside banks—three from exhaustion and two in clashes with the security forces during scuffles.

It was moreover alleged (i) that there had been breaches of security prior to the commencement of the changeover, prompting large property purchases by certain military personnel and an upturn in bank deposits; (ii) that certain bank deposits had been made on March 10 with the aim of creating the impression that they had been made before the changeover was announced (in which connexion the accounts of 43 individuals and organizations were frozen pending investigation); (iii) that certain bank officials had abused their positions, inter alia by operating unofficial rates of exchange; and (iv) that border security had been lax, in some cases due to active connivance with currency smugglers on the part of the Border Guards (who, however, announced the arrest of 45 such smugglers). Protests were also voiced about the exemption of existing bank deposits (representing an estimated 58 per cent of the total money supply) from the "changeover tax" applied to cash holdings.

The Events of May 15 and June 4, 1979 - Replacement of SMC by Revolutionary Government

On May 15, 1979 (i.e. the same day that the Constituent Assembly presented its final report to Gen. Akuffo), troops loyal to the Government suppressed an attempted uprising by a group of junior officers and other ranks led by Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings of the Ghana Air Force. It was reported that the rebels briefly held a number of hostages in incidents at three locations in Accra, but were defeated with the minimum of force after sporadic exchanges of fire in which one rebel was killed. The matter was treated by the Government as a mutiny against military authority rather than an attempt to seize political power, and Flt.-Lt. Rawlings and four of his associates were charged before a court martial later in May with attempting the violent overthrow of the lawful authority in the armed forces.

All the defendants pleaded not guilty, and it was stated during the court martial proceedings that their main concern was to counter "widespread corruption in high places" and to prevent the military leadership, which the defendants accused of gravely undermining the reputation of the armed forces by its conduct in government since 1972, from returning power to a civilian regime on terms which made it unaccountable for such conduct. Flt.-Lt. Rawlings stated in a subsequent interview that his aim on May 15 had been "to force a verbal confrontation with the authorities and senior officers" over this issue, and that he and his co-defendants had travelled from unit to unit seeking support for this aim prior to the counter-action of the military leadership.

Spectators in the court applauded the defendants' condemnation of the Government's failure to prosecute Mr Acheampong and other allegedly corrupt officers. Wide public support was expressed for their viewpoint, which served as a focus for general grievances about the personal enrichment of many senior military officers during a period of severe economic difficulties for most Ghanaians and for the particular concern which had been expressed about the accountability of both the Acheampong and Akuffo Governments in the light of recent developments.

The court martial, which was described by *Africa* magazine as "politically the most ill-considered event of the regime of Gen. Akuffo", adjourned on May 31, 1979, and was due to resume on June 4, but on the latter date the Akuffo Government was overthrown in a further uprising by junior officers and other ranks who released Flt.-Lt. Rawlings from the military prison at Burma Camp, near Accra. It was reported that the military leadership, through the offices of the Army Commander, Maj.-Gen. Neville A. Odartey-Wellington, had in the interim attempted to have Flt.-Lt. Rawlings assassinated following the receipt of numerous anonymous letters and telephone calls urging his release, but that junior guard personnel at the prison had prevented the would-be assassins from reaching him.

In the early hours of June 4 an apparently spontaneous uprising began at Burma Camp, initiated mainly by other ranks in several units who were sympathetic to Flt.-Lt. Rawlings's cause and who regarded the majority of officers as enemies of this cause (although a few junior officers participated in the early stages of the uprising). Having seized weapons and overpowered any officers who showed resistance to them, the rebels released Flt.-Lt. Rawlings and escorted him to Broadcasting House in Accra (where the military guard was in sympathy with the uprising), and a message by him announcing the overthrow of the SMC was broadcast at 7.30 a.m.

It was stated in the broadcast that officers who had "worked for the welfare of your subordinates" had "no reason to fear", and that any attempt to resist the uprising would result in bloodshed. Military personnel stationed in Accra were summoned to a general meeting to elect representatives to a "new Revolutionary Council", while those stationed outside the capital were instructed to hold local meetings and elections. Flt.-Lt. Rawlings said that the aim of the uprising was to secure "justice . . . [for those who] have suffered for far too long" and that the planned parliamentary and presidential elections would take place in the near future with the aim of implementing the return to civilian government "in due time".

At 9.15 a.m. a further broadcast stated that "friendly forces" had now taken control of Broadcasting House and that all previous announcements were "ineffective". Shortly afterwards it was stated in an address to the nation by Maj.-Gen. Odartey-Wellington that "steps were being taken to restore the armed forces to normality" and that all personnel "should return to their respective units . . . while steps are being taken to iron out any grievances or any alleged injustices". Fighting was meanwhile in progress between loyal and rebel troops, and at 10.40 a.m. a further statement by Maj.-Gen. Odartey-Wellington was broadcast urging all members of the armed forces to cease firing, calling upon Flt.-Lt. Rawlings to meet him at the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and assuring the rebels that "there would be neither victimization nor arrests".

Subsequent announcements by unidentified speakers indicated that the rebels had resumed control of the radio station. During the afternoon of June 4 all members of the military leadership were called upon to surrender to the rebel forces at Air Force headquarters and to leave their refuge at police headquarters, which would be bombarded at 5.30 p.m. Confirmation that Army headquarters was "under the control of the revolutionary forces and the supporting forces" was broadcast at 8.15 p.m. by the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt.-Gen. Joshua M. Hamidu, who appealed to all troops still fighting on behalf of the Akuffo Government "to lay down your arms and return to barracks and co-operate with the revolution".

Casualties in the fighting on June 4 were subsequently announced as 13 dead (including Maj.-Gen. Odartey-Wellington, who was reported to have been killed during a rebel assault on police headquarters) and over 60 injured, although substantially higher estimates were given by unofficial sources. The consolidation of power by the new regime was announced over Accra radio at 6.30 a.m. on June 5, when an unidentified spokesman said that the "junior officers and other ranks" had established an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (ARFC) "to take over the administration of the country".

The spokesman confirmed that preparations for the June 18 elections would proceed as planned and said that the AFRC would not tolerate "acts of lawlessness", which would be "ruthlessly crushed". All borders were closed and a dusk-to-dawn curfew was in force, but the civilian population were "safe to go about their normal duties". In conclusion it was announced that the AFRC had ordered that "all essential goods must be sold strictly within the controlled prices" on pain of "serious reprisals" by the new regime.

Later on June 5 an address by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings was broadcast which included a warning to troops to refrain from "molesting" officers and to "accord due respect" to those senior officers who were sympathetic to the aims of the revolution; this followed reports of a breakdown of discipline in some units where all senior officers had, by virtue of their rank, been regarded as targets of the coup.

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings's address was followed by an announcement by the "elected spokesman" of the AFRC, Capt. Boakye Djan, naming Flt.-Lt. Rawlings as the Chairman of the AFRC and listing nine other junior service personnel (including himself) as members.

The full membership of the AFRC after various new appointments and changes was as follows: Flt.-Lt. Rawlings (Chairman); Capt. Djan; Maj. Mensah Poku; Maj. Mensah Gbedemah; W/O Harry Obeng; Pte. Owusu Adu; L/Cpl. John N. Gatsiko; Cpl. Owusu Boateng; Staff Sgt. Alex Adjei; Lt.-Cmdr. H. C. Apaloo; L/Cpl. Tashiru Abongo; L/Cpl. Ansah Atiemo; L/Cpl. Sarkodee-Addo; and Cpl. Sheikh Tetteh. L/Cpl. Gatsiko had been one of Flt-Lt. Rawlings's co-defendants in the court martial arising out of the events of May 15. Lt.-Cmdr. Apaloo died in early September 1979.

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings (32) was a career officer of mixed Scottish and Ewe parentage who had trained at the military academy at Teshie and the flight training school at Takoradi in 1968-69, being commissioned as a second lieutenant in the latter year.

Capt. Djan also (on June 5) announced the following military appointments: Chief of Defence Staff—Col. Dan Clark *vice* Lt.-Gen. Hamidu; Army Commander—Col. Bruce-Konuah *vice* Maj.-Gen. Odartey-Wellington; Air Force Commander—Wing-Cmdr. Samuel Gyabaah *vice* Air Vice-Marshal George Y. Boakye; Navy Commander—Cmdr. Kenneth Dadzie *vice* Rear-Adml. Joy K. Amedume; Border Guard Commander—Col. Seidu Ayuma *vice* Maj.-Gen. Kwasi Osei-Boateng. Mr Charles O. Lamptey was appointed Inspector-General of Police *vice* Mr B. S. Kwakye.

However, those appointed to the senior military posts listed above were subsequently replaced during July 1979, mostly by more senior officers, as follows: Chief of Defence Staff—Brig. Joseph Nunoo-Mensah; Army Commander—Brig. Arnold Quainoo; Air Force Commander—Air Commodore J. E. Barnor; Navy Commander—Capt. S. G. Obimpeh; Border Guard Commander—Lt.-Col. Kwame Wemegah.

A proclamation giving formal effect to the assumption of power by the AFRC dissolved the SMC and the National Redemption Council and gave the AFRC power to rule by decree until the entry into force of a new constitution. The powers of C.-in-C. of the armed forces were vested in the AFRC.

All military officers who had held ministerial posts in the Akuffo Government were removed from office by the new regime, their responsibilities being reallocated to civilian central government commissioners (ministers), most of whom were reappointed (as were all civilian regional commissioners). The only former member of the SMC to be given new responsibilities by the AFRC was Lt.-Gen. Hamidu (a long-standing critic of Gen. Acheampong—see page 29338), who was appointed "liaison officer between the AFRC and the civilian government machinery". The new distribution of portfolios among central government commissioners (after the announcement of additional minor changes on June 26) was as follows:

* Mr Kwame Afreh	Information and Cocoa Affairs
* Dr Joseph L. S. Abbey	Economic Planning, Finance, Trade and Tourism
* Prof. George Benneh	Lands, Natural Resources, Fuel and Power
* Mr George Harlley	Transport, Communications, Works and Housing
†Nii Anyetei Kwakwranya	Sports
†Mr Abayifa Karbo	Agriculture
†Mr Kofi Badu	Consumer Affairs and Co-operatives
* Dr E. Evans-Anfom	Education, Culture and Health
‡Mrs Gloria A. Nikoi	Foreign Affairs
* Mr Anthony K. Woode	Labour, Social Welfare and Industry
* Mr Austin N. E. Amissah	Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice and Local Government
Mr Ben Fowler	Internal Affairs

* Took additional responsibilities. † Changed portfolio.
‡ No change.

Commencement of AFRC's "House-cleaning Exercise" - Executions of Former Heads of State and Others - International Reactions

It was made clear by the AFRC that its main objective in assuming power was to conduct a "house-cleaning" or "purging" exercise, under which action would be taken against those found guilty of corruption during the period of military government, as a prerequisite for the reintroduction of civilian rule. A meeting took place on June 7, 1979, between AFRC members and leading politicians, including all presidential candidates except Mr Victor Owusu, at which it was confirmed that preparations would proceed as planned for the holding of elections on June 18 under the supervision of Mr Justice J. Kingsley-Nyinah, who was reappointed as the Electoral Commissioner.

It was reported that the majority of the politicians concerned agreed that, in view of the time needed to carry out an AFRC anti-corruption campaign, it was preferable to delay the installation of an elected government rather than to delay the holding of elections. It was subsequently announced that the AFRC had postponed the planned date for the installation of an elected government by three months to Oct. 1, 1979.

Under a decree published on June 14, 1979, the AFRC accordingly dissolved the Constituent Assembly, promulgated the new Constitution (i.e. for the purpose of formalizing the status of the imminent elections), and fixed Oct. 1 as the date of the Constitution's entry into force "subject to such changes as [the AFRC] deems necessary in the public interest". (See below for principal provisions of the Constitution as finally introduced, including the controversial transitional provisions inserted subsequent to the above-mentioned decree.)

The principal machinery for implementing the AFRC's anti-corruption campaign was established under a decree published on June 24, 1979, which was deemed to have taken effect on June 4. The decree provided for the setting up of special courts (subsequently also referred to as "people's revolutionary courts"), each comprising a president and four other members appointed by the AFRC "or other body authorized by the Council".

The main offences within the province of the special courts included the abuse of public office to obtain favour or advantage; the illegal or dishonest acquisition of property by any resident of Ghana; various offences relating to public property; profiteering in respect of public contracts; the demanding or acceptance of bribes by public servants; and economic sabotage, smuggling, looting, hoarding and the sale of goods above controlled prices.

A unanimous verdict or a four-to-one majority verdict was required to convict, the maximum sentence which the special courts could impose being death by firing squad and the minimum three years' imprisonment with penal labour and confiscation of improperly acquired assets. Sentences could be reduced by the AFRC, which would review and confirm the courts' decisions. There was no right of appeal in respect of a decision confirmed by the AFRC, and the questioning of special court proceedings in any other court was declared to be unlawful, it being stated specifically that no habeas corpus or similar applications were permitted.

The commencement of trials for "anti-state crimes" was announced on June 12, 1979, when it was also stated that an army firing range had been prepared for the execution of persons sentenced to death. The former SMC chairman, Mr Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (47), and his former Border Guard Commander, Maj.-Gen. Emmanuel K. Utuka (42), were subsequently executed by firing squad on June 16 after being found guilty "on charges of using their positions to amass wealth while in office and recklessly dissipating state funds to the detriment of the country". No further details were given of their secret trial before a special court. The last executions of this kind in Ghana had occurred in 1967, when two officers had been shot for plotting the overthrow of the then Government [see 22107 B].

Mr Acheampong had on June 13 issued his first public statement since relinquishing the leadership of the country in the previous year, in which he had expressed support for the AFRC, denied all the allegations made against him by the Akuffo Government, and claimed moreover that he had been removed from office to prevent the launching in mid-1978 of his own campaign against corruption among members of the military leadership. He said that he had been wrongly held responsible for actions carried out without his knowledge during his leadership, and intended to appeal against the irregular manner of his dismissal from the armed forces.

After further secret trials the following senior officers were executed by firing squad on June 26, 1979: Gen. Fred W. K. Akuffo (42); Lt.-Gen. Akwasi A. Afrifa (43), who had been head of state in 1969-70; the former commanders of the Air Force and the Navy, respectively Air Vice-Marshal George Y. Boakye and Rear-Adml. Joy K. Amedume; Maj.-Gen. Robert E. A. Kotei, the former Army Commander under Gen. Acheampong (and briefly Chief of Defence Staff under Gen. Akuffo); and Col. Roger Felli, the former Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. It was stated that they had been found guilty of abuses of public office to obtain loans, property and personal advantages and of gross negligence in discharging their responsibilities concerning public property. The executions were carried out in the presence of crowds of spectators, whereas only journalists had been permitted to witness the June 16 executions.

Press reports indicated that strong pressure for the executions had come from within the other ranks in the armed forces, and that Flt.-Lt. Rawlings had acceded to this pressure with some personal reluctance on the understanding that no further such measures would follow the "exemplary" executions of these senior members of the former leadership. While some sections of Ghanaian public opinion were reported to have welcomed the majority of the executions, objections in principle to all the executions on the grounds that they had been carried out after secret trials were expressed by, among others, politicians of all parties and representatives of influential professional bodies, including the Bar Association.

Particular disquiet was widely expressed about the case of Lt.-Gen. Afrifa in view of his non-involvement in public affairs during recent years except in association with the civilian political opposition to the Acheampong Government and latterly with the United National Convention party. As stated above, Lt.-Gen. Afrifa had been nominated as a UNC parliamentary candidate, and his arrest and execution occurred shortly after he had won a seat in the Ashanti Region in the June 18 elections [see below]. It was pointed out in a number of protests to the AFRC that Lt.-Gen. Afrifa had recently submitted his affairs to investigation by the Sowah Assets Commission and that no adverse findings had been made against him; Flt.-Lt. Rawlings said that a special court had heard new evidence against Lt.-Gen. Afrifa, which would be made public in due course. However, no details of any such evidence had been disclosed from any source by mid-1980.

International Condemnation of Executions - Ghanaian Regime's Reactions

The executions in Ghana gave rise to strong protests not only from the Governments of neighbouring countries, many of whose leaders had established cordial personal relationships with Gen. Akuffo, but also from the wider international community.

Immediately after the June 16 executions the military Government in power at that time in Nigeria made strong representations to the AFRC through diplomatic channels, and on June 22 published the text of a letter from the then Head of State, Lt.-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (who had visited Ghana only 10 days before the June 4 coup), to the Christian Council of Nigeria in which assurances were given that the Nigerian Government had "expressed the concern, dissatisfaction and disgust of the people of Nigeria on the situation in Ghana".

The period of credit extended in respect of Ghanaian oil imports from Nigeria (representing over 80 per cent of the country's total oil imports) was reduced from 90 to 30 days, and although this was increased to 60 days following a visit to Nigeria on June 25 by a delegation led by Lt.-Gen. Hamidu it was made clear that no Nigerian oil would be supplied to Ghana if Gen. Akuffo was executed. Following the June 26 executions, Nigerian oil shipments were accordingly suspended (officially for technical reasons), leading to severe shortages and stringent rationing of petroleum products in Ghana. Subsequently, the agreement of Algeria and Libya to make up some of Ghana's supply shortfall was announced on Aug. 14 and emergency supplies of refined products were imported from Italy. (Negotiations with Algeria were conducted by Lt.-Col. Abdulai Ibrahim, a former Commissioner for Fuel and Power who was temporarily released from prison for this purpose—see below for his conviction by a special court and the subsequent cancellation of his sentence by the AFRC.)

Other neighbouring countries whose Governments expressed concern at the situation in Ghana included Ivory Coast, Togo and Upper Volta, which sent a joint delegation of Justice Ministers to Accra on June 18 to plead for the lives of Gen. Akuffo and others "on humanitarian grounds" (although it was stated that there was no intention to interfere in Ghana's internal affairs). A similar appeal for "clemency in dealing with those arrested" was made after the June 26 executions by all the (francophone) member states of the Common African and Mauritian Organization (OCAM).

International organizations which commented on the situation in Ghana included the International Commission of Jurists, which called upon the AFRC to "uphold the traditions of the rule of law" in the conduct of trials of former leaders, while non-African countries which made diplomatic representations were understood to include Britain and other European Community member states, as well as Canada and the United States.

In the British House of Commons, the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian Gilmour, stated on June 18, 1979, that the British Government "deeply regret the lack of tolerance that has been shown" in carrying out the June 16 executions, and would make urgent representations to the AFRC. Following the June 26 executions the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, said on that day that it had been made "perfectly clear" to the AFRC that "if there were to be prosecutions, they should be in accordance with internationally accepted principles of justice", and that the Government again expressed its "abhorrence" at the latest executions.

The AFRC, which had issued statements after its assumption of power stressing that Ghana's foreign policy remained unchanged and denying that the June 4 coup had any ideological significance, initially accused countries critical of the executions of seeking to interfere in Ghana's internal affairs. Moreover, it was alleged by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings that some neighbouring countries which saw the example of the Ghanaian coup as a threat to their own stability were mounting an "economic blockade" of Ghana. (In addition to developments affecting Nigerian oil supplies, it was reported inter alia that Upper Volta and Benin had suspended food exports to Ghana. The AFRC also accused Western countries of rejecting or delaying consideration of requests for emergency food aid.)

On July 1, however, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings stated in a broadcast that the AFRC had "taken note of the appeals for restraint from the world community, especially those from our sister African states, and we wish to assure them that in the spirit of brotherhood and African unity we would heed their advice". It subsequently became clear that the AFRC had decided not to carry out any further executions.

On July 3 militant students who favoured the continuation of "revolutionary justice" demonstrated in Accra outside the British and Nigerian high commissions and the US embassy (where the American flag was torn down) against "unwarranted interference in the affairs of Ghana by those who have never shown any concern for the suffering of the country and who can have no understanding of the revolutionary process which is unfolding today". The demonstrators dispersed in response to appeals by Capt. Boakye Djan and Maj. Mensah Gbedemah, and were subsequently addressed by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings, who said that "the slowdown in the tempo of the revolution is a strategic pause to reassess the position".

In the three months after the executions the AFRC sought to improve its relations with other countries, although the Nigerian military Government did not conclude an agreement on the full resumption of normal oil supplies until mid-September 1979 (i.e. shortly before Ghana's return to civilian rule) following talks with representatives of the civilian President-elect.

Major international meetings attended by Ghanaian delegations during the period of AFRC rule included the Organization of African Unity summit held in Monrovia in mid-July 1979 [see 29840 A], to which a delegation was led by the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Mrs Gloria Nikoi; the Commonwealth heads of government meeting held in Lusaka in August 1979 [see 29901 B], attended by Maj. Mensah Gbedemah; and the non-aligned summit held in Havana in September 1979 [see 30037 A], to which Flt.-Lt. Rawlings led a delegation including a member of the future majority party under civilian rule.

Trials of Prominent Members of Former Regimes

Apart from the eight officers executed by the AFRC, between 50 and 100 prominent members and officials of former regimes (including numerous military holders of ministerial office in the Acheampong and Akuffo Governments) were detained by the AFRC and their assets were in most cases frozen pending investigation. Those subsequently convicted of various offences by special courts included the following:

Squadron-Ldr. George Tagoe (former deputy head of the Cattle Development Board)—sentenced to 95 years' imprisonment; Col. Kwaku A. Takyi (a former regional commissioner)—80 years; Col. Kwame M. Baah (former Commissioner for Foreign Affairs)—50 years. All were said to have admitted "profiteering and buying property illegally". A group of 10 persons subsequently convicted of "various crimes against the state" included the following former commissioners: Col. B. K. Ahlijah (life imprisonment), Lt.-Col. G. K. Amevor (life imprisonment), Grp.-Capt. K. A. Jackson (life imprisonment) and Col. Paul K. Nkegbe (20 years). Four more former commissioners were subsequently imprisoned for the following terms for "anti-state crimes": Capt. J. A. Kyeremeh—life; Lt.-Col. R. K. Zumah—25 years; Cmdr. Godwin E. Osei—15 years; Lt.-Col. Simpe M. Asante—10 years.

In a subsequent trial of 18 army officers, the following former commissioners were among 12 men sentenced to prison terms: Lt.-Col. Abdulai Ibrahim (25 years), Lt. E. J. Dawuni (20 years), Col. E. O. Nyante (10 years) and Col. K. A. Quarshie (five years); the remaining six defendants, who were cautioned and discharged from the Army, included Brig. I. K. Amoah, Lt.-Col. I. K. Kujiku, Col. Kodzo B. Agbo and Col. Parker H. S. Yarney.

On Sept. 21, 1979 (i.e. only three days before the date finally established for the return to civilian rule—see below), it was announced that 68 persons said to have fled the country after the June 4 coup had been convicted in absentia by special courts of various crimes and that sentences including death by firing squad and 25 years' imprisonment with hard labour had been confirmed by the AFRC; no details were given at this stage of the charges against particular individuals.

The 68 included former senior military and police officers, prominent private businessmen, and senior public servants and banking officials. Among those in the first category were Maj.-Gen. Charles Beausoleil, a former Air Force Commander under the Acheampong Government; a former chief executive of the Cocoa Marketing Board, Cmdr. J. C. Addo; two former Inspectors-General of Police, Mr Ernest Ako and Mr B. S. Kwakye; and five former commissioners—Col. S. M. Akwagiram, Grp.-Capt. T. T. Kutin, Col. A. H. Selormey, Maj. Edward Yirimambo and Col. C. R. Tachie-Menson. All of the above were sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment with the exception of Maj. Yirimambo (five years) and Col. Selormey (sentence not announced). Civilians among the 68 included Mr E. K. Buckman (a former commissioner—sentenced to death) and Mr Kwame Karikari (former chief executive of the National Procurement Agency—sentenced to three years' imprisonment unless he returned to the country by Jan. 13, 1980, to take up a teaching post for at least five years).

Two days later, on Sept. 23, the AFRC ordered the release from imprisonment of Lt.-Col. Abdulai Ibrahim, Col. K. A. Quarshie and Col. Kwame M. Baah, although the assets of Lt.-Col. Ibrahim and Col. Baah remained confiscated. It was stated that none of the three men had been found guilty of corruption in office, but that Col. Baah had exploited his former contacts for personal gain after leaving office; that Col. Quarshie had damaged the economy through "ineffectiveness in office"; and that Col. Ibrahim had authorized indiscriminate building on reserved government lands.

Investigations of Police and Public Servants

In mid-July 1979 the AFRC established a six-member investigation panel into the police force, chaired by Capt. Carl Huppenbauer. This followed widespread agitation among junior police officers for a "purging" of allegedly corrupt senior officers to parallel the "house-cleaning" within the armed forces. Earlier in July some 36 senior police officers had been placed on compulsory leave by the new Inspector-General of Police, Mr C. O. Lamptey, some of them having reportedly been "arrested" by disaffected junior officers who had sent petitions and resolutions to the AFRC.

The investigating panel found evidence of various corrupt practices by senior officers, including the loaning of money to junior ranks at excessive interest rates and the extortion of bribes from suspects who applied to be released on bail, and recommended "a major and ruthless shake-up" of the police force. A total of 12 senior police officers were dismissed and 14 retired on the recommendation of the panel (in an interim report presented before the AFRC left office), while six others were to be prosecuted.

Civilians employed in the public sector whose affairs came under investigation as part of the "house-cleaning exercise" included senior officials of state corporations and enterprises, who were ordered to declare their assets and were moreover warned in mid-July 1979 that they would not be permitted to resign from their posts without the approval of the AFRC. All public and civil servants normally resident in Ghana who were absent from the country on leave or on official duties were ordered to return home by Aug. 15 (as were personnel of private businesses under investigation by the AFRC). In early August the requirement to make a declaration of assets was extended to include inter alios senior members of the civil service, the diplomatic service and the judiciary.

On Sept. 17 all public servants who were members of secret societies such as the Freemasons and the Oddfellows were ordered to resign from these "selective fraternities" by Sept. 21, it being stated that the AFRC had found that such societies fostered discrimination against the ordinary citizen and had played a part in the entrenchment of various corrupt practices at all levels of national life. Earlier in September the AFRC had announced the forthcoming establishment of various committees of inquiry whose work would continue after the return to civilian rule and which would submit reports to the ombudsman to be appointed under Chapter 11 of the new Constitution [see below]. The main areas to be investigated were educational institutions at all levels; financial institutions; the civil service; private business; public boards and corporations; local government; and the mass media.

It was estimated that between 30 and 40 senior civil servants and public-sector officials were dismissed or retired by the AFRC during its period of office, it being decreed moreover that none of these persons could leave the country after the return to civilian rule without the permission of the Special Tribunal set up to complete the work of the special courts [see below]; others subject to this decree included the senior police officers against whom adverse findings had been made [see above].

Public organizations from which senior officials were dismissed included the Ghana National Trading Corporation and the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB). The AFRC moreover decreed the dissolution of the CMB, together with the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs, and announced that a five-member Cocoa Council, responsible to the President and to Parliament, would be established after the return to civilian rule. The chief executive of the CMB, Mr Kwame Pianim, was appointed interim superintendent of cocoa affairs, but subsequently resigned from this post in October 1979 and was replaced by a three-member committee appointed by the civilian Government.

The dissolution of the CMB followed the publication of the final report of a committee of inquiry set up by the Akuffo Government [see page 29339 and also page 30438 above] under the chairmanship of Mr Justice P. E. Archer. The committee had found evidence of widespread fraud, bribery and mismanagement, including an attempt by Cmdr. J. C. Addo, a former CMB chief executive (for whose inclusion among those convicted in absentia by special courts, see above), to make an illegal transfer of 39,000,000 cedis in foreign exchange. A total of over C 65,722,000 was found to have been diverted from official cocoa purchases into the floating of private companies by some 16 cocoa-buying agencies, and these agencies were ordered to make repayment to the state by Sept. 18, 1979, or forfeit their assets, which were seized by the AFRC as a guarantee against default. Numerous other malpractices involving substantial sums were listed in the report.

Investigations into Private Sector Affairs - Nationalization and Other Economic Measures

In respect of the private sector, the AFRC investigated the affairs of numerous companies, particularly those which had received public contracts, and imposed heavy penalties on those found to have committed various offences. Several major companies were nationalized, and in many other cases assets were confiscated from companies and individuals and entrusted to a special committee set up to transfer such assets back into private ownership, with the proceeds going to the state. The AFRC also ordered the border security forces to shoot on sight any person involved in smuggling.

A number of foreign businessmen were deported from Ghana, including many Lebanese and Indian citizens who were said to have infringed the country's immigration regulations. All non-African immigrants were on Aug. 3, 1979, ordered to report to the authorities for registration within one week and on Sept. 4 some 107 naturalized Ghanaians were deprived of their citizenship "in the public interest" by decree of the AFRC. Sentences of 45 years' imprisonment were imposed by a special court in mid-September 1979 on each of 17

Lebanese and Lebanese-Ghanaian businessmen found guilty of making illegal foreign exchange transfers, misusing import licences and evading taxes.

Those whose payments of income tax, municipal rates and other public dues were in arrears were given ultimatums by the AFRC to settle these arrears by given dates or to face a campaign by "the whole of the intelligence and security agencies, together with revenue collectors", it being stated by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings on Aug. 31, 1979, that this action had resulted in tax receipts of C 40,000,000 in the space of two weeks, and that cumulative tax receipts since June now amounted to C 185,000,000 (excluding "the amount collected in the regions during August"), while total customs and excise receipts were in excess of C 389,000,000.

Much controversy was aroused by action taken against small traders and other individuals, which according to *The Financial Times* of July 4, 1979, included the blowing up of the houses of hoarders, the public flogging of those accused of overcharging and the seizure of the goods of shopkeepers who refused to open for business as normal, and which gave rise to widespread allegations of intimidation of civilians by undisciplined junior soldiers. The AFRC's main aim in this campaign was to ensure the sale of goods at officially controlled prices, despite the fact that most traders were thereby forced to sell at below the wholesale prices which they had paid. Existing shortages were thus greatly exacerbated by (i) the increased consumption of a limited supply of goods which could not be replenished in line with demand and (ii) an increased incentive for traders and local producers to withhold goods from the market.

In an operation which was widely regarded as a concession by the AFRC leadership to pressure from the ranks for further "direct action" on a large scale, the important Makola No. 1 marketplace in Accra, said to be controlled by traders guilty of hoarding and profiteering, was demolished by troops on Aug. 18, 1979. A similar demolition exercise was carried out on Sept. 5 at the so-called "money market" in Kumasi, a centre of illegal currency transactions.

The AFRC also took action to reduce rents and introduced a public-sector wage freeze. Other economic measures included a 50 per cent increase in the producer price of cocoa (from C 80 to C 120 per 30 kilograms) in order to give farmers "an incentive to increase production and stop smuggling" (see page 29339 for previous cocoa price increase).

AFRC Chairman's Assessment of "House-cleaning Exercise" - New Date set for Return to Civilian Rule

The achievements of the AFRC's house-cleaning exercise were outlined by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings in a major speech on Aug. 31 in which he accused those elements in society against which the exercise had been directed, as well as some "foreign interests", of mounting a "campaign of lies and distortion" against the AFRC.

He said that this campaign had included baseless allegations of bribery against military personnel who had implemented AFRC policies, propaganda aimed at creating divisions within the AFRC on the grounds that "one soldier or another is a real revolutionary and that others are mere spectators", and "the worst weapon" of tribalist propaganda (it having been alleged that the June 4 coup had concentrated power in the hands of the Ewe people, to the detriment particularly of the Ga and the Ashanti). Flt.-Lt. Rawlings said, however, that the AFRC was "emphatically opposed to separatism of any sort, from whatever quarter".

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings acknowledged in his speech that relations between soldiers and civilians had suffered during the house-cleaning exercise as a result of various incidents, but attributed some blame for this to civilians who had "used soldiers to molest" other civilians on the basis of false accusations.

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings concluded by announcing that the AFRC had decided to bring forward the date of the entry into force of the new Constitution and the return to civilian rule from Oct. 1 to Sept. 24, 1979.

The Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, June-July 1979

As stated above, elections commenced as scheduled in June 1979, resulting in a victory for the People's National Party, which obtained an absolute majority (71 seats out of 140) in Parliament and whose leader, Dr Hilla Limann, was elected President of Ghana after two rounds of voting.

Despite the declaration of a public holiday on June 18, there was a poor turnout among the country's 5,022,092 registered voters, of whom only 35.25 per cent voted in the parliamentary elections and 35.48 per cent in the presidential election on that day. The total number of parliamentary seats won by each party was as follows:

People's National Party (PNP)	71
Popular Front Party (PFP)	42
United National Convention (UNC)	13
Action Congress Party (ACP)	10
Social Democratic Front (SDF)	3
Third Force Party (TFP)	0
Independents	1

Only the PNP won parliamentary seats in every region of Ghana, the distribution of seats being as follows: *Central*—PNP eight, ACP seven; *Greater Accra*—PNP six, UNC three, PFP one; *Eastern*—PNP 11, PFP six, UNC four; *Ashanti*—PFP 19, PNP two, UNC one; *Brong Ahafo*—PFP 10, PNP two, independent one; *Volta*—PNP 11, UNC five; *Northern*—PNP seven, PFP four, SDF three; *Upper*—PNP 15, PFP one; *Western*—PNP nine, ACP three, PFP one. (An overwhelming majority of those elected had no previous parliamentary experience.)

The PNP candidate won the largest number of votes cast in the June 18 presidential election, but not the absolute majority required for victory at the first ballot. The full first-round voting figures were as follows:

	Votes	Per cent
Dr Limann (PNP)	631,559	35.3
Mr Owusu (PFP)	533,928	29.9
Mr Ofori-Atta (UNC)	311,265	17.4
Col. Bernasko (ACP)	167,775	9.4
Alhaji Mahama (SDF)	66,445	3.7
Dr Bilson (TFP)	49,104	2.7
Dr Baffour (ind.)	8,812	0.5
Mr Nyanteh (ind.)	8,480	0.5
Mr Addy (ind.)	5,959	0.3
Alhaji Ayannah (ind.)	4,874	0.3

In a subsequent run-off election between the two leading candidates on July 9, in which there was a fractionally higher turnout of 35.93 per cent, Dr Limann was elected President by 1,118,405 votes (62 per cent) to 686,132 (38 per cent) cast for Mr Owusu.

The AFRC placed a ban on the holding of any victory celebrations after the elections.

Transitional Arrangements pending Transfer of Power

Following the completion of the elections, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings congratulated the Electoral Commissioner, Mr Justice Kingsley-Nyinah, on the "creditable execution of a difficult assignment" and thanked the leaders of all the political parties for their "display of political maturity and comradeship". He expressed the hope that the incoming PNP administration would "continue the clean-up exercise with serious, unrelenting honesty". Temporary official accommodation was immediately made available to Dr Limann, and arrangements were made for him to hold a series of meetings with commissioners in the present Government for briefings on current topics. The President-elect also held meetings with foreign diplomatic representatives.

The establishment was also announced of a joint AFRC-PNP commission to "plan and execute measures that will ensure a smooth transition from a military to a civilian regime". The commission, inaugurated on Aug. 10, 1979, was jointly chaired by Lt.-Cmdr. Apaloo of the AFRC and the Vice-President-elect, Dr de Graft-Johnson, and comprised 10 PNP members and 10 representatives of the military Government, including the Chief of Defence Staff, Brig. Nunoo-Mensah, and the Attorney General, Mr Amissah.

Dr Limann said that the commission should "work immediately to reduce tensions and yet leave no doubt that an old, unenviable order has changed yielding a new perspective of hope", and pledged that his Government would "continue with the house-cleaning exercise" and ensure that there was "no relapse to the bad old ways".

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings said at a press conference on Aug. 22 that he and the other members of the AFRC would all resume their normal military duties on Sept. 24, and that they had made declarations of their assets to prove that they had derived no financial benefit from their period in government. Brig. Nunoo-Mensah confirmed that the necessary arrangements were being made, and that "we have no problem in taking them back".

Under a decree published on Sept. 7, 1979, the clerk to the dissolved Constituent Assembly was empowered to summon a special session of Parliament on Sept. 17 for the purpose of selecting a Speaker, discussing the ministerial and other nominations submitted by the President-elect for approval, and considering "any other matter relating to the functions assigned to Parliament under the Constitution with a view to facilitating a smooth handover". It was agreed at the session to nominate as Speaker Mr Justice Jacob Hackenburg Griffiths-Randolph, a distinguished judge who was not an elected MP, who was subsequently formally elected to this post on Sept. 24.

In order to guarantee the continuation of its "house-cleaning" measures after the return to civilian rule, the AFRC in mid-September 1979 issued a decree establishing a three-man "Special Tribunal", chaired by Mr Justice Isaac K. Abban (a former Electoral Commissioner—see 29063 A), which would assume exclusive jurisdiction over all cases still pending before the special courts on Sept. 24 and all cases subsequently arising out of the various inquiries initiated by the AFRC [see above]. The powers of the Special Tribunal were moreover entrenched in the transitional provisions of the Constitution as finally published, which were designed also to prevent any challenges to the measures taken under AFRC rule [see below].

During the subsequent controversy surrounding the transitional provisions [see below], it was claimed by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings in March 1980 that the PNP administration-elect had been party to their insertion into the Constitution, but this was denied by the leader of the PNP parliamentary party, Mr C. C. Fittih, who stated (i) that the administration-elect "was never consulted at any stage about any amendment to the Constitution"; (ii) that the question of such amendments had not formed part of the terms of reference of the joint AFRC-PNP planning commission (as had been claimed by Flt.-Lt. Rawlings); and (iii) that the decision to establish the Special Tribunal had been taken by the AFRC after the PNP representatives on the joint commission had made it clear that the special courts could not continue in existence under civilian rule.

One of the last acts of the AFRC was to declare (on Sept. 23, 1979) an amnesty under which (i) all convicted prisoners aged 70 years and above, and all convicted prisoners in poor physical or mental health, were released; (ii) prisoners with not more than two previous convictions who had spent at least three years in prison had their sentences halved (these two measures to exclude persons convicted by AFRC special courts and those convicted of murder, manslaughter, robbery, use of offensive weapons and rape); (iii) all death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment and all life sentences to 20 years' imprisonment (excluding in each case sentences imposed by AFRC special courts); and (iv) all persons convicted of political offences under the Acheampong and Akuffo Governments were granted free, absolute and unconditional pardons.

Ceremonial Return to Civilian Rule

The return to civilian rule on Sept. 24 was marked by ceremonies and celebrations in Accra which were attended by, inter alios, President Sekou Touré of Guinea. Following the formal election of the Speaker of Parliament and the swearing-in of MPs and of President Limann and Vice-President de Graft-Johnson, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings addressed Parliament before handing over a symbolic scroll of office to the President.

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings said that the new Government was taking office "at a very crucial stage in our nation's development", since "we of the AFRC, during our short stay in power, have demonstrated openly what many people have only suspected before, namely that the holding of office in government in this country had in almost all cases been used to plunder the wealth of the nation". The AFRC was, he said, "proud to have contributed to the development of this new consciousness in the people of Ghana, [which] . . . means that if people in power use their office to pursue self-interest they will be resisted and unseated no matter how unshakeable their oppression might seem to be", adding that the AFRC now made a "fervent appeal" to Parliament and the new Government "never to lose sight of this new consciousness of the Ghanaian people".

President Limann, in his inaugural address to Parliament, thanked the AFRC for "conducting the general elections and organizing the activities which have culminated in this solemn and memorable ceremony" and expressed the appreciation of all Ghanaians for the AFRC's "efforts, selfless devotion and sincerity of purpose". He referred to the "long period of blatant and shameless abuses which have so destroyed the people's confidence in our institutions and in our values that they are all yearning for a welcome change for the better" and said that his Government's policies would be "guided by the lessons drawn from the events since June 4, 1979, and by my own commitment to open, clean government based on participatory democracy at all levels".

The ceremonies in Parliament were followed by a military parade in Independence Square during which Flt.-Lt. Rawlings and Capt. Boakye Djan unexpectedly marched behind the rear column of troops while President Limann, as the new C.-in-C., took the salute. Flt.-Lt. Rawlings's appearance drew what was described by *West Africa* of Oct. 1 as "almost hysterical acclaim" from the crowds of spectators in one of several demonstrations of the "immense popularity" of the outgoing head of state, who was "the centre of all attention" throughout the Sept. 24 ceremonies.

In an address to troops at the military parade, President Limann stressed the need for "absolute loyalty, unity and discipline from the armed forces", which, "having redeemed their lost image by the events of June 4", were now expected to "fulfil their constitutional and traditional role of protecting and defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ghana" and to "maintain cordial relations with the civilian public".

President Sekou Touré also made a speech at the parade pledging his country's "support and friendship" for Ghana and urging Ghanaians not to be influenced by tribal disunity, but to work together "for the reconstruction of the nation" so that Ghana could "reoccupy its place in the African liberation struggle".

Provisions of New Constitution

The following is a summary of the principal provisions of the new Constitution under which Ghana returned to civilian rule on Sept. 24, 1979.

Chapter 1 stated that "the sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana, in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in this Constitution", and established the right of citizens, "should no other remedy be possible", to "resist any person or persons seeking to abolish the constitutional order as established by this Constitution". The interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution were vested in the Supreme Court. In defence of the Constitution, it was laid down (i) that "Parliament shall have no power to enact a law establishing a one-party state" and (ii) that it was illegal to suppress or seek to suppress "the lawful political activity of any person . . . or class of persons".

Chapter 2 defined the laws of Ghana. **Chapter 3** defined the territories of Ghana, and provided for the holding of referendums on the alteration of regional boundaries within the country. Upon receiving a petition demonstrating "substantial demand" for such an alteration, the President, acting upon the advice of the Council of State, was required to appoint a commission of inquiry which could recommend the holding of such a referendum, in which an 80 per cent majority of those voting would be required for the implementation of the proposed alteration. There was also a requirement for a minimum turnout of 50 per cent of the electorate except on a proposal for the merger of two or more regions, in which case a 60 per cent turnout was required in each of the regions concerned.

Chapter 4 defined the "directive principles of state policy", and required the Government to "report to Parliament at least once a year all the steps it has taken to ensure the realization of the policy objectives contained in this Chapter, and in particular the realization of a healthy economy, the right to work, the right to good health care and the right to education". The Government was required to conduct its international affairs in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and Organization of African Unity charters "in a manner consistent with the national interests of Ghana".

Chapter 5 dealt with citizenship. **Chapter 6** contained guarantees of fundamental human rights and freedoms, including freedom of religion, expression, assembly and association. The section on freedom of expression stated inter alia that state-owned media "shall afford equal opportunities and facilities for the representation of opposing or differing views". The proclamation by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Council of State, of a state of emergency limiting the operation of guarantees given in Chapter 6 was subject to parliamentary approval within 72 hours, and procedures were laid down for its subsequent prolongation by the vote of a majority of all members of Parliament. Procedures were laid down for the treatment of those detained under a state of emergency.

Chapter 7, dealing with the representation of the people, provided for the appointment by the President, on the advice of the Council of State, of an independent Electoral Commissioner responsible principally for organizing elections and referendums on the basis of universal adult suffrage (with a voting age of 18) and for reviewing constituency boundaries. In any referendum other than one held under Chapter 3 of the Constitution [see above], the Electoral Commissioner was required not to declare the results unless there had been a turnout of at least 50 per cent and a majority of at least 40 per cent.

Provision was made for the freedom of activity of political parties, provided that (i) a party was organized in accordance with democratic principles and pursued constitutional aims; (ii) its accounts, detailing its sources of income, were published annually in the government gazette; (iii) its leadership did not include persons who were not qualified to be elected to Parliament or to hold public office; and (iv) its leadership or membership were not restricted along tribal, ethnic or religious lines. No law could be enacted to establish "a body or movement having the right or power to formulate or propagate a common programme or a set of objectives of a religious or political nature for the country".

Chapter 8, dealing with the executive, provided for the election by universal adult suffrage of a person aged at least 40 years as President of Ghana to carry out the functions of head of state and C.-in-C. of the armed forces with executive authority for the implementation of the Constitution and all laws made under it. There would also be a Vice-President nominated by the President prior to his election. Nominations for the presidency required the signatures of not less than 128 persons qualified to stand for election to Parliament, including at least two persons from each district council area in Ghana. A presidential candidate required over 50 per cent of the valid votes cast to gain election, and provision was made for the holding of a further run-off election between the two leading candidates in the event of an inconclusive initial election. No person could serve as President for more than two four-year terms. Procedures were laid down for the removal from office of the President by a vote of at least two-thirds of all members of Parliament on the basis of the findings of a judicial tribunal or a medical board.

Provision was made for the appointment of a Cabinet consisting of the President, the Vice-President and between 10 and 19 ministers. Not more than 30 ministers (including non-cabinet ministers) could be nominated by the President, and their confirmation in office was subject to the approval of Parliament. Ministers and deputy ministers were required to be qualified for election to Parliament (although if they had been so elected they were required to resign their seats before assuming office). A motion of censure on a minister could be introduced in Parliament by not less than one-third of all the members and adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of all the members after a debate in which that minister would have the right to speak in his defence. (Ministers could also be requested to address Parliament in order to introduce bills and explain government policies.)

Provision was made for the establishment of (i) a National Development Commission responsible to the President for advising on the formulation and implementation of economic development policies and (ii) a National Security Council consisting of the President, the Vice-President, such ministers as were designated by the President (provided that they included those responsible for foreign affairs, defence, interior and finance) and up to five other persons appointed by the President. It was laid down that "no agency, establishment or other organization concerned with national security shall be established except as provided for under this Constitution".

Chapter 9, dealing with the legislature, vested the legislative power of Ghana in a unicameral Parliament of not less than 140 elected members, with a normal term of five years. The minimum age of a parliamentary candidate was 21, and those disqualified from membership of Parliament included persons who had within the previous ten years been found by a commission or committee of inquiry to be incompetent to hold public office or to have abused such office, and persons whose property had been confiscated as a result of the findings of such an inquiry.

Provision was made for the election by members of Parliament of a Speaker (who would have no voting rights), who was required to be qualified for election as a member of Parliament (although if he had been so elected he was required to vacate his seat). Other circumstances in which a member of Parliament was required to vacate his seat (in addition to assuming ministerial office—see above) included (i) absence without reasonable explanation from 15 sittings during a parliamentary session and (ii) leaving the political party for which he had been elected to join another party. The Speaker was required to summon a meeting of Parliament outside a normal session within seven days of receiving a request to this effect by at least 20 members. It was laid down that there should be two Deputy Speakers, elected by members of Parliament from among their own number, who could not be members of the same political party.

With regard to parliamentary procedures, provision was made inter alia for the appointment of all-party committees with responsibility for different areas of government, it being laid down that every member should serve on at least one committee. Provision was made for voting in Parliament to be secret in respect of (i) constitutional amendment bills [see below] and (ii) the election or removal of persons holding office under the Constitution.

In the event of the President refusing to assent to a bill passed by Parliament, he was required to inform the Speaker within 14 days of his grounds for recommending the reconsideration of the bill or of his decision to refer the bill to the Council of State for its comments. The President was required to give his assent within 30 days to a bill passed by at least half of all the members of Parliament after being referred back to the House for reconsideration in the light of comments made by the President or the Council of State. In the case of bills certified as urgent by the appropriate parliamentary committee, (i) the President did not have the right to withhold his assent and (ii) it was required that such bills should be considered by the Council of State. Money bills could only be introduced by or on behalf of the President, who could not withhold his consent to them when passed. Parliament could not enact laws having the effect of legislative judgments or (with the exception of certain money bills) having retroactive effect.

Chapter 10 provided for the establishment of a Council of State "to aid and counsel the President and Parliament in the performance of their respective functions", with the following membership: (i) any former President or Head of State who "did not leave office in disreputable or other circumstances imputing moral turpitude"; (ii) not more than five persons appointed by the President with the prior approval of Parliament from among former holders of the offices of Chief Justice, Speaker of Parliament, Chief of Defence Staff, Inspector-General of Police, Governor of the Bank of Ghana, vice-chancellor of a recognized university, Secretary to the Cabinet or Head of the Civil Service; (iii) not more than eight persons appointed by the President with the prior approval of Parliament from recognized professional bodies; (iv) the President of the National House of Chiefs; and (v) not more than 12 persons appointed by the President with the prior approval of Parliament from among "citizens of Ghana of proven eminence and merit", including at least one resident of each region of the country.

The Council of State was empowered to consider parliamentary bills (i) at the request of the President; (ii) if the chairman of the Council (elected by the members from among their own number) so determined; (iii) if not less than five members of the Council so demanded; and (iv) if a bill had been passed under a certificate of urgency [see above]. The Council was required to complete its consideration of an urgent bill within 72 hours and of other bills within 30 days of their third reading in Parliament. The Council was also empowered to make recommendations on "any matter being considered or dealt with by the President, a Minister of State, Parliament or any other authority established by this Constitution", although there was no requirement that such recommendations be acted upon.

Chapter 11 provided for the appointment by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament, of an ombudsman empowered to investigate allegations of maladministration by government ministries, the public services, public corporations, the armed forces, the police and the prison service. The detailed terms of reference of this office were to be determined by Parliament within six months of the Constitution's entry into force.

Chapter 12 dealt with the judiciary, which was to be "subject only to this Constitution and not subject to the control or direction of any other person or authority". **Chapter 13** dealt with public finance, **Chapter 14** with the public services, **Chapter 15** with the prison service, **Chapter 16** with the armed forces and **Chapter 17** with the police service. **Chapter 18** provided for the establishment by Parliament within one year of the Constitution's entry into force of "a national service scheme which may include military training" to apply to citizens aged 18 years or over.

Chapter 19 guaranteed the status of the institution of chieftaincy and its traditional councils as established by customary law, and debarred Parliament from legislating in certain related areas. Provision was made for the election by regional Houses of Chiefs of a National House of Chiefs with responsibility for advising "any person or authority charged with any responsibility under this Constitution or any other law for any matter relating to or affecting chieftaincy".

Chapter 20 dealt with local government and administration, and provided inter alia for the establishment of (i) district and other local government councils, two-thirds of whose members should be elected and one-third appointed by the traditional (i.e. chiefly) authorities, with the local member of Parliament as an additional ex-officio member; (ii) a Local Government Grants Commission; and (iii) regional councils responsible mainly for co-ordination, planning and the supervision of central government programmes. **Chapter 21** dealt with lands.

Chapter 22 provided for the establishment within six months of the Constitution's entry into force of an independent Press Commission responsible inter alia for (i) appointing the governing bodies of public corporations operating in any sphere of mass communication or information, including broadcasting and the press; (ii) ensuring "the procurement and distribution on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis of the facilities and services required for the efficient and independent operation of the press and other media"; (iii) making regulations for the registration of newspapers and the licensing of other media (in respect of which Parliament was specifically debarred from legislating); (iv) taking "measures to ensure the preservation of press freedom"; and (v) taking measures to ensure the maintenance of professional standards in the mass media, including adjudication upon complaints.

The membership of the Press Commission was as follows: (i) one representative each from the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, the Ghana Bar Association, The National Development Commission, The Ghana National Association of Teachers, the universities, the Ghana Association of Writers, the owners and proprietors of the private press, and the Christian Council/National Catholic Secretariat; (ii) two representatives of the Ghana Journalists' Association; and (iii) "two other members, one of whom shall be a woman".

Chapter 23 provided for the appointment by the President of a commission of inquiry into any matter of public interest, acting either on his own judgment, the advice of the Council of State or the request of Parliament. **Chapter 24** laid down a code of conduct for public officers, which provided inter alia for the disclosure of all property and assets held by the holders of specified offices, including the President, the Vice-President, government ministers, members of Parliament, senior diplomats and civil servants and senior management personnel in publicly-controlled corporations or companies.

Chapter 25 laid down the procedure for amending the Constitution, and specified inter alia (i) that a constitutional amendment bill should be published at least six months prior to its introduction in Parliament; (ii) that such a bill should be endorsed in secret ballots by at least two-thirds of all district or other local government councils within six months of its introduction in Parliament; (iii) that such a bill should be approved by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council of State in a secret ballot held within six months of its introduction in Parliament; (iv) that such a bill should be supported by a two-thirds majority of all members of Parliament in secret ballots held at the end of the second and final debates on it; and (v) that bills to amend Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 22 or 25 of the Constitution or some 16 other specified articles (including Art. 217—see below) could not be introduced without the approval of the electorate expressed through a referendum held in accordance with Chapter 7 of the Constitution [see above].

Chapter 26 contained miscellaneous provisions, and laid down inter alia that claims against the Government could be enforced as of right "without the grant of a *fiat* or the use of the process known as petition of right". The final article (Art. 217) stated that the transitional provisions laid down in a schedule to the Constitution "shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution".

Transitional provisions appended to the Constitution included an indemnity for the Government of Ghana or persons acting under its authority, and for persons who assisted in the changes of government on Feb. 24, 1966 [see 21273 A], Jan. 13, 1972 [see 25115 A], and June 4, 1979 [see above], "in respect of any act or omission relating to, or consequent upon" (i) the overthrow of the governments which had held office prior to those dates; (ii) the suspension or abrogation of the August 1969 Constitution; (iii) the establishment of the National Liberation Council [see 21273 A], the National Redemption Council [see 25115 A], the Supreme Military Council (SMC) appointed on Oct. 9, 1975 [see 27545 A], the SMC appointed on July 5, 1978 [see 29335 A], or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC—see above); (iv) the "purging exercise" conducted by the AFRC; and (v) "the establishment of this Constitution".

Further provisions declared that "no executive, legislative or judicial action" taken by the AFRC could be "questioned in any proceedings whatsoever" and that no penalties imposed in connexion with the AFRC's "purging exercise" could be "reversed by any authority under this Constitution". The AFRC's Special Tribunal [see above] was moreover empowered to "take over and complete the trial of all cases" which were pending before special courts immediately before the entry into force of the Constitution, and to impose any penalty which could have been imposed by those courts. The Special Tribunal would also have "exclusive jurisdiction to try all criminal offences disclosed by or arising out of the reports submitted by the committees of inquiry" set up by the AFRC and to hear appeals against the findings of such committees (which would if necessary continue in existence until the submission of their reports).

It was stated that the transitional provisions outlined above could not be amended by Parliament, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter 25 of the Constitution.

Formation of Limann Government - Consequent By-elections and Political Alignments

Following the return to civilian rule President Limann formed a Cabinet consisting of himself, the Vice-President and 16 ministers, of whom six had been elected to Parliament for the PNP and one for the UNC. Nine regional ministers (including one PNP MP) were also appointed, as were over 30 deputy ministers in the central Government and nine regional deputies. The President's nominations for all these posts were subject to confirmation by the appointments committee of Parliament, which initially approved the swearing-in of 12 cabinet ministers in early October 1979. The majority of the remaining posts were filled in the succeeding weeks, although it was not until June 1980 that the final nominee (the Ashanti Regional Minister) was sworn in. The full list of appointments was then as follows:

Central Government Ministers

Dr Amon Nikoi	Finance and Economic Planning
Mr S. K. Riley-Poku	Defence
Prof. W. C. Ekow-Daniels	Interior
Dr Isaac K. Chinebuah	Foreign Affairs
Dr E. K. Andah	Agriculture
Mr K. S. P. Jantuah	Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives.
Mr Michael P. Ansah	Health
Mr Harry Sawyerr	Transport and Communications
*Prof. George Benneh	Lands, Natural Resources, Fuel and Power
Col. David Zanlerigu	Works and Housing
Mr Francis K. Buah	Trade and Tourism
Mr Vincent Y. Bulla	Industries, Science and Technology
Mr Frank Q. Amega	Labour, Youth and Social Welfare
Dr Kwamena Ocran	Education, Culture and Sports
Dr John S. Nabila	Information and Presidential Affairs
Mr Joe Reindorf	Attorney General

*No change.

Regional Ministers

Mr I. T. Torto	Greater Accra
Mr Felix K. B. Amoah	Eastern
Mr N. Y. Agbesi	Volta
Mr Yaw O. Afriyie	Brong Ahafo
Dr John Owusu-Afram	Ashanti
Mr Sam Cudjoe.	Western
Mr E. A. Haizel	Central
Alhaji Ibrahim Haruna	Northern
Mr George Nandzo	Upper

A significant feature of the composition of the new Government was the exclusion of the so-called "old guard" of the former Convention People's Party, it being noted that although two ministers, **Prof. Ekow-Daniels** and **Dr Chinebuah**, had previously held office under President Nkrumah they had been appointed at a relatively late stage in his administration (in June 1965—see 20838 A). Prior to joining the Limann Government, both men had been at the University of Ghana at Legon, Prof. Ekow-Daniels as dean of the law faculty and Dr Chinebuah as dean of the arts faculty. Another academic, **Prof. Benneh**, was the only appointee of the outgoing military Government to be retained in office by President Limann.

Among the remaining ministers, none of whom had previously held office, **Dr Nikoi** was a former Governor of the Bank of Ghana, **Mr Buah** had been pro-vice-chancellor of the University of Cape Coast, **Dr Nabila** had been a lecturer at the University of Ghana at Legon and **Mr Riley-Poku** was a solicitor and barrister who had sat in the Constituent Assembly which debated the 1979 Constitution. **Mr Reindorf** and **Mr Jantuah** were also barristers; **Mr Bulla** was an oil company executive; **Dr Ocran** had served on the Atomic Energy Commission; and **Col. Zanlerigu** was a farmer and businessman and a former commander of Dr Nkrumah's presidential guard. **Mr Sawyerr**, a chartered surveyor, had sat as an independent MP in the Parliament of 1969-72, had played a prominent role in the campaign by the Association of Professional Bodies against the Acheampong Government's union government proposals [see 29063 A; 28524 A; 28468 A], and had been elected as an MP for the UNC in June 1979.

In addition to Mr Sawyerr (UNC), the following ministers had also been elected to Parliament (for the PNP): Dr Chinebuah, Mr Ansah, Col. Zanlerigu, Mr Buah, Dr Ocran, Dr Nabila and Mr Agbesi. By-elections were called for Nov. 16, 1979, in 10 constituencies to fill seats which had become vacant as a result of (i) the resignations from Parliament (as required under Chapter 8 of the Constitution—see above) of seven of the above-mentioned ministers (i.e. except Mr Agbesi, whose appointment had still to be confirmed); (ii) the resignations of two PNP MPs who had been appointed deputy ministers; and (iii) the execution of Lt.-Gen. A. A. Afrifa (who had, as stated above, been elected to Parliament for the UNC).

The alliance between the PNP and the UNC implied by Mr Sawyerr's appointment to and acceptance of ministerial office under President Limann was strengthened when each of these parties agreed not to nominate by-election candidates in those constituencies formerly held by the other party. The eight PNP-held seats were retained by that party (one unopposed and the remainder in two-sided contests with either the PFP or the ACP), while the UNC likewise retained its two seats (in two-sided contests with the PFP).

In subsequent by-elections (i) the seat vacated by Mr Agbesi was retained by the PNP in a two-sided contest with the PFP on Jan. 18, 1980, and (ii) a seat from which an ACP member resigned was retained by that party in a two-sided contest with the PNP on Feb. 22, 1980. The latter by-election was marked by an alliance between the ACP and the PFP, with the latter party calling upon all its members and supporters in the constituency to vote for the ACP candidate. (In the previous by-elections these two parties had agreed that candidates should only be nominated by whichever of them had won the more votes at the general election.)

Meanwhile PNP-UNC co-operation had been further deepened by (i) Mr William Ofori-Atta's acceptance of nomination by President Limann to the Council of State established under Chapter 10 of the Constitution (the UNC leader being subsequently unanimously elected to the chairmanship of the Council) and (ii) the election with PNP support of a UNC MP as Second Deputy Speaker of Parliament under Chapter 9 of the Constitution [see above].

The "tactical alliance" between the two parties was reported by *West Africa* to depend on personality factors rather than any agreement on fundamental policy issues, and to stem in part from a mutual desire to minimize party political dissension which could provoke a further military intervention in politics. The alliance was, however, strongly criticized by some senior members of the UNC, including Prof. Adu A. Boahen, who said in January 1980 that its formalization would "constitute an unpardonable betrayal" of the objectives for which the late Lt.-Gen. Afrifa had stood.

Dissension within PNP

During early 1980 there were many reports of serious divisions within the ruling party, particularly between the "old guard" of the former CPP and younger elements within the PNP.

In February 1980 Mr Imoru Egala, who had assumed the title of "founding father" of the PNP, sought to publicize various allegations which had been made against the party chairman, Nana Okutwer Bekoe III, in respect of import licences issued in 1978 to a business in which the latter was a major shareholder. Mr Egala claimed that his intention was to "allay any suspicions" over this matter, while Nana Okutwer said that Mr Egala's motive was to challenge his position as party chairman.

Nevertheless, the two men co-operated at the PNP national congress, held in Kumasi in May 1980, in putting forward a compromise motion designed to prevent the party from openly splitting into different factions. As a result the congress was adjourned indefinitely on May 31 with the dissolution of the central committee and without the holding of elections for national officers, the administration of party affairs being entrusted ad interim to President Limann, in consultation with Mr Egala and Nana Okutwer Bekoe III.

Repercussions of AFRC Rule - Rulings of Special Tribunal - Challenges to AFRC Measures

Throughout the first 10 months of President Limann's term of office Ghana's political life was dominated by issues arising out of the period of AFRC rule, which in early August 1980 were expected to continue to be the subject of much controversy for some considerable time, in view particularly of the nature of the transitional provisions of the 1979 Constitution [see above].

One cause of inter-party dissension shortly after the return to civilian rule was the Limann Government's acquiescence in the activities of local "vigilante groups" which had been established in various areas to combat black-marketeering and other forms of corruption.

On this issue the Government took the view that there was nothing in the Constitution to prevent "voluntary associations of public-spirited citizens" from reporting alleged offences to the law-enforcement agencies. On the other hand, objections to the activities of such groups were made (i) on human rights grounds, in view of several instances of the punishment of allegedly corrupt traders by vigilante groups in a manner reminiscent of events under AFRC rule and (ii) on political grounds, it being claimed by the PFP leader, Mr Owusu, that there was a danger of rival groups being mobilized for party-political ends.

The vigilante groups issue was the first major topic to be discussed by a "permanent inter-party consultative committee to assist the Government in finding solutions to pressing national issues" which was set up at the President's request and comprised representatives of all the parties in Parliament under the chairmanship of Vice-President de Graft-Johnson. Following these discussions the Government took action in early 1980 to regulate the membership and activities of vigilante groups by vetting the background of prospective members and by establishing formal co-ordination with the police force.

Meanwhile the Special Tribunal set up under Mr Justice Abban had commenced its work in October 1979 by (i) issuing lists of various persons required to appear before it in connexion with cases pending from the period of AFRC rule; (ii) approving the recommendations made in the first three reports of the AFRC's committee on the disposal of confiscated assets [see above]; and (iii) announcing a deadline of Oct. 31, 1979, for the submission of petitions requesting the Tribunal to review the findings of various AFRC committees of inquiry.

In November 1979 the Special Tribunal stated that by the middle of that month nearly C 24,000,000 was held by it in a suspense account, comprising about C 19,135,000 collected by the AFRC prior to Sept. 24 and the balance collected by the Tribunal since that date in settlement of various fines and surcharges, plus proceeds from the sale of confiscated goods; no drawings whatsoever had been made on this account and discussions were currently in progress with the Government on its transfer to the Consolidated Fund.

In the succeeding months the Special Tribunal sentenced various persons to terms of imprisonment, some of them in absentia, while acquitting others of charges laid against them under AFRC rule. The assets of some of those sentenced in absentia were confiscated. The Tribunal also commenced its consideration of some 500 petitions by individuals and organizations challenging dismissals from office and forfeitures of assets ordered by AFRC inquiries, a number of which were upheld.

In one controversial ruling the Tribunal declared an AFRC decree ordering the takeover of a private business to be "null and void in all respects" and instructed the Attorney General's department to take steps to have the decree repealed and to set up a fresh inquiry into the business concerned. Some of the public employees exonerated by the Special Tribunal were CMB officials; in this connexion it was stated in January 1980 by Mr Justice Archer, the chairman of the inquiry into the CMB, that the AFRC had acted on its report without waiting for the completion of consequent investigations by the Auditor General's department.

In April 1980 the Tribunal ordered the "de-freezing" of the assets and bank accounts of the wives and children of 53 persons convicted in absentia by AFRC special courts; this followed demands for such action by the media which had led to one newspaper editor being sentenced to three months' imprisonment by the Tribunal for publishing an editorial "calculated to bring the Tribunal into contempt and to incite the public against it".

The Limann Government in May 1980 suspended the activities of the committee on the disposal of confiscated assets pending an investigation of alleged irregularities (which were denied by its chairman, Capt. A. K. Kwayisi), and in June 1980 requested the Special Tribunal to continue in office "until it is determined whether its assignment has been completed".

Outstanding inquiries which fell outside the ambit of the Special Tribunal and associated machinery established by the AFRC included the committee of inquiry into the Black Star shipping line (set up by the Akuffo Government in September 1978—see page 29339), which reported directly to the Limann Government in May 1980 and whose recommendations were accepted. As a result of the inquiry the managing director and three other senior officials of the line were dismissed for incompetence and mismanagement, and negotiations were opened with reputable foreign shipping lines with a view to bringing in outside management for at least two years.

New investigative bodies set up by the Limann Government included (i) a commission of inquiry into the granting of loans by state-owned banks to their own officials (set up under the chairmanship of Mr Justice S. A. Crabbe in December 1979) and (ii) a commission of inquiry into the operations of the Diamond Marketing Corporation since 1970 (set up under the chairmanship of an Accra lawyer, Mr J. B. Quarshie-Idun, in February 1980).

Legal and Other Challenges to AFRC Measures

Notwithstanding the constitutionally-guaranteed irreversibility of sentences imposed by AFRC courts, a number of actions were brought which in effect sought to challenge the legitimacy of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the controversy surrounding which deepened as information began to be divulged from various sources about the secret procedures of the AFRC's special courts. (It was reported inter alia that detainees had been physically assaulted prior to their trial, that trials had been conducted without defence counsel and with the interposition of a screen between the accused and the members of the court, and that in many cases arbitrary sentences had been imposed without any trial taking place.)

In October 1979 three civilians imprisoned by AFRC special courts for terms of three, 15 and 20 years were granted bail by the Accra High Court, to which habeas corpus applications had been made by their wives stating that the men had been imprisoned without any trials being held. The judge overruled a submission by the state that the transitional provisions of the Constitution precluded any review or reversal of penalties imposed by or under the authority of the AFRC, but granted leave to appeal.

A similar application was heard in November in respect of another prisoner, to whom bail was granted by a High Court judge who stated that such cases fell within the jurisdiction of the court because they raised the question of whether or not trials had actually been held, and that only sentences which could be proved to have been imposed by a court were covered by the transitional provisions. Four other prisoners were granted bail in November, and a further 11 (including several military officers) were granted leave to make applications for habeas corpus.

Later in November, however, the Appeal Court revoked the bail granted to the three men whose case had come before the High Court in October, and ordered the proceedings to be stayed pending the reference of the matter to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the interpretation of the Constitution was involved. In the light of this judgment, applications were made by the state for the re-arrest of the five persons who had been granted bail in November. All eight of the persons involved evaded re-arrest and forfeited their bail.

In December 1979 a PFP MP called upon the Government "to order retrials before competent judges" of persons sentenced by AFRC special courts and to publish the records of all AFRC trials, the latter demand being endorsed by an MP of the UNC [see above for the latter party's alliance with the ruling PNP]. A leading member of the UNC, Mr R. R. Amponsah, subsequently appealed in March 1980 (i) for all those imprisoned under AFRC rule to be granted pardons, (ii) for all those convicted in absentia and living abroad to be permitted to return to Ghana for fresh trials, (iii) for all those convicted by the Special Tribunal to be granted the right of appeal to the highest court, and (iv) for the assets of the late Lt.-Gen. Afrifa to be remitted to his family by exercise of the President's prerogative of mercy.

In early 1980 four former commissioners imprisoned under AFRC rule—Col. Nkegbe, Capt. Kyeremeh, Lt.-Col. Amevor and Lt.-Col. Zumah—filed writs in the High Court challenging their sentences, which they maintained had been imposed without the holding of trials, and seeking to restrain the Attorney General from disposing of their confiscated assets. No date was set for the hearing of their case, however, apparently in view of the uncertainty now surrounding the court's jurisdiction in such matters.

In respect of the 107 naturalized Ghanaians who had been stripped of their citizenship by the AFRC [see above], the Limann Government announced in January 1980 that those concerned would not be deported and could remain in the country subject to the laws governing the residence of aliens.

It was reported by *West Africa* of June 23, 1980 (i) that the British section of Amnesty International had recently appealed to President Limann to order a judicial review of all sentences imposed by the AFRC special courts, which eyewitness reports had now demonstrated to be "inadequate and unfair", and (ii) that a petition urging their immediate release had been presented to the Minister of the Interior, Prof. Ekow-Daniels, by over 60 AFRC detainees on Jan. 30, 1980.

The number of AFRC detainees at the beginning of 1980 was given in the petition as 23 military officers (seven retired and 16 serving), four serving police officers, 26 "civilians from all walks of life", and 20 illiterate peasant farmers (of whom five were released on Jan. 4, 1980, while the release of a further three was ordered by a High Court judge in April 1980 after the Attorney General had failed to present a case for their continued detention). The petition alleged inter alia that the detainees had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment after their arrests (which were said to have been motivated by personal grievances or disputes) and that no acceptable legal procedures had been applied to their cases.

On June 9, 1980, the wives of the AFRC detainees presented a further petition to Vice-President de Graft-Johnson urging "the use of the presidential powers of pardon" to effect the release of their husbands, who, it was stated, had been imprisoned without trials and were "entitled to be treated humanely and justly whatever crimes they had committed". The wives' petition also drew attention to the severe financial hardship suffered by detainees' families as a result of the freezing of all family assets.

Status of Former AFRC Members and Related Questions

The failure of the Limann Government to make any early response to the various demands for the cancellation of sentences imposed by AFRC courts was widely attributed to apprehensions concerning the possibility of a further intervention by the military if the Government was seen to be "reversing the gains of the June 4 revolution" at this stage. An important basis for such apprehensions was the continuing immense personal popularity of Flt.-Lt. Rawlings, who attracted large crowds at public appearances and whose supporters alleged that the authorities were seeking to discredit the AFRC over a period of time before taking steps to reverse its actions.

Following the return to civilian rule, many former members of the AFRC either left the country (including Capt. Boakye Djan, who commenced a war studies course in London immediately after the handover of power) or went on accumulated leave, but Flt.-Lt. Rawlings himself remained in Ghana and resumed his former duties. Shortly after assuming office President Limann announced that he had nominated Flt.-Lt. Rawlings (as a former head of state) as a member of the advisory Council of State, but Flt.-Lt. Rawlings declined to accept nomination, subsequently stating that he had done so "for personal reasons".

An open conflict between Flt.-Lt. Rawlings and the new Government developed in November 1979 following the escape from an Accra prison of five soldiers who had held various offices under the AFRC and whose conviction on corruption charges by a special court had been announced shortly before the return to civilian rule. It was however claimed by the soldiers that they had in fact been judged innocent and had been unlawfully imprisoned as "scapegoats" in an attempt by Maj. Gbedemah, Capt. Djan and other senior AFRC members against whom various allegations had been made to demonstrate that the AFRC was prepared to take action on any corruption charges against its own members and officials.

The escape of the five men on Nov. 12 came shortly after reports by state-owned information media that Flt.-Lt. Rawlings had requested the Government to free them on the grounds that their release had been ordered by the AFRC prior to Sept. 24. The escape itself was described by Prof. Ekow-Daniels in a television broadcast on Nov. 13 as "the storming of the prison following a well laid-out plan involving prison officers, armed soldiers and certain unidentified men", although it subsequently became clear (from the evidence given to an official inquiry) that the escape had involved no outside intervention. Flt.-Lt. Rawlings described Prof. Ekow-Daniels's statement as an attempt by the Government "to connect me with the matter by an obvious insinuation" and as "part of a campaign to discredit the Government of the AFRC of which I was Chairman".

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings retired from Armed Forces - Senior Military and Police Appointments

On Nov. 27, 1979, the Government announced Flt.-Lt. Rawlings's immediate retirement from the armed forces on the grounds that his "continued presence in the forces as a serving officer is not compatible with his status as a former head of state".

At the same time the AFRC-appointed Chief of Defence Staff, Brig. Nunoo-Mensah, was retired and replaced by Brig. Edwin K. Sam (hitherto commandant of the Army Staff College and now promoted a major-general), while the Army Commander, Brig. Quainoo, was likewise retired, being succeeded by Brig. I. K. Amoah (the former commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, for whose discharge from the Army under AFRC rule see page 30443 above). The AFRC's appointees as Air Force and Navy commanders, respectively Air Commodore Barnor and Capt. Obimpeh, were confirmed in office, the latter being promoted a commodore. The Inspector-General of Police, Mr Lamptey, was retired together with two police commissioners, and Mr Felix P. Kyei was appointed as the new Inspector-General.

It was reported that the appointments of both Mr Kyei and Maj.-Gen. Sam were initially received with considerable hostility by junior police and army personnel respectively. That encountered by Maj.-Gen. Sam was so intense that he declined to take up his new post (although the Ministry of Defence denied reports of his resignation and attributed his failure to appear at various parades to absence on "accumulated leave" with effect from Dec. 6). Subsequently, however, the appointment of Air Commodore Barnor (who was promoted to the rank of air vice-marshal) as Chief of Defence Staff *vice* Maj.-Gen. Sam was announced on May 12, 1980.

Protests from within the armed forces and from other quarters at the retirement of Brigadiers Nunoo-Mensah and Quainoo led the Government to make a further announcement on Nov. 30, 1979, stating that this action had been taken so that "personal conflicts between [the two officers] would not undermine the peace, stability and security of the nation"; this followed "persistent complaints to the Government" by Brig. Nunoo-Mensah about "the non-cooperative attitude of Brig. Quainoo". The two officers responded by issuing a joint statement on Dec. 2 strongly rebutting this official explanation as totally baseless, adding: "This is yet another move in the series of stories being concocted to undo the gains and personalities of the June 4 revolution and to destroy the new-found self-confidence of the armed forces". President Limann, for his part, stated that he was ready to resign if the public did not accept the Government's explanation.

Shortly after the November 1979 military leadership changes, the Government announced that it was to establish a commission to inquire into the conditions of service of the armed forces and in particular junior officers and other ranks; to determine how far dissatisfaction with conditions of service had contributed to unrest in the armed forces; to inquire into the theory and practice of the present command structure and to determine how far it favoured or discouraged stability and discipline; and to determine what effects military involvement in civil government and non-military public affairs since 1965 had had on the forces' morality, discipline and stability. (The commission was subsequently appointed under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Charles E. Coussey on Feb. 6, 1980.)

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings's retirement was welcomed by the opposition PFP, whose party newspaper described it as "highly commendable", since his continued presence in the armed forces had "undermined the loyalties of a large number of serving personnel and left the impression that two governments were running affairs in the country". The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), however, on Nov. 29, 1979, accused the Government of seeking "to reverse all the popular democratic gains of the people of Ghana arising from the uprising of June 4", and student demonstrations took place in support of Flt.-Lt. Rawlings and the other retired officers.

Formation of Pro-AFRC Organizations - Controversy over Transitional Provisions of Constitution

Students were subsequently among those who formed various organizations to defend the aims of the former AFRC, including notably the "June 4 Movement" and the "People's Revolutionary League of Ghana" (Prelog, which also included members of a "rejectionist front" formed by members of the former People's Revolutionary Party who had refused to accept that party's merger with the PNP—see page 30438 above). Prelog in January 1980 addressed a memorandum to President Limann urging him to ignore the pressures which were developing in Ghana for the expunging of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, it being claimed that such action could warrant the invocation of Chapter 1 of the Constitution permitting resistance by citizens to the abolition of the constitutional order [see above]. The memorandum also expressed support for the Government's policy on the activities of vigilante groups [see above].

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings, in a long interview published in *West Africa* of Feb. 4, 1980, said inter alia that "most soldiers feel betrayed" by the "lack of appreciation of what the soldiers did for this country", and that the retirement of Brigadiers Nunoo-Mensah and Quainoo had been "the last straw".

He accused the Government of treating the AFRC's house-cleaning exercises as "an isolated or purely military affair with no relevance to the civilian front", and of permitting "the re-emergence of the old guard" within the PNP despite having undertaken "to clean up their party". (At a subsequent news conference held on June 4, 1980, to mark the anniversary of the AFRC coup, Flt.-Lt. Rawlings further alleged that Brig. Nunoo-Mensah had been dismissed because he had refused to swear an oath of loyalty to the Government, as opposed to the state and the Constitution.)

Flt.-Lt. Rawlings's reference in his Feb. 4 interview to the "old guard" of the PNP was on Feb. 19 dismissed by Mr Imoru Egala as "impertinent", and he challenged Flt.-Lt. Rawlings to form his own political party and stand for election if he thought he could do better than the present Government.

On Feb. 12, 1980, five persons were arrested by the security forces for allegedly distributing pamphlets at a military barracks urging soldiers to support the aims of the former AFRC and describing the transitional provisions of the Constitution as "holy". The five were reported to be members of Prelog, including the secretary of that organization, and it was announced by Prelog on Feb. 20 (by which time they had been released on bail) that it would seek legal redress for their imprisonment for four days without being charged, whereas the new Constitution placed a 24-hour limit on such detention.

Meanwhile Flt.-Lt. Rawlings, for his part, said at a news conference organized by the June 4 Movement on Feb. 14, 1980, that the security agencies themselves had distributed a number of pamphlets to soldiers and others since Sept. 24, many of which had purported to originate from non-Ewe military officers and had presented the period of AFRC rule as part of an Ewe tribal conspiracy to take over power in Ghana. Further anonymous pamphlets had, said Flt.-Lt. Rawlings, accused him, together with Brig. Quainoo and others, of plotting a coup against the Limann Government, and he claimed that the security and intelligence agencies were collaborating in an attempt to destabilize the country by feeding false information to the Government about alleged coup plots.

Later in February Capt. Boakye Djan and Maj. Mensah Poku, both of whom were on courses in the United Kingdom, flew home to Ghana to hold a news conference at which they urged the Government to appoint commissions of inquiry (i) to "probe all AFRC members and people associated with them to dispel the substantial doubts created in the minds of Ghanaians about the integrity of the leaders of the June 4 revolution" and (ii) to "ensure a constitutional settlement of the issue of whether the transitional provisions of the Constitution should be reviewed or not", the latter body to be composed of judicial experts from other Commonwealth countries. Capt. Djan named a number of persons who should be required to testify before the former inquiry.

This initiative by two former senior AFRC members who (according to recent reports) had had serious differences of opinion with Flt.-Lt. Rawlings was described by the NUGS as "an affront to the sovereignty and independence of the people of Ghana" and "the latest and most vicious intrigue . . . by reactionary forces to reverse the gains of the June 4 revolution". It was suggested by the NUGS that the circumstances of the two officers' return to Ghana showed that they were "being used" by military intelligence, and it was subsequently reported by *The Economist* of May 24 that their call for an inquiry into AFRC rule was "regarded as an attempt by the Government to discredit the [AFRC] with a view to removing the transitional provisions". The June 4 Movement issued a statement on March 7 saying that "if there are any specific allegations against any individuals connected with the AFRC, the solution is to take those individuals to court under the relevant laws of the land".

The Government made no immediate response to the call for the establishment of commissions of inquiry, and the Speaker refused a request by a PFP MP to raise the matter of the transitional provisions in Parliament. At the same time, it was stated outside Parliament by the leader of the PNP parliamentary party, Mr C. C. Fittih, that the Government had initiated "intensive consultation" within the inter-party consultative committee [see above], and thought it "fit that the committee should be allowed to deliberate on all aspects of these sensitive matters before Parliament . . . is approached to debate them".

Arrest of Alleged Conspirators - Allegations of Campaign against Former AFRC Officials

The Ministry of Defence announced on April 8, 1980, that "a number of soldiers and a civilian" had been arrested on March 29 "in connexion with a conspiracy to cause unrest in the country", and that one of the soldiers was a former AFRC liaison officer. According to *West Africa*, the officer concerned (Flying Officer Ebenezer Odoi) was subsequently released without being charged, it being widely thought that he had been arrested in order to create the impression that former AFRC leaders were implicated in the alleged conspiracy. Following a court martial held in camera from April 23 to May 6, seven soldiers and one civilian were sentenced to between five and 15 years' imprisonment "for offences relating to mutiny".

On May 19 a former army corporal, Mr Alex Dautey, issued a lengthy statement in which he said that 20 persons had originally been arrested on March 29, and that Flying Officer Odoi and the other persons who were eventually released had been "subjected to very humiliating treatment" during their detention. He alleged that the military intelligence authorities had on a number of occasions fabricated coup plots as an excuse for dismissing certain soldiers whom they had "already blacklisted", and gave detailed information of his recent personal experience of such an operation. Mr Dautey added that in most cases certain members of the present military leadership who had been punished by AFRC courts were responsible for these "reprisals", which he urged the other ranks to resist.

The Ministry of Defence described Mr Dautey's statement as part of a campaign to incite troops to mutiny which was being organized by Brig. Quainoo and other retired officers, a charge which was strongly denied by Brig. Quainoo.

Further allegations of a campaign by the security forces against former AFRC officials were made in June by Capt. Kojo Tsikata (one of the men who had been named by Capt. Boakye Djan as a person who should appear before an inquiry into AFRC rule), who claimed that he was subject to constant surveillance. Independent evidence of such surveillance was subsequently shown on a British television programme and published in the *Daily Graphic* newspaper (which although state-owned had published articles critical of the authorities under the editorship of Miss Elizabeth Ohene, who had been appointed under AFRC rule and was currently involved in a legal dispute with the Government over the interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press).

The Economic Situation - Industrial Unrest

Ghana's economic status was described by President Limann at the time of his inauguration in September 1979 as one of "virtual bankruptcy", the serious difficulties which had existed in early 1979 having been aggravated by developments during the period of AFRC rule. These included notably the enforced sale of limited supplies of goods at unrealistically low prices and the disruption of imports, including oil supplies from Nigeria [see page 30442 above].

Information released by the Bank of Ghana shortly after the return to civilian rule indicated that the country was being refused further credit by foreign exporters and bankers because of arrears in repayments of short-term loans totalling C 1,190 million at the end of July 1979; at the same time there were medium- and long-term debt obligations exceeding C 1,223 million and foreign exchange reserves of only C 229,900,000. It was subsequently stated by the Bank's governor in early December that Ghana's real per capita income had shown a slight decline over the past five years and that the proportion of national income devoted to consumption had "reached 96 per cent by 1977 and continued to rise". (The World Bank's estimate of Ghana's per capita income was revised downwards from US $450 to $380 in 1979.)

It was estimated by the Government in early 1980 that manufacturing industry was operating at less than 28 per cent of installed capacity and would require imported inputs costing C 50,000 million to achieve full production, and in April 1980 it was reported that spending on oil imports alone during the current year was, even after a cut in demand caused by the continued enforcement of petrol rationing, expected to equal the revenue from cocoa exports (representing about 60 per cent of total export earnings).

President Limann said that the three main features of his Government's strategy for controlling inflation (whose annual rate was officially estimated to be 47.7 per cent in January 1980) and rebuilding the economy were (i) "to provide inputs for agricultural development to ensure adequate food production"; (ii) "to restructure the import programme to ensure the regular supply of essential raw materials and spare parts to keep industries fully operative and to increase their capacity utilization"; and (iii) "to control the level of money supply through disciplining the Government's finances by holding down the level of budgetary deficits".

A two-year agricultural development programme was accordingly launched as the new Government's main priority, and it was announced that "all non-essential imports" would be eliminated and that steps would be taken "to ensure that the Government's plans are not frustrated by hoarders, profiteers and smugglers". The 1980-81 budget estimates, presented to Parliament on June 27, 1980, provided for the levying of new taxes and duties totalling C 1,200 million, although an overall deficit of C 1,600 million was still anticipated (of which it was proposed to fund C 430,000,000 from external sources). Various tax and duty increases had previously been made in an interim budget presented on Dec. 20, 1979, which had more than doubled petrol prices in particular by reducing the level of subsidy.

The Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Dr Nikoi, said in July 1980 that the Government had so far signed external loan agreements for development projects totalling C 950,000,000, and that this demonstrated the confidence of foreign countries in the Government's economic strategy (many statements having been made by President Limann welcoming foreign investment in Ghana, while measures had been taken to reduce short-term external debt arrears).

The Government regarded the official exchange rates of the cedi prevailing at the beginning of 1980 to be realistic at about C 6.68 = £1 sterling, C 2.75 = US $1 and C 11-12 = 1,000 CFA francs, notwithstanding the record black-market rates then obtaining of up to C 30 = £1, C 14 = $1 and C 70 = 1,000 CFA francs. The opposition PFP, however, said that by refusing to carry out a moderate official devaluation the Government was condoning a "devaluation by the back door of as much as 40-45 per cent" which was worsening price inflation.

The Government was unable to fulfil an election pledge to alleviate significantly the serious supply shortages suffered by consumers within six months of assuming office, and had only limited success in enforcing price controls in respect of goods which were available. A much-publicized exercise to import a large "gift" of consumer goods from Nigeria over Christmas 1979 led to a major dispute in Parliament over the circumstances of the exercise. With regard to pay, the Government failed to respond to demands for an increase in the national minimum wage from the level of C 4 per day fixed by the Acheampong Government in 1977 [see 28468 A], and while lifting the public sector wage freeze imposed by the AFRC [see above] announced its intention to draw up "strict guidelines" for pay increases.

Serious industrial unrest occurred in many sectors following the return to civilian rule, and it was stated by President Limann on Feb. 23, 1980, that there had so far been 23 strikes involving 21,000 workers since he took office, adding that it would cost C 235,000,000 to meet all current demands for pay increases. The Trades Union Congress responded by saying that the workers for their part were "intensely anxious and concerned about the grave situation" regarding wage levels, since many people found "their entire pay packets inadequate to spend on food alone" (the national minimum wage level being compared with the current prices of C 1.50 for one egg and C 10 for one pound of fish).

In an intensifying round of industrial unrest, about 5,000 employees of the state-owned Industrial Holding Corporation were dismissed in early June 1980 after the proceedings of Parliament had been disrupted by a violent demonstration in support of their demands for the implementation of a new salary structure, but were reinstated after they had initiated legal action. In another dispute involving the state-owned Black Star shipping line, which had immobilized 13 vessels since June 10 with serious effects on Ghana's trade, President Limann intervened on July 28 to assume personal control over the Black Star line, and announced that the Ghana Navy would take possession of the idle ships and that foreign crews would be recruited to man them "as and when necessary".

A major controversy over the separation of powers under the new Constitution arose in mid-1980 when the Government stated that its economic priorities did not permit the allocation of funds to the Electoral Commission to carry out a revision of the voters' register which the Commission had planned for August, adding that such a registration exercise would disrupt the current agricultural development programme. Following strong protests by leaders of the ACP, the PFP and the SDF and the reference of the matter to the Council of State, it was agreed that the exercise should proceed in phases between Aug. 18 and Nov. 30, 1980.—(West Africa - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Ghana High Commission, London - Financial Times - Guardian - Times - Daily Telegraph - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Le Monde - Sunday Times - Observer - Africa - Africa Confidential - Economist - IMF, Washington - Hansard - Overseas Development Administration, London - Standard Chartered Review) (*Prev. rep. 29335 A, 29353 A*)

A. COOK ISLANDS — Former Premier stripped of Knighthood

The former Premier of the New Zealand associated state of the Cook Islands, Sir Albert Henry, who had in August 1979 been convicted of conspiring to defraud the Crown and of other offences connected with the territory's 1978 general election [see 30275 B; 29553 A], was in April 1980 stripped of his knighthood. Such action had been recommended by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Robert Muldoon, following discussions with the current Premier of the Cook Islands, Dr Thomas Davis.—(Pacific Islands Monthly) (*Prev. rep. 30275 B*)

A. WEST GERMANY — Land Elections in Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia - Land Cabinet Changes

Elections were held during April and May 1980 to the *Landtage* (*Land* parliaments) of the Saarland and of North Rhine-Westphalia; in both cases gains were made by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which overtook the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as the largest party in both assemblies.

Party political campaigns in both elections were dominated by the major parties' programmes for the forthcoming elections to the *Bundestag* (Lower House of the Federal Parliament) which were scheduled to take place on Oct. 5, 1980, and the results were widely expected to indicate national political trends. The SPD in particular presented the voters' choice as being between its candidate for the federal chancellorship, Herr Helmut Schmidt (the current Federal Chancellor), and Herr Franz-Josef Strauss, who had been selected as the joint candidate of the CDU and its Bavarian sister-party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), in July 1979 [see 30086 A].

The Green Party (*Die Grünen*), recently formed as a national political party [see 30347 A], failed in both elections to obtain the 5 per cent minimum vote required for representation in a West German *Landtag*, while the Free Democrats (FDP), who formed part of the governing SPD/FDP coalition in North Rhine-Westphalia, also failed in this *Land* to cross the 5 per cent threshold and lost their representation in the *Landtag*, whereupon a solely SPD Government was formed on May 20.

Saarland

Elections to the Saarland *Landtag* took place on April 27, when the governing CDU/FDP coalition, formed in February 1977 by Dr Franz Josef Röder [see 28371 A] and led since July 1979 by Herr Werner Zeyer [see 29850 A], retained its majority in the 51-seat *Landtag* despite the loss of two CDU seats compared with the position after the 1975 *Land* elections [see 27219 A]. The SPD gained two seats and thus became the largest single party in the *Landtag*, while the FDP also gained one seat despite obtaining a lower proportion of the valid votes.

The allocation of an extra seat to the FDP resulted from the adoption in the Saarland of a new system of proportional representation, the previous system having hitherto usually worked to the disadvantage of smaller parties. The *Landtag* was also expanded for the new term from 50 seats to 51 in order to eliminate the possibility of such a numerical stalemate as had occurred after the 1975 elections when the CDU, obtaining exactly half of the 50 mandates, had been unable to form an effective Government without the assistance of the FDP [see 27219 A; 28371 A].

A total of 85.0 per cent of the 826,158 electorate voted on April 27, of whom 694,720 cast valid votes. The results of the election were as follows, with the (unrevised) 1975 figures given for comparison (SPD—Social Democratic Party; CDU—Christian Democratic Union; FDP—Free Democratic Party; *Die Grünen*—Green Party; DKP—German Communist Party; CSWU—Christian Social Voters' Alliance).

	Seats		Percentage		Votes	
	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975
SPD	24	22	45.4	41.8	315,457	295,347
CDU	23	25	44.0	49.1	305,536	347,008
FDP	4	3	6.9	7.4	47,975	52,074
Die Grünen ..	0	—	2.9	—	19,945	—
DKP	0	0	0.5	1.0	3,702	6,859
CSWU	0	—	0.3	—	2,105	—
Others	—	0	—	0.7	—	4,769

The CDU and FDP on May 13 signed an agreement to continue the coalition of the two parties, but at the constitutive session of the new *Landtag* on May 21 Herr Zeyer failed in a secret ballot to be re-elected as *Land* Premier, obtaining only 24 of the 50 votes cast. There were no other candidates, and Herr Zeyer abstained.

Certain CDU deputies had earlier voiced strong disapproval of Herr Zeyer's proposals for the composition of the new Cabinet, which they considered gave inadequate Cabinet representation to certain areas of the *Land*. However, when on May 23 Herr Zeyer again presented the same cabinet list, he was re-elected as Premier for a new term of five years. The membership of the new Cabinet was as follows:

Herr Werner Zeyer (CDU)—Premier; *Herr Gerhard Zeitel (CDU)—Finance; *Herr Wolfgang Knies (non-party)—Culture, Education and Sport; *Herr Franz Becker (CDU)—Justice and Federal Affairs; Herr Rainer Wicklmayr (CDU)—Interior (hitherto Justice and Federal Affairs); Herr Günther Schacht (CDU)—Planning and Construction; Herr Werner Klumpp (FDP)—Economy, Transport and Agriculture; Dr Rosemarie Scheurlen (FDP)—Labour, Health and Social Affairs. (Asterisk denotes new appointment.)

North Rhine-Westphalia

Elections took place on May 11 for the 201 seats in the North Rhine-Westphalia *Landtag*, where the SPD and FDP had governed in coalition since 1966 [see 22093 A]. The FDP, however, obtained only 4.99 per cent of the valid votes cast in the election, and thus lost its 14 seats in the *Landtag* under the above-mentioned 5 per cent threshold regulations. The SPD gained 15 seats, obtaining 106 mandates (i.e. an absolute majority in the *Landtag*), while the CDU retained the 95 seats which it had won in the 1975 elections [see 27219 A]. (As in the Saarland, the *Landtag* had been expanded by one seat in order to avoid numerical stalemates.)

The election campaigns, which were based largely on the national policies of the parties involved, were interrupted during April following the death on April 20 of Herr Heinrich Köppler (54), the leader of the CDU in the *Landtag* and chairman of the *Land* CDU. Herr Köppler, who had led the *Landtag* fraction since 1970 and the *Land* CDU since 1971, had suffered a heart attack on April 3. All parties agreed upon his death to suspend campaigning until after his funeral on April 24, and he was succeeded on this date in both his CDU functions by Prof. Kurt Biedenkopf, a former general secretary of the CDU [see page 28297] and a close associate of Herr Strauss.

A total of 80.1 per cent of the 12,316,648 electorate went to the polls on May 11, casting 9,805,182 valid votes. The results were as follows, with the (unrevised) 1975 figures given for comparison (SPD—Social Democratic Party; CDU—Christian Democratic Union; FDP—Free Democratic Party; *Die Grünen*—Green Party; DKP—German Communist Party; BP—Citizens' Party; KBW—Communist League of West Germany):

	Seats		Percentage		Votes	
	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975
SPD	106	91	48.39	45.12	4,744,272	4,629,513
CDU	95	95	43.24	47.06	4,240,284	4,828,534
FDP	0	14	4.99	6.72	488,946	689,429
Die Grünen ..	0	—	2.97	—	291,144	—
DKP	0	0	0.31	0.53	30,519	54,779
BP	0	—	0.06	—	5,416	—
KBW	0	—	0.02	—	2,358	—
Others	0	0	0.02	0.57	2,243	58,232*

* Including 36,265 votes cast for the National Democratic Party (NPD), which did not contest the 1980 election.

The Citizens' Party (*Bürgerpartei*) was officially founded as a national political party on May 1, 1979, by Herr Hermann Fredersdorf, a former SPD member, who was thereupon elected chairman of the new party. The BP, which campaigned particularly for tax reforms, described itself in its political programme as standing between the SPD and the CDU/CSU, and declared its intention to contest the 1980 federal elections. The BP announced on May 17 that Herr Fredersdorf had resigned as chairman of the party, accepting "full responsibility" for the poor results achieved in the election. No successor was immediately named.

The *Land* Premier, Herr Johannes Rau (SPD), who had succeeded Herr Heinz Kühn in September 1978 [see 30091 A], presented on May 21 an SPD cabinet list incorporating the following changes:

Herr Herbert Schnoor to be Minister of the Interior; Herr Hermann Heinemann to be Minister for Federal Affairs *vice* Herr Christoph Zöpel, who was to take on the new Ministry of Transport, Housing and Construction; Herr Hans Schwier to be Minister of Science *vice* Prof. Reimut Jochimsen (who had held this post since the election of Herr Rau, a former Minister of Science, as Premier); Prof. Jochimsen to be Minister of the Economy.

As well as Herr Rau, Prof. Friedhelm Farthmann (Labour, Health and Social Affairs), Herr Diether Posser (Finance), Herr Jürgen Girgensohn (Culture), Frau Ingeborg Donnepp (Justice) and Herr Hans Otto Bäumer (Food, Agriculture and Forestry) were to retain their previous posts.

Herr Rau was re-elected as *Land* Premier by 105 votes to 91, with two abstentions, when the *Landtag* met for its constitutive session on June 4, 1980.—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Guardian - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. 1975 Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia Landtag Elections 27219 A; Saarland Cabinet 28371 A, 28832 C, 29850 A; North Rhine-Westphalia Cabinet 29729 B, 30091 A*)

A. JAPAN — Elections to House of Representatives following Fall of Ohira Government - Death of Mr Ohira - Partial Elections to House of Councillors - Formation of New Cabinet under Mr Suzuki - International Consultations at Funeral of Mr Ohira

The minority Government formed on Nov. 8, 1979, by the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) under the premiership of Mr Masayoshi Ohira [see 30061 A] was on May 16, 1980, defeated in the House of Representatives (Lower House of the Japanese Diet) on a motion of no confidence proposed by the opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP); in the division two major factions within the LDP failed to support the Government. Consequently Mr Ohira on May 19 called a general election to the House of Representatives which took place on June 22, coinciding with the triennial election of half of the 252 seats in the House of Councillors (Upper House).

In the elections to the House of Representatives the LDP obtained 284 of the 511 seats, thus restoring the absolute majority which it had lost in the December 1976 general elections [see 28157 A] and had subsequently failed to regain in the October 1979 elections [see 29997 A]. The LDP also regained the absolute majority in the House of Councillors which it had lost in 1977 [see 28532 A], obtaining 69 of the 126 seats available for election and thus increasing its total of the 252 mandates to 135.

Campaigning for the elections to both Houses of the Diet was severely affected by the death on June 12 of Mr Ohira. Following protracted negotiations within the LDP, he was succeeded on July 15 as LDP president and on July 17 as Prime Minister by Mr Zenko Suzuki, who on July 17 formed what he termed a Government of consensus and compromise, including members of all major LDP factions.

Government Defeat on Motion of No Confidence - Death of Mr Ohira - The Election Campaign

The defeat of Mr Ohira's Government on May 16 was the first occasion since 1953 that a motion of no confidence in a Japanese government had been carried (the last Government to resign in such circumstances having been that of Mr Shigeru Yoshida in March 1953—see 12843 B). It reflected a period of particularly strong disagreement between the numerous LDP factions, the largest of which were led by Mr Ohira, by Mr Takeo Miki (Prime Minister from 1974 to 1976), by Mr Takeo Fukuda (Prime Minister from 1976 to 1978), by Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone (a former Director-General of the Self-Defence Forces, and formerly also secretary-general of the LDP) and by Mr Kakuei Tanaka, who had been Prime Minister from 1972 to 1974 and who retained a strong following in the LDP despite having sat as an independent since 1976 after allegations that he had accepted bribes from the American Lockheed Aircraft Corporation [see 27840 A; 28005 A; 28157 A; 28532 A; 29997 A; 30061 A].

The Ohira faction, which was generally supported by the Tanaka faction, had been blamed particularly by the other factions for the failure of the LDP in the October 1979 elections to consolidate its position in the House of Representatives. Further criticism arose from the disclosure in March 1980 that Mr Koichi Hamada, a senior LDP member of the House of Representatives and the chief electoral strategist of the party, had resigned from the Diet following police investigations into allegations that he had in 1972 covered gambling debts of some $1,500,000 with money given to him by a friend of Mr Tanaka and originating from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Followers of Mr Fukuda (whom Mr Ohira had replaced as Prime Minister and party leader in December 1978—see 29475 A) and of Mr Miki had in March formed a group for the "moral reform of the party", and the refusal of Mr Ohira to agree that Mr Hamada should be forced to give evidence on the matter was the immediate reason for the tabling of the motion of no confidence by the JSP, which contended that the LDP was thereby attempting to conceal the extent of the Lockheed scandal.

When the division bell was rung on May 16 before the vote on the no-confidence motion, some 70 members of the LDP, comprising largely the membership of the Fukuda and Miki factions, failed to take their seats; consequently the motion was carried by 243 votes to 187. Later the same day Mr Ohira announced after an extraordinary cabinet meeting his decision not to resign as Prime Minister but instead to dissolve the House of Representatives and to call a general election, stressing his intention to fight the challenge from within his party.

Mr Ohira on May 19 read an imperial edict dissolving the House of Representatives, and said that the Government would remain in office in a caretaker capacity until the appointment of its successor. Despite continuing acrimony between the opposing LDP factions, it was announced on May 23 that members of all factions would receive the party's endorsement as official LDP candidates in the June elections.

Campaigning for the elections to the House of Councillors began on May 30 and for the House of Representatives on June 2; however, Mr Ohira was on June 8 obliged to hand over control of the LDP campaign to Mr Suzuki, the chairman of the party's executive council, after being admitted to hospital on May 31 suffering from exhaustion with associated cardiac difficulties. (Mr Ohira had during May visited the United States, Mexico, Canada, Yugoslavia and West Germany, travelling over 28,000 miles.)

Mr Ohira died of heart failure on June 12, aged 70, and was cremated in a Christian ceremony on June 14. The Cabinet resigned on June 12 in accordance with a provision of the Japanese Constitution, but continued to act in a caretaker capacity under Mr Masayoshi Ito, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who became acting Prime Minister and who appealed in a speech given at Mr Ohira's wake on June 13 for unity within the LDP.

The death of Mr Ohira was reported to have caused serious difficulties for many of the opposition parties which had already published or recorded quantities of election material based on personal criticisms of him, while several of his opponents within the LDP had also made calls for his resignation the focal point of their election campaigns. Consequently campaigning for the elections was generally subdued, with differences between the major parties centering on the defence and nuclear power issues.

All major parties called for more effective controls on the financing of election campaigns and for the public disclosure of the personal assets of politicians. The LDP, which was extensively funded by donations from the private business sector, did not, however, share the view of the JSP, the *Komeito* (the Buddhist "Clean Government" party) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) for a complete ban on such contributions. All major parties called for more effective measures against inflation, particularly where public utility charges were concerned, and for more effective enforcement of the anti-monopoly and anti-cartel laws. Most parties supported the development of energy sources other than nuclear power and the general reduction of the level of dependence on oil as an energy source, but of the major parties only the JSP called for a halt to nuclear power development, while *Komeito* called for greater awareness of its environmental effects.

The LDP and the opposition Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) strongly advocated the continuation and development of military co-operation with the United States, and both demanded a significant increase in national defence spending. The DSP in particular called for a stronger and self-reliant national defence network under civilian control, this argument being most forcefully expressed by Gen. Hiroomi Kurisu, a DSP candidate and former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) who had in July 1978 been dismissed for supporting autonomous powers of emergency action for the SDF [see page 29476]. *Komeito* gave its provisional support to the Japan-US Security Treaty, though it called for its ultimate abolition, while the JCP demanded its immediate abolition and shared with the JSP a call for military non-alignment and reduced defence spending (the latter party also recommending the ultimate disbanding of the SDF within a global system of guarantees for the security of the Asia-Pacific area).

Prior to the elections an agreement was reached by *Komeito*, the DSP, the New Liberal Club (NLC—see page 28157) and the Social Democratic Federation (SDF, or *Shaminren*, formed in 1977 as the Socialist Citizens' League by former right-wing Socialists—see 28532 A; 28836 A), whereby in 15 of the multi-member constituencies the four parties would support whichever of the four parties' candidates appeared the strongest. *Komeito* and the DSP reached a similar bilateral agreement in respect of 34 constituencies (of which 10 were also covered by the four-party agreement). These arrangements were widely seen as preliminary steps toward the formation of a possible coalition government in the event of the LDP's failure to secure a majority in the House of Representatives (*Komeito* having since November 1979 conducted talks with both the DSP and the JSP concerning such a possibility).

The Election Results - Absolute LDP Majorities in Both Houses

Altogether 60,342,079 (74.6 per cent) of the 80,925,034 electors went to the polls on June 22 (compared with 68 per cent in November 1979—see 29997 A), casting 59,028,822 valid votes in the Lower House elections, while in the Upper House elections 60,318,775 votes were cast for the 76 local seats and 60,207,718 for the 50 national seats up for election. The accompanying table gives the results of both elections, with the results of the October 1979 Lower House elections being shown for comparison.

The extent of the LDP victory in the elections was generally attributed by the Japanese press to a "sympathy vote" resulting from the death of Mr Ohira. It was also thought that the relatively high turnout had assisted the ruling party, which had usually done well in previous elections when the poll was high.

The LDP majorities were further increased by a number of subsequent defections by representatives of various parties in both Houses of the Diet. Thus at the end of July the LDP was believed to have 286 deputies in the House of Representatives, the JSP 106, *Komeito* 34, the DSP 33, the JCP 29, the NLC 12, the SDF three and independents eight.

Election of Mr Suzuki as LDP President and as Prime Minister - Formation of New LDP Cabinet

In addition to Mr Suzuki, the nominations of Mr Nakasone [see above] and Mr Toshio Komoto (representing the Miki faction) were also made for the presidency of the LDP (and hence, because of its parliamentary majority, effectively for the post of Prime Minister). However, it was announced on July 11 that Mr Nakasone and Mr Komoto had withdrawn their nominations in accordance with a ruling by the LDP acting president, Mr Eiichi Nishimura, that the previous system of choosing the new president by multi-candidate election [see 29475 A] should be overridden and that a new leader should be chosen by consensus rather than by factional confrontation. Mr Suzuki, being presented as sole candidate, was thus on July 15 unanimously elected president of the party by the LDP representatives in both Houses of the Diet.

Mr Suzuki was on July 17 elected Prime Minister by the House of Representatives, obtaining 291 of the 508 valid votes cast, five other candidates nominated by opposition parties obtaining a total of 217 votes. Mr Suzuki's election was approved shortly afterwards by the House of Councillors.

Mr Suzuki announced on July 17 a Cabinet which retained only Mr Ito from the previous Government and in which, contrary to expectations, Mr Komoto and Mr Nakasone were not given senior posts. The composition of the Cabinet was as follows:

Mr Zenko Suzuki	Prime Minister
Mr Seisuke Okuno	Justice
*Mr Masayoshi Ito	Foreign Affairs
Mr Michio Watanabe	Finance
Mr Tatsuo Tanaka	Education
Mr Kunikichi Saito	Health and Welfare
Mr Takeo Kameoka	Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Mr Rokusuke Tanaka	International Trade and Industry
Mr Masayuki Fujio	Labour
Mr Masajuro Shiokawa . .	Transport
Mr Ichiro Yamanouchi	Posts and Telecommunications
Mr Shigeyoshi Saito	Construction
Mr Jiro Ishiba	Home Affairs

Ministers of State

Mr Kiichi Miyazawa	Chief Cabinet Secretary
Mr Taro Nakayama	Director-General of Prime Minister's Office and of Okinawa Development Agency
Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone	Director-General of Administrative Management Agency
Mr Joji Omura	Director-General of Defence Agency
Mr Yoshio Komoto	Director-General of Economic Planning Agency
Mr Ichiro Nakagawa	Director-General of Science and Technology Agency and Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission
Mr Hyosuke Kujiraoka	Director-General of Environment Agency
Mr Kenzaburo Hara	Director-General of National Land Agency and of Hokkaido Development Agency

* Member of previous Cabinet.

Mr Suzuki (69) entered the Diet in 1947 as a Socialist Party deputy for a small fishing community and, moving to the Liberal Party in 1949, became its foremost spokesman on fishery matters. He was Minister of the Postal Services from July to December 1960 [see 17571 C], Minister of Health and Welfare from 1965 to 1967 [see 20848 A; 21580 A], and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries from 1976 to 1977 [see 28157 A], being in this last-named capacity closely involved in the negotiations surrounding Japan's fishery dispute with the Soviet Union [see 28292 A; 28564 A]; he had also held a number of leading posts within the LDP, including that of chairman of its executive council.

Mr Okuno (67) was Minister of Education from 1972 to 1974 [see 25677 A; 26253 A]. **Mr Watanabe** (56), at the time of his appointment chairman of the cabinet committee of the House of Representatives, was Minister of Health and Welfare from 1976 to 1977 [see 28157 A] and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries from 1978 to 1979 [see 29475 A]. **Mr Tatsuo Tanaka** (69) held a number of posts in the administration of Mr Eisaku Sato between 1964 and 1972, and was Minister of International Trade and Industry from 1976 to 1977 [see 28157 A]. **Mr Kunikichi Saito** (71) was Minister of Health and Welfare from 1972 to 1974 [see 25677 A; 26253 A]. **Mr Kameoka** (60) was Minister of Construction from 1973 to 1974 [see 26253 A]. **Mr Rokusuke Tanaka** (57) was Chief Cabinet Secretary in Mr Ohira's first Government, from December 1978 to November 1979 [see 29475 A]. **Mr Fujio** (63) had held posts in the Ministries of Construction and of International Trade and Industry. **Mr Shiokawa** (58) was Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary under the Fukuda administration. **Mr Yamanouchi** (67) had held a number of posts in the Ministry of Construction and in the National Land Agency. **Mr Shigeyoshi Saito** (61) had been chairman of the LDP special committee on earthquakes. **Mr Ishiba** (71) was a former chairman of the House of Councillors foreign affairs committee.

Mr Miyazawa (60) was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Miki Government formed in 1974 [see 26917 A]. **Mr Nakayama** (55) was an expert on energy and technology. **Mr Nakasone** (62) was Minister of Transport from 1967 to 1968 [see 22483 C], Director-General of the Defence Agency from 1970 to 1971 [see 23806 A] and Minister of International Trade and Industry from 1972 to 1974 [see 25677 A; 26253 A]. **Mr Omura** (61) was Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary under the Tanaka administration. **Mr Komoto** (69) was Minister of Posts and Telecommunications from 1968 to 1970 [see 23086 A] and from

House of Representatives

	1980				1979		
	Votes	Seats	Candidates nominated	Percentage of vote	Seats	Percentage of vote	Seats at dissolution
LDP	28,262,438	284	310	47.9	248	44.6	258
JSP	11,400,742	107	149	19.3	107	19.7	107
JCP	5,803,612	29	129	9.8	39	10.4	41
Komeito . .	5,329,941	33	64	9.0	57	9.8	58
DSP	3,896,728	32	50	6.6	35	6.8	36
NLC	1,766,396	12	25	3.0	4	3.0	4
SDF	402,832	3	5	0.7	2	0.7	2
Others	109,167	0	42	0.2	0	0.1	0
Independents . .	2,056,966	11	61	3.5	19	4.9	4
Total	59,028,822	511	835	100.0	511	100.0	510*

* One seat vacant at dissolution.

House of Councillors

	Seats held before election	Seats up for election	Seats won	Seats held after election
LDP	124	58	69	135
JSP	52	27	22	47
JCP	16	14	7	12
Komeito . .	28	11	12	26
DSP	10	4	6	12
NLC	2	0	0	2
SDF	3	1	0	2
Others	1	1	2	2
Independents* . .	10	5	8	13
	246†	126‡	126	251§

* Including Niin Club candidates.

† Excluding six vacant seats.

‡ Including five vacant seats.

§ One vacancy was not among the 126 seats due for election.

1977 to 1979 [see 28157 A]. **Mr Nakagawa** (55) led a minor faction within the LDP. **Mr Kujiraoka** (64) was a former chairman of the House of Representatives standing committee on foreign affairs. **Mr Hara** (73) was Minister of Labour from 1971 to 1972 [see 24712 A].

Mr Suzuki said at a news conference held in Tokyo on July 18 that he regarded the improvement of diplomatic and trading relations with the United States as central to the foreign policy of his Government, and spoke also of the need for close relations with China (with which Japan had signed a treaty of peace and friendship in October 1978—see 29378 A; 29279 A). He also expressed his intention to strengthen the Japanese defence network (in apparent response to recent requests from President Carter for an increase in defence spending), but added that he regarded the defence issue as one of quality rather than of pure expenditure.

The Cabinet subsequently approved on July 29 a draft budget plan for the financial year starting April 1, 1981, which provided for a 9.7 per cent increase in national defence spending during that year (total defence spending being thus raised to the equivalent of some £4,400 million, or 0.9 per cent of the gross national product). The increase was believed to be less than that requested by President Carter. The draft budget restrained spending increases in other government departments to 7.9 per cent guidelines established by the Ministry of Finance.

Official Funeral of Mr Ohira - Bilateral Meetings of US, Chinese, Japanese and Thai Leaders

The official funeral (i.e. memorial service) for Mr Ohira took place in Tokyo on July 9 and was attended by guests from 103 countries and two international organizations as well as by Crown Prince Akihito and his wife, members of the Japanese Government and some 6,000 other Japanese guests. President Carter was one of four heads of state attending the ceremony, while 10 Prime Ministers including the Chinese Premier and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mr Hua Guofeng, and the ambassadors of 53 countries, including the Soviet Union, also attended.

Talks between representatives of various countries took place during their visits to Japan, notably between President Carter and Mr Hua Guofeng, who met for the first time; between President Carter, Mr Suzuki and Mr Ito; between Mr Hua Guofeng and Mr Suzuki, who spoke of the need to reinforce further the co-operation between the two countries; and between Mr Hua Guofeng and Mr Prem Tinsulanond, who had been Prime Minister of Thailand since March [see 30277 A] and who was assured of Chinese support for Thailand's "resistance against Vietnamese aggression" on the Kampuchean border.—(Japan Times Weekly - Japan Information Centre, London - Times - Sunday Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. 1979 Lower House Elections 29997 A; 1977 Partial Upper House Elections 28532 A; Cabinet 30061 A, 30283 A*)

A. BOTSWANA — Death of President Sir Seretse Khama - Election of Dr Quett Masire as Successor - Government Changes

President Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana died on July 13, 1980, in Gaberone, two weeks after his return from London where it had been announced on June 29 that he was incurably ill. Dr Quett K. J. Masire, then Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning, took over as acting President, and on July 18 Dr Masire was formally elected as President by the National Assembly.

Dr Masire, the sole candidate, was elected by 34 votes out of 36, with two abstentions, after he had been nominated unanimously on July 17 by the parliamentary caucus of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).

A memorial service for Sir Seretse Khama in Gaberone on July 24 was attended by an estimated 20,000 people, including six African heads of state. It was followed by a funeral in the royal cemetery of the Bamangwato tribe at Serowe on July 25.

Among those attending the memorial service were King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho, Presidents Banda of Malawi, Machel of Mozambique, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia and Banana of Zimbabwe, the Duke of Kent representing Queen Elizabeth II, and ministers and ambassadors from a number of other countries. Also present was Mr Harry Oppenheimer, the chairman of the Anglo American Corporation and joint chairman with Sir Seretse Khama of the Botswana Diamond Mining Company.

Sir Seretse Khama, who was 59, reportedly died of cancer after suffering for a number of years from diabetes and from heart and liver complaints. He had become chief of the country's majority Bamangwato tribe in 1925, at the age of four, on the death of his father, but he had renounced his claim to this title in 1956 [see 15117 A] as a condition of being allowed by the British authorities to return after six years in exile to what was then the British-administered Bechuanaland Protectorate. (His exile had followed a dispute within the tribe over his marriage to a White woman, Ruth Williams, whom he had met in England while studying law. The tribe decided in 1963 that his children should be reinstated as rightful heirs to the chieftainship—see 20650 B.)

He became Prime Minister of Bechuanaland in 1965 [ibid.] after a decisive electoral victory by the Bechuanaland Democratic Party, which he had founded in 1962. He became the first President of Botswana at independence on Sept. 30, 1966 [see 21659 B], when a knighthood was conferred upon him by Queen Elizabeth. He supported a multi-party democratic political system in Botswana, under which the BDP successfully secured parliamentary majorities at regular elections, the most recent being in October 1979 when he was also re-elected by the National Assembly for a further five-year presidential term [see 30083 A].

Within the non-aligned movement Sir Seretse Khama took a relatively conservative and pro-Western position. As a prominent figure in the Organization of African Unity and as President of one of the five southern African "front-line states", he opposed both the illegal Rhodesian regime and the South African apartheid system, but he refused to allow the establishment of guerrilla bases in Botswana. He supported initiatives to reduce Botswana's economic dependence on South Africa, both by diversification of the domestic economy and by fostering co-operation among other southern African states.

Dr Quett Masire, a member of the minority Bangwaketse tribe from the south of the country, and a former journalist and teacher, had been the BDP party secretary prior to his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister in the first (pre-independence) Cabinet in March 1965 [see 20724 A]. At independence he had become Minister of Finance [see 21694 C] as well as Vice-President, and the following year he also took over the portfolio of Development Planning, retaining these posts until becoming President in July 1980. He had lost his seat in the National Assembly in the 1969 elections, but had served as a nominated member [see 23723 B] until regaining his seat as an elected member in 1974 [see 26836 A].

In government appointments announced by President Masire on July 18, Mr Lenyeletse M. Seretse, the Minister of Local Government and Lands and a cousin of the late President, became in addition Vice-President. Mr C. Blackbeard became Minister of Works and Communications *vice* Mr Peter S. Mmusi, who took over responsibility for Finance and Development Planning from the President.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30083 A*)

B. ICELAND — Presidential Election

Following a closely-contested election on June 29, Ms Vigdís Finnbogadóttir took office on Aug. 1, 1980, as President of Iceland, thus becoming the world's first popularly-elected female head of state. She succeeded Dr Kristján Eldjárn, the President since 1968 [see 22798 C], who had announced on Jan. 1 that he would not seek re-election [see 30268 A].

Official returns showed that 90.4 per cent of registered voters took part in the election, with Ms Vigdís Finnbogadóttir receiving 33.6 per cent of votes cast. The other candidates and their percentage share of votes were: Mr Gudlaugur Thorvaldsson, the state arbitrator in labour disputes and former rector of the University of Iceland, 32.2 per cent; Mr Albert Gudmundsson, a representative of the conservative Independence Party in the *Althing* (Parliament), 19.8 per cent; and Mr Pétur Thorsteinsson, a career diplomat, 14 per cent.

Ms Vigdís Finnbogadóttir (50), a divorcee with a young adopted daughter, had been the director of the Reykjavik Theatre Company since 1972. Although she had no previous formal involvement in politics, she was generally regarded as being the preferred candidate of the Icelandic left, notably because of her opposition in principle to the American military presence in Iceland, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base at Keflavik [see 29260 A].

The President of Iceland is traditionally a non-political figure with primarily ceremonial duties, although with the authority to appoint a government in the event of there being no leader able to command a majority in the *Althing*.—(Icelandic Embassy, London - Times - Guardian - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Presidential Election 27784 B; General Elections 30268 A*)

A. THE COMMONWEALTH — Report of Expert Group on International Development Issues - Inauguration of Human Rights Working Party

The 100-page report of the Commonwealth expert group on "factors inhibiting structural change and a sustained improvement in economic growth in both developed and developing countries, in particular the acceleration of growth in developing countries", which had been inaugurated in January 1980 under the chairmanship of Prof. Heinz W. Arndt [see 30150 B], was published on July 18. The report's principal conclusions and recommendations are summarized below.

Balance-of-Payments Problems. The report stated that the financing of the balance-of-payments deficits of net oil-importing developing countries would remain one of the most critical international economic issues, and that in 1980 and 1981 resources of between $5,000 million and $10,000 million would be required for this purpose in addition to the external financing ordinarily likely to be available. If such additional resources were not forthcoming, the resultant compression of real imports and substantial cutbacks in the already low economic growth rates of these countries would have adverse effects not only for them but for the developed countries as well. If global economic activity was to be sustained, there was an urgent need to provide additional financing mechanisms to facilitate larger flows of commercial funds to non-oil countries and to increase official sources of financing for those not in a position to borrow from the commercial banks. In particular, to meet immediate needs, it should be possible for the World Bank to make fuller use of programme lending and for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to establish a facility which would lend to the poorer developing countries on first-credit-tranche conditions.

For the least developed countries and some of the low-income countries which already faced a serious debt situation, the report recommended the establishment of a special programme as soon as possible to increase the flow of official assistance from bilateral and multilateral sources. The members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries should also consider giving a rebate on oil prices to this group of countries for a limited period—e.g. for five years.

In addition to the above measures, the report recommended that negotiations between interested parties should commence immediately on (i) the provision of facilities for reserve diversification by the oil-exporting countries; (ii) the on-lending of surplus funds via the IMF to developing countries on suitable terms for financing their deficits; and (iii) the possible ways of making this lending process the starting point for long-term programme financing. Such financing arrangements could be made effective either through the World Bank group and other existing institutions or through a new institution such as the World Development Fund proposed by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues [the Brandt Commission—see 30457 A].

Protectionism and Structural Adjustment. The report described the present trend towards increasing protectionism in developed countries as one of the most serious threats to the structural changes in world production and trade which were necessary for continuing growth and development, and noted that protectionism adversely affected the economic health of developed countries as much as that of developing countries, and that trade in manufactures with developing countries had had a positive net effect on employment in the industrialized countries. The extra cost of protectionist measures to consumers in industrialized countries was described as considerable. The report asserted that freer trade between the two groups was central to a "mutual-interest agenda for global development", and called on developed countries to take immediate action to provide greater access to exports of developing countries.

Developing countries should take full advantage of openings for liberalization presented by the recent round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations [see 30109 A], and should maintain political pressures for freer access to the markets of the industrialized countries; the latter, for their part, should adopt positive and forward-looking adjustment policies and use "safeguard measures" only under limited and clearly defined conditions. Developing countries should also pay special attention to expanding trade among themselves through provision of related infrastructural facilities and negotiation of tariff preferences on a global basis.

The Problem of Inflation. The report noted the harmful effects on economic growth of the acceleration of inflation during the 1970s, and concluded that there was no universal or agreed solution to inflation and that appropriate policies could only be decided by governments on the basis of their local circumstances. In determining such policies, however, governments should take due account of their effects on other countries.

Energy. During the 1970s, the report said, energy had emerged as one of the dominant international economic issues for the remainder of the century in view particularly of the sharp increase in oil prices and the critical limits to petroleum as a major future energy source. The report recommended inter alia (i) the wider adoption in concession agreements of a "resource rent tax" principle and other similar arrangements and (ii) the provision of official funds on concessional terms to assist developing countries to survey and assess their energy resource potential before entering into contracts with external investors. Multilateral facilities could most effectively be deployed as a catalyst and in other ways to reassure external investors. The report identified requirements for more resources for research and development into raising energy recovery factors and developing new sources of energy, and for greater technical assistance to strengthen developing countries' capacity to adapt and use conventional energy technologies.

On the demand side, the report drew attention to the need to improve the efficiency with which energy was used, and saw an appropriate consumer pricing policy, especially for petroleum products, as indispensable and urgent for enhancing the effectiveness of conservation measures. Mandatory fuel standards could be a useful supplement, and increasing public awareness of and ability to acquire and absorb improved technologies for energy conservation, distribution and utilization were also crucial factors.

The report saw a need for a global energy policy as part of an agreement on a broad range of "North-South" issues, central to which should be an accommodation between the oil-exporting and importing countries, involving commitments by both.

Official Development Assistance. The report stated that the need for an increase in levels of official development assistance (ODA) had never been more urgent, and that the present concern about inflation and balance-of-payments deficits did not justify delaying action, it being suggested that a deepening of recession would strengthen the case for larger unilateral transfers to the developing countries. A greater effort should be made in the 1980s to reach the ODA target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product to which developed countries were already committed. While such aid should continue to facilitate the adoption of broad programmes for the removal of poverty, projects to meet the specific problems of the poorest countries and poverty groups within the framework of a comprehensive development strategy would offer the best prospects of evoking a positive response in developing countries.

Food. The report said that the world food security situation remained precarious and stressed the need to maintain the momentum of efforts to increase food production and improve its distribution. A dependable system of international food security should include reasonably stable grain prices, expanded storage capacity in developing countries and arrangements to make food aid more effective.

Commodities. The establishment of a worldwide programme to stabilize commodity markets was described as a test of the will of the international community to create an effective framework for self-sustained economic development in the developing countries, and governments were called upon to give their full support to the implementation of the Common Fund proposals drawn up by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [see 29887 A] and to make every effort to establish 10 major commodity agreements by 1985. The report added that serious consideration should also be given to export earnings stabilization and that international agencies should assist developing countries in the processing and distribution of their commodities.

Manufacturing Industries. To help developing countries expand their manufacturing industries, the report recommended inter alia that industrialized countries should indentify and encourage the movement of resources out of the particular industries in which developing countries had greater comparative advantage. Commonwealth developed countries could take a lead by setting a definite timetable for such a programme.

Disarmament and Development. The report noted that the expenditure of enormous resources for military purposes was a serious constraint to economic growth and that a purposeful pursuit of global justice could help to divert these resources from destructive uses to the satisfaction of urgent human needs.

Inauguration of Human Rights Working Party

The first meeting took place in London on April 14-18 of a nine-member working party appointed to study the feasibility of setting up a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission, as proposed by the Government of The Gambia at the 1979 Commonwealth heads of government meeting [see page 29908]. The working party was chaired by Mr Yvon Beaulne (the Canadian ambassador to the Vatican and a former chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission), and included also the Attorney General and Minister of Justice of The Gambia, Alhaji Muhamadu Lamin Saho, and senior legal experts from Britain, Dominica, Ghana, Malaysia, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Tanzania. All members had been appointed in their personal capacities.—(Commonwealth Secretariat, London) (*Prev. rep. 30150 B, 29901 B*)

A. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION — Report of Independent Commission on International Development Issues

The Independent Commission on International Development Issues, which had been formed in 1977 [see 29528 A] under the chairmanship of the former West German Federal Chancellor, Herr Willy Brandt, and which was generally known as the "Brandt Commission", published on Feb. 12, 1980, its report entitled "North-South: A Programme for Survival".

Owing to the illness of Herr Brandt, the commission had modified its original schedule of meetings and held its sixth and seventh sessions in Switzerland and France (rather than in Saudi Arabia and Latin America) before substantially completing its discussions at an eighth meeting in Vienna (Austria) in July 1979. Two editing sessions were then held, in Brussels (Belgium) and Kent (England), ending with unanimous adoption by the commission on Dec. 16, 1979, of the final text of its report as prepared by an editorial group led by Mr Edward Heath, the former United Kingdom Prime Minister, and Mr Shridath Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Herr Brandt held a press conference in London on Dec. 17, 1979, at which he outlined the commission's conclusions in advance of the publication of the full report.

Herr Brandt said that the world economic system of the last three decades had ceased to work effectively and was in need of "urgent and major reform and restructuring". The principal objective would be to accelerate the economic development of the "South", i.e. the developing countries, he said, and he asserted that this would be to the mutual advantage of both the "South" and the "North", i.e. the industrialized (including communist) countries. Herr Brandt called for the creation of a new world development fund and for a major transfer of financial resources to the South; other elements of the commission's proposed "package", he said, were an agreement on the security and conservation of energy supplies, an efficient world food programme, and reforms of international institutions particularly in the monetary sphere.

Summary of Commission's Report

The commission's report, with an introduction by Herr Brandt, comprised a review of the North-South division in the international system, an assessment of the problems of development, a chapter on the extent to which rich and poor countries had mutual interests in major reforms, and a series of recommendations for change. The commission's summary of its recommendations was as follows:

The Poorest Countries. "An action programme must be launched comprising emergency and longer-term measures, to assist the poverty belts of Africa and Asia and particularly the least developed countries. Measures would include large regional projects of water and soil management; the provision of health care and the eradication of such diseases as river-blindness, malaria, sleeping sickness and bilharzia; afforestation projects; solar energy development; mineral and petroleum exploration; and support for industrialization, transport and other infrastructural investment.

"Such a programme would require additional financial assistance of at least $4,000 million per year for the next two decades, at grant or special concessional terms, assured over long periods and available in flexibly usable forms. New machinery is required on a regional basis to co-ordinate funding and to prepare plans in co-operation with lending and borrowing countries. Greater technical assistance should be provided to assist such countries with the preparation of programmes and projects.

Hunger and Food. "There must be an end to mass hunger and malnutrition. The capacity of food-importing developing countries, particularly the low-income countries, to meet their food requirements should be expanded and their mounting food import bill reduced through their own efforts and through expanded financial flows for agricultural development. Special attention should be given to irrigation, agricultural research, storage and increased use of fertilizer and other inputs, and to fisheries development.

"Agrarian reform is of great importance in many countries both to increase agricultural productivity and to put higher incomes into the hands of the poor.

"International food security should be assured through the early establishment of an International Grains Arrangement [see page 29892], larger international emergency reserves, and the establishment of a food financing facility.

"Food aid should be increased and linked to employment promotion and agricultural programmes and projects without weakening incentives to food production.

"Liberalization of trade in food and other agricultural products within and between North and South would contribute to the stabilization of food supplies.

"Support for international agricultural research institutions should be expanded with greater emphasis given to regional co-operation.

Population: Growth, Movement and the Environment. "In view of the vicious circle between poverty and high birth rates, the rapid population growth in developing countries gives added urgency to the need to fight hunger, disease, malnutrition and illiteracy.

"We also believe that development policies should include national population programmes aiming at a satisfactory balance between population and resources and making family planning freely available. International assistance and support of population programmes must be increased to meet the unmet needs for such aid.

"The many migrant workers in the world should be assured fair treatment, and the interests of their home countries and the countries of immigration must be better reconciled. Governments should seek bilateral and multilateral co-operation to harmonize their policies of emigration and immigration, to protect the rights of migrant workers, to make remittances more stable and to mitigate the hardships of unanticipated return migration.

"The rights of refugees to asylum and legal protection should be strengthened. We also believe that commitments to international co-operation in the resettlement of refugees in the future will be necessary to protect countries of first asylum from unfair burdens.

"The strain on the global environment derives mainly from the growth of the industrial economies, but also from that of the world's population. It threatens the survival and development opportunities of future generations. All nations have to co-operate more urgently in international management of the atmosphere and other global commons, and in the prevention of irreversible ecological damage.

"Ocean resources outside the 'exclusive economic zones' of 200 miles should be developed under international rules in the balanced interests of the whole world community.

Disarmament and Development. "The public must be made more aware of the terrible danger to world stability caused by the arms race, of the burden it imposes on national economies, and of the resources it diverts from peaceful development.

"The mutual distrust which stimulates the arms race between East and West calls for continuing the process of détente through agreements on confidence-building measures. All sides should be prepared for negotiations (including those on the regional level) to get the arms race under control at a time before new weapons systems have been established.

"The world needs a more comprehensive understanding of security which would be less restricted to the purely military aspects.

"Every effort must be made to secure international agreements preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"A globally respected peace-keeping mechanism should be built up, strengthening the role of the United Nations (UN). In securing the integrity of states such peace-keeping machinery might free resources for development through a sharing of military expenditures, a reduction in areas of conflict and of the arms race which they imply.

"Military expenditure and arms exports might be one element entering into a new principle for international taxation for development purposes. A tax on arms trade should be at a higher rate than that on other trade.

"Increased efforts should be made to reach agreements on the disclosure of arms exports and exports of arms-producing facilities. The international community should become more seriously concerned about the consequences of arms transfers or of exports of arms-producing facilities and reach agreement to restrain such deliveries to areas of conflict or tension.

"More research is necessary on the means of converting arms production to civilian production which could make use of the highly skilled scientific and technical manpower currently employed in arms industries.

The Task of the South. "In any assault on international poverty, social and economic reforms within developing countries must complement the critical role to be played by the international environment for development, which itself needs to be made more favourable.

"In countries where essential reforms have not yet taken place, redistribution of productive resources and incomes is necessary. A broader package of policy improvements would include expansion of social services to the poor, agrarian reform, increased development expenditures in rural areas, stimulation of small-scale enterprises and better tax administration. Such measures are important both for satisfying elementary needs and for increasing productivity, particularly in rural areas.

"The full potential of the informal sector to contribute to economic development requires . . . increased resources in the form of easier access to credit and expanded training and extension services.

"The strengthening of indigenous technological capacity often requires a more scientific bias in education, the encouragement of a domestic engineering industry, increased emphasis on intermediate technology and the sharing of experience.

"Improved economic management and the increased mobilization of domestic resources are essential to the promotion of development. In many countries there is scope for improvements in such fields as taxation policies, public administration and the operation of the pricing system.

"Wider participation in the development process should be encouraged; measures to achieve this could include decentralized governmental administrative systems and support for relevant voluntary organizations.

"Regional and sub-regional integration, or other forms of close co-operation, still offer a viable strategy for accelerated economic development and structural transformation among developing countries especially the smaller ones. It supports industrialization and trade expansion and provides opportunities for multi-country ventures.

"Developing countries should take steps to expand preferential trade schemes among themselves. This could be encouraged by such measures as the untying of aid.

"Developing countries should give special attention to the establishment and extension of payments and credit arrangements among themselves to facilitate trade and to ease balance-of-payments problems.

"The emergence of capital-surplus developing countries provides special scope for the establishment of projects on the basis of tripartite arrangements involving developing countries alone or in partnership with industrialized countries. Such arrangements should be supported by both developed and developing countries. Tripartite projects (including, when appropriate, industrialized countries) should be encouraged by nations with complementary resources such as capital and technology.

"Developing countries should consider what forms of mutual assistance organization might help them to participate more effectively in negotiations and in the work of international organizations and to promote economic co-operation among themselves.

Commodity Trade and Development. "The commodity sector of developing countries should contribute more to economic development through the greater participation of these countries in the processing, marketing and distribution of their commodities. Action for the stabilization of commodity prices at remunerative levels should be undertaken as a matter of urgency.

"Measures to facilitate the participation of developing countries in processing and marketing should include the removal of tariff and other trade barriers against developing countries' processed products, the establishment of fair and equitable international transport rates, the abolition of restrictive business practices, and improved financial arrangements for facilitating processing and marketing.

"Adequate resources should be provided to enable the Common Fund [part of the Integrated Commodity Programme then under negotiation in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)—see 29887 A] to encourage and finance effective international commodity agreements (ICAs) which would stabilize prices at remunerative levels; to finance national stocking outside ICAs; and to facilitate the carrying out of 'second window' activities such as storage, processing, marketing, productivity improvement and diversification.

"Greater efforts should be made to bring to a rapid and successful conclusion negotiations on individual commodity agreements wherever these are feasible.

"Compensatory financing facilities should be expanded and improved to provide more adequately for shortfalls in real commodity export earnings.

"The mutual interest of producing and consuming countries in the development of mineral resources requires the creation of new financial arrangements leading to more equitable and stable mineral development agreements, greater assurance of world mineral supplies and increased developing country participation in their resource development. A new financing facility, whose primary function will be to provide concessional finance for mineral exploration, should be established on the basis of a global responsibility for investment in mineral development.

Energy. "An orderly transition is required from high dependence on increasingly scarce non-renewable energy sources.

"Immediate steps towards an international strategy on energy should be taken as part of the emergency programme recommended in the final chapter of the report.

"Prices which reflect long-term scarcities will play an important role in this transition; orderly and predictable price changes are important to facilitate a smooth development of the world economy.

"Special arrangements including financial assistance should be made to ensure supplies to the poorer developing countries.

"International and regional financial agencies must increase substantially their financing of exploration and development of energy sources including the development of renewable energy resources.

"A global energy research centre should be created under UN auspices to co-ordinate information and projections and to support research on new energy resources.

Industrialization and World Trade. "The industrialization of developing countries, as a means of their overall development efforts, will provide increasing opportunities for world trade and need not conflict with the long-term interests of developed countries. It should be facilitated as a matter of international policy.

"Protectionism threatens the future of the world economy and is inimical to the long-term interests of developing and developed countries alike. Protectionism by industrialized countries against the exports of developing countries should be rolled back; this should be facilitated by improved institutional machinery and new trading rules and principles.

"Adjustment to new patterns of world industrial production should be accepted as a necessary and desirable process. Industrialized countries should vigorously pursue positive and time-bound adjustment programmes developed through international consultation and subject to international surveillance.

"Safeguard measures must be internationally negotiated and should be taken only on the basis of established need. They should be non-discriminatory, of limited duration and subject to international surveillance.

"The generalized system of preferences (GSP—see 25376 A) should be eased in respect of its rules of origin, its exceptions and its limits. It should be extended beyond its present expiration and not be liable to unilateral termination.

"Financial support and technical assistance should be given to the poorer countries to facilitate their establishment of improved commercial infrastructure and their participation in international trade negotiations.

"Fair labour standards should be internationally agreed in order to prevent unfair competition and to facilitate trade liberalization.

"An international trade organization incorporating both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and UNCTAD is the objective towards which the international community should work. Meanwhile, there is need for improvement in existing arrangements including wider development of trade co-operation in such matters as the establishment and administration of rules, principles and codes covering restrictive business practices and technology transfer.

Transnational Corporations, Investment and the Sharing of Technology. "Effective national laws and international codes of conduct are needed to govern the sharing of technology, to control restrictive business practices, and to provide a framework for the activities of transnational corporations.

"The investment regime we propose would include (i) reciprocal obligations on the part of host and home countries covering foreign investment, transfer of technology, and repatriation of profits, royalties and dividends, (ii) legislation, co-ordinated in home and host countries, to regulate transnational corporation activities in matters such as ethical behaviour, disclosure of information, restrictive business practices and labour standards, (iii) intergovernmental co-operation in regard to tax policies and the monitoring of transfer pricing, and (iv) harmonization of fiscal and other incentives among host developing countries.

"In addition to improved access to international development finance, the bargaining capacity of developing countries, particularly of the smaller and least developed countries, vis-à-vis the transnational corporations should be strengthened with the technical assistance now increasingly available from the UN and other agencies.

"Permanent sovereignty over natural resources is the right of all countries. It is necessary, however, that nationalization be accompanied by appropriate and effective compensation, under internationally comparable principles which should be embodied in national laws. Increasing use should also be made of international mechanisms for settling disputes.

"Greater international, regional and national efforts are needed to support the development of technology in developing countries and the transfer of appropriate technology to them at reasonable cost.

"There should be increased efforts in both rich and poor countries to develop appropriate technology in the light of changing constraints regarding energy and ecology; the flow of information about such technology should be improved. The international aid agencies should change those of their practices which restrict the recipients' freedom to choose technology, and should make more use of local capacities in preparing projects.

The World Monetary Order. "The reform of the international monetary system should be urgently undertaken by all interested parties building on the large measure of consensus which emerged in the Committee of Twenty [the Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues, which held its final meeting in June 1974—see 26727 A], and taking account of current difficulties and dangers. Reform involves improvements in the exchange rate regime, the reserve system, the balance-of-payments adjustment process, and the overall management of the system which should permit the participation of the whole international community.

"Mechanisms should be agreed for creating and distributing an international currency to be used for clearing and settling outstanding balances between central banks. Such a currency would replace the use of national currencies as international reserves. It could take the form of an improved special drawing right (SDR), and could be facilitated by an appropriately designed 'substitution account'.

"New special drawing rights should be created to the extent called for by the need for non-inflationary increases in world liquidity. The distribution of such unconditional liquidity should favour the developing countries who presently bear high adjustment burdens. Such a distribution, often referred to as an SDR link, would also assist the adjustment process of the international monetary system.

"There should be agreement on an adjustment process which will not increase contractionist pressures in the world economy. The adjustment process of developing countries should be placed in the context of maintaining long-term economic and social development. The IMF should avoid inappropriate or excessive regulation of their economies, and should not impose highly deflationary measures as standard adjustment policy. It should also improve and greatly extend the scope of its compensatory financing facility, for example by relaxing quota limits, measuring shortfalls in real terms and making repayment terms more flexible. Surplus countries should accept greater responsibility for payments adjustments, and IMF measures to encourage this should be considered.

"Increased stability of international exchange rates, particularly among key currencies, should be sought through domestic discipline and co-ordination of appropriate national policies.

"The participation of developing countries in the staffing, management and decision-making of the IMF should be enlarged.

"In furthering the demonetization of gold, the bulk of the IMF gold stock should, after the completion of the present sales arrangements, be used as collateral against which the IMF can borrow from the market for onward lending particularly to middle-income developing countries. Staggered sales should also be undertaken and accruing profits of such sales should be used as interest subsidy on loans to low-income developing countries.

A New Approach to Development Finance. "There must be a substantial increase in the transfer of resources to developing countries in order to finance (i) projects and programmes to alleviate poverty and to expand food production, especially in the least developed countries, (ii) exploration and development of energy and mineral resources, and (iii) stabilization of the prices and earnings of commodity exports and expanded domestic processing of commodities.

"The flow of official development finance should be enlarged by (i) an international system of universal revenue mobilization, based on a sliding scale related to national income, in which East European and developing countries (except the poorest countries) would participate, (ii) the adoption of timetables to increase official development assistance (ODA) from industrialized countries to the level of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) by 1985, and to 1 per cent before the end of the century, and (iii) introduction of automatic revenue transfers through international levies on some of the following: international trade, arms production or exports; international travel; the global commons, especially sea-bed minerals.

"Lending through international financial institutions should be improved through (i) effective utilization of the increased borrowing capacity of the World Bank resulting from the recent decision to double its capital to $80,000 million [see 30250 A], (ii) doubling the borrowing-to-capital ratio of the World Bank from its present gearing of 1:1 to 2:1, and similar action by regional development banks, (iii) abstaining from the imposition of political conditions on the operations of multilateral financial institutions, (iv) channelling an increasing share of development finance through regional institutions, (v) a substantial increase in programme lending, (vi) the use of IMF gold reserves either for further sales, whose profits would subsidize interest on development lending, or as collateral to borrow for on-lending to developing countries, and (vii) giving borrowing countries a greater role in decision-making and management.

"Resource transfers should be made more predictable by long-term commitments to provide ODA, increasing use of automatically mobilized revenues, and the lengthening of the International Development Association (IDA) replenishment period.

"Consideration should be given to the creation of a new international financial institution—a World Development Fund—with universal membership, and in which decision-making is more evenly shared between lenders and borrowers, to supplement existing institutions and diversify lending policies and practices. The World Development Fund would seek to satisfy the unmet needs in the financing structure, in particular that of programme lending. Ultimately, it could serve as a channel for such resources as may be raised on a universal and automatic basis.

"There is need for major additional multilateral finance to support mineral and energy exploration and development in developing countries. Some of this will come from existing institutions, but we believe there is a case for a new facility for this purpose.

"The flow of lending from commercial banks and other private financial bodies to developing countries must be strengthened. Middle-income countries need special measures to lengthen the maturity of their debt structures and poorer developing countries should be enabled to borrow more easily in the market. The World Bank and other international financial institutions should assist this process by co-financing, by the provision of guarantees, and by using concessional funds to improve lending terms and reduce interest rates.

"Measures should be adopted to facilitate the placing of bonds by developing countries in international markets. These should include the removal of restrictions and the provision of guarantees and adequate arrangements for the assessment of risks.

International Organizations and Negotiations. "Policies, agreements and institutions in the field of international economic, financial and monetary co-operation should be guided by the principle of universality.

"The UN system, which faces ever-expanding tasks, needs to be strengthened and made more efficient. This calls for more co-ordination of budgets, programmes and personnel policies, to avoid duplication of tasks and wasteful overlapping.

"The performance of the various multilateral organizations in the field of international development should be regularly monitored by a high-level advisory body.

"There needs to be a review of the present system of negotiations to see whether more flexible, expeditious and result-oriented procedures can be introduced without detracting from co-operation within established groups.

"Increased attention should be paid to educating public opinion and the younger generation about the importance of international co-operation.

"The occasional use of limited summit meetings should be considered to advance the cause of consensus and change."

Proposed Summit Meeting in Mexico in 1981

Herr Brandt announced in Bonn (West Germany) on May 22 that President López Portillo of Mexico was to convene a summit meeting of world leaders, as proposed by the Brandt Commission, and that the meeting would take place early in 1981.

The announcement followed a meeting in Bonn between Herr Brandt, President López Portillo and Dr Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian Federal Chancellor. The Brandt Commission had suggested in its report that a summit meeting "should be limited to some 25 world leaders who could ensure fair representation of major world groupings", and had further recommended that it should concentrate on an emergency programme of measures for the forthcoming five years; such an emergency programme, it was envisaged, would in turn establish a basis for co-operation and shared responsibility, on which more fundamental changes would rest.

British Reaction to Brandt Commission's Proposals

The Brandt Commission's report was debated in the House of Lords on March 12 and in the House of Commons on June 16.

Introducing the debate in the House of Lords, the Earl of Listowel (Labour) described the report as the most important publication on relations between developed and developing countries since the Pearson Report in 1969 [see 23684 A]. Lord Tanlaw (Liberal), however, said that some of its recommendations seemed to have been made before, tried out and found wanting. For the Government, Lord Trefgarne said that the report was receiving the careful study it deserved, and that the Government endorsed its central message that North-South discussions should be advanced for the furtherance of mutual interests.

In the House of Commons, Sir Ian Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal, welcomed the stress laid in the report on the need for measures of mutual interest, and he said that the Government was ready to play its full part. Mr Edward Heath (Conservative), a member of the Brandt Commission, said that he wanted to hear "not that the British Government stands ready to play its part in whatever may or may not be done but that it is going to give a lead to Europe and the North as a whole in implementing the proposals", and he added that this needed a political will and public support. Mr Peter Shore (Labour), the opposition spokesman on foreign affairs, said that a relatively small shift from arms expenditure to overseas aid would provide great resources for the Third World, and he asked the Government to announce its detailed response to the commission's recommendations.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office on July 18 published a memorandum setting out the Government's position on the Brandt Commission's report. It maintained that there was limited scope for new initiatives, and that existing institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF were "already engaged in international discussion of all problems identified in the commission's report". It affirmed the Government's strong belief in "the merits of the present world economic system, with its wide reliance on open markets for trade and financial flows", and asserted that the ability of this system to adapt flexibly to changing conditions "gives the best hope of overcoming present difficulties and providing a firm basis for future growth".—(Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues - Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Development Forum) (*Prev. rep. 29528 A*)

A. SINGAPORE — Government Changes - Amnesty International Report on Internal Security Practices

In a cabinet reorganization announced on June 1, Mr Suppiah Dhanabalan, hitherto Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, while Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, hitherto Senior Minister of State for National Development, was appointed Minister for Education. Responsibility for Education had hitherto been held by the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Goh Keng Swee (62), who now became First Deputy Prime Minister with a general portfolio, while the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Sinnathamby Rajaratnam (65), became Second Deputy Prime Minister in overall charge of foreign affairs.

Mr Dhanabalan (42) had first been elected to Parliament at the December 1976 general election in which the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) had taken all 69 seats [see 28255 B], and **Dr Tan** (39) had been returned for the PAP in a by-election held in February 1979 [see 29621 A]; both men had formerly held senior banking posts.

The human rights organization Amnesty International published a report on Jan. 31 severely criticizing the internal security practices of the Lee Kuan Yew Government, which was urged to cease detaining people without trial and to stop what it alleged to be the use of torture in detention centres.

The 60-page report contained about 50 specific allegations of maltreatment of detainees, and drew particular attention to (i) the imprisonment without trial of three opposition politicians—Mr Ho Piao, Mr Lee Tze Tong and Dr Poh Soo Kai—the duration of whose detention was described as "almost without parallel in modern history", and (ii) the internal exile on the island of Pulau Tekong Besar of Dr Lim Hock Siew.

[Of those mentioned in the Amnesty International Report (all of whom had originally been arrested in 1963 in a largescale action by the authorities against alleged communist subversion—see 19816 A), (i) Dr Poh Soo Kai had reportedly been released in 1973 under a restriction order but had been rearrested three years later for involvement in "communist front" activities (as announced in June 1976—see page 28256); (ii) Dr Lim Hock Siew had been released from prison under a suspension order (as announced in November 1978—see 29621 A), together with Mr Said Zahari (the latter being permitted to return to Singapore Island under a restriction order in October 1979 after signing an undertaking not to involve himself in politics "ever again"); and (iii) Mr Lee Tze Tong (whose release had also been urged in an Inter-Parliamentary Union report of September 1979) was allowed to leave prison on Feb. 15 (i.e. after publication of the Amnesty report) under a suspension order confining him to the island of Pulau Ubin.]

The Singapore Government issued a statement on March 31 rejecting "lurid accounts of torture and assault of political detainees during interrogation" as "baseless", and asserting that political detention was necessary to combat subversion, there being currently some 34 detainees under the Internal Security Act. An inquiry set up under the chairmanship of Mr Dhanabalan [see above] to investigate the specific allegations made in the Amnesty International report had, it was stated, found that whereas "the process of interrogation does involve psychological stress", no evidence had been found of injury being caused. Amnesty International was, said the statement, welcome to pay the cost of legal proceedings alleging assault, which could "go right up to the Privy Council in London". (Singapore Bulletin - Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Internal Developments 29621 A*)

B. AUSTRIA — Referendum in Vorarlberg on Increased Powers for Regional Parliament

A referendum was held on June 23, 1980, in the Austrian *Land* (province) of Vorarlberg, in which the electorate approved an initiative proposed by the *Landtag* (*Land* Parliament) empowering it to conduct negotiations with the Federal Government for a number of devolved governmental powers. In the referendum 88.1 per cent of the electorate went to the polls, of whom 69.4 per cent voted in favour of the initiative and 30.6 per cent against.

The region of Vorarlberg, situated in the extreme west of Austria, had until the opening of the Arlberg road tunnel in December 1978 [see 29488 A] often been isolated from the rest of the country by adverse weather conditions and had a strong tradition of opposition to central rule from Vienna. Its electorate had voted in 1919 (i.e. after the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy and before the promulgation of the 1920 Constitution) in favour of an initiative proposing union with the Swiss Confederation instead of Austria, but had subsequently accepted the Austrian federal system.

The 1980 initiative, based on a 10-point programme, originated from an appeal published in September 1979 by the *Pro Vorarlberg* pressure group (although it did not take up the latter's demand for a separate "Vorarlberg statute" within the federal structure) and its supporters included the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), which formed the *Land* Government in coalition with the small Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The initiative called inter alia for financial and tax autonomy for the province, as well as for varying degrees of regional control of education, commerce, forestry and agriculture and broadcasting, and for the right to conclude autonomous contracts and agreements with neighbouring countries (the sale of hydroelectric power to West Germany being a major source of the province's income).

The Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ), which was the ruling party at federal level but which controlled only three of the nine Austrian *Länder*, strongly opposed the initiative, portraying its supporters as separatists. Prior to the referendum, the Federal Chancellor, Dr Bruno Kreisky, had on a number of occasions attacked the idea of granting special powers to any one province to the exclusion of the other eight.—(Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Times) (*Prev. rep. Arlberg Road Tunnel and Map 29488 A*)

C. CAMEROON — Cabinet Reorganization

In a decree published in Yaoundé on July 19, 1980, President Ahidjo made several cabinet changes involving in particular the dismissal of Mr Jean Keutcha, hitherto the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The portfolios of Foreign Affairs and of Public Service were given the status of ministries of state and were taken over respectively by Mr Paul Dontsop (former Minister of Labour and Social Welfare) and by Mr Sadou Daoudou (former Minister of State for the Armed Forces). The portfolios of Labour and Social Welfare and of Armed Forces were taken over respectively by Mr Daniel Kamgoue and by Dr Abdoulaye Maikano (former Minister for the Public Service).

Mr André Ngongang Wandji became Minister of Youth and Sports *vice* Mr René Ze Nguele; the latter became Minister of National Education *vice* Mr Adamou Ndam Nyoja, who was appointed to the new post of Minister Delegate of the General State Inspectorate and Minister of Administrative Reform. The portfolios of Public Health and of Equipment were taken over respectively by Mr Atenase Eteme Ondoa and by Mr Thomas Kanga.

In addition Mr William Eteki Mboumoua was appointed as a second Minister with Special Duties at the President's Office. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Presidential Election 30315 B; Cabinet 30044 A*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION — Venice Summit of Seven Major Non-Communist Nations - President Carter's Visits to Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain and Portugal

The sixth summit conference of the seven major non-communist industrialized countries was held in Venice (Italy) on June 22-23. Those heads of state or government attending (for the most part accompanied by Foreign, Finance and Energy Ministers) were Mr Pierre Trudeau (Canadian Prime Minister), President Giscard d'Estaing of France, Herr Helmut Schmidt (West German Federal Chancellor), Signor Francesco Cossiga (Italian Prime Minister), Mrs Margaret Thatcher (UK Prime Minister) and President Carter of the United States.

In view of the death of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Masayoshi Ohira, on June 12 during the campaign for the general elections subsequently held on June 22 [see 30453 A], the Japanese delegation was led by Mr Saburo Okita (Foreign Minister in the then caretaker Cabinet). The President of the Commission of the European Community, Mr Roy Jenkins, was present for discussions on matters within the competence of the Community.

The Venice summit was the sixth of its kind, earlier such meetings having been held as follows: at Rambouillet (near Paris) in November 1975 [see 27501 A]; in Puerto Rico in June 1976 [see pages 27877-78]; in London in May 1977 [see 28469 A]; in Bonn in July 1978 [see 29293 A]; and in Tokyo in June 1979 [see page 29993]. Canada had been represented at such meetings since the second summit in Puerto Rico and the European Community as such since the third in London.

Summit's Consideration of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan - Statements on Refugees, Hijacking and Diplomatic Hostages

Although this series of summits was primarily intended to concentrate on international economic and monetary problems, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan dating from late December 1979 [see 30229 A; 30381 A] constituted a major subject of discussion at the Venice meeting, immediately before the opening of which the Soviet news agency Tass announced a limited withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

The Tass announcement (dated June 22 under the heading "Information from Kabul") said: "According to information from the command of the Soviet military contingents now in Afghanistan, some military units whose presence in Afghanistan is not essential at present are currently being withdrawn to the territory of the USSR by agreement with the Afghan Government." A commentary broadcast by Moscow radio the following day (June 23) said that the Soviet withdrawal involved a division of troops, (thought by Western sources to signify anything between 7,000 and 14,000 men) and 108 tanks. (Prior notification of the Soviet intention was given to the French Government by the Soviet ambassador in Paris late on June 20, apparently to indicate the Soviet Government's desire to maintain special relations with France following President Giscard d'Estaing's talks with President Brezhnev in Warsaw in May 1980—see page 30384.)

A statement on Afghanistan issued by the Venice summit on June 22 said that the participants had "taken note of today's announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet troops" and continued that "in order to make a useful contribution to the solution of the Afghan crisis this withdrawal, if confirmed, will have to be permanent and continue until the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops". The full text of the statement was as follows:

"In seeking here in Venice to define a global economic strategy and to show our united determination to make it a reality, we are consciously accepting the responsibility that falls to the three great industrialized areas of the world—North America, Western Europe and Japan—to help create the conditions for harmonious sustained economic growth. But we cannot do this alone: others too have a part to play.

"However, present circumstances oblige us to emphasize that our effort will only bear fruit if we can at the same time preserve a world in which the rule of law is universally obeyed, national independence is respected and world peace is kept. We call on all countries to join us in working for such a world and we welcome the readiness of non-aligned countries and regional groups to accept the responsibilities which this involves.

"We therefore reaffirm hereby that the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is unacceptable now and that we are determined not to accept it in the future. It is incompatible with the will of the Afghan people for national independence, as demonstrated by their courageous resistance, and with the security of the states in the region. It is also incompatible with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with efforts to maintain genuine détente. It undermines the very foundation of peace, both in the region and in the world at large.

"We fully endorse in this respect the views already expressed by the overwhelming majority of the international community, as set out by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution ES-6/2 of Jan. 14, 1980 [see page 30237] and by the Islamic Conference at both its recent sessions [in January and May 1980—see pages 30241-42 and 30385 respectively].

"Afghanistan should be enabled to regain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character it once enjoyed. We therefore call for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and for the Afghan people to be left free again to determine their own future.

"We have taken note of today's announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In order to make a useful contribution to the solution of the Afghan crisis this withdrawal, if confirmed, will have to be permanent and continue until the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Only thus will it be possible to re-establish a situation compatible with peace and the rule of law and thereby in the interest of all nations.

"We are resolved to do everything in our power to achieve this objective. We are also ready to support any initiative to this end, such as that of the Islamic Conference. And we shall support every effort designed to contribute to the political independence and the security of the states of the region.

"Those Governments represented at this meeting which have taken a position against attendance at the [Moscow] Olympic Games vigorously reaffirm their positions." [Of the countries represented at the Venice summit, Canada, West Germany, Japan and the United States boycotted the Olympic Games, while efforts by the UK Government to bring about a British boycott were unsuccessful—see pages 30385-86.]

[The US State Department stated on July 2 that the Soviet Union had completed the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Afghanistan but added that US officials were studying reports that substantial numbers of other Soviet troops had been moved into the country before the June 22 announcement of a partial withdrawal; other reports in early July suggested that the withdrawn Soviet troops had been replaced by specially-trained anti-guerrilla units. These and other recent developments in Afghanistan will be covered in a subsequent article.]

Statements on Refugees, Hijacking and Diplomatic Hostages - US-West German Relations

Three other statements on non-economic questions adopted by the Venice summit dealt with "the ever increasing number of refugees throughout the world", hijacking and the taking of diplomatic hostages. Their full texts were as follows:

Refugees. "The heads of state and government are deeply concerned at the plight of the ever increasing number of refugees throughout the world. Hundreds of thousands have already left the Indo-Chinese peninsula [see 30075 A] and Cuba [see 30474 A], many of them taking the risk of fleeing across the open seas. Pakistan and Iran have received almost 1,000,000 refugees from Afghanistan [see page 30363]. In Africa refugees number several million.

"The heads of state and government note with great regret that the refugee population continues to grow and that, despite major international relief efforts, their suffering continues. They pay tribute to the generosity and forbearance with which countries in the regions affected have received refugees. For their part, the countries represented at this summit have already responded substantially to appeals for assistance to aid resettlement of refugees. They will continue to do so, but their resources are not unlimited. They appeal to others to join with them in helping to relieve this suffering.

"But however great the effort of the international community, it will be difficult to sustain it indefinitely. The problem of refugees has to be attacked at its root.

"The heads of state and government therefore make a vigorous appeal to the governments responsible to remove the causes of this widespread human tragedy and not to pursue policies which drive large numbers of their people from their own countries."

Hijacking. "The heads of state and government expressed their satisfaction at the broad support of the international community for the principles set out in the Bonn Declaration of July 1978 [see page 29295] as well as in the international conventions dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation. The increasing adherence to these conventions and the responsible attitude taken by states with respect to air hijacking reflects the fact that these principles are being accepted by the international community as a whole.

"The heads of state and government emphasize that hijacking remains a threat to international civil aviation and that there can be no relaxation of efforts to combat this threat. To this end they look forward to continuing co-operation with all other governments."

The Taking of Diplomatic Hostages. "Gravely concerned by recent incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on diplomatic and consular premises and personnel, the heads of state and government reaffirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They note the completion of work on the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages [see page 30225] and call on all states to consider becoming parties to it as well as to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons of 1973 [see pages 26345-46].

"The heads of state and government vigorously condemn the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norms of international law and practice. The heads of state and government consider it necessary that all governments should adopt policies which will contribute to the attainment of this goal and to take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They also resolve to provide to one another's diplomatic and consular missions support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic and consular establishments or personnel.

"The heads of state and government recall that every state has the duty under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, and deplore in the strongest terms any breach of this duty."

Prior to the opening of the summit conference, President Carter had private talks in Venice on June 21 with Herr Schmidt, during which discussion was reported to have centred on certain strains in current US-West German relations arising principally from a letter sent by President Carter to the Federal Chancellor on June 13 dealing inter alia with the latter's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union (which subsequently took place on June 30-July 1—see 30471 A).

In the letter, which was described as "astonishing" by Herr Schmidt in an interview with the *Washington Post* on June 21, President Carter was understood to have stressed the importance of the December 1979 decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Foreign and Defence Ministers to install new long-range theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe [see 30159 A]. However, both the US and the West German Governments on June 16 denied press reports that the letter had contained a specific warning from President Carter to Herr Schmidt not to depart from the NATO agreement while in Moscow. (Earlier in the year Herr Schmidt had suggested publicly that deployment of the new weapons might be delayed pending new negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on arms reductions, whereas the US Government was seeking a speedy implementation of the NATO decision.)

At the conclusion of the Venice summit President Carter stated his belief that meetings between West European and Soviet leaders were "useful" as a means of convincing the latter of the strength of Western opposition to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He added that such contacts were "inevitable" and that the United States "could not prevent them even if we wanted to, which I do not". (The previous month the US Government had strongly criticized France for not consulting with other Western Governments on President Giscard d'Estaing's decision to meet President Brezhnev in Warsaw—see page 30384.)

Declaration of the Venice Summit

The principal document adopted at the Venice summit (on June 23) was a declaration dealing with economic, monetary, development and trade questions and also energy consumption and production in the industrialized countries. Its full text was as follows:

"Introduction. (1) In this our first meeting of the 1980s, the economic issues that have dominated our thoughts are the price and supply of energy and the implications for inflation and the level of economic activity in our own countries and for the world as a whole. Unless we can deal with the problems of energy, we cannot cope with other problems.

"(2) Successive large increases in the price of oil, bearing no relation to market conditions and culminating in the recent decisions by some members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries at Algiers [at a meeting on June 9-10, when theoretical base and ceiling prices of $32 and $37 respectively per barrel were set, although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates voted against the increase], have produced the reality of even higher inflation and the imminent threat of severe recession and unemployment in the industrialized countries. We believe that these consequences are increasingly coming to be appreciated by some of the oil-exporting countries. The fact is that the industrialized countries of the free world, the oil-producing countries and the non-oil developing countries depend upon each other for the realization of their potential for economic development, but only if all work together, and with the interests of all in mind.

"(3) In this spirit we have discussed the main problems that confront us in the coming decade. We are confident in the ability of our democratic societies, based on individual freedom and social solidarity, to meet these challenges. There are no quick or easy solutions. Sustained efforts are needed to achieve a better future.

"Inflation. (4) The reduction of inflation is our immediate top priority and will benefit all nations. Inflation retards growth and harms all sectors of our societies. Determined fiscal and monetary restraint is required to break inflationary expectations. Continuing dialogue among the social partners is also needed for this purpose. We must retain effective international co-ordination to carry out this policy of restraint, and also to guard against the threat of growing unemployment and worldwide recession.

"(5) We are also committed to encouraging investment and innovation so as to increase productivity, to fostering the movement of resources from declining into expanding sectors so as to provide new job opportunities, and to promoting the most effective use of resources within and among countries. This will require shifting resources from government spending to the private sector and from consumption to investment, and avoiding or carefully limiting actions that shelter particular industries or sectors from the rigours of adjustment. Measures of this kind may be economically and politically difficult in the short term, but they are essential to sustained non-inflationary growth and to increasing employment which is our major goal.

"(6) In shaping economic policy, we need a better understanding of the long-term effects of global population growth, industrial expansion and economic development generally. A study of trends in these areas is in hand, and our representatives will keep these matters under review.

"Energy. (7) We must break the existing link between economic growth and consumption of oil, and we mean to do so in this decade. This strategy requires conserving oil and substantially increasing production and use of alternative energy sources. To this end, maximum reliance should be placed on the price mechanism, and domestic prices for oil should take into account representative world prices. Market forces should be supplemented, where appropriate, by effective fiscal incentives and administrative measures. Energy investment will contribute substantially to economic growth and employment.

"(8) We welcome the recent decisions of the European Community, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the need for long-term structural changes to reduce oil consumption, continuing procedures to monitor progress, the possible use of oil ceilings to deal with tight market conditions, and co-ordination of stocks [see 30131 A]. The member countries of the IEA have agreed that their energy policies should result in their collective 1985 net oil imports being substantially less than their existing 1985 group objective, and that they will quantify the reduction as part of their continuing monitoring efforts. The potential for reductions has been estimated by the IEA Secretariat, given existing uncertainties, at around 4,000,000 barrels a day.

"(9) To conserve oil in our countries: (i) we are agreed that no new base-load, oil-fired generating capacity should be constructed, save in exceptional circumstances, and that the conversion of oil-fired capacity to other fuels should be accelerated; (ii) we will increase efforts, including fiscal incentives where necessary, to accelerate the substitution of oil in industry; (iii) we will encourage oil-saving investments in residential and commercial buildings, where necessary by financial incentives and by establishing insulation standards. We look to the public sector to set an example.

"In transportation, our objective is the introduction of increasingly fuel efficient vehicles. The demand of consumers and competition among manufacturers are already leading in this direction. We will accelerate this progress, where appropriate, by fuel efficiency, by gasoline pricing and taxation decisions, by research and development, and by making public transport more attractive.

"(10) We must rely on fuels other than oil to meet the energy needs of future economic growth. This will require early, resolute and wide-ranging actions. Our potential to increase the supply and use of energy sources other than oil over the next 10 years is estimated at the equivalent of 15,000,000-20,000,000 barrels a day of oil. We intend to make a co-ordinated and vigorous effort to realize this potential. To this end, we will seek a large increase in the use of coal and enhanced use of nuclear power in the medium term, and a substantial increase in production of synthetic fuels, in solar energy and other sources of renewable energy over the longer term.

"(11) We shall encourage the exploration and development of our indigenous hydrocarbon resources in order to secure maximum production on a long-term basis.

"(12) Together we intend to double coal production and use by early 1990. We will encourage long-term commitments by coal producers and consumers. It will be necessary to improve infrastructures in both exporting and importing countries, as far as is economically justified, to ensure the required supply and uses of coal. We look forward to the recommendations of the International Coal Industry Advisory Board. They will be considered promptly. We are conscious of the environmental risks associated with increased coal production and combustion. We will do everything in our power to ensure that increased use of fossil fuels, especially coal, does not damage the environment.

"(13) We underline the vital contribution of nuclear power to a more secure energy supply. The role of nuclear energy has to be increased if world energy needs are to be met. We shall therefore have to expand our nuclear generating capacity. We will continue to give the highest priority to ensuring the health and safety of the public and to perfecting methods for dealing with spent fuels and disposal of nuclear waste. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of nuclear fuel and minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

"(14) The studies made by the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation (INFCE) group, launched at the London summit in 1977, are a significant contribution to the use of nuclear energy. [For final INFCE report as published in February 1980, see 30431 A.] We welcome their findings with respect to increasing predictable supplies; the most effective utilization of uranium sources, including the development of advanced technologies; and the minimization of proliferation risks, including support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We urge all countries to take these findings into account when developing policies and programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

"(15) We will actively support the recommendations of the international energy technology group, proposed at the Tokyo summit last year, for bringing new energy technologies into commercial use at the earliest feasible time. As far as national programmes are concerned, we will by mid-1981 adopt a two-phased approach. First, listing the numbers and types of commercial-scale plants to be constructed in each of our countries by the mid-1980s and second, indicating quantitative projections for expanding production by 1990, 1995 and 2000 as a basis for future actions. As far as international programmes are concerned, we will join others in creating an international team to promote collaborations among interested nations on specific projects.

"(16) A high-level group of representatives of our countries and of the Commission of the European Community will review periodically the results achieved in these fields.

"(17) Our comprehensive energy strategy is designed to meet the requirements of the coming decade. We are convinced that it can reduce the demand for energy, particularly oil, without hampering economic growth. By carrying out this strategy we expect that, over the coming decade, the ratio between increases in collective energy consumption and economic growth of our countries will be reduced to about 0.6; that the share of oil in our total energy demand will be reduced from 53 per cent now to about 40 per cent by 1990; and that our collective consumption of oil in 1990 will be significantly below present levels so as to permit a balance between supply and demand at tolerable prices.

"(18) We continue to believe that international co-operation in energy is essential. All countries have a vital interest in a stable equilibrium between energy supply and demand. We would welcome a constructive dialogue on energy and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies.

"**Relations with Developing Countries.** (19) We are deeply concerned about the impact of the oil price increases on the developing countries that have to import oil. The increase in oil prices in the last two years has more than doubled the oil bill of these countries, which now amounts to over $50,000 million. This will drive them into ever increasing indebtedness, and put at risk the whole basis of their economic growth and social progress, unless something can be done to help them.

"(20) We approach in a positive spirit the prospect of global negotiations in the framework of the United Nations and the formulation of a new international development strategy. In particular, our object is to co-operate with the developing countries in energy conservation and development, expansion of exports, enhancement of human skills, and the tackling of underlying food and population problems.

"(21) A major international effort to help these countries increase their energy production is required. We believe that this view is gaining ground among oil-exporting countries. We ask the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the resources and the mechanisms now in place for the exploration, development and production of conventional and renewable energy sources in oil-importing developing countries, to consider means, including the possibility of establishing a new affiliate or facility, by which it might improve and increase its lending programmes for energy assistance, and to explore its findings with both oil-exporting and industrial countries.

"(22) We are deeply conscious that extreme poverty and chronic malnutrition afflict hundreds of millions of people of developing countries. The first requirement in these countries is to improve their ability to feed themselves and reduce their dependence on food imports. We are ready to join with them and the international agencies concerned in their comprehensive long-term strategies to increase food production, and to help improve national as well as international research services. We will support and, where appropriate, supplement initiatives of the World Bank and of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to improve grain storage and food handling facilities. We underline the importance of wider membership and of an equitable replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

"(23) High priority should be given to efforts to cope with population growth and to existing UN and other programmes for supporting these efforts.

"(24) We strongly support the general capital increase of the World Bank [see 30250 A], increases in the funding of the regional development banks, and the sixth replenishment of the International Development Association [ibid.]. We would welcome an increase in the rate of lending of these institutions, within the limits of their present replenishments, as needed to fulfil the programmes described above. It is essential that all members, especially the major donors, provide their full contributions on the agreed schedule.

"(25) We welcome the report of the Brandt Commission [i.e. of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, whose report was published in February 1980—see 30457 A]. We shall carefully consider its recommendations.

"(26) The democratic industrialized countries cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and other different contributions to developing countries: it must be equitably shared by the oil-exporting countries and the industrialized communist countries. The personal representatives are instructed to review aid policies and procedures and other contributions to developing countries and to report back their conclusions to the next summit.

"**Monetary Problems.** (27) The situation created by large oil-generated payments imbalances, in particular those of oil-importing developing countries, requires a combination of determined actions by all countries to promote external adjustment and effective mechanisms for balance-of-payments financing. We look to the international capital market to continue to play the primary role in rechannelling the substantial oil surplus funds on the basis of sound lending standards. We support the work in progress by our monetary authorities and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) designed to improve the supervision and security of the international banking system. The private banks could usefully supplement these efforts.

"(28) Private lending will need to be supplemented by an expanded role for international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We are commited to implementing the agreed increase in the IMF quotas [i.e. the seventh increase—see page 29297], and to supporting appropriate borrowing by the Fund, if needed to meet financing requirements of its members. We encourage the IMF to seek ways in which it could, within its guidelines on conditionality, make it more attractive for countries with financing problems to use its resources. In particular, we support the IMF's examination of possible ways to reduce charges on credits to low-income developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank should work closely together in responding to these problems. We welcome the Bank's innovative lending scheme for structural adjustment. We urge oil-exporting countries to increase their direct lending to countries with financial problems, thus reducing the strain on other recycling mechanisms.

"(29) We reaffirm our commitment to stability in the foreign exchange markets. We note that the European Monetary System (EMS) [see 30010 A] has contributed to this end. We will continue close co-operation in exchange-market policies so as to avoid disorderly exchange-rate fluctuations. We will also co-operate with the IMF to achieve more effective surveillance. We support continuing examination by the IMF of arrangements to provide for a more balanced evolution of the world reserve system.

"**Trade.** (30) We are resolved further to strengthen the open world trading system. We will resist pressures for protectionist actions, which can only be self-defeating and aggravate inflation.

"(31) We endorse the positive conclusion of the multilateral trade negotiations [see 30109 A; 29781 A], and commit ourselves to early and effective implementation. We welcome the participation of some of our developing partners in the new non-tariff codes and call upon others to participate. We also call for the full participation of as many countries as possible in strengthening the system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We urge the more advanced of our developing partners gradually to open their markets over the coming decade.

"(32) We reaffirm our determination to avoid a harmful export credit race. To this end we shall work with the other participants to strengthen the international arrangement on export credits, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution covering all aspects of the arrangement by Dec. 1, 1980. In particular, we shall seek to bring its terms closer to current market conditions and reduce distortions in export competition, recognizing the differentiated treatment of developing countries in the arrangement.

"(33) As a further step in strengthening the international trading system, we commit our Governments to work in the United Nations towards an agreement to prohibit illicit payments to foreign government officials in international business transactions. If that effort falters, we will seek to conclude an agreement among our countries, but open to all, with the same objective.

"**Conclusions.** (34) The economic message from this Venice summit is clear. The key to success in resolving the major economic challenges which the world faces is to achieve and maintain a balance between energy supply and demand at reasonable levels and at tolerable prices. The stability of the world economy, on which the prosperity of every individual country relies, depends upon all of the countries concerned recognizing their mutual needs and accepting their mutual responsibilities.

"Those among us whose countries are members of the European Community intend to make their efforts within this framework. We, who represent seven large industrialized countries of the free world, are going to tackle our own problems with determination and to work with others to meet the challenges of the coming decade, to our own advantage and to the benefit of the whole world."

President Carter's Visits to Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain and Portugal

While in Europe for the Venice summit, President Carter paid official visits to four countries, beginning with a state visit to Italy from June 19 to 21 (on the last day of which he had a private meeting with Pope John Paul II in the Vatican). After the summit President Carter visited Yugoslavia (June 24-25), Spain (June 25-26) and Portugal (June 26).

Italy. A joint communiqué issued after President Carter's talks with President Pertini, Signor Cossiga and other Italian leaders said that the two sides supported "a comprehensive Western political strategy designed to make clear to the Soviet Union by the application of tangible measures the necessity of a prompt and complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan"; it also reaffirmed the December 1979 NATO decision concerning the deployment of new theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the accompanying proposal for new East-West disarmament negotiations [see 30159 A].

At a state dinner in Rome on June 20 President Carter shook hands with the secretary of the Italian Communist Party, Signor Enrico Berlinguer—this being reportedly the first time the latter had officially met a high US Government representative. (For US views of the possibility of Communist participation in government in Italy, see pages 29005-06; 27795 A.)

Yugoslavia. During his visit to Belgrade, which was the first to Yugoslavia by a foreign head of state since the death of President Tito on May 4 [see 30472 A], President Carter stressed the support of the United States for the independence, non-alignment and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. A joint communiqué issued after his talks with Mr Cvijetin Mijatovic (the current President of the collective Presidency of Yugoslavia) and other Yugoslav leaders called for respect for the principles of the UN Charter, "especially those which refer to the inadmissibility of the application of force, of intervention and interference in the affairs of other countries, of the imposition of alien will on sovereign states, whatever the form or justification, and of the blocking of their independent internal development"; this passage was widely interpreted as referring to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, although this issue was not specifically mentioned. The communiqué also called for the release of the US hostages in Iran [see pages 30148-50; 30205-12], while at the same time stressing Iran's right to independence and non-alignment.

It was subsequently reported in Washington on July 1 that negotiations were at an advanced stage for the purchase by Yugoslavia of sophisticated US armaments of a defensive character; if eventually agreed, the sales would constitute the first major arms deal between the two countries for 20 years. (For earlier discussions on a resumption of US-Yugoslav military co-operation, notably during President Tito's visit to Washington in March 1978, see 29401 A.)

Spain. During his visit to Madrid President Carter expressed support for Spain's application for full membership of the European Community [see pages 30012; 29423; 28657] and also (speaking at a luncheon given in his honour by King Juan Carlos on June 25) welcomed the Spanish Government's intention of joining NATO [see 30020 B], while recognizing that this decision had to be taken "fully and exclusively by Spain, in its own time and in its own way". In addition to having talks with the Spanish Prime Minister, Sr Adolfo Suarez, and other government leaders, President Carter also met Sr Felipe González, leader of the opposition Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (which together with the Spanish Communist Party was opposed to Spanish membership of NATO).

Portugal. During a six-hour visit to Lisbon on June 26, President Carter had talks with President Eanes and the Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr Francisco Sá Carneiro, and also met the leader of the opposition Socialist Party, Dr Mário Soares. Speaking at a state luncheon, President Eanes said that Portugal would always be grateful for the US economic support given in the aftermath of the 1974 revolution [see 27005 A] and also reiterated Portuguese support for US efforts to secure the release of the Tehran hostages. In response President Carter said that his talks in Lisbon had bolstered his confidence in the unity of the NATO alliance (of which Portugal is a member). In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit, the two sides said inter alia that "concrete political, economic and commercial measures" were required to bring about a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Immediately prior to President Carter's visit it was reported that formal US-Portuguese negotiations would begin shortly on the provision of a base in Portugal for US aircraft carriers and also on the stationing of US mid-air refuelling aircraft at the Beja air base south of Lisbon. (For June 1979 agreement on the continued use by the United States of the Lajes military base in the Portuguese Azores, see 29817 B.)

President Carter, who was accompanied throughout his visit to Europe by the US Secretary of State, Mr Edmund Muskie, flew back to Washington on June 26.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - Economist) (*Prev. rep. Tokyo Summit pages 29993, 30079; Afghanistan 30381 A, 30229 A; US-Italy pages 29005-06; US-Yugoslavia 29401 A; US-Spain 29530 A; US-Portugal 29817 B*)

A. CANADA — Quebec Referendum - Rejection of Government's Proposal for Sovereignty-Association - Agreed Timetable for Programme of Canadian Constitutional Reform - Proclamation of Official National Anthem

In a referendum held on May 20 the people of Quebec decided by 2,171,913 votes (59.5 per cent) to 1,478,200 (40.5 per cent) against giving the *Parti Québecois* Government a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association with the rest of Canada. The Quebec Government's proposals for sovereignty-association had been published in a White Paper on Nov. 1, 1979 [see 30257 A].

The wording of the referendum question, the proposed draft of which had been announced by Mr René Lévesque, the Premier of Quebec, on Dec. 20, 1979 [ibid.], was finally approved by the provincial Legislature on March 20, 1980, by 68 votes to 37 after a 35-hour debate spread over three weeks. Incorporating an amendment proposed by Mr Rodrique Biron, who had resigned as leader of the opposition *Union Nationale* party on March 3 to vote "yes" in the referendum, the final wording was as follows:

> "The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad—in other words, sovereignty—and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency; no change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be effected without approval by the people through another referendum; on these terms do you give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada? Yes. No." Before Mr Biron's amendment, the sentence dealing with a second referendum had read: "Any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be submitted to the people through a referendum."

In the referendum the "no" side won a majority of votes in all but two regions—Saguenay-Lac-St Jean and Côte-Nord together containing five per cent of the Quebec population—and took 94 of the 110 constituencies. There was an 84 per cent poll, compared with one of just over 80 per cent in the 1976 provincial election when the victorious *Parti Québecois* received 41 per cent of the votes [see 28178 A].

Mr Trudeau's Parliamentary Statement

Mr Pierre Trudeau, the Canadian Prime Minister, told the House of Commons in Ottawa on May 21 that the federal Government strongly hoped and believed that the referendum signalled the end of a long period of uncertainty, doubt and strained relations between Quebec and the other Canadian provinces and between French and English speaking Canadians.

He continued: "It marks a new beginning. It heralds a period of healing and rebuilding. By voting for Canada the people of Quebec have recognized that their fellow Canadians are prepared to listen to them, to understand them, and to meet their legitimate aspirations. But Quebeckers have also shown that they themselves are prepared to hear what other Canadians have to say, to find out what their aspirations are and to help them to realize their dreams. We Canadians are now agreed on a common destination, and that was the fundamental issue. What we must now do is chart a new course and agree on a common itinerary towards that common destination.

"Such is the profound meaning, the only possible interpretation of yesterday's referendum. The majority of Quebec voters have refused to give their provincial Government the mandate to negotiate the withdrawal of Quebec from the Canadian federation even though they had been assured over and over again that that could be done while maintaining some form of economic association with the rest of the country. Those voters said no because they put their confidence in Canada. . . . On the other hand, we know that a large proportion of those who voted "yes" did so not because they were in favour of independence for Quebec but because they had doubts about our assurances and felt that they would better promote changes by giving tactical support to the *Parti Québecois*.

". . . Altogether, what Quebeckers expressed was a massive support for change within the federal framework. We cannot venture to ignore this will to change which reflects that of all other areas in the country and to fall short of the expectations of Canadians. This is why, on May 14 [see below], I solemnly undertook to launch the constitutional renewal and never stop working at it until Canada finally has a new constitution. However, we would be deceiving ourselves if we were to believe that it will be easy to keep this commitment. We shall need the constant support of the Canadian people and their representatives within this Parliament. We are also counting on the support of all provincial Governments, including that of Quebec. We shall all have to agree on the basic principles underlying our efforts. We have to be receptive to the needs and aspirations of all Canadians, to seek together for methods and mechanisms more effective than those used until now and to be willing to make every effort required to achieve success. For that purpose, I have asked the Minister of Justice [Mr Jean Chrétien] to begin immediately a tour of the provincial capitals in order to obtain the views of the premiers on the best way to follow up on their will to change. As for us, our only prerequisites for change are the two which I outlined in Quebec as early as January 1977.

"First, that Canada continues to be a real federation, a state whose constitution establishes a federal Parliament with real powers applying to the country as a whole and provincial legislatures with powers just as real applying to the territory of each province. Second, that a charter of fundamental rights and freedoms be entrenched in the new constitution and that it extend to the collective aspect of those rights, such as language rights. . . . What we want is to give Canada a new, modern, and functional federal constitution which will enable our governments to better meet the needs and aspirations of all Canadians. This new constitution could include, if the people so wish, several provisions in our present organic laws, but it will also have to contain new elements reflecting the most innovative proposals emerging from our consultations or from the numerous analyses and considered opinions that have flowed in the last few years from the will to change of Canadians. . . ."

In his speech of May 14 Mr Trudeau had made a "most solemn commitment", in the event of a "no" majority in the Quebec referendum, to get constitutional talks started immediately.

Agreed Timetable for Constitutional Change

Following Mr Chrétien's tour of provincial capitals, Mr Trudeau and the 10 provincial premiers, meeting in Ottawa on June 9, agreed on a timetable of meetings of ministers and officials in charge of federal-provincial relations to discuss 12 priority items for constitutional reform, ranging from language rights to ownership of offshore resources and the selection of Supreme Court judges. Under this timetable, a preliminary ministerial meeting on June 17 would be followed by four weeks of meetings of ministers and officials between July 7 and Aug. 29, culminating in a First Ministers' conference on Sept. 8-12 to "finalize agreement on work under way and to put in train a further work programme".

However, the provincial premiers refused to subscribe to a statement of principles for a new constitution drafted by the federal Government and to a proposed preamble to the statement of priorities. They also rejected an attempt by Mr Trudeau to divide the 12 priority items into two categories, entitled respectively "Package for the People" and "Package on Government Powers and Institutions". Mr Trudeau said that he wanted to draw a distinction between changes that would benefit all Canadians and those that would merely shift powers, because he did not want the former to be traded for any shifts of power between Ottawa and the provinces.

Proclamation of Official National Anthem

Following the enactment on June 27 of the necessary legislation, the Governor-General, Mr Edward Schreyer, signed a royal proclamation on July 1 making "O Canada" the country's first official national anthem. Under the proclamation, "O Canada", composed in 1880 as a French-Canadian marching song, took precedence over "God Save the Queen", Canada's royal anthem.—(Globe and Mail, Toronto - Department of External Affairs, Ottawa) (*Prev. rep. 30257 A*)

A. SOVIET UNION — Internal Security Developments relating to Human Rights Groups, Religious Organizations, Trade Unions, Jews and Other Ethnic Minorities - Further Internal Developments - Jewish Emigration - Defections from the Soviet Union - Attacks on Soviet Offices in Other Countries

During the period between June 1979 and July 1980 there was a marked increase in the number of persons arrested and charged or otherwise accused by the Soviet authorities in connexion with a wide range of allegedly criminal activities, many of which were regarded by Western observers as constituting the exercise of a right to freedom of opinion or of religion. The measures, which were directed particularly against human rights activists including Dr Andrei Sakharov (who was removed on Jan. 22, 1980, to internal exile in Gorky—see 30243 B), religious groups and certain artists and scientists, were widely regarded by the Western news media as comprising part of a government campaign to prevent contact between dissenting elements in Soviet society and Western visitors to the 1980 Olympic Games, which were held in Moscow during July and August 1980.

Amnesty International published in London on April 29, 1980, a 200-page report entitled "Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: Their Treatment and Conditions", in which it claimed to have evidence that more than 400 people had been imprisoned or otherwise restricted in movement for exercising what it called fundamental human rights since the publication of its last full report in November 1975 [see page 27551]. The report added, however, that the real number of arrests for such activities was believed to be considerably greater, and went on to criticize inter alia the allegedly widespread use of forcible psychiatric confinement for dissidents; serious overcrowding of labour camps with associated risks to health; and the conditions under which prisoners were transported to and from labour camps. It was further alleged that Soviet courts sometimes disregarded the provision of the Soviet criminal code which stipulated that charges of agitation and propaganda against the state could be sustained only against individuals who knew of the slanderous nature of their utterances, or who deliberately set out to defame the Soviet state.

Maj.-Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko, a former Red Army officer who had been deprived of his Soviet citizenship in March 1978 and who had lived since November 1977 in the United States [see page 29112], claimed at a press conference in West Germany on June 19, 1980, that 215 known arrests for human rights or religious activities had taken place in the preceding nine months. It was also known by that date that numerous other dissidents had left the Moscow area, some apparently with official encouragement, for the duration of the Olympic Games.

Dr Sakharov, who had until his internal exile to Gorky been one of the principal sources of information for Western reporters on Soviet human rights developments, wrote in a letter smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published in *The New York Times* on June 8, 1980, that the broadest possible boycott of the

Moscow Olympics was necessary in order to demonstrate the strength of international feeling at the recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan [see 30229 A]. He was subsequently attacked on June 12 by the newspaper *Gorky Pravda*, which accused him of inciting the West to escalate the arms race and of thereby forcing the Soviet Union to divert more resources to the nation's defence.

Dr Sakharov was said by his wife, Mrs Yelena Bonner Sakharova, to have refused registration as a resident of Gorky and to be totally isolated. A group of nine colleagues, including the writers Gyorgy Vladimir and Lev Kopelev [see below], appealed on June 4 to President Brezhnev to appoint a committee of the Supreme Soviet to investigate the terms of his internal exile, and Mrs Bonner Sakharova also appealed on July 13 to the United States Academy of Sciences to press for his return to Moscow.

Four of the five Soviet dissidents who were exchanged in April 1979 against two Soviet citizens convicted in the United States of espionage [see 29725 A] were reunited with their families during this period. Eight relatives of Mr Georgi Vins, a Baptist pastor, left the Soviet Union for the United States on June 13, 1979; the mother of Mr Eduard Kuznetsov left for Israel on July 3; and the wife of Dr Valentyn Moroz, a Ukrainian nationalist, left for the United States on July 5, as did also on Jan. 13, 1980, the mother, wife and two children of Mr Alexander Ginsburg. However, Mr Ginsburg failed to obtain an exit visa for his unofficially adopted son, Mr Sergei Shibayev, who was serving in the Red Army. (The last of the five dissidents, Mr Mark Dymshits, had no surviving relatives in the Soviet Union.)

Trials and Arrests of Helsinki Group Members

Particular pressure was experienced during this period by members of the groups formed during 1976 and 1977 in Moscow, Armenia and the Ukraine to monitor Soviet adherence to the provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [see 27301 A; 28137 A].

Mr Vitaly Kalinichenko, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, was arrested on Nov. 29, 1979, following a series of searches of the premises occupied by numerous members of the group.

Mr Yuri Litvin, also a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, was said by Dr Sakharov on Dec. 19, 1979, to have been sentenced to three years' strict regime in a labour camp for "resisting authority". Mr Litvin had previously spent a total of 13 years in prisons and labour camps following two convictions on charges of "anti-Soviet activities".

Mr Oles Berdnyk, who had acted as leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki group since the imprisonment in June 1977 of his predecessors, Mr Mikola Rudenko and Mr Olexy Tikhy [see page 28775], was himself sentenced on Dec. 25, 1979, to six years' strict regime in a labour camp, to be followed by three years' internal exile, for disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda. Mr Berdnyk had been arrested during a search of his home on March 6.

Mrs Malva Landa (60), the principal spokesman of the Moscow Helsinki group and a close associate of Dr Sakharov, was on Jan. 4, 1980, charged in Petushki (a small town 100 km north-east of Moscow where she had been confined since her early release from a two-year sentence of internal exile—see pages 28778; 29111) with distributing anti-Soviet propaganda. Mrs Landa, who had recently refused to assist the official investigation into the activities of Mr Viktor Nekipelov (another Moscow group member—see below), was arrested on March 11 and was sentenced on March 26 to five years' internal exile in Kazakhstan following her conviction under Articles 190-191 of the Soviet penal code ("circulating fabrications known to be false which defame the Soviet state and social system").

Mrs Tatyana Ossipova, who had joined the Moscow Helsinki group in November 1977 [see page 28775], was sentenced on Jan. 4, 1980, to two weeks' imprisonment for having offered resistance to officers during a search of a friend's premises. Mrs Ossipova, who had assumed the function of spokesman for the Moscow group upon the arrest of Mrs Landa, was, however, again arrested on May 27. No official details of the new charges were released.

The Times of London published on Jan. 18, 1980, an article in which it claimed inter alia that two further members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, Mr Vasyl Sychko and Mr Petro Sychko, had each been recently sentenced to three years' detention in a labour camp, and that Mr Mykola Horbal, Mr Vasyl Striltsiv, Mr Petro Razumny and Mr Yaroslav Lesiv (all Ukrainian Helsinki group members) had also been arrested.

Dissident sources reported that Mrs Olga Matusevich, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, had also been arrested on March 12 in Kiev. Mrs Matusevich was the wife of Mr Mykola Matusevich, who had been sentenced in 1978 to seven years' confinement in a labour camp and five years' internal exile for anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation [see page 29111].

Mr Edvard Arutunian, a co-founder of the Armenian Helsinki group [see page 28775], was said by dissident sources to have been sentenced during April 1980 to 2½ years' detention in a labour camp for "distributing anti-Soviet fabrications". Mr Arutunian was the brother of Mr Chagen Arutunian, who had in 1978 received a three-year sentence for resisting the police [see page 29726]. Another member of the group, Mr Ambartsun Khokgatian [see page 28775], had received a visa to leave the Soviet Union shortly before Mr Edvard Arutunian's arrest on July 13, 1979, when it was thought that the Armenian group had effectively ceased to exist.

Mr Leonard Ternovsky (47), a member of the Moscow Helsinki group, was said by his wife to have been arrested on April 10 following a search of his home in Moscow. Mr Ivan Kovalyov, another member of the group, whose premises were also searched on April 10, said on April 11 that Mr Ternovsky would probably be charged under Articles 190-191 of the Penal Code.

Mr Alexander Lavout (51), a member of the Moscow Helsinki group and of its unofficial committee for the investigation of abuses of psychiatry [see also below], was arrested on April 29 following an intensive search of his home on Feb. 12.

Mr Vasyl Stus, a poet and a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, was arrested in Kiev on May 13. Mr Stus, who was reported to have been charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, had in 1979 finished serving a five-year sentence in a labour camp and three years' internal exile which had been imposed in 1971 after his conviction on similar charges [see also page 27551].

Mr Yuri Yarim-Agayev, a member of the Moscow Helsinki group, told Western journalists in Moscow on June 3 that the Soviet State Security Department (KGB) had threatened him with detention unless he left the Soviet Union before the start of the Olympic Games in July.

Mr Vyacheslav Chornovil, a writer and journalist and a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, was on June 9 sentenced to five years' detention in a labour camp after being convicted of rape. Mr Chornovil had been arrested on April 18 in the Siberian region of Yakutia, where he had been exiled since 1977 after completing a sentence of detention in a labour camp which had been imposed in 1973 for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda [see pages 22761; 25558; 26128], and was subsequently understood to have gone on hunger strike in protest at the verdict.

Mr Viktor Nekipelov (52), a poet and pharmacist and a member of the Moscow Helsinki group, was reported on June 15 to have been sentenced to seven years in a labour camp and five years' internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Mr Nekipelov, who had been arrested on Dec. 7, 1979, had in 1975 completed a two-year prison sentence imposed for "defamation" of the Soviet state [see also page 27550].

Mr Alexander Podrabinek (26), a member of the Moscow Helsinki group and chairman of its working party for the investigation of the abuse of psychiatry [see pages 29230; 29727], was arrested on June 13 in eastern Siberia, where he was serving a five-year term of internal exile imposed in August 1978 for "spreading fabrications known to be false" [see page 29230]. It was expected that new charges were to be brought in respect of material written by Mr Podrabinek during his exile.

[As well as Mr Podrabinek, other members of the Helsinki group's committee on the abuse of psychiatry became subject during this period to a series of measures including house searches, interrogations and arrests. These included Mr Felix Serebrov—see page 29727—who was on Feb. 13, 1980, imprisoned for two weeks after resisting officers conducting a search of his home, and Mr Vyacheslav Bakhmin, a mathematician, who was also reported to have been arrested during February.]

Dissident sources reported during June that Mrs Okhana Meshko (66), a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki group [see page 29111], had also been arrested.

Concern was expressed during this period at the conditions under which Dr Yury Orlov (55), the physicist and former chairman of the Helsinki Group, was being detained. Dr Orlov, who had been sentenced in 1978 to seven years' detention in a hard-labour camp followed by five years' internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" [see 29110 A], was said by his wife, Mrs Irina Orlova, after her once-yearly visit to Dr Orlov in August 1979, to be suffering from exhaustion and loss of weight.

Mrs Orlova said on Nov. 24 that Dr Orlov had been unable, because of a back injury sustained in 1966, to fulfil his production quota at the labour camp and thus to buy food with which to supplement the prison diet. She added that her August visit had been cut from three days to one as a punishment for this under-production, and said on Dec. 4 that Dr Orlov had been confined to a punishment cell after an unsuccessful attempt to smuggle a scientific article out of the prison. (Dr Orlov did, however, smuggle during September 1979 a 20-page report which was published in the Western press and which was sharply critical of the Soviet penal system, alleging that the current total population of Soviet prisons and labour camps had reached 5,000,000 persons.) Mrs Orlova also told reporters on June 10, 1980, that permission for her annual visit to her husband in 1980 had been refused by the prison authorities.

Measures Adopted against Religious Groups

Although the Soviet Council for Religious Affairs consistently maintained that all persons in the Soviet Union enjoyed the right to profess any religion, and that no person had ever been tried in the Soviet Union for his or her religious faith, the activities of numerous religious groups (particularly those "dissenting" churches which had disagreed with the officially registered churches) were interpreted as sectarian and as violating Soviet law. Consequently, members of various groups were charged with such offences as the calling of illegal meetings, the production of unofficial (*samizdat*) literature or the attempted breach of the laws on the separation of the state and the churches. Criminal charges were also frequently preferred against such persons.

Amnesty International claimed in a statement made in London on Oct. 9, 1979, to have reliable evidence that, as well as members of the Helsinki groups, the Soviet authorities intended to remove members of "dissenting" churches, and particularly Baptists, from the area of Moscow during the period of the 1980 Olympic Games.

The following cases were believed to be representative of measures taken against such churches, although it was widely thought that the number of persons involved was considerably greater than was suggested by detailed reports.

Dissident sources reported on July 2, 1979, that Mr Rumatschik, a dissenting Baptist pastor, had been arrested for alleged violations of the laws on the separation of state and churches in the Soviet Union. Mr Rumatschik had already been disciplined on a number of occasions after similar allegations.

Earlier, the French news agency *Agence France-Presse* (AFP) had reported that 28 members of a dissenting Baptist church had been arrested on May 31 and had each been sentenced in Kharkov (Ukraine) to 10-15 days' imprisonment. (AFP later reported that three members of an unofficial Adventist church had also been arrested during June in Georgia and the Ukraine.)

Dissident sources in April 1980 named five members of dissenting Baptist groups who they claimed had been arrested during that month in Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, and who included a pastor named as Mr Handeschin, said to have been sentenced to two years in a labour camp for his activities in Moscow.

Mr Georgi Vins, the dissident Baptist pastor who had been exchanged in April 1979, together with four other dissidents, for two Soviet citizens convicted of espionage in the United States [see 29725 A and above], claimed on April 24 in the United States (where he was now resident) that the number of Baptist ministers imprisoned in the Soviet Union had risen from 35 to 60 since the beginning of the year. Mr Vins added that only three of the 11 members of the Baptists' governing council were still at liberty, and that these had gone into hiding.

Mr Mikhail Chorev, a dissenting Baptist priest, was on July 23, 1980, said to have been sentenced in a secret trial held during May to five years' detention. No details of the charges against him were available.

A Pentecostal church elder identified as Mr Matveyuk was sentenced on Aug. 20, 1979, to two years' detention in a labour camp after refusing military service. Mr Matveyuk had, according to dissident sources, been exempted from this obligation but had been called up after applying for permission to emigrate. (Western sources estimated during 1979 that some 30,000 Pentecostalists in the Soviet Union had similarly applied for exit visas.)

At an unofficial news conference held for Western reporters in Moscow on June 28, 1979, Pentecostalists had earlier announced the formation of a new Committee for the Right to Free Emigration. The group also spoke at the conference in support of some 200 Moslem Iranians attempting to leave the Central Asian Republic of Tadzhikistan for Iran.

Seven Pentecostalists who had entered the United States embassy in Moscow on June 27, 1978, were still living in the embassy premises in June 1980. The group had resorted to this action after attempting for 17 years to obtain permission to emigrate, and had asked the United States for assistance. Consequently some 50 US senators had during May 1980 sent a letter to President Brezhnev appealing for their emigration to be allowed; the Soviet authorities had announced, however, in February 1980 that no visas would be forthcoming.

Father Gleb Yakunin, a member of the Russian Orthodox Church and a co-founder in 1976 of the "Committee for the Defence of Believers in the Soviet Union" [see page 28254], was arrested on Nov. 1, 1979, following a search of his home on Sept. 28, and was later charged with anti-Soviet agitation. Father Yakunin was on Aug. 28, 1980, convicted of this offence by a court in Moscow, and was sentenced to a term of five years in a labour camp, to be followed by a further term of five years in internal exile. Father Yakunin was believed to be the first Russian Orthodox priest to be imprisoned for such offences since the signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975. Another co-founder of the committee, Mr Viktor Kapitanchuk [ibid.], was also arrested on March 12 and charged with slandering the Soviet Union.

Dissident sources reported that Mr Alexander Ogorodnikov (29), an organizer of Orthodox seminars, had been arrested during January in Leningrad on charges of spreading anti-Soviet propaganda. Mr Ogorodnikov had in January 1979 also been sentenced to one year's imprisonment for "parasitism" [see page 29726].

Mrs Tatiana Shchipkova (40), a member of an Orthodox seminar, was on Jan. 8, 1980, sentenced to three years' detention in a labour camp after being convicted in Moscow of "hooliganism". Mrs Shchipkova had resisted a policeman who had entered the flat where a seminar was being held and who had forcibly removed a notebook from her. Two other Orthodox dissidents, Mr Vladimir Burzev and Mr Viktor Pupkov, were each sentenced on April 9 to 1½ years in a labour camp by a court in Smolensk.

Mr Vladimir Poresh (30), a member of a "Religious Philosophy Seminar", was on April 28 sentenced to five years' detention in a labour camp and three years' internal exile after being convicted of spreading anti-Soviet propaganda. Four other members of the group also received prison sentences. Mr Poresh had been involved in the distribution of a *samizdat* publication entitled *The Community* until his arrest in August 1979.

Father Dimitri Dudko, a dissident Russian Orthodox priest, was released from police custody on June 21, 1980, after making a statement on Soviet television the previous day in which he "repudiated" his past resistance to the doctrines of the official Orthodox Church and admitted to slandering the Soviet state. It was not known whether the charges against him had been dropped. Father Dudko had emerged during the early 1970s as a leading opponent of atheist doctrines and of what he described as the submissive attitude of the officially registered Orthodox Church [see also page 27550], and had acquired a considerable following which he had retained even after his removal from Moscow to a remote village outside the capital. He had often been warned by the church authorities for his holding of discussion sessions after normal church services, and had been arrested on Jan. 15, 1980, after being instructed by the Church in September 1979 to stop giving his sermons. The release of Father Dudko was generally seen by the Western press as an attempt by the Government to counter allegations of religious persecution. Earlier, Mr Ignati Lapkine, a follower of Father Dudko, had been arrested on May 23 in western Siberia following a series of press attacks.

Concern was expressed during this period at the conditions under which Prof. Igor Ogurtsov, a writer sentenced in 1967 to 20 years' imprisonment (not 15 years, as given on page 22760), was being held. Prof. Ogurtsov, who had been imprisoned for forming the "All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People" [see also page 22761], was believed to be in extremely poor health after spending the first 12 years of his confinement under strict regime conditions. The International Sakharov Committee announced in Copenhagen on June 24, 1979, that Mr Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the prominent exiled writer and critic of the Soviet Union and winner of the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature [see 26401 A], had asked President Carter and (Democratic) Senators Henry Jackson and Daniel Moynihan for their assistance in securing his early release. Mr Solzhenitsyn told a "Sakharov hearing" which took place in Washington in September 1979 that the "murder" of Prof. Ogurtsov was now "almost complete".

Mr Vladimir Shelkov (84), the spiritual leader of the Seventh Day Adventists in the Soviet Union, died on Jan. 27, 1980, in the strict-regime labour camp in Tashkent (central Asia) to which he had been sent in March 1979 [see page 29726] for anti-Soviet slander. Shortly after Mr Shelkov's conviction, *Izvestia* (the newspaper of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) had published an article accusing him of collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War, of operating illegal printing presses, of dealing in stolen icons and of hoarding money. Dr Sakharov had, until his own internal exile, conducted a campaign for the release of Mr Shelkov.

Jewish Emigration and Related Developments

The relaxation of controls on the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union which had become apparent during the summer of 1979 [see 29725 A] continued throughout the second half of 1979, so that a record total of 51,320 Jews left the country during the whole of that year, compared with a total of 28,864 in 1978. There were, however, indications during early 1980 of a reversal of this tendency, as only about 1,500 exit visas were granted during June 1980 compared with a maximum of 4,867 in October 1979. (United States Government sources indicated in June 1979 that around 100,000 of the approximately 2,500,000 Soviet Jews still in the country had applied to emigrate). About 35 per cent of the successful emigrants travelled to Israel, mostly via Vienna. [For earlier details of proportion of Jewish emigrants going to Israel, see pages 28139; 29725; 30108.]

Difficulties in obtaining visas for emigration were experienced particularly by residents of the Ukraine, where the authorities were reported to have instituted a severe limitation on exit permits during the autumn of 1979; by certain scientists and mathematicians said to be privy to official secrets; and by human rights activists and producers of Hebrew language or *samizdat* literature.

Among those Jews who received permission to leave the Soviet Union during this period were Mr Lev Ulianovsky, a major campaigner for the Jewish emigration movement, and the painter Andrei Resnitsky and his wife Nadescha Resnitsky-Sakharova; Mrs Resnitsky-Sakharova's permit was withdrawn, however, before her scheduled departure on March 14, on the grounds that she owed a sister a sum of money.

No exit visas were made available for Mr Nahum Meiman, a mathematician and member of the Moscow Helsinki group [see page 28775] who claimed during February 1980 to have been warned to abandon his political activities; for the family of Mr Eduard Lozansky, a scientist who had emigrated in 1977 to the United States; for Mr Grigory Rosenstein, a Jewish dissident, and his wife Natalia; for Dr Alexander Joffe, a mathematician barred from teaching or publishing in the Soviet Union because of his activities in the "refusenik" scientific seminars attended by numerous Jewish dissident scientists; or for Mr Boris Gulko, an international chess grand master and 1977 overall Soviet chess champion, who had refused in 1976 to sign a motion of condemnation of Mr Viktor Korchnoi's defection to the Netherlands in that year [see page 29726 and below].

Mr Igor Gubermann (43), a scientific author and co-editor of an underground Jewish journal *Jews in the USSR*, was arrested on Aug. 13, 1979, and was sentenced on March 20, 1980, to five years' strict regime in a labour camp for "receiving stolen icons". Another co-editor of the journal, Dr Viktor Brailovsky [see page 29725], was repeatedly refused permission to emigrate.

A court in Kiev on Oct. 16, 1979, sentenced 12 Jews to 15 days' imprisonment after their occupation of the offices of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in protest at the official refusal of exit visas. (An estimated 2,000 Jewish families in the Ukraine were reported to have begun in May 1980 a campaign of written complaints at the Ukrainian restrictions.)

The British embassy in Moscow expressed on June 17, 1980, its concern at the increasing difficulties being experienced by British tourists visiting Jewish groups or families in the Sovet Union, and listed 10 incidents involving official warnings to certain tourists, the confiscation of Hebrew literature carried by such tourists, and several instances of physical attack or other harassment to persons visiting Jews. The United States embassy in Moscow had expressed similar concern during April.

Mrs Bonner Sakharova was one of a group of Jews who appealed during July 1979 to the Western press to campaign for the release of Mr Anatoly Shcharansky (32), a Jewish computer specialist and Helsinki Group member who, having been refused permission to emigrate to Israel during 1973 [see page 28774], had been sentenced on July 14, 1978, to three years in a "close-confinement" prison and a further 10 years in a strict-regime labour camp for alleged high treason, espionage and anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda [see 29229 A].

Mr Shcharansky had been reported by fellow prisoners to be suffering from headaches, fever and loss of weight, and concern was also expressed at the failure of his eyesight. Mrs Ida Milgrom, Mr Shcharansky's mother, addressed on March 13, 1980, a letter to President Brezhnev asking for his personal intervention in the case, while a two-day international conference on the Shcharansky case held on May 12-13, 1980, in Amsterdam presented on May 13 its finding that "Anatoly Shcharansky has been persecuted and condemned for having tried to exercise his right to emigration and to free speech", adding that "since his trial no proof has been provided that he committed any act justifying such an extremely harsh verdict".

Developments relating to Other Ethnic Minorities

The trial began on July 7, 1979, of Mr Rechat Dzhemilev, a spokesman for the Crimean Tartars attempting to return to the Crimea after their 1944 deportation [see page 29727], who was charged with spreading slanderous fabrications. Mr Dzhemilev, who was subsequently said by dissident sources to have been sentenced to three years' imprisonment, was a cousin of Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev, who had in March 1979 received a four-year sentence of internal exile [ibid.]. Another Crimean Tartar, Mr Mamedi Chobanov (35), was sentenced on July 12, 1979, to three years' confinement in a labour camp for "anti-Soviet propaganda".

Mr Yuri Badzyo, a Ukrainian historian, was sentenced on Dec. 25 to seven years' confinement in a labour camp followed by five years' internal exile for allegedly slandering the Soviet Union. Mr Badzyo, who had been convicted in a secret trial, was the author of a book investigating Soviet-Ukrainian relations and accusing the Soviet leadership of attempting to eliminate non-Russian cultures within its post-war boundaries.

During August 1979 an appeal was published by 45 Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian citizens on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact [see 3693 A]. The appeal asked the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the East and West German Governments to revoke the pact on the grounds that secret protocols attached to it had made it possible for the Soviet Union during the following year to occupy the three Baltic republics, and it also called for the removal of "foreign" (i.e. Soviet) troops from the Baltic territories.

Dr Sakharov said on Jan. 14, 1980, that Mr Vitalda Skuodis, a Lithuanian geologist and a signatory of the appeal, had been arrested in connexion with the matter, and on March 13 another signatory, Prof. Juri Kukk (40), was also arrested. Prof. Kukk, an Estonian chemistry lecturer, had been barred from working since September 1979 after applying to emigrate to Sweden.

Meanwhile a series of arrests took place in connexion with the applications of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union [see also page 27555] for visas to emigrate to the Federal Republic (it being estimated in West Germany that some 100,000 persons had made such applications, although the Soviet authorities maintained that the number was only 10,000).

Four such ethnic Germans were arrested in Moscow on July 1, 1979, after a demonstration in Red Square at the refusal of the authorities to grant them exit visas. After three days they were believed to have been returned to their homes in Kirghizia (in central Asia).

Dr Sakharov reported on Aug. 8, 1979, that 26 ethnic Germans had been arrested in Frunze (Kirghizia) after being invited to the regional Communist Party office to discuss their applications for exit visas. Of these, 16 had been sentenced to 10-15 days' imprisonment for "hooliganism", and two, Mr Nikolaus Repp (49) and Mr Jakov Noi (54), had each been sentenced to two years' detention in a labour camp for similar offences.

Five ethnic Germans were arrested on March 31, 1980, in Red Square after a public protest at the refusal of exit visas. All were understood to have been further detained following their removal to the autonomous republic of Kabardino-Balkar (Caucasus) where they lived.

Father Miron sas-Schurakowski, an Orthodox priest living in the Ukraine, was arrested during April 1980 for contravention of the passport laws. Father sas-Schurakowski had refused to accept a Soviet passport, claiming to be a German citizen; it subsequently became known that about 80 ethnic Germans had returned their passports to President Brezhnev in a concerted protest at the repeated official refusal of visas for their emigration.

Arrests and Trials of Free Trade Union Members - Expulsion of Mr Borisov

Several members of the unofficial "Free Interprofessional Association of Soviet Workers" (SMOT), which had been founded in October 1978 [see pages 29112; 29727], were arrested or tried during this period, and Mr Vladimir Borisov (36), one of the founder members of SMOT [see pages 26128; 28254; 28776], was on June 22, 1980, expelled from the Soviet Union.

Mr Borisov had spent several periods in various forms of custody, including psychiatric detention, since his initial arrest in August 1979 together with two other SMOT members, Mrs Albina Yakoreva and Mr Nikolai Nikitin (who was subsequently said to have been charged with anti-Soviet slander), and his detention had provoked strong protests by Amnesty International and by trade union groups in several countries. Mr Borisov, who had in the past spent a total of nine years in psychiatric institutions in the Soviet Union, had nevertheless consistently opposed suggestions that he should leave the country, refusing an exit visa to Israel in 1977 and, on his June 1980 deportation, being forcibly expelled from a Soviet airliner on its arrival at Vienna after refusing to leave his seat.

Other measures taken against SMOT members during this period were as follows:

Mr Lev Volokhonsky, a founder member of SMOT, was sentenced on June 12, 1979, to two years' labour camp for the propagation of anti-Soviet slander.

Mr Anatoly Pozdniakov was arrested on Sept. 10 and transferred following his trial in Moscow on Oct. 30 to a psychiatric hospital.

Mr Mark Morozov was said on March 27, 1980, to have been arrested for spreading anti-Soviet propaganda in Vorkuta (inside the Arctic circle in the northern Urals, where he had been exiled for a period of five years following his arrest in November 1978 for spreading "anti-Soviet fabrications"—see page 29727).

Mr Mikhail Sokolov, who was said to have made derogatory remarks about President Brezhnev in public, was sentenced on April 1 to three years' labour camp for "hooliganism".

Dissident Artists and Writers

Particular pressure was applied during the period from mid-1979 to mid-1980 to a number of artists, writers and other persons involved in the production of *samizdat* or other unofficial material in the Soviet Union, and also to a wider range of artists whose works had in the past been the object of official criticism.

The French PEN Club claimed on April 27, 1979, to have reliable evidence that Mr Gyorgy Vladimov, the Soviet writer and chairman of the Soviet section of Amnesty International [see also page 28774], had been the object of harassment including threatening letters and the disconnection of his telephone. He was also said to have been sent an unsolicited visa allowing his emigration to Israel.

Mr Mikhail Kukobaka, described as a Soviet dissident, was understood to have been sentenced on June 22, 1979, to three years' imprisonment after writing essays critical of the Soviet Union. Mr Kukobaka had been detained in a psychiatric ward since his arrest in October 1978 [see also page 28139].

Mr Vasily Axionov, one of the five editors of the unofficial literary journal *Metropol* which had been suppressed during early 1979 [see page 29727], announced on Dec. 19, 1979, his resignation from the Writers' Union over the latter's refusal to reinstate two other editors of *Metropol*, Mr Yevgeny Popov and Mr Viktor Yerofeyev, who had been expelled from the Union shortly after the suppression of the journal on the grounds of "insufficient literary merit" [ibid.]. Mrs Inna Lisnyanskaya and Mr Semyon Lipkin, two other writers, were also said on Jan. 12, 1980, to have resigned over the matter, having threatened such a move, together with the writer Mrs Bella Akhmadulina and the remaining two editors of *Metropol*, Mr Vasil Iskander and Mr Andrei Bitov, unless Mr Popov and Mr Yerofeyev were reinstated.

Meanwhile an unofficial cultural and political magazine entitled *Poiski* (Searches), which had produced five issues since June 1978, was effectively suppressed during 1979 by a series of searches of the homes of its seven editors and by the confiscation of the sixth issue. Mr Valery Abramkin, one of the editors, was said to have been arrested on Dec. 4, while another, Mrs Raissa Borisovna Lert, was dismissed from the Communist Party, and a further writer, Mr Sorokin, was sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment for "hooliganism" after resisting a search of his flat.

Dr Sakharov reported on Dec. 29 that Mrs Tatiana Velikanova (47), a human rights campaigner and contributor to the underground journal *Chronicle of Current Events*, had been arrested during November and was to be charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

Sovietskaya Rossiya, a Soviet newspaper, published during February 1980 a harsh attack on Mr Lev Kopelev, a prominent historian [see page 28775], following his tribute to Dr Sakharov upon the latter's internal exile on Jan. 22. The article accused Mr Kopelev of being "a traitor to his country and his nation", and claimed that his flat in Moscow was "a nest of ideological subversion and a place of meetings with Western emissaries". Mr Kopelev's wife, Mrs Raissa Orlova, a literary critic, was expelled from the Communist Party during February, and both expressed their intention to leave the country during the period of the 1980 Olympics after being allegedly subjected to official pressures to this end. (Mr Vladimir Voinovich, a writer and satirist who claimed during March to have been advised to emigrate, also announced his intention to leave the Moscow area before emigrating in September, while Mr Axionov also emigrated on July 22. For Mr Voinovich's earlier decision in 1978 not to visit the West, see page 29112.)

It was reported on Aug. 27, 1979, that Mr Gyorgy Mikhailov, a professor of physics and a collector of modern art, had been tried in Leningrad for trafficking in paintings, a charge carrying possible sentences of up to six years' imprisonment.

Tass had earlier reported on June 29, 1979, that Dr Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Georgian literary critic, had been released from the labour camp where he was serving a three-year sentence, to be followed by two years in internal exile, which had been imposed in 1978 [see page 28775; 29110 A; 29229 A]. Mr Gamsakhurdia had confessed in a television broadcast to having "prepared and distributed literature containing slanderous inventions".

Mr Arva Piart, an Estonian composer and conductor, was said on Nov. 15, 1979, to have been barred from membership of the Soviet Composers' Union because of the "too modernistic" character of his work. Mr Piart had applied two days previously for permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

Further Internal Security Developments

An explosion occurred on March 28, 1979, in the United States embassy in Moscow, in which Mr Yury Vlasenko, a Ukrainian, died after igniting a bomb attached to his body. Mr Vlasenko, who was thought by the United States officials to be mentally unbalanced, had demanded political asylum and United States assistance in obtaining an exit visa, and detonated the bomb when the embassy staff summoned Soviet officials for assistance.

The Supreme Court of Appeal in the Ukraine confirmed during June 1979 the death sentences imposed in August 1978 on four Jews accused, together with some 50 others, of fraud and theft involving the illicit sale of textiles. Amnesty International appealed on July 16 to President Brezhnev for the pardoning of the four men, who were named as Mr Rafael Adjiastvili (48), Mr Elia Mikhailishvili (42), Mr Gabriel Spiashvili (39) and Mr Mamed Abassov (50). By June 1980 Mr Mikhailishvili and Mr Spiashvili were understood to have been reprieved, while the other two death sentences had not yet been carried out.

It was announced, however, during July 1980 that three men, including a public prosecutor and the head of one of his investigative commissions, had been executed in the republic of Azerbaijan after being convicted of leading another major textile fraud. Some 100 persons were said to have received sentences of up to 15 years in labour camps after being convicted of participation in the fraud.

Mrs Antonia Agapova was arrested in Moscow on June 18, 1979, after raising a white flag in Red Square in protest at the refusal of the Soviet authorities to allow her to join her son, Mr Valentin Agapov, in Sweden where he had defected in 1974 [see page 29112]. Meanwhile, Mr Agapov was arrested by Swedish police in Stockholm on June 2 and again on June 15 by Austrian police in Vienna while demonstrating outside the Soviet embassies in the two cities for the reunification of his family.

Dissident sources reported on Sept. 24, 1979, that Mr Sergei Yermolayev (19) and Mr Igor Polyakov (24) had been sentenced respectively to four years and 3½ years in a labour camp for "malicious hooliganism" after shouting anti-Soviet slogans in a Moscow underground railway station. No witnesses were said to have been called for the defence.

An unnamed 27-year-old woman was sentenced in September 1979 to four years' detention in a labour camp for "malicious hooliganism". The woman was said to have approached the French embassy in Moscow for assistance in obtaining mail from her French husband, who had returned to France.

Mr Iosif Dyadkin, a geophysicist, was reported on April 28, 1980, to have been arrested in Kalinin on charges which were not made public. Mr Dyadkin, who had recently written a number of letters to Soviet newspapers protesting at the internal exile of Dr Sakharov, was best known for his demographic studies of the Soviet Union, and *samizdat* copies of his *Unnatural Deaths in the Soviet Union*, a history of successive political purges in the Soviet Union since 1917, had recently reached the West. Mr Solzhenitsyn released in New York on May 20 a statement appealing for a worldwide campaign for the release of Mr Dyadkin.

Mrs Tatiana Mamonova, Mrs Tatiana Goricheva and Mrs Natalia Nalatchoskaya were on July 20, 1980, expelled from the Soviet Union and travelled to Vienna on the same day. All three had been involved in the production of a *samizdat* periodical entitled *Women and Russia* which discussed questions relating to the rights of Soviet women.

Tass described on June 19, 1980, as "slander" reports published during the previous week by *The Financial Times* of London, according to which the major vehicle factories at Togliatti and Gorky had been the scenes of strikes on May 6 and May 7-8 respectively. The workers at the two factories were said to have walked out in protest at the allegedly inadequate local provision of meat and dairy products.

Defections from the Soviet Union

Numerous Soviet citizens, including particularly artists and sportsmen, defected from the Soviet Union between mid-1979 and mid-1980 and applied for political asylum in other countries; particularly notable among these were seven members of Soviet ballet companies who defected in five separate incidents, and the defection in August 1979 of a Bolshoi Ballet dancer, Mr Alexander Godunov, resulted in considerable strains to Soviet-US relations.

Mr Godunov (29), the leading male dancer of the Bolshoi Ballet, was granted political asylum in the United States immediately upon his defection in New York on Aug. 23, 1979, at the end of the company's appearance there. However, his wife, Mrs Ludmila Vlasova (36), also a dancer with the company, boarded a Soviet airliner on Aug. 24 to return to Moscow; upon Mr Godunov's insistence that she had been coerced into taking this step, US officials withheld permission for the aircraft to take off and demanded to interview her privately. However, the US request for a private interview was refused by Soviet officials and three days of deadlock ensued during which most of the Soviet passengers remained on the aircraft. Finally, on Aug. 27, US officials were allowed a 20-minute interview with Mrs Vlasova in a mobile passenger lounge parked next to the aircraft with Soviet officials present, on the basis of which the State Department pronounced itself satisfied that Mrs Vlasova wished to return to Moscow and gave the plane clearance to leave. Tass described the incident on Aug. 26 as a case of "air piracy" and of "diplomatic hijacking" which "flouted all provisions of international law" in the service of "political blackmail". (Mrs Vlasova was reported in early August 1980 to have applied successfully for an exit visa, although no details of its date of effect were then available.)

Two more dancers from the Bolshoi Ballet, Mr Leonid Kozlov and his wife Valentina, also defected on Sept. 16 at the end of the company's tour of the United States, and both received political asylum in the United States on Sept. 17.

Mrs Sulamif Messerer (71), a choreographer with the Bolshoi Ballet, and her son Mikhail Messerer (31), a dancer with the company, defected on Feb. 6, 1980, during a tour of Japan. They were granted political asylum by the US embassy in Tokyo and travelled on the same day to the United States.

Mr Henryk Mayerov (43), also a choreographer with the company, defected on Feb. 10, 1980, in Austria and applied for political asylum there.

A member of the Moscow Academy Ballet, Mr Yury Stepanov, applied for political asylum in Trieste in January 1980 during a tour of Italy, but returned to the Soviet Union on April 1, claiming subsequently in an article published in *Izvestia* to have been approached in Italy by Western agents who had tried to recruit him as a spy.

Other persons defecting from the Soviet Union during this period included Mr Vladyslav Cessunias, a former Olympic champion canoeist, who defected to West Germany during June 1979 but subsequently returned to the Soviet Union; Mr Valentin Malkov and Mrs Natalia Kolossova of the Leningrad Philharmonia Orchestra, in Japan on June 9, 1979; an unnamed Soviet marine who, defecting to Norway on July 4, was subsequently granted an entry visa to the United States; Mr Lev Albury, a Soviet chess grand master, who defected in the United States during July; Mr Juris Kahns, who rowed to Sweden and was granted Swedish political asylum on Aug. 5; an unnamed man who arrived at the US embassy in Stockholm on Sept. 14, 1979, claiming to have walked 2,400 miles from Murmansk; Mr Oleg Protopopov and Mrs Ludmila Belusova, former Olympic champion ice skaters, who received Swiss political asylum on Oct. 30; Mr Igor Ponomarenko, who defected from a Soviet ship off Florida during October; Mr Stanislav Levtchenko, a newspaper correspondent in Japan, who defected during October 1979 and travelled to the United States; an unidentified technician who defected to Sweden during October 1979; Mr Gegam Grigorian, a singer who disappeared in Italy during November 1979 shortly after requesting political asylum in Italy; Mr Buzinov, an interpreter who asked for political asylum in West Germany in December 1979 but subsequently returned to the Soviet Union; and Mr Ilya Gregorievich Dzhirkvelov, reputedly a member of the KGB, who was granted political asylum in the United Kingdom on May 2, 1980, having disappeared from his post with the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva on March 21.

The Soviet embassy in Washington protested on July 23, 1980, at the decision of the US authorities to grant political asylum to a 12-year-old Ukrainian boy, Walter Polovchak, who had refused to return to the Soviet Union with his family after a period of residence in Chicago. The Soviet authorities contested that, as a minor, he was unaware of the significance of his action, and accused the US authorities of his "kidnap".

Mr Viktor Korchnoi, the Soviet chess grand master who had defected to the Netherlands in 1976 and who had subsequently been deprived of his Soviet citizenship [see page 29726], was on Sept. 24, 1979, granted political asylum in Switzerland; however, his son, Mr Igor Korchnoi (20), was on Dec. 19 sentenced by a court in Leningrad to 2½ years' detention in a labour camp for avoiding conscription, having gone into hiding on the grounds that military service would almost certainly debar him from permission to join his father abroad.

Attacks on Soviet Institutions in Other Countries - Death of Soviet Economist in Switzerland

The offices of the Soviet airline Aeroflot and a number of diplomatic missions in foreign cities became the targets of bomb and other attacks in late 1979 and the first few months of 1980, leading on several occasions to official protests at what was felt by the Soviet authorities to be an inadequate level of protection for their staffs and property.

Two cars and a minibus belonging to the Soviet embassy in Paris were destroyed by fire bombs on Nov. 27, 1979, responsibility for the attack being claimed by a Ukrainian nationalist group.

The Soviet mission to the United Nations in New York was damaged on Dec. 11, 1979, by an explosion in which two Russian women and four American policemen were injured. A Cuban guerrilla group, Omega 7 [see also 29408 A; 29868 A], which was opposed to the rule of Dr Fidel Castro in Cuba, claimed responsibility for the attack, which it described as "a repudiation of Soviet colonialism in Cuba". The same group had also claimed responsibility for a bomb attack which occurred on Dec. 8 at the Cuban mission to the United Nations (this being its second attack on the Cuban mission—see 29408 A).

Ukrainian nationalists claimed responsibility for a fire bomb which caused extensive damage to the Munich offices of Aeroflot on Dec. 19, 1979. Tass reported on Dec. 21 that an official protest had been lodged with the West German embassy in Moscow.

The Voice of Lebanon, a radio transmitter operated by Phalangist groups in Lebanon, reported on Jan. 11, 1980, that the Soviet embassy in Beirut had been damaged by a fire bomb.

The Aeroflot offices in New York were damaged on Jan. 14, 1980, by a bomb attack which injured three people, responsibility for the attack being claimed by Omega 7, but also by a group of Soviet Jewish activists.

The Aeroflot offices in Paris were damaged on Feb. 26 when they were attacked by some 30 masked youths who broke windows and started fires inside the building. The Soviet Foreign Ministry protested on the same day to the French embassy in Moscow at the attack.

An unexploded bomb was found on March 7, 1980, inside the Aeroflot offices in Frankfurt, while on the same day an explosion at the Soviet general consulate in West Berlin caused structural damage to the building. Responsibility for the latter attack was claimed by an organization of Afghan rebels who opposed the recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan [see 30229 A].

The Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* published on Aug. 8, 1979, an article in which it strongly suggested that Swiss counter-intelligence agents had been responsible for the death on April 7 of Mr Leonid Panchenko (32), a Soviet economist attached to the International Cocoa Organization in London, who had been found dead on that date in a Swiss hotel. A post mortem ordered by the Swiss authorities, but not attended by Soviet officials, had found that Mr Panchenko had committed suicide, and the Swiss Ministry of Justice on Aug. 8 rejected the suggestions of murder as "totally absurd". The official enquiry into the incident confirmed the verdict of suicide when it closed on Dec. 4.

Earlier, it had been announced on April 23, 1979, that a member of the Soviet mission to the United Nations in Geneva had been ordered to leave Switzerland following Swiss investigations into his alleged espionage activities.—(Times - Sunday Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Le Monde) (***Prev. rep.** Internal Security Developments 29725 A, 30243 B*)

A. WEST GERMANY - SOVIET UNION — Herr Schmidt's Visit to Moscow

The West German Federal Chancellor, Herr Helmut Schmidt, paid a two-day official visit to Moscow on June 30-July 1, during which he had talks with President Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. Herr Schmidt, whose delegation included the West German Foreign Minister, Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, thus became the first Western head of government to visit Moscow since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan dating from late December 1979 [see 30229 A; 30381 A], although President Giscard d'Estaing of France had had talks with President Brezhnev in Warsaw in May [see page 30384].

Apart from Afghanistan, a major theme of Herr Schmidt's talks in Moscow was the December 1979 decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy new theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the accompanying NATO proposals for new East-West disarmament negotiations [see 30159 A].

Herr Schmidt's trip to Moscow took place just over two years after President Brezhnev's state visit to West Germany in May 1978 during which a 25-year Soviet-West German economic co-operation agreement had been signed [see 29093 A]. Formal invitations to visit Moscow had been extended to Herr Schmidt and Herr Genscher by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Andrei Gromyko, when the latter was in Bonn in November 1979 [see 30266 A].

Speaking at a state banquet given in his honour in the Kremlin on June 30, Herr Schmidt referred to a Soviet announcement of June 22 concerning a limited military withdrawal from Afghanistan and called upon the Soviet leadership to commit itself to an eventual complete withdrawal in the interests of improving East-West relations. (The June 22 Soviet announcement had coincided with the opening of the Venice summit conference of the seven leading non-communist countries, which had similarly called for a Soviet undertaking to effect a complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan—see 30461 A.)

In his speech (the relevant passages of which were not carried by the Soviet media) the Federal Chancellor reminded the Soviet Government that the joint declaration which he had signed with President Brezhnev in Bonn in May 1978 had referred to "the indivisibility of peace and security in all regions of the world" [see pages 29093-94], and he continued: "Those who care for peace in this world must refrain from forcing their own political, social and economic ideas on the Third World." Reiterating that the West German Government desired "an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan, free of foreign troops", Herr Schmidt said that the situation in that country "throws a long shadow over East-West relations in Europe" and also "causes deep worry and great anxiety among third-world nations, the non-aligned and especially the Islamic countries".

Addressing President Brezhnev directly, Herr Schmidt added: "I am sure that you . . . would contribute considerably to the defusing of this dangerous crisis if you could declare that the announced withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Afghanistan is the start of a continuous movement, which will be continued until there is a complete withdrawal."

A joint communiqué issued on July 1 at the end of Herr Schmidt's visit recorded that on Afghanistan the two sides had "stated their respective viewpoints thoroughly and with great frankness" in an awareness of "the necessity to press for the earliest possible political settlement of the situation which has taken shape". On the NATO decision to deploy new theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the accompanying proposal for new East-West disarmament negotiations, the communiqué said that the two leaders had stated their respective positions and had "also paid attention to the prospects for achieving accord on these questions".

As regards Soviet-West German economic co-operation, the communiqué recorded (i) that on the basis of the 25-year co-operation agreement of May 1978 a "long-term programme of main lines of co-operation" between the two countries had been signed in Moscow on July 1 (by the Soviet ambassador in Bonn and the West German ambassador in Moscow), and (ii) that the two leaders had "expressed their consent that preliminary negotiations be held shortly between competent organizations and enterprises of the two sides on a new project on natural gas deliveries from the USSR".

In the latter connexion, a preliminary agreement had been reached earlier in June under which West German concerns would construct a new network of gas pipelines from western Siberia to West Germany at a total estimated cost of some £5,000 million, with a view to greatly increasing Soviet natural gas supplies to the Federal Republic. [For earlier such agreements, see page 26896.]

West German-Soviet trade had expanded rapidly in the 1970s, from a volume of DM 2,800 million in 1970 to DM 14,000 million in 1979, when Soviet exports to West Germany were worth DM 7,400 million and imports from that country DM 6,600 million, representing increases on 1978 figures of 36 and 5 per cent respectively.

Herr Schmidt's Report on Soviet Readiness for Negotiations on Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe - West German Controversy over Schmidt-Brezhnev Talks

After Herr Genscher had on July 2 flown to Washington to brief US officials on the Moscow visit, Herr Schmidt the following day gave a report on his talks with President Brezhnev to the *Bundestag* (Lower House of the Federal Parliament). In his statement the Federal Chancellor disclosed that President Brezhnev had informed him of the Soviet Union's conditional readiness to enter into bilateral negotiations with the United States on the limitation of theatre nuclear weapons in Europe without setting as a precondition the abandonment of the December 1979 NATO decision concerning the deployment of new weapons of this type; any resulting agreement could only come into effect after US ratification of the second strategic arms limitation (SALT II) treaty [see 30117 A]. (For deferment of consideration of the SALT II treaty by the US Senate in the light of the Afghanistan situation, see pages 30234-35.)

Confirmation of the modified Soviet stance was given on July 4 in a resolution adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party after it had discussed the outcome of Herr Schmidt's talks in Moscow. (For Soviet opposition to the deployment by NATO of new nuclear weapons in Western Europe, see page 30161.)

In his statement Herr Schmidt said that the Soviet leaders had rejected as "unjust" his own proposal for a three-year freeze on the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to facilitate the initiation of negotiations. However, President Brezhnev had said that the Soviet Union was "willing to enter into bilateral talks with the United States on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons [usually referred to as "long-range theatre nuclear forces" (LRTNF) in official NATO terminology] even before US ratification of SALT II; such talks would in the Soviet view, said Herr Schmidt, need to encompass "all elements which influence the strategic situation in this area", including the forward-based systems (FBS) deployed by the United States in Western Europe. Herr Schmidt added: "I do not yet see this as a breakthrough, since it cannot yet be foreseen if such talks would be successful; but it seems to me that it gives the chance of avoiding an unbridled arms race in this field."

The relevant passage of the Soviet Politburo's resolution said: "Having reaffirmed the position which it had set out earlier concerning the most correct ways of solving the question of medium-range arms in Europe, the Soviet side, being guided by the broad interests of peace and security, suggested [i.e. during the talks with Herr Schmidt] beginning a discussion on the question of medium-range nuclear missiles simultaneously and in organic connexion with the question of American forward-based nuclear means. It is intended that possible accords on these questions can be translated into practice only after the entry into force of the Soviet-American treaty on strategic arms limitation (SALT II)."

After hearing Herr Genscher's account of the Soviet proposals, the US Secretary of State, Mr Edmund Muskie, said (on July 2) that they would be studied "in a constructive spirit". Within the framework of the NATO alliance itself, the new development was given a cautious welcome, it being stressed that the proposals required clarification and further study.

Speaking at a press conference in Brussels after a special meeting of NATO representatives which had been briefed by a West German Foreign Ministry official, Dr Joseph Luns, the NATO Secretary-General, said that the Soviet Union now seemed willing to begin "preliminary exchanges without preconditions or delay" on measures to limit nuclear arms in Europe; the Soviet proposal would, he said, be studied "in a careful and constructive spirit" and a definitive response would be forthcoming from NATO when appropriate consultations had been completed.

Considerable controversy developed in West Germany after the daily newspaper *Die Welt* had on July 6 published extracts from what it claimed were verbatim notes taken during Herr Schmidt's talks in Moscow and apparently showing that certain issues had been discussed to which the Federal Chancellor had not referred in his report to the *Bundestag*. According to the published extracts, these included a strong warning from President Brezhnev that West Germany should not support the expansion of NATO by the inclusion of Spain. (For the Spanish Government's expression of intent to join NATO, see 30020 B.)

While an official government spokesman denied that the published notes were an authoritative account of the Moscow talks, Herr Franz Josef Strauss (the opposition candidate for the chancellorship in the federal election due to the held in October 1980) accused Herr Schmidt of deliberately misleading Parliament.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Soviet Embassy Press Department - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) *(Prev. rep. West German-Soviet Relations 30266 A, 29093 A; NATO Decisions 30159 A)*

A. YUGOSLAVIA — Death of President Tito - New Appointments in State and Communist Party Leadership

Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the President of Yugoslavia, President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), Chairman of the National Defence Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, died in Ljubljana (Slovenia) on May 4, 1980, at the age of 87, following a protracted illness. The political functions previously held by him were subsequently reallocated in a major reorganization of LCY and state structures which took place in accordance with proposals made by the President some 10 years before his death.

Marshal Tito was born Josip Broz on May 7, 1892, in a rural community in Croatia. He joined the Social Democratic Party in 1910 and, after training as a mechanic, worked in Bohemia, Germany and Austria before serving with the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Army in 1913. He was wounded and captured by Russian troops in 1915, and in 1918, while living in Russia, joined the International Brigade of the Red Guard and became a member of the Russian Communist Party.

Upon his return to Croatia in 1920 he joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (which was declared illegal in 1921) and became in 1925 general secretary of a major metal workers' trade union. He was sentenced in 1928 to five years' imprisonment for membership of the Communist Party, distributing communist propaganda and possessing firearms and explosives. After his release in 1934 he adopted the cover name Tito and travelled in 1935 to Moscow, working as a translator and agent for the Third Communist International (Comintern) and also, upon his return in 1936 to Yugoslavia, reorganizing the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and becoming in 1937 its general secretary.

Following the German and Italian occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941 [see 4549 A] and the German declaration of war on the Soviet Union, Gen. Tito called for the mobilization of the Communist Party against the invaders, and became the leader of what was overall the most significant army of partisans in Yugoslavia, conducting campaigns against the German occupying forces until the liberation of most of Yugoslavia in 1944. His forces faced competition, however, from the royalist and predominantly Serbian partisans led by Gen. Draza Mihailovic [see 4755 A; 4984 A; 6185 A] who were subsequently discredited in 1944 when it was learned that they had on occasions collaborated with the Nazis against Tito's partisans [see 7806 A].

Rejecting the authority of the émigré royalist Government established in London and subsequently in Cairo with the approval of King Peter II (by now resident in London), Gen. Tito set up in December 1943 a provisional Government (National Liberation Committee) within the liberated territories [see 6185 A]. He was appointed President of the Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Liberation and was awarded the rank of Marshal. In December 1944, however, he reached an agreement with the émigré Government which resulted in the latter's return to Belgrade during February 1945 [see 7011 A] and in the subsequent formation of a "Government of National Unity" [see 7121 B], in which he was Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Most of the non-Communist ministers resigned in the following months, however, and Yugoslavia was declared a republic in November 1945 [see 7649 A]. Upon the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1953, Marshal Tito became President of the Republic [see 12813 A], a post which he held until his death.

In the post-war period several of Marshal Tito's personal political opponents, in particular nationalists and Catholics, were among those purged immediately after the liberation of Yugoslavia, including Gen. Mihailovic (who was executed in July 1945 for alleged collaboration with the Nazis—see 7806 B; 7986 A; 9346 A) and Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac, the Roman Catholic Primate (who was also imprisoned in 1945 for collaboration—see 9346 A). Many Stalinists and other critics of President Tito's domestic policies were subsequently also removed from office; these latter included Mr Milovan Djilas, a close wartime associate of Marshal Tito and a Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, who after his expulsion from the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1954 [see 13409 A] was later convicted on a number of occasions in connexion with his publications supporting a multi-party democracy and criticizing President Tito's policies [see 14092 A; 15273 B; 15822 A; 18764 A]. Mr Alexander Rankovic, the Vice-President of Yugoslavia, was also forced to resign in 1966 after allegations that he had formed a Serbian political faction in competition to President Tito [see 21567 A].

An open breach developed between Marshal Tito and Marshal Stalin in 1948, following the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform (reformed from the Comintern, which had closed in 1943—see 8864 A), in view of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia's "entirely wrong line on the principal questions of foreign and internal policy", these deviations from Stalinist policy being largely attributed by the Cominform to Marshal Tito personally [see 9381 A]. The ensuing tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which in turn tended to strengthen the Western support won by Marshal Tito during the war, were partially resolved only after the death of Stalin in 1953 [see 12797 A]. An agreement on the normalization of bilateral relations was reached in May 1955 [see 14265 A], but further strain arose in 1956 following President Tito's condemnation of the Soviet intervention in the Hungarian uprising [see 15189 A; 15258 A], and again in 1968 following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and East German troops [see page 22993].

As the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union developed, President Tito came increasingly to speak of the ideological and political independence of Yugoslavia, notably at the 1958 congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (as the party had been known since 1952) [see 16171 A], and sought to improve Yugoslavia's links with the developing countries and especially with such "neutral" countries as India, with the aim of increasing the influence of such non-aligned countries in international negotiations. In particular, his Belgrade meeting in 1956 with President Nasser of the United Arab Republic and with Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India [see 15008 A], was often regarded as the first major step towards the first conference of the non-aligned countries which took place in Belgrade in September 1961 [see 18601 A]. President Tito represented his country at this conference, as also at all the subsequent non-aligned conferences in Cairo [see 20431 A], Lusaka [see 24212 A], Algiers [see 26117 A], Colombo [see 27977 A] and Havana [see 30037 A]—these meetings taking place in 1964, in 1970, in 1973, in 1976 and in 1979 respectively. At the Havana conference President Tito strongly contested the claim made by President Castro of Cuba that the Soviet Union was the "natural ally" of the non-aligned countries against imperialism, leading to some concern for the unity of the movement [ibid.].

Major elements of the domestic policies promoted by President Tito since the Second World War included the federalization of the various republics and regions within Yugoslavia and the suppression of nationalist or separatist movements such as that which became active in Croatia particularly during the 1970s; the introduction in 1950 of a decentralized system of economic self-management and profit-sharing [see 10912 A; 11403 A]; the measures introduced in 1954 allowing withdrawals from the collective system of agriculture [see 13162 A; 13349 E]; and the removal in 1965 of foreign travel restrictions on Yugoslav citizens, which resulted inter alia in the movement of large numbers of workers to Western Europe, bringing in additional foreign currency earnings of some $2,000 million per annum during the 1970s.

Illness and Death of President Tito - Low-Priority Military Alert

President Tito was admitted on Jan. 3, 1980, for preliminary tests to a hospital in Ljubljana (the capital of Slovenia), and underwent on Jan. 12 an unsuccessful operation on a blood vessel in his right leg. The leg was amputated on Jan. 20 following the onset of complications, and after a brief improvement in his condition he suffered a relapse, and diabetes and arteriosclerosis were further complicated by a weakening of the heart, by kidney and liver damage, by failure of the digestive organs and by pneumonia. He entered a coma on Feb. 15 and died without regaining consciousness on May 4 after a total of 113 days in hospital.

President Tito maintained until his lapse into a coma close contacts with members of the collective Presidency, particularly with Mr Lazar Kolisevski (the Vice-President of the Presidency and his eventual successor as head of state—see below) and with Mr Stevan Doronjski (acting President of the Presidium of the LCY), and also with Gen. Nikola Ljubicic, the Federal Secretary of Defence.

The Central Committee of the LCY met for an emergency session on Jan. 15 to hear reports on the President's condition and issued an appeal to the country's 1,700,000 LCY members to continue with their party activities despite the gravity of the situation.

All army leave was cancelled on the same day (Jan. 15) and a travel ban was imposed on members of the (reserve) territorial defence force as a state of low-priority military alert was declared, and on Jan. 20 anti-aircraft batteries were installed at Belgrade airport. Gen. Ljubicic told the President on Jan. 27 that these measures had been adopted as a demonstration of strength in view of reports of recently increased foreign military manoeuvres taking place "close to Yugoslavia's borders", but Western press commentators noted that the recent Soviet involvement in Afghanistan [see 30229 A; 30381 A] had heightened uncertainties as to the Soviet Union's intentions towards Yugoslavia. Press suggestions of a Soviet threat to Yugoslavia were, however, dismissed as "crude, provocative and false" by the Soviet news agency Tass in an article published on Jan. 16, which went on to claim that "relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav people are marked by profound friendship".

Reactions to the Death of President Tito - International Consultations at Funeral

The Government declared on May 4 a seven-day period of official mourning for President Tito, and his body was carried the next day in his personal train to the Parliament building in Belgrade where it lay in state until the funeral on May 8.

The LCY Central Committee and the collective Presidency [see below] issued on May 4 a joint proclamation describing President Tito as "the greatest historic figure of our time", and stressing particularly his role in the unification of the differing ethnic groups within Yugoslavia and in the development of the country's economic system. "Only through unity, increased collective work, responsibility and full mobility can we fill the enormous vacuum left in our ranks by comrade Tito," the statement said.

Tributes to President Tito were also made during the following days by the leaders of numerous other countries. Queen Elizabeth sent a message to Mr Kolisevski (now head of state—see below) expressing "profound sympathy in your grievous loss", while an official statement from the Prime Minister's office expressed Mrs Thatcher's regret at the President's death, describing him as "a great statesman" and as "Britain's staunch ally in war". President Carter referred to the President as "a towering figure on the world stage", and added: "I reaffirm today that America will continue its long-standing policy of support for Yugoslavia, and do what it must to provide that support." The French President, M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, applauded President Tito's involvement in the non-aligned movement, while a statement on Soviet television described him as "an outstanding communist leader". A message to Mr Kolisevski and Mr Doronjski from Chairman Hua Guofeng, the Chinese Prime Minister and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, described President Tito as "a great Marxist and outstanding proletarian revolutionary" who with the LCY had "created the socialist self-management system suited to the conditions of Yugoslavia".

The state funeral of President Tito was held in Belgrade on May 8 and was attended by some 80 official state delegations as well as by over 60 delegations from political parties or other organizations. The United Kingdom delegation comprised Mrs Thatcher, the Duke of Edinburgh, Mr James Callaghan and Mr David Steel (the leaders of the Labour and Liberal parties) and Sir William Deakin and Sir Fitzroy Maclean (both of whom had led British missions with Gen. Tito's partisans during the Second World War—see page 6277). The United States delegation was led by Vice-President Walter Mondale and not, to the openly expressed disappointment of the Yugoslav press, by President Carter. President Brezhnev, despite early reports to the contrary, led the Soviet delegation with Mr Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, and Chairman Hua Guofeng led the Chinese delegation. Cuba was represented not by President Castro but by Dr Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Rodríguez (one of the Vice-Presidents). The United Nations Organization was represented by Dr Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General.

A considerable number of largely informal meetings took place between the delegates during their stays in Belgrade. Thus, for example, Mrs Thatcher met President Ceausescu of Romania, Signor Francesco Cossiga (the Italian Prime Minister), Mr Brian Talboys (the New Zealand Foreign Minister), Herr Helmut Schmidt (the West German Federal Chancellor), President Kaunda of Zambia, President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan and Mrs Indira Gandhi (the Indian Prime Minister). Herr Schmidt held two meetings with Herr Erich Honecker (the General Secretary of the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party) and also met Vice-President Mondale, Mr Edward Gierek (the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party), Mr Yassir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Chairman Hua Guofeng. Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh (the Iranian Foreign Minister) met Dr Waldheim, while Chairman Hua Guofeng met Mrs Gandhi, President Zia ul-Haq, Mr Qotbzadeh, President Ceausescu, Herr Schmidt, Mr Arafat and President Kim Il Sung of North Korea. President Brezhnev met President Kim Il Sung, Mrs Gandhi and Herr Honecker, but not Vice-President Mondale or Chairman Hua Guofeng.

Changes in Party and State Leadership Structures

The death of President Tito brought into effect a number of changes in the governing structure of Yugoslavia, and marked the beginning of the final phase of a process formally begun in 1971 which had been planned to eliminate as far as possible the political problems anticipated by the President upon his death or resignation.

President Tito had expressed in September 1970 a concern that, in the event of his death or departure from power, destructive disputes over his succession could arise among the different ethnic groups which comprised the Yugoslav nation [see 24733 A]. He had therefore proposed that he should ultimately be replaced as head of state by a collective Presidency comprising balanced numbers of representatives from the six republics and two autonomous provinces which made up the Federation. Subsequently constitutional amendments were adopted in June 1971 [ibid.] establishing a collective Presidency of 23 members (including President Tito who, being President of the Republic and of the LCY, automatically presided over the collective Presidency); its membership was reduced by further constitutional amendments adopted in 1974 [see 26655 A] to nine, i.e. one member from each of the republics of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro; one each from the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo; and the President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (President Tito). The 1971 amendments also provided inter alia (i) that the Vice-President of the collective Presidency should be elected on an annually rotating basis from among the representatives of the eight republics and autonomous regions and (ii) that, upon President Tito's death or resignation, the post of President of the Presidency should come into being, this post rotating annually in a similar fashion between its members. (President Tito had in 1974 been elected President of the Republic for an unlimited term—see 26655 A.)

With the death of President Tito the title and function of President of the Republic therefore effectively ceased to exist, and in accordance with the 1971 amendments the positions of head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces were transferred to the newly-created post of President of the collective Presidency. This position was assumed on May 4 by Mr Lazar Kolisevski, the Macedonian representative, who had since his election on May 15, 1979, been Vice-President of the collective Presidency [see 29692 B]. Mr Kolisevski's 12-month term of office expired on May 15, 1980, however, and he was succeeded in rotation on that date as President of the Presidency and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by Mr Cvijetin Mijatovic (Bosnia-Herzegovina) who had become Vice-President on May 4. Mr Mijatovic was himself succeeded as Vice-President on May 15 by Mr Sergej Kraigher (Slovenia).

The death of President Tito also necessitated a reorganization of responsibilities within the Central Committee of the LCY, since it had been agreed that he was not to be replaced as President of the party.

President Tito had been empowered, as President of the LCY, inter alia to propose the membership and officers of the Presidium of the Central Committee, to convene and preside over meetings of the Central Committee, and, as mentioned above, to sit on the collective state Presidency. The reallocation of these functions would, however, according to a decision of the Presidium, necessitate an alteration of the party statutes, a step which could only be accomplished at a full LCY party congress. (Congresses were normally convened every four years, and the last congress, the 11th, had taken place in June 1978—see 29236 A.) The Central Committee therefore approved on June 13 an interim measure proposed by the Presidium which stipulated that, pending a final decision to be taken at the 12th LCY Congress, the authority and duties of the former LCY President should be allocated thus:

(1) The right to sit as LCY representative on the collective state Presidency should be transferred to the newly-created post of President of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee [see also below].

(2) The right to propose the membership of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee was to be taken on by a special commission of the Central Committee.

(3) The right to convene sessions of the Central Committee was to be assumed by the Presidium. Such sessions were to be declared

open by the President of the Presidium and to be steered by a working presidium.

(4) The Secretary of the Presidium was to be elected every two years from among its own members (whereas previously President Tito, as LCY President, had nominated the holder of this post—see 29692 B), and was each time to represent a different republican or provincial organization. The Secretary was not at any given time to represent the same regional organization as the President of the Presidium.

The current acting President of the Presidium was Mr Stevan Doronjski (elected on Oct. 23, 1979—see 30050 A), who accordingly became President of the Presidium. He was not, however, expected to take up the LCY seat on the state Presidency as provided in amendment (1) above, since he already sat on that body in his capacity as a representative of the autonomous region of Vojvodina, and the collective Presidency was thus effectively reduced to eight members.—(Review of International Affairs, Belgrade - Times - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - New York Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Soviet Embassy Press Department) (*Prev. rep. Constitution 24733 A, 26655 A, 27061 A; Collective State Presidency 29692 B, 29842 C; League of Communists 30050 A*)

A. CUBA — Flight of 10,000 Cubans into Peruvian Embassy in Havana - Exodus of Cubans by Sea to United States - Sinking of Bahamian Vessel by Cuban Aircraft - Hijackings to Cuba - Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with East Germany

In the space of a few days in early April 1980, more than 10,000 Cubans wishing to leave the country took refuge in the grounds of the Peruvian embassy in Havana after President Fidel Castro had lifted the police guard from around the embassy. His move was the culmination of disputes between Cuba and, respectively, Peru and Venezuela over the right of Cubans to seek asylum in foreign embassies.

Several hundred people in the embassy were airlifted out of the country to Costa Rica in the next two weeks before Dr Castro raised objections to this but let it be understood that Cuban exiles in the USA would be permitted to pick up by boat anyone who wished to leave Cuba. Accordingly, fleets of small boats from Florida began to arrive in the Cuban port of Mariel (west of Havana) on April 21 to take friends and relatives back to the United States, generating a massive administrative and refugee problem there. By the end of June, when the exodus had virtually stopped, 114,475 Cubans were reported to have arrived in the USA by boat, joining some 500,000 Cubans already in Florida and 25,000 other refugees including Haitians [see 30411 A] and Indo-Chinese.

In preceding weeks there had been references in Cuba to another "Camarioca"—an allusion to the Cuban port from where a similar exodus was permitted in 1965, this being followed at the time by the establishment of a US airlift from Varadero airport [see 21085 A].

There had been several cases in 1979 and early 1980 of Cubans forcing their way into the Peruvian and Venezuelan embassies [see 29868 A], and in mid-January 1980 the Venezuelan ambassador was temporarily recalled to Caracas for consultations after one Cuban attempting to enter the embassy was shot dead by police and another injured. The Cuban ambassador to Venezuela was recalled indefinitely at the same time. In a note to Latin American ambassadors in Havana on Jan. 26 the Cuban Foreign Ministry said that the right of asylum was only legitimate when people's lives or liberty were seriously endangered on political grounds, and in another note on Jan. 29 the Ministry said that the Cuban Government alone would decide who was a political refugee and who a "common criminal".

Six people including two children entered the Peruvian embassy on March 28, while on April 1 a Cuban guard was killed when six people crashed their way through the embassy gates in a van, bringing the total of Cubans inside the embassy to about 24. The guard's death led Cuba to announce on April 4 that it would no longer grant safe-conducts out of the country to anyone who had forcibly entered an embassy, nor would it post armed guards outside the Peruvian embassy to prevent "delinquents, common criminals and anti-social elements" from seeking refuge there, although they were violating diplomatic immunity and the attitude of Peru and Venezuela would, it said, be liable to encourage acts of violence against embassies. The Peruvian Foreign Minister, Sr Arturo García y García, rejected the statement on the same day as "containing crude insinuations about the supposed manoeuvres of Peru and other South American Governments against Cuba", while the Venezuelan ambassador was again withdrawn on April 6.

As thousands of Cubans crowded into the embassy compound conditions swiftly deteriorated in view of the intense heat and the lack of food, water and sanitary facilities. The Cuban Government on April 6 took over the supply of food and water for the refugees (but refused Red Cross aid) and on April 7 offered them safe-conducts to return to their homes while their exit applications were being processed—an offer which was accepted by about 4,000 people. Those who remained faced hostility from crowds of pro-government Cubans who had gathered outside the embassy and who over the next few weeks were reported to have harassed those wishing to leave.

Meanwhile, an editorial in the Cuban Communist Party organ *Granma* on April 6 said that Cuba would be glad to authorize all anti-social elements to leave the country as well as those who were "ideologically in disagreement with the revolution and socialism", and referred to the Cubans in the embassy as "delinquents, 'lumpenproletariat' and parasites".

The Foreign Ministers of the Andean Pact nations (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) met in Lima on April 9 to discuss the problem of distributing the refugees, whom Peru could not absorb alone, and it was announced on April 10 that Peru would accept 1,000 and the other countries an as yet unspecified number. Quotas for various countries were later announced as USA 3,500, Venezuela 500, Spain 500, Canada 300, Costa Rica 300, Ecuador 200, Belgium 150.

On April 15-18 some 500 people were airlifted out of Cuba to Costa Rica en route to other destinations, but on April 18 Cuba objected to the use of Costa Rica as a staging-post and said that henceforth safe-conducts would only be given for direct flights to other countries, with the result that the airlift was halted. In the meantime, however, an editorial in *Granma* on April 14 indicated that Cubans living abroad should sail to Cuba to evacuate their relatives to the United States, commenting that several boats were already in Mariel and that others would not be met with hostility. The US Government, which had not been consulted, expressed deep concern at the prospect of a refugee influx and warned at this stage that Cubans coming in this manner to the USA would be regarded as illegal immigrants.

Hundreds of boats began arriving in Mariel from April 21 onwards, and by early May 3,000 refugees were arriving daily at Key West after making the 140-mile journey across the Florida Straits. President Carter ordered on May 1 that US naval vessels which had been scheduled to take part in the Solid Shield 80 manoeuvres at the US base of Guantánamo (on the eastern tip of Cuba) should be diverted to help the refugee boats, none of which would be turned away; moreover, he announced on May 5 that all refugees would be received with "open heart and open arms" and on May 6 he declared parts of Florida disaster areas so that $10,000,000 in federal funds could be sent to reimburse the Florida state authorities.

In response to a US statement that any criminals among the refugees who "presented a threat" to the USA would be sent back to Cuba, Dr Castro said in a May Day speech that the USA had provoked the exodus and must now "swallow the dagger whole". US officials believed that a number of those arriving in the United States were former prisoners and that Cuba was taking the opportunity to deport its convicts and also some of its mental patients.

In the meantime, talks between Cuba and Costa Rica, which had offered to give asylum to all the refugees in the Peruvian embassy to facilitate the airlift, were halted by Costa Rica on April 30 in view of Cuba's "negative attitude".

The numbers of people leaving Cuba increased after an announcement on May 9 (by which time 25,000 people had already arrived in Florida) that passports would be issued freely to all those wishing to leave, whether or not they had relatives abroad. Although the Cuban authorities had repeatedly stated that anyone was free to leave the country, the issue of documents now appeared to be accelerated and on May 11 a total of 5,300 refugees were reported to have arrived in Florida, representing the largest single day's total to date.

In a speech on May 14 announcing a change of US policy towards the refugees, President Carter announced that boats used to bring Cubans unlawfully to the USA would now be seized and he proposed a US air- and sealift to transport "screened and qualified" people out of Cuba in a safe and orderly manner "as soon as the Cubans accept this offer".

The following categories of Cubans would be considered: (i) those who had "sought freedom" in the US interests section in Havana (located inside the Swiss embassy—see 28600 A and below); (ii) political prisoners who had been "held by Castro for many years"; (iii) those who had entered the Peruvian embassy; and (iv) close family members of Cuban-Americans residing permanently in the USA. A family registration centre was to be opened immediately in

Miami to receive the names of Cubans who were eligible for immigration to the USA.

President Carter went on to say that the US Coast Guard would contact all boats en route to Cuba and those at Mariel to urge them to return to the USA without passengers; no new trips should be started, and henceforth persons travelling to Cuba to pick up passengers would be liable to prosecution, and boats used for unlawful journeys seized. Stating, furthermore, that Dr Castro had “taken hardened criminals out of prison” and “forced some of the boat owners” to bring them to the USA, President Carter said that over 400 such people had been detained; their return to Cuba would be negotiated and steps taken to exclude others. He said that all these measures were consistent with an agreement reached by 22 countries and seven international organizations at a meeting in Costa Rica on May 8 and that consultations with other nations would continue on resolving the refugee problem.

In implementation of the measures the US Coast Guard on May 17 began establishing a 200-mile patrol zone from the southern tip of Florida to Miami to block any further mass exodus from Cuba; however, refugees continued to arrive in the USA on a smaller scale, the flow diminishing substantially only at the end of May. Dr Castro ordered on June 1 that all foreign boats still in Mariel should leave the port within 24 hours.

The refugees arriving in the USA were sent to reception centres at Eglin Air Force base near Pensacola (Florida), Fort Chaffee (Arkansas) and Fort Indiantown (Pennsylvania). The White House on June 19 announced that a special category would be created for Cuban and Haitian refugees to bypass the new 1980 Refugee Act [see also 30411 A], and on June 20 confirmed that they would be granted “indefinite parole” while they were processed as applicants for asylum.

In protest at the slow handling of refugees by the US immigration authorities, there were disturbances at Eglin on May 26 and at Fort Chaffee on June 1, when about 40 people were injured in clashes between Cubans and National Guardsmen and 35 arrested. Some 300 soldiers were sent to Fort Chaffee on June 2 and up to 2,000 Guardsmen made available in case of further unrest.

Meanwhile, nearly 400 people (including 14 with injuries) remained inside the US interests section in the Swiss embassy in Havana, where they had fled on May 2 after being attacked by a crowd of pro-government Cubans while awaiting information on immigration. Dr Castro on May 4 demanded the handover of all those inside the section, and on the same day the USA closed the office in protest, a tight police cordon being placed around the building. Cuba said that the incident was caused by “Yankee provocation” and refused to allow those inside to be airlifted out of the country.

It was reported on June 3 that all but 25 of the people left in the Peruvian embassy had flown to Lima, while 14 Cubans remained inside the Venezuelan embassy. An estimated 100,000 Cubans were still reported to want to leave the country, including 5,000 former political prisoners who had registered at the US interests section. [For earlier releases of political prisoners and their acceptance by the USA, see 29868 A and 30068 A.]

Among long-term political prisoners still detained in Cuba was Sr Armando Fernando Valladares (42), who had been sentenced in 1961 to 30 years' imprisonment for offences against the state and who was now reported to be partially paralysed due to bad conditions and an earlier hunger strike. A campaign for his release was currently being co-ordinated in Europe by Maj. Huber Matos, another long-term prisoner released in October 1979 [see 30068 A].

A report by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (of the Organization of American States), based largely on evidence from former prisoners and released in Washington on March 12, said that Cuba ill-treated political prisoners (of whom about 1,000 remained) and gaoled some without trial. Those who refused to conform to socialist principles in return for preferential treatment were, the report said, treated worst and were often deprived of proper food and medical treatment, and many prisoners were obliged to carry out forced labour in contravention of international conventions.

Sinking of Bahamian Vessel by Cuban Aircraft

Several Cuban MiG fighter aircraft on May 10, 1980, attacked and sank the Bahamian Defence Force patrol boat *Flamingo* in Bahamian waters south of Ragged Island at a distance of some 20 miles north of eastern Cuba, killing four of its crew and injuring three. The incident occurred after the *Flamingo* had taken in tow two Cuban fishing boats with eight crew on charges of poaching in Bahamian waters.



(*Carpress*)

The Cuban Government, in an initial statement on May 12, said that it “sincerely regretted the incident if it is true that the vessel which was sunk was a Bahamian patrol craft” and explained that the crew of one of the trawlers had radioed to say that it was being attacked by a pirate ship; aircraft were sent to investigate, continued the Cuban statement, and subsequently fired at the vessel. However, the Bahamian Prime Minister, Mr Lynden Pindling, described the explanation as a cover-up and the attack as “an atrocious act of aggression”. A strongly-worded note of protest was sent to Cuba and a copy circulated to the UN Security Council, while the Bahamian Government said in a statement on May 12 that it was “particularly appalled by the inhumane act of firing on defenceless men struggling in the water” and claimed that even after the survivors had made their way to Duncan Town (Ragged Island) aboard a Cuban trawler, the MiGs had reappeared and made “simulated rocket runs” over Duncan Town at treetop level, hampering the search for missing sailors.

A Cuban delegation visited Nassau on May 12 for talks on the incident but called off a further meeting, while at the same time a *Granma* editorial on May 13 claimed that the “hand of the [US] Central Intelligence Agency” had been behind the *Flamingo* affair. However, the Bahamian Foreign Minister, Mr Paul Adderley, stated that his Government's position remained the same and that the Bahamas would not allow Cuba to use it as a pawn in its international affairs.

After contacts were subsequently resumed between Cuba and the Bahamas, the Cuban Government on May 29 (i) accepted responsibility for the sinking of the *Flamingo* and for the Duncan Town incidents; (ii) said that there had been no intention to violate Bahamian sovereignty or territorial integrity; (iii) agreed to pay compensation for the loss of the *Flamingo* and to the victims' families, the amount to be negotiated; (iv) stated that the *Granma* editorial had not been intended to offend the Bahamas; and (v) apologized to the Bahamas for “the involuntary violation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”.

Cuba also on May 16 apologized to the United States for “buzzing” a US helicopter off the Bahamas on May 12.

Hijackings of US Aircraft to Cuba

In the space of one week in August 1980 six aircraft were hijacked from the United States to Havana (including three on the same day) by Cuban refugees who, it appeared, were discontented with life in the USA; two other attempts were foiled. In each case the hijackers were detained in Havana and all passengers and crew were returned safely to Miami.

In the first incident an Air Florida Boeing 737 on an internal flight from Miami to Key West (Florida) was forced to fly to Havana on Aug. 10 by a man who threatened the pilot with a bar of soap disguised as a bomb. Several days later seven Cubans threatening to ignite a jar of petrol hijacked another Air Florida jet on the same route with 74 people on board (including one passenger and one crew member who had been on the first hijacked flight), and on Aug. 14 a National Airlines DC-10 flying from Miami to San Juan (Puerto Rico) with 211 passengers and 12 crew was hijacked by two Cubans also carrying petrol.

Despite increased security measures an Eastern Airlines Boeing 727 was commandeered on Aug. 16 by six Cubans; later the same day a Delta Airlines L-1011 jumbo jet was hijacked and, within half an hour, a Republic Airlines DC-9. Also on Aug. 16, four Cubans were arrested at Tampa airport (Florida) as they tried to board an aircraft with bottles of petrol, and three Cubans were detained at Miami airport as they tried to board an Air Florida flight to Key West, also with jars of petrol.

The Federal Aviation Administration announced on Aug. 17 that armed marshals would travel on every flight leaving Florida airports and on some flights from other selected cities to prevent further incidents.

There had been a number of hijacking incidents to Cuba earlier in 1980 which appeared to demonstrate that the US-Cuban hijacking treaty, which was abrogated unilaterally by Dr Castro in 1977, remained unofficially in force [see 25827 B; 28132 A; 29868 A].

A US citizen claiming to be a Black Muslim on Jan. 25 hijacked a US Delta Airlines Tristar with some 60 people on board heading for New York from Atlanta (Georgia) and forced it to fly to Cuba. In Havana, his demand to be flown on to Tehran was refused by the Cuban authorities, and after most of the passengers had been allowed to leave the aircraft the man was overcome by the crew and arrested.

Subsequently, an American Airlines Boeing 727 was hijacked at Ontario airport (California) on April 9 as it was about to take on passengers and was also forced to fly to Cuba, refuelling in Texas en route. The hijacker, a Black American, was arrested in Havana and said that he wished to leave the USA on religious and political grounds.

On July 23 a Delta Airlines L-1011 en route from Chicago to Puerto Rico via Miami with 133 passengers and 13 crew on board was forced to fly to Cuba by a Puerto Rican hijacker. The aircraft was obliged by bad weather to land at Camaguey airport (300 miles south-east of Havana), where the hijacker was detained and the aircraft allowed to fly back to Miami.

Signature of Friendship and Co-operation Treaty with East Germany

Cuba and East Germany on June 1 signed a 25-year treaty of friendship and co-operation at the end of an official visit to Havana by Herr Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED). The treaty, which made no provision for military co-operation, pledged both countries to support détente in Europe and the "fight by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism"; and committed them to ideological, political, economic, cultural and technical co-operation.

Dr Castro had visited East Germany—Cuba's largest trading partner after the USSR—twice previously, in 1977 [see 28401 A] and in 1972 [see 25663 A], while Herr Honecker had also been to Cuba before.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Financial Times - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Economist - Latin America Weekly Report - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - Archiv der Gegenwart, Bonn - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. US Relations 29408 A, 29868 A, 30068 A, 30085 A; Diplomatic Relations with Bahamas 27214 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Competition Bill - Parliamentary Proceedings and Enactment

The Competition Bill, which had been published on July 12, 1979 [see page 29832], was enacted on April 3, 1980. Providing inter alia for the abolition of the Price Commission [ibid.], the Bill had been foreshadowed in the Conservative Party's general election manifesto [see page 29635] and in the Queen's Speech of May 15, 1979 [see 29705 A].

The Bill was given a second reading in the House of Commons on Oct. 23, 1979, by 302 votes to 235 and in the House of Lords on Feb. 4, 1980, without a division.

Mr John Nott, Secretary of State for Trade, moving the second reading in the Commons, said that, in strengthening the power of the Director-General of Fair Trading and of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission to investigate anti-competitive practices in the public and private sectors, the Bill avoided the approach embodied in the United States anti-trust legislation. This would have involved a very long statute setting out an extended list of anti-competitive practices, which would have brought the whole procedure into the courts and created most of the burdens on industry and commerce which were a well known feature of the American practice. Instead, the Government had decided to build on the approach, already embodied in the Fair Trading Act [of 1973—see 26054 A], of taking a broad definition of anti-competitive practice and then seeking in each case to establish by a short investigation without sanctions whether a prima facie case of limited competition was evident or not, and if it was, whether it was appropriate for a fuller investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission as a practice which might operate against the public interest.

What was new in the legislation was that, for the first time, an individual practice by an individual firm could be investigated to see whether it was anti-competitive, and if it was found to be against the public interest it could be stopped. Formerly, it had been necessary to involve every firm in an industry in order to decide whether a monopoly situation existed. Furthermore, the Bill allowed the Director-General of Fair Trading in his investigation into an anti-competitive practice to treat the public and the private sectors alike. The new procedures would considerably strengthen competition policy without imposing the uncertainties and burdens on industry of temporary price restrictions and pre-notification, which were two of the main elements of the Price Commission Act [of 1977—see 28557 A].

Dealing with the new powers for public sector industries, Mr Nott said that the definition in the Bill had been widened to include the water industry, bus undertakings and the agricultural marketing boards, as well as the nationalized industries which were already dealt with in the Fair Trading Act. The Government believed that, as public sector bodies were not subject to the normal sanctions of bankruptcy, acquisition by other firms and the wider sanctions of competition in the market place, they needed to be subject to an investigation of the service which they provided to consumers and occasional investigation into their efficiency and costs and possibly sometimes into the occasional abuse of their monopoly position. "Of course," he went on, "this kind of inquiry into efficiency and costs, as well as possible abuse of the monopoly position, which will take six months and could possibly extend to nine months, could have been undertaken by a different body. We considered the possibility of creating a new body for this purpose. We considered asking the Exchequer and Audit Department to carry out this work but we came back to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission as being the most suitable body in a new form to conduct this kind of efficiency audit. The Commission already has experience of investigating large monopolies and in its new form we thought it would be the best body to build up experience in this very difficult and important field. I am anxious not to overburden the Monopolies and Mergers Commission immediately with a great weight of new investigation. It must have time to develop its practice and build up experience."

At the heart of the Bill, Mr Nott concluded, lay the fact that the consumer could not be free to choose unless producers were obliged to compete and, because economic freedom rested on competition, the task of grappling with monopoly—the denial of choice—was an important part of economic policy. Indeed, it must pervade every part of it. The Government intended to stimulate the improvement and performance of the economy by encouraging enterprise, by persuading entrepreneurs to look for new opportunities and by persuading businessmen to go for new products and to enter new markets. The Bill, which would ensure the denial of monopoly and therefore greater freedom of choice, was central to these objectives.

Mr John Fraser, an opposition spokesman on trade, prices and consumer protection, said that the value of the Price Commission could not be measured by the number of times that it or the Secretary of State exercised its powers. Its real power was measured by the number of times that firms did not apply for a price increase because they did not want to be held publicly to account. There was real value in the number of times that it did not have to use its powers. He continued: "The second overwhelming advantage of the existence of the Price Commission was that it demonstrated that Governments were concerned about prices and were prepared to do something about them. When the Government talked about the restraints on companies and trade unions—a difficult task—and when they undertook the job of discussing the inflation prospects with both sides of industry, they had something to offer in return. They were able to offer their own power to control prices. The repeal of price controls is not merely the elimination of bumf and bureaucracy. It is much more than that. It is a total abdication of a responsibility. This is what the Government are saying: 'The era of co-operation and discussion with the trade unions, in particular, has disappeared. From now on we are declaring a holy monetary war upon the ordinary working people of this country.' However, once the Bill becomes law the Government will have abandoned their ability to carry out their side of the bargain."

In the division the Government was supported by five Liberals and five Ulster Unionists, while the two Scottish National Party (SNP) members, Mr Dafydd Thomas (*Plaid Cymru*) and Mr Gerard Fitt, then Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), voted with the opposition.

During the Bill's standing committee stage on Nov. 27, 1979, a government amendment enabling the Director-General of Fair Trading to make a competition reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission without considering the public interest was accepted.

Mrs Sally Oppenheim, Minister of State for Consumer Affairs, explained that it should not be the Director-General's function to assess the public interest. Since he was one man and not a commission, it would be placing an enormous responsibility on him in what after all was only a preliminary investigation.

Having passed its remaining stages in the Commons on Jan. 22, 1980, and in the Lords on Feb. 19, March 3 and March 17, the Bill, as stated above, received the Royal Assent on April 3. Its main provisions were brought into operation by statutory instruments on Aug. 12.—(Times - Guardian - Trade and Industry/British Business - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. page 29832*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. UNITED STATES — Republican National Convention - Republican Policy Platform - Election of Mr Reagan as Presidential Candidate - Mr Bush elected Vice-Presidential Candidate

The 32nd National Convention of the Republican Party held in Detroit from July 14 to 17 approved the party's policy platform for the forthcoming presidential and congressional elections, and elected Mr Ronald Reagan as the party's presidential candidate and Mr George Bush as vice-presidential candidate.

Republican Policy Platform

The convention approved on July 15 the party's policy platform, excerpts from which are given below under cross-headings.

Energy. "In order to increase domestic production of energy, Republicans advocate the decontrol of the price at the wellhead of oil and gas. We believe that the so-called windfall profits tax [see 30355 A], which is unrelated to profit, should be repealed as it applies to small volume royalty owners, new oil, stripper wells, tertiary recovery and heavy crude oil, and that the phase-out of the tax on old oil should be accelerated. This tax legislation should be amended to include a ploughback provision. We will seek decontrol of prices on all oil products and an end to government authority to allocate petroleum supplies except in national emergency. We also believe that market restrictions on the use of natural gas should be eliminated.

"Republicans support a comprehensive programme of regulatory reform, improved incentives and revision of cumbersome and overly stringent Clean Air Act regulations. This programme will speed conversion of utility, industrial and large commercial oil-burning boilers to coal to the greatest extent feasible, thus substantially cutting out dependence on foreign oil. Coal, gas and nuclear fission offer the best intermediate solutions to America's energy needs. We support accelerated use of nuclear energy through technologies that have been proven efficient and safe. The safe operation, as well as design, of nuclear generating plants will have our highest priority to ensure the continued availability of this important energy source. The design and operation of these plants can be guaranteed in less than the 10 to 12-year lead time now required to license and build them. We believe that the licensing process can and should be streamlined through consolidation of the present process and the use of standardized reactor designs.

"The Three Mile Island incident [of March 1979—see 30287 A] suggests the need for certain reforms, such as in the area of operator training, but illustrates that properly designed and operated nuclear plants do not endanger public health or safety. We further encourage the research, development and demonstration of the breeder reactor with its potential for safely contributing to our nation's future energy supplies. Nuclear power development requires sound plans for nuclear waste disposal and storage and reprocessing of spent fuel. Technical solutions to these problems exist and decisive federal action to choose and implement solutions is essential.

Inflation. "Ultimately, inflation is a decline in the value of the dollar, the monetary standard, in terms of the goods it can buy. Until the decade of the 1970s monetary policy was automatically linked to the overriding objective of maintaining a stable dollar value. The severing of the dollar's link with real commodities in the 1960s and 1970s, in order to pursue economic goals other than dollar stability, has unleashed hyperinflationary forces at home and monetary disorder abroad, without bringing any of the desired economic benefits. One of the most urgent tasks in the period ahead will be the restoration of a dependable monetary standard—that is, an end to inflation.

"Lower tax rates, less spending, and a balanced budget are the keys to maintaining real growth and full employment as we end inflation by putting our monetary policy back on track. Monetary and fiscal policy must each play a part if we are to achieve our joint goals of full employment and price stability. Unfortunately, Mr Carter and the Democratic Congress seek to derail our nation's money creation policies by taking away the independence of the Federal Reserve Board. The same people who have so massively expanded government spending should not be allowed politically to dominate our monetary policy. The Republican Party believes inflation can be controlled only by fiscal and monetary restraint, combined with sharp reductions in the tax and regulatory disincentives to savings, investment, and productivity. Therefore, the Republican Party opposes the imposition of wage and price controls and credit controls. Controls will not stop inflation, as past experience has shown. Wage and price controls will only result in shortages, inequities, black markets, and ultimately higher prices. We reject this short-sighted and misguided approach.

Taxes. "The Republican Party supports across-the-board reductions in personal income tax rates, phased in over three years, which will reduce tax rates from the range of 14 to 70 per cent [see page 29573] to a range from 10 to 50 per cent.

Foreign and Defence Policy. "For three and a half years the Carter Administration has been without a coherent strategic concept to guide foreign policy, oblivious to the scope and magnitude of the threat posed to our security, and devoid of competence to provide leadership and direction to the free world. The Administration's conduct of foreign policy has undermined our friends abroad, and led our most dangerous adversaries to miscalculate the willingness of the American people to resist aggression. Republicans support a policy of peace through strength; weakness provokes aggression. Despite clear danger signals indicating that Soviet nuclear power would overtake that of the United States by the early 1980s, threatening the survival of the United States and making possible, for the first time in post-war history, political coercion and defeat, the Administration reduced the size and capability of our nuclear forces.

"Despite clear danger signals indicating that the Soviet Union was using Cuban, East German, and now Nicaraguan, as well as its own, military forces to extend its power to Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere, the Administration often undermined the very governments under attack. As a result, a clear and present danger threatens the energy and raw material lifelines of the Western world. Despite clear danger signals indicating that the Soviet Union was augmenting its military threat to the nations of Western Europe, American defence programmes such as the enhanced radiation warhead [the 'neutron bomb'] and cruise missiles, which could have offset that build-up were cancelled or delayed [see 28965 A; 28591 A]—to the dismay of allies who depend upon American military power for their security.

"The evidence of the Soviet threat to American security has never been more stark and unambiguous, nor has any President ever been more oblivious to this threat and its potential consequences. The sustained malign neglect of our military manpower is nothing short of a national scandal. The average military family has lost between 14 per cent and 25 per cent in purchasing power over the past seven years. Officers and skilled enlisted personnel are leaving in droves, and 250,000 of our servicemen qualify for public assistance. Many of our career people earn less than the minimum wage. The services are currently short of 70,000 senior enlisted personnel. This scandal is the direct result of Mr Carter's wilful downgrading of the military and inept mismanagement of personnel policy. As a top priority, the Republican Party pledges to end this national disgrace.

US-Soviet Relations. "The premier challenge facing the United States, its allies, and the entire globe is to check the Soviet Union's global ambitions. This challenge must be met, for the present danger is greater than ever before in the 200-year history of the United States. The Soviet Union is still accelerating its drive for military superiority and is intensifying its military pressure and its ideological combat against the industrial democracies and the vulnerable developing nations of the world. Republicans believe that the United States can only negotiate with the Soviet Union from the position of unquestioned principle and unquestioned strength. Unlike Mr Carter, we see nothing 'inordinate' in our nation's historic judgment about the goals, tactics, and dangers of Soviet communism. Unlike the Carter Administration, we are not surprised by the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan [see 30229 A; 30381 A] or by other Soviet violations of major international agreements regulating international behaviour, human rights and the use of military force. As the Soviet Union continues in its expansionist course, the potential for dangerous confrontations has increased. Republicans will strive to resolve critical issues through peaceful negotiations, but we recognize that negotiations conducted from a position of military weakness can result only in further damage to American interests.

NATO and Western Europe. "The Republican Party recognizes that NATO serves the vital interest of the entire Western world, and over the years we have continued to give the Alliance our undiminished and bipartisan support. Through its inept policies, the Carter Administration has substantially contributed to the evident erosion of Alliance security and confidence in the United States. A Republican Administration, as one of its highest priorities and in close concert with our NATO partners, will therefore ensure that the United States leads a concerted effort to rebuild a strong, confident Alliance fully prepared to meet the threats and the challenges of the 1980s. Carter Administration inconsistencies have caused disunity in the Alliance. We have seen confusion in the fields of trade, fiscal and energy policies. The lack of close co-ordination regarding Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Olympic boycott, nuclear proliferation, East-West trade, human rights, North-South issues, and a host of other international issues affecting Alliance interests, has reinforced Allied concerns. Republicans are concerned that these Carter Administration actions have increased Allied temptation to conduct independent diplomacy and to seek accommodation in the face of pressure from the Soviet Union. In this regard, we categorically reject unilateral moratoria on the deployment by the United States and NATO of theatre nuclear weapons [see 30159 A]. Further, Republicans will oppose arms control agreements that interfere with the transfer of military technology to our Allies. In pledging renewed United States leadership, co-operation and consultation, Republicans assert their expectations that each of the Allies will bear a fair share of the common defence effort [and] that they will work closely together in support of common Alliance goals.

Middle East and Persian Gulf. "Today the countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf are encircled as never before by Soviet advisers and troops based in the Horn of Africa, South Yemen and Afghanistan. Moreover, the Soviets have close political and military ties with other states in the region. Republicans believe that the restoration of order and stability to the region must be premised upon an understanding of the interrelationship between Soviet and radical Palestinian goals, the fundamental requirements of stable economic development and marketing of the area's resources, and the growing ferment among Islamic radical groups. Republicans believe that a wise and credible United States policy must make clear that our foremost concern is for the long-term peaceful development of all states in the region, not purely a self-serving exploitation of its resources. Our goal is to bring a just and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

"With respect to an ultimate peace settlement, Republicans reject any call for involvement of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] as not in keeping with the long-term interest of either Israel or the Palestinian Arabs. The imputation of legitimacy to organizations not yet willing to acknowledge the fundamental right to existence of the State of Israel is wrong. Repeated indications, even when subsequently denied, of the Carter Administration's involvement with the PLO [see page 29956] have done serious harm to the credibility of US policy in the Middle East and have encouraged the PLO's position of intransigence. We believe the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank would be destabilizing and harmful to the peace process. Our long- and short-term policies for the area must be developed in consultation with our NATO Allies, Israel, Egypt and other friends in the area, and we will spare no effort in seeking their consultation throughout the policy process, not merely demand their acquiescence to our plans.

"The sovereignty, security and integrity of the State of Israel is a moral imperative and serves the strategic interests of the United States. Republicans reaffirm our fundamental and enduring commitment to this principle. We will continue to honour our nation's commitment through political, economic, diplomatic and military aid. Peace between Israel and its neighbours requires direct negotiations among the states involved. Accordingly, a Republican Administration will encourage the peace process now in progress between Egypt and Israel, will seek to broaden it, and will welcome those Arab nations willing to live in peace with Israel. We applaud the vision and courage of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and we pledge to build our relationship with Egypt in cultural affairs, economic development and military co-operation. While re-emphasizing our commitment to Israel, a Republican Administration will pursue close ties and friendship with moderate Arab states. We will initiate the economic and military framework for ensuring long-term stability in the internal development of regional states and an orderly market place for the area's resources. We will make clear that re-imposition of an oil embargo would be viewed as a hostile act. We will oppose discriminatory practices, including boycotts, and we will discourage arms sales which contribute to regional instability. Republicans believe that Jerusalem should remain an undivided city with continued free and unimpeded access to all Holy Places by people of all faiths.

The Americas. "We deplore the Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua [see 30025 A] and the Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. We do not support United States assistance to any Marxist government in this hemisphere and we oppose the Carter Administration aid programme for the Government of Nicaragua [ibid.]. However, we will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent government. Republicans deplore the dangerous and incomprehensible Carter Administration policies towards Cuba. Republicans recognize the importance of our relations within this hemisphere and pledge a strong new United States policy in the Americas. We will stand firm with countries seeking to develop their societies while combating the subversion and violence exported by Cuba and Moscow. We will return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend and self-proclaimed enemies as enemies, without apology. We will make it clear to the Soviet Union and Cuba that their subversion and their build-up of offensive military forces [are] unacceptable.

"Republicans recognize the special importance of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands in the defence of freedom in the Caribbean. We believe that Puerto Rico's admission to the Union [for attitudes to which, see 29498 A] would demonstrate our common purpose in the face of growing Soviet and Cuban pressure in that area. We pledge to ensure that the Panama Canal remains open, secure and free of hostile control. The reservations and understanding to the Panama Canal treaties, including those assuring the United States of primary responsibility for protecting and defending the canal, are an integral part of those treaties and we will hold Panama to strict interpretation of the language of the treaties, clearly established by the legislative history of Senate adoption of amendments, reservations and understanding at the time of Senate approval of the treaties [see 30047 A]. We will seek a North America accord designed to foster close co-operation and mutual benefit between the United States, Canada and Mexico.

Asia and the Pacific. "The United States is and must remain a Pacific power. It is our vital interest to maintain US-guaranteed stability in the area. Republicans recognize the dangerous shifts in power that have accelerated under the current Democratic Administration. The balance of the Korean peninsula has shifted dangerously towards the North. Soviet naval forces in Asia and the Pacific have steadily increased and are now at least equal to US naval forces there. Unilateral cancellation by the United States of the mutual defence pact with Taiwan [see 29533 A] and the abrupt announcement of withdrawal of US ground forces from [South] Korea [see 29797 A] have led countries throughout the region to question the value of alliance with the United States.

"A new Republican Administration will restore a strong American role in Asia and the Pacific. We will make it clear that any military action which threatens the independence of America's allies and friends will bring a response sufficient to make its cost prohibitive to potential adversaries. Japan will continue to be a pillar of American policy in Asia. Republicans recognize the unique danger presented to our ally, South Korea. We will encourage continued efforts to expand political participation and individual liberties within the country, but will recognize the special problems brought on by subversion and potential aggression from the North. We will maintain American ground and air forces in South Korea, and will not reduce our presence further. Our treaty commitments to South Korea will be restated in unequivocal terms and we will re-establish the process of close consultations between our Governments.

"We will strive for the creation of conditions that will foster the peaceful elaboration of our relationship with the People's Republic of China. We will exercise due caution and prudence with respect to our own vital interests, especially in the field of expanding trade, including the transfer of sophisticated technology with potential offensive military applications. The relationship between the two countries must be based on mutual respect and reciprocity, with due regard for the need to maintain peace and stability in Asia. At the same time, we deplore the Carter Administration's treatment of Taiwan, our longtime ally and friend. We pledge that our concern for the safety and security of the 17,000,000 people of Taiwan will be constant. We would regard any attempt to alter Taiwan's status by force as a threat to peace in the region.

Africa. "Working closely with our allies, a Republican Administration will seek to assist the countries of Africa with our presence, our markets, our know-how and our investment. We will work to create a climate of economic and political development and confidence. We will encourage and assist business to play a major role in support of regional industrial development programmes, mineral complexes and agricultural self-sufficiency. A Republican Administration will adhere to policies that reflect the complex origins of African conflicts, demonstrate that we know what US interests are, and back those interests in meaningful ways. We will recognize the important role of economic and military assistance programmes and will devote major resources to assisting African development and stability when such aid is given on a bilateral basis and contributes directly to American interests on the continent. In Southern Africa American policies must be guided by common sense and by our humanitarian principles. Republicans believe that our history has meaning for Africa in demonstrating that a multiracial society with guarantees of individual rights is possible and can work. We must remain open and helpful to all parties, whether in the new Zimbabwe, in Namibia, or in the Republic of South Africa. A Republican Administration will not endorse situations or constitutions, in whatever society, which are racist in purpose or in effect. It will not expect miracles, but will press for genuine progress in achieving goals consistent with American ideals.

Foreign Assistance and Regional Security. "The United States has included foreign assistance and regional security as a major element of its foreign policy for four decades. Properly administered and focussed, foreign assistance can be an effective means of promoting US foreign policy objectives, and serve to enhance American security by assisting friendly nations to become stronger and more capable of defending themselves and their regions against foreign subversion and attack. The threat posed to individual third-world nations is beyond the means of any of them to counter alone. A Republican Administration will seek to strengthen and assist regional security arrangements among nations prepared to assume the burden of their defence. No longer should American foreign assistance programmes seek to force acceptance of American governmental norms. The principal consideration should be whether or not extending assistance to a nation or group of nations will advance America's interest and objectives. The single-minded attempt to force acceptance of US values and standards of democracy has undermined several friendly nations, and has made possible the advance of Soviet interests in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and in the Western Hemisphere in the past four years.

"American foreign economic assistance is not a charitable venture. Charity is most effectively carried out by private entities. Only by private economic development by the people of the nations involved has poverty ever been overcome. US foreign economic assistance should have a catalytic effect on indigenous economic development, and should only be extended when it is consistent with America's foreign policy interest. America's foreign assistance programmes should be a vehicle for exporting the American idea. A Republican Administration will emphasize bilateral assistance programmes whenever possible. Bilateral programmes provide the best assurance that aid programmes will be fully accountable to the American taxpayer and wholly consistent with our foreign policy interests.

"The effort of the Carter Administration to diminish the role of American military assistance and foreign military sales in our foreign policy has had several negative effects. It has resulted in the export of many thousands of American jobs as the Soviet Union, Britain and France have taken sales prohibited to American manufacturers; it has reduced the ability of friendly nations to defend their independence against Soviet-sponsored subversion, resulting in several cases in abject takeovers by overtly pro-Soviet regimes; and it has weakened the fabric of the US alliance structure by making the United States appear to be an unreliable ally, a trend which can only lead to the undesirable attempt by nations fearful of their security to seek to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Decisions to provide military assistance should be made on the basis of US foreign policy objectives. Such assistance to any nation need not imply complete approval of a regime's domestic policy. Republicans pledge to strengthen America's presence abroad by well constructed programmes of military assistance to promote national and regional security.

International Trade and Economic Policy. "Republicans will conduct international economic policy in a manner that will stabilize the value of the dollar at home and abroad. The Republican Party believes the United States must adopt an aggressive export policy. For too long our trade policy has been geared towards helping our foreign trading partners. Now, we have to put the United States back on the world export map. We helped pull other countries out of the post-World War Two economic chaos; it is time to remedy our own crisis. Trade, especially exporting, must be high on our list of national priorities. The Republicans will put it there and will promote trade to ensure the long-term health of the US economy. Exports can play a key role in strengthening the US economy, creating jobs and improving our standard of living. Export promotion will be a central objective of international economic policy in a Republican Administration.

"A Republican Administration will emphasize a policy of free trade, but will expect our trading partners to do so as well. The failure of the Carter Administration energetically to pursue negotiations designed to improve the access of American exports to foreign markets has contributed, in part, to protectionist sentiment. Republicans believe that this nation's international trade balance can be improved through the elimination of disincentives for exporters. Statutory and regulatory requirements that inhibit exports should be reviewed and, where practical, eliminated. We further recognize that Government can play a role in promoting international trade by establishing incentives for exports, especially those for small and medium-size business. We pledge also to work with our trading partners to eliminate subsidies to exports and dumping.

Women's Rights. "We acknowledge the legitimate efforts of those who support or oppose ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment [approved by Congress in October 1971-March1972—see 25209 A]. We support equal rights and equal opportunities for women, without taking away traditional rights of women such as exemption from the military draft. We support the enforcement of all equal opportunity laws and urge the elimination of discrimination against women. We oppose any move which would give the federal Government more power over families. Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment is now in the hands of state legislatures, and the issues of the time extension and rescission are in the courts. The states have a constitutional right to accept or reject a constitutional amendment without federal interference or pressure. At the direction of the White House, federal departments launched pressure against states which refused to ratify ERA. Regardless of one's position on ERA, we demand that this cease.

Abortion. "There can be no doubt that the question of abortion, despite the complex nature of its various issues, is ultimately concerned with equality of rights under the law. While we recognize differing views on this question among Americans in general—and in our own party—we affirm our support of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children. We also support the congressional efforts to restrict the use of taxpayers' dollars for abortion. We will work for the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life."

The platform also called for an end to the US grain embargo against the Soviet Union, imposed in January 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan [see 30229 A], saying that the Republican Party opposed the "singling out of American farmers to bear the brunt" of an ineffective and ill-conceived policy.

Mr Reagan's Election as Presidential Candidate

Mr Reagan's overwhelming lead in the primary elections [see 30408 A] was reflected in the final vote on July 16 for the presidential nomination. Having been proposed by his national campaign chairman, Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada, Mr Reagan was elected on the first ballot with 1,939 votes to 37 for Representative John Anderson of Illinois, who had announced his intention on July 1 to contest the presidential election as an independent [ibid.]. Mr Bush, Mr Reagan's leading rival in the primaries, received 13 votes, one delegate voted for Mrs Anne Armstrong, a former US ambassador to Britain, and there were four abstentions.

Mr Reagan was born in Tampico (Illinois) on Feb. 6, 1911, the son of a shoe salesman, and graduated in economics and sociology from Eureka College (Illinois). After working for some years as a sports announcer for an Illinois radio station he was given a screen test and went to Hollywood as an actor. By 1942 he was an established star and, having spent most of the war years narrating military training films for the US Army, he returned to Hollywood in 1945 and from 1947 to 1952 was president of the Screen Actors Guild. In 1954 he switched from films to television and for the next eight years acted as host for a weekly drama programme. Originally a Democrat, Mr Reagan became a Republican on actively entering politics and began supporting conservative candidates and causes. He was elected Governor of California in 1966, defeating the incumbent Democrat, Mr Edmund G. "Pat" Brown [see 21742 A] and was re-elected in 1970 [see 24365 A]. While not seeking a third term as governor in 1974, he contested the 1976 presidential primaries against President Gerald Ford [see 27863 A] and was defeated by the latter by 117 votes at the ensuing Republican Convention in Kansas City [see 28037 A].

Election of Mr Bush as Vice-Presidential Candidate

On July 17 the convention approved the nomination of Mr Bush as the Republican vice-presidential candidate.

Mr Reagan had announced his choice of Mr Bush as his running mate earlier the same day following the breakdown of negotiations with Mr Ford on the terms under which the latter would have accepted the nomination.

During these negotiations, which also included Dr Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, and Mr Alan Greenspan, a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Mr Ford was reported to have proposed a division of powers between himself and Mr Reagan, with the latter acting like the chairman of a big corporation and Mr Ford as the chief executive officer. According to these reports, Mr Ford wanted control of the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget, and a veto over appointments to the White House staff. Although he had previously declined to be considered for the vice-presidential nomination, Mr Ford told a television interviewer on July 16 that he would not go to Washington and be a "figurehead" and would have to have "responsible assurances" that he would play a "meaningful role across the board in the basic and crucial and important decisions that have to be made in the four-year period".

In a broadcast interview on July 18, Mr Ford said that he and Mr Reagan had discussed changing the role of the vice-presidency "so that the Vice-President is more than a traditional officeholder that has limited power". He continued: "Under no circumstances did we discuss any decrease in the power and the responsibility of the presidency. We were trying to mesh in a management way the process by which we could give the President more time to concentrate on major things, and we almost made it. We might have made it if there had been more time."

Announcing his decision to the convention, Mr Reagan said: "Let me as quickly as I can straighten this out and bring it to a conclusion. It is true that a number of Republican leaders, people in our party, officeholders, feel, as I am sure many others felt, that a proper ticket would have included the former President of the United States, Gerald Ford. We have gone over this, and he and I have come to the conclusion that he can be of more value as the former President campaigning his heart out, as he has pledged to do, than as a member of the ticket. I respect his decision." Mr Reagan then disclosed that he had chosen Mr Bush, "a man who has wide experience in government, a man who told me that he can enthusiastically support the platform across the board". (For biography of Mr Bush see 30408 A.)

Mr Reagan's Acceptance Speech

Mr Reagan's speech accepting the Republican Party's presidential nomination was made at the convention's final session on July 17.

Mr Reagan said: "More than anything else I want my candidacy to unify our country; to renew the American spirit and sense of purpose. I want to carry our message to every American, regardless of party affiliation, who is a member of this community of shared values. Never before in our history have Americans been called upon to face three grave threats to our very existence, any one of which could destroy us. We face a disintegrating economy, a weakened defence, and an energy policy based on the sharing of scarcity. The major issue of this campaign is the direct political, personal and moral responsibility of Democratic Party leadership—in the White House and in the Congress—for this unprecedented calamity which has befallen us. They tell us they've done the most that humanly could be done. They say that the United States has had its day in the sun, that our nation has passed its zenith. They expect you to tell your children that the American people no longer have the will to cope with their problems; that the future will be one of sacrifice and few opportunities.

"My fellow citizens, I utterly reject that view. The American people, the most generous on earth, who created the highest standard of living, are not going to accept the notion that we can only make a better world for others by moving backwards ourselves. And those who believe we can have no business leading this nation. I will not stand by and watch this great country destroy itself under mediocre leadership that drifts from one crisis to the next, eroding our national will and purpose. We have come together here because the American people deserve better from those to whom they entrust our nation's highest offices, and we stand united in our resolve to do something about it. We need a rebirth of the American tradition of leadership at every level of government and in private life as well. The United States of America is unique in world history because it has a genius for leaders—many leaders—on many levels. . . . As your nominee, I pledge to you to restore to the federal Government the capacity to do the people's work without dominating their lives. I pledge to you a government that will not only work well but wisely, its ability to act tempered by prudence, and its willingness to do good balanced by the knowledge that government is never more dangerous than when our desire to have it help us blinds us to its great power to harm us.

". . . First, we must overcome something the present Administration has cooked up: a new and altogether indigestible economic stew, one part inflation, one part high unemployment, one part recession, one part runaway taxes, one part deficit spending seasoned with an energy crisis. It's an economic stew that has turned the national stomach. Ours are not problems of abstract economic theory. These are problems of flesh and blood; problems that cause pain and destroy the moral fibre of real people who should not suffer the further indignity of being told by the Government that it is all somehow their fault. We do not have inflation because—as Mr Carter says—we've lived too well. . . . Can anyone look at the record of this Administration and say 'Well done'? Can anyone compare the state of our economy when the Carter Administration took office with where we are today and say 'Keep up the good work'? Can anyone look at our reduced standing in the world today and say 'Let's have four more years of this'? I believe the American people are going to answer these questions, as you've answered them, in the first week of November and their answer will be 'No—we've had enough'. And then it will be up to us—beginning next Jan. 20—to offer an administration and congressional leadership of competence and more than a little courage.

"We must have the clarity of vision to see the difference between what is essential and what is merely desirable; and then the courage to bring our Government back under control. It is essential that we maintain both the forward momentum of economic growth and the strength of the safety net beneath those in our society who need help. We also believe it is essential that the integrity of all aspects of social security be preserved. Beyond these essentials, I believe it is clear our federal Government is overgrown and overweight. Indeed, it is time our Government should go on a diet. Therefore, my first act as chief executive will be to impose an immediate and thorough freeze on federal hiring. Then, we are going to enlist the very best minds from business, labour and whatever quarter to conduct a detailed review of every department, bureau and agency that lives by federal appropriation. And we are also going to enlist the help and ideas of many dedicated and hard-working government employees at all levels who want a more efficient government just as much as the rest of us do. I know that many of them are demoralized by the confusion and waste they confront in their work as a result of failed and failing policies.

"Our instructions to the groups we enlist will be simple and direct. We will remind them that government programmes exist at the sufferance of the American taxpayer and are paid for with money earned by working men and women, and programmes that represent a waste of their money—a theft from their pocket books—must have that waste eliminated or that programme must go. It must go by executive order where possible, by congressional action where necessary. Everything that can be run more effectively by state and local government we shall turn over to state and local government, along with the funding sources to pay for it. We are going to put an end to the money merry-go-round where our money becomes Washington's money, to be spent by states and cities exactly the way the federal bureaucrats tell us it has to be spent. I will not accept the excuse that the federal Government has grown so big and powerful that it is beyond the control of any President, any Administration or Congress. We are going to put an end to the notion that the American taxpayer exists to fund the federal Government. The federal Government exists to serve the American people and to be accountable to the American people. On Jan. 20 we are going to re-establish that truth.

"Also on that date we are going to initiate action to get substantial relief for our taxpaying citizens and action to put people back to work. None of this will be based on any new form of monetary tinkering or fiscal sleight of hand. We will simply apply to government the common sense that we all use in our daily lives. . . . The American people are carrying the heaviest peacetime tax burden in our nation's history—and it will grow even heavier, under present law, next January. We are taxing ourselves into economic exhaustion and stagnation, crushing our ability and incentive to save, invest and produce. This must stop. We must halt this fiscal self-destruction and restore sanity to our economic system. I've long advocated a 30 per cent reduction in income tax rates over a period of three years. This phased tax reduction would begin with a 10 per cent 'down payment' tax cut in 1981, which the Republicans in Congress and I have already proposed. A phased reduction of tax rates would go a long way towards easing the heavy burden on the American people. But we shouldn't stop there. Within the context of economic conditions and appropriate budget priorities during each fiscal year of my presidency, I would strive to go further. This would include improvement in business depreciation taxes so we can stimulate investment in order to get plants and equipment replaced, put more Americans back to work and put our nation back on the road to being competitive in world commerce. We will also work to reduce the cost of government as a percentage of our gross national product. The first task of national leadership is to set realistic and honest priorities in our policies and our budget, and I pledge that my Administration will do that.

". . . When we move from domestic affairs and cast our eyes abroad, we see an equally sorry chapter in the record of the present Administration. A Soviet combat brigade trains in Cuba, just 90 miles from our shores [see 30085 A]. A Soviet army of invasion occupies Afghanistan, further threatening our vital interests in the Middle East. America's defence strength is at its lowest ebb in a generation, while the Soviet Union is vastly outspending us in both strategic and conventional arms. Our European allies, looking nervously at the growing menace from the East, turn to us for leadership and fail to find it. And incredibly more than 50, as you've been told from this platform so eloquently already, more than 50 of our fellow Americans have been held captive for over eight months by a dictatorial foreign power [Iran] that hold us up to ridicule before the world [see page 30150; 30205 A]. Adversaries large and small test our will and seek to confound our resolve, but we are given weakness when we need strength, vacillation when the times demand firmness. The Carter Administration lives in the world of make-believe. Every day, it dreams up a response to that day's troubles, regardless of what happened yesterday and what will happen tomorrow. The Administration lives in a world where mistakes, even very big ones, have no consequence. The rest of us, however, live in the real world. It is here that disasters are overtaking our nation without any real response from the White House. I condemn the Administration's make-believe, its self-deceit and, above all, its transparent hypocrisy.

". . . It is the responsibility of the President of the United States, in working for peace, to ensure that the safety of our people cannot successfully be threatened by a hostile foreign power. As President, fulfilling that responsibility will be my No. 1 priority. We're not a warlike people. Quite the opposite. We always seek to live in peace. We resort to force infrequently and with great reluctance—and only after we've determined that it is absolutely necessary. We are awed—and rightly so—by the forces of destruction at loose in the world in this nuclear era. But neither can we be naive or foolish. Four times in my lifetime America has gone to war, bleeding the lives of its young men into the sands of island beachheads, the fields of Europe and the jungles and rice paddies of Asia. We know only too well that war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong. It is when they are weak that tyrants are tempted. We simply cannot learn these lessons the hard way again without risking our destruction. Of all the objectives we seek, first and foremost is the establishment of lasting world peace. We must always stand ready to negotiate in good faith, ready to pursue any reasonable avenue that holds forth the promise of lessening tensions and furthering the prospects of peace. But let our friends and those who may wish us ill take note:

the United States has an obligation to its citizens and to the people of the world never to let those who would destroy freedom dictate the future course of life on this planet. I would regard my election as proof that we have renewed our resolve to preserve world peace and freedom. That this nation will once again be strong enough to do that. . . .''

Mr Reagan concluded: "I have thought of something that's not a part of my speech and worried over whether I should do it. Can we doubt that only a divine providence placed this land, this island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe free? Jews and Christians enduring persecution behind the Iron Curtain; the boat people of South-East Asia, Cuba and of Haiti; the victims of drought and famine in Africa, the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, and our own countrymen held in savage captivity. I'll confess that I've been a little afraid to suggest what I'm going to suggest. I'm more afraid not to. Can we begin our crusade joined together in a moment of silent prayer? God bless America."—(International Herald Tribune - US International Communication Agency - Times) (*Prev. rep. Republican Presidential Candidatures 30408 A; 1976 Republican Convention 28037 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Transport Bill - Provisions and Enactment

The Transport Bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons on Nov. 15, 1979, and enacted on June 30, 1980, provided for a major reform of the bus licensing system and the reconstruction of the National Freight Corporation (NFC, set up under the 1968 Transport Act—see 24139 A) as a company operating under the Companies Acts. The changes had been promised in the Conservative Party's general election manifesto [see page 29635] and in the Queen's Speech of May 15, 1979 [see 29705 A], and were set out in policy documents issued by the Transport Department in August 1979 [see page 29832].

Among the main subsidiaries of the NFC were British Road Services, National Carriers Ltd, Roadline and Pickfords. Freightliners, originally set up under the 1968 Act as a joint subsidiary of the NFC (51 per cent) and the British Railways Board (49 per cent), became a wholly owned subsidiary of the British Railways Board under the 1978 Transport Act which received the Royal Assent on Aug. 2, 1978.

The Transport Bill was given a second reading in the House of Commons on Nov. 27, 1979, by 314 votes to 250 and in the House of Lords on April 24, 1980, without a division.

Mr Norman Fowler (Minister of Transport), moving the second reading in the Commons, said that the Bill made fundamental changes in the road service licensing system which had survived since the 1930 Road Traffic Act. Coming at an important point in the development of transport in Britain, the Bill aimed to increase the freedom of choice for the public, to provide a better range of transport services, and to take the state out of activities which it should not be in. The starting point of transport policy was the interest of the passenger and of the consumer. Others had a right to put their view, but in the final analysis government, in the form of legislation, must decide what was in the interest of the user of transport and must not be content simply to preserve the position of existing providers. The 1930 Road Traffic Act was based on the recommendations of the 1929 Royal Commission on Transport, and these proposals formed the basis of the law which had lasted to this day. This meant that the legislation governing the provision of passenger transport was formed in the decade after the First World War, a time when road signs, car headlights and third party insurance were all novel ideas. It was also a time when bus services were expanding at an unprecedented rate.

The Bill did not reduce in any way the safety requirements. It tackled the protectionist legislation which was designed and devised for a different age and for entirely different conditions. The 1929 Royal Commission reported at a time when bus services were expanding and expanding. That was not remotely the position today. The story of the last 30 years had been one of reducing bus services. In 1949 there were 17,000 million passenger journeys by bus. In 1959 the figure was 14,000 million and in 1969 it was 10,000 million. In 1979 the figure was expected to be 7,000 million. Bus use had halved since 1959, while in the same period the total mileage of all forms of passenger transport had doubled. In other words, buses had been carrying a smaller and smaller share of a growing market. This did not challenge the proposition that bus services had and should have an important role to play. But it did challenge the relevance of legal apparatus designed to check growth. The aim of the Royal Commission and of the 1930 Act was the creation not of competition but of a "controlled monopoly". The aim was not to encourage new operators but to prevent them, with the result that there were now fewer passengers and fewer services but increasing cost to the public not only through fares but through rates and taxes. In 1978 central and local government support totalled £291,000,000, compared with £23,000,000 in 1969.

The Bill made important changes to meet these different positions. In a number of important areas restrictions on new operators entering or existing operators expanding were being scrapped altogether. Safety restrictions would remain, but provided the operator could meet those safety requirements there would be no restrictions on him operating long distance express services and excursions and tours.

The Government did not believe that the public interest was served by restricting the number of express bus services—those over 30 miles in length. The Bill therefore removed obstacles put in the way of operators who wanted to run inter-city bus services, thus introducing free competition between operators who wanted to run inter-city coach services between major cities.

Restrictions on excursions and tours would also be abolished. Even the most diehard protectionist must be daunted by the prospect of having to defend a system requiring that an operator wishing to run an extended tour of British castles might have to appear before the traffic commissioners three or four times.

A third area where restrictions were being scrapped was car sharing. The case in principle was clear. If the Government could persuade only a small proportion of motorists coming to work each day to share cars, there would be great savings in energy and congestion. During the morning peak period in London about 130,000 cars came into the centre carrying 176,000 people. The major change that was being made was to lift restrictions on advertising. At present it was lawful to advertise a car share on notice boards at a works, a club or a church. One could not, however, advertise at one's local newsagent. This was an absurd position and one which the Bill would change.

With local services—those of less than 30 miles—where restrictions were to be substantially modified, existing operators now enjoyed a privileged position. In future, however, the commissioners would grant a new licence unless they were satisfied that to do so would be against the public interest. In London the system was changed, so that for the first time a new operator had a chance of appeal. At present the London Transport Executive (LTE) operated, in effect, as its own traffic commissioners. No one else could run a service without permission from the LTE. In future, however, a prospective operator would be able to appeal to the commissioners. Dealing with a provision concerning trial areas, Mr Fowler said that under the legislation he intended to establish a limited number of trial areas—perhaps two or three—in different parts of the country, where there would be a minimum of restrictions and no road service licences would be required. He continued: "Let me emphasize that the trial areas will come into existence not on the insistence of the Government but on the application of the locally elected county councils. The House will be pleased to know that a number of county councils have shown considerable interest in this scheme. It also means, of course, that local authorities that continue to give support to particular services will be presented with a better choice of options on whom they support and at what price. It will enable local authorities to get the best possible value for money."

The second part of the Bill dealt with the NFC, under whose umbrella there were 50 subsidiary companies, ranging from road haulage to removals, from cold storage to package holidays, from waste disposal to parcel delivery. Although the corporation was in competition with the private sector, it did not have the commercial freedom and opportunities open to private firms and had been shielded in the past from the full rigours of normal commercial disciplines. The Bill's aim was to transfer control of the NFC firmly into the hands of the private sector, and the Government did not want a majority or a controlling interest in the corporation. The NFC's legal form would be changed into that of a normal Companies Act company with an appropriate capital structure, including shares which could be sold to private investors. The change to an equity financed company was strongly supported by the NFC board. The decision on when the Government would sell shares in the company would depend on a range of factors, such as general stock market conditions and the track record of the company itself. However, the overall objective was to sell, as quickly as market conditions allowed, a controlling interest in the company to private investors, and if an interest were retained it would certainly be no more than a small one. At the same time, the Government would ensure that there was a full opportunity for employees of the company to acquire shares, and it was hoped that as many as possible would want to do this.

Mr Albert Booth, chief opposition spokesman on transport, said that the Bill, if operated in the way the Minister envisaged, would pose a serious threat, possibly a threat of irreparable damage, to bus services in many parts of the country. The reason why so many miles of road and so many potential routes had no buses had nothing to do with the licensing system, but everything to do with modern conditions being such that it was impossible for private or public operators to make a profit by running buses on them. If the Bill resulted in new operators coming forward to obtain licences, of one thing they could be certain—they would come forward to seek licences for the profitable routes, not for routes where the operators were losing money. The Minister argued that the present licensing system deterred people from applying for new licences. But in almost every traffic area a large number of new service licences had been granted over the past two years of operation. Even in London the overwhelming number of applicants seeking agreement to operate within the LTE area had been successful.

The Bill provided for the handing over of an important national asset, the NFC, to private interests. The NFC was paying into the Exchequer about £8,000,000 a year in return for the financial support which the taxpayer gave. The Minister had the audacity to ask the House to pass a Bill which would enable him to fix the nominal value of shares through which he would sell off this public asset to private interests. The nation would not only lose £8,000,000 in income but would also lose control of an important element of the freight transport system. The NFC with only 20 per cent of the market was still the largest operator in the field, and it was an industry which had more than its fair share of small and dubious concerns. The Bill, in its licensing provisions, was a cowboys' charter and in its provisions for the NFC a blank cheque to dispose of an important public asset.

In the division the Government were supported by six Liberals and by Mr William Ross (Official Unionist), while the two Scottish National Party (SNP) members and Mr Dafydd Thomas (*Plaid Cymru*) voted with the opposition.

Having been considered by a standing committee, the Bill passed its remaining stages in the Commons on March 24-25, 1980. During the committee stage in the Lords a government amendment giving a new power to local education authorities (LEAs) to carry fare paying adults on their own school buses, where they had spare capacity, was approved on May 13 by 101 votes to 91.

Lord Bellwin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Environment, explained that the present position was that buses provided on contract to LEAs might pick up adults and charge them, but that in the small number of cases where the authorities themselves owned the vehicles, they had no powers to take fare paying adults. The amendment would allow for the maximum flexibility, in that school buses would be able to carry other passengers not only on journeys to and from school, but also at times of the day and of the year when they were not required for their primary purposes.

Having completed its committee stage in the Lords on May 19 and its remaining stages on June 6 and 19 respectively, the Bill, as stated above, received the Royal Assent on June 30. Mr Fowler had told the Commons on June 25 that he planned to bring the road service licensing provisions and those removing the remaining restrictions on the advertising of car sharing into effect in October 1980.—(Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. page 29832; Queen's Speech 29705*)

A. ST LUCIA — Government Changes - Associated Political Developments - Relations with Venezuela - Hurricane Disaster

A number of changes took place in the membership of the St Lucia Cabinet during the first half of 1980, culminating in a major redistribution of portfolios on July 1; following these changes the Cabinet was composed as follows.

Mr Allan F. L. Louisy ..	Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Home Affairs, Housing and Information
Mr George Odlum	Foreign Affairs, Trade and Tourism
Mr Michael Pilgrim	Development, Planning and Industry
Mr Jon Odlum	Community Development, Youth and Sport
Mr Bruce Williams	Health and Local Government
Mr Evans Calderon	Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs
Mr Kenneth Foster	Communications, Works and Transport
Mr Peter Josie..	Agriculture, Lands, Fisheries, Labour and Co-operatives

The most significant feature of the July 1 changes was the abolition of the designation Deputy Prime Minister, hitherto held by Mr George Odlum, and the transfer from Mr Odlum to other ministers of responsibility for Industry and for Information (the latter portfolio having been held by Mr Odlum in addition to those listed on page 30271).

As stated in 30271 A, Mr Louisy (63) and Mr George Odlum (46)—respectively the leader and deputy leader of the St Lucia Labour Party (SLP)—had since that party's victory in the July 1979 general election come into serious conflict as a result of Mr Louisy's rejection of a bid by Mr Odlum to succeed him as Prime Minister. Whereas the central executive committee of the SLP had in early 1980 endorsed Mr Louisy's leadership by 23 votes to none with two abstentions, the 12 SLP MPs were reported to be divided six to five in Mr Odlum's favour, with the then Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs, Mr Winston Cenac, endorsing neither faction of the party.

In order to strengthen his support within the Cabinet, Mr Louisy in January 1980 appointed two additional ministers (including Mr Bruce Williams, hitherto a parliamentary secretary, as Minister without Portfolio). The resignations subsequently occurred during June of Mr Cenac and of Mr Kenny Anthony (then Minister-designate for Education and Culture), both of whom took this action in protest against the continuing factional rivalry within the Government.

In furtherance of their protest over Mr Louisy's nomination of Mr Boswell Williams as acting Governor-General of St Lucia [ibid.], MPs belonging to the Odlum faction of the SLP, together with all five MPs of the opposition United Workers' Party, boycotted Mr Williams's speech from the throne at the opening of a new session of the House of Assembly. (Opposition to Mr Williams's appointment centred on his involvement in a controversial legal dispute with the Government over the ownership of an estate which included the Soufriere sulphur springs, regarded as an important potential energy resource—see page 29592.)

During May and June 1980 the crisis within the SLP deepened, and Mr Louisy and his supporters were subjected to a campaign by the Odlum faction alleging that they had been involved in various malpractices, which led one pro-Louisy minister, Mr Kenneth Foster, to issue a public warning to "certain individuals who hold positions in government" that he was prepared to take legal action in respect of defamatory allegations. Mr Foster and Mr Odlum came into direct conflict in early June when the latter (as Minister of Information) ordered the closure of the independent station Radio Caribbean International after its French owners had refused to rescind the dismissal of an announcer who was reputedly a strong supporter of the Odlum faction. Mr Foster (as Minister of Communications) subsequently ordered the station to reopen, stating that Mr Odlum's action, which had been represented by the latter as having the backing of the Cabinet, was "unilateral on the part of the Minister of Information".

Following this development, the St Lucia Chamber of Commerce called upon the Government to resign and call a fresh general election as "the only way of resolving these continuing undesirable political situations", stating that "it now appears conditions have further deteriorated to the extent that the fundamental and constitutional rights are openly being disregarded by ministers and individuals in authority" and that "it is evident to any right-thinking St Lucian that any potential investor expecting to be protected by the law and the Constitution would have second thoughts".

Mr Odlum issued the following statement after the July 1 cabinet changes (which were seen as marking the end of the dispute within the SLP):

> "The people of St Lucia have been very confused and demoralized in recent months because of what is popularly known as the leadership struggle in our Government. It has been said that this leadership struggle affected the economy adversely and is creating great concern among St Lucians. . . . In recent weeks the Prime Minister and myself have held discussions with . . . the St Lucia Christian Council and the Civil Service Association, and we have had representations from a number of other groups like the teachers and other interested persons in the community.
>
> "As a result of this collective community negotiation we have decided to settle our differences on the leadership issue and to work together with whatever Cabinet emerges in the weeks ahead in the interest of St Lucia. This was done with calm and objectivity and we now hope that the people of St Lucia will get together with the leadership in the country and move to project the general interest of our people."

Relations with Venezuela

Mr Louisy paid a two-day state visit to Venezuela in late February 1980 at the invitation of President Luis Herrera Campins, at the conclusion of which a treaty of friendship and co-operation between the two countries was signed. It was announced that Venezuela would provide wide-ranging technical and financial assistance to St Lucia in the fields of agriculture, education, sports, health, transport, tourism and energy. In the energy field, Venezuela was expected to guarantee regular supplies of petroleum products to St Lucia on favourable financial terms and to assist in a technical survey of the island's own geothermal energy resources.

Hurricane Disaster

St Lucia was among several territories struck in early August by hurricane Allen (the first Atlantic/Caribbean hurricane of 1980), whose strongest winds of over 170 miles per hour were among the most intense ever recorded in the region, although the loss of life was less than in some milder hurricanes which had passed closer to major population centres in previous years.

After causing severe damage (but no loss of life) in Barbados, hurricane Allen struck St Lucia on Aug. 4, devastating banana plantations and destroying many buildings (including a number of important industrial plants); about 17 people were killed and over 6,000 made homeless. In the following days the worst effects of the hurricane were felt in southern Haiti (where at least 67 people died, although the final toll was expected to be higher, and official estimates put the economic damage at over $400,000,000, equivalent to about two-fifths of the country's gross domestic product); in northern Jamaica (where there were at least six deaths, with 4,000 people rendered homeless and economic damage of about £80,000,000); and in Cuba (where four deaths were reported and extensive economic damage was caused, particularly in western areas).

Major precautions were subsequently taken along Mexico's Yucatan coast and the Texas coast of the United States and in the Gulf of Mexico (particularly in respect of offshore oil operations), but damage in these areas, although substantial in parts, was far less than had been anticipated as a result of an unexpectedly rapid diminution in the hurricane's intensity on Aug. 9-10. Reported deaths included four persons killed when an oil rig capsized as it was being towed out of the hurricane's path, and two persons killed in Texas.—(Insight - St Lucia High Commission, London - Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - Latin America Weekly Report - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. St Lucia 30271 A; Hurricanes 30091 B*)

A. HONDURAS — Liberal Party Victory in Constituent Assembly Elections

In the first national elections to be held in Honduras since 1971, the Liberal Party on April 20, 1980, won a surprise victory with 52 per cent of the votes cast and 35 out of 71 seats in a new Constituent Assembly, which would have the task of choosing a provisional President, drafting a new constitution and establishing procedures for the election of a civilian President. The National Party, having close links with the armed forces, won 44.5 per cent and 33 seats, and the small centrist Innovation and Unity Party (PINU) 3.5 per cent and the remaining three seats.

Some 75 per cent of the electorate of 1,200,000 people went to the polls, notwithstanding a campaign in favour of abstention carried out by the leftist Honduran Patriotic Front, grouping nearly 50 parties and organizations which were ineligible to stand or illegal (including the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Communist parties and the Christian Democratic Party, which was banned from standing on a technicality). The National Party admitted defeat on April 22 and conceded that the elections had been "clean".

The United States had in the past year strongly encouraged moves towards the establishment of civilian rule and had doubled its economic aid for 1980 to $45,000,000 and allocated $3,900,000 in military aid in an effort to stabilize Honduras as a buffer state between Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. It was also believed to have put pressure on a group of dissident officers in February 1980 not to carry out a coup against the junta.

The last Liberal Government, headed by President Ramón Villeda Morales, had been overthrown in 1963 by Gen. Oswaldo López Arellano [see 19722 A]. Since then the country had been almost uninterruptedly under military rule, except for a short period in 1971-72 under a National Party President, Sr Ramón Ernesto Cruz (constitutionally elected in March 1971—see 24562 A), before Gen. López Arellano again seized power in December 1972 [see 25656 B].

Indications of an eventual return to civilian rule were first given in 1976 by Col. Juan Alberto Melgar Castro, President López Arellano's successor [see 27113 A; 27708 B], and an electoral law was approved providing for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly and a resumption of political activity [see 29036 B]. Elections were set for 1979 [ibid.] but were subsequently postponed to the following year, Gen. Policarpo Paz García confirming on taking power as head of the military junta in 1978 that elections would be held in 1980 [see 29328 B].



(*Carpress*)

Unlike its neighbours, Honduras had hitherto been free from guerrilla activity, although the "Francisco Morazón Front" (named after a 19th-century military leader) had recently emerged with the intention of pursuing a "revolutionary struggle" after the elections. Furthermore, in an effort to forestall an intensification of rural unrest such as that which was currently being experienced in neighbouring Central American countries and which had precipitated the 1972 coup [see 25656 B], the Honduran junta had already announced a literacy campaign and a land reform programme (on which, however, little progress had been made). [For land reform developments under President Melgar Castro, see 27708 B and 27363 A.]

It was reported in May that an Amnesty International delegation would shortly visit Honduras to investigate the conditions of political prisoners, among whom were nine members of the Socialist Party (Paso) who had been arrested in April. Earlier, at the end of 1979, the Honduran Church accused the military junta of violating human rights by expelling a priest from the country and subsequently said that it had "excommunicated" the members of the junta for this act. The expulsion led to the temporary occupation by students of cathedrals in Tegucigalpa (the capital) and San Pedro Sula.—(Latin America Weekly Report - Le Monde - Guardian - Times - New York Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 29900 B; Developments in Nicaragua 30317 A; El Salvador 30322 A; Guatemala 30320 A*)

B. GREECE - TURKEY — Reopening of Aegean Air Corridors for Civilian Flights - Agreement to resume Bilateral Talks on Other Issues

Turkish Airlines resumed its service of scheduled passenger flights across the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey on July 14, 1980, thus becoming the first airline from either country to do so since the lifting in February 1980 of all restrictions on the civilian use of the air space over the Aegean in accordance with an agreement originally reached in August 1976 but not subsequently implemented [see 29936 A; page 27988]. At the same time the Greek airline Olympic Airways announced that it intended to resume flights across the Aegean to Turkey in late 1980.

The air corridors over the Aegean had been closed in 1974 shortly after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the ensuing hostilities between Greece and Turkey [see 26661 A; 26709 A]. Turkey had on Aug. 6, 1974, unilaterally extended its flight information region to the median line between the two countries, whereupon the Greek authorities had declared the air routes over the remaining (western) half of the Aegean closed to all foreign air traffic, and no international traffic had been permitted to use Aegean air space thereafter. In implementation of the 1976 agreement, however, Turkey informed the Greek civil aviation authorities on Feb. 22, 1980, of the withdrawal of the 1974 instruction, whereupon the Greek authorities announced on Feb. 23 the reopening of Greek Aegean air space to international civilian air traffic. The British air company Dan Air resumed its use of the Aegean route on Feb. 29.

The reopening of the Aegean air corridors was widely seen as a development towards the resumption of talks between Greece and Turkey on a number of outstanding bilateral issues on which the two sides had remained in deadlock for several years. These included Turkish opposition to the re-integration of the Greek armed forces into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), from which they had been withdrawn in 1974 in protest at the latter's alleged failure to intervene over the Cyprus issue [see 26709 A], as well as the disputed sovereignty over the continental shelf between the two countries [see 29936 A].

Notwithstanding the resumption of civilian traffic, the use of Aegean air space for military purposes also continued to be a source of friction between the two countries (Greece claiming a 10-mile coastal limit of aerial sovereignty, whereas Turkey recognized only a six-mile limit). Consequently Turkish military aircraft were in March and again in May 1980 escorted by Greek fighters out of the zone claimed by Greece.

Immediately after the spring ministerial session of NATO Foreign Ministers held in Ankara on June 25-26 [see 30420 A], the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, respectively Mr Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Mr Hayrettin Erkmen, had talks in the Turkish capital on June 28-29. At the conclusion of the meeting it was announced that the two Governments had agreed to resume bilateral talks in late 1980 and to create a "propitious climate" by refraining from "any act tending to discredit the other country".—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. 29936 A*)

A. DOMINICA — General Election - Formation of New Government

Following the expiry in April 1980 of the term of the House of Assembly elected in 1975 [see 27217 B], it was announced that Dominica's first general election since the attainment of full independence in 1978 [see 29525 A] would be held on July 21. The outgoing Government had been formed by Mr Oliver J. Seraphine without a clear party orientation following the removal from office of Mr Patrick R. John in June 1979 [see 30269 A], which was accompanied by a split in the Dominica Labour Party (DLP) which had won 16 of the 21 elective seats in the 1975 election.

The DLP contested the 1980 election under Mr John's leadership, while Mr Seraphine led the Dominica Democratic Labour Party (DDLP), which was formally inaugurated as a separate party shortly before the commencement of the election campaign; both parties nominated candidates in all 21 constituencies. The conservative Dominica Freedom Party (DFP), led by Miss Mary Eugenia Charles, which had won three seats in the 1975 election and had formed the official opposition in the outgoing House of Assembly, nominated 19 candidates. A recently formed "new left" grouping, the Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA), led by Mr Atherton Martin (for whose dismissal from the Seraphine Cabinet in October 1979 see page 30270), nominated 16 candidates, and there were also five independent candidates.

The July 21 election was held on the basis of a voters' register compiled in late 1979 with the assistance of the Barbados Electoral Office, and there was a 79.9 per cent turnout among the electorate of 38,452. The atmosphere of the election campaign was described by *Insight* of July 1980 as one of "mutual animosity, with character assassination and blatant lies being bandied about irrespective of an earlier desire by some parties to have an electoral code of conduct". The results of the election were as follows.

	Seats	Votes	Per cent
DFP	17	16,083	52.34
DDLP	2	5,944	19.34
DLP	0	5,195	16.91
DLMA	0	2,464	8.02
Independents	2	1,043	3.39

The wide margin of the DFP's victory was generally attributed to that party's reputation for integrity and cohesion, which had helped to attract support among poorer voters in rural areas (who had previously tended to regard the DFP as the party of the richer classes in the capital, Roseau) during a period when all other parties had been affected in varying degrees by allegations of corruption or by internal dissension. Factors in the relatively poor showing of the DDLP were reported to include widespread opposition to Mr Seraphine's refusal to call the election until the last possible date and a recent controversy over his Government's contacts with a US-based corporation (said to be linked with the family of the former Shah of Iran) from which the Government had in April 1980 sought to obtain a substantial loan but had failed to secure the necessary approval of the House of Assembly.

Mr Seraphine lost his seat in the election, and of the three former ministers in his Cabinet who stood for election as DDLP candidates (Mr Ferdinand F. Parillon, Mr Luke T. Corriette and Mr Michael A. Douglas), only the last-named was successful. Other defeated DDLP candidates included a leading Marxist politician, Mr Rosie Douglas (Mr Michael A. Douglas's brother), and a former member of the John Cabinet, Mr Eustace H. Francis. (The Douglas brothers had each originally been associated with "new left" organizations, but had transferred their allegiance to the DDLP in early 1980 following a dispute over co-operation among such organizations to form the DLMA.)

The defeated candidates of the DLP included, in addition to Mr John himself, a former member of his Cabinet (Mr Victor A. J. Riviere) and a former Speaker of the House of Assembly (Mr Pershing A. Waldron). The two independent candidates to be elected were Mr Conrad W. Cyrus (an independent member of the outgoing House) and Mr Jenner B. M. Armour (the former acting President—see 30269 A), in neither of whose constituencies had a DFP candidate been nominated.

The new Government formed by Miss Charles after the election included two former members of the Seraphine Cabinet (for whose dismissal in January 1980 see page 30270), namely Mr Brian Alleyne (a former senator who was now an elected MP) and Mr Charles Maynard (the only senator in the new Cabinet). The distribution of portfolios was as follows.

Miss Mary Eugenia Charles	Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Development
Mr Roland David	Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs
Mr Brian G. K. Alleyne	Home Affairs, Industrial Relations and Housing
Mr Heskeith Alexander	Agriculture, Lands, Co-operatives and Trade
Mr Henry Dyer	Communications, Works, Tourism and Industry
Mr Charles Maynard	Education, Health, Youth Affairs and Sports

Miss Charles (61) was a barrister and the daughter of an influential landowner. She said after her appointment as Prime Minister that the DFP was a "liberal, democratic and anti-communist" party, and that her Government would pursue a non-aligned foreign policy and would seek foreign investment in Dominica in order to promote industrial development, since the agricultural sector could not provide sufficient new jobs to overcome the country's serious unemployment problem. (Dominica High Commission, London - Insight - Financial Times - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30269 A*)

B. AUSTRALIA — Mr Sinclair's Return to Federal Cabinet

Mr Ian Sinclair, deputy leader of the National Country Party (the junior partner in the ruling coalition), who had resigned from the federal Cabinet as Minister for Primary Industry in September 1979 [see 29996 A], was sworn in on Aug. 19, 1980, as Minister for Special Trade Representations. He succeeded Senator Douglas Scott, who had resigned to make way for him after holding the portfolio since December 1979 [see 30074 A].

Mr Sinclair had been acquitted in a Sydney court on Aug. 14, 1980, on nine charges of forging, uttering and making false statements in the annual returns of funeral companies of which he was a director.—(Australian Information Service) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 30074 A*)

C. NEW ZEALAND — Cabinet Changes

Mr Robert Muldoon, the New Zealand Prime Minister, announced on Aug. 14 the following cabinet changes arising from the resignation of Mr Frank Gill as Minister of Defence and Police on being appointed New Zealand ambassador to the United States: (i) Mr David Thomson, Minister of State, Leader of the House of Representatives and Minister of State Services, became Minister of Defence while retaining his other portfolios; (ii) Mr Benjamin Couch, Postmaster General and Minister of Maori Affairs, became Minister of Police while retaining the Maori Affairs portfolio; (iii) Mr Warren Cooper succeeded Mr Couch as Postmaster General while retaining the portfolios of Tourism and Regional Development.—(New Zealand News UK) (*Prev. rep. 29499 B*)

University of North Carolina Greensboro

A. CHINA — Internal Political Developments, June 1978 to August 1980

Between June 1978 and August 1980 there was a drastic reversal within China of those policies which had been introduced during the Cultural Revolution (i.e. from mid-1960s) and had continued up to the arrest in October 1976 of the "gang of four"—Mr Zhang Chunqiao (Chang Chun-chiao), Mr Wang Hongwen (Wang Hung-wen), Miss Jiang Qing (Chiang Ching) and Mr Yao Wenyuan (Yao Wen-yuan) [see page 28206]. Whilst supporters of the "gang of four" were removed from office, many of them being arrested and some executed, thousands of people who had been disgraced during the Cultural Revolution, or even earlier, were rehabilitated, and some were appointed to high Communist Party or government posts. This process culminated in the posthumous rehabilitation of Mr Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-chi), the former President, who had been removed from his government and party posts in 1968 as the leading "revisionist" [see 23069 A]. Although lip service continued to be paid to the memory of Chairman Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) who died in September 1976 [see 28053 A], he ceased to be the centre of a personality cult, and his theories and policies were subjected to increasingly severe criticism.

A session of the National People's Congress in June 1979 abolished the revolutionary committees set up during the Cultural Revolution as organs of local government and replaced them by elected people's congresses. It also adopted a code of criminal law, for the first time since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and a number of laws intended to regularize judicial procedure. Other policy changes during this period included the restoration of property confiscated from former capitalists during the Cultural Revolution, the restoration of their political rights to former landlords, greater freedom for literature and the arts and increased religious toleration.

The dominant political figure during this period was not Mr Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng), the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Communist Party, but Mr Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping), First Deputy Premier and a Vice-Chairman of the party. One of his closest political associates, Mr Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang), was elected to the party's Political Bureau in December 1978, and promoted to its Standing Committee and appointed to the newly-revived office of General Secretary in February 1980. At the same session of the party's Central Committee in February 1980 another of Mr Deng's supporters, Mr Zhao Ziyang (Chao Tzu-yang), was also elected to the Standing Committee, and his four leading opponents on the Political Bureau were removed from their party posts.

The changes introduced during this period stimulated popular demands for more radical reforms. Posters calling for greater democracy and criticizing Chairman Mao began to appear in Peking in November 1978, apparently with the support of Mr Deng's faction, and a number of unofficial newspapers voicing these demands began publication. A series of peasant demonstrations in Peking and riots by unemployed young people in Shanghai and other cities in the early months of 1979 led to a reaction, however; two of the dissident leaders were imprisoned, the poster campaign was suppressed and the unofficial press was forced to cease publication.

These and related developments are described below—proper names being given in the Pinyin spelling adopted in 1979 [see 29625 A], with the forms previously used being generally shown in parentheses at their first appearance. (Details of wide-ranging changes in the membership of party and state bodies immediately prior to or in connexion with a session of the National People's Congress held from Aug. 30 to Sept. 10, 1980, will be given in a subsequent article.)

Campaign against Supporters of "Gang of Four"

The campaign against the supporters of the "gang of four", which had been in progress since their arrest [see pages 28718; 29191], continued throughout the second half of 1978. At mass meetings at which they were denounced details were revealed for the first time of a number of atrocities said to have been committed during the Cultural Revolution.

The campaign against the "gang of four" involved the condemnation of many aspects of the Cultural Revolution. The Peking newspaper *Guangming (Kwangming) Daily* on Nov. 15, 1978, attacked the article *Comments on the New Historical Play "Hai Rui (Jui) dismissed from Office"*, published in 1965, which is regarded as the starting point of the Cultural Revolution [see page 21577], and stated on Dec. 29 that Miss Jiang Qing had ordered Mr Yao Wenyuan to write it. *Hai Rui dismissed from Office* was revived on the stage in February 1979.

The Peking *People's Daily* (the Communist Party organ) on Dec. 15, 1978, referred with approval to the July 1967 revolt at Wuhan in Hubei (Hupeh) province, which had been denounced at the time as "counter-revolutionary" [see pages 22185, 22945].

The article stated: "On Jan. 4, 1967, Tao Zhu (Tao Chu), who was then director of the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was overthrown on trumped-up charges by Lin Biao [Marshal Lin Piao, the former Defence Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party, who died while fleeing China in 1971—see 25437 A], Chen Boda [Chen Po-ta, formerly chairman of the party's Cultural Revolution Group and member of the Political Bureau, expelled from the party in the early 1970s—see 25437 A; page 26136] and Jiang Qing. Three days later they seized power over the municipal government and party committee in Shanghai, giving the signal to other careerists and conspirators to seize power elsewhere [see pages 21987-89]. . . . Troops in many places took action against the conspiracy of the Lin-Chen-Jiang group. . . . Mass resistance was mounting everywhere, till it reached a dramatic climax on July 20, when more than 1,000,000 army men and civilians in Wuhan demonstrated on the streets against Wang Li [Mr Tao Zhu's successor—see page 21993], a member of the Lin-Chen-Jiang group who was there to suppress the masses. . . ." The article thus not only rehabilitated Mr Tao Zhu [see below] and the Wuhan revolt, but condemned the setting up of the revolutionary committees.

The reaction against the Cultural Revolution, together with the desire to promote tourism, led to the revival of many practices which had been banned as "bourgeois" [see page 21580]. It was reported on Oct. 30 that ballroom dancing and massage parlours were now permitted, and that a curio and antique shop in Shanghai had resumed business after being closed for 10 years. A broadcast on Nov. 20 called for increased production of Western-style clothes to meet the demand.

Rehabilitation of "Revisionists" and "Rightists"

The campaign against the "gang of four" was accompanied by the wholesale rehabilitation of persons imprisoned or disgraced during the Cultural Revolution. In Fuzhou (Foochow, in Fujian—Fukien—province) for example, 340 people convicted of spying for the United States and Taiwan were rehabilitated on Dec. 6, 1978. Official statements, however, suggested that this process was meeting with opposition in some areas.

Mr Jiang Hua (Chiang Hua), president of the Supreme People's Court, addressed meetings of provincial judicial officials in July and August 1978. A summary of his speeches published in *The People's Daily* said that in some regions many people unjustly convicted were still in prison, and emphasized that "obtaining confessions by force and giving them credence are activities in violation of party discipline and state laws".

The New China News Agency reported on Nov. 16, 1978, that all the remaining "bourgeois rightists" purged in 1957 [see 15839 A] had recently had their designation removed and had been given appropriate work.

Cabinet Changes, August to December 1978

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Aug. 18, 1978, appointed Mr Yao Yilin Minister of Commerce *vice* Mr Wang Lei [see also below] and Mr Qian Min (Chien Min) Minister of the Fourth Ministry of Machine-building in succession to Mr Wang Cheng, who had died. On Dec. 26 [see page 29626] the committee appointed Mr Guo Weicheng (Kuo Wei-cheng) Railways Minister in place of Mr Tuan Chunyi, who had been appointed first secretary of the Henan (Honan) provincial party; Mr Wang Zigang (Wang Tzu-kang) Minister of Posts and Telecommunications *vice* Mr Chung Fuxiang (Chung Fu-hsiang); and Mr Wang Renzhong (Wang Jen-chung) a Deputy Premier. Mr Wang Renzhong (71) had taken a leading part in the Wuhan revolt of 1967 as mayor of the city and first secretary of the Hubei (Hupeh) Communist Party, and had been denounced as the leader of the "handful of capitalist-roaders" in the province [see pages 22185; 22945].

Revival of Trade Union Federation, Communist Youth League and Women's Federation

The All-China Federation of Trade Unions held its first conference since 1957 in Peking on Oct. 11-21, 1978. The federation's newspaper, *The Workers' Daily*, which had been suppressed in 1966, resumed publication on Oct. 6.

Addressing the opening session of the congress, Mr Deng Xiaoping said: "All our enterprises without exception should have democratic management, and this should be combined with centralized leadership. Workshop directors, section chiefs and group heads must in the future be elected by the workers in the unit. Major issues in an enterprise should be discussed by workers' congresses or general membership meetings, at which leading cadres of the enterprise must listen to the views of the workers and accept criticism and supervision by them. Such congresses and meetings have the right to suggest to higher levels that certain leading or managing personnel be punished or replaced for serious negligence of duty or for a bad style of work. The trade union in an enterprise will be the functioning body between workers' congresses and general membership meetings. . . ."

Mr Ni Zhifu (Ni Chih-fu), chairman of the trade union federation and a member of the Communist Party Political Bureau, said in a report: "In December 1966 the office building of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions was occupied by force and *The Workers' Daily* was closed and sealed, at the personal instigation of Jiang Qing. . . . Many trade unions at the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional levels, as well as basic-level trade unions, were battered and crushed. Their office buildings were occupied by force, properties divided and files lost. . . . In 1975 the party Central Committee decided to prepare for the convocation of the ninth national congress of trade unions. The sinister cohorts of the gang of four usurped the leadership of the preparatory group for this congress, turned the preparatory group into a secret liaison centre carrying out their conspiracies, did many evil things and tried to change the trade unions into their tools for usurping party and state leadership. . . ."

The first union to resume its activities, after 12 years' suspension, was the All-China Federation of Railway Workers' Unions, which held its national congress from Oct. 31 to Nov. 8, 1978. The federation was stated to have 2,400,000 members.

The Communist Youth League held its first congress since 1964 in Peking on Oct. 16-26, 1978. The congress adopted a new constitution for the league and elected its central committee, which approved at its first meeting a new charter for the Young Pioneers, the organization for children between seven and 14.

The Communist Youth League was dissolved in 1966, when it was replaced by the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers by the Little Red Soldiers [see page 21986]. It was revived in 1968, although the Red Guards continued to exist for some years, being mentioned in the party constitution of 1969 but not in that of 1977 [see pages 22949; 23378; 24699; 28722].

The All-China Women's Federation held its first congress since 1957 in Peking on Sept. 8-17, 1978. A speaker at the congress said that Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" had disbanded the federation and forced it to suspend its activities for 11 years.

Press Campaign on Re-evaluation of Chairman Mao's Thought

From June 1978 onwards the press repeatedly used the slogans "seek truth from facts" and "practice is the only criterion of truth", and emphasized that Chairman Mao must not be regarded as an infallible genius and that his thought must be reinterpreted in the light of changing circumstances. This campaign, although it was nominally directed against the practices of Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" and was supported by quotations from Chairman Mao himself, represented a further development of the tendency to play down the personality cult of Chairman Mao which had become apparent in the early months of the year [see page 29190].

The campaign was launched on June 1, 1978, by the *Guangming Daily* with an article declaring that not Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought but practice was the criterion of truth. On July 1 all the Peking newspapers published a speech made by Chairman Mao in 1962 in which he emphasized that "my mistakes must not be kept hidden", admitted that "there are many problems in the work of economic construction which I still do not understand", and stated that "for shortcomings and mistakes in our work of the last few years [i.e. during the 'great leap forward' period inaugurated in 1958—see 16511 A; 16599 A] the responsibility rests first with the Central Committee and in the Central Committee primarily with me".

The campaign was intensified from Sept. 19, 1978, when an article published in the *People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily* and *Guangming Daily* quoted Chairman Mao as condemning those who "regard odd quotations from Marxist-Leninist works as a ready-made panacea" and "take Marxism-Leninism as a religious dogma", and accused Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" of turning Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought into "sacrosanct religious dogmas which were not subjected to test through practice". On Oct. 27 *The People's Daily* attacked the "Little Red Book" of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* issued by Marshal Lin Biao in 1964, which became the handbook of the Cultural Revolution, saying that it "turned Mao Zedong thought into a mechanical sum total of fragmentary statements".

The reassessment of Chairman Mao met with some resistance inside the Communist Party. *The People's Daily* said on Oct. 30, 1978, that people who mentioned the "elementary Marxist knowledge" that practice is the sole criterion of truth were "still regarded by some comrades as dissidents, as if they had committed a serious crime". The Hungarian MTI agency reported on Nov. 8 that the party committees had affirmed their support for the principle that practice is the only criterion of truth in all the provinces except Hunan, where Chairman Hua was formerly the party's first secretary.

Amnesty International Report on Political Prisoners - Legal Reforms

The human rights organization Amnesty International published a report on political imprisonment in China on Nov. 27, 1978, after no reply had been received from the Chinese Government to a request for comment. As it had not been permitted to send a mission of inquiry, the report was based on Chinese official documents and the evidence of about 50 former prisoners or their relatives and friends who had escaped or left the country legally.

The report pointed out that there was no clear distinction between political and criminal offences in China, as all cases were treated in the light of political considerations. Political trials were a mere formality, consisting of public meetings to announce the sentence, and executions sometimes took place before thousands of spectators. At least 150 death sentences for criminal or political offences were known to have been passed or carried out in 1977, and the number of executions had certainly been greater.

Political prisoners, the report stated, were made to work up to 12 hours a day or sometimes longer, and most received less than the minimum food needed for heavy manual labour. If they complained they were classed as "resisting reform" and punished, the ultimate punishment being increase in sentence. Officials occasionally used handcuffs or fetters to break an offender's resistance, and non-convicted detainees were sometimes handcuffed to hasten confession. Prisoners were subjected to compulsory political education, and mutual denunciations by prisoners, like self-criticism, were compulsory.

A number of changes in judicial procedure provided for by the new Constitution adopted in March 1978 were introduced during the course of the year. Public trials, which were specified by the new Constitution but not by that of 1975 [see pages 26968; 29187], were reintroduced for the first time since the Cultural Revolution, and it was announced on Nov. 29 that all the 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions had appointed their chief procurators. The procuratorates, with the role of determining whether there was sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial, were abolished during the Cultural Revolution; the 1975 Constitution stated that their functions were exercised by "the organs of public security", but that of 1978 provided for their reintroduction.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted new regulations on arrests and detentions on Feb. 23, 1979.

These provided that no person might be arrested without a warrant issued by a court or procuratorate, unless he was caught committing a crime or was suspected of having committed a major crime, and that within three days of his arrest the police must submit the evidence against him to the procuratorate, which must order his detention or release within three days of receiving it. The Ministry of Public Security was reported on March 6 to have issued a circular to the police ordering them to adhere strictly to these regulations, prohibiting illegal house searches, maltreatment or humiliation of arrested persons and the extortion of confessions by torture, and ordering them to take action against infractions of the law by guards or interrogators.

Mr Lin Hujia becomes Mayor of Peking - Changes in Provincial Party Leadership

Mr Wu De (Wu Teh) was removed on Oct. 10, 1978, from his posts as Mayor of Peking and first secretary of the city's Communist Party, which he had held since 1972, while retaining his membership of the Political Bureau. He was succeeded in both posts by Mr Lin Hujia (Lin Hu-chia), who was transferred from Tianjin (Tientsin). Since July 1978 Mr Wu had been repeatedly attacked in the press and on posters for his conduct of municipal affairs, his past associations with the "gang of four" and especially his part in the suppression of the riots in Tiananmen (Tien An Men) Square on April 5, 1976 [see 27805 A]. Mr Lin Hujia had previously been appointed Mayor and first party secretary of Tianjin in June 1978, after the municipal party leadership had been criticized for failure to carry out "the struggle to expose and criticize the gang".

The appointment of new provincial first secretaries was reported from Liaoning on Sept. 29, 1978, from Inner Mongolia in the middle of October and from Henan on Oct. 21.

The New China News Agency on Jan. 9, 1979, described Mr Peng Chong (Peng Chung) as first secretary of the Shanghai party and chairman of the municipal revolutionary committee (a post equivalent to mayor). Adml. Su Zhenhua (Su Chen-hua), Mr Ni Zhifu and Mr Peng, all three of whom were members of the Political Bureau, had been first, second and third secretaries of the municipal party respectively since 1976, and Adml. Su chairman of the revolutionary committee with Mr Ni and Mr Peng as first and second vice-chairmen [see page 28208]. Mr Peng's promotion was apparently due to the ill health of Adml. Su, who died in February 1979 [see below], and Mr Ni's transfer to trade union duties [see also above].

Rehabilitation of Tienanmen Square Demonstrators

The reassessment of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations remained a burning issue during the summer and early autumn of 1978, posters demanding the rehabilitation of those involved being displayed in Peking. The question was an embarrassing one for the Government, however, as the Political Bureau's resolution of April 7, 1976, condemning the demonstrations as a "counter-revolutionary incident" had been adopted at the same time as those appointing Mr Hua Guofeng to the post of Prime Minister and dismissing Mr Deng Xiaoping from his party, governmental and military positions [see page 27805]. A compromise formula had therefore been adopted, describing the demonstrations as a legitimate expression of sorrow for the the death of Mr Zhou Enlai (Chou En-Lai) and of opposition to the "gang of four", which had been exploited by "counter-revolutionary elements" [see page 29192].

Following the removal of Mr Wu De, the Peking Communist Party committee formally declared on Nov. 15, 1978, that the demonstrators' actions had been "completely revolutionary", and that "all those comrades who were persecuted for honouring the memory of Premier Zhou and opposing the gang of four should be rehabilitated". It was announced on Nov. 18 that investigations by the Peking Municipal Security Bureau had shown that none of the 388 people arrested in connexion with the demonstrations was a "counter-revolutionary", and that all had been rehabilitated.

The Poster Campaign, November to December 1978

The reversal of the verdict on the demonstrations was followed by an outbreak of public political debate unparalleled since the "100 flowers" movement of 1957 [see 15681 A; 15839 A]. Posters appeared in Peking and other cities criticizing not only the "gang of four" but also Chairman Mao and the Cultural Revolution, as well as Chairman Hua, Mr Wang Dongxing (Wang Tung-hsing—Chairman Mao's former bodyguard and a Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party), Mr Wu De and other members of the Political Bureau, and demanding a greater degree of democracy.

"Big-character posters" containing political criticisms and demands and often attacking political leaders were a prominent feature of the Cultural Revolution and the anti-Confucian campaign of 1973-74 [see page 26787], and the right to display them was guaranteed in the Constitutions of 1975 and 1978 [see pages 26967; 29187]. The number of posters displayed tended to grow in the autumn of 1978, but from Nov. 19 onwards they suddenly increased both in number and in the


CHINA'S ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
HEILONGJIANG
Harbin
JILIN
Changchun
LIAONING
Shenyang
INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS REGION
Hohhot
BEIJING
Tianjin
HEBEI
BOHAI SEA
Ürümqi
XINJIANG UYGUR AUT. RGN.
GANSU
NINGXIA HUI AUT. RGN.
Yinchuan
Taiyuan
Shijiazhuang
SHANXI
Jinan
SHANDONG
HUANGHAI SEA
QINGHAI
Xining
Lanzhou
Xi'an
SHAANXI
Zhengzhou
HENAN
JIANGSU
ANHUI
Hefei
Nanjing
Shanghai
TIBET AUT. RGN.
Lhasa
SICHUAN
Chengdu
HUBEI
Wuhan
EAST CHINA SEA
Hangzhou
ZHEJIANG
Nanchang
Changsha
GUIZHOU
HUNAN
JIANGXI
Guiyang
Fuzhou
FUJIAN
Taibei
TAIWAN
Kunming
YUNNAN
GUANGXI ZHUANG AUT. RGN.
GUANGDONG
Guangzhou
Nanning
Hongkong (Br occupied)
Macao (Port occupied)
SOUTH CHINA SEA
0 180 360 540 km.
Guangzhou
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SOUTH CHINA SEA IS.

Beijing and Guangzhou are the Pinyin forms of Peking and Canton respectively. *(Chinese Embassy, London)* boldness of their criticism. They were normally fastened to a wall about 100 yards long in Xidan Street, a main thoroughfare in Peking, which was popularly nicknamed "Democracy Wall".

Some posters praised Mr Deng Xiaoping and indirectly challenged Chairman Hua's right to the premiership. One said that during the past 10 years there had been a struggle inside the party between a "democratic group" headed by Mr Zhou Enlai and a group of "fascist dictatorship and family politics", and praised Mr Deng as "the living Zhou Enlai". Another said that the people would "feel at ease" under Mr Deng's leadership—an ironic reference to Chairman Mao's alleged note to Mr Hua saying "With you in charge, I am at ease" [see page 28206]. A third declared that the Political Bureau's resolutions of April 7, 1976, appointing Mr Hua Premier and removing Mr Deng from all his posts had been undemocratic and illegal and should be annulled.

At an interview with a Japanese delegation on Nov. 26, 1978, Mr Deng said that when the two resolutions had been adopted Chairman Mao had been so ill that he could hardly speak and was unable to make judgments. Only one member of the "gang of four" (apparently his wife, Miss Jiang Qing) had been allowed to see him, and the "gang" had "disposed of matters as if they had his approval by the way in which he nodded his head". Mr Hua, he emphasized, had not been allowed to see Chairman Mao, and had not known what the "gang" told him. On the poster campaign Mr Deng said: "We have no intention of suppressing them or denying the right of the masses to express their views by pasting up wall posters. It is necessary for some time for us to be urged along by them." He repeated this view in an interview with an American journalist on the following day, stating: "If the masses feel some anger, we must let them express it. Not all the opinions of the masses are carefully thought out, nor can we demand that they all be entirely correct. That is nothing terrible. . . ."

Posters which appeared from Nov. 24, 1978, onwards became still more radical in their criticisms and demands. One compared China unfavourably with the United States, which, it said, had developed because "it has no idols or superstition", whilst another asked "Why can't the national economy catch up with the one on Taiwan?" Others denied that democracy had ever existed in China; described Chairman Mao as dogmatic and susceptible to flattery; condemned his economic and political theories as ridiculous and "not even truly Marxist"; and denounced the Cultural Revolution as a national disaster.

The crowds which gathered to read the posters mobbed foreign diplomats and journalists, asking for information about the political systems in their countries. On Nov. 27, 1978, between 3,000 and 4,000 people marched from Xidan Street to Tiananmen Square in a spontaneous demonstration, cheering both Chairman Hua and Mr Deng and shouting "Long live democracy". About 10,000 people gathered in Tiananmen Square on the following day to listen to orators who called for greater democracy. Both demonstrations were completely orderly, the police making no attempt to intervene. The press and radio reported the poster campaign for the first time on Nov. 28, together with Mr Deng's two interviews referred to above.

Instructions were reported to have been issued to the population at special meetings at their places of work on Nov. 30, 1978, that they should not put up posters criticizing Chairman Mao or Chairman Hua and should avoid inflammatory demonstrations. As a result the number of new posters appearing declined, the people reading them tended to avoid foreigners, and demonstrations ended. A poster issued on Nov. 30 by a group which claimed to have organized the demonstrations said that their repetition would "give bad elements the opportunity to abuse them".

Posters containing radical criticisms and demands nevertheless continued to appear during December 1978.

One which appeared on Dec. 5 complained that wage increases had not kept pace with prices, and called for "the fifth modernization—democracy". [The "four modernizations"—of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology—had been a Communist Party slogan since 1975—see page 26965.] An open letter to President Carter displayed on Dec. 7 and signed by "the Human Rights Group" appealed to him to "pay attention to the state of human rights in China". It was torn down overnight, replaced on Dec. 10 and again torn down, amid protests from about 50 onlookers who all expressed their agreement with it.

A poster which appeared on Dec. 18 said that Chairman Mao had made mistakes in his later years, and that the people should be able to dismiss Chairman Hua or Mr Deng if they too made mistakes. The state system, which was practically the same as in the Soviet Union, had produced a bureaucracy and a privileged class, and if the four modernizations were carried out under this system they would either be abandoned or would result in "Soviet-style modernization—enrichment of the state and impoverishment of the people". The poster demanded that officials should be elected and subject to recall by the people and should not be more highly paid than ordinary workers, and that the people should be kept informed on political conflicts inside the party, and especially the Central Committee.

Similar poster campaigns were reported to have taken place in other cities, including Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan and Hangzhou (Hangchow, in Zhejiang—Chekiang—province). In Shanghai, where crowds had gathered to hear orators calling for greater political freedom, people were reported to have been told on Nov. 30, 1978, to discuss their demands privately with Communist Party officials in future.

Third Plenary Session of Communist Party Central Committee (December 1978) - New Appointments to Political Bureau

The third plenary session of the Communist Party's 11th Central Committee met in Peking on Dec. 18-22, 1978. It was officially stated to have been preceded by a "central working conference" which "made full preparations for it"; no details were given of the composition of the conference. The Central Committee session made the following decisions:

(1) The campaign to expose and criticize the "gang of four" would be ended, and the stress of the party's work would shift to economic modernization.

(2) Mr Chen Yun was elected a member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee and a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, and Miss Deng Yingchao (Teng Ying-chao), Mr Hu Yaobang and Mr Wang Zhen (Wang Chen) members of the Political Bureau.

Mr Chen Yun (73) was elected a member of the Political Bureau in 1934 and a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee in 1956, losing both posts during the Cultural Revolution. As a Vice-Premier from 1949 to the Cultural Revolution he specialized in economic affairs. **Miss Deng Yingchao** (75) was the widow of Mr Zhou Enlai. **Mr Hu Yaobang** (63) was appointed director of the party's organization department in December 1977. **Mr Wang Zhen** had been a Deputy Premier since 1975. All four were regarded as political supporters of Mr Deng Xiaoping.

(3) The party's Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, which had ceased to operate during the Cultural Revolution, was revived, with Mr Chen Yun, Miss Deng Yingchao and Mr Hu Yaobang as its first, second and third secretaries respectively.

(4) The Tiananmen Square demonstrations were recognized as "entirely revolutionary actions".

(5) It was decided to rehabilitate Marshal Peng Dehuai (Peng Teh-huai), Mr Tao Zhu, Mr Bo Yibo (Po I-po) and Mr Yang Shangkun.

Marshal Peng Dehuai, a former Vice-Premier and member of the Political Bureau, held commands in the Red Army from 1928 onwards, and commanded the Chinese troops in the Korean War. He was removed from his post as Defence Minister in 1959 after he had criticized Chairman Mao's economic policies, however, being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao, and was arrested in 1966 [see 17016 B; pages 21987; 22947]. He died in 1974, aged 76. **Mr Tao Zhu**, a former Deputy Premier, was appointed head of the party's propaganda department in 1966, ranking fourth in the party hierarchy, but was disgraced a few months later, and died in 1969 [see pages 21578-79; 21987-88]. **Mr Bo Yibo**, formerly a Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Economic Commission, was disgraced in 1967 [see page 21987]. **Mr Yang Shangkun**, a former member of the party Secretariat, was arrested in 1966 on a charge of complicity in an alleged plot [ibid.].

(6) It was decided to raise the purchase price for agricultural products and to reduce the prices of farm equipment and fertilizers, while keeping the selling price of farm produce stable.

The communiqué issued after the Central Committee session stated that the movement to criticize the "gang of four" had come to a successful conclusion, except in a few places where it "still needs time to catch up and so cannot end simultaneously". On democracy and the legal system it said: "Since for a period in the past democratic centralism was not carried out in the true sense, centralism being divorced from democracy and there being too little democracy, it is necessary to lay particular emphasis on democracy at present, and on the dialectical relationship between democracy and centralism. . . . In ideological and political life among the ranks of the people, only democracy is permissible and not suppression or persecution. . . . The constitutional rights of citizens must be resolutely protected, and no one has the right to infringe them.

"In order to safeguard people's democracy, it is imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy is systematized and written into law. . . . Procuratorial and judicial organizations must maintain their independence as is appropriate. They must faithfully abide by the laws, rules and regulations, serve the people's interests, keep to the facts, guarantee the equality of all people before the people's laws and deny anyone the privilege of being above the law."

The communiqué commented as follows on the controversies over Chairman Mao and the Cultural Revolution: "It would not be Marxist to demand that a revolutionary leader be free of all shortcomings and errors. It also would not conform to Comrade Mao Zedong's consistent evaluation of himself. . . . The Great Cultural Revolution should also be viewed historically, scientifically and in a down-to-earth way. Comrade Mao Zedong initiated this great revolution primarily in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union had turned revisionist, for the purpose of opposing revisionism and preventing its occurrence. As for the shortcomings and mistakes in the actual course of the revolution, they should be summed up at the appropriate time as experience and lessons so as to unify the views of the whole party and the people of the whole country. However, there should be no haste about this. . . ."

The communiqué also stated that Chairman Hua had "laid stress on the importance of collective leadership", and had "proposed that newspapers and publications throughout the country and works of literature and art . . . give less publicity to any individual".

A memorial meeting in honour of Marshal Peng Dehuai and Mr Tao Zhu was held on Dec. 24, 1978, Mr Deng Xiaoping delivering the oration on the former and Mr Chen Yun that on the latter. Mr Yang Shangkun was appointed first secretary of the Canton party on April 2, 1979.

On Dec. 26, 1978, the 85th anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao, the newspapers published a speech made by him in 1958 in which he called for "a technological revolution so that we can catch up with or surpass Britain in 15 years or a little longer" and said that "we should shift the emphasis in our party's work to the technological revolution". *The People's Daily* commented that Chairman Mao's thought had not been correctly applied after 1958 [i.e. the period of the "great leap forward"], and that during the Cultural Revolution "10 years were wasted as far as socialist construction was concerned".

On Dec. 28, 1978, *The People's Daily* developed Chairman Hua's criticism of the personality cult of party leaders. Newspapers, it said, devoted too much space to their activities, and instead should give more space to the progress of modernization, foreign news and their readers' views on political and economic issues. After the Central Committee session the press abandoned the practice of referring to Chairman Hua as "the wise leader".

The session was followed by numerous changes in the party organization. Mr Wang Dongxing, the leading representative in the Political Bureau of the left-wing tendency advocating continuation of Chairman Mao's policies, was succeeded as director of the Central Committee's general office by Mr Yao Yilin; Mr Wang was also reported to have been removed from the command of Unit 8341 (the force responsible for the security of the government and party leadership) and replaced by Mr Yang Yong, the Deputy Chief of Staff. Mr Zhang Pinghua (Chang Ping-hua) was replaced as director of the propaganda department by Mr Hu Yaobang, who was succeeded at the organization department by Mr Song Renqiong (Sung Jen-cheng). Mr Ji Pengfei (Chi Peng-fei, a former Foreign Minister and secretary-general of the National People's Congress—see page 26968) was appointed head of the international relations department in place of Mr Geng Piao (Keng Piao—a member of the Political Bureau), who had assumed a new post in the party's military commission. The New China News Agency referred to Mr Hu Yaobang on Jan. 3, 1979, as the general secretary of the party, although his appointment was not officially announced until February 1980 [see below].

Adml. Su Zhenhua, first political commissar of the Navy and a member of the Political Bureau since 1973, died on Feb. 7, 1979, aged 67.

Cabinet Changes, February to April 1979

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress announced the following new appointments to the State Council (Cabinet) on Feb. 23, 1979 [see also page 29626]:

(1) Mr Wang Renzhong, who had recently been appointed a Deputy Premier [see above], was also appointed chairman of the newly-formed State Agricultural Commission.

(2) The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was divided into two, Mr Huo Shilian being appointed Minister of Agriculture and Mr Lo Yuchuan Minister of Forestry.

(3) Mr Yang Ligong (Yang Li-kung), previously Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, was transferred to the new Ministry of Agricultural Machinery.

(4) The Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power was divided into two, the former minister, Miss Qian Zhengying (Chien Cheng-ying), becoming Minister of Water Conservancy and Mr Liu Lanbo Minister of the Power Industry.

(5) Mr Wang Lei reassumed his former post as Minister of Commerce *vice* Mr Yao Yilin, who had been appointed director of the Communist Party's general office [see above].

(6) Mr Zeng Sheng (Tseng Sheng) was appointed Minister of Communications *vice* Mr Ye Fei (Yeh Fei, who later became Commander of the Navy—see page 30498 below).

(7) Mr Zheng Tianxiang (Chen Tien-hsieng) was appointed Minister of the Seventh Ministry of Machine-building *vice* Mr Song Renqiong (Sung Jen-chiung, who had become head of the party's organization department—see above).

(8) Mr Jiang Nanxiang (Chiang Nan-hsiang), a former Minister of Higher Education who had been removed from his post during the Cultural Revolution, was appointed Minister of Education *vice* Mr Liu Xiyao (Liu Hsi-yao).

The Standing Committee on April 3, 1979, appointed Mr Qian Xinzhong (Chien Hsin-chung) Minister of Public Health *vice* Mr Jiang Yizhen (Chiang Yi-chen), and appointed Mr Song Yangchu (Sung Yang-chu) to the new Ministry of Building Materials.

Payment of Compensation to "National Bourgeoisie" - Rehabilitation of Former Landlords

Gen. Ulanhu (Ulanfu), a member of the Political Bureau and a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, announced at a meeting in Peking on Jan. 22, 1979, that property confiscated from the "national bourgeoisie" during the Cultural Revolution would be restored to them. The Japanese Kyodo agency commented that this measure had been announced just before Mr Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States [see page 29537], and suggested that it was intended to reassure residents of Taiwan that their property would not be confiscated if Taiwan were reunited with China.

Gen. Ulanhu recalled that Chairman Mao had pursued "a buying-out policy in dealing with the national bourgeoisie", with the result that the socialist transformation of capitalist owned means of production had been basically completed by 1956. During the Cultural Revolution, however, the former capitalists' bank deposits and other property had been confiscated, although they were protected by the Constitution; their salaries had been reduced; their houses had been taken over; and most of those holding administrative posts had been transferred to manual labour. In recent years these measures had been reversed in some provinces and municipalities, but not in others. The Central Committee had now decided that all confiscated bank deposits should be returned to their owners, along with the interest due; that houses and other confiscated property should be restored; and that industrialists and businessmen whose salaries had been cut should be paid their original salaries, together with the arrears due to them. Such people should be employed in posts where they could use their specialized skills; they should receive arrears of interest on their shares, payment of which had stopped in 1966; and their children should not be discriminated against in any way.

It was announced on Jan. 29, 1979, that their political rights would be restored to all former "landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements" who had observed the law and worked honestly for many years, and that they and their children would not be discriminated against. The Public Security Minister, Mr Zhao Cangbi (Chao Tsang-pi), said on Jan. 30 that "those who cannot now have their designations removed are extremely few". It was reported on Feb. 25 that the former "counter-revolutionaries" whose designation had been removed in Zhejiang province included a niece and other relatives of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the former President of Taiwan.

Reassessment of Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution

Articles published in the first half of 1979 suggested that a controversy was in progress inside the party, not only over the Cultural Revolution, but also over the policies adopted under Chairman Mao's leadership from as far back as 1957.

The People's Daily said on Jan. 11, 1979, that from 1958 to 1962 "some of our leading cadres . . . would not listen to different opinions, nor would they accept criticism". Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" had been "allowed to run wild" because "over the years political life inside the party had been abnormal, and the lack of democracy inside the party had led to a lack of democracy in society as a whole". The recent plenary session of the Central Committee, however, had "revived the fine traditions of the Yenan era [i.e. the period before the 1949 revolution], with cadres speaking their minds freely". Senior party cadres had "said things they did not dare to say in the past and raised questions that it had not been possible to resolve in the past".

The same points were developed in the report issued by the party's new Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline after its first session. Although the commission had met on Jan. 4-22, 1979, its report was not published until March 24, apparently because of opposition inside the party leadership. After the party took power, the report stated, some members "prided themselves on their merits", and party democracy was undermined. The situation became worse in 1958, and particularly after 1959, with the result that members "did not dare to hold different opinions, to stand for justice and to criticize party organizations and leading cadres". During the Cultural Revolution Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" had "trampled underfoot all norms of party life, formed factions and employed bad people to attack good people". The result was that "party discipline was weakened, bad practices became rampant, anarchist trends of thought spread, factionalism prevailed everywhere, the phenomena of violating party discipline and state laws could not be curbed, cases accumulated, for a long time many comrades who had been wrongly accused could not find a place to submit their appeals, and victims of false accusations could not be exonerated".

The *Guangming Daily* on May 31, 1979, strongly criticized Mr Kang Sheng, a member of the standing Committee of the Political Bureau who died in 1975 [see 27589 A] and had not previously come under attack. Referring to him as "that 'leading theoretician' and adviser to the Central Cultural Revolution Group", it described the campaign conducted against Mr Yang Xianzhen (Yang Hsien-chen) in 1964-65 for his philosophical views [see page 20795] as "a big frame-up" and "a salient expression of the rampant ultra-leftist trends of thought".

Whereas in the past first Marshal Lin Biao and then the "gang of four" had been described as pursuing an "ultra-right counter-revolutionary revisionist line" or a "fake left and real right counter-revolutionary revisionist line" [see pages 26135; 28211; 28720], the *Guangming Daily* described their policies on Jan. 23, 1979, as a "'left' deviationist line", and said that "the pernicious influence of the 'left'" was hindering the implementation of the party's policies and the four modernizations. *The People's Daily* referred to their "ultra-left counter-revolutionary revisionist line" on Jan. 26, and on Feb. 16 condemned the "ultra-right" and "fake left and real right" formulae as "not scientific".

Two long articles published in *The People's Daily* on Jan. 7 and Feb. 26, 1979, which gave new details of developments in the Cultural Revolution, emphasized the moderating role of Mr Zhou Enlai but ignored Chairman Mao almost completely. The first, written by Gen. Fu Chongbi (Fu Chung-pi), commander of the Peking garrison during the Cultural Revolution [see also below], revealed that Mr Zhou had frequently ordered the garrison to protect leaders who were under attack or had been illegally arrested, including Mr Peng Zhen (Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking—see also below), Gen. Lo Ruiqing (Lo Jui-ching, Deputy Premier and Chief of General Staff), Marshal Chen Yi (Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister), Marshal He Long (Ho Lung, Deputy Premier) and Gen. Chen Zaidao (Chen Tsai-tao, leader of the Wuhan revolt).

The second article dealt with the "February counter-current", i.e. the attempt of the moderates, led by Mr Zhou, to regain control in February 1967 [see page 21992]. It claimed that Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" had attempted to remove a group of Deputy Premiers, including Marshal Chen Yi, Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Nieh Jung-chen), Mr Li Fuchun, Mr Li Xiannian (Li Hsien-nien) and Mr Tan Zhenlin (Tan Chen-lin), and then to overthrow Mr Zhou and Marshal Zhu De (Chu Teh, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, who died in 1976—see 28053 A), in order to obtain supreme power for themselves with Chairman Mao as a figurehead. It also stated that Mr Zhang Linzhi (Chang Lin-chih), Minister of the Coal Industry, had been beaten to death [see page 21992]; that at a meeting in August 1967 Mr Zhou had had to order guards to protect Marshal Chen Yi; and that at another meeting a few days later three men had beaten Mr Tan Zhenlin, kicked him off his feet and stamped on his back.

The People's Daily found it necessary on March 9, 1979, to deny suggestions in the foreign press that "de-Maoification" was in progress. "There are people who are not familiar with China and its policy, and who confuse certain sayings of Comrade Mao Zedong with what the gang of four advocated, concluding therefore that we are carrying out 'de-Maoification'," it said. "Our party is not 'de-Maoifying', but on the contrary is restoring Mao Zedong thought to its original form by refuting the distortions of Lin Biao and the gang of four. We are reaffirming the great achievements of Comrade Mao Zedong, defending the core of Mao Zedong thought while discarding certain things which were wrong or overdone. . . ."

Continuation of Campaign against Supporters of "Gang of Four" - Further Rehabilitations

Despite the Central Committee's decision to end the campaign to criticize the "gang of four", arrests and trials of their followers continued throughout 1979 and into 1980.

The prolongation of the campaign against the "gang" was apparently connected with the delays which had occurred in some provinces in removing their supporters from power. *The Shaanxi (Shensi) Daily* said on March 9, 1979, that the "exposure-criticism-investigation movement" had been launched in the province only in September 1978, and that although a number of "arch-criminals" had then been arrested their "backstage supporters" had been let off lightly. It was reported on July 15, 1980, that although "persecution under the ultra-left line caused 173 unnatural deaths" in a county in Hebei (Hopei) province, and another 100 deaths were being investigated, the county party secretary, who had recently been relieved of all his posts, had "kept the higher authorities in total darkness", with the result that the policy of redressing cases of injustice had never been implemented.

Rehabilitation of "revisionists" and "rightists" meanwhile continued at a rapid pace. The guests at a Spring Festival party in the Great Hall of the People on Jan. 27, 1979, included Mr Peng Zhen, Mr Lu Dingyi (Lu Ting-yi) and Miss Wang Guangmei (Wang Kuang-mei), who was referred to as "the widow of Liu Shaoqi", this being their first appearance at an official occasion since their disgrace in 1966, and also the first official confirmation that ex-President Liu was dead. The festivities included ballroom dancing and a bridge tournament, both practices which had been banned during the Cultural Revolution.

Mr Peng Zhen, formerly Mayor of Peking, first secretary of the Peking Communist Party and a member of the Political Bureau, was disgraced in 1966 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and subsequently arrested on a charge of plotting a coup against Chairman Mao [see pages 21577-78; 21987]. **Mr Lu Dingyi** was removed from his posts as Minister of Culture and head of the party's propaganda department in 1966 and arrested on a charge of complicity in Mr Peng's alleged plot [ibid.]. **Miss Wang Guangmei** came under violent attack during the Cultural Revolution [see pages 21987, 21993], and was later arrested and sentenced to death.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Feb. 23, 1979, appointed Mr Peng Zhen chairman of a new legal commission. *The People's Daily* on March 13 deplored the fact that editions of Chairman Mao's works published since the Cultural Revolution had been revised to delete references to "Comrade Liu Shaoqi".

Mr Wu Han, the author of *Hai Rui dismissed from Office* [see above], and two other writers who had been violently attacked at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mr Deng Tuo (Teng To) and Mr Liao Mosha [see pages 21577; 22948], were rehabilitated on Feb. 22, 1979, the first two of them posthumously. General Fu Chongbi, who had been removed from the command of the Peking garrison in March 1968 after being accused of organizing an armed attack on the Cultural Revolution Group [see page 22951], was rehabilitated on April 29. Miss Ding Ling (Ting Ling), a distinguished novelist purged as a "rightist" in 1957 [see page 15840], was reported to have been rehabilitated on March 10. Mr Tian Han (Tien Han), author of the original words of the national anthem, *The March of the Volunteers* [see page 29188], who died in prison in 1968, was posthumously rehabilitated in April, four of his plays subsequently being revived in Peking.

Mr Jiang Hua, the president of the Supreme Court, told the National People's Congress on June 27, 1979, that up to the end of May the cases of 164,000 people who had been "framed" or wrongly charged during the Cultural Revolution had been reviewed and redressed. In Shanxi (Shansi) it was announced on Feb. 27 that the courts had quashed the death sentences on three people who had been arrested in 1975 for criticizing "the ultra-leftist line pursued by Lin Biao and the gang of four" and tried in November 1977, over a year after the arrest of the "gang".

The Liaoning Communist Party committee on March 31, 1979, publicly exonerated Miss Zhang Zhixin, a party member executed in 1975 as a "counter-revolutionary" after several years' imprisonment, and declared her a "revolutionary martyr".

Great prominence was given by the press to this case, a play on which was produced in Peking. The *Guangming Daily* pointed out on July 17, 1979, that the regulations under which she had been executed for "attacking central leading people with malignity" had been unconstitutional, as they had not been approved by the National People's Congress and contravened the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.

Continuation of Poster Campaign, January to March 1979 - The Unofficial Press

The posters displayed on Peking's "Democracy Wall" in the early weeks of 1979 became increasingly bold in their demands for human rights and fundamental political and social reforms and their attacks on Chairman Mao and some members of the Political Bureau.

A manifesto which appeared on Jan. 5 put forward 19 demands, including the removal of Chairman Mao's body from its mausoleum, the re-establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the release of all political prisoners, a constitutionally-guaranteed right to criticize state and party leaders, representation for non-Communist parties in the National People's Congress, open sessions of the Congress and freedom to change one's work and to travel abroad. Other posters displayed in January and February reproduced the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789; criticized the Communist Party's failure to reassess Chairman Mao's policies; denounced Mr Wang Dongxing, Mr Ji Dengkui (Chi Teng-kuei), Mr Wu De, Gen. Chen Xilian (Chen Hsi-Lien) and Mr Ni Zhifu, all members of the Political Bureau; demanded the abolition of the communes; attacked the Government's policy of demanding sexual abstinence until a late age; and condemned the Chinese invasion of Vietnam [see page 29871] as an act of aggression.

Details of the treatment of political prisoners were given in a poster signed by Mr Wei Jingsheng, the editor of *Exploration* [see below], which appeared on March 3. It alleged that many political prisoners, including Miss Wang Guangmei, Mr Peng Zhen and the Panchen Lama of Tibet, had been detained in a prison in the suburbs of Peking known as Qing Chen No. 1, where prisoners were kept in solitary confinement in small cells, underfed, often denied work or exercise, and sometimes beaten or tortured.

Many of the most controversial posters were the work of human rights groups, which also expressed their views through unofficial periodicals. The first such group to appear was the Society of Light, founded in Guizhou (Kweichow) province in November 1978. A Peking branch was formed on Jan. 21, 1979, and began issuing a magazine, *Exploration*. A second group, the Human Rights Alliance, was responsible for the 19-point manifesto issued on Jan. 5, and a third, the April 5 Group, appeared in March 1979.

By March about eight unofficial periodicals were being openly sold in Peking. *Exploration*, the most remarkable of these, was edited by Mr Wei Jingsheng, an electrician, who had been responsible for the poster calling for "the fifth modernization—democracy" [see above]. Other unofficial publications included *The April 5 Tribune*, the organ of the April 5 Group, *Peking Spring, Chinese Human Rights, Today, Enlightenment* and *Fertile Land*. Although they appeared only at irregular intervals in duplicated editions of a few hundred copies, the display of each issue on "Democracy Wall" enabled them to be read by thousands of people.

The authorities at first adopted a tolerant attitude towards these activities. *The People's Daily* said on Jan. 3, 1979: "Let the people say what they wish—the heavens will not fall. If we do not allow people to say things which are incorrect, that is just the same as keeping everybody's mouth shut. . . ." Mr Deng Xiaoping assured a group of visiting US senators on Jan. 9 that free speech would be allowed to continue "for generations to come".

Peasant Demonstrations in Peking (January 1979)

Several hundred peasants carrying a banner saying "Down with starvation, down with oppression, we want democracy" marched through Tiananmen Square on Jan. 8, 1979, and then went on to Zhongnanhai (the walled compound where the Chinese leaders live) to present their complaints. A similar demonstration took place on Jan. 14, and on Jan. 27 peasants again demonstrated outside the Great Hall of the People during the reception to mark the Spring Festival [see above].

Thousands of peasants (estimates of their number ranged from 20,000 to 70,000) had come to Peking in recent months to seek redress of their grievances, often after travelling hundreds of miles. *The People's Daily* reported on Jan. 27 that Chairman Hua had recently addressed a meeting called to discuss ways of handling the petitioners' complaints, and commented: "The number of people pouring into Peking is increasing daily. It is now the dead of winter, and there are grave difficulties in providing them with food and accommodation. . . . Officials responsible for receiving visitors must understand and sympathize with those who have come to Peking a number of times. On no account must they be accused of making trouble deliberately. . . ."

Miss Fu Yuehua, a municipal employee and a prominent member of the human rights movement, who had helped to organize the demonstration on Jan. 8, was arrested on Jan. 18, 1979. Two peasants who had taken part in the demonstration on Jan. 27 were reported on Jan. 31 to have been sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

Strikes and Riots by Young People (December 1978 to February 1979)

Widespread unrest occurred at the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979 among young people who had been sent to work in the country.

The practice of sending urban young people on leaving secondary schools to work in remote rural areas originated in 1968. In theory its object was to enable them to "learn from the peasants" and to prevent the emergence of an intellectual elite, but in practice it was originally designed to rid the cities of the Red Guard organizations, which had become politically embarrassing to the leadership [see page 22953]. In the early 1970s there were about 16,000,000 urban young people employed in the country. Many of them failed to adapt themselves to their new surroundings and returned without authorization to the cities, where they were often unable to obtain work and were forced to support themselves by begging, crime or prostitution. The unemployment problem in the cities led to a massive increase in 1978-79 in both legal and illegal emigration to Hong Kong [see pages 30076, 30078], many of the emigrants being urban youths who had returned from the country.

About 50,000 young people working on state farms in Yunnan province went on strike on Dec. 9, 1978, as a protest against "intolerable" conditions, this being the first strike reported in China for some years. After a delegation from the strikers had discussed their problems with government leaders, however, they agreed on Jan. 4, 1979, to call off the strike. A provincial official said on Feb. 10 that "the turbulent situation in some state farms is stabilizing", and that action would be taken to meet the strikers' demands, many of which were reasonable.

About 3,000 unemployed young people demonstrated in Shanghai on Dec. 11-13, 1978, demanding work. One of them, who was alleged to have deliberately blocked traffic and "stormed state organs", was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on April 27, 1979. More serious disturbances occurred in the first week of February 1979, many of those taking part being young people who had returned to the city for the Spring Festival. On Feb. 5 the demonstrators held a mass meeting outside the offices of the revolutionary committee, occupied the municipal employment office and blocked traffic at the railway station for 12 hours by standing or sitting on the lines, and smaller demonstrations took place on the two days following. Two of the demonstrators were sentenced on Dec. 10, 1979, to nine and five years' imprisonment respectively.

Similar disturbances occurred in the first half of February 1979 in Hangzhou (Hangchow), Nanchang (in Jiangxi—Kiangsi—province) and Chongqing (Chungking, in Sichuan—Szechwan—province), whilst provincial broadcasts referred to disturbances in Jinan (Tsinan, in Shangdong—Shantung—province), Lanzhou (Lanchow, in Gansu—Kansu—province) and Xining (Sining, in Qinghai—Chinghai—province) without giving details. Zhejiang provincial radio said on March 28 that some time before "an unhealthy trend of violating labour discipline" which had "adversely affected production", had emerged among some young workers at a factory at Huzhou (Huchow), suggesting that a strike had taken place. Discharged soldiers demonstrated in Peking on May 7 in protest against the authorities' failure to provide employment for them.

At a conference on youth unemployment a government spokesman said on Aug. 17, 1979, that young people would continue to be sent to the countryside, but in smaller numbers. During the current year the Government would try to provide employment for about 7,000,000 school-leavers in the cities, and would send about 800,000 to the countryside. It was officially stated on March 18, 1980, that 7,070,000 young people had been found jobs in 1979, out of 12,160,000 who were unemployed. The improvement had been most marked in the cities, where about 70 per cent of the young people were working.

A New China News Agency report of Nov. 2, 1979, said that over 1,000,000 young people had been organized to run 30,000 collective farms, where they received at least twice as much pay as they would receive in communes and living standards were almost the same as in the cities, and that all the 5,000,000 urban young people working in the countryside would gradually be shifted to such farms. Prosperous collective farms had been established in the suburbs of some cities, which they supplied with grain, fruit and other foodstuffs, and were gradually becoming satellite towns.

Restrictions on Poster Campaign - Arrest of Human Rights Leaders

The increasing boldness of the human rights movement and the popular demonstrations led to a reaction in March 1979. A notice issued in Shanghai on March 6 forbade demonstrations which blocked the traffic, the display of posters except in places officially designated for the purpose and the production and sale of "reactionary" publications, and a number of people who put up posters were arrested on March 9.

In a speech on March 16, 1979, Mr Deng Xiaoping attacked members of the human rights movement who had contacts with foreigners, accusing them of selling state secrets, and laid down four basic principles which must be upheld—the socialist system, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. *Youth News* described the concept of human rights on March 17 as "bourgeois" and "outdated", and *The People's Daily* on the following day denounced "scum" who "betray national secrets".

A notice issued in Peking on March 31, 1979, contained similar provisions to that issued in Shanghai, and also banned posters, books and journals which opposed the four principles laid down by Mr Deng and forbade the disclosure of state secrets. The emphasis laid on state secrets was believed to be connected with the publication by Western correspondents in Peking of casualty figures and other information about the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Similar notices were issued in March and April in Hangzhou, Nanjing (Nanking, in Jiangsu—Kiangsu—province), Harbin (in Heilongjiang—Heilungkiang—province), and Xining, and in the provinces of Guangdong (Kwangtung), Anhui (Anhwei), Henan (Honan), Jilin (Kirin), Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia.

The wording of some of these notices suggested that serious fighting had recently taken place; in Henan and Jilin the carrying of weapons was forbidden, and a notice issued in Inner Mongolia on April 10 said that "ganging up to fight with arms and implements" would be severely punished. An Anhui broadcast on April 1 condemned "sinister theatrical troupes", and forbade the performance of plays without previous approval.

Mr Wei Jingsheng, the editor of *Exploration*, was arrested on March 29, 1979, and all posters except those on "Democracy Wall" were removed in Peking on April 1. Mr Ren Wanding, the founder of the Human Rights Alliance, was arrested on April 4 and Mr Yang Guang, the assistant editor of *Exploration*, on May 22, and about 20 other dissidents were also reported to have been arrested. A number of the unofficial journals continued to be publicly sold, however, and dissident groups continued to put up posters, although normally these were quickly torn down.

Controversy over Party Policy, April to June 1979

The crisis caused by the human rights movement and the demonstrations gave the rigidly Maoist elements in the party leadership a temporary advantage, but in the last week of April 1979 the more liberal group led by Mr Deng Xiaoping launched a new offensive.

The Jiangxi Daily on April 26 condemned the "rightists" who attacked the four basic principles [see above] and "stir up disturbances", but directed its main attack against those who "view as rightist the series of major measures taken by the party Central Committee" and "pursue the two 'whatevers'", declaring that "if we followed their way we could only return to the period of Lin Biao and the gang of four". (The phrase "the two whatevers" referred to the belief attributed to the Maoist faction that "we must act in accordance with whatever documents were annotated by Mao and with whatever he said before he died".)

The conflict inside the leadership was reflected in the press in May and June 1979 in a controversy over democracy and human rights.

The People's Daily on May 22 pointed out that whereas in the 1950s the national and regional people's congresses had been elected, in recent years the method of "consultation" had been used instead, and added: "Certain areas and units consider even the business of 'consultation' too troublesome. They let the leadership 'nominate persons for election'. . . . The bourgeois countries have . . . created some effective systems. Why can we not selectively adapt them to serve socialism?" *The Peking Daily* replied on June 1 by attempting to prove that "the bourgeois way of universal suffrage . . . is a sheer fraud". *The People's Daily* declared on June 22 that "some people think that . . . since the third plenum there has been too much democracy". Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four", it continued, had taken power "because at that time the power to select party and state leaders was not in the hands of the party members and the masses", and therefore "the people must be made the real masters of the country to block the road to this kind of careerist".

The *Guangming Daily* on June 19 defended the "bourgeois" slogan of human rights, which, it said, "can also be used by the proletariat". Human rights, it continued, existed only in the form of civil rights, which were defined in the Constitution but had been violated by Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four", as was shown by the persecution of Miss Zhang Zhixin [see above]. "If it is said that the citizens have not fully enjoyed the civil rights given them by the Constitution," it declared, "naturally they have the right to fight for them, and our party has the responsibility to lead the citizens to fight for them."

The strongest opposition to Mr Deng's policies appeared to come from Hunan, where, as in the autumn of 1978 [see above], the press and radio continued to advocate Maoist policies in agriculture, education and foreign affairs.

A poster which appeared on "Democracy Wall" on June 29, 1979, accused Mr Wang Dongxing of having used 7,000,000 yuan (about £2,000,000) to build himself a private residence, and another on the following day accused Gen. Chen Xilian of having signed Miss Zhang Zhixin's death warrant. The fact that no attempt was made to remove the posters suggested that they had official backing.

Session of National People's Congress - Cabinet Appointments - Adoption of Electoral Law

The second session of the fifth National People's Congress met in Peking from June 18 to July 1, 1979, and adopted seven laws dealing with local government, electoral procedure, the courts, the procuratorate, the criminal code, criminal procedure and joint ventures with Chinese and foreign investment. [The last will be dealt with in a subsequent article.] The Congress also approved the appointment of Mr Chen Yun (a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau—see page 30488 above), Mr Bo Yibo (recently rehabilitated—see above) and Mr Yao Yilin (director of the Communist Party's general office—see above) as Deputy Premiers, and elected Mr Peng Zhen (the former Mayor of Peking—see above), Adml. Xiao Jingguang (Hsiao Ching-kuang), Mr Zhu Yunshan and Miss Shi Liang (Shih Ling) vice-chairmen of its Standing Committee.

Adml. Xiao was a Deputy Defence Minister and Commander of the Navy [see also page 30498 below]. **Mr Zhu** and **Miss Shi** were leading members of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and of the China Democratic League respectively, and were elected to represent the non-Communist parties [see also page 30496 below].

In his report to the Congress on June 18, 1979, Chairman Hua laid his main emphasis on the two themes of modernization of the economy and democratization.

On the class struggle he said that although the landlords, rich peasants and capitalists had ceased to exist as classes, there were still "counter-revolutionaries and enemy agents, criminals and political degenerates", as well as "new exploiters such as grafters, embezzlers and speculators", over whom "proletarian dictatorship" must be exercised. As the influence of bourgeois and feudal ideologies among the people would continue for a long time, it was necessary to "wage class struggle economically, politically and ideologically" so that it would be impossible for a new bourgeoisie to arise, but there was no longer any need for "large-scale and turbulent class struggle waged by the masses". "Class struggle is no longer the principal contradiction in our society," he declared. "In waging it we must centre around and serve the central task of socialist modernization. . . ."

A high degree of political democracy was necessary for the development of the economy, he said, and continued: "Only with full democracy can the masses criticize and supervise leading bodies and leading cadres so as to overcome bureaucracy and conservatism, promptly expose political degenerates, grafters and embezzlers, counter-revolutionaries and criminals, and consolidate the socialist cause. . . . It should be admitted, however, that our country has a long feudal tradition and is relatively backward economically and culturally, and that in the past we did not do enough to publicize appropriately and practise democracy. Moreover, there are defects in our rules and regulations. In these circumstances autocracy, bureaucracy, love of privilege, the patriarchal style of work and anarchism are apt to spread. It was precisely this that gave an opening to conspirators like Lin Biao and the gang of four to usurp state power. Although they have been overthrown, their pernicious influence, as shown particularly in factional and anarchic tendencies, must not be underestimated. . . ."

The seven draft laws were presented to the Congress by Mr Peng Zhen on June 26, 1979, and after discussion were approved on July 1. Those relating to local government and electoral procedure are summarized below.

Local Government. The law provided for the establishment of people's congresses (replacing the revolutionary committees introduced during the Cultural Revolution) at three levels: (i) in provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Government, elected for five years; (ii) in prefectures, counties, cities and municipal districts, elected for three years; and (iii) in people's communes and towns, elected for two years. Deputies to the people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, prefectures and cities divided into districts would be elected by the people's congresses at the next lowest level, whilst deputies to other people's congresses would be directly elected. Deputies might be replaced with the approval of more than 50 per cent of the electorate.

The people's congresses at and above the county level would elect provincial governors, chairmen of autonomous regions and mayors, and also the presidents of people's courts and chief procurators at the corresponding level. The number of candidates would normally exceed the number of vacancies, and voting would be by secret ballot.

People's congresses would meet at least once a year, and would elect standing committees which would meet at least once every two months.

Electoral Law. Deputies to the National People's Congress would be elected by the people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities and by the armed forces. All Chinese citizens over 18 had the right to elect and to be elected, except those suffering from mental diseases or who had been deprived of their political rights.

The total number of deputies would not exceed 3,500. The number of deputies to be elected by a province, autonomous region or municipality would be distributed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in accordance with the principle that the number of people represented by each deputy in a rural area was equal to eight times the number represented by each deputy in a city. National minorities would have special representation.

Candidates might be nominated by the Communist Party, other parties, mass organizations or any four electors. The number of candidates for deputies to be directly elected would be from half as many again to double the number to be elected; the number for deputies to be elected by people's congresses would be from one-fifth to half as many again as the number to be elected. Where the number nominated was too high a preliminary election might be held to decide on a formal list of candidates. Voting would be by secret ballot. A deputy might be recalled with the approval of more than half the voters in the electoral district or people's congress from which he was elected.

The National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, adopted amendments to the 1978 Constitution [see page 29184] which replaced the term "revolutionary committee" throughout Section III by "people's government", and provided for direct election of people's congresses at county level and the establishment of standing committees in people's congresses at and above county level.

The *Guangming Daily* commented on July 14 that "the name revolutionary committee . . . was the product of the 'January storm', a counter-revolutionary sinister wind whipped up by Lin Biao and the gang of four" [see page 21989]. Some provincial revolutionary committees had had as many as 200 members, scattered all over the province, and after an inaugural meeting had never met again. The new people's governments would be more streamlined and practical bodies, which could deal promptly with important business.

Adoption of Criminal Code and Laws on Judicial Procedure

Mr Peng Zhen presented a draft code of criminal law to the National People's Congress on June 26, 1979, together with draft laws on criminal procedure, the courts and the procuratorates.

Introducing these measures, Mr Peng said that they were intended to avoid abuses which had occurred during the Cultural Revolution. The number of capital offences had been reduced, and the death penalty could be inflicted only with the Supreme Court's approval. False charges, perjury and extortion of confessions by illegal means were strictly guarded against, and the accused was granted the right to defence counsel.

The Criminal Law. The criminal law was applicable to offences committed by any person in Chinese territory, and to offences committed by a Chinese abroad or offences against China or a Chinese citizen committed by a foreigner abroad, if the minimum penalty was not less than three years' imprisonment, unless the act was not punishable in the state where it was committed. The code would become effective on Jan. 1, 1980. Acts committed before that date would be dealt with under the law in force at the time of the crime, unless a lighter sentence would be imposed under the new law.

Offenders between 14 and 16 were liable only when they had committed serious offences, and those under 18 would be given a lighter penalty. Minors under 16 might be taken into custody for re-education. Instigating a person under 18 to commit a crime would be severely punished.

Major punishments were surveillance, detention, imprisonment and death, and supplementary punishments, fines, deprivation of political rights and confiscation of property. A person guilty of an offence resulting in financial loss to the victim should also be sentenced to make reparation. For minor offences the offender might be reprimanded or ordered to apologize and pay compensation.

The period of surveillance was not less than three months or more than two years, during which offenders must regularly report to the authorities. The period of detention was not less than 15 days and not more than six months. Persons under detention might go home for one or two days every month and would be paid for their work.

Death sentences would be passed only for the most heinous crimes, and must be approved by the Supreme Court. A two-year reprieve might be granted, and if the offender showed signs of repentance the sentence might be commuted to not less than 15 years' imprisonment. The death penalty was not suitable for people under 18 at the time of the crime or for pregnant women, but a person between 16 and 18 who had committed a particularly serious offence might be sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve.

The period of deprivation of political rights, including the right to vote or stand for election, to hold a position in state organs or to hold a leading position in any enterprise or organization, would normally be not less than one year and not more than five.

If an offender sentenced to imprisonment committed another offence punishable by imprisonment within three years of serving his sentence he must be severely punished. The sentence for a person who had committed several offences must be shorter than the total term for all his offences and longer than the maximum sentence for one of them. Offenders sentenced to detention or imprisonment for less than five years might be placed on probation. If an offender showed signs of repentance his sentence might be commuted, or he might be granted parole, but the term served might not be less than half the original sentence, or 10 years in the case of life imprisonment.

Counter-revolutionary offences, including conspiring with foreign countries, plotting to overthrow the Government, instigating members of the armed forces to rebel or defect, defection to the enemy, armed rebellion, releasing prisoners by force and espionage, were punishable by imprisonment or in particularly heinous cases by death. Arson and sabotage were punishable by three to 10 years' imprisonment, or if resulting in serious injury or death by life imprisonment or death. Offences against the economic order such as smuggling, currency speculation, tax evasion and counterfeiting were punishable by terms of imprisonment of up to 10 years.

Grave cases of murder, instigating a riot in which someone was killed, rape, armed robbery and embezzlement by an official were punishable by death. Provision was made for the punishment of a wide variety of abuses of power by officials, including extortion of a confession by torture, bringing false charges, unlawful imprisonment, unlawful searches, depriving others of their religious freedom, violating the customs of minority nationalities and taking bribes. Libel by means of posters was punishable by up to three years' imprisonment.

The Courts. Judicial authority was exercised by local courts at various levels, special courts (e.g. military courts) and the Supreme Court. Local courts consisted of basic-level courts in counties and cities, intermediate courts in provincial and municipal districts, and higher courts in provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. Appeals by the defendant or the prosecution would be referred to the court at the next highest level, and appeals against judgments by higher courts would be referred to the Supreme Court.

The presidents of local courts were elected by the people's congress at the corresponding level, whilst other judges were appointed by the standing committee of the local people's congress. The president of the Supreme Court was elected by the National People's Congress, and other judges by its Standing Committee.

The courts were required to treat all citizens equally. Citizens of all nationalities had the right to use their own language in court proceedings. All cases were heard in public, except those involving state secrets, sexual offences and juvenile delinquencies. The accused had the right to defend himself or to be defended by a lawyer, relative or other person, and if necessary the court might appoint a defender for him. Elected representatives of the masses participated as assessors in administering justice, except in minor cases.

The Procuratorate. Procuratorates were set up at levels corresponding to the various levels of courts, the chief procurators being elected by the people's congress at the corresponding level and other procurators by its standing committee. The procuratorate would decide whether prosecution in a case was warranted, institute prosecutions and supervise the activities of the police, courts and prisons to check on their legality.

Criminal Procedure. This law reaffirmed the regulations on arrests and detentions promulgated on Feb. 23, 1979 [see page 30486 above], and the provisions for public trial, the right of defence, etc.

The provision for the right of defence raised the problem of China's acute shortage of lawyers. Only about 1,000 students had graduated in law at Peking University since 1949, and all law schools had been closed since the Cultural Revolution. Prof. Qian Duansheng, a former dean of the Peking Institute of Political Science and Law, said on July 7, 1979, that China needed at least 10,000 lawyers if the right of defence was to be guaranteed. The law departments of Peking University and the China People's University and the institutes of political science and law in Peking, Shanghai, Xian (or Zian—formerly Sian—in Shaanxi province) and Chongqing were reported on Oct. 24 to have reopened.

The press, radio and television gave greatly increased prominence to crime reports in the later months of 1979. From the middle of November onwards the number of executions showed a marked increase, at least 40 being announced in the next two months. Although most of the executions were for murder, rape or armed robbery, a woman official convicted of embezzlement was shot in Harbin on Feb. 28, 1980, under the law making grave cases of embezzlement by an official a capital offence.

The wide publicity given to trials and executions was intended to discourage a serious crime wave which, the press admitted, had developed in the major cities. In Shanghai army patrols were called in on Nov. 12, 1979, to assist in maintaining order, and before the end of the year similar measures were adopted in Peking and the provinces or autonomous regions of Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi Zhuang (Kwangsi Chuang), Hebei, Henan, Jilin, Shaanxi and Xinjiang Uygur (Sinkiang Uighur). The prevalence of crime and especially of juvenile delinquency, which was reported to be 10 times more common than before the Cultural Revolution, was officially attributed to the tendency to "anarchism" encouraged by Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four", but unofficial reports suggested that the primary cause was rather the presence in the cities of millions of unemployed young people.

The State Council promulgated on Nov. 29, 1979, new regulations on "re-education through labour" to supplement those issued in 1957. The original regulations provided that people with no regular occupation and "counter-revolutionaries" who had committed criminal or political offences not serious enough for prosecution should be given paid work and receive "political education". The supplementary regulations placed the organizations conducting re-education through labour under the control of the local authorities and the supervision of the procuratorates; limited the period of detention to between one and three years, with an optional additional year; and provided that people who had completed their term should not be discriminated against in employment and education. It was unofficially reported in June 1980 that in Peking alone over 5,000 unemployed young people had been sent to re-education through labour camps since the beginning of the year.

New regulations approved by the State Council on July 5, 1980, authorized the police to use pistols or batons in certain circumstances.

Meeting of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

The Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on June 5, 1979, elected 109 new members, the majority of whom were said to have been "persecuted by Lin Biao and the gang of four". [For description of the principally consultative CPPCC, see pages 29189-90.] These new members included Mr Lu Dingyi, Mr Yang Shangkun, Miss Ding Ling and Miss Wang Guangmei (all recently rehabilitated—see pages 30488 and 30490 above), Mgr Yang Gaojian, the Catholic Bishop of Changde and deputy secretary-general of the Patriotic Catholic Association [for which see below], and Miss He Zizhen (Ho Tzu-chen), Chairman Mao's second wife, whom he had divorced in about 1940 in order to marry Miss Jiang Qing. The announcement of Miss He's appointment did not mention her marriage to Chairman Mao, describing her as "a veteran Communist Party member and participant in the famous Long March".

The fifth National Committee of the CPPCC held its second session in Peking from June 15 to July 2, 1979, and elected six additional vice-chairmen, including Mr Lu Dingyi and Banqen Erdini (Panchen Erdeni), the Panchen Lama of Tibet [for whom see also page 29190 and page 30491 above].

Cabinet Appointments, September 1979

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress appointed Mr Ji Pengfei (previously head of the Communist Party's international relations department—see page 30489 above) a Deputy Premier on Sept. 13, 1979. Mr Ji (70) had previously been Foreign Minister in 1972-74. Mr Zhang Jinfu (Chang Ching-fu), the Finance Minister, was appointed deputy general secretary of the Financial and Economic Commission, and was succeeded in his previous post by Mr Wu Bo.

The Standing Committee also revived the Ministry of Justice, which had been abolished in 1959 [see 16863 C], and established two new ministries, the Eighth Ministry of Machine-building and the Ministry of Geology. Mr Wei Wenbo, a professional jurist, was appointed Minister of Justice, Mr Jiao Ruoyu Minister of the Eighth Ministry of Machine-building and Mr Sun Daguang Minister of Geology.

Controversy over Party Policy, July to September 1979 - New Appointments to Political Bureau

The Communist Party press admitted during the summer of 1979 that the policies adopted by the Central Committee in December 1978, the view put forward by Chairman Hua that the landlords and capitalists had ceased to exist as classes [see above] and the payment of compensation to former capitalists were all meeting with strong opposition from a leftist faction inside the party, which was particularly strong in the armed forces among young officers who had grown up during the Cultural Revolution.

The Shanghai *Wenhui Daily* said on Aug. 4, 1979, that those who "cling to the ideological system of Lin Biao and the gang of four and to the viewpoint of the two 'whatevers'" [see above] had "stirred up an erroneous trend of thought" in the spring against the principles laid down by the third plenary session of the Central Committee, and went on: "The third plenum decided to shift the focus of work to socialist modernization, took 'production and construction as the key link' and declined to 'take class struggle as the key link'. Some of our comrades found this decision sudden and could not accustom themselves to it. . . . These comrades feel that some of the policies are 'deviating' while others are 'rightist'. . . ."

The *Guangming Daily* said on Aug. 22 that in the past "we stressed the seriousness of class struggle in China and the danger of capitalist restoration to such an extent that we flew in the face of the objective reality", and continued: "We must guard against not only the rightist tendency of regarding class struggle as having died out, but also the leftist tendency of artificially widening the scope of class struggle. . . . Any debate between divergent views within the party or any contention among different opinions on academic matters must never be taken for class struggle, and must never be considered as a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves. . . ."

The party's attitude towards Chairman Mao became increasingly critical during this period. *The Workers' Daily* said on Sept. 25, 1979: "Guided by practice being the sole criterion for testing truth, we must give up anything outdated and rectify anything inappropriate which was said by Chairman Mao." The large hoardings in Peking displaying quotations from Chairman Mao were painted over in September and used for advertisements on such subjects as road safety.

The fourth plenary session of the Central Committee, held on Sept. 25-28, 1979, elected 12 new members, including Mr Yang Shangkun, Mr Lu Dingyi, Mr Peng Zhen and Mr Bo Yibo. Mr Peng Zhen was also elected to the Political Bureau, and

Mr Zhao Ziyang was promoted from an alternate to a full member.

Marshal Ye Jianying's Speech on 30th Anniversary of People's Republic

Marshal Ye Jiangying (Yeh Chien-ying), chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, gave the official speech on Sept. 29, 1979, to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. In a lengthy review of the history of China since 1949 he praised the policies pursued up to 1957, but strongly criticized the anti-rightist campaign and the "great leap forward" as well as the Cultural Revolution.

Whilst praising Chairman Mao as a great revolutionary, he emphasized that "Mao Zedong thought is not the product of Mao Zedong's personal wisdom alone, it is also the product of the wisdom of his comrades-in-arms, the party and the revolutionary people". He also stated that the Central Committee proposed to convene a meeting at an appropriate time to sum up the history of the last 30 years, and especially of the Cultural Revolution. He praised the achievements of the period up to 1956, and especially the transformation of "capitalist into socialist economy by the peaceful means of redemption". Chairman Mao's *On the 10 Major Relationships* and *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*, together with the major documents of the 1956 party congress [see page 28211; 15681 A; 15232 A], he said, contained "the guiding principles for socialist revolution and socialist construction in our country".

"Amidst these immense victories we had become imprudent," Marshal Ye went on. "In 1957, while it was necessary to counter the attack of a handful of bourgeois rightists, the mistake was made of broadening the scope of the struggle. In 1958 . . . we made the mistake of giving arbitrary directions, being boastful and stirring up a 'communist wind'. In 1959 in inner-party struggle we ineptly carried out the struggle against so-called right opportunism [a reference to the dismissal of Marshal Peng Dehuai—see page 30488 above]. These leftist errors, plus the three years of natural calamities and the scrapping of contracts and withdrawal of specialists by the Government of the Soviet Union, brought about the serious economic reverses of the late fifties and early sixties."

On the Cultural Revolution he said: "The Cultural Revolution was launched with the aim of preventing and combating revisionism. . . . The estimate made of the situation within the party and the country ran counter to reality, no accurate definition was given of revisionism, and an erroneous policy and method of struggle were adopted. . . . Lin Biao, the gang of four and other conspirators and careerists exploited these errors, pushed things to the extreme and formulated and pursued an ultra-left line. . . . The havoc which the counter-revolutionary gang wrought for 10 long years spelt calamity for our people and constituted the most severe reversal to our socialist cause since the founding of the People's Republic."

Summing up the policies of Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four", he declared: "They treated revolutionary leaders as omniscient and omnipotent deities, whose every word is truth. . . . They held that classes should be distinguished according to people's ideological and political viewpoints, and asserted that even after the system of exploitation had been abolished socialist society was still, and would for ever be, seething with their brand of 'class struggle'. . . . They concocted the theory of 'new changes in class relations', loudly asserting that a bourgeois class had formed inside the party. . . . They undermined democracy in the party and the state at its very base and, to the extent permitted by their power, imposed a counter-revolutionary, fascist dictatorship. . . . They were against developing the productive forces, and wanted to supplant production with their so-called 'class struggle'. They vilified the four modernizations as 'Westernization' and 'capitalist transformation', slandered the measures to develop production, promote economic prosperity and improve the material and cultural life of the masses as 'revisionism' or 'capitalism', and labelled the study of the advanced experience of foreign countries, the introduction of advanced technology and the expansion of foreign trade as 'worshipping things foreign and fawning on foreigners'. . . . They freely distorted the true sense of 'bourgeois rights' mentioned by Marx, insisted that the principle 'to each according to his work' was the economic source of capitalism and wished to replace this principle with egalitarianism. . . . They annulled the policy of 'letting 100 flowers blossom, letting 100 schools of thought contend' and deprived the people of the freedoms of speech, publication, teaching, research and artistic creation and performance."

The lessons to be drawn from the activities of Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" he summarized as follows: "(i) For socialism to replace capitalism, we must liberate the productive forces and achieve a constantly rising labour productivity. . . . (ii) It is necessary to make a scientific analysis . . . of the internal class situation and class struggle after the establishment of the socialist system. . . . While rejecting the view that class struggle no longer exists, we must oppose the view that magnifies it, to say nothing of creating so-called class struggles out of the void. . . . (iii) We must have a correct understanding of the inter-relationship between the masses, classes, political parties and leaders. . . . Leaders are not gods. They are not infallible and therefore should not be deified. . . . (iv) We must further improve both party discipline and the socialist legal system, ensure democratic rights for all party members and citizens, and see to it that inner-party democracy and socialist democracy are institutionalized and guaranteed by law. . . ."

In conclusion, he dealt at length with the question of raising the standard of officials. More middle-aged and young cadres must be promoted to responsible posts, and to give competent leadership to the modernization campaign leading cadres at all levels must acquire the necessary scientific knowledge. Those who abused their positions to seek personal gain and privilege must be duly dealt with.

Revival of Poster Campaign - Further Demonstrations in Peking and the Provinces

The apparent dominance of a more liberal faction in the Communist Party leadership led to a revival of the poster campaign, the unofficial press and protest demonstrations by peasants and others in the latter part of 1979. *Exploration* went on sale again on Sept. 9 for the first time since April, and the Human Rights Alliance again put up its 19-point manifesto [see page 30491 above] on "Democracy Wall" on Sept. 23.

Peasants and other petitioners seeking redress of their grievances staged demonstrations in Peking on Aug. 7-9, 1979, for the first time since January, and again on Aug. 28-Sept. 2. About 1,000 people took part in a meeting in Tiananmen Square on Sept. 13 convened by an organization calling itself the Association for the Study of Scientific and Democratic Socialism, at which speakers protested against the petitioners' plight and the privileges of party officials. The Government announced on Sept. 14 that over 1,000 officials had been appointed to examine the petitioners' grievances, escort them back to their homes and urge local officials to solve their problems. During the next two weeks most of them were sent back to their home provinces, but sporadic protest demonstrations continued until Oct. 15.

About 120 young people demonstrated in Peking on Sept. 20, 1979, in protest against their failure to obtain university places although, they alleged, officials' children with lower qualifications had been admitted. Students of the China People's University went on strike on Oct. 10 as a protest against the occupation of part of the university buildings by an army unit, returning to their classes on Oct. 13 only after the Army had agreed to return the buildings.

Riots took place on Hainan island (in the far south of the country) on July 8, 1979, in which, according to official reports, over 300 people occupied a broadcasting station, made propaganda broadcasts and wrecked Communist Party offices. Two of the alleged ringleaders were sentenced to 10 and two years' imprisonment respectively on July 31. *Exploration* reported that the riots had been caused by fighting between factions supporting and opposing the "gang of four", and that troops had been called in to restore order.

Over 40 people occupied offices of the Shanghai municipal headquarters on Oct. 20, 1979, and remained there until removed by the police on Nov. 3, some of them being arrested. Official reports suggested that the demonstrators were individuals with personal grievances. In Fushun (Liaoning province) several hundred people took part in demonstrations outside the Communist Party offices on two occasions early in November, the three ringleaders being arrested on Nov. 10. According to unofficial reports, over 300 of the protesters had also gone to Shenyang, the provincial capital, where they staged a violent demonstration.

The Xinjiang regional Government stated in January 1980 that since February 1979 youths sent from Shanghai to the Aksu district, near the Soviet border, had formed illegal organizations, assaulted officials and disturbed law and order. The directive, which banned their organizations and ordered those absent without leave to return to work, was posted up in Shanghai.

Trial and Imprisonment of Dissident Leaders

As had previously occurred in the spring, the revival of dissident activities and popular demonstrations was followed by a reaction. Mr Wei Jingsheng, the editor of *Exploration*, was found guilty on Oct. 16, 1979, of supplying a foreigner with military intelligence and carrying out counter-revolutionary agitation, and was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, to be followed by three years' deprivation of political rights. His appeal against the judgment was rejected by the Peking Municipal High Court on Nov. 6. Mr Yang Guang, the assistant editor of *Exploration*, who had given evidence against Mr Wei at his trial, was released on Nov. 15, the charges against him being dropped.

Although the trial was nominally public, foreign journalists and Mr Wei's relatives and friends were refused admission to the court.

The prosecution alleged that on Feb. 20, 1979, three days after China invaded Vietnam [see page 29871], he had told a foreigner the names of the commanders of the invasion force and given him information on its strength and the number of Chinese casualties. He had also published articles on "Democracy Wall" and in *Exploration* in which he "slandered Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought", vilified China's state system, slandered party and state leaders, incited the people to "direct their anger at the criminal system" and agitated for "seizing political power from these overlords".

According to an unofficial transcript of Mr Wei's defence, he appealed to the rights of freedom of speech and the press guaranteed by Article 45 of the Constitution [see page 29187]. The military information which he passed on, he maintained, was derived from hearsay and not from official documents, and could not have caused any harm to the situation at the front. Denying that his writings were counter-revolutionary, he said that their central theme was that without democracy there could be no four modernizations, and that his criticism had been directed against those who used Marxism as "the pretext for enslaving people". *Exploration* was a journal of theoretical investigation on public sale, and had never taken the overthrow of the government as its aim.

A transcript of his defence was displayed on "Democracy Wall" on Nov. 2, 1979, and went on sale on Nov. 11, several people, including Mr Liu Qing, an editor of *The April 5 Tribune*, being arrested for selling it. A man who had put up posters in Xinxiang (Hsin-hsiang, in Henan province) protesting against the sentence on Mr Wei was himself sentenced on Dec. 9 to eight years' imprisonment and 13 years' deprivation of political rights.

The trial of Miss Fu Yuehua, the organizer of the peasant demonstration on Jan. 8, 1979 [see page 30491 above], on charges of violating public order and falsely accusing a party official of raping her opened on Oct. 17, but was adjourned to allow new evidence to be investigated. When the trial resumed on Dec. 24 she was found guilty on both charges and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

The regulations on state secrets adopted in 1951 were reissued on April 10, 1980. These defined as state secrets secret information on virtually all aspects of military, political and economic affairs, and provided that anyone who sold or divulged such information to "enemies at home or abroad" or to "domestic and foreign profiteers" should be punished as a counter-revolutionary.

Abolition of "Democracy Wall"

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress unanimously agreed on Nov. 29, 1979, that "the question of the Xidan wall should be solved with appropriate measures". The Peking municipal authorities on Dec. 6 forbade the display of posters except at a designated site in Yuetan Park or at the author's place of work; required their authors to register their names, addresses and places of work; and stated that although posters would not be subject to censorship their authors would be held responsible for their contents. All posters were removed from "Democracy Wall" on the following day. The new site was a wall only about half the length, situated in a park in a remote residential area, and was not visible from the street.

Following these measures, the human rights movement virtually disappeared. *The April 5 Tribune* announced on April 1, 1980, that it would cease publication after a final issue, and by July only one unofficial journal, *Today*, was being produced in Peking. New regulations announced on July 15, 1980, required all publications to be registered with the local authorities; forbade printing works to do business without the local authorities' consent; and banned the supply of paper and other printing materials to unlicensed printing works.

Writers' and Artists' Congress - Developments in Literature and Art

The Federation of Literary and Art Circles, which had been forced to suspend its activities during the Cultural Revolution, held its fourth national congress from Oct. 30 to Nov. 16, 1979. Mr Zhou Yang (Chou Yang), a former deputy director of the Communist Party's propaganda department, who had been purged in 1966 and rehabilitated in 1977 [see pages 21578; 28726], was elected chairman of the federation. The congress adopted a new constitution, which provided that the federation would protect writers' and artists' democratic rights against encroachments.

After an unofficial exhibition in a Peking park organized by 23 young artists had been closed by the police, about 100 artists and writers held a protest demonstration on Oct. 1, 1979. In consequence the exhibition was allowed to reopen in an art gallery on Nov. 25. The exhibits, which were neither in the traditional Chinese nor the official "socialist realist" style, showed Western influences, and included abstract paintings and nudes.

The publication of foreign books and the showing of foreign plays and films, which had been banned during the Cultural Revolution, were resumed in 1978 [see page 29195]. The first complete Chinese translation of Shakespeare was published in August 1978. The first foreign play to be publicly performed since the Cultural Revolution, Shakespeare's *Much Ado about Nothing*, was produced in Shanghai in February 1979, and the first contemporary foreign play, Brecht's *Life of Galileo*, in Peking in March 1979.

Local Elections

The first elections in China since the 1949 revolution in which voters were given a choice between candidates were held in the East district of Peking on Nov. 8 and 15, 1979, under the new electoral law [see page 30493 above], 96 per cent of the electorate voting. A total of 7,866 candidates had been nominated for the 350 seats in the district people's congress, but this was reduced by a "winnowing process" to 592. The 348 members elected included 130 non-Communists and 122 women. Two seats were left vacant, as no candidate had obtained a majority of the votes cast.

The Minister of Civil Affairs, Mr Cheng Zihua (Cheng Tzu-hua), said on Aug. 3, 1980, that direct elections had already been held in 552 counties, and would be completed at the county level in the second half of the year. The leading cadres in many places had "boldly let the constituency or their representatives nominate candidates", but elsewhere "implementing the system of nominating more candidates than the number of people to be elected encountered much resistance", as "some cadres do not quite understand the meaning of expanding the people's democratic rights in the new period".

It was officially reported in July 1980 that all the 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions had held their people's congresses, which had elected their standing committees and people's governments.

The new local authorities, it was stated, differed from the former revolutionary committees in the following respects: (i) The legislative and administrative organs (the standing committees and people's governments) were separated. (ii) Many experienced cadres who had been "persecuted by Lin Biao and the gang of four" had been elected. (iii) Members of the non-Communist parties and non-party "patriotic personages" had been elected to leading posts. (iv) Members of national minorities had been elected to the chairmanship in the five autonomous regions. (v) The Communist Party and local authorities had been separated, so that first secretaries of party committees did not concurrently hold positions as provincial governors, mayors or chairmen of standing committees of local people's congresses. (vi) The number of cadres in the prime of life holding major leading posts had increased, although there were "still too many old cadres".

Non-Communist Parties' Congresses

The eight non-Communist parties and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce all held their first congresses for 20 years in Peking on Oct. 11-23, 1979, at which they revised their constitutions and elected their leadership. The organizations concerned and their new leaders were as follows:

(1) The Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, founded in 1948. Chairman: Mr Zhu Yunshan (92), a veteran of the 1911 revolution.

(2) The China Democratic League, an organization mainly composed of intellectuals founded in 1941. Chairman: Miss Shi Liang (79), who was the first Minister of Justice after the establishment of the People's Republic [see page 10443].

(3) The China Democratic National Construction Association, an organization of businessmen and intellectuals founded in 1945. Chairman: Mr Hu Juewen (Hu Chueh-wen) (84), a former industrialist.

(4) The China Association for Promoting Democracy, founded by a group of Shanghai intellectuals in 1945. Chairman: Mr Zhou Jianren (Chou Chien-jen) (91), a brother of the famous writer Lu Xun (Le Hsun).

(5) The China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, founded in 1947 and stemming from the China Revolutionary Party created in 1927. Chairman: Mr Ji Fang (Chi Fang) (89), a veteran of the 1911 revolution.

(6) The China *Zhi Gong Dang* (*Chih Kung Tang*—Party for Public

Interests), originally organized by overseas Chinese. Chairman: Dr Huang Dingchen (78).

(7) The *Jiu San* (*Chiu San*—Sept. 3) Society. Chairman: Mr Xu Deheng (Hsu Teh-heng) (89).

(8) The Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, founded in Hong Kong in 1947. Chairman: Mr Cai Xiao (59).

(9) The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the organization representing the former capitalists. Chairman: Mr Hu Ziang (82).

The democratic parties, as they were usually known, were formed by middle-class elements and intellectuals who opposed the dictatorship of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his apparent appeasement of Japan and supported the Communist Party in the civil war of 1946-49. They co-operated with the Communist Party in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1949 in drawing up the Common Programme which formed the organic law of the People's Republic, and were represented in the new Government [see 10441 A]. They came under attack in the anti-rightist movement of 1957 [see 15839 A], however, and again during the Cultural Revolution, when they were forced to suspend their activities and many of their leaders were imprisoned. Since 1976 the Communist Party had again sought their co-operation; of the chairmen of the democratic parties, Mr Hu Juewen, Mr Zhou Jianren and Mr Xu Deheng were elected vice-chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress at its 1978 session [see page 29188], and Mr Zhu Yunshan and Miss Shi Liang at its 1979 session [see above]. Mr Ji Fang, Dr Huang Dingchen and Mr Cai Xiao held senior posts within the CPPCC.

At a reception for the delegates attending the congresses on Oct. 19, 1979, Mr Deng Xiaoping said that many of them had significant achievements in the arts and sciences or long experience in business management, and could play a positive role in the modernization of the economy. They also had wide contacts and influence among the Chinese in Taiwan, and he hoped that they would work actively for the reunification of Taiwan with China.

Mr Deng Xiaoping's Policy Report (January 1980)

Mr Deng Xiaoping dealt with the current situation and the tasks facing the country in a speech to about 10,000 party and state officials in the Great Hall of the People in Peking on Jan. 16, 1980, which was afterwards circulated for general discussion inside the party. Although the speech was not published in China, what was believed to be an authentic text of it appeared in Hong Kong newspapers, and is summarized below.

Modernization was the core of the tasks for the 1980s, he said, as China's role in international affairs depended on the speed of her economic development. To accomplish the four modernizations it was necessary to have "an unswerving political line which is implemented all the time". "But for the leftist interference of the past, the upheaval of 1958, and especially the Great Cultural Revolution," he went on, "our industrial and agricultural production and science and education would have developed considerably and there would have been a comparatively large improvement in people's living standards." A great defect of planning in the past had been a failure to maintain a balance between agriculture and industry, between light and heavy industry and between economic and other forms of development. Expenditure on education, science, culture and public health was too small and must be increased. Even some third-world countries, such as India and Egypt, spent more per capita on education than China.

Stability and unity and also liveliness and vigour were necessary for construction, he continued. Such things as had happened at the Xidan wall, however, could not be described as liveliness and vigour, and would lead to chaos if allowed to spread. There were still factors making for instability, such as remnants of the "gang of four", counter-revolutionaries and dissidents who opposed the socialist system, and these were capable of banding together under certain conditions. Some party members, including a number of cadres, were supporting these activities, and if they did not correct their standpoint they would be liable for party disciplinary punishment. The constitutional guarantee of the right to speak out freely, air views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters had never played a positive role, and the party would propose its abolition.

Turning to economic policy, he said that China was poor and that its education, science and culture was backward, which meant that "we have to go through a process of plain living and hard work". In 1979 some enterprises had granted bonuses indiscriminately, even though production plans had not been fulfilled, and to get more bonuses some had arbitrarily increased prices. With China's huge population and its small area of arable land, the people's income could not grow fast. If the total national output value increased from the present figure of a little over $200 to $1,000 per head of population by the end of the century China would be comfortably off. The present figure in Singapore was almost $3,000 and in Hong Kong over $2,000, but if China reached $1,000 life would be much better than in those countries, as China had no exploiting class.

China could only catch up with the developed countries by long-term efforts. Coal production in 1979 was 620,000,000 tonnes, compared with 599,000,000 tonnes in the United States in 1978 and 724,000,000 in the Soviet Union, but in proportion to population China's production was much less than theirs. Japan produced almost one tonne of steel per head of population, and the United States, the Soviet Union and many European countries half a tonne per head. To reach that level China would have to produce 600,000,000 tonnes by the end of the century, which was neither possible nor necessary.

Party members and cadres must take the lead in building the country, Mr Deng declared, and must acquire the necessary specialized knowledge. At least 1,000,000 more cadres capable of doing judicial work and 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 more school and university teachers were needed. There were fewer than 1,000,000 students in the universities, compared with 10,000,000 in the United States.

Party committees had paid insufficient attention to discovering, promoting and assisting talented people. Particular attention must be paid to selecting and promoting people in their forties and fifties. "I am afraid there are not many of that age here today," Mr Deng added. "That is regrettable. It will be a sign that our cause is prospering if one day the majority of comrades sitting and listening to a report like this are in their forties."

On the question of party leadership, he said that "some young people have blind faith in the so-called democracy of capitalist society", but the multi-party system in the capitalist countries was "determined by the situation of internal strife and contest within the bourgeoisie". China was a multi-party country, but the other parties served the socialist cause while acknowledging the Communist Party's leadership. To uphold the party's leadership, however, it had to be improved, as "our party's prestige among the people is not as high as it used to be". In the past party members had been the first to suffer and the last to enjoy material benefits, but some members now had joined the party to be the first to enjoy material benefits and the last to suffer. Party discipline, which had fallen to pieces during the Cultural Revolution, must be strengthened, and it was necessary to eliminate "the anarchist trend of thought introduced into the party by the gang of four and the various bourgeois liberal trends of thought which have recently appeared in the party".

The Shanghai *Wenhui Bao* admitted on Jan. 13, 1980, that there was a "crisis of confidence" in Marxism-Leninism, stating that "in schools political lessons are not well received", and that enterprises often regarded political study classes as "just occasions for killing time". It attributed this attitude to the fact that after the exposure of Marshal Lin Biao and the "gang of four" many people, and especially the younger generation, "felt deeply that they have been deceived and fooled".

Changes in Military Commands

The commanders of at least seven of the 11 military regions (or military units as they were renamed) were changed in January and February 1980, in the first major reshuffle of the kind since 1974 [see page 26785], the changes being as follows:

(1) Gen. Qin Jiwei (Chin Chi-wei), a political associate of Mr Deng Xiaoping and a former military commander in Chengdu (Chengtu), was reported on Jan. 23 to have succeeded Gen. Chen Xilian as commander of the Peking military units. Gen. Qin Jiwei had been appointed first political commissar of the Peking military region in November 1978 *vice* Mr Ji Dengkui. For the removal of Gen. Chen Xilian from his other posts, see below.

(2) Gen. Wu Gehua (Wu Ke-hua), the commander of the Urumqi military units, was reported on Jan. 27 to have replaced Gen. Xu Shiyu (Hsu Shih-yu) as commander of the Guangzhou (Canton) military units.

(3) Gen. Zhang Zhixiu succeeded Gen. Yang Dezhi (Yang Teh-chih) on Jan. 30 as commander of the Kunming military units. (From 1974 to 1979 Gen. Yang Dezhi had commanded the Wuhan region.)

(4) Gen. Xiao Quanfu was reported on Feb. 2 to have been appointed commander of the Urumqi military units in place of Gen. Wu Gehua. Gen. Wu Gehua's earlier post of commander of the Chengdu military units (currently vacant) was taken by Gen. Yu Daizhong (Yu Tai-chung), a former military commander, Communist Party first secretary and chairman of the revolutionary committee of Inner Mongolia.

(5) Gen. Zhang Zaizhien was reported on Feb. 7 to have succeeded Gen. Wang Bicheng as commander of the Wuhan military units. (From 1972 to 1979 Gen. Wang Bicheng had commanded the Kunming region.)

(6) Gen. Rao Shoukun, previously commander of the North Sea Fleet, was reported on Feb. 19 to have been appointed commander of the Jinan military units in place of Gen. Zeng Siyu (Tseng Ssu-yu).

The changes were believed to be connected with Mr Deng Xiaoping's demand in his report of Jan. 16 that senior officials should make way for younger men. Mr Wang Enmao (Wang En-mao), first secretary of the Jilin party, said in a speech in November 1979 that the recent war with Vietnam had shown that "higher demands should be made on every commander in regard to their age, physical condition and vigour", and that "veteran comrades in our Army are urgently required to train and select successors".

Mr Ye Fei (71), the former Minister of Communications [see page 30489 above], was reported on Feb. 8, 1980, to have been appointed Commander of the Navy in place of Adml. Xiao Jingguang (76), who had been appointed in mid-1979 a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress [see page 30492 above].

Mr Deng Xiaoping (75) resigned his post as Chief of General Staff, which he had held since 1977, on Feb. 25, and was succeeded by Gen. Yang Dezhi (70). (Gen. Yang Dezhi had been successively military commander in Jinan, Wuhan and Kunming, and had been a deputy commander of the Chinese forces in Vietnam in early 1979—see page 29871.)

Cabinet Appointments, February 1980

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress approved the following appointments to the State Council on Feb. 12, 1980: (i) Mr Bo Yibo, a former Deputy Premier rehabilitated at the end of 1978 [see page 30488 above], was appointed Minister in charge of the Machine-building Industry Commission, a new body with the task of supervising the work of the eight Ministries of Machine-building. (ii) Mr Ji Pengfei, a Deputy Premier since September 1979, succeeded Mr Jin Ming as Secretary-General of the State Council while retaining his cabinet post. (iii) Mr Gao Yangwen succeeded Mr Xiao Han (Hsiao Han) as Minister of the Coal Industry. (iv) Mr Zhao Xinchu succeeded Mr Chen Guodong (Chen Kuo-tung) as Minister of Food (Mr Chen Guodong having previously been described as Minister of Supply and Marketing Co-operatives).

Fifth Plenary Session of Communist Party Central Committee (February 1980) - Changes in Political Bureau - Mr Hu Yaobang elected General Secretary - Rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi

The fifth plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee, which met in Peking on Feb. 23-29, 1980, made the following decisions:

(1) Mr Hu Yaobang and Mr Zhao Ziyang were elected to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.

(2) The committee approved the "requests to resign" made by Mr Wang Dongxing, Mr Ji Dengkui, Mr Wu De and Gen. Chen Xilian, all of whom were members of the Political Bureau, removed them from their party posts and decided to propose their removal from their government posts. Mr Wang had previously been a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau; Mr Ji and General Chen Deputy Premiers; and Mr Wu De Mayor of Peking until October 1978 [see above]. All had been criticized during the poster campaign of early 1979 [see above].

(3) The party Secretariat, which had been abolished during the Cultural Revolution, was revived, with Mr Hu Yaobang as General Secretary (a post previously held by Mr Deng Xiaoping) and Mr Wan Li, Mr Wang Renzhong, Mr Fang Yi, Mr Gu Mu (Ku Mu), Mr Song Renqiong, Mr Yu Qiuli (Yu Chiu-li), Gen. Yang Dezhi, Mr Hu Qiaomu, Mr Yao Yilin and Mr Peng Chong (Peng Chung) as members of the Secretariat. Following Mr Hu Yaobang's new appointment, Mr Wang Renzhong was reported on March 7 to have succeeded him as head of the party's propaganda department.

Of the members of the Secretariat, Mr Fang Yi, Mr Yu Qiuli and Mr Peng Chong were members of the Political Bureau; Mr Wang Renzhong, Mr Fang Yi, Mr Gu Mu and Mr Yao Yilin were Deputy Prime Ministers; Mr Song Renqiong was director of the party's organization department; Mr Yao Yilin was also director of the party's general office; Mr Wan Li was first secretary of the Communist Party in Anhui province and a former Minister of Railways [see page 28718]; Gen. Yang Dezhi was Chief of General Staff; and Mr Hu Qiaomu was deputy secretary-general of the party's Central Committee in the 1950s and was appointed president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1977.

(4) The party's 12th national congress would be convened before the due date (1982), at a time to be decided by the Political Bureau.

(5) The draft of a new party constitution would be issued to the whole party for discussion, before being submitted to the congress for approval. The official communiqué stated that, besides setting out strict requirements for party members and containing provisions regarding democratic centralism within the party, "the draft includes a number of new provisions on the party's cadre system, including an end to what amounts in practice to holding a cadre's position for a lifetime".

(6) The committee approved a document submitted by the Political Bureau on guiding principles for inner-party political life.

(7) The committee accepted a report on the case of Mr Liu Shaoqi submitted by the Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline; held that he was "a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary", who on the basis of false evidence had been subjected by "Lin Biao, the gang of four and company" to "the biggest frame-up our party has ever known"; and decided to remove the labels "renegade, traitor and scab" imposed on him by the Central Committee in 1968 and to cancel the resolution expelling him from the party and dismissing him from all his posts [see 23069 A].

(8) The committee decided to propose to the National People's Congress that the stipulation in Article 45 of the Constitution that citizens "have the right to speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters" [see page 29187] be deleted.

The Central Committee session was regarded as a major triumph for Mr Deng Xiaoping. The leading opponents of his policies were removed from the Political Bureau, whilst two of his strongest supporters were promoted to its Standing Committee and others were appointed to the Secretariat. The rehabilitation of Mr Liu Shaoqi was the most decisive repudiation to date of the Cultural Revolution, of which he had been the most prominent victim, and also an implicit repudiation of Chairman Mao's thought and policies.

The "guiding principles for inner-party political life" approved by the Central Committee were as follows:

(1) "Adhere to the party's political line and ideological line." It was necessary to emancipate the mind and use practice as the sole criterion for testing truth. Two erroneous ideological tendencies must be opposed—"ossification of the mind and proceeding by the book in everything we do", and "negating the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, party leadership and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought".

(2) "Uphold collective leadership and oppose arbitrary decision-making by a single person." "Unprincipled glorification" of leading party members was forbidden.

(3) "Safeguard the party's unity and centralized leadership and strictly abide by party discipline." Expression in the press or on the radio of views contrary to the Central Committee's decisions and instigation of or participation in disturbances by party members were strictly forbidden.

(4) "Uphold party spirit and root out factionalism." Party members were forbidden to join any secret organization or to participate in any secret activities. Appointments must be made strictly on merit.

(5) "Speak the truth and match words with deeds."

(6) "Promote inner-party democracy and take a correct attitude towards dissenting views." Party members should be allowed to express their views freely, and expression of erroneous opinions should not be regarded as a violation of party discipline.

(7) "Protect the rights of party members against any encroachment."

(8) "Elections should fully express the wishes of the electors." The number of candidates in inner-party elections should be greater than the number of places to be filled, and all elections should be by secret ballot. Electors should pay particular attention to electing middle-aged and young cadres.

(9) "Struggle against erroneous tendencies, bad people and bad actions." "Factionalism, anarchism, ultra-individualism, bureaucracy and seeking privilege" were condemned.

(10) "Treat comrades who have made mistakes correctly." Cadres who had gone astray must not be rejected because of one mistake.

(11) "Accept supervision by the party and the masses; no one may seek privilege."

(12) "Study hard and strive to be red and expert." "'Red'," the document stated, "means possessing a sound, correct political orientation and upholding the four fundamental principles. 'Expert' means learning and mastering a professional understanding of modernization and becoming a professional and good at one's work. To become expert does not necessarily mean one has become red, but to become red one must be expert. . . ."

The rehabilitation of Mr Liu Shaoqi inevitably affected the standing of Chairman Mao, who had been his leading opponent during the Cultural Revolution, and *Red Flag* (the official fortnightly party organ) stated in April that it had been resisted by younger elements in the party, who held that it harmed the party's prestige. At a memorial meeting for Mr Liu Shaoqi held on May 17, however, Mr Deng Xiaoping described him as "the first to advance the concept of Mao Zedong thought", and attributed his persecution not to Chairman Mao but to "Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and company". An editorial in *The People's Daily* on the previous day said that Chairman Mao had advocated correcting mistakes and righting wrongs whenever discovered, and that Mao Zedong thought was "a product of the collective wisdom pooled by Comrade Mao Zedong and his comrades-in-arms . . . and not a particular sentence or action by any individual". A new edition of Mr Liu Shaoqi's book *How to be a Good Communist*, which had been condemned and banned during the Cultural Revolution, was published on March 14.

Press reports published after Mr Liu Shaoqi's rehabilitation revealed that he had died of pneumonia in prison at Kaifeng (Henan province) on Nov. 12, 1969, and gave details of the sufferings of his family during the Cultural Revolution. His wife, Miss Wang Guangmei, had been imprisoned and sentenced to death; his eldest son had been beaten to death; his second son had died in prison; two of his other children had been imprisoned; and his three youngest children had been reduced to destitution. The New China News Agency reported on June 4 that people involved in 19,464 cases connected with "the frame-up of Liu Shaoqi" had been exonerated, and that an unspecified number who had been executed had been posthumously rehabilitated.

Cabinet Appointments, April 1980

A session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress held on April 8-16, 1980, appointed Mr Zhao Ziyang and Mr Wan Li Deputy Premiers, relieved Mr Ji Dengkui and Gen. Chen Xilian of their posts as Deputy Premiers, and accepted Mr Wu De's resignation as one of its vice-chairmen. It also decided to convene the third session of the National People's Congress in August, and to recommend that the session should delete the reference in Article 45 of the Constitution to the right of citizens to write big-character posters.

Inner-party Controversies, March-August 1980

Following the rehabilitation of Mr Liu Shaoqi, party spokesmen became increasingly outspoken in the spring and summer of 1980 in their criticisms of Chairman Mao, his policies and the cult surrounding him.

An indication of this trend was the posthumous rehabilitation of two of his former opponents, Mr Qu Qiubai (Chu Chiu-pai) who was commemorated in an article in *Red Flag* on March 19, and Mr Li Lisan, for whom a memorial meeting was held on the following day.

Mr Qu Qiubai was general secretary of the party in 1927-28 and was executed by the Kuomintang in 1935, whilst Mr Li Lisan succeeded him as general secretary in 1928-30, served as Minister of Labour in 1949-54 and died in 1967, his death being attributed to suicide [see page 22948]. Together with Marshal Peng Dehuai, Mr Liu Shaoqi and Mr Deng Xiaoping, they had formerly been included among the 12 "leaders of opportunist or counter-revolutionary revisionist lines" said to have been defeated by Chairman Mao.

This trend continued to meet with opposition inside the party.

The People's Daily stated on May 23: "The party's Marxist political, ideological and organizational lines since the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee still encounter all kinds of resistance. In addition, the party's economic policies, policies on literature and art, cadres and intellectuals, as well reversing verdicts on unjust, trumped-up and incorrect cases, are not implemented fully. . . . We must eliminate the remnants of the gang of four who are still usurping leadership positions. . . ."

The demand for the retirement of older officials was intensified in June. *Red Flag* on June 1 attacked officials who "are unwilling to use their brains, are irresponsible, pretend to know everything and issue confused orders", who "eat three square meals a day and do no work" and who lacked professional knowledge, and demanded their replacement by "young and energetic talented personnel". A secretary of the Xinjiang Communist Party who had asked to retire at the age of 74 was widely praised by the media.

Chairman Mao's thought was openly attacked by Mr Hu Yaobang in an interview with Yugoslav correspondents on June 21.

Although Chairman Mao had made a great contribution to the revolution, he said, his mistakes in his last years had caused a disaster for the Chinese people, and had been responsible for the "incorrect" development of the Cultural Revolution. The basic tenets of his thought in philosophy, party development, military doctrine, culture and some other spheres were still of guiding significance, but some of his later works on socialist construction and some of his economic theories were not so rich in content. After revealing that about 100,000,000 victims of the Cultural Revolution or earlier purges had been rehabilitated, Mr Hu said that he had himself been attacked in the Cultural Revolution and had lived and worked in a stable for 2½ years, spent another 2½ years in a "re-education school" and then been unemployed for five years.

Mr Kang Sheng, the theorist of the Cultural Revolution, who had already been indirectly attacked [see page 30490 above], was denounced by name by Mr Hu, who said on July 12 that when Mr An Ziwen, a leading party official, was in prison in 1969 Mr Kang had tried to force him to bring false evidence against Mr Liu Shaoqi.

The People's Daily said on July 24 that Mr Kang's theory that "to neglect politics and the line and pay attention to production is in itself revisionist" had led to the neglect of production, and on Aug. 4 that he had been "the first person to set forth political ideology as the sole criterion for determining social classes", which had formed the theoretical basis of the "ultra-leftist line".

The campaign against Chairman Mao and the Cultural Revolution in July assumed the form of attacks on the influence of China's feudal traditions.

Thus, for example, *The People's Daily* said on July 18: "The personality cult, the patriarchal system pursued by some leaders, the practice of one person laying down the law, certain cadres seeking political privileges and special favours in private life, the undying vestiges of sectarianism and factionalism in the party, the lifelong tenure of cadres, cadres' bureaucratization and, in the economic field, the closed-door policy and bureaucratic work-style in industry and commerce—all these are basically a reflection in modern life of such feudalistic ideas as despotism, monarchism, imperial power, privilege-seeking, hierarchy, patriarchal clans and obscurantism. . . . In our practical work as well as in our analysis of China's characteristics and appraisal of China's class forces, we neglected one of the most fundamental facts—before national liberation China was not a capitalist society but a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. . . . We not only failed to draw a distinction between proletarian ideology and bourgeois ideology, but also failed to draw a distinction between proletarian ideology and feudal ideology, thus enabling feudal ideology to pass itself off as proletarian ideology. . . ."

Most of the portraits of Mao on public buildings in the centre of Peking (though not that over Tiananmen Gate) were removed at the end of July and the beginning of August. A party directive issued on Aug. 11 said: "There have been too many portraits, quotations and poems of Chairman Mao in public places. This is lacking in political dignity. The number should be gradually reduced to an appropriate amount. . . ."

The same directive stated furthermore that the identical principle applied also to portraits and inscriptions of other leaders. In this connexion, the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin were removed from Tiananmen Square on Aug. 21, a spokesman of the Peking municipal people's government stating that they would be put up "only when necessary"; originally they had been put up only when important festivals were being celebrated, but during the Cultural Revolution they had been erected and had remained there ever since.

In an interview with the Yugoslav newspaper *Vjesnik* on Aug. 10 Chairman Hua said that although Chairman Mao was "the most outstanding figure in Chinese history" he was "a human being and not a god and therefore fallible". After praising the Communist Party's achievements between 1935 (when Chairman Mao assumed the leadership) and 1957, he said that between 1958 and 1966 it had made "some rather big mistakes"; its economic policy had been over-ambitious, and in some cases it had "erroneously exaggerated the gravity of class struggle". During the Cultural Revolution it had made "grievous, serious mistakes", for which as its chairman Mao bore the responsibility. These consisted mainly of the appraisal of the situation in the party and the country, which had been contrary to fact, and the erroneous policies and methods of struggle adopted. The "gang of four" had seized upon these mistakes to attempt to change completely China's socialist nature, and had taken advantage of Chairman Mao's illness to hide the truth from him. He had to some extent perceived their conspiracies, however, had exposed and criticized them, and had himself invented the designation "gang of four". The party was holding discussions on its history, particularly since 1949, and would make a summing-up at its 12th congress.

Religious Policy

From 1978 onwards the Government adopted a more tolerant attitude towards religious practices, which had been almost completely suppressed during the Cultural Revolution [see page 21580]. Churches, mosques and temples were reopened, members of the clergy who had been forced to adopt other occupations returned to their former posts, and religious services were resumed. The new criminal code [see above] made it an offence for an official to deprive a citizen of his freedom of religious belief. Some cities unfroze rents which had been paid to local religious institutions and restored the salaries of the clergy, in some cases paying them arrears of salary. Representatives of religious bodies took part in the 1978 and 1979 meetings of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference [see page 29190 and above], some being elected to its Standing Committee.

The Institute for Religious Studies in Peking, which had been closed since 1966, reopened early in 1978, and religious studies were resumed in a number of universities in the following year. It was officially stated on Aug. 2, 1979, that the Koran was being retranslated into Chinese and the Chinese translation of the Bible revised.

Foreign visitors to China in 1980 reported that a religious revival was in progress, and that young people, including the children of high officials, were attending Christian services or becoming Buddhist monks. *China Youth* said on March 11 that the Government's policy had been misinterpreted by some young people as "an incitement to practise religion", and *The Liberation Army Daily* complained on March 17 that some soldiers "even go so far as to believe in Christ". *The Quinghai Daily* reported in May that some villages in the province had spent collective funds on organizing religious rites and some production team leaders had been elected as Moslem mullahs or living Buddhas, and condemned the "perverse trend" of "believing in Marxism-Leninism and religion simultaneously".

Details of developments affecting the various religious bodies are given below.

Catholicism. A number of tentative steps towards normalization of relations between China and the Vatican were taken during 1979-80. The breach had largely been caused by the former domination of the Chinese Catholic Church by foreign clergy; according to official Vatican figures, out of about 100 bishops and 5,800 priests in 1949, only about 40 bishops and 2,700 priests were Chinese. The Papal internuncio and the foreign bishops were expelled in 1951 [see 12117 A], and a number of Chinese bishops were subsequently imprisoned, including Mgr Ignatius Gong Pingmei (Kung Ping-mei), Bishop of Shanghai [see 17497 A], and Mgr Dominic Deng Yiming, Bishop of Canton [see below]. The Patriotic Catholic Association was set up in 1957, and in the following year began to elect and consecrate its own bishops, who were elected without papal consent and in consequence were not recognized by the Vatican. Pope John Paul II said on Aug. 20, 1979, that the Vatican was prepared to use "every possible means to restore the perfect union that once existed between it and the Chinese Church".

Mgr Michael Fu Tieshan was elected Bishop of Peking on July 25, 1979, his predecessor having died in 1964, and was consecrated on Dec. 21. He said on Aug. 23 that diplomatic relations between China and the Vatican were not only possible but desirable, but that the Vatican must adopt a policy of non-interference in internal affairs and recognize the independence of the Chinese Church.

Father Michael Chu Li-teh, adviser on Chinese affairs to the Society of Jesus, visited China from June 29 to Sept. 6, 1979. He stated on Nov. 22 that a little over 100 Jesuits were still living in China, some of whom he had met. Most were living in labour camps, but a number of them had recently been allowed to spend several weeks a year with their families. He also stated that he had met other clergy and laymen who retained their attachment to the Pope and "do not feel themselves to be represented by the Patriotic Church".

Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, Archbishop of Marseilles, visited Peking from Feb. 27 to March 3, 1980, at the invitation of the Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and afterwards visited Xian, Shanghai and Canton. Although he emphasized that he was not on an official mission, he had talks with Gen. Ulanhu and with Mr Xiao Xianfa, director of the Bureau of Religious Affairs.

Cardinal Franz König, Archbishop of Vienna and president of the Papal Secretariat for Non-believers, also visited Peking on March 10-20 at the Friendship Association's invitation and had talks with a number of bishops of the Patriotic Church. He said on March 13 that "for the moment China is not interested in relations with the Vatican", but that he would not exclude future talks on establishing relations.

The Patriotic Catholic Association held its third synod—the first since 1962—in Peking on May 22-30, over 30 bishops and 2,000 priests, nuns and laymen being present. Mgr Zong Huaide, Bishop of Jinan, was elected chairman of the association (a post equivalent to Primate of the Chinese Catholic Church), in succession to Mgr Ignatius Pi Shushi, Archbishop of Shenyang, who had died in 1978 [see page 29190].

Mgr Dominic Deng Yiming, the former Bishop of Canton, who had been in prison since 1958, was released on June 9. Father Stanislaus Shen, a 78-year-old priest, was reported to have been sent back on May 6 to a labour camp from which he had recently been released on a charge of "hampering production", however; according to unofficial sources, he had organized a pilgrimage in Shanghai which had attracted about 3,000 Catholics and resulted in a stoppage of work.

Protestantism. The Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches of China, which met in Shanghai from Feb. 25 to March 1, 1980, decided to reprint the Bible, for the first time since 1957, and to reopen theological seminaries. It was reported in May that about 300 people were regularly attending services at Peking's Protestant church, which seated fewer than 100, and that it was hoped to reopen a second church which had recently been returned by the Government. In Shanghai Protestant services were resumed in the autumn of 1979, and attracted large congregations.

Islam. Chinese Moslems, estimates of whose number ranged from 10,000,000 to 35,000,000, had enjoyed a more favoured position under the Communist regime than Christians and Buddhists, partly because they largely lived in frontier regions and partly in the interests of good relations with Moslem countries. Islam came under attack during the Cultural Revolution, however, and after 1978 benefited from the regime's more liberal religious policy. The Koran was reprinted in 1979; 158 mosques in the Ningxia Hui (Ningsia Hui) autonomous region, which had been closed during the Cultural Revolution, were reopened after being repaired with government funds; and 16 Chinese Moslems made the pilgrimage to Mecca in October 1979, for the first time since 1964. The fourth national conference of the China Islamic Association was held in Peking on April 6-15, 1980.

Buddhism. A number of historic Buddhist temples were repaired at government expense during 1978-79, and Buddhist monasteries were reopened. Monks and nuns who had been forced to leave their monasteries during the Cultural Revolution were allowed to return, being granted monthly allowances by the Government, and the monasteries were permitted to admit a few acolytes.

Taoism. The China Taoist Association held a conference in Peking on May 7-13, 1980, for the first time since the Cultural Revolution. Taoism, China's only major indigenous religion, had been regarded with particular suspicion in the past because of its association with peasant superstitions and magical practices, and was the last major religion to achieve toleration. The largest Taoist temple in Peking was reported in July to be undergoing major repairs.

Increased tolerance of religion was accompanied by a drive against superstitious practices such as witchcraft, fortune-telling and exorcism, which had also revived in recent years. The 1979 criminal code made the practice of witchcraft for money punishable by seven years' imprisonment.—(Beijing Review - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Le Monde - New York Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29181 A; 29625 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Sir Terence Beckett appointed Director-General of Confederation of British Industry

Sir Terence Beckett, chairman and chief executive of the Ford Motor Company Ltd (the main British subsidiary of the US Ford Motor Company) took office on Oct. 1 as director-general of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in succession to Sir John Methven, who had held this post since 1976 [see 27588 B] and who had died suddenly on April 23, 1980, at the age of 54; Sir John had previously been Director-General of Fair Trading from 1973 [see 26054 A].

Sir Terence (56), whose appointment was announced on Sept. 8, had joined Ford in 1950 and had since held a wide range of posts in the company, becoming managing director and chief executive of the Ford Motor Company Ltd in 1974 and chairman in 1976.—(Times - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. 27588 B*)

A. UNITED STATES — Democratic National Convention - Party Policy Platform - President Carter and Vice-President Mondale re-elected Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates - Mr Anderson's Vice-Presidential Running Mate and Campaign Platform

The 38th National Convention of the Democratic Party held in New York City from Aug. 11 to 14 approved the party's policy platform for the forthcoming presidential and congressional elections, and re-elected President Jimmy Carter and Vice-President Walter Mondale as the party's presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

Democratic Policy Platform

The convention approved on Aug. 13 the party's policy platform, excerpts from which are given below under cross-headings.

The Economy. "The Democratic Party will take no action whose effect will be a significant increase in unemployment—no fiscal action, no monetary action, no budgetary action—if it is the assessment of either the Council of Economic Advisers or the Congressional Budget Office that such action will cause significantly greater unemployment.

"In all of our economic programmes the one overriding principle must be fairness. All Americans must bear a fair share of our economic burdens and reap a fair share of our economic benefits. High interest rates impose an unfair burden—on farmers, small businesses and younger families buying homes. Recession imposes an unfair burden on those least able to bear it. Democratic economic policy must assure fairness for workers, the elderly, women, the poor, minorities and the majority who are middle-income Americans. In 1980 we pledge a truly Democratic economic policy to secure a prosperous economic future.

"While the past three and a half years of Democratic leadership have been years of growth for our economy, we now find ourselves in a recession. The Democratic Party is committed to taking the necessary steps to combat the current recession. However, we cannot abandon our fight against inflation. We must fight both of these problems at the same time; we are committed to do so. We will continue to pursue the fight against inflation in ways not designed or intended to increase unemployment.

Anti-Recession Assistance. "Immediately, we must undertake a short-term anti-recession programme to reverse the tide of deepening recession and rising unemployment. Each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate adds $25,000 million to the federal deficit. A Democratic anti-recession programme must recognize that Blacks, Hispanics, other minorities, women and older workers bear the brunt of recession. We pledge a $12,000 million anti-recession jobs programme, providing at least 800,000 additional jobs, including full funding of the counter-cyclical assistance programme for the cities, a major expansion of the youth employment and training programme to give young people in our inner cities new hope, expanded training programmes for women and displaced homemakers to give these workers a fair chance in the workplace and new opportunities for the elderly to contribute their talents and skills.

Tax Reductions. "We commit ourselves to targeted tax reductions designed to stimulate production and combat recession as soon as it appears so that tax reductions will not have a disproportionately inflationary effect. We must avoid untargeted tax cuts which would increase inflation. Any tax reduction must, if it is to help solve pressing economic problems, follow certain guiding principles: The inflationary impact must be minimized; reductions provided to individuals must be weighted to help low- and middle-income families, to improve consumer purchasing power, and to enhance a growing economy while maintaining and strengthening the overall progressive nature of the tax code; productivity, investment, capital formation, as well as incentives, must be encouraged, particularly in distressed areas and industries; the effect on our economy must be one which encourages job formation and business growth.

Interest Rates. "The Democratic Party will not pursue a policy of high interest rates and unemployment as the means to fight inflation. We will take no action whose effect will be a significant increase in unemployment—no fiscal action, no monetary action, no budgetary action.

Federal Spending. "Spending restraint must be sensitive to those who look to the federal Government for aid and assistance, especially to workers in times of high unemployment. At the same time, as long as inflationary pressures remain strong, fiscal prudence is essential to avoid destroying the progress made to date in reducing the inflation rate.

Rebuilding American Industry. "To create new markets for American products and strengthen the dollar we must seek out new opportunities for American exports; help establish stable, long-term commercial relationships between nations; offer technical assistance to firms competing in world markets; promote reciprocal trading terms for nations doing business here; and help ensure that America's domestic retooling is consistent with new opportunities in foreign trade. We must make international trade a major focus of our domestic and international policy. We will continue to support the development of trading companies which will compete more effectively in world markets. We must ensure that our efforts to lower tariff barriers are reciprocated by our trading partners.

Budget. "International events have required increased defence spending. The Soviet challenge cannot be ignored. We have had to reverse the steady decline in defence spending that occurred under the Republican Administration. The federal budget has not been and must not be permitted to be an inflationary or a recessionary force in our economy, but it also must not be permitted to ignore pressing human needs. We support the discipline of attempting to live within the limits of our anticipated revenues. Government must set the example of fiscal responsibility for all our citizens who are helping in the fight against inflation. Spending discipline allows us to concentrate our resources to meet our most pressing human needs. We as Democrats will continue our policy of opposing drastic cuts in social programmes which impose unfair burdens on the poor and the aged, on women, on children and minorities. We have always opposed and will continue to oppose imposition of ever greater burdens on the poor, who can least afford them.

Equal Rights Amendment. "The Democratic Party commits itself to a constitution, economy and society open to women on an equal basis with men. The primary route to that new horizon is ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment [approved by Congress in October 1971-March 1972—see 25209 A]. The Democratic Party must ensure that ERA at last becomes the 27th Amendment to the Constitution. We oppose efforts to rescind ERA in states which have already ratified the amendment, and we shall insist that past rescissions are invalid. The Democratic Party shall withhold financial support and technical campaign assistance from candidates who do not support the ERA.

Abortion. "The Democratic Party recognizes reproductive freedom as a fundamental human right. We therefore oppose government interference in the reproductive decisions of Americans, especially those government programmes or legislative restrictions that deny poor Americans their right to privacy by funding or advocating one or a limited number of reproductive choices only. Specifically, the Democratic Party opposes involuntary or uninformed sterilization for women and men, and opposes restrictions on funding for health services for the poor that deny poor women especially the right to exercise a constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.

Energy. "We must make energy conservation our highest priority. We must establish a massive residential energy conservation grant programme. We must provide subsidized loans, direct financial assistance, and other substantial incentives to make all residences in the United States energy efficient. Special incentives should be afforded for the use of renewable energy resources, such as passive and active solar energy systems. Our goal should be to ensure that all economically justified energy efficiency investments are made by 1990. We should use our energy programmes to aid in rebuilding the industrial heartland. Industry must be given financial incentives to improve the energy efficiency of industrial processes and to build substantial amounts of generating capacity through co-generation. Major new efforts must be launched to develop synthetic and alternative renewable energy sources. In pursuing a strong programme of synthetic fuel plants we must also be sensitive to environmental and water concerns.

"We must increase our use of coal. To accomplish this we must see that shippers are not overburdened with excessive rates for transportation. Coal conversion can and must be accomplished in a manner that protects public health. It can and must increase the use of coal, reduce the demand for oil, and provide employment where jobs are needed the most. We must lead the Western world in developing a programme for increased use of coal in Europe, Japan and the developing nations. Oil exploration on federal lands must be accelerated, consistent with environmental protections. Offshore energy leasing and development should be conditioned on full protection of the environment and marine resources. Solar energy use must be increased, and strong efforts, including continued financial support, must be undertaken to make certain that we achieve the goal of having solar energy account for 20 per cent of our total energy by the year 2000. To ensure that we reach the 20 per cent goal the Democratic Party commits itself to a federal programme for solar or other renewable resources that exceeds the federal commitment to synthetic fuels. A greater share of federal funds should be committed to basic research and must be devoted to the development of renewable energy resources and fusion research and development. Moreover, we support the commercialization of solar, wind, low head hydro, bio-mass and other renewable resources as quickly as possible through direct assistance, investment and loan guarantees in addition to monies available from the solar bank.

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

"We must encourage research and development of hydrogen or electric powered vehicles. We must fully commit ourselves to an alcohol fuel programme. The federal Government should expand its use of alcohol fuels in government and military vehicles. This will help reduce surplus feed grain and help to stabilize prices. The Democratic Party pledges that production of fuel grade alcohol will be increased until at least a target of 500,000,000 barrels of ethanol by 1981 is achieved. A standby gasoline rationing plan must be adopted for use in the event of a serious energy supply interruption. The strategic petroleum reserve should be filled as market conditions permit, consistent with the requirements of existing law. We must make conservation and renewable energy our nation's energy priorities for the future. Through the federal Government's commitment to renewable energy resources and energy efficiency, and as alternative fuels become available in the future, we will retire nuclear power plants in an orderly manner. We must give the highest priority to dealing with the nuclear waste disposal problem. Current efforts to develop a safe, environmentally sound nuclear waste disposal plan must be continued and intensified.

Defence. "America's military strength is and must be unsurpassed. The Democratic Administration has moved to reverse the threatened decline in America's world position. While claiming concern for our nation's defence preparedness, the Nixon-Ford Administration presided over a steady decline of 33 per cent in real US military spending between 1968 and 1976. As a result of the joint efforts of the Democratic Administration and Congress, there has been a real increase in our defence spending in every year since 1976. This increase is necessary in order to compensate for the decline in US military strength over the previous eight years and to assure a high quality of military personnel, an effective nuclear deterrent capability, a capable conventional fighting force and an improved intelligence capability. We will act to further improve intelligence gathering and analysis. We will upgrade the combat readiness of our armed forces. We will give the highest priority to combat training, to an effective reserve and guard force, and to sufficient supplies, spare parts, fuel and ammunition. We need to go forward to protect our retaliatory capabilities in the face of continuing Soviet advances in their strategic forces.

"The nation has moved to modernize its strategic deterrent through the M-X, Trident and Cruise missile system. The M-X missile deployment [see page 30118] will enhance the survivability of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force. Cruise missiles [see 28591 A] will modernize our strategic air deterrent, and the new Trident submarine [see page 29960], with a missile range of over 4,000 miles, will both improve and help guarantee the invulnerability of our nuclear deterrent. The United States has acted to correct the dangerous military imbalance which had developed in Europe, by initiating and obtaining Allied support for a long overdue NATO long-term defence programme [see 29141 A; 28417 A] and proceeding towards the deployment in Europe of long-range theatre nuclear deterrents to counter the Soviet build-up of such weaponry in Europe [see 30159 A]. Our commitment to increase defence spending by at least 3 per cent per year [see 28417 A] is crucial to the maintenance of Allied consensus and confidence in this regard. We need to modernize our conventional military capabilities so that we can better protect American lives and American interests abroad. The Democratic Administration has acted to improve our ability to make rapid response to contingencies by organizing and supporting rapid deployment forces capable of responding to military problems in any part of the world where our vital interests are threatened [see 30378 A]. To that end, we favour the development and production of a new fleet of cargo aircraft with intercontinental range, the design and procurement of a force of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades, and an increase in regional military exercises, in co-operation with friendly states.

US-Soviet Relations. "A strong, consistent and principled policy towards the Soviet Union is a vital element of our foreign policy everywhere. The Democratic Administration will use all its resources—including both firm diplomacy and military power—to deter adventurism and to make restraint the only acceptable course available to our adversaries. We stand ready to pursue good faith negotiations with the Soviet Union at every opportunity on a wide range of issues including strategic arms, forces in the European theatre, and other matters which would contribute to peace and a more genuine and reciprocal détente. At the heart of our policy towards the Soviet Union must be a clear recognition of the reality of Soviet power. We must reject the easy mythology that the Soviets see the world as we do. A long-term strategy for the 1980s requires a clear view of the Soviet Union, a view without illusion that our adversary is either benign or omnipotent. A strong American response to the illegal and brutal invasion of Afghanistan [see 30229 A; 30381 A] serves our nation's security interests. It must and will be sustained as long as Soviet troops remain there. While the invasion of Afghanistan has side-tracked our pursuit of a productive relationship with the Soviet Union, the Democratic Party supports efforts to strengthen ties with the nations of Eastern Europe.

Arms Control. "The SALT II [strategic arms limitation] Treaty [see 30117 A] also serves our security interests. It is a vital step in an arms control process that can begin to lift from humanity the shadow of nuclear war. That process, also, must be sustained. Soviet aggression against Afghanistan has delayed the course of ratification of the SALT II Treaty [see page 30130], but we must continue to pursue both security priorities: deterrence of Soviet aggression and balanced arms control agreements. Both the response to Afghanistan and the SALT II Treaty serve this purpose. The SALT Treaty is in the US interest because it is an important way of restraining Soviet behaviour. Without SALT II the Soviets could have hundreds more missiles and thousands more nuclear warheads than the treaty permits. Under the treaty, they would have to eliminate many nuclear weapons they already have. The treaty helps sustain a strong American position in the world. Our Allies and other nations around the world know the SALT II Treaty serves their security interests as well as ours. American support for arms control is important to our standing in the international community, the same community that has rebuked the Soviets for their attempted suppression of Afghanistan. It is also important to our efforts to organize an enduring response to the growing threat to Europe of the Soviet SS-20 [limited range mobile] missiles and to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

"Along with support for SALT, we seek to maintain a stable conventional and theatre nuclear balance in Europe. We will support modernization programmes in which European countries bear their fair share of the cost and other burdens. At the same time, we will ensure that no possibility for effective limits on theatre nuclear weapons is left unexplored. The Democratic Administration will join with our NATO Allies in making far-reaching, equitable and verifiable proposals for nuclear and conventional arms control in Europe. We will pursue other arms control opportunities that can enhance both our national security and the prospects of peace. In particular, the Democratic Administration will pursue a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Such a treaty is vital to our hopes to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Human Rights. "In the area of international affairs the Democratic Administration has placed America's power in the service of a more decent world by once again living up to our own values and working in a formal, deliberate way to foster the principles set out in the [UN] Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We must be vigilant about human rights violations in any country in which they occur, including South Africa. We note in particular that many of the communist-dominated countries are persistent violators of the most basic human freedoms—the right to free speech, the right to religious freedom, the right to travel and emigrate, and the right to be free from arbitrary harassment. We support continuation of the leadership role taken by the United States in the area of human rights and urge that the Democratic Administration continue to speak out openly and forcefully on human rights violations whenever and wherever they occur.

Middle East. "US policy is—and should continue to be—guided also by the following principles: UN Security Council Resolution 242 [of November 1967—see 22473 A; page 25029], unchanged, and the Camp David Accords [of September 1978—see 29646 A] are the basis for peace in the Middle East. We support Israel's security, and will continue to provide generous military and economic aid to that end. We pledge not to provide Israel's potential enemies with sophisticated offensive equipment that could endanger the security of Israel. Jerusalem should remain for ever undivided, with free access to the Holy Places for people of all faiths. We oppose creation of an independent Palestinian state. We will not negotiate with or recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization unless and until it accepts Israel's right to exist and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 [of October 1973—see page 26197]. It is also long past time for an end to all terrorism and other acts of violence against Israel. We have not and will not use our aid to Israel as a bargaining tool; and we will never permit oil policies to influence our policy towards peace or our support for Israel.

"The Democratic Administration will also take needed measures to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf, including energy security, regional stability and national independence. This will require sophisticated diplomacy as well as military capability. We will seek both to counter external threats and to encourage necessary political and economic development. In the end our Allies have an equal or greater interest than we in the security of oil supply and regional stability, and the Democratic Administration will continue to co-operate with them in a common strategy and to share common burdens. We condemn the Government of Iran for its outrageous conduct in the taking of our diplomatic personnel as hostages [see page 30150; 30205 A]. We insist upon respect for the principle—as repeatedly enunciated by the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice—of the inviolability of diplomatic personnel. We call upon all Governments to abide by and uphold this basic tenet of civilized international conduct.

"In the region as a whole, we must end our dangerous dependence on foreign oil. Only in this way can our foreign policy counter effectively the pressures of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and of Soviet power poised above the Persian Gulf in

Afghanistan. The Democratic Administration will fulfil its commitments to the strategic petroleum reserve to protect America against an oil embargo. As we reduce oil consumption and dependence on OPEC, we will be able to bargain on equal terms with the OPEC states for an assurance of more certain supplies of oil at more stable prices.

Europe and Japan. "America and her Allies must continue the mutual confidence and commitment, the sense of common purpose, that marked our relations for decades. The problems we face are global in scope. We cannot begin to solve them if each of us goes a separate way. We must learn to work in partnership on an increasing range of problems in areas such as Africa and the Persian Gulf, and on worldwide economic and security issues. The Democratic Administration will be committed to a strong NATO and a stable military balance in Europe. We will pursue both modernization of NATO conventional and nuclear forces and equitable limitations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Our relations with Japan have moved to a new level of maturity and co-operation. The United States is able to deal with patience and understanding on a range of difficult and contentious economic issues. In the foreign policy and security area Japan's record in support of US foreign policy objectives is second to none. We will continue to nurture this relationship.

Trade. "Trade promotes new jobs for American workers, new markets for farmers and businessmen, and lower prices for consumers. But trade can also cause dislocations within the economy, and we have sought—and will continue to seek—ways to ease the burden of adjustment to foreign competition without impeding the process of structural change so vital to our economic health. We favour a free international trading system, but that system must also be fair. We will not allow our workers and industries to be displaced by unfair import competition. We have entered orderly marketing agreements and other arrangements in areas such as colour television, footwear and textiles, to help promote the competitive position of American industry. Others may be necessary. To strengthen the US economy and improve our competitive position in the world economy, US export-import policy must be based on the principle of fair trade that will enhance our exports while safeguarding domestic industry from unfair trade practices. In ensuring orderly foreign trade, the US must require observance of our trade laws, as well as co-operation with our trade policies if economic disruption is to be avoided. This will require: Encouragement of export expansion through vigorous negotiations to open foreign markets and enforce US rights; the Government to take swift, effective and anti-dumping actions and enforce all US trade laws to ensure an end to unfair trade practices that lead to the export of American jobs; regulations of imports of textiles and apparel in accordance with current laws and agreements.

The Developing World. "The Democratic Administration will work with the Congress to develop and sustain policies and programmes of economic co-operation with the developing nations, guided by the test of mutual interest. We will contribute the United States' fair share to the capital of the multilateral development banks and agencies, and we will continue substantial and innovative US programmes of direct development assistance to low-income countries. These policies will be reflected in further concentration of US development assistance in countries that make good use of aid and on programmes that address the basic needs of poor people, especially food, health and voluntary family planning services. We will increase US and multilateral technical and financial assistance to oil importing nations for the development of their energy resources. The participation of US private enterprises in the economic growth of developing nations will be selectively encouraged, with due regard for our own employment objectives.

Latin America and the Caribbean. "In stark contrast to the policies of previous Republican Administrations, this Democratic Administration has begun to forge a new, collaborative relationship with nations of Latin America and the Caribbean: one resting on a firm commitment to human rights, democratization, increased economic and industrial development, and non-intervention. We must now move innovatively to strengthen our ties with our neighbours in the Western hemisphere, first to obviate any vacuum for outside intervention and second to promote bilateral approaches for social progress and economic development including energy resources. We will oppose a spiral of confrontation with Cuba for its own sake, but we will not evade the real issues between that country and the United States. Under no conditions will we accept a Soviet military offensive capability based in Cuba or anywhere else in the hemisphere. In order to permit the pursuit of normal relations between our countries, Cuba should stop its disorderly movement of those seeking to leave [see 30474 A]; it should co-operate with the international community to develop a fair and orderly emigration programme; it must withdraw its armed forces from Africa; it must cease subversive activities throughout the hemisphere; and it should follow the principles of the American Convention on Human Rights [see page 30140].

Asia. "The Democratic Party commits itself to a broadening and deepening of our relationship with China in a way that will benefit both our peoples and the peace and security of the world. We will continue to seek new areas where the United States and China can co-operate in support of common interests. We have not and will not play 'China cards' or other dangerous games; nor will we allow our relationship with any other country to impede our efforts to continue the process of normalization of relations with China. In 1976 the so-called Koreagate affair [see 29555 C] had badly hurt our ties to [South] Korea. A friendly and increasingly frank dialogue with the Korean Government has been promoted. We will continue not only to fulfil our commitment to security, but equally to the promotion of a more democratic government. North and South Korea have renewed their dialogue and made a difficult but hopeful start down a long, uncertain road. In our relationships with the Philippines, Taiwan and others in the region we will also press for political liberalization and human rights.

Africa. "Africa will be of central importance to American foreign policy in the 1980s. By the end of the previous Republican Administration in 1977 the United States had little credibility in Black Africa for they had made little or no attempt to see African problems from an African perspective. Our policy had no clearly defined goals. As a consequence, our attempts to bring an end to the war in southern Africa were ineffective. We were becoming, in African eyes, irrelevant—even antagonistic—to African aspirations. Considerable success has been achieved, perhaps most notably in southern Africa. Our diplomatic efforts there have been instrumental in helping to bring about a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia—now Zimbabwe [see 30365 A; 30165 A]—while lessening Soviet/Cuban influence in the area. We will continue to assist in the reconstruction and development of an independent Zimbabwe as a means of promoting stability in the region.

"The Democratic Party pledges itself to continue efforts to improve US relations with all African nations on the basis of mutual respect and a mutual commitment to enhance economic justice and human dignity everywhere, with particular emphasis on the recurrent problem of drought and starvation. US aid in the form of grain and foodstuffs must be continued but, in addition, we must seek with African Governments ways of removing famine permanently from the African continent. In southern Africa we will exert our influence to promote progress towards majority rule and to end the racist system of apartheid. We condemn the brutal suppression of Black native African people in Soweto [in 1976—see 27886 A] and Capetown [in June 1980] by the South African regime and support increased political and economic pressure on this oppressive regime through legal sanctions."

The first two paragraphs of the section on the economy and the section on anti-recession assistance were approved by voice votes of the convention, following a debate in which the main speaker (on Aug. 12) was Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, who had been Mr Carter's main rival in the primary elections [see 30408 A].

Calling for a renewal of the ideals and commitment of the Democratic Party, Mr Kennedy said: "I have come here tonight not to argue as a candidate but to affirm a cause. I'm asking you to renew the commitment of the Democratic Party to economic justice. I am asking you to renew our commitment to a fair and lasting prosperity that can put America back to work. This is the cause that brought me into the campaign and that sustained me for nine months across a hundred thousand miles in 40 different states. We had our losses, but the pain of our defeat is far, far less than the pain of the people that I have met. We have learned that it is important to take issues seriously, but never to take ourselves too seriously. Our cause has been, since the days of Thomas Jefferson, the cause of the common man and the common woman. On this foundation we have defined values, refined our policies and refreshed our faith. Now I take the unusual step of carrying the cause and the commitment of my campaign personally to our national convention. I speak out of a deep sense of urgency about the anguish and anxiety I have seen across America. I speak out of a deep belief in the ideals of the Democratic Party and in the potential of that party and of a President to make a difference. And I speak out of a deep trust in our capacity to proceed with boldness and a common vision that will feel and heal the suffering of our time and the divisions of our party.

"The economic plank of this platform on its face concerns only material things, but it is also a moral issue. In this campaign, and in this country that we seek to lead, the challenge in 1980 is to give our voice and our vote for these fundamental democratic principles. Let us pledge that we will never misuse unemployment, high interest rates and human misery as false weapons against inflation. Let us pledge that employment will be the first priority of our economic policy. Let us pledge that there will be security for all those who are now at work. And let us pledge that there will be jobs for all who are out of work. And we will not compromise on the issues of jobs. These are not simplistic pledges. Simply put, they are the heart of our tradition; and they have been the soul of our party across the generations. It is the glory and the greatness of our tradition to speak for those who have no voice, to remember those who are forgotten, to respond to the frustrations and fulfil the aspirations of all Americans seeking a better life in a better land. We dare not forsake that tradition. We cannot let the great purpose of the Democratic Party become the bygone passages of history. We must not permit the Republicans to seize and run on the slogans of prosperity."

Mr Kennedy concluded: "I congratulate President Carter on his victory here. I am confident that the Democratic Party will reunite on the basis of Democratic principles and that together we will march towards a victory in 1980. And some day, long after this convention, long after the signs come down, and the crowds stop cheering, and the bands stop playing, may it be said of our campaign that we kept the faith. May it be said of our party in 1980 that we found our faith again. For me, a few hours ago, this campaign came to an end. For all those whose cares have been our concern, the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives and the dream shall never die."

Mr Carter stated on Aug. 13 that, although he accepted and supported the intent behind the platform proposal for a $12,000 million jobs programme and planned to pursue policies which would implement its spirit and aims, the amounts needed to "achieve our goals" would "necessarily depend on economic conditions, what can be effectively applied over time, and the appropriate concurrence by Congress".

Re-election of Mr Carter and Mr Mondale as Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates

Senator Kennedy had withdrawn his candidature on Aug. 11, following the convention's approval by 1,936 votes to 1,390 of a new rule, proposed by the Democratic national committee in 1978, under which delegates would be bound to vote on the first convention ballot for the presidential candidate whom they were elected to support in state primaries or caucuses, unless released in writing by their candidate. Mr Kennedy and his supporters had argued for the retention of the previous rule which allowed delegates a free vote on the first ballot.

Announcing the withdrawal of his candidature, Mr Kennedy said: "I have called President Carter and congratulated him. The effort on the nomination is over. My name will not be placed in nomination, but the effort for Democratic principles must and will continue. I continue to care deeply about the ideals of the Democratic Party. I continue to care deeply about where this party stands, and I hope the delegates will stand with me for a truly Democratic platform. Tomorrow I will speak to the convention about the economic concerns that have been at the heart of my campaign and about the commitments to the future of the Democratic Party [see above]. I will speak again for the people I have seen and the cause I have carried across this country."

Having been proposed by Governor Robert Graham of Florida, Mr Carter was elected on the first ballot in the early hours of Aug. 14 by 2,129 votes to 1,146 for Senator Kennedy, although the latter had released his delegates before the roll-call vote to "vote their consciences". Of the remaining votes, 2.5 went to Mr Ronald Dellums, a Black Congressman from California, whose name had been placed in nomination at the last minute to provide him with broadcast time to present issues important to the Black community and to protest against the minor role of "progressive forces" at the convention. Soon after Mr Carter had passed the 1,666 votes needed for nomination the following message from Senator Kennedy was read to the convention: "I congratulate President Carter on his renomination. I endorse the platform of the Democratic Party. I will support and work for the re-election of President Carter. It is imperative that we defeat Ronald Reagan [the Republican candidate] in 1980. I urge all Democrats to join in that effort."

Later on Aug. 14 Mr Mondale was renominated as Democratic vice-presidential candidate.

Mr Carter's Acceptance Speech

Mr Carter's speech accepting the Democratic Party's presidential nomination was made at the convention's final session on Aug. 14.

Mr Carter said: "I'd like to say a personal word to Senator Kennedy. Ted, you're a tough competitor and a superb campaigner, and I can attest to that. Your speech before this convention was a magnificent statement of what the Democratic Party is and what it means to the people of this country, and why the Democratic victory is so important this year. I reach out to you tonight and I reach out to all those who supported you and your valiant and passionate campaign. Ted, your party needs and I need you. And I need your idealism and your dedication working for us. There is no doubt that even greater service lies ahead of you, and we are grateful to you and to have your strong partnership now in a larger cause to which your own life has been dedicated. I thank you for your support, we'll make great partners this fall in whipping the Republicans.

". . . During the last presidential campaign I criss-crossed this country and I listened to the thousands and thousands of people—housewives and farmers, teachers and small business leaders, workers and students, the elderly and the poor—people of every race and every background and every walk of life. It was a powerful experience—a total immersion in the human reality of America. And I have now had another kind of total immersion—being President of the United States of America. Let me talk for a moment about what that job is like—and what I have learned from it. I've learned that only the most complex and difficult tasks come before me in the Oval Office [i.e. at the White House]. No easy answers are found there—because no easy questions come there. I've learned that for a President experience is the best guide to right decisions. I am wiser tonight than I was four years ago. And I have learned that the presidency is a place of compassion. My own heart is burdened for the troubled Americans. The poor and the jobless and the afflicted—they've become part of me. My thoughts and my prayers for our hostages in Iran are as though they were my own sons and daughters. The life of every human being on earth can depend on the experience and judgment and vigilance of the person in the Oval Office. The President's power for building and his power for destruction are awesome. And the power is greatest exactly where the stakes are highest—in matters of war and peace. And I've learned something else—something that I have come to see with extraordinary clarity. Above all, I must look ahead—because the President of the United States is the steward of the nation's destiny. He must protect our children—and the children they will have—and the children of generations to follow. He must speak and act for them. That is his burden—and his glory. And that is why a President cannot yield to the short-sighted demands, no matter how rich or powerful the special interest might be to make those demands. And that's why the President cannot bend to the passions of the moment, however popular they may be. That's why the President must sometimes ask for sacrifice when his listeners would rather hear the promise of comfort. The President is a servant of today. But his true constituency is the future. That is why the election of 1980 is so important.

"Some have said it makes no difference who wins this election. They are wrong. This election is a stark choice between two men, two parties, two sharply different pictures of what America is and what the world is, but it's more than that. It's a choice between two futures. The year 2000 is just less than 20 years away, just four presidential elections after this one. Children born this year will come of age in the 21st century. The time to shape the world of the year 2000 is now. The decisions of the next few years will set our course, perhaps an irreversible course, and the most important of all choices will be made by the American people at the polls less than three months from tonight. The choice could not be more clear nor the consequences more crucial. In one of the futures we can choose, the future that you and I have been building together, I see security and justice and peace. I see a future of economic security, security that will come from tapping our own great resources of oil and gas, coal and sunlight, and from building the tools and technology and factories for a revitalized economy based on jobs and stable prices for everyone. I see a future of justice, the justice of good jobs, decent health care, quality education, a full opportunity for all people regardless of colour or language or religion: the simple human justice of equal rights for all men and for all women, guaranteed equal rights at last under the Constitution of the United States of America. And I see a future of peace, a peace born of wisdom and based on a fairness towards all countries of the world, a peace guaranteed both by American military strength and by American moral strength as well. That is the future I want for all people, a future of confidence and hope and a good life. It is the future America must choose, and with your help and with your commitment, it is the future America will choose.

"But there is another possible future. In that other future I see despair, despair of millions who would struggle for equal opportunity and a better life and struggle alone. And I see surrender, the surrender of our energy future to the merchants of oil; the surrender of our economic future to a bizarre programme of massive tax cuts for the rich, service cuts for the poor, and massive inflation for everyone. And I see risk, the risk of international confrontation, the risk of an uncontrollable, unaffordable and unwinnable nuclear arms race. No one, Democrat or Republican either, consciously seeks such a future, and I do not claim that my opponent does. But I do question the disturbing commitments and policies already made by him and by those with him who have now captured control of the Republican Party. The consequences of those commitments and policies would drive us down the wrong road. It's up to all of us to make sure America rejects this alarming and even perilous destiny. The only way to build a better future is to start with the realities of the present. But while the Democrats grapple with the real challenges of a real world, others talk about a world of tinsel and make believe. Let's look for a moment at their make-believe world. In their fantasy America, inner city and farm workers and labourers do not exist. Women, like children, are to be seen but not heard. The problems of working women are simply ignored. The elderly do not need

Medicare [introduced in 1966—see 21047 A; 21504 C]. The young do not need more help in getting a better education. Workers do not require the guarantee of a healthy and a safe place to work. In their fantasy world all the complex global changes of the world since World War Two have never happened. In their fantasy America all problems have simple solutions—simple and wrong. It is a make-believe world, a world of good guys and bad boys, where some politicians shoot first and ask questions later. No hard choices, no sacrifice, no tough decisions. It sounds too good to be true, and it is. . . .

"The new leaders of the Republican Party, in order to close the gap between their rhetoric and their record, have now promised to launch an all-out nuclear arms race. This would negate any further effort to negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement. There can be no winners in such an arms race, and all the people of the earth can be the losers. The Republican nominee advocates abandoning arms control policies which have been important and supported by every Democratic President since Harry Truman [1945-53], and also by every Republican President since Dwight D. Eisenhower [1953-61]. This radical and irresponsible course would threaten our security and could put the whole world in peril. You and I must never let this come to pass. It's simple to call for a new arms race, but when armed aggression threatens world peace, tough sounding talk like that is not enough. A President must act—responsibly. . . . The new Republican leaders oppose our human rights policy. They want to scrap it. They seem to think it's naive for America to stand up for freedom and democracy. Just what do they think we should stand up for? Ask the former political prisoners who now live in freedom if we should abandon our stand on human rights. Ask the dissidents in the Soviet Union about our commitment to human rights. Ask the Hungarian-Americans, ask the Polish-Americans, listen to Pope John Paul II. Ask those who are suffering for the sake of justice and liberty around the world. Ask the millions who've fled tyranny if America should stop speaking out for human principles. Ask the American people. I tell you that as long as I am President we will hold high the banner of human rights and you can depend on it.

"Here at home the choice between the two futures is equally important. In the long run, nothing is more crucial to the future of America than energy. Nothing was so disastrously neglected in the past. Long after the 1973 Arab oil embargo the Republicans in the White House had still done nothing to meet the threat to the national security of our nation. Then, as now, their policy was dictated by the big oil companies. We Democrats fought hard to rally our nation behind a comprehensive energy policy and a good programme, a new foundation for challenging and exciting progress. Now, after three years of struggle, we have that programme. The battle to secure America's energy future has been fully and finally joined. Americans have co-operated with dramatic results. We've reversed decades of dangerous and growing dependence on foreign oil. We are now importing 20 per cent less oil. That is one and one half million barrels of oil every day less than the day I took office. . . .

"Now what do the Republicans propose? Basically their energy programme has two parts. The first part is to get rid of almost everything that we've done for the American public in the last three years. They want to reduce or abolish the synthetic fuels programme. They want to slash the solar energy incentives, the conservation programmes, aid to mass transit, aid to elderly Americans to help pay their fuel bills. They want to eliminate the 55 mile speed limit, and while they are at it, the Republicans would like to get rid of the Clean Air Act. They never liked it to begin with. That's one part of their programme. The other part is worse. To replace what we have built, this is what they propose. To destroy the windfall profits tax [see 30355 A] and to 'unleash' the oil companies and let them solve the energy problem for us. That's it. That is it. That's their whole programme. There is no more. Can this nation accept such an outrageous programme? No. We Democrats will fight it every step of the way and we'll begin tomorrow morning with a campaign for re-election in November. . . ."

Mr Carter concluded: "Americans have always been on the cutting edge of change. We've always looked forward with anticipation and confidence. I still want the same thing that all of you want, a self-reliant neighbourhood, strong families, work for the able bodied and good medical care for the sick, opportunity for our youth and dignity for our old, equal rights and justice for all people. I want teachers to explain what a civilization really is—and I want students to understand their own needs and their own aims, but also the needs and yearnings of their neighbours. I want women free to pursue without limit the full life of what they want for themselves. I want our farmers growing crops to feed our nation and the world, secure in the knowledge that the family farm will thrive and with a fair return on the good work they do for all of us. I want workers to see meaning in the labour they perform and work enough to guarantee a job for every worker in this country. And I want the people in business free to pursue with boldness and freedom new ideas, and I want minority citizens fully to join the mainstream of American life, and I want from the bottom of my heart to remove the blight of racial and other discrimination from the face of our nation, and I'm determined to do it. I need for all of you to join me in fulfilling that vision. The choice, the choice between the two futures, could not be more clear. If we succumb to a dream world then we'll wake up to a nightmare. But if we start with reality and fight to make our dreams a reality, then Americans will have a good life, a life of meaning and purpose in a nation that's strong and secure. Above all, I want us to be what the founders of our nation meant us to become—the land of freedom, the land of peace and the land of hope."

Mr Anderson's Vice-Presidential Running Mate and Campaign Platform

Mr John Anderson, the independent presidential candidate [see page 30410], named on Aug. 25 as his vice-presidential running mate Mr Patrick Lucey, a former Democratic Governor of Wisconsin and US ambassador to Mexico in 1977-79 [see page 29382]. A former supporter of Senator Kennedy, Mr Lucey resigned from the Wisconsin delegation to the Democratic National Convention after the senator lost the presidential nomination to Mr Carter.

Mr Anderson and Mr Lucey presented an election platform on Aug. 30, the main domestic planks of which were:

(1) A wage-price incentives programme, under which labour and management would negotiate "fair and realistic guidelines", with both sides enjoying tax-based incentives as long as they continued to comply with the agreement.

(2) Following the achievement of a balanced budget, the proposal of legislation for the indexing of personal income tax brackets to prevent incomes from being pushed into higher tax brackets by inflation. Additional tax cuts would await further economies in federal spending.

(3) A series of new tax advantages for both individuals and businesses designed to promote saving and capital investment, including higher exclusions for dividend and interest income, more investment credit benefits, and incentives to promote more research and development by industry.

(4) The combating of unemployment through the promotion of jobs in the private sector rather than by means of a "bloated government payroll".

(5) A gradual expansion of health insurance, grounded "in the existing private structure", to the 22,000,000 Americans not at present protected.

(6) An assessment of the future role of nuclear power "in light of its dependence on public subsidy and of the possibility that slower growth and demand may enable us to phase in other energy supplies in preference to nuclear systems".

In foreign policy and national security the platform called for the attainment and maintenance of "essential equivalence with the Soviet Union" in military capacity, the conclusion of international arms control agreements, and the stabilization of relations with the Soviet Union through an active exchange of communications.—(International Herald Tribune - US International Communication Agency - Times) (*Prev. rep. Democratic Presidential Candidatures 30408 A; 1980 Republican Convention 30477 A; 1976 Democratic Convention 27973 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Life Peerages

The Birthday honours list published on June 14 contained the names of five new life peers, as follows:

Mr Thomas Boardman, Conservative MP for Leicester, South-West, from 1967 to February 1974, and for Leicester, South, from February to October 1974, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, January-February 1974, Minister for Industry, 1972-74, formerly president of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce.

Sir Frank McFadzean, chairman of Rolls-Royce Ltd since November 1979 [see 30415 A].

Sir Frank Marshall, a vice-chairman of the Conservative Party Organization and chairman of the Maplin Development Authority in 1973-74 [see 26221 A; 26684 A].

Mr Victor Matthews, chairman and chief executive of Express Newspapers Ltd, and deputy chairman and chief executive of Trafalgar House Ltd [see page 28585].

Sir Arnold Weinstock, managing director of the General Electric Company Ltd.

The new life peers took the following titles: Mr Thomas Boardman—Baron Boardman; Sir Frank McFadzean—Baron McFadzean of Kelvinside; Sir Frank Marshall—Baron Marshall of Leeds; Mr Victor Matthews—Baron Matthews; Sir Arnold Weinstock—Baron Weinstock.—(Times - Hansard) (*30215 A*)

A. SURINAM — Resignation of Government following Military Coup - Political Developments leading to Crisis - Establishment of National Military Council - Reintroduction of Civilian Government - Capture of Foreign Mercenaries during Attempted Counter-attack - Subsequent Developments

An armed revolt led by some 300 non-commissioned officers of the Surinam armed forces took place in Paramaribo, the national capital, on Feb. 25, 1980, leading to the overthrow of the coalition Government led by Mr Henck Arron, who had been Prime Minister since the November 1973 elections [see 26272 A; 26748 A], and to the temporary installation of a military administration in Surinam. A predominantly civilian Government led by Dr Henk Chin-a-Sen, a doctor described as politically neutral, was subsequently sworn in on March 15, although it was generally believed that the army officers would retain most of their effective powers of government.

The political instability in Surinam continued after the coup, however, and after a period of bitter dispute among the members of the new military administration it was announced on Aug. 15 that three of its original members had been arrested together with Mr Arron, and that an essentially right-wing faction among the officers had gained control of the administration, appointing Dr Chin-a-Sen President of the Republic in addition to his office of Prime Minister. The Cabinet, which had already been modified since its appointment in March, was said thereupon to have once again been remodelled.

Political Factors leading to Unrest - Cabinet Changes during 1979 following Dismissal of KTPI from Coalition - Military Trials

Although the immediate cause of the coup was resentment among army NCOs at the refusal of the state authorities to permit trade union activity within the armed forces and at the trial of three sergeants for such activities, it followed a period of increasing general discontent over the social and economic policies enacted by the Government since Surinam's achievement of independence from the Netherlands in 1975 [see 27515 A]. The unstable situation was aggravated by a series of political crises and by allegations that members of the Government had misused their powers for personal or political advantage.

In particular, high rates of unemployment had prompted the emigration to the Netherlands of some 150,000 people (representing about a third of the total population) under a five-year transitional scheme which had been established at the time of Surinam's independence and was thus due to expire in October 1980. The development aid offered by the Netherlands at the time of independence [see page 27516], reported to be worth about 3,500 million guilders (then about £650,000,000), had been largely spent on capital-intensive projects such as bauxite mining and hydro-electric schemes, and had thus, contrary to general expectations, so far had little effect on employment or on general standards of living.

Racial tensions between the Creole, Javanese, Hindu, Amerindian, Chinese and European ethnic groups continued to dominate party politics within the coalition, leading to the dismissal in January 1979 of the mainly Javanese *Kaum-Tani Persuatan Indonesia* (KTPI) from the coalition after a dispute concerning what was felt by the party to be its lack of influence in the Government.

The national press had in November 1978 published allegations that Mr Arthur Seedorf, the then secretary of the National Party of Surinam (NPS), the largest party in the coalition National Party Alliance [see 28740 A], had been guilty of irregularities in the compilation of electoral registers for the 1977 elections, so that the (predominantly Creole) NPS had gained extra votes and the Hindu groups in particular had been under-represented on the polling lists. Mr Seedorf was subsequently arrested, but was released shortly afterwards.

The two KTPI members of the Cabinet—Mr J. S. Sisal (Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries) and Mr Cornelis Ardjosemito (Minister of Social Affairs)—both left the Government during January 1979 upon the dismissal of their party by Mr Arron, and were replaced on Feb. 14, 1979, by Mr J. T. Kasantaroeno and Mr R. A. P. Ling respectively. (Mr Sisal had been accused in the press of having, like his predecessor, Mr Willy Soemita—see 28668 A—abused his ministerial authority in the allocation of agricultural land.)

The death in May 1979 of Mr Walter Zalmijn, a member of the National Alliance, reduced the coalition's effective representation in the 39-member *Staten* (Parliament) to 19 seats, i.e. less than a majority of the available mandates. Mr M. Koorndijk was appointed to succeed Mr Zalmijn, but the opposition United Democratic Parties [see 28740 A], led by Mr Jaggernath Lachmon, refused to accept his accreditation and boycotted the session of the *Staten* on the day of his admission, announcing also its intention to boycott the session of the *Staten* which was to begin on Sept. 1, 1979. An agreement was reached, however, on Aug. 31 whereby the United Democratic Parties accepted Mr Koorndijk's membership of the *Staten* in return for the bringing forward to March 1980 of the general elections due in late 1981; the date of March 27, 1980, was subsequently agreed.

Discontent in the armed forces centred mainly on pay and promotion opportunities, frequent allegations being made of political patronage among the upper ranks. Moreover, attempts to form a trade union within the Army had already led to the arrest of Sgt. Ramon Abrahams after his publication of an article in support of such a union, although he had been released following widespread protests by NCOs. Sgt. Abrahams was, however, again arrested, together with Sgt. Badresein Sital and Sgt. Laurens Neede, on charges of mutiny after leading a strike and occupation of the Memre Boekoe barracks in Paramaribo during January 1980. The occupation had been ended by other troops and by police, and the military tribunal examining the incident was to have passed sentence on the three men on Feb. 26.

Seizure of Power by National Military Council - Introduction of Civilian Cabinet

On Feb. 25 at 3 a.m. a group of NCOs at the Memre Boekoe barracks removed weapons including tanks and armoured cars and opened fire on the army headquarters. Meanwhile a patrol boat shelled the Paramaribo police headquarters from the river Surinam, severely damaging the building. Several people were believed to have died in the fighting which, however, had subsided by 11 a.m. Sgt. Abrahams, Sgt. Neede and Sgt. Sital were released from custody by the rebelling soldiers, numerous senior army officers were arrested and the Procurator-General, Mr Maurits de Miranda, was shot and seriously injured. A curfew was announced in the afternoon, and troops moved into the centre of Paramaribo to stop looting which had broken out. Radio communications were cut off at 3 p.m., but a National Military Council (NMC) later issued a communiqué signed by Sgt. Neede and Sgt. Sital in which it pledged itself to the maintenance of the "democratic principles of the lawful state of Surinam", and appealed to the public to comply with all orders.

The National Military Council was listed as comprising Sgt. Neede, Sgt. Sital, Sgt. Abrahams, Lt. Michel Van Rey, Sgt. Denis Horb, Sgt. Charles Nelson Mijnals, Sgt. Stanley Joeman and Sgt. Daysie Bouterse.

On Feb. 26 Mr Olton van Genderen (NPS), the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Internal Affairs, submitted the resignation of the Government on behalf of Mr Arron, who remained in hiding until Feb. 28 when, together with four other ministers, he gave himself up and was placed under house arrest. By March 19, when the house arrest was lifted, 12 of the 14 ministers and deputy ministers had given themselves up on the undertaking of the National Military Council that they would be unharmed. Mr Arron submitted his own resignation on March 10 following the announcement made by the National Military Council on March 3 that a civilian Government was to be set up. He was, however, believed to have spent a large proportion of the next six months in successive periods of custody pending investigations into allegations of corruption during his period of office.

On March 15 it was announced that a 14-member Cabinet had been nominated by the National Military Council, but that the NMC would not be handing over full powers to the new Government. Dr Henk Chin-a-Sen (43), was named as Prime Minister and as Minister of Foreign Affairs; the other members of the Cabinet were largely drawn from the legal, engineering and medical professions, and none had previous experience of government.

The new Cabinet had been formed on the advice of Mr Eddy Bruma, Minister of Economic Affairs from 1973 until the withdrawal of his (largely Creole) Nationalist Republican Party from the coalition in 1977 [see 28668 A], and of Mr Franklin Leeflang, a lawyer (both men having been associated with the defence of Sgt. Neede, Sgt. Sital and Sgt. Abrahams before the military tribunal), and was reported to be composed as follows:

Dr Henk Chin-a-Sen	Prime Minister and General and Foreign Affairs
Mr Franklin Leeflang	Internal Affairs
Mr H. Neyhorst	Finance
Mr R. M. Reeder	Justice
Mr H. B. Adhin	Development
Mr Harold Rusland	Education and People's Development
Mr H. Abrahams	Economic Affairs
Mr A. H. van Dijk	Agriculture, Husbandry and Fisheries
Mr R. T. Wongsodikromo	Social Welfare
Mr M. N. Ataoellah	Public Works and Communications
Mr J. Tjong-Tjin-Joe	Health
Mr H. L. Illes	Labour and Housing
Lt. Michel van Rey	Defence and Police
Mr A. J. Zundar	Development Planning

Lt. Van Rey was replaced on June 8 as Minister of Defence and Police by Capt. Eddy Ruimveid, and was understood thereupon to have left the country for the United States.

It was reported during late June that the Ministries of Development Planning, Economic Affairs and Social Welfare had been dissolved at the request of Dr Chin-a-Sen, their tasks being taken on by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Labour and Housing respectively. Consequently Mr Zundar, Mr Abrahams and Mr Wongsodikromo were said to have resigned. (A subsequent report published during August suggested, however, that the Ministry of Social Welfare had in fact been taken over by Mr Rudi Kamperveen.)

Dr Chin-a-Sen announced on March 26 that the elections planned for March 27 would not now take place on that date but in October 1981 as formerly planned.

Domestic and International Reactions to the Coup

News agencies in Surinam reported that the coup had met with little or no resistance from the general public and that, apart from the curfew imposed between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m., normal daily life was quickly resumed. The police were disarmed and resumed their functions in early March, and the airport at Paramaribo, which had been closed since the coup, was reopened.

The National Military Council had continually stressed since its assumption of power its intention to abide by the provisions of the Constitution; to honour all commitments and arrangements made with other countries since the achievement of national independence in 1975; and to adhere to the basic norms established by the United Nations. Widespread public support was won particularly by the announcement that the country's 40,000 civil servants would henceforth be required to attend work regularly and punctually (inefficiency and bureaucracy in the public sector having been a common complaint against the former administration).

A spokesman for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Feb. 26 that Dutch development aid to Surinam would continue unaffected by the coup, as it constituted a contractual obligation, and at the end of June and early July a Dutch delegation led by Mr Jan de Koning, the Minister of Development Aid, held talks in Paramaribo on details of Dutch development aid to Surinam; the talks were broken off, however, on July 2 by Dr Chin-a-Sen. Meanwhile, the United States Department of State expressed on March 7 its deep concern over the events in Surinam, describing as particularly worrying the expected postponement of the general elections.

Attempted Counter-attack by Foreign Mercenaries

Dr Chin-a-Sen confirmed on May 6 a report published the previous day by the Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* that some 300 Dutch, Belgian, Venezuelan and South Moluccan mercenary soldiers had, "during the previous week", been captured by the Surinam armed forces while attempting to enter the country from French Guiana (which lies directly to the east of Surinam—for map see page 27515). The alleged leader of the group, a Dutch citizen named as Mr Frits Ormskerk (who was reported to be a former member of the Surinam armed forces), had according to the *Handelsblad* subsequently been executed by a firing squad (although the Dutch authorities made no comment on the cause of his death).

Dr Chin-a-Sen added in his statement that several members of the Surinam *Staten* had been arrested in connexion with the incident. The National Military Council held a news conference on May 13 at which it exhibited arms and explosives allegedly confiscated during the capture of the mercenaries, and presented also a Dutch citizen, Mr Johannes Cornelis Krol, whom it accused of participation in the attempted coup. The Council also claimed that Mr Jan Pronk, the Netherlands Minister of Development Co-operation from 1973 to 1977, had assisted in the formation of the group. (Mr Pronk, a member of the Labour Party, had been one of the chief Dutch negotiators involved in the independence of Surinam—see 27515 A.)

It was also reported during June that the National Military Council had called on the Netherlands to extradite Mr Kasantaroeno, the former Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, to Surinam, where he was accused of planning the coup after his escape to the Netherlands in February.

Dr Chin-a-Sen Appointed President - Arrest of Officers - State of Emergency declared

News agencies in the Netherlands reported on Aug. 15 that Dr Johan Ferrier, who had been President of the Republic since Surinam's achievement of independence in 1975, had been dismissed by the National Military Council following a dispute over political policy. Dr Chin-a-Sen was said to have succeeded him as President (while retaining the post of Prime Minister) and to have again reorganized the Cabinet, becoming according to some reports also Minister of the Interior. A state of emergency was declared on Aug. 15, the Constitution was suspended and a dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed; the airport at Paramaribo was closed for two days, press censorship was introduced and all foreign communications were cut. It was also announced that Mr Arron had been rearrested on charges of corruption and that Sgt. (now Sgt.-Maj.) Sital, Sgt. Mijnals and Sgt. Joeman had also been arrested together with a considerable number of other people, including several members of the *Staten*.

Sgt.-Maj. Sital had been chairman of the National Military Council until July, when he was succeeded by Sgt. Mijnals, while Sgt. Joeman had recently been expelled from the body. The mid-August developments were believed to have resulted from the removal of Sgt. Mijnals as chairman by Sgt. (now Sgt.-Maj.) Bouterse, who accused the three officers of plotting with unnamed foreign elements to stage a counter-coup. It was known that the three men had favoured closer contacts with the left-wing governments in Cuba, Nicaragua and Jamaica. (Keesings Historisch Archief, Amsterdam - Latin America Political Report - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Achievement of Independence 27515 A; 1977 Elections 28740 A; Coalition, Cabinet 28970 B*)

A. COOK ISLANDS - UNITED STATES — Signature of Treaty on Territorial Issues

The United States ambassador to New Zealand, Mrs Anne C. Martindell, visited the New Zealand associated state of the Cook Islands in June 1980 to sign a treaty formally relinquishing US claims to four islands in the north of the Cooks group. The treaty also dealt with matters arising from the overlap between the offshore economic zone of American Samoa and that proclaimed by the Cook Islands in October 1979 [see page 30276].

The US claim to the four islands dated back to the so-called "Guano Act" of Aug. 18, 1856, under which jurisdiction had been asserted over a total of 58 Pacific islands which contained phosphate resources and which had been discovered by US citizens (although some of the islands listed in the original claim were non-existent and in other cases one island was listed under different names). Of the 25 islands which had continued to be subject to such claims in modern times, four had been formally recognized as Tuvalu territory and 14 as Kiribati territory under treaties signed during 1979 [see 29706 B and page 30192 respectively].

Following the signature of the US-Cook Islands treaty, it was expected that the United States would conclude a treaty with New Zealand in respect of the three remaining islands, which formed part of the New Zealand dependency of Tokelau, negotiations having already commenced with this aim.—(Pacific Islands Monthly - New York Times) (*Prev. rep. page 30276; page 30192; 29706 B*)

A. ICELAND - NORWAY - DENMARK — Agreement on Jan Mayen Fishing Rights - Declaration of 200-Mile Economic Zone off Greenland

After more than two years of negotiations the Icelandic and Norwegian Governments on May 28 signed an agreement regulating fishing rights in overlapping 200-mile economic zones arising from Norway's decision to declare a 200-mile zone around the island of Jan Mayen (some 350 miles to the north-east of Iceland) with effect from May 29, 1980. [For entry into force of general Norwegian 200-mile fisheries zone on Jan. 1, 1977, see 28907 A.] The agreement did not, however, cover rights to the area's continental shelf, on which the two sides undertook to conduct further negotiations.

The main provisions of the agreement were as follows: (i) Norway tacitly accepted the full Icelandic 200-mile fisheries zone (established in October 1975—see 27511 A), while Iceland accepted the projected 200-mile Norwegian zone around Jan Mayen subject to Iceland having sovereignty in the 10,000 square miles where the two zones overlapped; (ii) a bilateral committee would regulate fishing in the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, particularly with a view to determining catch quotas for capelin (the main fish resource in the waters around Jan Mayen); (iii) Iceland would decide the size of the total catch unilaterally if the two sides could not reach agreement, although Norway would not regard itself as bound by a total quota which it considered unreasonable; and (iv) in the four-year period 1980-83 Norway's share of the total capelin quota would be 15 per cent.

The agreement was regarded as potentially damaging to Norway by that country's Fishermen's Association, which directed particular criticism at the Government's retreat from its earlier insistence that the two economic zones should be delimited on the median-line principle. On the other hand, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr Knut Frydenlund, justified the agreement on the grounds both of Iceland's special dependence on fishery resources and of the need to maintain harmony within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The agreement also reflected the fact that Jan Mayen (which was annexed by Norway in 1929) was populated only by the staff of a weather station and had no economic life of its own.

The need for further negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf between Jan Mayen and Iceland arose from the Norwegian Government's insistence that the median-line principle be applied, notwithstanding its acceptance of the full Icelandic 200-mile economic zone. In taking this line on the continental shelf issue Norway was understood to be seeking to avoid setting any precedent applicable to its current negotiations with the Soviet Union over the delimitation of the Barents Sea [see 29939 A; 28907 A].

Shortly after the Norwegian declaration of a 200-mile economic zone around Jan Mayen, on June 1 the Danish Government declared a similar economic zone off the east coast of Greenland, creating an overlapping area of some 30,000 square miles. Accordingly, the Norwegian Government opened negotiations with Denmark to delimit the continental shelf between Jan Mayen and Greenland and with Denmark and the European Commission jointly to determine fishing rights in the relevant area. Similar negotiations were expected to take place shortly involving Iceland, Denmark and the European Commission to determine the position in the Denmark Strait, where the Greenland and Icelandic 200-mile zones also overlapped. (Norwegian Information Service, Oslo - Le Monde - Financial Times) *(Prev. rep. Iceland-Norway page 28908; 27824 A)*



The above map shows the overlapping Norwegian, Icelandic and Greenland economic zones, each of 200 nautical miles, in the vicinity of the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen.

B. JORDAN — New Cabinet

King Hussein of Jordan on Aug. 28 accepted the resignation of the Government of Dr Kassem Rimawi which had taken office on July 3 [see 30430 B] and on the same day appointed a new Cabinet under Mr Mudar Badran, who had previously held the premiership from July 1976 [see 28000 A] until December 1979. The full composition of the new 21-member Cabinet was as follows:

Mr Mudar Badran . .	. . Prime Minister, Defence
* Mr Marwan al-Kassem	. . Foreign Affairs
Mr Ahmed Abed Karim al-Taraouneh . .	. . Justice
†Mr Soleiman Arar . .	. . Interior
†Dr Jawad al-Anani . .	. . Labour
* Mr Salem al-Mesadeh	. . Finance
Mr Awni al-Masri . .	. . Public Works
†Dr Said Tall	. . Education
* Dr Mohamed Addoub al-Zabn	Communications
* Mr Kamel al-Charif . .	. . *Waqfs*, Islamic Affairs and Holy Places
Mr Adnan Abu Odeh. .	. . Information
* Dr Zuheir Malhas . .	. . Health
Mr Hassan al-Mumani	. . Municipal, Rural and Environmental Affairs
†Mr Man Abu Nuwwar	. . Culture and Youth, Tourism and Antiquities
* Mrs Inam al-Mufti . .	. . Social Development
Mr Ibrahim Ayoub . .	. . Supply
Mr Walid Asfur . .	. . Industry and Trade
Mr Marwan Dudin . .	. . Agriculture
†Mr Hassan Ibrahim . .	. . Occupied Land Affairs
* Mr Ali as-Suhaimat . .	. . Transport, Minister of State for Prime Minister's Affairs
Mr Hikmat as-Sakit . .	. . Minister of State for Prime Minister's Affairs

* No change. †Changed responsibilities.

Mr Badran (46), a lawyer of Palestinian origin, had been successively director of Jordan's information and intelligence services and head of the Occupied Land office before becoming Education Minister in May 1973 [see 25972 A]. Having been appointed Chief of the Royal Court in late 1974 [see 26926 A], he was subsequently Prime Minister from July 1976 until his resignation in December 1979.

Of the incoming ministers, **Mr al-Taraouneh** and **Mr Odeh** had been appointed to the previous Badran Cabinet in July 1976, while **Mr Ayoub** had joined it on its reconstitution in November 1976 [see 28339 D].

It was understood that the appointment of the new Cabinet would involve no change in Jordan's strong opposition to the Camp David Middle East peace agreements of September 1978 [see 29646 A] and to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in March 1979 [see 29941 A]. In his letter of appointment to Mr Badran, King Hussein said that "Jordan must work hard . . . to end the Zionist occupation of the Palestinian Arab territory so that it will return to its people and rightful owners, who will then freely determine their own destiny".—(Le Monde - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) *(Prev. rep. 30430 B)*

C. SINGAPORE — Constituency Boundary Changes

Legislation passed in mid-1980 provided for the creation of nine new parliamentary constituencies and the abolition of three existing ones to take account of recent demographic trends. The total membership of Parliament would thereby be increased from 69 to 75 at the next general election, which was due not later than the end of 1981; the last increase in membership took effect from the 1976 general election [see 28255 B]. (Singapore Bulletin) *(Prev. rep. 30460 A)*

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. SOUTH AFRICA — Government Changes - Constitutional Proposals and Creation of President's Council - Abolition of Coloured Representative Council - Party Political Developments - School Boycott and Protests by Coloured and Black Students - Industrial Unrest - Position of Church Groups - UN Security Council Resolution and Calls for Release of Imprisoned Black Leaders - Report on 1976 Soweto Unrest - Black Political Groups - Security Detentions, Trials and Guerrilla Activity

Mr P. W. Botha, the South African Prime Minister, announced on Aug. 26, 1980, a reorganization of his Government with effect from Oct. 7, including the appointment of seven new ministers and various other changes. He also announced at the same time the nomination of Mr A. L. Schlebusch, the former Minister of Justice and of the Interior, as the candidate of the ruling National Party (NP) for the new post of Vice State President and Chairman of the newly-created President's Council [see below], while three other former cabinet ministers were among the five people appointed to chair the committees of this new Council.

The cabinet appointments were as follows (with previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

Gen. M. A. de M. Malan (Chief of the South African Defence Force) . .	Defence
Mr P. T. C. du Plessis (Deputy Minister of Finance)	Agriculture and Fisheries
Mr H. Schoeman (Agriculture) . .	Transport Affairs
Mr J. C. Heunis (Transport)	Internal Affairs
Mr H. J. Coetzee (Deputy Minister of Defence)	Justice
Dr D. J. de Villiers (Ambassador to the United Kingdom)	Industries, Commerce and Tourism
Dr C. V. van der Merwe (Administrator of the Orange Free State)	Water Affairs, Forestry and Environmental Conservation
Dr G. V. N. Viljoen (Administrator-General of South West Africa/Namibia)	National Education
Mr S. F. Kotze (Deputy Minister of the Interior and Community Development)	State Auxiliary Services and Community Development
Dr A. P. Treurnicht (Public Works, Statistics and Tourism)	State Administration and Statistics
Mr R. F. Botha (Foreign Affairs) . .	Foreign Affairs and Information
Deputy Ministers	
Mr P. Cronjé	State Auxiliary Services and Community Development
Mr P. J. Badenhorst	Internal Affairs
Mr D. W. Steyn	Finance, Industries and Commerce

The portfolio of Defence was formerly held by the Prime Minister (who retained the portfolio of National Intelligence, formerly known as National Security—see below). The Ministry of Coloured Relations and Indian Affairs was combined with that of the Interior to form the new Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The cabinet changes, and in particular the appointments of Gen. Malan, Dr Viljoen and Dr de Villiers, were generally seen as ensuring stronger support within the Government for reformist policies espoused by the Prime Minister. It was noted that Dr Viljoen, who was regarded as a *verligte* (enlightened) Afrikaner intellectual [see 29913 A], also held the influential position of chairman of the *Broederbond*, the Afrikaner secret society to which the majority of government members belonged. (In elections for this post of chairman in 1974, Dr Viljoen—who prior to his appointment as Administrator-General had been rector of the Rand Afrikaans University—had reportedly defeated Dr Treurnicht, who in 1978 became National Party leader in the Transvaal and was a prominent *verkrampte* or conservative member of the party—see 29539 A.)

Of the five outgoing ministers, Mr Schlebusch was nominated for the post of Vice State President; Mr S. J. M. Steyn, the outgoing Minister of Community Development, Coloured Relations and Indian Affairs, became ambassador to the United Kingdom; Dr S. W. van der Merwe, the outgoing Minister of Industries, Trade and Consumer Affairs, was appointed as chairman of the economic committee of the President's Council, while the planning and community relations committees were to be chaired respectively by Mr A. J. Raubenheimer, the outgoing Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, and Mr T. N. H. Janson, the outgoing Minister of National Education and Sport and Recreation. (The chairmen of the constitutional and scientific committees, as announced at the same time, were to be Dr Dennis Worrall and Prof. Ernst Marais; the committee chairmen, with the exception of Prof. Marais, were due to take up their posts on Oct. 7.)

Mr Schlebusch was succeeded as leader of the National Party in the Orange Free State by Dr C. V. van der Merwe, who was elected unanimously to the post at the NP provincial congress in Bloemfontein on Sept. 3.

It was announced on Sept. 3 that Mr Danie Hough (43), who had been a member of the Transvaal provincial executive since 1974, was to succeed Dr Viljoen as Administrator-General of South West Africa/Namibia.

On the same day the promotions were also announced (with effect from Oct. 7) of Gen. (formerly Lt.-Gen.) Constand Viljoen, who was appointed to succeed Gen. Malan as Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF), and of Lt.-Gen. (formerly Maj.-Gen.) Jan Geldenhuys, who was appointed to succeed Gen. Viljoen as Chief of the Army (having previously been GOC, South West Africa Command—see 28789 A).

The announcement of these changes followed a period of discussion regarding the constitutional future of South Africa. Innovations proposed by the Government in this respect were nevertheless criticized as inadequate by opposition leaders in Parliament and by Coloured (i.e. mixed-race) leaders, and the proposal to create a separate Black advisory council was withdrawn after it had been rejected by Black homeland leaders. The constitutional debate coincided with a boycott of non-White schools and with strikes by Black workers in several industries. These and other developments are described below.

Creation of President's Council - Subsequent Abandonment of Proposal for Black Advisory Council

The Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Bill, establishing a framework for deliberations on the country's future constitutional, economic and social development, was introduced into Parliament on May 29, 1980. The Bill was based closely on the majority recommendations of a constitutional commission under the chairmanship of Mr Schlebusch, then Minister of Justice and of the Interior, whose interim report [see below] had been tabled in Parliament on May 7 and accepted by the Government the following day.

The most significant features of the Bill were the abolition with effect from Jan. 1, 1981, of the Senate which was in part indirectly elected and in part appointed, and the creation of a 60-member President's Council comprising White, Coloured, Indian and Chinese representatives nominated by the State President for a five-year term. It was envisaged that a separate advisory council would be created to represent the views of the Black population.

Other provisions included an enlargement of the existing House of Assembly, whose 165 elected members would choose eight additional members (distributed among the parties on the basis of their proportional numerical strength in the House), while another four members would be nominated by the State President.

The number of cabinet ministers would be increased from 18 to 20, and a new office, that of Vice State President (with a seven-year term of office) would be created; the Vice State President would act as chairman of the President's Council.

The President's Council would be divided into five committees (constitutional, economic, planning, community relations and science) with each committee having its own chairman appointed by the State President. The Council would advise the State President on matters referred by him to the Council, or on any matter deemed to be in the national interest except matters relating to draft legislation. The State Parliament could instruct the Council to consult with the proposed separate Black advisory council. Recommendations made by the President's Council would automatically be tabled in Parliament.

The Bill, which received its first, second and third readings in the House of Assembly on May 29, June 5 and June 12 respectively, was supported by the ruling National Party (NP), with the South African Party (SAP) and the New Republic Party (NRP) also voting in favour, but it was opposed at each stage by the Progressive Federal Party (PFP).

Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (PFP), the Leader of the Opposition, said during the second reading debate that his party's principal objection was to the exclusion of Blacks from the proposed President's

Council, and he added that the PFP would consequently refuse to take part in the new body, although he indicated on June 11 that this refusal might be reconsidered "provided that the Government agrees to bring Black people into the President's Council in an advisory capacity". (Mr Japie Basson, a founder member of the PFP in 1977—see page 28663—was expelled from the party's parliamentary caucus on June 5 after stating his willingness to serve on the proposed President's Council, even though he opposed the exclusion of Blacks and voted with other PFP members against the Bill. Having informed the Prime Minister on July 24 that he had accepted an invitation to serve on the President's Council, Mr Basson resigned from the PFP on July 26, while a decision to expel him from the party was also taken at a meeting on the same day of the PFP executive.)

Mr F. W. de Klerk, the Minister of Mines, Environmental Planning and Energy, asserted that the formation of a separate Black advisory council was a positive feature of the Government's approach, which would provide a Black forum without duplicating existing channels of communication between Black people and the Government. He added that Blacks had their own countries, sovereignty and citizenship (i.e. under the Government's policy of creating tribal "homelands" which could develop towards independence on the model of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda—see 30001 A) and that this justified a differentiated approach in the creation of new mechanisms for consultation.

Mr H. M. Smit, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, made a controversial speech during the second reading debate on June 4, defending the exclusion of Blacks from the proposed President's Council in terms which were widely regarded as racially insulting.

Mr Smit said that while it would be an easy solution to include everyone, even "lesser developed Black population groups", he doubted the feasibility of involving "people whose thought processes are slower than most of us here". In a correcting statement later the same day he replaced the latter phrase by the words "those whose assimilation of constitutional processes is slower than most of us here", and added that his words had been intended not as a racial insult but as a statement of reality.

Dr P. G. J. Koornhof, the Minister of Co-operation and Development, said on June 5 that Mr Smit had "expressed himself in an unfortunate manner", while opposition leaders called for a government repudiation of what they described as Mr Smit's racially insulting remarks. Although Mr P. W. Botha (the Prime Minister) said on June 6 that he considered the matter to have been settled by Mr Smit's correcting statement, a cabinet meeting was reportedly held to discuss domestic and international reactions, after which Mr Smit announced in Parliament on June 10 that he wished "unconditionally to withdraw any objectionable remarks I used".

Mr Smit's remarks were condemned by non-White leaders including the Rev. H. J. (Alan) Hendrickse, the leader of the (Coloured) Labour Party, Bishop Desmond Tutu, the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

Chief Buthelezi, the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu tribal homeland and leader of the *Inkatha* movement (with a substantial popular following particularly among Zulus—see page 28864), said on June 5 that Mr Smit's remarks "will make it impossible for any members of the race groups who are allowed to participate in the President's Council to do so without being seen through their participation to be endorsing the view of us expressed by Mr Smit".

The South African Black Alliance (SABA), the group formed by *Inkatha*, the Labour Party and the Indian Reform Party early in 1978 under the chairmanship of Chief Buthelezi [ibid.], issued a statement after a meeting in Durban on June 7-8, condemning the proposed composition of the President's Council. The statement said that the council would reflect the opinions of only a minority of the population, and criticized also the provision that its members would be nominated by the State President rather than selected by the communities which they were to represent.

[SABA had been joined in December 1978 by the Basotho National Party (*Dikwankwetla*), the ruling party in the Qwaqwa homeland led by Mr T. Kenneth Mopeli—see 30001 A—which in elections on April 19-21, 1980, won all 20 popularly elected seats in the Qwaqwa assembly—see also page 27423. Representatives from the Lebowa and Gazankulu homelands and opposition leaders from Ciskei also attended the SABA conference in February 1979, which resolved to oppose any constitutional proposals which did not include the participation of all races.]

In view of the opposition of Black leaders, the Government on Aug. 8 abandoned the proposal to create a separate Black advisory council. However, the Prime Minister made it clear that this did not mean that Blacks would be represented on the President's Council itself.

This decision emerged after a meeting between Mr P. W. Botha and Black homeland leaders, at which the latter had reiterated the position reached by them at an earlier meeting on July 19-20 whereby they did not, however, necessarily reject the concept of the President's Council provided that it was revised to include Black representation. (Chief Buthelezi was absent from the meeting with Mr Botha in protest over what he regarded as attempts by the Government to "foist half-baked constitutional arrangements on Blacks".) A similar position had been taken by the Urban Councils' Association of South Africa, speaking for the leaders of the officially-recognized community councils in the Black urban areas; spokesmen for more radical groups in the urban Black communities (including Dr Nthato Motlana, the leader of the unofficial Soweto "Committee of 10"—see 28661 A and also below) had, for their part, dismissed as "irrelevant" the Government's whole approach to constitutional change.

Earlier Work and Recommendations of Schlebusch Constitutional Commission

As stated above, the Government's proposals for constitutional change had been based on the recommendations of the Schlebusch Constitutional Commission; this had itself originated as an all-party select committee of both Houses of Parliament, which had been set up on March 30, 1979, and had been converted into a commission at the end of the 1979 parliamentary session.

By creating the select committee, the Government had in effect abandoned its original intention of presenting to Parliament in 1979 a bill based on its previous constitutional proposals [see pages 28664-65]. Those proposals, which had aroused opposition from Blacks, Coloureds and Indians as well as from the parliamentary opposition, were instead referred to the select committee for further consideration, together with whatever other proposals might be submitted by other interested parties as evidence to the committee (or later to the commission).

The commission's interim majority report tabled on May 7, 1980, had proposed an increase of 20 (rather than 12) in the membership of the House of Assembly, but its recommendations were otherwise adopted substantially unchanged in the Government's subsequent bill.

A minority report by the PFP members of the commission opposed the proposal to create a President's Council which would not include Black representatives, and consequently opposed the creation of a separate Black advisory council and the creation of the position of Vice State President. The minority report also opposed the recommendation that 20 additional members be appointed to the House of Assembly by the State President on the recommendation of the various parties in proportion to existing party strength. The NRP members of the commission, in an addendum to the majority report, recorded their view that "a single consultative council embodying all elements would be preferable to the proposed two bodies", and their disagreement with the proposal to increase the membership of the House of Assembly—on which point Mr John Wiley (SAP) also registered his objection.

Opposition of Coloured Leaders to Schlebusch Commission

The (Coloured) Labour Party leaders of the Coloured Persons' Representative Council (CRC), at a meeting with the Prime Minister on Nov. 9, 1979, refused to give evidence before the Schlebusch Constitutional Commission; they asserted that they were prepared to participate in constitutional discussions as full negotiating partners, but not merely to submit their constitutional proposals for consideration by an all-White commission.

The CRC had in April 1979 accepted the report of the Du Preez Committee, set up by the CRC and consisting of four Labour Party members and one independent member. The report recommended creation of a unitary parliament for South Africa, elected by universal suffrage (for all citizens over 18) on a proportional representation basis. Other recommendations included the creation of non-racial political parties (which was currently illegal under the 1968 Prohibition of Improper Political Interference Act—see 22937 A), the removal of all apartheid legislation, guarantees of total independence for the judiciary, the retention of the Senate as a house of review for all legislation, and the retention of the State Presidency as a ceremonial office. The opposition Freedom Party (formerly Federal Party prior to 1978) walked out of the CRC debate in protest over what its spokesman described as a party political and unrepresentative set of recommendations (although the Freedom Party subsequently joined with the Labour Party in calling for the abolition of the CRC and the creation of one parliament for all races).

The policy of unequivocal opposition to the Government's constitutional proposals had been adopted by the Labour Party following the election of Mr Hendrickse as its national leader on Dec. 28, 1978, in succession to Mr Sonny Leon who had resigned on Sept. 3, 1978, officially for health reasons; Mr David Curry became national chairman *vice* Mr Hendrickse and was himself succeeded as deputy party leader by Mr Norman Middleton (hitherto deputy chairman). [For Mr Leon's subsequent resignation from the Labour Party, see below.]

Abolition of CRC by Legislation providing for Creation of Nominated Council - Reported Abandonment by Government of Proposals for New Council

Mr S. J. M. Steyn, then Minister for Coloured Relations, said on Nov. 12, 1979 (three days after the meeting betweeen the Prime Minister and the CRC leaders), that no elections were planned after the current five-year term of the elected CRC members expired on March 31, 1980 [for 1975 election see 27107 B]. He indicated, furthermore, that the partially-elected CRC created in 1969 [see 23646 A] might be replaced by a nominated interim council, pending the introduction of new constitutional arrangements.

The South African Coloured Persons' Council Bill, implementing the Government's policy in this matter, was subsequently introduced in Parliament on Feb. 22, 1980, was approved in March and came into force on April 1, 1980, abolishing the CRC and providing for the creation of a Coloured Persons' Council (CPC); this new Council was to consist of not more than 30 members nominated by the State President, with an executive (also appointed by the State President) comprising an Administrator of Coloured Affairs and four other members. During a two-year period (a termination date of April 1, 1982, having been introduced by an amendment accepted by the Government during the committee stage of the Bill in the Senate on March 24) the CPC was to function as an advisory body to which the Minister for Coloured Relations could refer legislation for recommendation and comments.

A government memorandum released also on Feb. 22 stated that the "negative approach of the Labour Party" had frustrated the expansion of the authority of the CRC as envisaged by the Government; it cited in this context the Labour Party's refusal since 1975 (i.e. when it gained an overall majority in the elections of that year) to discuss the budget allocated for Coloured affairs, and the party's apparent intention of using the CRC "for its own political objectives" while repeatedly calling for its abolition. Since the official opposition in the CRC had also associated itself with calls for the abolition of the CRC, the memorandum continued, the Government had "decided to give effect to the requests and to dissolve the Council".

The Coloured Persons' Council Bill was opposed in Parliament by the PFP and the NRP; Mr Colin Eglin, the PFP spokesman on Coloured affairs, described it on Feb. 22 as "an admission of failure" by the Government in its relations with Coloured people, for whom the proposed new council was "a slap in the face". On the same day, Mr Hendrickse said that the Government had resorted to legislation "to negate the will of the people" instead of negotiating with recognized leaders, and he added that "this proposed all-nominated body further exposes the Government's fraudulence about what it terms consultation".

Mr Hendrickse said in an interview on March 27 (following the final meeting of the CRC Executive) that he had no regrets about the abolition of the CRC, but that the 10 years of its existence had "afforded a platform for our strategy to use the system to exploit, expose and oppose". The Labour Party national executive committee at a meeting in Durban on April 15 resolved to expel from the party anyone accepting nomination from the Government to sit on the CPC, although it was confirmed that party members would continue to serve on the management committees dealing with Coloured affairs at local level.

Following the resignation of several Coloured politicians from the Labour Party in early 1980, Mr Sonny Leon (the former leader—see above) said on April 2 that he saw no reason why he should not form a new party, and he added: "I think you can safely say that it is going to happen." Mr Leon, who indicated that he might be willing to serve on the CPC, had himself left the Labour Party in January, and had commented on Jan. 28 that he regarded as "regrettable" the refusal of the party leaders to give evidence before the Schlebusch Commission. Mr Achmat "Lofty" Adams, the Labour Party chief whip, was expelled from the party on Dec. 29, 1979, after he had expressed support for the Government's constitutional initiatives and had advocated giving evidence before the Schlebusch Commission. Mr Martin D. Arendse, who had been Mr Leon's predecessor as Labour Party leader until 1970, and who had stood unsuccessfully as an independent candidate in the 1975 elections for the CRC [see 27107 B], resigned from the Labour Party on April 2, 1980, but stated that his position regarding the new CPC was "still a matter for conjecture".

Mr Steyn said on May 28 that he had originally hoped that the nomination of CPC members would be completed during April, but that he had decided that it should be delayed at least until after the current wave of unrest. (For boycott of Coloured schools and related unrest during April-June, see below.) However, the Government reportedly abandoned its proposals to create a nominated CPC, when leaders of both the Labour Party and the Freedom Party reaffirmed their opposition at a meeting with Mr P. W. Botha on Aug. 11.

Mr Hendrickse welcomed this development as a sign that the Government would not create structures "which were not wanted by Coloured people", but he emphasized the "implacable opposition" of the Labour Party to a proposed President's Council excluding Blacks (whereas leaders of the Freedom Party had reportedly agreed to serve on the proposed President's Council without insisting on Black representation).

Disagreements within National Party over Reforms

Within the ruling National Party, the policy of seeking to involve non-White racial groups in establishing a new constitutional structure was identified with the party's *verligte* (enlightened) wing [see 29539 A]. Summarized in the Prime Minister's slogan "we must adapt or die", the Government's policy had been set out in a 12-point strategy, which had been unanimously endorsed by the Cabinet and also accepted by the four National Party provincial congresses in 1979.

The 12-point strategy included acceptance of multi-nationalism and of differentiation between racial groups, affirmation of the policy of creating Black "homelands" with the right to self-determination and the option of moving towards independence, and a division of power among Whites, Coloureds and Indians, with a system of consultation on matters of common interest. Different racial groups should have their own schools and communities wherever possible, and hurtful and unnecessary discrimination should be ended. Other points of the strategy referred to the creation of a "constellation of states" in southern Africa, the determination of South Africa to resist outside interference, the maintenance of a free enterprise system, and the pursuit of a policy of qualified neutrality in international disputes between East and West.

The prospect of constitutional change, to which the Prime Minister referred in a number of speeches in early 1980, was regarded with concern by the rigidly conservative or *verkrampte* wing of the party [ibid.] whose adherents also opposed relaxation of apartheid legislation.

The differences within the NP apparently posed a threat to the unity of the Cabinet when a public disagreement arose in March 1980 between the Prime Minister and Dr Treurnicht, then Minister of Public Works and Statistics and Tourism (who was regarded as the *verkrampte* spokesman—see also above), over the issue of participation by a Coloured team in the "Craven Week" national schools rugby festival.

Whereas Dr Treurnicht supported exclusion of the Coloured school team, Mr Botha said on March 7 that "attitudes which create the impression that Coloureds are lepers must come to an end". In a speech the following day he restated his Government's reformist approach, including the intention of consulting with all races on constitutional changes; he also said that mixed marriages (prohibited in South African law) were not sinful, and that the prohibition of sexual relations between people of different races (under the Immorality Act of 1927, as amended in 1950—see page 12215) was not vital to White survival. (Mr Botha had said at the NP provincial congress in the Transvaal on Sept. 25, 1979, that "improvements" to the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act—ibid.—and the Immorality Act could be considered in the forthcoming 1980 parliamentary session. However, on Feb. 6, 1980, he said in the House of Assembly that there was a strong feeling in the country that these laws should be retained, and that nothing should be done to inflame those feelings, although he remained willing to consider suggestions "for removing from the Acts anything offensive or humiliating to any person".)

Despite speculation that their disagreement might precipitate a split in the party, both Mr Botha and Dr Treurnicht issued statements calling for party unity after a cabinet meeting on March 11. Mr Botha said in a speech on March 15 that those who disagreed with the Government's 12-point strategy did not belong within the NP, while in the House of Assembly on March 21 he dismissed allegations that the Cabinet was itself divided, and asserted that there were "no differences of principle between Dr Treurnicht and me". It was noted, however, that Dr Treurnicht had not made any retraction of his original statements opposing Coloured participation in the schools rugby festival.

Mr B. J. Vorster, the former Prime Minister and State President who had resigned from the latter post in June 1979 [see 29834 A], made a speech on March 12 which was generally regarded as a criticism of Mr Botha's reformist policies. Reaffirming his faith in the principle of apartheid, Mr Vorster warned of the dangers of arousing expectations which could not be met; he said that, as Prime Minister, he had not been prepared to consider the participation of Blacks in Parliament alongside Whites, but that demands for this would inescapably follow if Blacks were accepted as citizens. Mr Botha responded only by issuing on March 14 a statement that he would observe "the time-honoured rule not to draw former State Presidents into party political matters".

Dr Cornelius P. Mulder, the leader of a newly-formed *Nasionale Konserwatiewe Party* (NKP) founded by him in November 1979 [see also page 29836], said on March 16 that a new political alliance was imminent which would bring to power a conservative Government led by himself, Mr Vorster and Dr Treurnicht. (Dr Mulder, who had been Minister of Information at the time of the subsequently-revealed irregularities in that Department, had resigned in November 1978 from his posts as Minister of Plural Relations and leader of the National Party in the Transvaal—see 29539 A. He had been expelled from the NP in April 1979—see 29834 A. There had been speculation over his possible readmission to the party, following comments by Dr Treurnicht—his successor as party leader in the Transvaal—in speeches during February 1980 that the views espoused by the NKP properly belonged within the NP; however, the Prime Minister and other NP leaders took a firm line against any possibility of Dr Mulder's readmission, and Dr Treurnicht indicated that his apparent suggestion of this had been due to misinterpretation of his remarks. The NP parliamentary caucus issued on March 5 a statement proposed by the party's four provincial leaders, including Dr Treurnicht, expressing the party's "strongest disapproval and condemnation concerning the contemptible and opportunist politics of Dr Mulder" and rejecting the latter's "efforts to divide the NP".)

Parliamentary By-elections, August 1979-May 1980

In 11 by-elections held between August 1979 and May 1980, all in constituencies formerly held by the NP, the NP retained 10 of the seats with reduced majorities, and lost one to the PFP.

At Johannesburg West on Aug. 29, 1979, the NP candidate was returned after a low 50 per cent turnout despite an increase in the PFP vote, while a 55 per cent poll at Koedoespoort (Pretoria) on the same day resulted in a NP majority of 1,737 (compared with 6,870 at the 1977 general election—see 28813 A) over the right-wing *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (HNP), whose candidate was the party leader, Mr Jaap Marais. The HNP also increased its share of the vote in three of the four by-elections on Oct. 5, 1979, when the NP nevertheless held the seats (at Rustenburg, Prinshof, Brentwood and Germiston, all in the Transvaal).

On Nov. 8 the constituency of Edenvale (east of Johannesburg) was won by the PFP (from which party the NP had won the seat at the general election—ibid.), but the NP held Eshowe in Natal and Durbanville and Worcester in Cape Province. The by-election at Fauresmith in the Orange Free State on May 7, 1980, was won by the NP with a majority of 3,337 (compared with a majority of over 5,000 in 1977), despite what was reportedly a major effort by the HNP (which had not succeeded in capturing a seat in the House of Assembly since its formation in 1969—see 23939 A); the candidate of Dr Mulder's new NKP lost his deposit.

Party Political Developments - Further By-elections

Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert took over as leader of the PFP on Sept. 3, 1979, when he was elected unanimously by the party congress in place of Mr Colin Eglin.

The PFP congress affirmed that South Africa was not "a collection of nations" but "one plural society with a diversity of cultural and ethnic groups who share a common destiny", and declared that a new constitution "must be decided by all our people, not only by one section". The congress also urged members of the NRP to make their position on the constitutional issue clear by leaving the NRP and joining the PFP.

In subsequent discussions on a possible union of the PFP and the NRP, which were broken off by the latter on March 12, 1980, it emerged that the parties shared the aims of decentralization and an end to discrimination, and agreed on the need for a negotiated constitution. However, the PFP opposed allowing local communities to retain the option of segregation, and envisaged a federal constitutional structure based on common roll elections, with legislation to protect the rights of minorities, while the NRP advocated a confederation of separate parliaments, in which each racial group would thus have its own political power base.

There were various changes of party allegiance among members of the House of Assembly during the period from November 1979 to June 1980.

Mr Louis Nel, who had been expelled from the NP in March 1979 [see 29834 A], was readmitted to the party on Nov. 30, 1979.

Mr Gerrie de Jongh announced on Nov. 27, 1979, that he was leaving the NRP because he disagreed with its submission to the Schlebusch Constitutional Commission; he also said that he would retain his seat (Maritzburg South) as an independent, at least until the end of the 1980 parliamentary session.

Mr John Malcomess announced on March 13, 1980, that he had left the NRP, thereby reducing the party's strength in the House to eight. On March 19 he joined the PFP, which thus had 19 seats (although Mr Basson was later expelled from the PFP—see above). Mr Malcomess subsequently resigned his seat (at East London) with effect from Aug. 15, having stated his intention of contesting it in a by-election as a PFP candidate.

Mr John Wiley, the leader of the SAP, announced on June 13, 1980, that his party (which held three seats in the House) was to disband, that he would resign his seat (Simonstown) and seek re-election as a candidate of the National Party, and that the other SAP representatives (the members for Walmer and Port Elizabeth Central, and three members of the Cape Provincial Council) would retain their seats and join the NP, thereby increasing the NP party strength in the House to 136. (Mr Myburgh Streicher, the former SAP party leader, and two colleagues, all of whom had lost their seats in the 1977 National Assembly elections, had also joined the NP some time before, Mr Streicher's decision to this effect having been reported in January 1978.)

Mr Wiley was elected as NP member for Simonstown in a by-election on Sept. 3, defeating the PFP candidate, Mr Eddie Barlow (a former international cricketer), by 1,182 votes in an 82 per cent poll. (Because of the high turnout, although Mr Wiley received 22 per cent more votes than in the 1977 election, his actual majority was slightly reduced.) In another by-election the PFP retained the Parktown (Johannesburg) seat, their candidate Dr Marais Barnard being declared returned unopposed when no other candidates were nominated on July 28.

Administrative Changes - Security Service Developments

Mr P. W. Botha announced on Dec. 6, 1979, a reorganization of the governmental administrative structure, under which the number of central executive institutions was to be reduced from 39 to 22, with responsibilities being distributed between 18 ministries.

Explaining in the House of Assembly on Feb. 6, 1980, that the rationalization would be implemented in four stages, Mr Botha also announced that the Department of National Security (DONS), which had replaced the former Bureau of State Security (BSS) in November 1978 [see 29539 A], was to become the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI).

Mr Alec van Wyk, who had succeeded Gen. Hendrik van den Burgh in July 1978 as head of BSS and who had remained as secretary of DONS, was in turn succeeded as head of DNI by Prof. L. D. Barnard, a political scientist from the University of the Orange Free State, whose appointment had been announced on Nov. 13, 1979; Dr Barnard took up his post on June 2, 1980.

Mr Botha furthermore on Feb. 6 rejected calls made by Mrs Helen Suzman (PFP) for a parliamentary investigation into allegations that DONS had intercepted mail and tapped telephones to build up dossiers on the activities of opponents of the National Party, including Mrs Suzman herself.

Mrs Suzman's complaints arose from documents made available to the British newspaper *The Observer* in December 1979 by Mr Arthur McGiven, a former DONS agent, relating to surveillance of several prominent South African political figures. Mr Jaap Marais, the HNP leader, filed a complaint to the Advocate-General, who in a report on May 6 confirmed that the HNP office telephones had been tapped illegally and that post office officials had unlawfully allowed the interception of calls made by the editor of the HNP party newspaper, *Die Afrikaner*. The Advocate-General's report, which was tabled in the House of Assembly, recommended stricter controls by the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications over the monitoring by the state security services of mail and telephone conversations.

In another development, it was revealed in Switzerland on Jan. 21, 1980, that Mr Craig Williamson, an official of the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) since 1977 and IUEF deputy director from June 1978 to December 1979, had been working as an agent for the South African security police.

Mr Williamson's most recent post had been that of liaison officer between the IUEF and anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa; Mr Louis le Grange, the Minister of Police, said in Pretoria on

Jan. 24 that information supplied by Mr Williamson had been invaluable to the security of South Africa. The Swiss Government on Jan. 30 sent an official protest to the South African Government over the illegal activities of South African agents operating in Switzerland. Mr Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, the IUEF director, resigned with effect from July 1980, his health having deteriorated after the exposure of Mr Williamson, while the IUEF also faced allegations of financial irregularities. It was reported on Aug. 5 that the Netherlands Government (co-sponsors of the IUEF along with the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) had withdrawn its financial support for the Fund, and that the Governments of Denmark and Norway had also ended their contributions.

Boycotts of Coloured and Some Black Schools - Protests and Violence

Serious unrest among the Coloured population, arising in particular from grievances over education standards, led to a school boycott in April-July 1980 which was joined by Coloured university and college students and which gained support also from Coloured teachers and from students at a number of Black schools and colleges. The boycott was accompanied by widespread demonstrations which ended in violence on several occasions; over 30 people were killed in rioting, the most serious incidents occurring in the Cape Town area, while several hundred people were detained by police.

The boycott originated in four Coloured schools in the Western Cape on April 14, in support of demands for student representative councils (SRCs) and for an end to "inferior education". The boycott spread rapidly during April throughout the Western Cape (where action was co-ordinated by a "Committee of 81" representing affected Coloured and Black schools and colleges) and also to the Eastern Cape and other areas including Durban, Bloemfontein and Johannesburg.

The Committee of 81 presented on May 14 a list of short-term demands relating to the supply of textbooks and school equipment, the removal of examination fees, introduction of equal pay for teachers of all races and establishment of SRCs as well as guarantees that there would be no expulsions and that all those detained by police in connexion with the boycott would be released. Long-term demands envisaged the creation of "a non-racial education system for all". (The South African Institute for Race Relations—SAIRR—calculated that the ratio of teachers to pupils in all primary, secondary and special classes in 1979 was 1:19.6 for White pupils, 1:26.2 for Asians, 1:29.6 for Coloureds and 1:47.6 for Blacks. Official government figures for 1977-78 showed that per capita expenditure on education for White pupils was three times that for Coloureds and 10 times that for Blacks.)

Protests and demonstrations continued through the latter half of May; two people, including a Coloured boy of 15, were killed at Elsie's River on May 28 when police opened fire on Coloured youths throwing stones. An increasing number of arrests were made by police; detainees were held either under Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act (providing for detention for up to 14 days without access to lawyers) or Section 10 of the Internal Security Act (providing for indefinite detention, but with access to lawyers and relatives), or in certain cases under Section 6 of the 1967 "Terrorism" Act [see 22620 A] (providing for indefinite detention with no access to lawyers or visitors). Mr Schlebusch announced on June 30 the names of 133 people held under the Internal Security Act in May and June, four of whom had already been released, while SAIRR estimated on June 24 that 393 people had been detained since the beginning of the schools boycott, 63 of whom had been released.

The Committee of 81, which had called for suspension of the Western Cape school boycott from May 14 pending consideration by the authorities of the demands submitted by it, renewed its call for boycott action on May 21 in protest over the closure of the University of Fort Hare (where Black students supporting a boycott had been ordered to leave the campus on May 19).

In anticipation of disturbances on June 16 (the anniversary of the beginning of rioting in Soweto in 1976—see 27886 A), the Government took security precautions including a prohibition of all public gatherings in most urban areas from June 14 to June 30 (this ban being subsequently extended until the end of August), and a temporary ban on foreign journalists entering Black and Coloured townships.

Following a work stoppage by Black and Coloured workers on June 16, serious rioting occurred in the Western Cape on June 17-18. The disturbances were suppressed by police only after a number of people had been killed (officially recorded by police as 32, but estimated at over 40 by press sources).

Mr P. W. Botha said on June 22 that "there was a criminal element which exploited the unrest simply to break laws, and it was necessary to act against them"; he acknowledged that there were justified grievances, but warned that the state "will have to use its full might" if those grievances continued to be exploited by "revolutionary, irresponsible elements". (He had earlier given a similar warning on April 29 that the full might of the state would be used against extra-parliamentary action by those whom he said were seeking to "push the Government around behind the uniform of schoolchildren", but he had also assured Coloured teachers at a meeting on May 5 that he would ensure that their grievances and the "eradication of the backlog in providing education" were given priority.)

Coloured students suspended their boycott of schools in the Western Cape in July, following decisions by the Committee of 81 on July 16 and July 30.

The committee reportedly recommended an end to the boycott on July 16 after government announcements that (i) textbooks would be provided, (ii) an urgent programme of repairs to school buildings would begin, and (iii) there was no objection to the establishment of autonomous SRCs in Coloured schools. Although the committee's decision was subsequently reconsidered, it was reaffirmed on July 30 "in view of a beginning of the release of detainees".

The University of Fort Hare was officially reopened on July 15, and students not attending classes were threatened with expulsion.

Boycotts continued, however, at a number of Black high schools and higher primary schools during July and August, particularly in the Eastern Cape, with violent disturbances recurring.

In attempts to end this continuing boycott, Dr F. Hartzenberg, the Minister of (Black) Education and Training, announced on Sept. 4 the closure for two days of all Black higher primary and secondary schools in five Port Elizabeth townships and three Cape Town townships, as well as of three schools in Grahamstown. Pupils at the schools were required to re-register for classes on Sept. 6, and schools where boycott action continued would be closed for the remainder of the year, it was announced. Dr Hartzenberg said that the response of pupils would determine whether building and other development programmes were to be continued.

Industrial Unrest

In connexion with demands for recognition by independent Black trade unions [see 30021 A], Black workers in the motor industry were involved in strike action in November and December 1979, particularly at the Ford Cortina works in Port Elizabeth.

The strike followed the resignation on Oct. 30, 1979, of Mr Thomazile Botha from his job as a draughtsman at the Cortina works; Mr Botha, who had recently been elected as chairman of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO), asserted that the company had compelled him to choose between his job and his political activities. Ford began recruiting in late November for replacements for some 700 strikers, who were deemed to have dismissed themselves by taking strike action illegally without observing official dispute procedures, but on Jan. 8, 1980, Ford agreed to reinstate all those dismissed (as had been demanded by PEBCO), and the strike was then ended.

Mr Thomazile Botha was, however, prevented from resuming his job when, along with three other PEBCO executive members, he was detained by security police on Jan. 11, reportedly because of his opposition to the proposed removal of Blacks from Walmer's Black township in Port Elizabeth to a new site 12 miles away. Mr Botha was released on Feb. 28 but was made subject to a five-year banning order, as were the three other PEBCO executive members; Mr Botha fled from South Africa to Lesotho on May 3-4.

A further series of strikes in the motor industry in June and July 1980, affecting especially the Volkswagen works at Uitenhage, ended on July 14 with the acceptance of an agreement which included a 25 per cent increase in minimum wages for Blacks in the industry.

The strikes involved an estimated 3,500 men at the Volkswagen plant and several thousand more at Ford and the Goodyear Tyre works. The eventual settlement was described as "a breakthrough for disciplined trade union action" by a spokesman for the International Metalworkers' Federation in Geneva (Switzerland).

A strike by Black municipal workers in Johannesburg in July 1980 ended on Aug. 1 when police supervised the removal from the city of over 1,000 men dismissed by the Johannesburg city council. Mr Joseph Mavi, the chairman of the unofficial Black Municipal Workers' Union (BMWU), was arrested on the previous evening.

Mr Mavi had said on July 25, after several hundred workers had been deemed to have dismissed themselves by striking in support of pay demands, that the strike would spread on July 28 unless the city council entered negotiations with his organization. However, the council refused to recognize the BMWU, which was not officially registered, and dealt instead with the Union of Johannesburg Municipal Workers, an organization which completed the official union registration procedure on July 31. According to press reports, mass support for the BMWU was demonstrated when the strike spread from some 25 per cent of the 14,000 workforce on July 28 to an estimated 10,000 on July 30.

Mr Mavi was arrested on July 31 and was subsequently charged under the Sabotage Act, together with Mr Philip Dlamini, the BMWU secretary. Dismissed workers were taken by bus either to the Transkei and Venda homelands where an estimated 60 per cent of the Johannesburg municipal workers were officially resident, or to the neighbouring Black township of Soweto.

Other sectors affected by industrial unrest included (i) the meat industry in the Cape (where a strike by meat packers from May until August was supported by a consumer boycott); (ii) the textile industry in Natal (which had been affected by a previous wave of industrial unrest in 1973—see 26205 A); and (iii) construction work at Secunda, in the Transvaal, on two large synthetic fuel plants for the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL II and SASOL III), which was interrupted on July 15-21, amid disturbances in which a White worker was stoned to death, and again on Aug. 4. In the case of the SASOL disputes, a number of workers were reportedly dismissed and deported to tribal homelands.

The Chamber of Mines of South Africa, representing the country's major mining companies, announced on July 1, 1980, wage increases of 15 and 28 per cent respectively for Black face and surface workers in the gold and coal mining industries.

It was reported in this connexion that substantially larger pay increases for Black miners had been proposed by Mr Harry Oppenheimer, the chairman of the Anglo American Corporation (the largest mining concern in South Africa), but that the proposed improvements for non-Whites were opposed by the conservative (White) Mineworkers' Union (MWU). (In March 1979, after 121 White colliery workers had been dismissed for striking in protest over the appointment of two Coloured workers to jobs previously held only by Whites, the MWU had organized a strike to demand their reinstatement.)

The Wiehahn Commission, which had in May 1979 proposed reforms in labour legislation [see 30021 A], published on June 11, 1980, its recommendations on the training of Black workers, including government-supported training in industrial relations. Meanwhile, with the South African economy continuing to face a shortage of skilled labour, additional steps were taken by the Government to remove obstacles to the employment of skilled non-Whites in certain sectors.

The Wiehahn Commission recommended that Blacks should be given apprenticeship training at the 16 Black in-service training centres set up in 1976, or in other similar (segregated) institutions. It also envisaged the provision of support for training in areas such as labour law and trade union practice; such training as was currently available for Blacks in these matters was generally outside official control within the unregistered Black trade unions.

Mr S. P. Botha, the Minister of Manpower Utilization, announced on Nov. 26, 1979, the cancellation with effect from Dec. 1 of three job reservation determinations applicable in respect of the motor industry. He further announced on April 11, 1980, the removal of the ban on the employment of skilled Black construction workers in White areas, despite opposition to this decision by the Amalgamated Union of Building Trades Workers (representing White and Coloured construction workers). Meanwhile the Department of Community Development announced on Jan. 7, 1980, that forthcoming legislation would give effect to the recommendation by the Riekert Commission [see 30021 A] that the 1950 Group Areas Act [see 12211 A] should be amended, to allow the appointment of persons outside their own group area to positions of authority over persons of other races.

Relations between Government and Church Leaders

A delegation from the South African Council of Churches (SACC) met with the Prime Minister and other government leaders on Aug. 7, 1980, in Pretoria, following calls by the churchmen for urgent discussions on the causes of unrest in the country. The SACC delegation said after the meeting that "we were on different wavelengths, but at least we are talking"; it was reported that a second such meeting was to be held before the end of the year, at which the participation of different racial groups in the country's political future would be discussed.

The SACC delegation, led by the council's president, the Rev. E. T. A. (Sam) Buti, and its general secretary, Bishop Tutu, sought inter alia the release of political prisoners, an end to the mass removals of non-White populations to designated areas and Black homelands, and the return of passports which had earlier been confiscated from Bishop Tutu and Mrs Sally Motlana, an SACC vice-president.

Before agreeing to meet the SACC delegation, Mr P. W. Botha had asked for assurances that SACC (i) rejected communism, (ii) would cease its alleged efforts to undermine national service, (iii) would denounce violence and all organizations supporting violence, and (iv) rejected efforts by the banned African National Congress (ANC—see also below) to disrupt orderly government.

The SACC executive stated in response on June 25 that (i) it did not support, and never had supported, communism or any other ideology, (ii) it did not seek to undermine national service, which it believed should be performed as an obligation by all South Africans of all races, subject to the right of conscientious objectors to perform alternative non-military service, (iii) it rejected violence "including institutionalized violence such as the withdrawal of citizenship, migratory labour, detention without trial and enforced population removal schemes", and (iv) it did not identify with the ANC or any other political movement, and therefore considered superfluous any dissociation of SACC from the methods of such movements.

Bishop Tutu had been one of 53 churchmen arrested on May 26, 1980, at a demonstration in central Johannesburg against the detention of a fellow clergyman who had supported the schools boycott by Coloured students [see above].

The Rev. John Thorne, a former SACC president, had been arrested on May 24 and was later charged along with three other clergymen under the Riotous Assemblies Act. The 53 who were arrested in the subsequent protest march were released on bail on May 27 after being charged under the same Act; charges against one, a Canadian, were later dropped, while 17 paid admission-of-guilt fines and the remaining 35, who pleaded guilty to obstructing traffic but not to attending an unlawful gathering, were convicted on July 1 on both charges and were each fined 50 rand (about £27). Three who refused to pay their fines were sent to prison but were released a few days later after their fines had been paid by their parishioners.

In what was regarded as a reference to this and other protests, Mr P. W. Botha said on May 30 that civil disobedience, passive resistance and "so-called non-violent actions" were clearly linked with the activities of the ANC, and he also said that the SACC had in 1978 received R 2,500,000 (about £1,300,000) in funds from abroad which had, he alleged, been "channelled to numerous bodies and projects with only one purpose—that is to promote unrest". Bishop Tutu replied on the same day that he was "sick and tired of government officials making such allegations"; he stated that funds had been used and would continue to be used for legal defence of people charged under what he called "vicious security legislation"; and he added that SACC had helped with assistance to political prisoners, detainees and banned people as well as with unemployment self-help projects.

In another development, the Rev. David Russell, on whom a five-year banning order had been imposed in October 1977 [see page 28666], was charged in December 1979 with breaking this banning order, notably by attending the Cape provincial synod of the Anglican Church in Southern Africa. (At the synod a resolution was approved calling for the continued holding of multiracial church gatherings without complying with laws requiring Whites to obtain permits for meetings in non-White areas. The Anglican Metropolitan, the Most Rev. Bill Burnett, Archbishop of Cape Town, said on Dec. 8 that the Church would defy government directives even if it led to "the end of the institutional church" in South Africa.)

Mr Russell was sentenced on Feb. 28, 1980, to one year in prison after pleading guilty to breaking his banning order, and he also received suspended prison sentences totalling 27 months on 11 other charges. He was freed on bail on March 3 pending appeal, but on April 18 he received another suspended prison sentence on a further charge of breaking his banning order.

Other Christian groups to face government action included the Roman Catholic Young Christian Workers' Movement, some 20 of whose members were detained in May and June 1978, while in July 1979 Dr Gabriel Setiloane of the South African Methodist Church was deprived of his passport. Dr Theo Kotze, the former regional director in Cape Province of the banned Christian Institute [ibid.], arrived in Britain on July 18, 1978, after escaping from South Africa via Botswana.

The principal Afrikaans church, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) or Dutch Reformed Church, together with its sister churches for Blacks (the NGK in Afrika), Coloureds (the NG Sendingkerk) and Indians (the Reformed Church in Africa), issued on March 12, 1980, a statement that "the

Churches bring no objection in principle if the authorities judge that circumstances justify reconsideration'' of the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act.

The statement was a compromise after the White NGK had declined to join with its non-White sister churches in issuing calls for the abolition of the two Acts. In an earlier decision the White NGK had on Oct. 25, 1978, rejected proposals from its sister churches for a general unified synod with the power to take decisions binding on each church. It had also (on April 5, 1978) severed its links with its parent church in the Netherlands, in view of the support given by the latter to the World Council of Churches' programme and special fund to combat racism [see 28586 A and also 29302 A; 29544 A].

Dr Buti, the Scriba of the (Black) NGK in Afrika [see 27932 A] as well as president of SACC [see above], announced in June 1980 that he would not take part in a joint NGK delegation to conferences in the United Kingdom and France, and in an open letter he accused the White NGK of being ''part and parcel of the oppressor'' and of supporting apartheid. Dr Buti said that ''at the moment we cannot in honesty have any further dialogue or discussions with the NGK''. The (Indian) Reformed Church in Africa also took no part in the delegation, while Coloured churchmen opposing participation formed a ''Broederkring'' group led by Dr Alan Boesak; the official NG Sendingkerk leaders did participate, however, reportedly after they had been assured that a further meeting of the NGK churches was to be organized later in 1980 for further discussion of attitudes towards the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act.

UN Security Council Condemnation of Repression in South Africa - Calls for Release of Mr Nelson Mandela

The United Nations Security Council, at a meeting held at the request of the African group on June 4-13, unanimously adopted on the latter date a resolution which inter alia strongly condemned South Africa for ''its massive repression against all opponents of apartheid, for killings of peaceful demonstrators and political detainees, and for its defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions''.

The resolution called for the South African Government to end violence and to eliminate apartheid, and expressed the hope that ''the inevitable change in South Africa's racial policies can be attained through peaceful means''. It called also for the release of ''all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and all other Black leaders with whom it must deal in any meaningful discussion of the future of the country'', and demanded that South Africa refrain from military aggression against independent African states. Finally it called for full implementation of the UN Security Council embargo on arms sales to South Africa, which had been imposed by its Resolution 418 (1977) in November 1977 [see 28749 A].

Mr R. F. (Pik) Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, said on June 5 that the United Nations ''was not created with the object of discussing the internal situation in any country''.

Following calls by Black South Africans, notably expressed in the newspaper *The Post*, for the Government to release Black political leaders from prison and enter a round-table conference with them, a campaign was launched in March 1980 for the release of Mr Nelson Mandela, the 61-year-old former ANC leader who was serving a term of life imprisonment in the maximum security gaol on Robben Island off Cape Town following his conviction in 1964 [see 20245 A] under the ''Sabotage'' Act (the 1962 General Law Amendment Act) and the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act [for which see 19094 A and 12241 A respectively].

Organizations supporting this campaign included the Soweto ''Committee of 10'' [see below], *Inkatha*, the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO—see below), the Labour Party, the Natal Indian Congress and SACC. In the House of Assembly on April 15, Dr Slabbert said that the PFP as a party had not taken a decision regarding the campaign to have Mr Mandela released, but he personally urged the Government to consider releasing Mr Mandela provided that he renounced the use of violence. However Mr Vause Raw, the NRP leader, said that South Africa could not come to terms with revolutionaries and should not ''take people like Mandela from gaol and sue for peace with them now''.

Mr P. W. Botha stated on April 11 that the Government had no intention of releasing Mr Mandela, whom he described as a self-declared Marxist and self-appointed leader of an organization committed to overthrowing the state.

Mr Louis le Grange said in the House of Assembly on April 15 that Mr Mandela had not changed his communist views and that he still had liaison with the banned ANC, and he confirmed that ''the Government's reply to calls for his release is short and simple: no''.

Gen. Van den Bergh, the former head of BSS, said in a newspaper interview on April 20 that if he were still the head of the security service he would recommend an investigation with a view to releasing Mr Mandela, whom he described as a broken man who had paid his debt to society. Gen. Van den Bergh also commented that Mr Mandela was not a Marxist but ''stood and still stands for Black nationalism'' just as Afrikaners like himself still stood for Afrikaner nationalism.

A statement reportedly written by Mr Mandela in 1976 was released in London on June 10 by the Anti-Apartheid Movement; it called for Black unity and for the destruction of apartheid and White minority racist rule ''between the anvil of united mass action and the hammer of armed struggle''. Mr Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, said in a foreword to the statement that ''we believe the message remains fresh and valid and should be presented to our people'', and he urged that 1980 should be made ''a year of united mass struggle''.

No details were given as to how and when the statement had been smuggled out from the prison on Robben Island, and the South African Government declined to comment on either its authenticity or its content. Apparently written soon after the Soweto unrest of 1976, the statement said that the revolt of Black youth demonstrated the ''utter bankruptcy of apartheid'', and urged that ''within the ranks of the people differences must be submerged to the achievement of a single goal—the complete overthrow of apartheid and race domination''; it also warned that ''every effort to divide the Blacks, to woo and pit one Black group against another, must be vigorously repulsed''.

Publication of Cillié Report on 1976 Soweto Unrest - Conviction of Soweto Student Leaders on Sedition Charges

Mr Justice Petrus Cillié submitted to Parliament on Feb. 29, 1980, his report on the violent racial disturbances which began in Soweto in June 1976 [see 27886 A; 27932 A; 28009 A; 28450 A].

Mr Justice Cillié had been appointed to conduct a commission of inquiry by Mr James Kruger, then Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, in June 1976 [see 27886 A]; his report covered the period to February 1977, and was compiled from evidence collected at hearings lasting until July 1977.

The report concluded that the immediate cause of the riots was the Government's decision to introduce the use of the Afrikaans language on an equal basis with English as the official teaching medium in Bantu (i.e. Black) schools. It criticized the Bantu Education Department for failing to understand and respond to the grievances of Black youth, but pointed out that ''virtually all legislation regarding relations between races is separatist and seen by Blacks and Coloureds as unjust and discriminatory''; the consequent underlying dissatisfaction and hatred among the Black and Coloured population had been exploited by activists, the report said.

Mr Justice Cillié's statistics showed that 575 people had been killed in the disturbances between June 16, 1976, and Feb. 28, 1977. Of this total, 451 died ''as a result of police action'', but the report stated that ''it was never police policy to shoot indiscriminately and this never happened'' and that there was no evidence of wilful or inadmissible assaults by members of the police force. Nevertheless the police shared the responsibility for the initial outbreak of violence in Soweto on June 16, according to the report's findings, in that they failed to predict or to take adequate steps to control the demonstrations by Black youths.

Of those killed, 494 were Black, 75 were Coloured, five were White and one was Indian; 134 of the dead were aged under 18. Damage to property owned by the Bantu Administration Boards was estimated at R 29,700,000 (about £16,500,000), and damage to private property at over R 10,000,000.

It was suggested by opposition leaders in Parliament that the findings of the Cillié report should merit the dismissal from the Cabinet of Dr Treurnicht, who had been associated with the introduction of Afrikaans teaching as the then Deputy Minister of Bantu Education.

Dr Slabbert, who described the disturbances as ''the greatest internal disaster in South Africa's history'', said that the responsibility must be shared by Mr James Kruger, Mr Michiel C. Botha (the then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and of Bantu Education) and Dr Treurnicht. The first two of these were no longer within the active political arena, Mr Kruger having become president of the Senate in June 1979 [see 29834 A] and Mr Botha having resigned in November 1977 [see 28661 A].

Dr Treurnicht, however, asserted that he was clearly exonerated by the report, which criticized officials in his department for failing to keep him informed of feelings on the issue of Afrikaans teaching. [Since Dr Treurnicht had not been kept properly informed, the report said, he was justified in making statements indicating that the Government did not intend to compromise over this issue, even though witnesses had commented that such statements had "tipped the scales towards unrest".]

After a trial lasting from September 1978 to May 11, 1979, 11 former leaders of the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) were found guilty of sedition in connexion with the organization of the June 1976 disturbances.

Taking into account that the defendants had already been detained for between 21 and 28 months, Mr Justice Van Dyk suspended the balance of five-year sentences passed on seven of those convicted. Mr Daniel Sechaba Montsitsi (a former president of the SSRC) was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, Mr Matison Morobe to seven years, and Mr Seth Mazibuko and Ms Susan Mthembu both to six years, with four years of each of these four sentences being suspended.

In another trial Mr Linda Mario Mogale, a former SSRC chairman, was on Aug. 20, 1979, sentenced to seven years' imprisonment (with sentences on several charges amounting to 24½ years in all but running concurrently) after being convicted of culpable homicide, assault, terrorism and arson in connexion with petrol bomb attacks in Soweto in February and March 1978. Both Mr Mogale and Mr Jimmy Mabaso (a former chairman of the Soweto Students' League who was already serving a five-year term on a terrorism conviction and who was accused along with Mr Mogale but who was found not guilty) pleaded not guilty to all charges, and claimed that they had been tortured by police during interrogations (similar allegations having been made by Mr Montsitsi and other defendants in the earlier trial of SSRC leaders).

Political Activity Among Urban Blacks - Detentions and Banning Orders - Escape from Prison of Mr Alexandre Moumbaris

After the banning in October 1977 of the principal organizations of the Black Consciousness Movement [see pages 28665-66], the overt political activities of urban Blacks in the period to mid-1980 were limited by (i) widespread non-participation in organs created by the Government, and (ii) the apparent absence of effective successors to the banned organizations. Attempts made to create new bodies, notably the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), or to sustain the activities of those bodies which had not actually been banned, were severely hampered by the numerous detentions and restrictions imposed under security legislation.

Elections in February 1978 to the official 30-member Soweto community council having been boycotted by the majority of the population of the township [see 28925 A], further elections were held on April 15, 1978, at which 17 of the 19 seats still vacant after the February elections were filled although participation in voting remained less than 6 per cent.

The council was inaugurated on June 15, 1978, under the chairmanship of Mr David Thebehali (the former chairman of the defunct Soweto Urban Bantu Council—see 28661 A) who stated that "we are primarily concerned about the civic needs of our people in Soweto" and that "there are other institutions which can provide for the political needs of the people". Dr Mulder, then the Minister of Plural Relations, said that the council's powers would include housing allocation as well as control over illegal squatters and the maintenance of law and order by "community guards"; he added that these powers were granted "with the view of leading the people of Soweto to full management of their civic affairs".

Dr Nthato Motlana, the chairman of the unofficial Soweto "Committee of 10" (the majority of whose members, including Dr Motlana, had been detained under the Internal Security Act along with numerous other Black leaders—see 28661 A), was released on March 25, 1978; he continued to reject the official community council, asserting that it would merely "be made to do the dirty work for the White authorities", and demanding instead the establishment of an autonomous city council with full control (including fiscal powers) over the affairs of Soweto. (He was subsequently banned for a month from Sept. 6, 1978.)

Chief Buthelezi, who had called for a boycott of the community council in 1978 [see page 28927], announced a change in his attitude in a speech on the weekend of April 12-13, 1980, in which he urged his supporters to use the official community councils in Black urban areas as part of a strategy to "outwit the Whites" in a democratic struggle against the apartheid system.

Chief Buthelezi claimed that his *Inkatha* movement had a paid-up membership of over 300,000, and he challenged Dr Motlana and other prominent urban Black spokesmen (whom he had earlier criticized for assuming the role of community leaders while they had no proven constituency) to contest community council elections as a measure of their support. He suggested that Blacks could use the councils to link cities, towns and villages into a "coherent, disciplined whole", and he warned those who rejected all co-operation with the existing political system that they were "living in a fool's paradise" and would one day be obliged to open a dialogue "unless there is a military overthrow of this Government".

It was announced on July 25, however, that *Inkatha* would not participate in the Soweto Council elections scheduled for Sept. 27, because it did not regard the council as economically viable.

Mr Peter Davidson, a spokesman for *Inkatha*, said that the Government could make the council viable by giving it the land which it controlled. With assets in land, the council would then have a greatly increased capacity to raise the credit necessary for financing local development; political resistance among residents to paying and maintaining what did not belong to them would also disappear, Mr Davidson asserted.

This decision followed a meeting of the *Inkatha* central committee at Ulundi on July 19, at which Chief Buthelezi had also read out a letter written by him to Mr Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, expressing "growing misgiving" over recent hostility shown by ANC leaders towards *Inkatha*, and accusing Mr Tambo of creating discord in the Black community.

In an earlier incident, Chief Buthelezi had been denounced by radical Black demonstrators as a collaborator with the apartheid regime, when he was among those compelled to leave the funeral on March 11, 1978, of Mr Robert Sobukwe, the founder of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

At the funeral, held at Graaff Reinet in Eastern Cape Province, the demonstrators had also objected to the presence among the mourners of Coloured leaders including Mr Leon and Mr Hendrickse, while invitations to White opposition figures had been withdrawn in advance.

Mr Sobukwe, who died of cancer on Feb. 26, 1978, after a long illness, had founded the PAC in 1959 as a breakaway movement from the ANC, and he had led the campaign against the pass laws in 1960 which culminated in the shooting of protestors by police at Sharpeville in March of that year [see 17449 A]. He was then convicted of incitement and sentenced to three years' imprisonment on Robben Island, after which he was rearrested in 1963 [see page 19503] and held without charge for a further six years. Since his release from Robben Island in 1969 [see page 23565] he had been subject to a banning order restricting him to the Kimberley area.

Among the organizations seeking to continue the aims of the Black Consciousness Movement were the Soweto Students' League (SSL—see page 28927), the Council of South African Students (COSAS, founded by Black high school students in mid-1979), and also AZAPO.

AZAPO, which included Coloureds and Indians as well as Blacks, held its inaugural conference in September 1979 and elected as its president Mr Curtis Nkondo, the chairman of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee. AZAPO adopted the slogan "One Azania, one people" formerly used by the banned Black People's Convention (BPC) led by the late Mr Steven Biko [see page 28663], Azania being the Black nationalist name for South Africa. The organization declared itself opposed to all institutions created by the Government, and to the principle of ethnically-based institutions, and advocated the creation of a single parliamentary state as well as the establishment of a common system of education for all races. (The decision to create AZAPO had emerged from a meeting in April 1978, but prominent figures at that meeting had immediately been detained under security legislation and then issued with banning orders—see below.)

The majority of those detained under security legislation (i.e. without being charged) in 1977 were released by the end of 1978, although several were made subject to banning orders, while Mr Peter Jones, a former BPC member arrested with Mr Biko in August 1977 [see 28925 A], was not released until Feb. 13, 1979, when he was issued with a five-year banning order (and he was again briefly detained during July 1980).

Mr Percy Qoboza, the former editor of *The World*, was released on March 10, 1978, along with nine others; Mr Motlana was released on March 25, and other members of the Committee of 10 were among those released in the following months; Mr Hlaku Kenneth Rachidi, the former BPC president, was released on Oct. 27 and was issued with a five-year banning order on Dec. 18 (as were four others including two former journalists on *The Voice* and Mrs Nohle Mohapi, whose husband had died in detention during 1976—see also below). Five-year bans were also imposed on eight of those released in November, viz. Mr Thandisizwe Mazibuko and Mr Sedupe

Ramakgopa of the Committee of 10; Mr Aubrey Mokoena, the former director of the Black Community Programmes; three other former BPC members; and Mr Diliza Mji and Mr Terence Tryon of the banned South African Students' Organization (SASO). Miss Tenjiwe Mtintso, a former journalist on the *Daily Dispatch* and member of the BPC and SASO, was released on Aug. 10, 1978, after 12 months in detention; she remained subject to a banning order imposed before her arrest, and she was again detained from Sept. 13 until Dec. 1, 1978. Mr Barney Pityana, the former secretary-general of SASO, was also released on Aug. 10, 1978, and was made subject to a banning order; he and his wife (who had been among those arrested in October 1977 and who was also banned on her release in March 1978) escaped with their children via Lesotho to the United Kingdom, where they were granted refugee status in October 1978.

Several other organizations were affected by the detention of prominent members during 1978, 1979 and early 1980, while the school boycott beginning in April 1980 was the occasion for renewed widespread arrests [see above].

Mr Ishmael Mkhabele and Mr Lybon Mabasa, who had been associated with the decision in April 1978 to create AZAPO, were detained on May 4, 1978, and were both banned on their release; Mr Mybasa was again detained for three months from Aug. 31, 1978, while Mr Mkhabele and Ms Thoko Mphahane, the administrative secretary of AZAPO, were detained during March 1980. Mrs Sally Motlana, vice-president of SACC [see above] and the wife of Dr Motlana, was detained for two months from Oct. 25, 1978; Mr Colin Kutu, the SSL chairman, was detained on Jan. 30, 1979, and the arrest was reported on Dec. 24, 1979, of Mr Charles Mogale, the president of COSAS, and of six other members of that organization's executive.

Among those arrested in connexion with the school boycott were (i) on April 23, 1980, Mr Curtis Nkondo (who had been suspended as president of AZAPO in January after a disagreement within the executive) and Mr Achmat Cassiem, the banned former president of the South African Students' Association (SASA), who was still in detention as of early August 1980; and (ii) Mr Trevor Wentzel of AZAPO (released on July 29) and Mrs Nombulelo Melane, the acting president of AZAPO (still in detention in early August). Mr Andrew Boraine, the (White) president of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and Mr Edwin Angless, a tutor at the University of Cape Town, both arrested on June 16, were subsequently detained until Aug. 13 under the Terrorism Act, which provided for indefinite detention without access to relatives or lawyers [see page 30513 above]; also reported to be imprisoned under this legislation was Mr Vuyisile Mdleleni, a banned former BPC member, who had been arrested in April.

Mr Fanyana Mazibuko, the secretary of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee, was banned for three years with effect from July 13, 1980.

Mrs Helen Joseph, aged 75, was served with a two-year banning order on June 25, 1980; Mrs Joseph, who had been invited by students to address several meetings during the school boycott, was a "listed person" who could not be quoted, a restriction imposed under the Suppression of Communism Act, and she had been subject to banning restrictions between 1957 and 1971 [see page 24952] as well as being detained during 1963; she had also been sentenced in 1977 to imprisonment, along with three others, for refusing to reveal whether she had visited Mrs Nomzano (Winnie) Mandela, the wife of Mr Nelson Mandela [see 28925 A].

Mrs Lillian Ngoyi, the former president of the Women's League of the banned ANC, who had herself been a banned person for 16 years, died on March 12, 1980, at the age of 68.

Mr Edward Joseph Daniels, who had been convicted in 1964 for his part in an alleged sabotage conspiracy involving the African Resistance Movement [see 20646 A], was released on Nov. 16, 1979, after completing his 15-year prison sentence; on his release, he was issued with a five-year banning order. Also earlier released and banned, on Feb. 27, 1978, were Mr George Naicker and Mr Kiston Moonsamy, who had both served 14-year prison sentences on convictions for sabotage [ibid.].

Mr Alexandre Moumbaris, who was serving a 12-year sentence after being convicted in 1973 on charges under the Terrorism Act [see 26107 A], escaped with two others from Pretoria Central prison on Dec. 11, 1979, and succeeded in reaching Zambia.

At a press conference in Lusaka on Jan. 2, 1980, Mr Moumbaris asserted that no part had been played in the prison escape by a prison officer arrested in this connexion. Those who escaped with Mr Moumbaris were Mr Timothy Jenkin and Mr Stephen Lee, both White academics from the University of Cape Town, who had been sentenced on June 15, 1978, to 12 and eight years' imprisonment respectively after pleading guilty to involvement in terrorist activities. Their offences included the production of pamphlets in the name of the ANC and the illegal South African Communist Party (SACP) urging support for armed struggle; they had reportedly distributed these pamphlets both by post and by means of explosive devices described as "pamphlet bombs", which were designed to throw them into the air in public places.

Mr John Hosey, a Dublin-born former student and co-defendant in the Moumbaris trial, had returned to Britain on completion of his five-year prison sentence on June 19, 1978.

Major Trials Under Security Legislation

A number of major trials were held during 1978 and 1979, at which prison sentences of up to 18 years were imposed on those convicted of terrorist offences; in two cases death sentences were passed; and Mr Solomon Mahlangu was executed in April 1979 despite international protests.

ANC Treason Trial and Other Trials in 1978

Six members of the ANC were on April 7, 1978, sentenced in Pretoria to prison terms of between seven and 18 years, after a trial lasting some 10 months at which they were convicted of revolutionary activities over a period of 15 years.

Those convicted were Mr Mosima Sexwale (aged 25, sentenced to 18 years), Mr Naledi Tsiki (22, sentenced to 14 years), Mr Lela Motoung (45, 12 years), Mr Simon Mohlanyaneng (24, 10 years), Mr Jacob Seathlolo (sentenced to 12 years) and Mr Martin Ramokgadi (68, seven years). Mr Ramokgadi had previously served a 10-year prison sentence on Robben Island from 1964 to 1974. Mr Sexwale, Mr Tsiki and Mr Motoung were specifically charged with having received Soviet military training, and another specific charge against Mr Sexwale was that he had thrown a hand grenade at a police vehicle; other charges included sabotage, conspiracy to overthrow the Government by violence, and illegal possession of arms.

Six other accused persons were acquitted and discharged after being in prison for over 15 months, the death of the presiding judge during the trial having made it necessary for the proceedings to begin afresh in January 1978. A feature of the trial was the sentencing of two witnesses to six months each for refusal to testify, and the arrest for perjury of three other witnesses who had told the court that statements made by them to police were untrue.

Prison sentences of up to 18 years were imposed during the first half of 1978 on a number of other persons found guilty of sabotage offences, notably arising from the burning of schools [see 28925 A].

One of those convicted, Mr Mputhe Johannes Matsobane (aged 21), died on Robben Island on Aug. 9, 1978; police attributed his death to a heart attack, although a police inquiry was later held after the pathologist's report indicated probable death from unnatural causes.

(Following the death in police custody of Mr Biko in September 1977—see page 28663 and also 28925 A—increased attention was paid in the international press to reports of other such deaths, particularly those of persons detained under security legislation who were said to have committed suicide or to have died in accidents. In the case of Mr Biko, the doctors who examined him before his death were exonerated by the South African Medical and Dental Council, which accepted on June 20, 1980, the findings of its preliminary inquiry two months earlier, to the effect that there was insufficient evidence to justify a public inquiry into the doctors' conduct. Mr Biko's family had agreed on July 27, 1979, to settle out of court their civil action for compensation for his death in detention; a payment of R 65,000 was made by the state authorities to Mrs Biko in October 1979, after a delay during investigation of the affairs of the family lawyer, Mr Shun Chetty, who had left the country in August because of alleged police harassment. In a civil action brought by Mrs Mohapi against the Minister of Police, in connexion with the death in custody of her husband Mr Mapetla Mohapi in August 1976, a judgment in the Grahamstown Supreme Court on July 3, 1980, stated that there was no reason to doubt the police evidence that Mr Mohapi had hanged himself.)

Sentences of five and 12 years' imprisonment respectively were imposed on Mr Anthony Mabelandize Gazi (19) and Mr David Tharasimbi (28), convicted in June and August 1978 under the Terrorism Act of having received military training abroad and having trained others to conduct guerrilla operations against South Africa. Two men, Mr Mountain Qumbella (48) and Mr Matthews Lumko Huna (27), had each received 10-year sentences on similar charges in January, but Mr Qumbella's sentence was reduced to six years by the Supreme Court in December 1979 after an appeal.

Mr Jeffrey Klaas, a former policeman, was on Oct. 27, 1978, sentenced to six years' imprisonment (three of which were conditionally suspended) for membership of the ANC, in which capacity he had infiltrated the police force with the intention of bringing about political change.

PAC and ANC Treason Trials in 1979 - Execution of Mr Mahlangu

Sentences were passed on June 26, 1979, in the trial at Bethal, Transvaal, of 17 PAC members found guilty of charges including conspiracy to overthrow the state, sending recruits out of South Africa for insurgency training, and incitement to riot in June 1976 in Kagiso township near Soweto.

The trial, covering activities during the period 1963-77, lasted for 18 months and was held largely in camera. Among the 86 persons named as co-conspirators in the indictments were the late Mr Sobukwe, the former PAC leader [see above], and four others who had died in detention, three allegedly from suicide and one from natural causes. The state called 165 witnesses, and granted indemnity from prosecution to 60 of them; witnesses were accommodated at Bethal prison during the period of the trial.

Mr Zeth Mothopeng (66), described by the judge as the recognized leader of the PAC inside South Africa, was sentenced to 15 years on each of two counts (to run concurrently); Mr Michael Matsobane (36) was sentenced to 15 years, Mr Mark Shinners (38) and Mr Dan Matsobane (32) to 12 years each, Mr John Ganya (50) to 11 years, and Mr Bennie Ntoeloe (39) and Mr Johnson Nyathi (33) to 10 years each. Nine others received sentences ranging from eight to five years' imprisonment, while one was released after being given a suspended sentence.

Mr James Mange was sentenced to death (later commuted on appeal to 20 years imprisonment—see below) on Nov. 15, 1979, and 11 others received prison sentences ranging from 18 to 13 years, in a treason trial of ANC members at which the charges included undergoing military training in the Soviet Union, bringing arms into South Africa, and planning a number of guerrilla actions including attacks on a court, a police station, and the house of a magistrate.

All 12 men pleaded not guilty and refused to co-operate with court proceedings, and were sentenced to additional (concurrent) terms of imprisonment for contempt of court involving the singing of nationalist songs and the display of placards with nationalist slogans.

Those convicted with Mr Mange (24) were Mr John Mofokeng Sekete (24), Mr Jeffrey Ramasake Legoabe (30), Mr Thibe Jimmy Ngobeni (27), Mr Bennet Komane (46), Mr Titus Maleka (25), Mr Sydney Choma (23), Mr Mandlenkosi Hadabe (27), Mr Mandla Mthetwa (22), Mr Tladitsagae Molefe (24), Mr Andrew Mapheto (20) and Mr Vusumuzi Nicholas Zulu (28).

The death sentence passed on Mr Mange was unusual in that his activities had not resulted in loss of life (the usual criterion for imposition of death sentences in trials for politically-motivated offences in South Africa). Following an international campaign for clemency, the sentence was overruled on Sept. 11, 1980, by the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein, and Mr Mange was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

Mr Solomon Mahlangu (22) was executed on April 6, 1979; he had been sentenced to death on March 2, 1978 after being captured in a shooting incident in Johannesburg, in June 1977, in which two White bystanders were killed.

Mr Mahlangu was convicted of murder and other offences under the Terrorism Act, but the man who was said to have fired the shots resulting in the deaths, Mr Mondy Motloung, was declared unfit to stand trial because of brain damage thought to have been caused by a blow on the head probably sustained during his arrest.

Mr Mahlangu said that he had received insurgency training in Angola as an ANC member, and had then returned to South Africa, where he and Mr Motloung (and a third man who evaded arrest) were stopped by a policeman when in possession of a hand grenade and a firearm. The shooting occurred when they had run away and sought refuge in a garage.

The execution of Mr Mahlangu was carried out despite worldwide pleas for clemency and protests by Black leaders in South Africa. Among governments expressing their opposition to the execution were those of the United States and of member countries of the European Communities, while on April 5 the UN Security Council issued a solemn call to the Government of South Africa to spare the life of Mr Mahlangu. Following the execution, a memorial service organized by the SSL in Atteridge township on April 7 was broken up by police who used tear gas and made five arrests; on the same day Mr R. F. (Pik) Botha described as "shocking and repugnant" what he called "the selective indignation directed against South Africa" by Western governments, particularly those of the Netherlands, West Germany and the UK, whose attitudes Mr Botha regarded as irreconcilable with their own actions to combat terrorism.

Mr Edian Ntuli, a former police detective, had been executed on May 16, 1978, in accordance with the death sentence passed on him a year earlier for "robbery with aggravating circumstances". The execution was carried out despite a petition for mercy signed by 3,000 people, many of whom were said to believe that Mr Ntuli's actions were politically motivated and that money stolen by him from banks had been sent to Black political organizations abroad.

Security Trials in 1980

Dr Renfrew Christie, an academic and former student leader from the University of Cape Town, was sentenced on June 6, 1980, to 10 years' imprisonment (with four other sentences of five years each to run concurrently) after being found guilty on five charges under the Terrorism Act. He was said to have supplied information to ANC members regarding South Africa's nuclear programme, and to have exposed vital installations to the danger of sabotage by guerrillas.

Dr Christie (30), whom press reports described as a scientist although his research work concerned South African mining history, was arrested on Oct. 23, 1979, some few months after his return from the UK (where he had completed his doctorate at Oxford University); however, he was not charged until April 1980. Mr Craig Williamson, whose infiltration of the International University Exchange Fund as a South African secret agent had been revealed in January [see above], gave evidence that Dr Christie had conspired with IUEF officials to pass information to the ANC.

Mr Bhekizitha Oliver Nqubelani was sentenced on March 10 to 20 years' imprisonment on charges relating to an attempted bomb attack on the Cape Province Supreme Court the previous year.

The bomb had been discovered and defused on May 15, 1979, and Mr Nqubelani (30) had been arrested the following day; he was also convicted of possessing arms and explosives, of undergoing military training in Botswana and Angola, and of inciting others to do likewise.

Increased Guerrilla Activity - Developments within Liberation Movements

An apparent increase in guerrilla activity in 1979 and early 1980 included a series of attacks on police stations (notably in Soweto in May and November 1979, at Soekmekaar in northern Transvaal on Jan. 3, 1980, and in a White suburb of Johannesburg on April 4) as well as two incidents regarded as particularly significant, namely the seizure of a bank and 25 hostages at Silverton (near Pretoria) on Jan. 25, 1980, and a sabotage attack on the SASOL I fuel plant complex at Sasolburg (50 miles south of Johannesburg) on June 1.

Police stormed the Volkskas bank at Silverton after a six-hour siege, killing all the three ANC guerrillas (Mr Stephen Mafoko, Mr Wilfred Madela and Mr Humphrey Makhubo) who had taken over the bank and who were holding 25 hostages (reportedly with a view to demanding the release of eight African nationalist leaders). One of the hostages died in the shooting and another died later in hospital, while several others were injured. Large crowds attended the funerals of the three guerrillas, particularly that held for Mr Mafoko in Soweto on May 9 when police used teargas to control a gathering of between 10,000 and 20,000 mourners.

Mr Oliver Tambo, the president of the ANC, claimed that ANC guerrilla units were responsible for the sabotage attacks at Sasolburg on June 1, and for other unsuccessful attacks at SASOL II on the same night, where limpet mines exploded but failed to set off fires. The fires at Sasolburg affected five fuel tanks at the SASOL I synthetic fuel plant and three at the neighbouring National Fuel Refinery (NATREF), causing damage estimated at a total of R5,800,000 (of which three-quarters was fuel product losses and the rest damage to plant). Mr Le Grange (the Minister of Police) said that the attack had been "masterminded" by the Soviet ambassador in Zambia (Dr Vassily Solodovnikov) and exiled members of the South African Communist Party.

Dr Barnard (the new head of the security services, DNI) warned on June 3 that the Sasolburg incident was not isolated but was "part of a greater plan" for concerted terrorist action in a total onslaught against South Africa. Police had earlier warned repeatedly of an escalation in guerrilla activity, it having been estimated that several thousand young Blacks, many of them from Soweto, had left South Africa to join the armed liberation movements in the aftermath of the racial upheavals of 1976.

Brig. C. F. Zietsman, then chief of the security police, said in a newspaper interview on June 2, 1978, that an estimated 4,000 Black South Africans were undergoing military training in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Libya. He had earlier (on April 17) revealed that a system of special border patrols had been established in 1977 to prevent both the departure of guerrilla recruits and the infiltration of trained insurgents. His successor, Brig. Johan Coetzee, said on Aug. 21, 1979, that 170 trained insurgents had been captured since October 1976, and that in this period there had been 48 guerrilla attacks including 18 directed against railway lines and five attacks on police stations.

It was reported in February 1980 that the South African Defence Force had taken over from police the responsibility for the security of northern Natal, and that the area was becoming a third front in security force action against guerrilla infiltration (which had hitherto been primarily either from Mozambique towards the Witwatersrand area, or through Botswana into the north-west of the country). A police spokesman said on Feb. 17 that the most important ever discovery of a guerrilla arms cache had been made in northern Natal the previous week; the discovery of an even larger cache, in a township near Springs east of Johannesburg, was announced by Mr Le Grange on March 3.

On June 12, 1980, the Government published details of proposed legislation under which the Minister of Defence could designate any place, area or installation as a "national key point"; this would then enable the Government to take any steps deemed necessary for the protection of such a key point, while the owners of strategic installations would be obliged in law to take adequate security measures.

The ANC, the organization to which the majority of the more recent guerrilla activity in South Africa was attributed, issued on June 16, 1980, a call for the intensification of the liberation struggle on all fronts.

Mr Sizakele Sigxash, the ANC information secretary, said in Lusaka when issuing the call (which marked the fourth anniversary of the Soweto disturbances) that South Africa was "in the grip of new mass struggles including the renewed mighty offensive for a free and democratic system of education". (See also page 30515 above for developments relating to the imprisoned ANC leader Mr Mandela.)

A breakaway group from the ANC, calling itself the ANC of South Africa (African Nationalists), held a congress in London (England) on Aug. 13-14, 1978, at which a four-man executive was elected under the chairmanship of Mr Jonas Matlou. The organization, which affirmed its allegiance to Mr Mandela and also stated that it was discussing possible unity with the PAC, criticized the ANC for allegedly being excessively influenced by communists, including Whites. (The death had earlier been reported, on Dec. 4, 1977, in London, of Mr P. J. Hodgson, 67, who was a listed person banned under the Suppression of Communism Act in 1954, and who had escaped from South Africa with his wife in 1963—see 19861 C—to continue in exile his activities in the liberation movement. Mr Moses Kotane, 72, who was a member of the ANC executive and also general secretary of the South African Communist Party—see 19216 A—died in Moscow in May 1978.)

A statement issued on July 4, 1978, following a PAC meeting attended by about 100 members at Arusha (Tanzania), announced the election of Mr Potlako Leballo as the organization's president, in succession to the late Mr Sobukwe [see above].

Mr Leballo had been acting president of the PAC during the imprisonment and subsequent illness of Mr Sobukwe. Seven former members of the PAC central committee, including Mr T. M. Ntantala, the former deputy chairman, were expelled from the movement at the Arusha meeting after being accused of dishonesty (and after reports of a power struggle at the PAC external headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, during the preceding six months). The movement's military commander, Mr Lancelot Dube, described as the commander of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, was killed in a car accident in January 1979, along with the PAC representative in Zambia.

Mr Leballo resigned the PAC presidency on May 2, 1979, officially on health grounds; he was succeeded by a three-man presidential council consisting of Mr David Sibeko (who had been the PAC representative at the UN), Mr Vusumzi Make and Mr Elias Ntloedibe. Mr Sibeko was killed and Mr Make was wounded in an attack on June 12, 1979, at the house where they were staying in Dar es Salaam; 19 PAC members were charged with this killing when preliminary hearings began in Dar es Salaam in October, but it was later reported (on May 17, 1980) that 12 of them had been released.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - Economist - Africa - Africa Confidential - Cape Times - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - South African Embassy, London - UN Information Centre, London) (*Prev. rep. 30021 A; Cabinet 29834 A; Internal Security 28925 A*)

A. RELIGION — World Council of Churches - Central Committee Meeting - Further Allocation of Grants from Special Fund to Combat Racism

The central committee of the World Council of Churches, meeting in Geneva from Aug. 14 to 22, authorized a 10th allocation of grants from the Special Fund to combat Racism.

Of the total allocation of $755,000, $200,000 and $150,000 respectively went to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress of South Africa. In addition, $90,000 was given to a number of organizations supporting liberation movements in southern Africa, including the British based Anti-Apartheid Movement. The ninth allocation of grants authorized in October 1979 had excluded SWAPO and the African National Congress, although a special grant of £16,000 was made towards the costs of the technical and administrative staff supporting the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe delegation at the Lancaster House constitutional conference [see page 30165].

The central committee at its August 1980 meeting considered the report of a world consultation on racism held in the Netherlands during the previous June, and passed a resolution reaffirming the programme to combat racism (PCR) and calling for the continuation of the special fund under its present criteria. In a statement on South Africa, the committee noted that the independence of Zimbabwe [see 30365 A] had strengthened the struggle within and outside South Africa against the apartheid regime, and urged that apartheid be declared a "sin which, as a fundamental matter of faith, is to be rejected as a perversion of the Christian gospel".

The WCC's membership was increased to 300 with the admission of five churches, including three new Anglican Churches.—(Ecumenical Press Service, Geneva - Church Times - Guardian) (*Prev. rep. Central Committee 29544 A; 1979 PCR Grant to Patriotic Front page 30165; 1978 Grants 29302 A; Termination of Membership by Presbyterian Church of Ireland 30350 A*)

B. LATIN AMERICA — Conference of Indigenous Peoples

The first Latin American conference of indigenous peoples took place from Feb. 27 to March 3, 1980, in Ollantaitambo, near the south Peruvian town of Cuzco. The delegates split into two main factions, (i) the Bolivian-led "indigenist" faction, supported also by Indians from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, which dominated the conference with its "cosmic concept of harmony between man and nature"; and (ii) the opposing Marxist faction, supported by Indians from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, which called for the liberation of the Indian by means of a class struggle with the participation of workers, peasants and other "enemies of imperialism". The delegates from Paraguay did not support either faction.

The conference decided to establish a Latin American regional council of Indian movements on which each country would be represented by two delegates; this would co-ordinate activities and support the work of the Canada-based World Council of Indigenous Peoples. The conference also called for an "energetic letter" to be sent to the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, requesting that the World Council should be represented and have the right to vote at the United Nations. (Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Brazilian Indians pages 28194-95*)

C. NEW ZEALAND — Parliamentary By-election - National Party defeated by Social Credit

A by-election in the Auckland constituency of East Coast Bays on Sept. 6 resulted in the Social Credit Political League winning the seat from the National Party, the voting figures being as follows: Mr Gary Knapp (Social Credit) 7,728, Dr Donald Brash (National Party) 6,616—Social Credit majority 1,112. Labour and Values Party candidates polled 3,130 and 137 votes respectively. The by-election had been caused by the resignation of Mr Frank Gill, the former Minister of Defence and Police, following his appointment as New Zealand ambassador to the United States [see 30484 C].

Party strengths in the House of Representatives following the by-election were: National Party 50; Labour Party 40; Social Credit 2. Since the general election of November 1978 [see 29499 B] a Labour MP had been unseated and replaced by his National Party opponent after a judicial recount.—(New Zealand News UK) (*Prev. rep. General Election 29499 B*)

A. ITALY — Regional, Provincial and Municipal Elections - The Donat Cattin Affair - Other Internal Political Developments - The Bologna Bombing

Elections took place on June 8-9 to renew regional councils (parliaments) in the 15 regions of Italy governed by normal statute. Compared with the last such elections in 1975 [see 27338 A] the results showed a 1.5 per cent advance for the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and a loss of almost 2 per cent for the Communist Party (PCI), although in comparison with the results of the 1979 general elections [see 29765 A] the DC lost ground slightly. The Christian Democrats won 13 extra seats on regional councils whereas the Communists lost 14 seats; the left lost their absolute majority on the Piedmont, Liguria and Latium (Lazio) councils, although they retained their majority in Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria.

The Socialist Party (PSI), which in April 1980 had agreed to participate in a coalition Government together with the DC and the Republican Party (PRI) [see 30341 A], won 3 per cent more of the vote than in 1979 and 0.7 per cent and four seats more than in 1975; the position of the PRI remained virtually unchanged. Of the other smaller parties, the extreme right-wing Italian Social Movement (MSI), the Social Democrats (PSDI) and the Proletarian Democrats (DP) all lost seats, while the Liberal Party (PLI) and the Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism (PDUP) registered gains.

According to final figures 88.5 per cent of the electorate went to the polls, although 3.5 per cent of votes cast were blank and 2.7 per cent were spoiled; the Radical Party (PR), which did not contest the elections, campaigned in favour of abstention or vote-spoiling.

The results of the regional elections are set out in the first table below; the second table gives the results of the simultaneous provincial and municipal elections [see below].

		Regional 1980			Regional 1975		General 1979*
		Votes	Per cent	Seats	Per cent	Seats	Per cent
DC	..	11,153,439	36.8	290	35.3	277	38.1 (38.3)
PCI	..	9,555,767	31.5	233	33.4	247	31.8 (30.4)
PSI	..	3,851,722	12.7	86	12.0	82	9.9 (9.8)
MSI	..	1,785,750	5.9	37	6.4	40	5.1 (5.3)
PSDI	..	1,505,607	5.0	31	5.6	36	3.8 (3.8)
PRI	..	922,970	3.0	18	3.2	19	3.0 (3.0)
PLI	..	816,418	2.7	15	2.5	11	2.0 (1.9)
PDUP	..	372,102	1.2	8	0.5	4	1.4 (1.4)
DP†	..	274,100	0.9	2	0.9	4	0.8 (0.8)
PR	..	—	—	—	—	—	3.5 (3.4)
Others	..	85,491	0.3	0	0.2	0	0.6 (1.9)

*Showing percentage of votes won in the relevant 15 regions, with parties' national percentages given in parentheses.

† In the 1979 general elections DP formed part of the New United Left (NSU) [see 29765 A]. In 1975 the DP members of the regional councils of Lombardy (2), Latium (1) and Campania (1) were elected in alliance with the PDUP [see 27338 A] and are shown below as PDUP in the comparative results for these regions.

		Provincial				Municipal			
		1980		1975		1980		1975	
		Per cent	Seats	Per cent	Seats	Per cent	Seats	Per cent	Seats
DC ..	..	36.0	981	34.8	949	35.7	16,334	34.4	15,662
PCI ..	..	31.1	816	32.6	860	30.0	11,732	31.9	12,181
PSI ..	..	13.3	343	12.8	333	14.1	5,494	13.2	5,278
MSI ..	..	6.2	144	6.8	162	4.8	856	4.8	1,033
PSDI	..	5.4	129	5.9	143	5.3	1,642	5.8	1,829
PRI ..	..	3.4	78	3.4	72	3.7	840	3.6	753
PLI ..	..	3.0	52	2.7	41	2.6	397	2.3	349
DP ..	..	0.5	2	0.3	1	0.6	51	0.5	43
PDUP	..	0.3	3	0.2	3	0.5	36	0.2	34
Per Trieste	..	0.3	11	—	—	—	—	—	—
PS d'A*	..	0.2	5	0.1	2	0.1	15	—	—
Others	..	0.3	7	0.4	5	2.6	2,950	3.3	3,185

* Sardinian Action Party.

Elections had taken place in 1978-79 in Italy's five special statute regions, these being Sardinia [see page 29910], Trentino-Alto Adige [see page 29686] and Sicily, Val d'Aosta and Friuli-Venezia Giulia [see pages 29222-23].

The percentages and seats won in the 15 individual regions are set out below, with final 1975 results shown in parentheses:

Liguria. PCI 36.1 (38.4), 15 (16); DC 30.7 (30.4), 13 (13); PSI 13.4 (13.5), 5 (5); PSDI 4.5 (5.5), 2 (2); PLI 4.5 (3.9), 2 (1); MSI 4.2 (4.6), 2 (2); PRI 3.2 (3.5), 1 (1); DP 1.1 (—), 0 (—); PDUP 1.0 (—), 0 (—); others 0.3 (0.2), 0 (0). Size of council 40.

Piedmont. DC 32.5 (32.1), 20 (20); PCI 31.6 (33.9), 20 (22); PSI 14.2 (12.9), 9 (8); PSDI 6.0 (7.4), 3 (4); PLI 5.9 (5.0), 3 (2); MSI 4.0 (4.3), 2 (2); PRI 3.3 (3.6), 2 (2); PDUP 1.0 (0.8), 1 (0); DP 0.9 (—), 0 (—); others 0.6 (—), 0 (—). Size of council 60.

Lombardy. DC 38.9 (37.5), 34 (32); PCI 28.1 (30.4), 23 (25); PSI 14.5 (14.1), 11 (11); PSDI 4.5 (5.2), 3 (3); MSI 4.4 (4.5), 3 (3); PLI 3.4 (2.8), 2 (2); PRI 2.6 (3.1), 2 (2); DP 1.7 (—), 1 (—); PDUP 1.5 (2.4), 1 (2); others 0.4 (—), 0 (—). Size of council 80.

Veneto. DC 49.4 (48.0), 32 (31); PCI 21.7 (22.8), 13 (14); PSI 12.1 (12.8), 7 (8); PSDI 5.4 (6.3), 3 (3); MSI 3.6 (3.8), 2 (3); PRI 2.6 (2.5), 1 (1); PLI 2.6 (2.3), 1 (1); PDUP 1.1 (1.5), 1 (0); DP 1.0 (—), 0 (—); others 0.5 (—), 0 (—). Size of council 60.

Emilia-Romagna. PCI 48.2 (48.3), 26 (26); DC 25.6 (25.3), 13 (13); PSI 10.3 (10.2), 4 (4); PSDI 4.7 (5.2), 2 (2); PRI 4.4 (3.9), 2 (2); MSI 3.2 (3.7), 1 (1); PLI 2.1 (1.8), 1 (1); PDUP 1.4 (1.6), 1 (1); others 0.1 (—), 0 (—). Size of council 50.

Tuscany. PCI 46.4 (46.5), 25 (25); DC 28.7 (28.5), 15 (15); PSI 11.8 (10.7), 5 (4); MSI 3.7 (4.2), 1 (2); PSDI 3.1 (3.9), 1 (2); PRI 2.8 (2.6), 1 (1); PLI 1.3 (1.2), 1 (0); PDUP 1.1 (2.1), 1 (1); DP 1.1 (—), 0 (—); others — (0.3), — (0). Size of council 50.

Umbria. PCI 45.2 (46.1), 14 (14); DC 27.6 (27.6), 9 (9); PSI 14.3 (13.9), 4 (4); MSI 5.4 (5.7), 1 (1); PSDI 2.6 (2.4), 1 (1); PRI 2.6 (2.4), 1 (1); PDUP 1.3 (1.1), 0 (0); PLI 1.0 (0.8), 0 (0). Size of council 30.

Marches. DC 37.1 (36.5), 16 (16); PCI 37.2 (36.9), 15 (15); PSI 10.1 (9.8), 4 (4); PSDI 4.5 (5.3), 1 (2); MSI 4.3 (4.5), 1 (1); PRI 3.8 (3.4), 1 (1); PDUP 1.5 (2.1), 1 (1); PLI 1.4 (1.5), 1 (0); others 0.1 (—), 0 (—). Size of council 40.

Abruzzi. DC 45.8 (42.5), 20 (18); PCI 27.5 (30.3), 12 (13); PSI 10.8 (10.2), 4 (4); MSI 5.9 (6.4), 2 (2); PSDI 4.6 (6.2), 1 (2); PRI 2.4 (2.6), 1 (1); PLI 1.5 (1.8), 0 (0); PDUP 1.3 (—), 0 (—); DP 0.2 (—), 0 (—). Size of council 40.

Latium. DC 34.1 (31.5), 22 (20); PCI 30.7 (33.5), 19 (21); PSI 10.6 (9.8), 6 (6); MSI 10.1 (11.4), 6 (6); PSDI 5.3 (6.1), 3 (3); PRI 3.7 (3.7), 2 (2); PLI 2.7 (2.5), 1 (1); PDUP 1.2 (1.5), 1 (1); DP 1.2 (—), 0 (—). Size of council 60.

Molise. DC 55.3 (50.0), 17 (16); PCI 15.8 (17.9), 5 (6); PSI 9.4 (10.1), 3 (3); PSDI 4.8 (6.2), 2 (2); MSI 4.1 (5.0), 1 (1); PLI 4.1 (4.4), 1 (1); PRI 3.7 (4.5), 1 (1); PDUP 0.8 (1.2), 0 (0); others 2.0 (0.7), 0 (0). Size of council 30.

Apulia. DC 42.1 (39.2), 22 (21); PCI 24.6 (28.5), 13 (15); PSI 13.3 (11.9), 6 (5); MSI 9.3 (10.8), 4 (5); PSDI 5.2 (4.7), 2 (2); PRI 2.5 (2.3), 1 (1); PLI 1.6 (1.7), 1 (1); PDUP 1.3 (0.8), 1 (0); others 0.1 (0.1), 0 (0). Size of council 50.

Campania. DC 38.9 (36.7), 25 (23); PCI 24.0 (27.1), 15 (16); PSI 12.8 (10.4), 7 (6); MSI 11.2 (12.1), 7 (7); PSDI 6.2 (6.6), 3 (4); PRI 3.0 (3.6), 1 (2); PLI 1.7 (2.1), 1 (1); DP 1.1 (—), 1 (—); PDUP 1.0 (1.1), 0 (1); others 0.1 (0.3), 0 (0). Size of council 60.

Basilicata. DC 45.2 (41.9), 14 (13); PCI 24.9 (27.1), 8 (9); PSI 13.7 (13.2), 4 (4); MSI 5.5 (6.4), 2 (2); PSDI 5.2 (6.9), 2 (2); PLI 1.7 (2.1), 0 (0); PRI 1.6 (1.6), 0 (0); PDUP 1.3 (—), 0 (—); DP 0.9 (—), 0 (—); others — (0.8), — (0). Size of council 30.

Calabria. DC 41.2 (39.5), 18 (17); PCI 24.2 (25.2), 10 (10); PSI 16.5 (14.7), 7 (6); MSI 7.1 (8.3), 2 (3); PSDI 5.8 (5.3), 2 (2); PRI 2.1 (3.0), 1 (1); PDUP 1.2 (2.7), 0 (1); DP 1.1 (—), 0 (—); PLI 0.8 (1.3), 0 (0). Size of council 40.

The process of forming regional administrations (*giuntas*) was protracted, and by the end of August Liguria, Piedmont, Marches, Latium, Molise, Apulia and Calabria were still without an administration, while in Abruzzi only an agreement in principle existed between the DC and the PSI on the formation of a *giunta* with probable PRI and PSDI support. The situation in the remaining regions had been resolved as follows:

Lombardy: a DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI administration presided over by Signor Giuseppe Guzzetti (DC); **Veneto:** a DC administration presided over by Signor Carlo Bernini (DC); **Emilia-Romagna:** a PCI administration supported by the abstention of the PSI, with Signor Lanfranco Turci (PCI) as its president; **Tuscany:** a PCI-PSI administration presided over by Signor Mario Leone (PSI); **Umbria:** a PCI-PSI administration supported by the PRI, with Signor Germano Morri (PCI) as president; **Campania:** a DC-PSI-PSDI administration, supported by the PLI and the PRI, presided over by Signor Emilio De Feo (DC); **Basilicata:** a DC-PSI-PSDI administration, with Signor Vincenzo (DC) as president.

Voting trends in the regional elections were broadly repeated in the simultaneous elections to provincial councils held in all areas except Aosta, Viterbo and Pavia [see page 29056], Trento, Bolzano, Gorizia [see page 29222], Ravenna, Rome and Foggia, and to seats on some 6,575 municipal councils. (For overall results see second table in first column.)

Of the major cities, Milan, Turin, Florence, Genoa, Venice and Bologna had PCI-PSI councils as a result of the municipal elections, while Palermo's council was dominated by a DC-PRI-PSDI coalition. The PCI retained control over the Naples council where, however, the MSI won 22.3 per cent of the vote to the disadvantage of the Christian Democratic Party.

The Donat Cattin Affair - Unsuccessful PCI Attempt to secure Impeachment of Signor Cossiga - Confidence Votes on Crisis in Judiciary and Economic Recovery Plan

The position of the Christian Democratic Party had been jeopardized prior to the elections by allegations that Signor Francisco Cossiga, the Prime Minister, had assisted the flight from justice of Signor Marco Donat Cattin, a wanted terrorist suspect, by warning Senator Carlo Donat Cattin (DC deputy secretary since October 1978—see 29504 B) that his son was about to be arrested. The allegations led to repeated calls by the PCI for the impeachment of Signor Cossiga, and in the run-up to the elections many press commentaries described the forthcoming poll as a "referendum" on his Government.

Senator Donat Cattin resigned as DC deputy secretary on May 31 even though a special parliamentary commission of inquiry (before which he and Signor Cossiga both testified) had ruled earlier in the day by 11 votes to 9 that the matter should be closed. Notwithstanding this decision and a statement by the Prime Minister on June 2 rejecting all "accusations and doubts" about his own handling of the Donat Cattin affair, most of the parties except the PSI and the PRI (the DC's coalition partners) joined in the PCI's demands for his resignation. The same day the PCI announced its intention to collect the minimum of 315 parliamentary signatures necessary to initiate parliamentary proceedings which could lead to the impeachment of Signor Cossiga, and by June 13 a total of 347 signatures had been collected.

A warrant for the arrest of Signor Marco Donat Cattin (29), alleged to be a member of the extreme left-wing Front Line organization (linked to the Red Brigades—see pages 30342 and 29057) had been issued in early May. Subsequently another captured suspect, Signor Roberto Sandalo, made statements to a Turin magistrate claiming that he had acted as a messenger between father and son and that at the end of April, on the basis of information provided by the Prime Minister, Signor Cattin had been advised by his father to flee to avoid imminent arrest.

Senator Donat Cattin told the parliamentary commission that he had received the information about his son's imminent arrest from an anonymous source but admitted that he had warned his son by means of Signor Sandalo; Signor Cossiga told the commission that he had merely reassured Senator Donat Cattin that the charges against his son were not too serious.

On July 23 an extraordinary joint session of Parliament opened to debate the Donat Cattin issue, and at the conclusion of five days of debate Signor Cossiga was effectively cleared in two secret votes on July 27. In the first of these a PCI-sponsored motion to have the case referred back to the parliamentary commission of inquiry was defeated by 507 votes to 416, and in the second an MSI-PR motion calling for the impeachment of the Prime Minister by the Constitutional Court for divulging judicial secrets was defeated by 535 votes to 370.

In the face of continuing PCI attacks against the Government, Signor Cossiga decided on July 30 to forestall possible defeat on a forthcoming (secret) vote on a PCI motion demanding the resignation of the Justice Minister by turning it into a confidence issue, on which voting would be open. The Government won the vote by 325 (DC, PRI, PSI) to 270 (PCI, PSDI, PLI, MSI, PDUP, PR).

The PCI accused the (DC) Justice Minister, Signor Tommaso Morlino, of being responsible for a "crisis" in the judiciary, which was intermittently paralysed by stoppages of magistrates demanding better protection from attacks by extremists [see below]. The PCI noted in its motion that four magistrates had already been killed in 1980 [see page 30343] and accused the Government of failure to put into effect measures to protect those most at risk.

The Government on Aug. 27 won a further technical vote of confidence on a major economic recovery programme which it had introduced in early July in the form of two decrees subject to parliamentary endorsement within 60 days (i.e. by Sept. 1 and Sept. 7 respectively). After the MSI and the PR had between them tabled 1,400 amendments in an effort to prevent the enactment of the package by the deadline dates, the Government used a 1971 procedure designed to halt filibustering [see also page 30342] to turn the vote into a confidence issue, and won it by 317 votes to 260.

98 76
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE
Trento
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA
VAL D'AOSTA
Aosta
LOMBARDY
Milan
VENETO
Venice
Trieste
Turin
PIEDMONT
Genoa
EMILIA-ROMAGNA
Bologna
FRANCE
LIGURIA
YUGOSLAVIA
Florence
SAN MARINO
Ancona
TUSCANY
Perugia
MARCHES
UMBRIA
L'Aquila
Adriatic Sea
ROME
ABRUZZI
VATICAN CITY
Campobasso
MOLISE
LATIUM
CAMPANIA
Naples
Bari
APULIA
Tyrrhenian Sea
SARDINIA
Potenza
BASILICATA
Cagliari
CALABRIA
Catanzaro
Mediterranean Sea
Palermo
SICILY
TUNISIA
ITALY
MALTA
0 M 100
CARPRESS

(*Carpress*)

The austerity programme, which had already received Senate approval after considerable modification, was intended to cut the public sector deficit from the equivalent of $50,000 million annually in order to curb inflation (currently running at about 20 per cent) and also to increase Italy's industrial competitiveness by shifting resources away from private consumption towards industrial production and investments. The programme would, it was envisaged, bring in an extra $3,600 million a year in revenue, reduce the trade deficit (which amounted to nearly L 7,800,000 million, or some $9,300 million, in the first half of 1980) and relieve pressure on the lira, which by the end of August had fallen close to the bottom of its maximum permitted fluctuation within the European monetary system [EMS—see 30010 A]. The approximate rate of exchange of the Italian currency against the US dollar at the end of August was 856 lire = $1.00.

Among the key points of the package were the transfer to the state of employers' responsibility for some social security payments in order to reduce labour costs and increase the competitiveness of Italian products; increases in indirect taxes, including value added tax (VAT) and duty on petrol and spirits; the creation of a solidarity fund to help industries in difficulties in the south, which was to be financed by a 0.5 per cent levy on all industrial wages (repayable after five years with interest) and administered with the participation of the trade unions; and the introduction of measures to fight chronic tax evasion, including the imposition of a numbered tax receipt system in shops and businesses, such as had already been introduced in restaurants.

The existing eight VAT rates were streamlined in the package into five levels as follows: 1 and 3 per cent rates were combined into a 2 per cent rate, and the 6 and 9 per cent rates into an 8 per cent rate; the 12 per cent rate on petrol and oil products was raised to the existing upper rate of 18 per cent; the 14 per cent rate was raised to 15 per cent; and the 6 per cent rate on property transfers was lowered to 2 per cent.

The programme as a whole had been endorsed on July 2 by the leaders of the three main trade union confederations including the Communist CGIL leader, Signor Luciano Lama, in return for government assurances that the wage indexation system (*scala mobile*) would not be modified [see also page 30341]. However, in the face of bitter opposition from the PCI secretary, Signor Enrico Berlinguer, and the trade union rank and file, the Government on July 18 backed down on the issue of the 0.5 per cent levy on wages in order to facilitate the passage of the measures through Parliament before the expiry date; Signor Cossiga proposed to present the levy measure separately as a draft bill later in the year.

In a statement issued with the economic measures on July 2 the Italian Cabinet asserted: "Of all the industrialized countries Italy today is the one with the highest inflation, the strongest internal demand, the fastest rising costs and the greatest dependence on imported oil. For those reasons it is the one most threatened by any loss in competitiveness. Yet it still retains huge potential, as the consistently fast economic growth of the past two years proves."

The Bologna Bombing - Other Internal Security Developments

In the worst single act of terrorism in Western Europe since the Second World War, a bomb exploded in Bologna's central railway station at 10.25 a.m. on Aug. 2 at the height of the holiday season, killing 76 people and wounding 203; injuries proved fatal in another eight cases, so that by the end of August the death toll had risen to 84, several more people being in a critical condition. The neo-fascist Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), initially claimed responsibility for the attack, which it said was "in honour of Mario Tuti" [see below], and although this organization later denied involvement the bombing continued to be attributed to the extreme right. (However, the MSI condemned the bombing and called for the death penalty for terrorists.)

Italy's previous worst terrorist incident had occurred six years earlier, also near Bologna, when a bomb planted by right-wing extremists exploded on the Rome-Munich Italicus express on Aug. 4, 1974, killing 12 and injuring 48 [see 26820 A]. Only two hours before the Aug. 2 explosion eight people had been charged with carrying out the Italicus attack including Signor Mario Tuti, a right-wing extremist already serving a life sentence for the murder of two policemen.

The explosion was at first thought to have been caused by a gas leak or a faulty boiler, but these possibilities were later ruled out when traces of a bomb were found in a broad crater in the ruins of the second-class waiting room. The force of the blast, which investigators estimated to have been caused by some 90 lbs of explosive, completely destroyed part of the station's central building whose roof collapsed, burying many victims under the rubble and injuring passengers on the stationary Ancona-Basle express. Seven foreigners were among the dead and 19 among the injured.

Signor Cossiga, who went to Bologna on Aug. 3 to chair an emergency meeting of the PCI-dominated council, told Parliament in a statement on Aug. 4 that the slaughter at Bologna "reminds us all of other doctrines of oppression and other horrors which first the Resistance and then the post-war Republic fought to ensure would never be brought back into our country". On the same day demonstrations and strikes were staged all over Italy in protest at the attack and thousands held a mass rally in Bologna itself.

A mass funeral for the victims who perished in the explosion was held in Bologna on Aug. 6, which was declared a day of national mourning, but in the event the families of all but eight chose to bury their dead privately. Many expressed bitterness towards the state which, they maintained, had failed to protect its people from terrorism. Among the politicians attending the ceremony were President Pertini, Signor Cossiga and Signor Bettino Craxi, the PSI secretary.

In an editorial in the Communist Party organ *L'Unità* on Aug. 5 Signor Berlinguer called for political changes which would allow "something new and valid" to be done for Italy. He maintained that problems were being solved on a "day-to-day basis" and that the resulting situation of "political uncertainty and ineptitude" gave rise to "anti-democratic and subversive efforts". In response the Cabinet on Aug. 5 issued a statement asserting that "the Government intends to carry out with the maximum awareness and energy its role of political leadership in the interests of the nation", while Signor Flaminio Piccoli, the DC secretary, described Signor Berlinguer's statement on Aug. 6 as "superficial and contradictory" and accused him of "exploiting the suffering and the grief of so many families and citizens of Italy to obtain momentary advantages from a polemic which has nothing to do with the political debate and indeed reduces it to a mediocre quarrel".

Among more than 20 people arrested by the end of August in connexion with the bombing on the basis of information supplied to the police by an informant were Signor Franco Furlotti (26), who police believed had placed the bomb, Prof. Aldo Semerari (57), a lecturer in forensic psychiatry at Rome University, and two teachers, Signor Claudio Mutti (34) and Signor Paolo Signorelli (46). The Italian authorities also tendered an application for the extradition from France of Signor Marco Affatigato (22), a former leader of the neo-fascist Black Order (*Ordine Nero*, formed as the successor to New Order—see 26410 A; 26820 A) who had been arrested in Nice on Aug. 6. Signor Affatigato was subsequently extradited to Italy on Sept. 7.

As well as killing a policeman in Rome on May 28 the NAR had in 1980 claimed responsibility for the murder on June 23 at a Rome bus stop of Signor Mario Amato (43), a deputy public prosecutor who had been investigating right-wing attacks in Rome including the bombing of the Capitol in April 1979 [see page 29688] and an attack on the Regina Coeli prison in May 1979 [see page 29766], both of which were attributed to the NAR. Signor Amato was thought to have had evidence that the NAR and other right-wing groups were about to form an alliance with the Red Brigades and other left-wing organizations.

The death of Signor Amato, the eleventh magistrate to be killed by terrorists since 1976, led to a protest strike by magistrates on June 24-25 and another on July 15 in support of security measures and better pay.

(The Mafia was believed to have been responsible for the murder on Aug. 6 of Signor Gaetano Costa, the chief state prosecutor of Palermo, Sicily, as well as for the death earlier in the year of the DC president of the Sicilian regional council—see page 30343—and the killing on Aug. 13 of the Mayor of Castelvetrano, Signor Vito Lipari.)

At the conclusion of a four-month trial a Milan court on June 21 sentenced 27 members of the extreme left organization Front Line to lengthy prison terms for crimes including murder and kidnapping, three others being acquitted. Of those convicted Signor Corrado Alunni, who was also a leading member of the Red Brigades [see page 29687] and who had been wounded on April 28 in an unsuccessful attempt to break out of prison, received a 29-year sentence to run concurrently with two sentences already being served for Red Brigades activities [ibid.].

Six defendants received 28 years each, four others received sentences of more than 20 years, and the remaining sentences ranged from 18 years down to six months; two of the longer sentences were imposed in absentia on Signor Antonio Marocco and Signor Daniele Bonato, who had been successful in escaping from a Milan prison on April 28.

In a Red Brigades attack perpetrated in May 1980 a *Corriere della Sera* journalist, Signor Walter Tobagi (33), was shot dead in Milan on May 28 by the "March 28" column of the organization, which stated that those connected with the Italian press would now be a major target, particularly journalists who took a "progressive" stance on terrorism.

Signor Tobagi was the co-author of a recent book on the psychology of terrorism and had, after four Red Brigades suspects were killed by police in a Genoa flat on March 28, 1980 [see page 30342], written a newspaper article on the "disintegrating myth of the [Genoa] column".

Signor Guido Passalacqua, a journalist on *La Repubblica*, was shot in the legs by the Red Brigades in an attack at his home in Milan on May 7.

The organization was also responsible for killing the head of the Venice anti-terrorist police in Mestre on May 11 and for shooting dead a DC regional councillor for Campania in Naples on May 19, four of the perpetrators of the latter attack being captured and sentenced to life imprisonment on July 19.

Signor Franco Piperno, who had been extradited from France to Italy in October 1979 on suspicion of involvement in the Red Brigades' kidnapping and murder of Signor Aldo Moro [see page 30343], was released on June 30 for lack of evidence together with a colleague, Signor Lanfranco Pace.—(La Stampa, Turin - Corriere della Sera, Milan - La Repubblica, Rome - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Economist - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. Other Internal Developments 30341 A; 1975 Regional Elections 27338 A*)

A. VATICAN — Pope John Paul's Visits to Africa, France and Brazil

Between May 2 and July 11, 1980, Pope John Paul II paid pastoral visits to six African countries, France and Brazil at the invitation of the respective ecclesiastical and civil authorities. [In previous overseas visits since his election in October 1978, the Pope had visited Mexico (in January 1979—see 29551 A), Poland (June 1979—see 29852 A), Ireland (September 1979—see pages 30113-15), the United States (October 1979—see pages 30115-16) and Turkey (November 1979—see 30136 A).]

Visit to Africa

During his 11-day journey the Pope visited Zaïre (May 2-6), the Congo (May 5), Kenya (May 6-8), Ghana (May 8-10), Upper Volta (May 10) and the Ivory Coast (May 10-12).

Announcing the journey, the first to Africa since that of Pope Paul VI in 1969 [see 23542 A], Pope John Paul said on March 26, 1980, that he intended to pay tribute to the whole of Africa and to express his "sincere affection" to "all the inhabitants of that dear continent". He also recalled that 1980 marked the centenary of the evangelization of Zaïre, the Congo and Ghana by Roman Catholic missionaries. [According to figures published in Nairobi by the All-Africa Council of Churches, the number of Christians in Africa was over 200,000,000, the annual growth rate of 8,000,000 (4 per cent) being faster than the rate of increase in the continent's population. A quarter of the Christian population was Roman Catholic, the proportion in the six countries covered by the Papal visit ranging from 43.5 per cent in Zaïre to 7 per cent in Upper Volta.]

In addition to meetings with the civil and religious leaders of all six countries, the Pope had a 45-minute meeting in Accra on May 9 with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Robert Runcie, who was on his way to Zaïre to inaugurate a new province of the Anglican Communion. Other important engagements included the ordination of eight bishops in Kinshasa (Zaïre) and the blessing of the foundation stone of the new cathedral to be built at Abidjan (Ivory Coast).

While most of the Pope's speeches and homilies dealt with moral and social questions, e.g. abortion, contraception, monogamy and sterilization, certain passages of addresses delivered in Kenya and the Ivory Coast touched specifically on political issues.

Addressing the diplomatic corps in Nairobi on May 6, the Pope said: "Political independence and national sovereignty demand, as a necessary corollary, that there be also economic independence and freedom from ideological domination. The situation of some countries can be profoundly conditioned by the decisions of other powers, among which are the major world powers. There can also be the subtle threat of interference of an ideological nature that may produce, in the area of human dignity, effects that are even more deleterious than any other form of subjugation. There are still situations and systems within individual countries and in the relationships between states that are marked by injustice and social injury and that still condemn many people to hunger, disease, unemployment, lack of education and stagnation in their process of achieving development.

"The state, the justification of which is the sovereignty of society, and to which is entrusted the safeguarding of independence, must never lose sight of its first objective, which is the common good of all its citizens—all its citizens without distinction, and not just the welfare of one particular group or category. The state must reject anything unworthy of the freedom and of the human rights of its people, thus banishing all elements such as abuse of authority, corruption, domination of the weak, the denial to the people of their right share in political life and decisions, tyranny or the use of violence and terrorism. Here again, I do not hesitate to refer to the truth about man. Without the acceptance of the truth about man, of his dignity and eternal destiny, there cannot exist within the nation that fundamental trust which is a basic ingredient of all human achievements. Neither can the public function be seen for what it truly is: a service to the people, which finds its only justification in solicitude for the good of all." The Pope also declared that an "atheistic ideology" could not be the "moving and guiding force for advancing the well being of individuals or for promoting social justice".

On the following day at an outdoor mass in Nairobi's Uhuru Park the Pope urged African Christians to participate fully in the political life of their countries. "In the state", he said, "citizens have a right and duty to share in the political life. For a nation can ensure the common good of all, and the dreams and aspirations of its different members, only to the extent that all citizens in full liberty and with complete responsibility make their contributions willingly and selflessly for the good of all."

In a farewell speech at Abidjan airport on May 12, the Pope said: "Africa struck me as being a vast workyard, from all points of view, with its promises and also, perhaps, its risks. Wherever you go, you admire a considerable undertaking in favour of development and of raising the standard of living, in favour of the progress of man and society. There is a long way to go. Methods can be different and turn out to be more or less suitable. But the desire to advance is undeniable. Already considerable results have been obtained. Education is spreading, diseases that used to be fatal are overcome, new techniques are started, success is beginning to be achieved in the struggle against certain natural obstacles. The value of the riches peculiar to the African soul is also being felt more, and that arouses pride. Parallelly, accession to national sovereignty and respect for it seem to be the object of everyone's aspirations.

"There is here an important heritage, which must absolutely be safeguarded and promoted harmoniously. It is not easy to control this seething life, to make sure that its living forces are used for true development. There is a great temptation in fact to demolish instead of constructing, to acquire at a high price arms for populations that need bread, to want to seize power—were it by setting some ethnical groups against others in bloody and fratricidal struggles—whereas the poor are longing for peace, or else to succumb to the intoxication of profit for the benefit of a privileged class. Do not get caught up, dear African brothers and sisters, in this disastrous mechanism, which has really nothing to do with your dignity as creatures of God, or with what you are capable of. You have not to imitate certain foreign models, based on contempt of man or on interest. You have not to run after artificial needs which will give you an illusory freedom or which will lead you to individualism, whereas the community aspiration is so strong in you. Nor have you to delude yourselves about the virtues of ideologies which hold out bright prospects of complete happiness, always postponed to tomorrow. . . ."

Visit to France

Announcing this visit on April 9, the Pope said that he had been invited by the president of the French episcopal conference, the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris (Cardinal Marty), President Giscard d'Estaing and the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Mr Amadou Mahtar M'Bow. The visit (May 30-June 2) took place at a time when, according to a recent poll, only about 15 per cent of French Catholics practised their religion regularly and the number of men ordained to the priesthood had declined from 573 in 1963 to 118 in 1978.

During the visit the Pope had talks with President Giscard d'Estaing, celebrated three masses in Paris, in front of the cathedral of Notre Dame, in the working class suburb of Saint-Denis and at Le Bourget airport, and addressed the French bishops and the executive council of UNESCO. His only visit outside Paris was to the shrine at Lisieux of St Thérèse of the Child Jesus, one of France's most popular saints.

In his address at UNESCO headquarters Pope John Paul appealed to scientists throughout the world to use their collective strength to end the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

He said: "The future of man and of the world is threatened, radically threatened, in spite of the intentions, certainly noble ones, of men of learning, men of science. It is threatened because the marvellous results of their researches and their discoveries, especially in the field of the sciences of nature, have been and continue to be exploited—to the detriment of the ethical imperative—for purposes that have nothing to do with the requirements of science, and even for purposes of destruction and death, and that to a degree never known hitherto, causing really unimaginable damage. Whereas science is called to be in the service of man's life, it is too often a fact that it is subjected to purposes that destroy the real dignity of man and of human life. That is the case when scientific research itself is directed towards these purposes or when its results are applied to purposes contrary to the good of mankind. That happens in the field of genetic manipulations and biological experimentations as well as in that of chemical, bacteriological or nuclear armaments.

"Two considerations lead me to submit particularly to your reflection the nuclear threat which is weighing upon the world today and which, if it is not staved off, could lead to the destruction of the fruits of culture, the products of civilization elaborated throughout the centuries by successive generations of men who believed in the primacy of the spirit and who did not spare either their efforts or their fatigue. The first consideration is the following. Geopolitical reasons, economic problems of world dimension, terrible incomprehension, wounded national pride, the materialism of our age and the decadence of moral values have led our world to a situation of instability, to a frail balance which runs the risk of being destroyed any moment as a result of errors of judgment, information or interpretation.

"Another consideration is added to this disquieting perspective. Can we be sure, nowadays, that the upsetting of the balance would not lead to war, and to a war that would not hesitate to have recourse to nuclear arms?. Up to now it has been said that nuclear arms have constituted a force of dissuasion which has prevented a major war from breaking out, and it is probably true. But we may wonder at the same time if it will always be so. Nuclear arms, of whatever order of magnitude or of whatever type they may be, are being perfected more and more every year, and they are being added to the arsenal of a growing number of countries. How can we be sure that the use of nuclear arms, even for purposes of national defence or in limited conflicts, will not lead to an inevitable escalation, leading to a destruction that mankind can never envisage or accept? But it is not you, men of science and culture, that I must ask not to close your eyes to what a nuclear war can represent for the whole of humanity.

"Ladies and gentlemen, the world will not be able to continue for long along this way. A conviction, which is at the same time a moral imperative, forces itself upon anyone who has become aware of the situation and the stake, and who is also inspired by the elementary sense of responsibilities that are incumbent on everyone. Consciences must be mobilized. The efforts of human consciences must be increased in proportion to the tension between good and evil to which men at the end of the 20th century are subjected. We must convince ourselves of the priority of ethics over technology, of the primacy of the person over things, of the superiority of spirit over matter. The cause of man will be served if science forms an alliance with conscience. The man of science will really help humanity if he keeps the sense of man's transcendence over the world and of God's over man.

"Thus, seizing the opportunity of my presence at the headquarters of UNESCO today, I, a son of humanity and Bishop of Rome, directly address you, men of science, you who are gathered here, you the highest authorities in all fields of modern science. And through you I address your colleagues and friends of all countries and all continents. I address you in the name of this terrible threat which weighs over mankind, and at the same time, in the name of the future and the good of humanity all over the world. I beseech you: let us make every effort to establish and respect the primacy of ethics, in all fields of science. Let us do our utmost particularly to preserve the human family from the horrible perspective of nuclear war.

"I tackled this subject before the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, in New York, on Oct. 2 of last year [see 30113 A]. I am speaking about it today to you. I appeal to your intelligence and your heart, above passions, ideologies and frontiers. I appeal to all those who, through their political or economic power, would be and are often led to impose on scientists the conditions of their work and its orientation. Above all I appeal to every scientist individually and to the whole international scientific community. All together you are an enormous power; the power of intelligences and consciences. Show yourselves to be more powerful than the most powerful in our modern world. Make up your mind to give proof of the most noble solidarity with mankind: the solidarity founded on the dignity of the human person. Construct peace, beginning with the foundation: respect for all the rights of man, those which are connected with his material and economic dimension of his existence in this world. May wisdom inspire you. May love guide you, this love which will suffocate the growing threat of hatred and destruction. Men of science, commit all your moral authority to save mankind from nuclear destruction."

Visit to Brazil

During this journey (June 30-July 11) the Pope visited 13 of Brazil's largest cities, travelled 8,000 miles within the country, made 44 speeches and celebrated 13 masses. The cities visited were Brasilia; Belo Horizonte; Rio de Janeiro; São Paulo; Aparecida do Norte; Pôrto Alegre and Curitiba (in the south); Salvador da Bahia; Recife, Teresina, Belem and Fortaleza (in the north-east); and Manaus (on the river Amazon).

Among the Pope's engagements were a meeting with President Figueiredo in Brasilia, the consecration of the Basilica of Our Lady of Aparecida, Brazil's patron saint, and the opening of the Brazilian Eucharistic Congress in Fortaleza. He also attended in Rio de Janeiro the 25th anniversary meeting of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM), the Third General Conference of which he had opened in Puebla de los Angeles (Mexico) in January 1979 [see 29551 A].

Dealing in many of his speeches with the deep economic and social divisions within Brazilian society, Pope John Paul reaffirmed the Roman Catholic Church's commitment to seek non-violent social change, to uphold human rights against authoritarian regimes of the right or the left, and to denounce political and economic injustice. While endorsing the efforts of the more militant clergy in defence of trade unions, the urban poor, landless peasants and Indians, he warned that the liberation of the poor and oppressed must be in accordance with Christian, and not Marxist, concepts.

One of his most important speeches was to 150,000 workers in São Paulo, where the Church's support for a 41-day strike of metal workers in April-May 1980 had been strongly criticized by the Brazilian Government.

Calling for a just social order, the Pope declared: "The Church, when she proclaims the Gospel, also tries to ensure, without, however, abandoning her specific task of evangelization, that all aspects of social life, in which injustice is manifested, should undergo a change towards justice. The common good of society demands as its fundamental requirement that society should be just. The persistence of injustice, the lack of justice threatens the existence of society from within, just as it can be threatened from outside by everything that attacks its sovereignty or tries to impose on it ideologies and models, any form of economic and political blackmail, or any attack by force of arms. This threat from within exists in actual fact when, in the sphere of the distribution of goods reliance is laid solely on the economic laws of growth and greater profit; when the results of progress touch only marginally, or do not touch at all, the vast social layers of the population. It exists also when there persists a deep gap between a very strong minority of rich people on the one hand and the majority of those who live in poverty and want on the other hand.

"The common good of society, which will always be the new name of justice, cannot be achieved by means of violence, because violence destroys what it intends to create, both when it tries to maintain the privileges of some and when it tries to impose the necessary transformations. The changes required by a just social order must be carried out by means of a constant action—often gradual and progressive, but always efficacious—along the way of peaceful reforms. This is the duty of everyone. This is especially the duty of those who wield power in society, whether it is a question of economic or of political power. All power finds its justification solely in the common good, in the realization of a just social order. Consequently, power must never be used to protect the interests of one group to the detriment of the others. The class struggle, in its turn, is not the way that leads to social order, because it brings with it the risk of reversing the conditions of the contenders, creating new situations of injustice. Nothing is constructed on a foundation of lack of love, far less on one of hatred which aims at destroying others.

"To reject the class struggle is also to opt resolutely for a noble struggle in favour of social justice. The various centres of power and the various representatives of society must be capable of uniting, co-ordinating their own efforts and arriving at an agreement on clear and effective programmes. This is what the Christian formula for creating a just society consists of. The whole of society must be in solidarity with all men and, in the first place, with the man who needs help most, the poor man. The option for the poor is a Christian option; it is also the option of the society that is concerned about the true common good."

In a farewell speech on July 11 before departing for Rome, the Pope described Brazil as a "promising and pulsating" country and expressed the wish that its doors might "remain wide open to Christ".—(L'Osservatore Romano - Le Monde - Times - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. Pope John Paul's visit to Turkey 30136 A*)

A. NETHERLANDS — Partial Elections to First Chamber

Elections were held on July 1, 1980 for the renewal of 38 of the 75 seats in the First Chamber (Upper House of the States-General), of which 21 seats were for the provinces of North Brabant, Zeeland, Utrecht, and Limburg, and 17 for the provinces of North Holland and Friesland. (Members of the First Chamber are elected by members of the appropriate provincial councils for a term of six years, half of the 75 seats being due for re-election every three years.)

The resulting composition of the First Chamber was as follows, with the party strengths prior to the election also given for comparison (PvdA—Labour Party; CDA—Christian Democratic Appeal; VVD—Party of Freedom and Democracy; D-66—Democrats 66; PPR—Radical Political Party; CPN—Communist Party; SGP—State Reform Party; GPV—Reformed Political Association; PSP—Pacifist Socialist Party):

	Post-election	Pre-election
PvdA	26	25
CDA	27	24
VVD	13	15
D-66	2	0
PPR	3	5
CPN	1	2
SGP	1	1
GPV	1	1
PSP	1	1
Independent*.	0	1

* Mr B. W. Maris, formerly of the Farmers' Party (BP), who did not stand for re-election.

The CDA and VVD, which had formed the Government under Dr Andreas van Agt since December 1977 [see 28837 A], thus retained their combined overall majority in the Upper House.—(Keesings Historisch Archief, Amsterdam) (*Prev. rep. 1977 Partial Elections to First Chamber 28574 A*)

A. IRAN - UNITED STATES — Developments in Hostage Crisis between February and July 1980 - Unsuccessful US Attempt to Rescue Hostages in Military Operation - Death of Former Shah of Iran

Efforts to secure the release of the American hostages held in Tehran since Nov. 4, 1979 [see page 30150; 30205 A], proved unsuccessful in the first half of 1980, in the course of which negotiations on the terms of their release continued to be complicated by a power struggle between rival factions in the Iranian leadership. (During this period it was established that there were 53 US hostages in Iran, of whom 50 were then being held in the US embassy in Tehran by militant students and three in the Iranian Foreign Ministry.)

The more moderate politicians, principally President Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr and the Foreign Minister, Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, while agreeing that the question of the hostages could not be separated from US involvement in Iran, favoured an end to the crisis through a US apology for past involvement and an undertaking by the United States that it would refrain from future interference.

The hardliners, principally members of the Islamic Republican Party, led by Ayatollah Mohammed Hossein Beheshti, supported the militant students in their demands for the return of the former Shah and the Pahlevi family's wealth as well as a US apology for its past "crimes" in Iran, and also advocated that the hostages be put on trial for spying. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of Iran, who on some occasions expressed support for the militants and on others for President Bani-Sadr, declared on Feb. 28 that the fate of the hostages would be decided by the new Iranian *Majlis* (Parliament) which held its first session on May 28 and which was dominated by the Islamic Republican Party.

Although the United States refused to meet the conditions demanded, hopes were raised in early 1980 that the hostages would at least be transferred to the control of the ruling Revolutionary Council (headed since early February by President Bani-Sadr—see page 30214) rather than of the militant students; when these hopes proved unlikely to be fulfilled, however, the United States on April 7 broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and imposed additional sanctions. President Carter urged other Western countries to support these measures but, despite an announcement on April 22 by members of the European Community that they would impose sanctions in two stages, the United States on April 24 launched an unsuccessful military operation to free the hostages.

In early July one of the hostages was released for health reasons, but the death of the former Shah at the end of that month failed to have any immediate impact on the impasse over the hostage issue.

These and other developments are described below.

Developments prior to Rescue Attempt

Formation of UN Commission of Inquiry - Failure of Mission in Iran

After lengthy consultations with the parties involved, a United Nations commission of inquiry was approved by the United States on Feb. 17 and by Iran on Feb. 19 and arrived in Tehran on Feb. 23 to begin investigations into the grievances of the Iranian people against the former Shah with a view to resolving the US-Iranian crisis. The commission (which remained in Iran until March 11) was composed of the following five international jurists: Mr Harry W. Jayawardene (63), a lawyer from Sri Lanka (and brother of the Sri Lankan President, Mr Junius R. Jayawardene); M. Louis Edmond Pettiti (64), a French judge of the European Court of Human Rights; Sr Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley (55), who had latterly served as Venezuela's permanent representative at the United Nations (and formerly as ambassador to the United States in 1972-74); Mr Adib Daoudy (57), a career diplomat from Syria and political adviser to President Assad; and Mr Mohammed Bedjaoui (51), Algerian permanent representative at the United Nations. Sr Aguilar Mawdsley and Mr Bedjaoui were appointed co-chairmen of the commission.

The sending of such a commission to Iran had been proposed by the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, shortly after the seizing of the US hostages in November 1979, and discussions on the formation of such a delegation had been held on a number of occasions since then. On Feb. 13 President Carter finally expressed his backing for the UN proposal saying that the United States would "support steps by the United Nations that would lead to the release of the hostages if the steps are consistent with our goals and our essential international principles". On Feb. 17 Dr Waldheim had completed the formation of the commission which, after receiving approval from both Iran and the United States, flew to Geneva on Feb. 20. Its departure for Tehran was, however, delayed until Feb. 23 as Iranian officials had requested more time to prepare the "working conditions" of the UN team.

After preliminary meetings with President Bani-Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh, both of whom promised their co-operation, the commission began its work on Feb. 24.

On Feb. 25-26 the UN team heard evidence from Iranian jurists and some 150 disabled people who claimed that they had been the victims of torture and cruelty during the Shah's reign. The members of the commission, who said that they had been "really moved" by their meetings with these witnesses, subsequently issued a statement in which they described the witnesses as "victims of violations of human rights under the Shah's regime" and, referring to the invalids who had gathered in Tehran to present their cases to the commission, said that they had examined "in dramatically live terms the plight of those involved".

On Feb. 26 the commission also held talks with Mr Ali Reza Nowbari, governor of the Bank Markazi Iran (the central bank), who had been investigating the wealth of the former royal family and who told reporters after he had given evidence to the UN team that he had documents "showing that the total amount of money plundered by the former imperial family was 500 billion rials" (equivalent to $7,140 million), and that he had submitted to the commission a file on "plundered national property".

While the UN panel had been considering the cases against the former Shah, the militants outside the US embassy in Tehran showed reporters documents which, they alleged, provided evidence that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had attempted to spy on the oil industry in Iran and had assisted in the escape from Iran of a former agent of Savak (the national intelligence and security agency disbanded in 1979—see page 29743).

On Feb. 27 the commission met representatives of the Iranian Foreign Ministry but were later that day mobbed by some 2,000 angry demonstrators who attacked their cars and shouted "death to the Shah" after they had been taken to visit the Behesht Zahra cemetery where many of those killed during the revolution had been buried. The following day, however, the commission was able to continue its investigations and visited the Shah's former palace in northern Tehran and also a prison in the capital which had been run by Savak. In addition, they met with a gathering of some 1,500 Iranians, the majority of whom had been injured in violent demonstrations and clashes with security forces before the Shah had been forced to leave the country in January 1979 [see page 29741].

Despite successfully beginning its inquiries in Iran, the UN commission cut short its visit on March 11 and refused to publish the report of its findings. The failure of the mission was attributed to the different interpretations of its mandate by the United States, Iran and the United Nations with regard to its link with the release of the hostages, in which connexion Ayatollah Khomeini had issued a statement on Feb. 23 (when the mission arrived in Tehran) reiterating his full support for the militants at the US embassy and had moreover declared that the new Iranian *Majlis*, not due to be elected until April, would have the responsibility of deciding the fate of the hostages. (Ayatollah Khomeini had issued his statement from a Tehran hospital, where for four weeks he had been receiving treatment for a heart ailment. He was released from hospital on March 2.)

Iranian authorities insisted that the commission's task was to reveal (i) "acts of torture and murder" and the embezzlement of funds perpetrated by the former Shah's regime and (ii) US "manipulation" of Iran's internal affairs. This stance was supported also by President Bani-Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh, although they indicated that the commission would be able to meet the hostages.

The United States, on the other hand, saw a direct link between the work of the commission and the release of the captives. Mr Hodding Carter, the State Department spokesman, said at a news conference on Feb. 23 that the purpose of the UN commission was twofold: not only to hear Iran's grievances but also to bring about an early end to the crisis, which "of course requires the release of the hostages". In further statements on Feb. 25, US officials said that they would never have agreed to the despatch of the mission without "the clearest of expectations" that the hostages would be freed within the period of the commission's work, stressing that an "understanding" to this effect had been reached in the first part of February.

Dr Waldheim stated on Feb. 20 that the commission (which had been set up that day—see above) was to "hear Iran's grievances and allow for an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States". On the same day Mr Bedjaoui, a co-chairman of the commission, said that while there was no "direct linkage" between the investigations and the release of the hostages there was nevertheless a "gentleman's agreement" to this effect. According to this agreement the UN mission was threefold, namely (i) to investigate the grievances both of Iran and the United States; (ii) to find a means to "re-establish" relations between Tehran and Washington; and (iii) to talk to each of the hostages.

The breakdown of the commission's work in Iran was, however, ultimately due to disagreements between rival factions in Iran as to whether the commission should be allowed to visit the hostages, as had been demanded by both the United States and the United Nations.

On Feb. 28 the commission pressed the Revolutionary Council to permit a meeting with the hostages, insisting that this was an inseparable part of their mission. Mr Qotbzadeh agreed to such a visit, but other members of the Council and the militants holding the hostages put conditions on such a meeting.

A spokesman for the Revolutionary Council said on Feb. 28 that the commission would only be permitted to see the hostages if the latter testified "on the crimes of the United States". The militant students said on March 4 that the UN panel could meet only a few of the hostages and then only to question them about "US crimes in Iran"; moreover, in a broadcast later that day on Tehran radio, they said that on no account could the United States be seen to have achieved a "victory", adding that if the UN commission made a satisfactory report and if the world "accepted the desires of the Iranian people", then the commission could return to Iran to talk to the hostages.

In view of this situation the UN commission prepared to leave Iran on March 6, but at a final meeting with Mr Qotbzadeh en route to the airport that day they were persuaded to stay, Mr Qotbzadeh assuring them that the Revolutionary Council needed time to arrange a meeting between them and the hostages.

Also on March 6, in an unexpected reversal in their attitude, the militant students at the US embassy said that the Revolutionary Council had pressurized them into agreeing to turn their captives over to the Council.

In a broadcast that day the students said that "we recognize that our responsibility for the hostages is finished . . . and we believe that the Iranian nation guards the revolutionary line of the Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] and will respond to any deviation from this line". A spokesman for the students added that they had been pressurized into allowing a "humanitarian visit" and that, while they were opposed to such a meeting taking place, they were nevertheless prepared to hand over responsibility to the Revolutionary Council. The militants at the same time dismissed reports that the Council had threatened to resign if they maintained their intransigent attitude.

However, frequent exchanges between the militants and the Revolutionary Council in the following few days failed to bring about the transfer of the hostages, the situation being exacerbated by differences between the moderate and hardline factions of the Revolutionary Council. On March 10 the students moreover announced that they had abandoned any plans for the transfer of the hostages because of a statement made earlier that day by Ayatollah Khomeini setting out the conditions for a visit to the hostages by the UN commission.

On March 7 the militant students had said that they would not transfer the hostages unless they were given radio and television time to announce the schedule for the transfer. Mr Qotbzadeh said that these new demands had been based on the militants' belief that their supporters would then rally outside the US embassy when the transfer was due to take place and would thus prevent the handover of the hostages.

While the militants were making their new conditions known, Mr Qotbzadeh on March 7 said that he had been made the representative of the Revolutionary Council and would take custody of the hostages and the embassy compound the following day, shortly after which the UN team would be permitted to see the US captives. He added that he had the support of Ayatollah Khomeini.

On March 8, however, the Ayatollah claimed that he had not sanctioned the transfer of the hostages, reiterated his earlier decision that the new Parliament should decide the outcome of the hostage issue and stated that he would otherwise remain "silent" on the matter.

A series of acrimonious exchanges ensued between the militants and Mr Qotbzadeh, who said after a meeting with the Council on March 9 that the militants had 24 hours to decide one way or the other, either to allow the visit by the commission or to hand over the hostages, as otherwise the Revolutionary Council would take control of the hostages. On March 10, however, Mr Qotbzadeh (after a meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini) was forced to announce that it was no longer "appropriate" to take custody of the hostages, but indicated at the same time that he was still prepared to receive them and urged the UN commission to stay in Iran for a few more days so that a meeting could be arranged.

Against this background President Carter had told journalists in the United States on March 9 that he was willing to make some expression of concern over the developments which had marked US-Iranian relations as part of an agreement to free the hostages, but reiterated his earlier refusals to apologize for the role which the United States had played in Iran.

On March 11 the UN commission left Iran for what Dr Waldheim described as a "suspension" of its activities there. Dr Waldheim added that "there will be no report, either written or published, before the whole problem, in all its aspects, has been resolved" and indicated that the commission would shortly return to Iran to resume its work; at the same time he said that he was "encouraged" because the Iranian Government and the US Administration had told him that they wished to continue the negotiations.

The United States supported the decision of the commission to leave Iran but expressed considerable concern at its failure. Mr Hodding Carter stated on March 11 that the situation thus created was "very serious" but at the same time added that "peaceful means to resolve the crisis have not yet been exhausted". Later that day a statement was issued from the White House sharply criticizing Iran's failure to arrange a meeting between the commission and the hostages.

President Bani-Sadr said in an interview with the French daily *Le Monde* on March 11 that he regretted that the commission had not been able to complete its work and also accused the Revolutionary Council of "weakness" and "indecision", complaining that it had contributed to the crisis.

In the course of the UN commission's visit to Tehran the Revolutionary Council on Feb. 26 authorized the entry of certain US journalists into Iran (US journalists having on Jan. 14 been asked to leave the country within three days because of spreading "malicious news" and "biased reporting"). Announcing this decision Dr Hassan Ebrahim Habibi, spokesman for the Council, made no mention of Americans but said that "those journalists whose impartiality is approved by the diplomatic representatives of Iran abroad can return to the country". Asked if this applied to American journalists Dr Habibi replied that "if they have the capabilities, then obviously yes". This decision was believed to have been in response to an appeal by the UN officials accompanying the commission for reporters accredited to the United Nations, including Americans, to be allowed into Iran at least while the panel was there. Between 30 and 40 journalists had been barred from entering Iran with the commission on Feb. 23 because Americans were among them.

Prior to the arrival of the UN commission in Iran hopes for an improvement in the hostage crisis had been raised in view of a number of conciliatory remarks made in this respect by President Bani-Sadr who stated in particular that the release of the hostages was not solely conditional upon the return of the former Shah to Iran.

President Bani-Sadr had first made his comments in an interview with *Le Monde* published on Feb. 11 in which he named three conditions for the release of the hostages as being (i) that the United States admit its "crimes" in Iran during the Shah's reign; (ii) that it promise never again to interfere in Iranian affairs; and (iii) that it recognize Iran's right to the return of the Shah and his personal fortune. (These conditions were said to have been approved by Ayatollah Khomeini.)

Moreover, President Bani-Sadr had latterly made a number of attacks on the militant students holding the hostages, accusing them inter alia of being "lawless" and "anti-Islamic", of "forming a government within a government" and of creating chaos in Iran by their criticism of certain officials.

On Feb. 20, however, Ayatollah Khomeini, in contradiction to President Bani-Sadr's remarks, expressed his full support for the militants and called on his people to continue their fight for the extradition of the Shah (currently in Panama) "until you achieve victory", while on Feb. 27 Ayatollah Beheshti, secretary of the Revolutionary Council and leader of the Islamic Republican Party, said that the decision on the Americans held in Tehran was not up to President Bani-Sadr, whose moderate views he described as "his personal and private idea".

Hearings by International Court of Justice on US Appeal for Release of Hostages

The International Court of Justice at The Hague on March 18-20 held hearings on the US appeal for the release of the hostages; Iran declined to be represented. The hearings had been postponed from Feb. 18 [see page 30209] because of the planned visit to Iran by the UN commission. [For the delivery of the Court's judgment on May 24, see page 30535 below.]

The Court had previously met to discuss the hostage affair in December 1979 when it had called for the immediate release of the captives and for full protection and immunities for all US diplomatic and consular staff under treaties in force between the United States and Iran. At the same time the Court had called on the countries to resist taking any action which might cause a further deterioration in bilateral relations. In January 1980 the United States had again applied to the Court for the release of the hostages and also for payment of damages by Iran [see page 30209].

On March 18-20 the Court heard statements from Mr Roberts B. Owen, a State Department legal adviser, who alleged that Iran had committed "literally hundreds of different offences" against the United States which he summarized into five main categories as follows: "(i) the seizure and continuing detention of the hostages; (ii) the harsh and inhumane treatment imposed upon them; (iii) the totally unlawful interrogation to which they have been subjected; (iv) the seizure and continued holding of the diplomatic and consular facilities of the United States in Iran, including the ransacking and defilement of the archives and documents; and (v) the failure on the part of the Government of Iran to prosecute those who had in fact been carrying out that Government's orders". He added that, while Iran had indicated its various grievances against his country, "none of those grievances has been presented to this Court, and none can be treated as having any relevance whatever in these proceedings".

In concluding his testimony on March 20 Mr Owen urged the Court to "press forward" its judgment as quickly as possible, since the US Government "continues to view this Court as the most promising hope for bringing about the ultimate release of the hostages through a binding and enforceable judgment".

On the subject of the treatment of the hostages Mr Owen, basing his evidence largely on the details supplied by the 13 US hostages released on the orders of Ayatollah Khomeini on Nov. 13 [see page 30205], said on March 19 that the hostages were frequently blindfolded, were prevented from talking to one another, and had their hands bound at night. He added that the windows of the rooms where the hostages were held were boarded up while lights were kept burning all the time; that the female hostages were tied to straight chairs facing a wall and kept in that position for up to 16 hours a day; that some of the captives were forced to sleep on bare floors and that changes of clothing and baths were permitted only rarely. Mr Owen also said that the hostages were repeatedly threatened with guns and other weapons and that some had been pararaded before jeering crowds. (For statements on the condition of the hostages by Mr Richard Queen, who was released on July 10, see page 30537 below.)

Mr Owen reminded the Court that Iran had allowed no contact between the hostages and their Government and pointed out that the UN commission had also so far been denied access to them. He further said that, despite requests from the US Government, Iran had never produced evidence to substantiate its allegations of US "conspiracies" or "subversive actions against the new Iranian Government", and that moreover "none of the generalized suggestions made by the Iranian officials related to any of the diplomatic or consular staff in Iran". Iran had, he continued, never indicated any intention of declaring any of the US staff persona non grata.

On March 20 Mr Owen requested that the Court rule against the detention of the hostages and declared that "since the dispute before the Court continues to imperil international peace, I submit that the high responsibilities imposed upon the Court by the United Nations Charter call for the entry of the final judgment requested in this case as rapidly as possible". Mr Owen pointed out that in view of the failure of the UN commission's visit the situation had changed greatly since the United States had asked for a delay in the proceedings, and that "the signals now coming out of Iran suggest that the detention of the hostages may continue indefinitely, and no one in this courtroom has any way of knowing whether the Ayatollah Khomeini will continue to hold the hostages in captivity for a month or for a year or for a decade". He added that "in making this request, the primary focus of my Government's interest is upon the well-being of the hostages" but stressed that it was also motivated by the fact that Iran's continued detention of the hostages "to coerce desired political action . . . can only lead to a complete unravelling of the fabric of international relations", and had furthermore contributed to increased tension in the world.

Earlier, on March 19, Mr Owen's deputy, Mr Stephen Schwebel, said that the United States wanted the Court to condemn Iran for violating international law and to order it to pay reparations even if the hostages were home before the Court rendered judgment. He also called for the militants to be prosecuted or extradited to the United States.

Departure of Former Shah from Panama - Granting of Permanent Exile in Egypt

The former Shah on March 23 left the Panamanian island of Contadora, where he had been staying since his departure from the United States on Dec. 15, 1979 [see page 30212]. On March 24 he arrived in Egypt, accepting a long-standing invitation from President Sadat who welcomed him at Cairo airport and offered him and his family a permanent home in Egypt. The Shah was taken directly from the airport to the Maadi military hospital in Cairo in preparation for an operation to remove his spleen.

President Sadat had earlier offered the Shah permanent exile during the latter's brief stay in Egypt after leaving Iran in January 1979 [see page 29741]. Following the subsequent breaking of diplomatic relations with Iran [see page 30148], the Egyptian Parliament, despite opposition from certain deputies, passed a resolution in July 1979 granting the Shah the right to seek political asylum in Egypt.

When the Shah returned to Egypt in 1980 eight deputies on March 29 registered their protest at the granting of permanent asylum to him, but a further vote cast by the Parliament confirmed its decision of the previous July. Opposition to the presence of the Shah in Egypt was also expressed in the form of demonstrations in the country, in particular in the upper Egyptian town of Asyut, where violent protest demonstrations broke out on March 28 and continued for several days causing numerous casualties among security forces and students, many of the latter being arrested.

The Shah's departure from Panama occurred some 24 hours before Iran was due to present the Panamanian Government with a formal request (foreshadowed in December 1979—see page 30212) for his extradition to stand trial in Iran, where he was accused of "complicity in embezzlement of public funds, in torture resulting in mutilation, in assassinations and in genocide". Notwithstanding the Shah's departure from Panama, a lawyer acting for the Iranian authorities on March 24 formally presented the extradition request to the Government of Panama in case the Shah ever returned to that country.

The Shah had not only been angered by the apparent willingness of the Panamanian authorities to allow Iran to use Panamanian courts in an effort to extradite him but also felt that he and his entourage were being overcharged for their stay on the island. Furthermore, the Shah was said to have disliked the isolation to which he had been subjected "for security reasons", although reports that he was under house arrest were not confirmed [see also page 30212]. The "final straw" however had been a dispute between Panamanian and US doctors over his medical treatment which was urgently needed in March to remove his spleen.

The Shah had been admitted to the Patailla Medical Centre in Panama City on March 14 suffering from an enlarged spleen, which was suspected of being cancerous, and from serious blood disorders. An operation was initially scheduled to take place on March 16 but was postponed due to the Shah's weak state. The Shah was being attended by Panamanian and US doctors, the latter headed by Dr Michael DeBakey who insisted that the splenectomy should be carried out by himself. Panamanian authorities on the other hand wished to retain control over the operation and initially refused Dr DeBakey a licence to operate in their country. In a subsequent television interview on April 3 Dr DeBakey stated that he had previously told Mr Hamilton Jordan, the White House chief of staff (who had travelled to Panama on March 21) that he thought performing the operation in Panama would be "risky" and that he did not have confidence in the Panamanian medical facilities available.

The Shah's move had been strongly opposed by US Administration officials, who were on March 23 reported to be privately "extremely disturbed", fearing (i) that Iran might suspect a US plot, (ii) that any chances for an early end to the hostages crisis would be dispelled, (iii) that President Carter's political prestige at home would suffer and (iv) that Egypt would be further isolated from the rest of the Arab and Moslem world.

After hearing that the Shah had contacted the Egyptian leadership in March, US officials sought to persuade him to stay in Panama. Mr

Jordan, accompanied by the White House counsel, Mr Lloyd Cutler, travelled to Panama on March 21 in an effort (i) to convince the Shah (through his representatives) that Panama would not allow his extradition as the national law prohibited extradition for political matters or to countries where the deportee faced the death penalty (Ayatollah Khomeini having in May 1979 sentenced him to death—see page 30149) and (ii) to settle the dispute between Panamanian and American doctors, with a view to persuading the Shah to remain in Panama for the necessary surgery.

Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's Assistant for National Security Affairs, stated on March 23 that the Shah could in fact have gone to the United States for medical assistance "which is something that we promised him earlier", but that he had decided that "he would be best served if he went to Egypt". (At the same time Dr Brzezinski stressed that the Shah was "merely trying to obtain medical treatment" and that there should be "no connexion whatever between the illegal detention of the captives and the physical well-being of the Shah". He added that he did not expect the latest development to complicate the hostage issue and later, on March 25, said that the United States no longer had any commitments to the Shah now that he had left Panama.)

In reaction to the Shah's move, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, a leading revolutionary judge, stated on March 24 that the United States had "engineered" his transfer and warned that some of the hostages would be tried and imprisoned and also that President Sadat would "have to pay for his dirty act".

On March 26 Ayatollah Beheshti said at a press conference in Tehran that most members of the Revolutionary Council wanted to put the hostages on trial if the former Shah and his wealth were not returned to Iran; he added that Iran should break off diplomatic relations with the United States in retaliation for what he described as "Washington's lack of respect for Iran's independence". Earlier, on March 24, clerical groups in Iran called for nationwide protest demonstrations in response to which several thousand people gathered in front of the US embassy in Tehran the following day to denounce the former Shah, President Carter and also President Sadat, calling on the Egyptian people to "rise and overthrow their leader".

In particular the Shah's transfer ended the efforts then being made by moderate politicians headed by Mr Qotbzadeh and President Bani-Sadr, who had been working through a team of French-based lawyers to persuade Panama to agree to some form of extradition proceedings with a view to creating a situation in which the hostages could be released. Even after the Shah had left Panama on March 23 Mr Qotbzadeh, in a final attempt to prevent his arrival in Egypt, said that if he was detained en route to Cairo and returned to Panama to take part in an extradition trial then the hostages would be handed over to the Revolutionary Council "within 24 hours". When this move proved unsuccessful Mr Qotbzadeh on March 25 warned that it would now be "extremely difficult" for the Iranian Government to find ways of freeing the hostages and disclosed at the same time that he had made a number of previous efforts to induce Panama to hold the Shah.

Earlier, on March 22, Mr Qotbzadeh had accused the former US Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, and Mr David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, of being behind a plan to take the Shah out of Panama in order to foil extradition attempts. Dr Kissinger and Mr Rockefeller, who denied these latest accusations, had been frequent targets of condemnation in Iran as they had helped the Shah during his months of exile and had been influential in the decision by the US Administration to permit the Shah to enter the United States for medical treatment in October 1979 [see pages 30149-50; 30212-13].

On March 28 the Shah underwent surgery to remove his enlarged spleen, the operation being performed by Dr DeBakey and a team of US and Egyptian surgeons and specialists. A medical bulletin issued on March 31 said that while the Shah was making a good recovery from the surgery, samples of tissue taken during the operation had shown that lymphatic growth had spread to both his spleen and liver. The Shah was discharged from hospital on April 9 following which chemotherapy treatment was to be used to prevent the advance of his cancer.

Opposition to the Shah's stay in Egypt had diminished considerably by this time, the government-controlled press continually encouraging tolerance of the former Iranian monarch by reminding Egyptians of the aid which he had sent Egypt during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

US Threat to impose Further Sanctions against Iran

Coincidentally with an announcement by the Revolutionary Council on March 27 that the second round of the elections to the *Majlis* had been postponed (the first round having previously been postponed to March 14—see page 30214)—thereby causing a further delay in the new Parliament's decision on the fate of the hostages—the United States was reported to have decided that it would impose a series of new economic and political measures against Iran on March 31 if by that date the Iranian Government had not transferred the hostages from the control of the militant students. This decision had been taken at a meeting of the US National Security Council on March 22, although the implementation of new measures had long been contemplated.

On April 1, however, following a speech some three hours earlier by President Bani-Sadr at a rally to mark the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Iranian Republic [see page 30143], and on the same day as the US primary elections in Wisconsin and Kansas [see 30408 A], President Carter announced that he had deferred his plans to impose more sanctions as "the President of Iran had announced that the hostages' control would be transferred to the Government of Iran, which we would consider to be a positive step" and that "in the light of that action, we do not consider it appropriate now to impose sanctions".

In his announcement, however, President Carter had ignored both a hostile speech made earlier in the day by Ayatollah Khomeini and also, and more importantly, a section in President Bani-Sadr's speech which stipulated that the hostages would only be handed over to the custody of the Iranian Government if the US authorities made an official statement that "they will not make any propaganda or say any words or make any provocative acts about the hostages until the formation of the *Majlis* and the decision made by the *Majlis* [on the hostage issue]".

Later on April 1 President Bani-Sadr said that the US decision to defer sanctions was not enough to secure the transfer of the hostages and called for a more forthright declaration. In response to this, President Carter's press secretary, Mr Jody Powell, was authorized to say on April 2 that the US Government promised to show restraint towards Iran "in our words and actions" as long as "progress" was being made towards resolving the crisis. (At the same time Mr Powell said that the USA was "trying to determine what the position of the Iranian leader is" and that there were "conflicting signals on the public record".) Following this US statement President Bani-Sadr said that he had received a message from Mr Carter which complied with the Iranian conditions.

The following day the Iranian President sought the approval of the Revolutionary Council for the transfer but the Council, in the course of an acrimonious debate on the subject, decided that they needed further clarification of President Carter's position. Mr Powell stated after the April 3 meeting, however, that his President's position was already clear and that he would not make any more "clarifying statements".

Numerous exchanges, both public and private, between the two countries failed to resolve the situation and on April 7, following a meeting of the Revolutionary Council the previous day to seek the position of Ayatollah Khomeini, the latter announced that the hostages would not be transferred (although he did not rule out the possibility of supervised visits being made to check on their "health and welfare"). Confirming this decision later on April 7 Dr Habibi, spokesman for the Council, said: "We did not make a decision because the Imam's decision is decisive, explicit and clear. It is not appropriate for the hostages to be transferred."

Diplomatic moves at this time had been complicated by confusion which had arisen over two letters allegedly sent by President Carter to Iranian leaders, the first of which was purported to contain conciliatory statements including an admission that the United States had made mistakes in the past with regard to its policy towards Iran, while the second was said to have been an ultimatum to Iran to transfer the hostages by March 31.

After immediately denying the existence of any conciliatory messages, the US Government later, on March 31, conceded that two notes had been sent to Iran via the Swiss Government, but stressed that both had been tersely worded warnings that further action would be taken against Iran if the hostages were not transferred to the custody of the Revolutionary Council.

The full text of what was presented as being the controversial "conciliatory" letter (reportedly dated March 26) was broadcast on Iranian radio on March 29, and included the following statements allegedly made by President Carter: "I would like to emphasize that my Government has inherited a very sensitive international situation which is the result of policy and other conditions, which made us all make mistakes in the past. The great advantage of American democracy is that it always could recognize its mistakes or condemn them". President Carter was said to have stated that the seizing of the US embassy in Tehran by the militants had caused considerable problems "for your Government and ours", adding that "I can well realize . . . that the occupation of our embassy in Tehran could have been considered a reasonable reaction by the youth of Iran, but as time goes on I have serious reasons for doubting the real motives of those who have occupied our embassy".

Mr Jody Powell on March 29 said that no such message had been sent by President Carter, or any other administrative official, to Ayatollah Khomeini or any other Iranian leader.

Notwithstanding this denial Mr Qotbzadeh on March 30 said that the letter was undoubtedly authentic and revealed that it had been an oral, rather than written, message delivered to himself and President Bani-Sadr which was translated into Farsi and handed to Ayatollah Khomeini on March 28. Mr Qotbzadeh described the message as "very constructive and balanced" and a "move forward". While acknowledging that Iran might have been unwise to publicize the letter, he regretted that its existence had been denied by the United States, as this had reduced its "psychological effect and acceptability" with the Iranian public, but stressed at the same time that something positive could still develop if the United States admitted to sending the letter.

On March 30, moreover, President Bani-Sadr said that he had that day received a separate letter from President Carter, this being confirmed by the Swiss Government, which said on March 30 that Swiss representatives in Tehran had recently delivered two letters from President Carter to President Bani-Sadr, although the contents of these messages were not known to them.

Following the US acknowledgement on March 31 that it had sent two non-conciliatory messages to Iran it was reported in *The Times* of April 1 that the US denial of the messages covered "only the general thrust of the messages and their authorship" and that the messages were signed by administration officials and not by President Carter.

Also on April 1 President Carter said: "No one in the Government of the United States has apologized to anyone in Iran and the reason is that we have nothing to apologize about. Nor have we condoned or expressed understanding or approval of the seizure of the hostages, nor will we ever condone the seizing of our people in Iran."

Breaking of Diplomatic Relations by United States - Imposition of Other Sanctions against Iran

In view of Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal on April 7 to give his approval to the transfer of the hostages, President Carter that day announced further punitive measures against Iran which involved (i) the breaking of diplomatic relations, the expulsion of all diplomats and the closing of diplomatic and consular offices; (ii) the prohibition of all exports to Iran, except for food and medicine; (iii) the drawing up of an inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government frozen since the previous November with a view to their possible confiscation; and (iv) the invalidation of all visas issued to Iranians for future entry into the United States.

President Carter made the decision to apply these new measures against Iran at a meeting with his senior advisers earlier on April 7, which followed an agreement reached at the March 22 meeting of the National Security Council [see page 30528 above] to impose additional sanctions if the Iranian Government had not taken custody of the hostages by March 31.

President Carter described the latest moves as marking the onset of a "tougher phase" which could involve "increasingly heavy costs" for Iran if the hostages were not released promptly. However, while these measures were said to be more severe than those the United States had initially envisaged imposing on March 31, it was generally acknowledged that they would have little impact on the current impasse over the hostage issue.

Trade between the two countries had been severely disrupted shortly after the seizure of the US embassy, when President Carter had barred the importation of Iranian oil and had frozen the Iranian Government's assets in US banks [see pages 30206-07]. There had been no normal diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States since the onset of the crisis (when all US diplomats in Tehran had been seized), most negotiations being carried out through third countries such as Switzerland, while Mr Hamilton Jordan had also held a series of discussions with French-based lawyers representing the Iranian Government. Iranian diplomats at the United Nations in New York were not affected by the new measures, while already in December 1979 Iranian embassy and consular representation in the United States had been severely curtailed [see page 30209].

It was reported at this time that many US Administration officials were concerned that the sanctions would have negative effects on the situation and would in particular (i) undermine moderate politicians such as President Bani-Sadr; (ii) lead to reprisals being taken against the hostages; and (iii) seriously harm the Iranian economy and cause the "disintegration" of the country. It was also feared that the US allies would not support the sanctions.

It was subsequently reported that Switzerland would henceforth represent the United States in Iran, while Algeria would take care of Iranian interests in the United States.

Official reaction in Iran to the latest US measures was one of jubilation and triumph, Iranian leaders dismissing the idea that the economic sanctions would have an adverse effect on Iran and indicating their readiness to turn to East European countries for trade.

(On April 8 the US measures were attacked by the Soviet Union which, in a statement by the official news agency Tass, said that the moves were "guided by undisguised imperialist interests and not by concern for the personnel of the American embassy". The Tass statement added that the United States had failed to comply with Iranian wishes despite Iranian offers to "solve this question" and contended that the US Government was "obviously in search of a pretext for heightening tension in the region of the Near and Middle East".)

As the deadlock over the hostage issue continued, President Carter on April 13 and April 17 announced further measures against Iran, including a ban on visits to Iran by American citizens.

In an announcement on April 13 the United States said that all Iranians would be forced to leave the country when their travel documents expired unless there were "compelling humanitarian reasons" for them to remain. This measure would not, however, affect some 67,000 Iranian students currently studying in the United States [for whom see page 30206].

Announcing further measures on April 17 President Carter said that henceforth (i) all financial dealings between US subjects and Iran would be banned (although US journalists in Iran and family remittances to the hostages would be exempt); (ii) the import of Iranian goods would be prohibited; (iii) all Americans, with the exception of journalists, would be banned from travelling to Iran and (iv) all US military equipment previously purchased by Iran and subsequently impounded would be made available to the US armed forces or sold to other countries. President Carter also envisaged requesting that legislation be passed to allow the seizure of frozen Iranian assets (amounting to over $8,000 million) in the United States to pay for private and government claims against Iran.

In announcing the decisions on April 17 President Carter warned that "if this additional set of sanctions that I have described . . . today and the concerted action of our allies is not successful then the only next step available that I can see would be some sort of military action, which is the prerogative and the right of the United States under these circumstances".

While not elaborating on this subject the President did however suggest that any military force might be aimed at interrupting trade, apparently through the blocking or mining of Iranian ports, as distinct from an invasion or any other sort of combat operation.

Later, on April 24, Mr Qotbzadeh warned that if the United States attempted to blockade Iranian harbours Iran might retaliate by blocking the rest of the Gulf, "even if the whole area goes to fire". He also suggested that if Iranian harbours were mined then Iran might ask other countries "who are able to", to demine them, and implied that the Soviet Union had been approached in this respect.

Notwithstanding the announcement on April 17 of a ban on travel by Americans to Iran, Mrs Barbara Timm, mother of Sgt. Kevin Hermening (20), the youngest American hostage held at the US embassy, arrived in Tehran on April 19 with her husband, Mr Kenneth Timm, after receiving visas from the Iranian embassy in Paris. The US Administration decided not to take action against Mr and Mrs Timm as they had arrived in Tehran before the regulations banning such visits had been printed.

On April 21 Mrs Timm was allowed to visit her son at the US embassy, apparently after the militants had received a letter from President Bani-Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh urging them to let the couple into the embassy compound.

After discussions with the militants, who also took them to visit the Behesht Zahra cemetery, Mrs Timm was allowed to see her son for some 45 minutes, although Mr Timm (Sgt. Hermening's stepfather), while being allowed into the compound, was not permitted into the room where the meeting took place under supervision of the militants. Mrs Timm and her son were not allowed to discuss politics.

Following her visit Mrs Timm said on April 21 that her son seemed in "excellent physical health" and emotionally unchanged, and that he spent his days with several other male hostages who occupied themselves by reading and playing cards. Mrs Timm said that she had been treated with "hospitality" by the militants and added that "these are people to care about and not to hate". Upon her arrival in Tehran Mrs Timm had said on April 19 that she and her husband wanted not only to visit their son but also to gain a better understanding of the Iranian people and had at the same time expressed some criticism for President Carter's stance, in particular with regard to his recent threats to take military action against Iran.

On April 21 President Carter, while expressing his sympathy for Mrs Timm's desire to see her son, urged other relatives not to visit Iran.

On April 22 several relatives of the hostages began a visit to West European capitals to urge allied action to help secure the release of the hostages.

Support for US Sanctions given by European Community Countries and Others

Throughout this period the United States increased its pressure on Western allies, in particular the nine members of the European Community, to take measures against Iran in line with the draft UN Security Council resolution of January 1980 which had called for harsh measures against Iran but which had been vetoed by the Soviet Union [see pages 30211-12]. In messages sent to Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and West European countries on April 8 President Carter asked US allies to consider banning all exports except food and medicine and to pass legislation needed to remove legal obstacles to such actions, and also urged them to withdraw their ambassadors from Iran and to consider the possibility of breaking diplomatic relations. The United States stressed at this time that Western support would make the US measures more meaningful and might make further retaliatory actions unnecessary.

Despite the US appeals for support, the Foreign Ministers of the European Community countries, meeting informally on April 10 in Lisbon (where they were attending a ministerial meeting of the Council of Europe—see below), declined to impose economic sanctions or to reduce their embassy staff, and instead issued a renewed condemnation of the Iranian Government for permitting the detention of the hostages and said that they would instruct their ambassadors in Tehran to make representations to President Bani-Sadr requesting the immediate release of the hostages, and to seek information and assurances from the Iranian authorities about the date and method of release.

Also in Lisbon on April 10, ministerial representatives of the 21-member Council of Europe (comprising the nine Community countries and 12 other West European states) similarly denounced the continued detention of the hostages and called on the Iranian authorities to take the necessary measures for their immediate release (although without endorsing the direct appeal to President Bani-Sadr).

In accordance with the April 10 decision the ambassadors of eight Community countries (Luxembourg having no regular diplomatic representation in Iran) subsequently met President Bani-Sadr to demand the release of the hostages. The President rejected their call and warned them against joining the US measures, but at the same time reiterated offers to let the hostages be visited by an international organization such as the Red Cross. The ambassadors then returned to their countries to report to their Governments.

On April 13 President Carter issued a further appeal for support in a press interview with British, French, West German and Italian journalists, in which he said that "we do need the full and aggressive support of our allies" and urged them to fulfil two basic proposals immediately, namely (i) to join the United States in banning all exports to Iran except food and medicine, and, if this move should fail to produce progress, (ii) to "join us in strong diplomatic moves against Iran, to show them that we all do stand together in this condemnation of terrorism, a threat to our country, to all of them, and particularly a threat to smaller nations who do not have the economic or military power to protect their interests". At the same time the Administration warned that if America's allies failed to collaborate or if they did and the hostages were still not released, then the United States might have to take additional steps including the use of force.

Earlier, after the announcement of the Community's Lisbon decision on April 10, President Carter had criticized those who "ask for protection but are wary of alliance", adding that they "ask for understanding, yet often decline to understand us in return", while on April 12 he had warned allied countries that "we don't have much time left" before new moves, including the possible use of force, would have to be taken, and urged them to join the US action by a specific date.

At a special European political co-operation meeting in Luxembourg on April 22, Community Foreign Ministers adopted a two-stage plan, initiated by Lord Carrington, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to take action against Iran.

Under the first part of this plan diplomatic sanctions and limited economic measures were to be taken immediately as follows: (i) there would be a reduction in the staffs of Community member countries' embassies in Tehran and in the number of accredited Iranian diplomats permitted in the corresponding European capitals; (ii) Iranians visiting Community member countries would be required to apply for visas; (iii) no new export or service contracts should be concluded; and (iv) there would be a formal ban on the sales to Iran of arms or defence-related equipment. If no "decisive progress" in the hostage crisis had been made by May 17 then these measures would be followed by full-scale trade and economic sanctions in line with the draft UN Security Council resolution of January.

May 17 had been chosen as the deadline date as it coincided with a further meeting of the Community Foreign Ministers, to be held in Naples, and was also shortly after the new Iranian Parliament was due to meet for the first time. The delay in imposing full sanctions was necessary to enable certain Community member countries to pass the required legislation and also to give the Iranian leadership time to reconsider its stance.

On April 23 the United States said that it "strongly welcomed" the action of the Community countries but expressed the hope that any legislation required by these countries to carry out the sanctions against Iran would be "promptly enacted". Unofficially, reaction to the Luxembourg decision was said to be less enthusiastic as the Community plan fell far short of President Carter's hopes.

The Community plan was described by some European officials as a "compromise" between Britain, which together with West Germany had been the strongest advocate of taking substantive measures against Iran, and France, which had initially indicated its firm opposition to US pressure on the Western Allies to take punitive action. The original British draft had included a call to end all oil purchases from Iran by Community member countries, but it was understood that the French Foreign Minister, M. Jean François-Poncet, had persuaded his colleagues to omit this passage, taking the view that Iran would in any case cut off supplies once the Community measures were announced (the Iranian Oil Minister, Mr Ali Akbar Moinfar, having on April 8 threatened to take such action). [In 1978 Community member countries imported 1,550,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Iran, totally 16.3 per cent of the Community's entire imports of crude oil, but in 1979 this amounted to only 656,000 bpd, or 6.9 per cent of total crude imports.]

In addition to France, Italy had also expressed considerable concern at the possible effects of sanctions, particularly in view of Italy's 1,750 workers in Iran. West Germany, however, had fully supported imposing sanctions and had even threatened to take unilateral action in the absence of a joint Community initiative.

On April 17 the European Parliament adopted a resolution proposed by the parties of the right and centre (but opposed by parties of the left) which inter alia urged the Governments of the Community member countries to contemplate the suspension of diplomatic relations with Iran if the hostages were not released; it rejected, however, a Socialist-sponsored resolution which proposed the sending of a Community delegation to Iran to help find a solution which would "respect international law and the sovereignty of Iran".

On April 23 the Japanese Government said that it would join the Community action, and on April 24 it was reported that Japan was urging the nation's largest trading companies to conclude no new export contracts with Iran.

Japan was expected to be seriously affected by imposing sanctions against Iran. In particular the Mitsui corporation had put up half of the capital for a $3,500 million petrochemical plant in the Bandar Khomeini area (in western Iran near the Gulf) [see page 30209], where construction work had already been interrupted by the revolution; Japan also depended on Iran for much of its oil supplies [ibid.]

(although these had been temporarily halted on April 21 because of Japan's refusal to pay Iran increased prices for its oil). On April 12 Mr Masayoshi Ohira, then the Japanese Prime Minister, had said, however, that while oil was vital to Japan, "friendship with America" was more important and it was stated that day that Japan was prepared to ask Mexico for 200,000 bpd if Iran did cut off supplies [for existing provisional supply agreement, see 30054 A].

Several other Western countries expressed their support for the US appeal for action against Iran.

In particular, the Canadian Government announced a series of measures on April 24. [In January Canada had helped six US diplomats escape from Iran, and all members of the staff of the Canadian embassy had been withdrawn from Tehran—see page 30205.] The Canadian measures, which were announced by the Minister of External Affairs, Mr Mark MacGuigan (who warned of further action if the hostages were not released by May 17), were as follows: (i) that one of the two Iranian diplomats in Canada was being asked to leave the country within 72 hours; (ii) that no further visas would be issued to Iranian students, except for a small number provisionally approved before the seizing of the US embassy in Tehran; (iii) that Canadian companies would be requested not to enter into new contracts with Iran until the hostages were released; (iv) that export permits for military equipment for Iran and export credits would continue to be refused; and (v) that all Canadian oil companies would be informed that they should not import Iranian oil (although they were currently not receiving any).

On April 21 the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Andrew Peacock, announced trade restrictions against Iran which, while not amounting to a full embargo, would make exporting to Iran difficult and unprofitable; under these restrictions companies trading with Iran would not be given export incentives, subsidies or tax concessions, while insurance cover for new exports would be limited. These measures did not, however, affect exports of foodstuffs (comprising the bulk of Australian exports to Iran—see also page 30147) or medical supplies. Earlier, on April 14, Mr Peacock had said that Australia had decided (i) to withdraw its trade commissioner from Tehran and (ii) not to appoint a new ambassador to Iran until after the hostages had been released. Mr Peacock added that, had there currently been a resident Australian ambassador in Iran, he would have been withdrawn.

On April 24 the Norwegian Government decided on a total trade boycott against Iran effective May 17 if no progress had been made towards the release of the hostages by that date, and also recalled its ambassador to Oslo for consultations although no break in diplomatic relations was envisaged.

Portugal was on April 17 reported to have agreed to ban all exports and imports and all financial dealings with Iran.

Against this background Iran on April 23 announced the conclusion of an oil supply contract with Romania and said that other trade agreements with East European countries would follow shortly. [For oil supply situation in Eastern Europe, see 29845 A.]

Visit to the Hostages at the US Embassy by International Red Cross Delegation

Two representatives of the International Red Cross were on April 14 permitted to visit the occupied US embassy in Tehran for some eight hours, in the course of which they were said to have seen all the hostages although they were not allowed to speak with them privately or to count them. In a statement issued on April 15 the Red Cross said that the hostages were in "relatively good condition".

President Carter on April 14 described the visit as "nothing but a palliative" and said that anything less than the hostages' release was "a mask for the central reality, which is that they are still being held prisoner".

The two Red Cross officials, Mr Harald Schmid de Gruneck, the society's permanent representative in Tehran, and Dr Bernard Liebeskind, a doctor from Geneva, said in their April 15 statement that the hostages were no longer tied up and were able to sleep on mattresses on the floor. The rooms in which they were kept were "generally tidy" and decorated with family photographs. None of the hostages was said to have shown signs of brainwashing. During the visit they were all understood to have written personal messages to relatives in the United States on the standard "family messages form" used by the Red Cross for prisoners.

Also on April 15 Dr Mansur Shamsa, head of the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Organization, who was among those who accompanied Mr de Gruneck and Dr Liebeskind during their talks with the hostages, said that all the hostages were in good health and that none had any "major psychological problem". He admitted, however, that between seven and eight of the hostages had been isolated and were kept in "individual rooms apart from the others".

Unsuccessful US Military Operation to Free Hostages

The United States on April 24 launched an airborne commando operation to rescue the 53 Americans held in Tehran. The mission was, however, abandoned in its early stages at a remote desert area near Tabas in eastern Iran following the failure of three of the eight Sikorsky RH-53D helicopters involved. As the commando force prepared to evacuate the area in complete darkness a helicopter collided with a Hercules C-130 transport aircraft, one of six which had met up with the helicopters at the desert base, killing eight men.

In protest at the launching of the military operation Mr Cyrus Vance on April 28 resigned from his position as US Secretary of State and was succeeded on April 29 by Senator Edmund Muskie [see 30538 A]. Mr Vance had written his letter of resignation on April 21, stating inter alia that he could not give the President his support on the proposed rescue attempt.

Statements by President Carter

News of the rescue attempt was given to the American public in the early hours of April 25 and was followed at 7 a.m. (Washington time) by a televised statement made by President Carter who accepted full responsibility for the operation which, he stressed, had been undertaken with the sole purpose of freeing the hostages and returning them to the United States, as negotiations had proved unsuccessful, and was not an act of aggression against Iran itself. In this connexion he urged Iran not to take reprisals against the American captives and said that he still held the Iranian Government responsible for their safety. President Carter also indicated that preparations for such a mission had been under way since the hostages had been seized the previous November and stated that efforts to secure their release would continue.

The full text of the President's statement was as follows:

"Late yesterday, I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was under way in Iran to position our rescue team for a later withdrawal of American hostages who have been held captive there since Nov. 4.

"Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission. As our team was withdrawing, after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided on the ground following a refuelling operation in a remote desert location in Iran.

"Other information about this rescue mission will be made available to the American people when it is appropriate to do so. There was no fighting. There was no combat. But to my deep regret eight of the crewmen of the two aircraft which collided were killed and several other Americans were hurt in the accident.

"Our people were immediately airlifted from Iran. Those who were injured have gotten medical treatment and all of them are expected to recover.

"No knowledge of this operation by any Iranian officials or authorities was evident to us until several hours after all Americans were withdrawn from Iran.

"Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be difficult and it was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that, if and when the rescue operation had been commenced, it had an excellent chance of success.

"They were all volunteers. They were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

"To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I want to express the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

"The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran. It was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.

"Planning for this rescue effort began shortly after our embassy was seized. But, for a number of reasons, I waited until now to put those rescue plans into effect. To be feasible, this complex operation had to be the product of intensive planning and intensive training and repeated rehearsal.

"However, a resolution of this crisis through negotiations and with voluntary action on the part of the Iranian officials was obviously then, has been and will be preferable.

"This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unravelling of authority in Iran, and the mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans.

"This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long-developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interest, and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued.

"It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own.

"In the aftermath of the attempt, we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early release of the American hostages who have been held so long.

"The United States remains determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible. As President, I know that our entire nation feels the deep gratitude I feel for the brave men who were prepared to rescue their fellow Americans from captivity. And, as President, I also know that the nation shares not only my disappointment that the rescue effort could not be mounted because of mechanical difficulties, but also my determination to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freedom.

"We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now.

"We will seek to continue, along with other nations, and with the officials of Iran, a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and through peaceful and diplomatic means.

"Thank you very much."

At a press conference on April 29 President Carter further justified his decision to launch a rescue mission and added that "there is a deeper failure than that of incomplete success, and that is the failure to attempt a worthy effort, a failure to try".

With regard to the timing of the attempt the President said that the onset of the Iranian summer would have meant higher temperatures, shorter nights and strong headwinds which would have seriously jeopardized the chances of a later rescue bid. He added that training and preparations had been "perfected to a point where those involved believed it stood a good chance of success".

It was subsequently disclosed that President Carter had decided on April 10 that such an operation would be necessary (on which day European Community member countries had decided to delay imposing sanctions against Iran—see above) and had the following day called a National Security Council meeting in the course of which it was agreed that diplomatic exchanges had failed and that the release of the hostages was unlikely before the US presidential election in November 1980. This meeting was attended by Vice-President Walter Mondale, by Adml. Stansfield Turner (the director of the CIA) by Dr Brzezinski and by Dr Harold Brown (the Defence Secretary). Mr Vance was absent, having not been recalled from a holiday weekend in Florida.

Dr Brzezinski and Dr Brown defended the rescue attempt in separate television interviews on April 27.

Dr Brzezinski said that "what the President ordered to be done was morally right and politically justified". Dr Brown said that the rescue attempt "represented the best course of action for getting the hostages out of Iran expeditiously" and was "also the course that raised the least risk of harming the Iranian people and the least risk of causing instability in this troubled region"; he also pointed out that the United States' allies had not been told in advance of the mission because "secrecy was vital".

The Rescue Plan

At the beginning of his April 27 news conference (which he shared with Gen. David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Dr Brown provided details of the first part of the rescue operation which, together with information given by other officials, gave the following outline of the events:

The operation was carried out by a special anti-terrorist unit, known as the "Blue Light Squad", which was formed in 1977 and based at a US Army base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. About 90 men from this unit were involved in the rescue attempt under the command of Col. Charles A. Beckwith, a Special Forces commander in the Vietnam war, while overall command was exercised by Maj.-Gen. James Vaught from an unspecified location in the Middle East. Among the squad were a number of Iranians who were opposed to the new regime and who had enlisted in the United States. Simulations of the rescue operation had been carried out in US desert areas.

On, or around, April 22 six Hercules aircraft—three of them carrying fuel for the helicopters and three transporting the commando force, weapons, jeeps and motor cycles—left the United States and flew to an Egyptian military base close to Cairo's civilian airport. (Although President Sadat did not confirm reports that Egypt had provided facilities for the raid he nevertheless on April 26 refused to deny them.) On April 24 the Hercules left Cairo, flying low over the Red Sea (while equipment on board the planes jammed the radar in Soviet installations in South Yemen and Ethiopia) and then refuelled in that area. The United States refused to identify the refuelling base although according to Israeli reports Oman and Bahrain were each involved in this stage of the operation; the Governments of both these countries however denied such allegations. (A report in *The Daily Telegraph* of May 5 said that Oman, Israel and also Turkey had been involved in addition to Egypt.) [For build-up of US forces in the Arabian Sea area, see 30378 A, where details are also given of the alignment of certain countries in the region.] After refuelling, the aircraft took off under cover of darkness and flew on to the first base in Iran, known as "Desert One" in the Dasht e Kavir desert between Tabas and Yazd (some 300 miles south-east of Tehran). The United States had gained experience of this area in 1978 when it had been involved in a relief operation there following a serious earthquake disaster [see page 29389].

In the meantime eight RH-53D US Navy helicopters had taken off under cover of darkness from the US aircraft carrier *Nimitz* in the Arabian Sea (for deployment of which see page 30235), some 500 miles from the rendezvous point at Desert One. Soon after entering Iranian airspace at least three helicopters were caught in a sandstorm leaving one without the use of its gyroscopes. This helicopter, which had been carrying the hydraulic repair equipment, then returned to the *Nimitz*. Another helicopter later suffered hydraulic failure and made a forced landing in the desert but the crew were picked up safely by one of the remaining six craft and were taken to the first base stop where they met up with the Hercules shortly after midnight local time. Upon refuelling at Desert One another helicopter was found to have hydraulic failure in the control system which could not be repaired, leaving only five helicopters operational. As six had been stipulated as providing the minimum safety margin, it was decided to abandon the operation, this order being given by President Carter himself around 2.30 a.m. local Iranian time. (It was subsequently disclosed that the helicopters used in the rescue mission, although of the same make, had not been those actually used in practice in the United States and, more importantly, that they had, on the day before their mission commenced, been accidentally drenched with salt water and chemicals on board the *Nimitz* when fire extinguishers in the hangars had been set off by mistake.)

During the refuelling of the five remaining helicopters (which were to have been flown out with the six Hercules), one of them had to fly a short distance to fill its tanks from a nearby Hercules and in doing so, in complete darkness, its rotor blade cut into the fuselage of a Hercules full of troops. Both aircraft burst into flames, killing three Marines in the helicopter and five Air Force crewmen in the Hercules. The bodies of those killed could not be removed from the burning aircraft and the survivors left the scene at 4 a.m. local time, abandoning the four remaining operational helicopters for fear they they had been damaged by flying ammunition and shrapnel from the collision. (Concern was later expressed at the failure of the US commando force to destroy or remove a number of documents left behind in the helicopters which gave details of the rescue operation.)

While the US troops had been on the ground at Desert One they had halted a bus carrying over 40 Iranians. Shortly afterwards a lorry had appeared and had tried to crash through an improvised road block but was stopped when its engine was fired at, the driver of the lorry escaping to a following car. It was believed that both vehicles had been involved in a smuggling operation and had mistaken the Americans for Iranian soldiers.

Iranian armed forces arriving at the scene of the accident later on April 25 were understood to have either fired into, or blown up, the helicopters (in the course of which a Revolutionary Guard was killed).

Although US officials refused to comment on the later stages of the original rescue plan, saying only that its implementation was dependent upon the successful completion of the first phase, further details of the second part of the operation emerged from other US sources and Western press reports, which indicated inter alia that American and Iranian agents inside Iran would have played a vital role in the post-Desert One stages.

According to the reports received the second stage of the rescue plan entailed the transport of the 90 commandos by helicopter from Desert One to Desert Two—a mountain hideaway some 50-100 miles from Tehran—where they would have remained throughout the day-light hours of April 25. The US and Iranian undercover teams would in the meantime have rounded up lorries and other vehicles and left them near the Desert Two base as transport for the troops into the capital at night. Other agents and sympathizers would meanwhile have made a thorough reconnaissance of the US embassy compound, some possibly infiltrating the buildings and locating the hostages. Among these agents were reportedly members of the CIA who were understood to have entered Iran on forged passports shortly after the embassy takeover the previous November, and who had largely posed as European businessmen. (After the failure of the rescue mission all were thought to have left Iran safely in the same way as they had entered.)

On reaching Tehran late on April 25 the rescue team would have reconnoitred with the agents there and then stormed the embassy, possibly incapacitating the guards there with nerve gas. After "neutralizing" the US embassy and finding the hostages, helicopters from Desert Two would have landed in or near the compound, by which time a small group of raiders would have infiltrated the Foreign Ministry, less than a mile from the embassy, and taken the three US diplomats held there to the embassy. The helicopters would then have flown all the hostages, the commandos and possibly also the agents to a third base, east of Tehran, where the helicopters would have been abandoned and the escape from Iran made in a Hercules flown in from Desert One, probably accompanied by one or more other Hercules to refuel the rescue plane in mid-air. The remaining Hercules would have jammed strategic Iranian radar equipment.

A later, and unconfirmed, report in *The New York Times* of May 1 said that the United States would have had the option of striking at military facilities around Tehran if the mission had run into any serious resistance; at least two of the Hercules aircraft were said to have been armed for use in such an event, while more fighter planes were standing by on board the *Nimitz*. It was later also revealed that the United States had no contingency plans for preventing Iranians from rounding up the other 250 Americans still in Iran if the rescue attempt had been successful, Mr Vance in particular having expressed his fears that this was a possibility.

Shortly after the unsuccessful rescue attempt, Iran on April 29 claimed that US F-14 fighter planes had opened fire on one of its military patrol aircraft over the Gulf of Oman, but US officials stated that the Iranian aircraft had only been escorted out of the area as a routine exercise.

The bodies of the US servicemen killed during the rescue attempt were held in Iran until May 5 despite President Bani-Sadr's assurances on April 26 that they would be returned to the United States "without conditions". Considerable controversy had arisen during this period over the treatment of the bodies by Iranian officials, and by demands that the bodies should be held to force concessions from the United States.

The remains of the servicemen had been transferred from the site of the collision in the desert to the US embassy in Tehran under the supervision of Ayatollah Khalkhali, who on April 27 held a press conference at the embassy with certain of the militants and Revolutionary Guards at which he displayed the remains of the Americans and, claiming that there were nine bodies rather than eight, pulled pieces from the corpses. Asked why he had shown the bodies in this manner, Ayatollah Khalkhali said: "The action of the American authorities led to the destruction of these people. We brought them here [to the US embassy] so that you could see the result of Carter's move. These are the documents of the crimes of America." Contrary to President Bani-Sadr's statements the previous day, he added that the bodies would not be handed to the US Government but rather to the US Catholic Church, to the Pope or to Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, the former Greek Catholic Archbishop of Jerusalem (known to be sympathetic to the new Iranian regime and also to the Palestinian cause—see page 30206), who arrived in Tehran on April 29 but without a Vatican mandate.

President Carter, at a press conference in Washington on April 29, denounced the treatment of the bodies as "ghoulish" and a "horrible exhibition of inhumanity". He added that the desecration had "aroused the disgust and contempt of the rest of the world" and "indicates, quite clearly, the kind of people with whom we have been dealing in an effort to secure a peaceful resolution of this crisis".

Following lengthy discussions in Iran Mgr Capucci was on May 5 given custody of the bodies (in nine coffins). Accompanied by Mr Erik Lang, the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, and by Mgr Annibale Bugnini, a papal representative, Archbishop Capucci then took the bodies to Switzerland where in Zurich they were handed over to a Swiss Foreign Ministry official and a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Custody was then given to the US ambassador to Switzerland and the coffins were on May 6 transported to the United States in a US Air Force plane. (In early April Mgr Capucci, Mr Lang and Mgr Bugnini had made an unsuccessful attempt to mediate on the US-Iranian dispute in Tehran.)

Immediate Iranian Reaction to the Rescue Attempt

The rescue operation was fiercely denounced in Iran. Leaders of the country condemned the United States, claiming that God had been "on their side" in inflicting "a defeat" on the United States, while in the capital thousands of people, upon hearing news of the failed mission, filled the streets around the embassy to celebrate. In general, however, the Iranian reaction was considerably less violent than had been anticipated and, in particular, fears that the hostages would be harmed proved unfounded.

By the end of May the hostages were said to have been dispersed among 16 towns and cities throughout Iran in order to forestall another rescue attempt, although it was stated that some, including the three held at the Foreign Ministry, had remained in Tehran. US reports of late May, however, speculated that the hostages had not been moved as the militant students would otherwise have lost their power base at the US embassy.

Ayatollah Khomeini, in a statement broadcast on Tehran radio on April 25, indicated that the hostages would not be hurt as a result of the rescue bid but warned at the same time that the Government might not be able to control the militant students at the US embassy if a second attempt to free them was made.

The Ayatollah said that he had warned President Carter that should he resort to "such foolish things", then it would be impossible to control these "Moslem combative and heroic" young people who were "guarding the spies in the spy nest" and that President Carter would be responsible for their lives; he added that "Carter must realize that if this group had attacked the US spy centre in Tehran then there would not have remained any trace of the group and the 50 hostages in the spy nest, with all of them gone to hell". Ayatollah Khomeini moreover said that "it is quite possible that to minimize his crime, he [i.e. President Carter] has admitted to the deaths of only eight people, whereas the nature of things show that dozens of people have given their lives for his whims, with dozens more wandering in the [Dasht e] Kavir [desert] and being exposed to death".

The militants holding the hostages said that they would not be harmed but warned that "if the United States wants to commit such stupidities" President Carter would "have the bodies of his spies and all his satanic agents in Iran burned in Iran".

Mr Qotbzadeh considered the US move tantamount to "an act of war" and saw an "international plot between imperialism and Zionism". He also warned Iranians to watch for any Americans who might have been left behind in the desert but at the same time appealed for calm. He added that President Carter's actions were due to his "nervousness and idiocy" and warned that if the United States tried another such move Iran would let its oil flow into the Gulf and would set it on fire.

President Bani-Sadr said at a news conference on April 26 that the rescue attempt was only part of a larger plot by the United States to overthrow the Iranian Government, and in this connexion drew a link between the mission and recent clashes at several Iranian universities and continuing hostilities in the Kurdish provinces [see 30301 A].

On May 14 President Bani-Sadr said that he had received information that an American sabotage squad of some 100 men had landed in Iran to "create unrest" and that the "sabotage actions", which would commence within two weeks, would be led by certain Iranians who had been living in the United States for some time. On May 15 the right-wing Islamic *Mujaheddin Khalq* predicted that a coup attempt led by "American mercenaries" would shortly be launched, such theories at this time being accompanied by reports of sightings of US planes and helicopters over Iran and of foreigners in the provinces.

Coincidentally with President Bani-Sadr's remarks of May 14 two unidentified Americans were said to have been arrested in connexion with the US rescue attempt, while at the beginning of the month the arrest had been reported of an American freelance travel writer, Ms Cynthia Dwyer, who had entered Iran at the end of April and who was alleged to have confessed to being a CIA agent.

US Reaction

In the United States the immediate reaction of the public was generally to support President Carter's decision to attempt a rescue bid, although at the same time considerable concern was expressed at the possible dangerous repercussions of the failed mission, in particular with regard to the safety of the hostages, while many also thought that the attempt should have been made earlier.

In political circles, however, there was much greater criticism of the President. Many members of Congress reacted angrily to the recourse to military action and to the timing of the operation, and protested at the lack of consultations; congressional leaders were informed of the rescue attempt only minutes before news of its failure was broadcast to the nation, while other congressmen heard about the mission through the media.

The very day before the rescue attempt was launched, the Senate foreign relations committee, in an effort to discourage President Carter from carrying out his repeated threat to use force against Iran, had sent a letter to Mr Vance stressing that under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 the President was required to consult Congress before sending US armed forces into a hostile or potentially hostile situation. This letter was signed by Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), chairman of the committee, and by Senator Jacob Javits (Republican, New York), both of whom had the previous month proposed that the committee should issue a "White Paper" on US relations with Iran to counter the complaints made by Iran that the United States was refusing to acknowledge its role in the building up of the Shah's regime.

Upon hearing of the rescue attempt on April 25 Senator Church said that President Carter had violated the provisions of the War Powers Resolution and called for a full investigation. At the same time he said that he did "not understand the timing of such a military operation, because our allies were backing up our economic sanctions presumably on the assumption that these would foreclose military action". Among others who echoed these views were Senator Javits and Senator Daniel Moynihan (Democrat, New York) who said that President Carter should have shared responsibility with Congress. Senator Edmund Muskie (Democrat, Maine), on the other hand, said that the operation was legal within the War Powers Resolution as it had been a rescue attempt rather than a military operation. (Senator Muskie was subsequently appointed to succeed Mr Vance as Secretary of State—see 30538 A.)

Of President Carter's opponents in the presidential elections only Mr John Anderson (Republican, Illinois, who on July 1 announced his decision to stand as an independent candidate—see 30408 A) was critical, and expressed his concern in particular at the effects of the raid on US allies. Mr Ronald Reagan, who was on July 16 elected as the Republican presidential candidate [see 30477 A], declined to comment initially, while Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts), President Carter's chief rival for the Democratic nomination, said on April 25 that he supported the President's action; Senator Kennedy added: "Whatever our differences, we are one nation in our commitment to the hostages, our concern for their families and our sorrow for the brave men who gave their lives trying to rescue their fellow citizens. We are also united as Americans in our determination to hold the Iranian Government fully accountable for the safety of the hostages." Mr George Bush, who was then a candidate for the Republican nomination (and who was elected as his party's vice-presidential candidate in July—see 30477 A), similarly appealed for the American public to support President Carter, while unequivocal support for the decision to launch a rescue operation was expressed by the former President, Mr Richard Nixon, and by Dr Kissinger.

Relatives of the hostages expressed their fears that the rescue bid would endanger the lives of the captives in Iran, and some families were extremely critical of the President's decision to resort to military force after they had repeatedly urged him against it. Mrs Barbara Timm, who had recently visited her son at the embassy in Tehran [see above] said at a press conference given by President Bani-Sadr on April 26 that "we deeply regret the actions of our President [and] we would like to apologize for that action".

International Reaction

The United States' principal allies, with the exception of Japan and Italy, made few public recriminations against President Carter, and on the whole acknowledged that the mission had been a rescue attempt rather than a punitive act against Iran and praised the US President for making the attempt; the European Community member countries, moreover, expressed their willingness to continue supporting President Carter's sanctions policy against Iran, while at the same time calling for increased US consultation with Europe over certain international issues. Privately, however, the allies were understood to have been critical both of the failure of the United States to consult or even advise them beforehand and also of the timing of the operation which was embarked upon just two days after the Community's Foreign Ministers had agreed to support US sanctions against Iran, largely in the hope that this would forestall any US military actions [see page 30530 above]. In addition, Western countries were said to fear that the failed mission would inter alia strengthen the radical elements in Iran and would further jeopardize collective Western interests in the Gulf.

Of the reactions expressed by Western countries on April 25-26, the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, sent a message of personal sympathy to President Carter, while Sir Ian Gilmour, the Lord Privy Seal and foreign affairs spokesman in the House of Commons, told Parliament that Britain could not condemn the US action as the blame rested with the militants holding the hostages, and added that Britain had been informed in advance of the possibility of the United States launching a rescue operation. A group of Labour MPs on the same day, however, tabled a motion deploring the US action and urged the Government to cease co-operation with the United States on sanctions against Iran until the United States had given its assurances not to use military force again, although the Labour Party leader, Mr James Callaghan, said on April 29 that he supported President Carter's efforts to free the hostages by force. Disquiet was also expressed by certain Conservative MPs.

In France, a government spokesman said only that France had no prior knowledge of the operation while the West German Government issued a similar statement.

Italy, however, condemned the raid and expressed its "clear opposition to the recourse to action of force in any circumstances for the liberation of the hostages".

The then Japanese Foreign Minister, Dr Saburo Okita, said that he was "worried and seriously concerned that the US action this time might lead to armed action in the future".

The Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Pierre Trudeau, described the US action as a "valiant effort" and said that he hoped that it would not jeopardize diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis, while the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Peacock, said that the US move was "understandable" and its failure "regretted", and that he hoped that "in the days ahead there will be a great deal of restraint shown by all parties".

The UN Secretary-General, Dr Waldheim, called for restraint and urged renewed efforts at a peaceful settlement through negotiations, while Dr Joseph Luns, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), told reporters in Denmark on April 25 that the rescue mission had "further complicated the already delicate situation in the Middle East" and that he feared a hostile reaction from the Iranians "in view of [their] emotional nature".

China, which had latterly expressed concern that US policies towards Iran might push that country closer to the Soviet Union, declined to comment immediately, but the Soviet Union on April 25 sharply criticized the rescue attempt.

The official Soviet news agency Tass said on April 25: "President J. Carter takes one reckless step after another. One more confirmation of this is Washington's attempt to land an American military force in Iran, an operation carried out under the pretext of freeing the personnel of the American embassy detained in Tehran". The real objective of the United States, Tass continued, was to "pursue an aggressive, hegemonistic . . . policy aimed at making Iran submit to its imperialistic diktat and bolstering the American presence in the Near and Middle East". The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Andrei Gromyko, who received news of the events while on an official visit to Paris, said that a "peaceful solution is the way for the United States to travel".

Most Arab countries condemned the US action and denounced Egypt for its alleged involvement. President Sadat for his part said that the failure of the mission was "bad luck" and should not discourage the United States from taking further action to free the hostages; without elaborating he also promised the United States that he would "give facilities for the rescue of any Arab state in the Gulf". The Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Menachem Begin, said he was "sorry about the mistakes which happened" and hoped that "the status of the United States in the world is not harmed".

Post-raid Developments

Further International Visits to Iran

The UN Secretary-General, Dr Waldheim, on May 17 launched a new initiative to help resolve the continuing crisis over the detention of the US hostages by appointing Dr Daoudy (a member of the UN commission of inquiry which visited Tehran in February-March, see pages 30525-26 above) as his representative to hold further talks with Iranian officials in Tehran. This move was understood to have been approved by both Mr Qotbzadeh and by Mr Muskie, the new US Secretary of State, both of whom had latterly held talks with Dr Waldheim. The role of Mr Daoudy, however, remained confused and he achieved no significant results during his stay in Tehran. Mr Daoudy arrived in Tehran on May 24 and remained there until after the opening of the new Iranian Parliament on May 28.

The United Nations announced on May 17 that the object of Mr Daoudy's mission was to "discuss the resumption of the work of the UN commission of inquiry and the completion of its mandate, including its report, in order to solve the crisis between Iran and the United States". Iranian authorities on the other hand regarded the purpose of the visit as completing whatever work was necessary for the commission of inquiry to issue its report on Iran's case against the former Shah and the United States. Mr Qotbzadeh, who had frequently expressed his hope that the UN commission would return to Iran, said on May 20 that Mr Daoudy could not talk about the release of the hostages while he was in Tehran and could "only complete the previous investigation" into the crimes of the deposed Shah.

On May 25 Mr Daoudy held a one-hour meeting with Mr Qotbzadeh, following which he told reporters that they had discussed the work of the UN commission as well as the content of the report which it had been asked to prepare. He implied at the same time that the commission might be able to return to Iran and resume its work. On May 27 Mr Daoudy met Ayatollah Beheshti, and the following day he attended the opening of the new Iranian Parliament. (The militants at the US embassy sent a message to the opening session in which they urged the new Parliament not to "yield to US threats", nor to release the hostages until the former Shah and his wealth were returned to Iran; at the same time, however, they said that they would accept any decision by the deputies on the terms for the hostages' release if this had been approved by Ayatollah Khomeini. Generally, however, the subject of the hostages was omitted from the three-hour inaugural ceremony.)

Mr Daoudy's visit had been overshadowed by the arrival in Tehran on May 25 of a three-man delegation of the Socialist International, comprising Dr Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Sr Felipe González, secretary-general of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, and Mr Olof Palme, chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. The delegation said that the object of its visit was not to take part in negotiations on the hostage crisis but was a "fact-finding tour to further understanding by Europeans of the Islamic revolution". The delegation did not meet Mr Daoudy while in Tehran, the latter saying that there was "nothing in common" between the two missions.

On May 25-26 the delegation held "intensive talks" with President Bani-Sadr, Mr Qotbzadeh and Ayatollah Beheshti, and upon leaving Tehran on May 26 said that they were "satisfied" with their discussions.

Although the three socialist leaders had stressed that their visit had not been an attempt to mediate on the hostage issue, Dr Kreisky later acknowledged that the problem had been raised repeatedly during their meetings. Commenting on this in Austria on May 27-28, Dr Kreisky said that the US-Iranian crisis had arisen in conversation because men like President Bani-Sadr believed that the American hostages would have to be released before Iran could come out of its "political isolation". Dr Kreisky expressed his confidence that the hostages would eventually be released as long as no more forceful methods were used, although any decision on their fate would need the ratification of Ayatollah Khomeini, and he added that new sanctions against Iran could further delay their release.

It was later also revealed that one outcome of the visit had been the outlining of a plan to guarantee Iran's neutrality which might, in turn, ultimately lead to the release of the hostages.

Delivery of Judgment by International Court of Justice

Coincidentally with the arrival of Mr Daoudy in Tehran on May 24 the International Court of Justice in The Hague met to deliver its judgment on the US complaints against Iran [see page 30527 above]. The Court reiterated its demands made the previous December for the immediate release of the hostages [see page 30209], told the Iranians not to put any of the hostages on trial and ruled that Iran was liable to pay reparations for its actions. At the same time the Court admonished the United States for its attempt to rescue the hostages but added that the military operation "can have no bearing on the evaluation of the conduct of the Iranian Government over six months earlier".

The Court had decided on six points as follows: "(i) that Iran has violated and is still violating obligations owed by it to the United States; (ii) that these violations engage Iran's responsibility; (iii) that the Government of Iran must immediately release the United States nationals held as hostages and place the premises of the embassy in the hands of the protecting power; (iv) that no member of the United States diplomatic or consular staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as witnesses; (v) that Iran is under an obligation to make reparation for the injury caused to the United States; and (vi) that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the parties, shall be settled by the Court."

Points (iii) and (iv) were agreed upon by all 15 judges. Dr Platon Morozov (Soviet Union), however, dissented on the other four, while Dr Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syria) rejected points (i), (ii) and (v), and Dr Manfred Lachs (Poland) point (v).

After hearing the judgment on May 24 the US State Department said that the decision was "binding on Iran" and called on that country to carry out its provisions. In Tehran, however, Ayatollah Moussavi Ardabili, the prosecutor-general (and a member of the Revolutionary Council), said that the verdict had no meaning because "only one side" had taken part in the proceedings (Iran having boycotted the sessions of the International Court on the US-Iran dispute).

Imposition of Sanctions by European Community Member Countries

At the end of an informal two-day meeting in Naples the European Community Foreign Ministers on May 18 decided on the joint imposition of sanctions on Iran as there had, in their view, been no "decisive progress" made towards the release of the hostages since their April 22 Luxembourg meeting. The latest Community decision, however, fell short both of their April 22 proposal and of the draft UN Security Council resolution of January [see page 30211 and page 30530 above] and affected only those contracts signed between Community member countries and Iran after Nov. 4, 1979—i.e. the day on which the hostages were seized. The new restrictions would thus not affect the bulk of trade between Europe and Iran.

At a two-day meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg on April 27-28 Community heads of state or government (accompanied by their Foreign Ministers) had reaffirmed their solidarity with the United States over Iran and their decision to impose two-stage sanctions against Iran. However, their readiness to impose full sanctions was understood to have diminished since the rescue attempt. In particular they still feared that sanctions would harm the West more than Iran and would force Iran into increasing its links with the Eastern bloc; they had, moreover, grown increasingly apprehensive about the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan [see 30381 A] and about continuing problems in the Middle East which appeared potentially more dangerous than the stalemate over the hostage crisis. Moreover, the Community countries had feared that full sanctions would alienate the more moderate factions in Iran, prominent among these being President Bani-Sadr who had, in an interview with four European newspapers on May 17, urged the Community not to impose sanctions.

The United States on May 18, in a statement issued by the State Department, said that it welcomed the Foreign Ministers' decision to "impose meaningful sanctions on Iran"; it added that it would have "preferred that the pre-Nov. 4 contracts had also been covered", but understood the "impediment in doing so in the absence of a UN resolution".

Mr Qotbzadeh, who together with President Bani-Sadr had in the previous few days sought to dissuade the Community from imposing sanctions, said on May 18—while attending the 11th session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Islamabad (Pakistan) [see page 30385]—that "we could not care less about the sanctions".

In anticipation of the European sanctions being imposed it was reported throughout this period that raw materials and consumer goods had been "flooding" into Iranian ports "faster than customs officials can handle them". Most of the goods were from Western Europe, but large amounts also arrived from Japan. At the same time Iran withdrew money from areas where it was considered "most vulnerable"; in particular, a considerable amount of money had reportedly been withdrawn from West Germany and deposited in Libyan and Algerian banks.

In the United Kingdom the Iran (Temporary Provisions) Bill which was introduced on May 8 and enacted on May 15 (i) empowered the Government to impose sanctions in relation to contracts with Iran; (ii) laid down that no order under the legislation might apply to existing contracts or to any contracts made before the date on which any order under the Bill was made; and (iii) excluded contracts with banks or other financial institutions for the provision of banking or other financial services (restrictions in respect of which had already been in force since the end of 1979).

The Bill was read a second time in the House of Commons on May 12 by 230 votes (including 25 Labour and four Liberal members) to 85 (Labour, together with one Conservative—Mr Jock Bruce-Gardyne—and two Official Unionists) and completed its remaining stages in the Commons unamended on May 13; in the House of Lords it was given an unopposed second reading on May 15 and passed unamended through all its remaining stages on the same day, with the third reading being approved by 82 votes to four (all Labour).

Following the Naples meeting of the Community Foreign Ministers on May 17-18, Sir Ian Gilmour announced in the House of Commons on May 19 that it had been agreed by the Foreign Ministers that the sanctions would affect existing contracts for the export of goods to Iran entered into any time after Nov. 4, 1979, and that the export of goods under such contracts would be prohibited under the 1939 Import, Export and Customs (Defence) Act; however, service contracts would not be affected except for new service contracts in support of industrial projects, which would be banned as from the date of the entry into force of the appropriate order in council. As regards implementation of sanctions, the Government intended to follow a variation of the normal affirmative resolution procedure for orders made under both the 1939 Act and the 1980 Iran (Temporary Provisions) Act, whereby such orders would lapse unless they had been approved by Parliament within 28 sitting days.

This announcement was strongly criticized by opposition members, who accused the Government of deception in the debates of the preceding week, and a short emergency debate was held on May 20 at the request of Mr Tam Dalyell (Labour), who had led the attack on the Iran (Temporary Provisions) Bill during its committee stage; in the course of this debate on May 20, Sir Ian Gilmour announced that the Government had decided that sanctions would not now be retrospective.

"No orders," he said, "will be laid before the House which ban the supply of goods under arrangements made before the date on which those orders were laid. Last night [i.e. May 19] we informed our European Community partners and the Government of the United States that, in view of the opposition of this House to retrospection, we would no longer be prepared to proceed to apply any element of retrospection among the decisions that we agreed to at the meeting in Naples. Arrangements that ban the supply of arms continue in force." Orders in council which would be laid before the House to implement sanctions would therefore now not apply to the export of goods under arrangements made before the date of those orders."

The British Government finally imposed sanctions at midnight on May 29 but at the same time reduced their effect even further by exempting (i) extensions of existing trade contracts and (ii) new contracts made in continuation of an established course of business.

The orders imposing the sanctions were made on May 29 (effective May 30) under the 1980 Iran (Temporary Provisions) Act and the 1939 Act and were approved in the House of Commons on June 4 by 129 votes to 18 and by 124 votes to 15 respectively; in each case those voting against were Labour MPs together with one Conservative (Mr Tony Marlow) and three Northern Ireland MPs (Mr James Kilfedder, Mr Enoch Powell and Mr William Ross), while those voting in favour included respectively six and one Liberals. The orders were approved in the House of Lords on June 9.

Following a meeting on May 18 between Dr Okita, then Japan's Foreign Minister, and his European Community counterparts, it was announced that Japan would implement sanctions in line with them. This decision was approved at a special meeting of the Japanese Cabinet on May 22 and took effect on June 2.

The Japanese action meant the freezing of large export orders signed since Nov. 4, 1979. Businessmen in Tokyo said that in their opinion the sanctions move would have failed without the support of Japan as one of Iran's largest trading partners. However, the contracts for the petrochemical complex at Bandar Khomeini were not affected.

The Australian Government on May 20 announced a ban on all trade except for food and medicines to take effect immediately. Similar measures were announced by Canada on May 22, on which day the Minister of External Affairs, Mr MacGuigan, said that Canada was further asking its citizens to stop all travel to Iran as long as US citizens were held hostage there.

Also on May 22 the then Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Süleyman Demirel, said that his country would not impose a trade embargo against Iran because of its "very close ties with the people of Iran", but offered Turkey's help as a "middleman, to secure the release of the American hostages".

The Turkish daily *Hürriyet* of May 26 reported that Turkish exports to Iran had increased considerably since US sanctions had been in force. (Many goods were, however, stranded at Turkish stations near the border due to continuing hostilities in Iranian Kurdish areas, cutting the railway link between the two countries.)

The Norwegian Cabinet at a meeting on June 20 approved details of sanctions on the export of goods to Iran (under legislation passed by the *Storting*—Parliament—on June 6) which prohibited "Norwegian citizens, companies, associations and institutions from fulfilling contracts entered into after Nov. 4, 1979, or entering into, or assisting in, new contracts for the export and delivery of goods to Iran". Food and medical supplies remained exempt from this ban.

Holding in Iran of International Conference on US "Crimes in Iran"

On the initiative of President Bani-Sadr an international conference to examine "US crimes in Iran" since 1953 [i.e. from the time of the temporary flight and return of the Shah—see 13093 A] was held in Tehran on June 2-5. The conference was attended by some 300 delegates from 54 countries, among them, at the invitation of Iran, a 10-man US delegation headed by Mr Ramsey Clark (US Attorney General under President Lyndon Johnson in 1967-69), who had been refused entry into Iran in November 1979 [see page 30205].

The 10 Americans faced a maximum penalty of a $50,000 fine and a 10-year prison sentence for defying the US ban on travel to Iran, but prosecution was waived.

On the first day of the conference's proceedings, delegates were given documents which were described as containing evidence of the Iranian case against the US Government, including a document which was said to confirm that the United States had been plotting a military coup in Iran during the final days of the Shah's regime.

Photocopies were distributed of a message purportedly sent to Gen. Alexander Haig, then NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, from Gen. Robert Huyser, a senior US officer who had been sent to Iran immediately prior to the departure of the Shah from that country on Jan. 16, 1979 [see pages 30149 and 30212], allegedly with the task of organizing a plan with Iranian military leaders to keep the Shah in power. Gen. Haig disputed the authenticity of this document, while the US Administration refused to comment.

On June 4 President Bani-Sadr held a meeting with Mr Clark in the course of which the former was understood to have proposed a three-point plan to resolve the hostage crisis which included the formation of a commission in the United States, headed by Mr Clark, to investigate American involvement in Iran during the Shah's rule. President Bani-Sadr said, however, that this proposed commission was "not related to the hostages" but rather to the "necessity of knowing the truth".

The previous day Mr Clark had addressed the conference and had brought up the subject of the continuing detention of the US hostages, stating that it was "imperative that the hostages be released now", as the threat of US intervention in Iran was greater so long as they were still held captive, and himself offered to take the place of one of the 53 hostages. At the same time he condemned the US rescue attempt and called for the trial of the former Shah and for the return of his wealth to Iran.

A final 12-point declaration on the conference was on June 6 issued by an anonymous committee which denounced the United States, called for the return of the former Shah and his private fortune and stated that all disputes between the United States and Iran should be resolved "peacefully" and "as soon as possible", but did not specifically mention the hostages. Mr Clark had reportedly tried to have included in the declaration a point condemning the seizing of the hostages.

Mr Qotbzadeh described the conference as a "great success for Iran", while Ayatollah Khomeini also approved its result. The US delegation was, however, dissatisfied with the content of the final document, which denounced Mr Clark as a "possible secret agent". Mr Qotbzadeh on June 6 defended Mr Clark's presence at the conference but Tehran radio that day criticized the Foreign Minister for his "conciliatory attitude" and described Mr Clark as the "vilest American agent".

Also on June 6 Mr Qotbzadeh said that he was opposed to the trial of any of the hostages, declaring that it was "the trial of the United States" which was important. His views were endorsed by President Bani-Sadr who, in an interview published in the daily *Ettela'at* on June 9, warned the Iranian hardliners against putting the hostages on trial, pointing out inter alia that "if the hostages are tried and some of them found not to be spies then we would be faced with the question as to why they were kept for seven months".

Release of US Hostage

Ayatollah Khomeini on July 10 personally authorized the release of Mr Richard Queen (28, a vice consul at the US embassy) for medical treatment outside Iran. Mr Queen had been in a Tehran hospital for four days and Iranian authorities said that they lacked the proper medical facilities to treat him. Mr Queen was flown to Zurich in Switzerland on July 11 and the following day was escorted to West Germany where he was taken to a US Air Force hospital in Wiesbaden. Doctors there on July 15 diagnosed that Mr Queen was suffering from multiple sclerosis and on July 18 he returned to the United States.

Ayatollah Ardabili (the prosecutor-general) said on July 11 that Mr Queen's release did not indicate a change in policy towards the hostages and stressed that the fate of the hostages was the decision of the new Parliament, as had been ordained by Ayatollah Khomeini.

On July 24 Mr Queen held a press conference at the State Department in Washington in the course of which he disclosed certain details of his eight months of detention.

Emphasizing that he could speak only for himself and not for the other hostages from whom he had mostly been isolated for the past eight months, Mr Queen said that the militants had made no attempt to brainwash him although they had "lectured him and tried to turn him against the US Government but not against the American people". He said that for the first four months of his captivity he had been kept in a windowless basement room with other hostages who were not allowed to talk to each other, but that he was later transferred to a room with a window along with two other male hostages with whom he was permitted to talk. He added that he was "not aware" that any of the hostages were "seriously ill" and felt that mentally they were "coping well".

Mr Queen said that the conditions of his detention had not changed after the failed rescue attempt on April 25 and that he did not know anything about the operation until two hours before he was flown from Tehran to Zurich on July 11 when he was given "an article" about it. Prior to receiving this information all he had heard was that the United States had been planning some form of raid but had called it off.

Asked about his captors, Mr Queen said that as far as he knew they were all students and were "zealous Islamics" and "very anti-communist". Mr Queen added that he had spoken to few of his captors about the conditions for the release of the hostages and was unable to ascertain if all the militants were united in their demands.

Death of Former Shah

The former Shah of Iran died on July 27 in the Cairo Maadi military hospital at the age of 60. His death was attributed to complications induced by the chemotherapy treatment which he had been receiving to arrest the spread of his cancer but which had seriously weakened his resistance to infections.

The former Shah had contracted pneumonia in mid-June and was readmitted to hospital on June 28. Two days later he underwent surgery to extract fluid from an infected abscess in his pancreas and on July 3 further surgery was carried out to arrest haemorrhaging caused by the first operation; on July 5 he was operated on again to drain off fluids from his abdomen. Despite a slight improvement, he relapsed into a state of shock on July 26 and later lapsed into a coma with circulation failure, low blood pressure and fever. Before going into a coma the former Shah was understood to have asked doctors not to prolong his life with support systems.

Upon hearing of the former Shah's death President Sadat, who had visited him on a number of occasions since his hospitalization in late June, returned to Cairo, cutting short a visit to Alexandria. In a subdued appearance before reporters on July 27, which was broadcast on Egyptian television and radio, President Sadat paid tribute to the Shah, whom he described as a "personal friend and Moslem brother", announced a week's mourning in Egypt and said that, despite the Shah's declared wishes to have a "very simple funeral", he would be buried with full state honours and "all due respects . . . to this man who stood by Egypt in its difficult moments". At the same time President Sadat said that no other heads of state would be invited to the funeral and "even if they ask, we shall apologize politely", and promised that he would continue to provide a sanctuary for other members of the Iranian royal family which he now considered to be headed by Crown Prince Reza Cyrus, the late Shah's eldest son aged 19.

The Shah's body was carried to its final resting place in a mausoleum at the Al Rifai mosque in Cairo on July 29; the mosque had been the burial place of several members of the Egyptian royal family and the body of the Shah's own father, Reza Khan, had been interred there for several years following his death in exile in South Africa in 1944 [see page 7481].

An estimated 250 official mourners attended the funeral, principal among these being President Sadat (the only head of state present), the Shah's widow (the Empress Farah) and her four children, his twin sister (Princess Ashraf) and other members of his family, former King Constantine of Greece, and ex-President Nixon, who had been a close friend of the Shah and who, upon his arrival in Cairo on July 28, sharply criticized the US Administration for its treatment of the Shah during his fall from power and his subsequent exile.

The United States was represented by its ambassador in Cairo, Mr Alfred Atherton. Other countries represented by ambassadors or chargés d'affaires were France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel and Australia. Morocco was the only Islamic state other than Egypt to be represented, King Hassan having offered the Shah a brief period of refuge in his country in 1979 [see page 29741].

Mohammed Reza Pahlevi had become Shah at the age of 21 in September 1941 after British and Soviet forces had occupied Iran and forced his father, Reza Khan, to abdicate and go into exile because of his sympathy with Nazi Germany [see 4791 A]. The new Shah proclaimed an end to absolute rule, granting power to the Cabinet and *Majlis*, and in 1943, in a further reversal of his father's policies, declared war on Germany [see 5999 C]. Following the war the Soviet Union in 1946 set up a communist state in Azerbaijan, in the north of Iran, but Soviet troops were forced out of Azerbaijan after the Shah had appealed to the UN Security Council and had gained the support of the Western allies [see 7864 A; 7952 A]. In 1949, after an attempt on his life, the Shah banned the pro-Soviet *Tudeh* communist party [see 9785 A], which thereafter operated from East Germany.

Towards the late 1940s public discontent had grown in Iran at the British ownership of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which controlled a large part of Iran's petroleum assets. In 1951 Dr Mohammed Mossadeq became Prime Minister and rapidly completed the process of nationalizing the oil industry [see 11365 A; 11449 A; 11569 A]. In retaliation, the British organized a boycott of Iranian oil with the result that production fell drastically. This situation adversely affected Iran's already ailing economy, giving rise in turn to further internal discontent and a marked decrease in the popularity of Dr Mossadeq. On Aug. 16, 1953, officers loyal to the Shah attempted to overthrow the Prime Minister but supporters of Dr Mossadeq rallied around him and the Shah himself was forced into exile; three days later, however, Dr Mossadeq was ousted from power in a coup in which the (US) CIA and British security services were commonly believed to have been involved, and the Shah returned to Iran on Aug. 22 [see 13093 A].

Over the following years he sought to consolidate his personal authority over Iran. In this context he in particular stressed the importance of the Iranian monarchy, which he described as Iran's "destiny" and whose 2,500th anniversary was celebrated in 1971 [see 24922 B]; he strove to be regarded as a "great and glorified leader", calling himself "King of Kings" and "Light of the Aryans" (as which he was crowned in 1967—see 22386 A); and, according to *The Financial Times* of July 28, 1980, he "emphasized Iran's pre-Islamic origins and the Aryan race of most of its people at the expense of its religious traditions and heritage".

The Shah's main aim was to rebuild Iran and to transform it from a poor, backward country into a modern, prosperous, industrialized nation based on Western culture and institutions rather than on traditional Iranian values. To this end he received enormous financial and military backing from the United States, which feared Soviet dominance of the area, and allocated vast amounts to the armed forces which, however, remained dependent on Western technicians. In 1961-62 he began his so-called "white revolution" of reforms which included the breaking up of the old feudal system and the transformation of the old class structure [see 18117 A; 18882 A]; however, this was, in fact, generally regarded as being of limited benefit to the peasantry, many of whom left the countryside and moved to major towns and cities, notably Tehran, gradually creating a new class of urban poor.

Meanwhile, opposition began to develop against what was seen as an increasingly autocratic and oppressive rule, but this opposition was itself harshly dealt with by the national intelligence and security agency, Savak, set up in 1957 [see also 27811 A]. In the early 1970s

Iran was variously estimated to have between 7,000 and 100,000 political prisoners (although official estimates put the figure at 2,500), the majority of these being supporters of the *Tudeh* party; many opponents, moreover, fled the country. In 1975 the Shah officially dissolved the two-party system and set up the *Rastakhiz* (national resurgence) as the sole legitimate party [see 27189 A].

The quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973-74 [see 26224 A; 26355 A] gave rise to hopes in Iran that the Shah would fulfil his promises to improve the economic situation and benefit the poorer sectors of society, but the majority of the oil wealth in fact remained in the hands of a few (a recently released survey showing that in 1976 only 3 per cent of Iranians shared 90 per cent of the nation's wealth). The royal family itself amassed an enormous personal fortune [see also page 30149 and page 30525 above] and had vested much in the Pahlevi Foundation which was set up in 1958 as a "charitable organization" [see 18380 B].

In 1977 the Shah dismissed his Prime Minister of 12 years, Mr Amir Abbas Hoveida, blaming him for Iran's economic difficulties [see 28563 A], but by this time opposition had grown considerably, demonstrations and protests being organized by supporters of the clergy, left-wingers, human rights campaigners, intellectuals and liberal politicians, which continued throughout 1977 and 1978 [see 28939 A; 29383 A; 29733 A]. Efforts either to silence or to appease his opponents failed and the entire opposition movement gradually threw its support behind Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of Iran's Shia Moslems, who had been exiled for his part in anti-government riots in 1963 against the Shah's programme of reforms [see 19564 A].

By early 1979 the Shah had lost the support of his Western allies and was advised to leave the country, and in February that year after his departure the Islamic revolution took control of Iran [see 29733 A]. After brief periods of exile in Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas and Mexico [ibid.] he was permitted to enter the United States in October for surgery to remove his gall bladder [see page 30149], when it was revealed that he had been suffering from cancer of the lymph glands (lymphoma) since 1973. After the seizure of the US embassy by militant students in November 1979 the Shah left the United States for Panama in December [see page 30212].

Following his return to Cairo the former Shah on May 28 expressed his regret at having pursued a "policy of surrender" to his opponents during his final days in power and at not using military force to put down demonstrations. He moreover blamed the US and British Governments for his downfall, complaining that they had persuaded him to deal moderately with "looters, arsonists and bandits", and had then withdrawn their support. He also complained of the "conflicting reports" which he had received from the United States during this period, which was presumed to refer to the differences of opinion over Iran expressed by Dr Brzezinski, who advocated harsh military reaction, and Mr Vance, who refused to give his support to such a course. The Shah at the same time expressed his horror at the actions taken by the new Iranian regime but continued to deny that his own regime had been marked by repression and torture of political opponents and by corruption, through which his family and others had profited.

The Shah had been married three times. In 1939 [see 3482 D] he married Princess Fawzieh, sister of King Farouk of Egypt, by whom he had a daughter in 1940. This marriage was dissolved in 1948 [see 9654 A] and three years later he married Soraya Esfandiari [see 11306 G], but divorced her in 1958 [see 16060 A] as she failed to provide him with a male heir. In 1959 he married Farah Diba [see 17162 C], daughter of an army officer, and by this marriage had four children, the eldest being a son, Crown Prince Reza Cyrus, born in 1960 [see 17718 B].

Reaction to the Former Shah's Death

The announcement by the Iranian state radio on July 27 that the "bloodsucker of the century is dead" gave rise to jubilation throughout the country although official reaction was generally restrained. It was noted in the Western press at this time that the Shah had been virtually forgotten in Iran as a "physical entity" and that his return to Iran for trial had long since ceased to be the main condition for the release of the hostages. Iranian officials stressed that the former monarch's death would make no difference either to the fate of the hostages or to demands for the return of the Shah's wealth.

In Washington the US Administration issued a statement expressing sympathy for the former Shah's family, saying they "deserve sympathy and an atmosphere of tranquility", but made no mention of the Shah's long alliance with the United States, stating only: "The Shah was the leader of Iran for an exceptionally long period of time—38 years. History will record that he led his country at a time when profound changes were taking place. His death marks the end of an era in Iran which all hope will be followed by peace and tranquility".

The Republican presidential candidate, Mr Ronald Reagan, however, stated that "the Shah of Iran was a loyal and valued friend of the United States", that "his leadership was dedicated to the progress and prosperity of the people of Iran", and that "his passing reminds us of the importance of remaining true to friends". Mr Nixon described the Shah as a "loyal friend and ally of the United States and a personal friend as well".

The British Government issued a statement saying: "Her Majesty's Government have learned with sorrow of the death of [the former Shah of Iran]. During his long reign successive British Governments enjoyed close relations with the Shah, and his friendship for this country will not be forgotten".

Other international reaction was, for the most part, cautious or non-committal, both the Soviet Union and China reporting his death without comment.—(International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Guardian - Times - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - Sunday Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Economist - European Commission, Brussels - US International Communication Agency - International Court of Justice - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. Hostage Crisis 30205 A*)

A. UNITED STATES — Cabinet - Mr Vance's Resignation - Mr Muskie appointed Secretary of State - Consequential Gubernatorial Appointment to Senate

Mr Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State since January 1977 [see 28245 A], resigned from the US Cabinet on April 28, 1980, because of his inability to support President Carter's decision to try to rescue the American hostages currently being held in Iran [see 30525 A], this attempt having failed in the night of April 24-25.

The resignation was announced in the following exchange of letters between Mr Vance and Mr Carter.

Mr Vance to Mr Carter, dated April 21, 1980 (i.e. three days before the launch of the rescue attempt):

"I have the greatest respect and admiration for you and it is with a heavy heart that I submit my resignation. It has been a privilege and high honour to serve you and our nation. I look with pride and satisfaction at the many actions and new directions which have marked our foreign policy under your leadership. . . . I know how deeply you have pondered your decision on Iran. I wish I could support you on it. But for the reasons we have discussed I cannot. You would not be well served in the coming weeks and months by a Secretary of State who could not offer you the public backing you need on an issue and decision of such extraordinary importance—no matter how firm I remain in my support on other issues, as I do, or how loyal I am to you as our leader. Such a situation would be untenable and our relationship, which I value so highly, would constantly suffer. I shall always be grateful to you for having had the opportunity to serve. I shall always have for you the deepest respect and affection, and you know you can count on my support for your continued leadership of our nation."

Mr Carter to Mr Vance, dated April 28, 1980:

"I accept your resignation with regret, but with deep appreciation for your dedicated and effective service to me and to our country. As mentioned in your letter, we have had notable accomplishments under your leadership as Secretary of State. I share your pride in what has been achieved. Because you could not support my decision regarding the rescue operation in Iran, you have made the correct decision to resign. I know this is a matter of principle with you, and I respect the reasons you have expressed to me. You leave your post with the admiration and best wishes of a grateful nation. Our close friendship and partnership during challenging times have been a source of strength and reassurance to me. I look forward to your continuing advice and counsel on matters of importance to the United States—our country, which you have served so well."

According to press reports, Mr Vance, while absent from the National Security Council meeting of April 11 at which the decision to mount the rescue mission in Iran was taken [see page 30532], opposed the idea at meetings with President Carter and senior advisers on April 15. Arguing that it was possible through diplomatic efforts, augmented by economic and political sanctions, to bring about a solution, he said that the use of force would raise unforeseen problems in the Moslem world, deflect attention away from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan [see 30229 A; 30381 A], alienate many of the Allies, and endanger the hostages.

President Carter announced on April 29 the appointment of Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine as Secretary of State in succession to Mr Vance.

Mr Muskie (66) was born in 1914, the son of a tailor who had emigrated to the United States from Poland in 1903. Educated at Bates College, Maine, he graduated from Cornell Law School, served in the US Navy during World War II, and afterwards resumed his law practice in Waterville, Maine. He was a member of the state Legislature from 1947 to 1951, was elected as Maine's first Democratic Governor in 20 years in 1954, was re-elected in 1956, and in 1959 became the first elected Democratic US senator in the history of Maine [see 16436 A]. He was Democratic vice-presidential candidate in 1968 [see 22961 A], when Mr Hubert Humphrey was defeated in the presidential election by Mr Richard Nixon, and contested the early primary elections in 1972 [see 25418 A].

Governor Joseph Brennan of Maine on May 8 appointed Mr George Mitchell (Democrat), a federal district judge, to fill the vacancy in the US Senate left by the appointment of Mr Muskie as Secretary of State. Announcing the appointment, Governor Brennan said that Mr Mitchell would serve for the remaining two and a half years of Mr Muskie's current six-year term.—(New York Times - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 30028 C; Iran 30525 A*)

A. CUBA — Government Reorganization - Economic Problems

Following months of economic crisis in Cuba described as the worst since Dr Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, a reorganization of the Government was announced on Jan. 11, 1980, in an apparent move to provide greater control over the economy and to improve the functioning of some government bodies, which the Prensa Latina news agency on Jan. 11 described as "not always efficient". On top of the economic crisis signs of dissidence had emerged in Cuba in late 1979 in the form of anti-government slogans and pamphlets and a clandestine radio station (Radio Libertad) allegedly operating from the eastern mountains, in response to which Dr Castro had on Dec. 15, 1979, appointed as Minister of the Interior the reportedly hard-line Gen. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, who had fought alongside Dr Castro against the Batista regime and who had later organized the intelligence and security services for Dr Castro.

The previous Interior Minister, Sr Sergio del Valle Jiménez, was appointed Minister of Public Health on Dec. 15, retaining this post in the January reorganization; also on Dec. 15 Sr Guillermo García Frías was appointed Minister of Transport *vice* Sr Antonio E. Lussón Battle and Sr José López Moreno became a Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, retaining the Construction Ministry which he had held since December 1976 [see 28214 A].

A list is given below of (i) the members of the State Council (the highest representative body whose president, Dr Castro, was also head of state and government and First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party), (ii) the Council of Ministers and its executive committee, and (iii) the heads of state committees and other state bodies.

Council of State

President: Dr Fidel Castro Ruz.

First Vice-President: Gen. Raúl Castro Ruz.

Vice-Presidents: Sr Juan Almeida Bosque, Gen. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, Sr Guillermo García Frías, Sr Blas Roca Calderio, Sr Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Rodríguez.

Secretary: Sr Juan Miyar Barruecos.*

Members: Sr Pedro Miret Prieto, Sr Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, Sr Armando Hart Dávalos, Sr Sergio del Valle Jiménez, Sr José Ramón Machado Ventura, Sr Arnaldo Milián Castro, Sr Diocles Torralba González, Sr Belarmino Castilla Mas, Sr Flavio Bravo Pardo, Sr Joel Domenech Benítez, Sr Luis O. Domínguez Muñiz, Sr Roberto Veiga Menéndez, Sr Jorge Lezcano Pérez, Sra Vilma Espín Guilloys, Sr José Ramírez Cruz, Sr Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriarán, Sr Severo Aguirre del Cristo, Sr Reinaldo Castro Yedra, Sra Marta Depress Arozarena, Sr Senén Casas Regueiro, Sr Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, Sr Raúl Roa García.

* Sr Miyar Barruecos succeeded Sra Celia Sánchez Manduley, who had also been a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Dr Castro's private secretary and companion, and who died in January 1980. Together with Sra Haydée Santamaría Cuadrado, also a member of the Council of State and of the Central Committee, who committed suicide on July 28, she was one of the best-known figures of the Cuban revolution; both women fought alongside Fidel Castro against the Batista regime and Sra Santamaría Cuadrado took part in the abortive attack on the Moncada barracks in 1953 [see 13516 C].

Executive Committee of Council of Ministers

Dr Fidel Castro Ruz	Chairman
Gen. Raúl Castro Ruz	First Vice-Chairman
Sr Guillermo García Frías	Vice-Chairmen
Gen. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez	
Sr Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Rodríguez	
Sr Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado	
Sr Arnaldo Milián Castro	
Sr Joel Domenech Benítez	
Sr Flavio Bravo Pardo	
Sr Diocles Torralba González	
Sr José Ramón Fernández Alvarez	
Sr Humberto Pérez González	
Sr José A. López Moreno	
Sr Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriarán	Vice-Chairman and Secretary

Council of Ministers

Gen. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez	Interior
Gen. Raúl Castro Ruz	Revolutionary Armed Forces
Sr Isidoro Malmierca Peoli	Foreign Affairs
Sr Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado	Justice
Sr Arnaldo Milián Castro	Agriculture
Sr Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz	External Trade
Sr Serafín Fernández Rodríguez	Internal Trade
Sr Pedro Guelmes González	Communications
Sr José A. López Moreno	Construction
Dr Armando Hart Dávalos	Culture
Sr José Ramón Fernández Alvarez	Education
Sr Fernando Vecino Alegret	Higher Education
*Sr Alejandro Roca Iglesias	Food Industry
Sr Marcos Lage Coello	Iron, Steel and Metallurgy
Sr Manuel Millares Rodríguez	Light Industry
Sr Jorge A. Fernández Cuervo Vinent	Fishing Industry
Sr Diocles Torralba González	Sugar Industry
Sr Joel Domenech Benítez	Basic Industry
Sr Sergio del Valle Jiménez	Public Health
Sr Guillermo García Frías	Transport
Sr Levi Farah Balmaseda	Minister responsible for Overseas Construction
Sr Jorge Lezcano Pérez	Ministers without Portfolio
Sr Antonio Esquivel Yebra	
*Sr José A. Naranjo Morales	Minister to the President
Sr Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriarán	Secretary

* Appointed to these posts on June 17, 1980.

Heads of State Committees

Sr Humberto Pérez González	Central Planning Authority
Sra Irma Sánchez Valdés	Technical and Material Supplies
Sr Héctor Rodríguez Llompart	Economic Co-operation
Sr Fidel Vascós	Statistics
Sr Francisco García Valls	Finance
Sr Ramón Darias Rodés	Standardization
Sr Santiago Riera	Prices
Sr Joaquín Benavides	Labour and Social Security
Sr Raúl León Torras	National Bank of Cuba

Heads of State Institutes

Dr Wilfredo Torres Iribar	Academy of Science
Sr Nivaldo Herrera Sardiñas	Radio and Television
Sr Carlos Galván Vila	Sport, Physical Education and Recreation (INDER)
Sr Rodrigo Fernández Monert	Automated Systems and Computer Technology (INSAC)
Sr José L. Padrón González	Tourism (INTUR)
Sr Joel Chaveco	Hydrography

Sr Idalberto López de Guevara Quintana was appointed Attorney-General at the same time.

Members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers had supervisory functions over various ministries and state committees and institutes as follows:

Dr Castro assisted by Gen. Castro (Interior, Public Health, Armed Forces, Culture), Sr García Frías (Communications), Sr Rodríguez Rodríguez (Foreign Affairs, External Trade, National Bank, Economic Co-operation), Sr Dorticós Torrado (Standardization), Sr Milián Castro (Food Industry), Sr Domenech Benítez (Iron, Steel and Metallurgy), Sr Bravo Pardo (Light Industry, Fishing Industry, Internal Trade), Sr Fernández Alvarez (Higher Education, Academy of Science, INDER, Radio and Television), Sr Pérez González (Prices, Statistics, INSAC), Sr Cienfuegos Gorriarán (Technical and Material Supplies, Finance, Labour and Social Security, INTUR).

Havana radio reported on Jan. 11 that (i) the State Committees for Science and Technology and for Construction, (ii) the Ministries of the Electricity Industry, the Chemical Industry, Mining and Geology and the Construction Materials Industry, and (iii) the State Institutes for Infancy, Forestry Development and Exploitation, and Investment and Orientation of Internal Demand had been abolished and their powers and functions transferred to other bodies.

The membership of the Secretariat and Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was as follows:

Secretariat: Dr Fidel Castro Ruz, Gen. Raúl Castro Ruz, Sr José Ramón Machado Ventura, Sr Pedro Miret Prieto, Sr Antonio Pérez Herrero, Sr Jorge Risquet Valdés, Sr Lionel Soto Prieto, Sr Julio Camacho Aguilera.

Politburo: Dr Fidel Castro Ruz (First Secretary), Gen. Raúl Castro Ruz (Second Secretary), Sr Juan Almeida Bosque, Sr Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, Sr Guillermo García Frías, Dr Armando Hart Dávalos, Gen. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, Sr Sergio del Valle Jiménez, Sr Blas Roca Calderio, Sr José Ramón Machado Ventura, Sr Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Rodríguez, Sr Pedro Miret Prieto, Sr Arnaldo Milián Castro.

Gen. Raúl Castro had referred to the economic crisis in a speech on Nov. 29, 1979, in which he said that without Soviet assistance Cuba would be facing "economic disaster and bankruptcy" with its "sequel of starving people and hundreds of thousands of unemployed".

The state of the world economy, inflation, low sugar prices and crop diseases had all contributed to Cuba's difficulties, as had faults among workers such as "indiscipline, lack of control, irresponsibility, complacency, negligence and personal favouritism", which were preventing problems from being solved and were generating "justified irritation on the part of broad sectors of the population". He added that all Cuba's problems could not be blamed on the US embargo (imposed in 1962—see page 18717) and capitalism, however often these had been "used as pretexts to hide our deficiencies", and that many people were contributing to economic difficulties by working only four to six hours a day.

The slump in sugar production followed a record harvest in 1979 (the second best in Cuba's history) and was attributed in the Communist Party organ *Granma* in January 1980 to the lack of voluntary workers in the sugar cane fields, "wastage" caused by the cutters' inefficient methods, shortage of equipment, bad weather, lack of spare parts, and a rust fungus disease in some plantations. (For drastic fall in world sugar prices to about £85 per tonne in the period to late 1977, see 28214 A and page 28996. World prices remained low in 1978 but doubled in the latter part of 1979 and rose sharply in the first few months of 1980 to a peak of about £360 per tonne at the end of May.)

The sugar slump was accompanied by the devastation of the tobacco crop by a fungus disease which forced the closure of the major tobacco factories in March 1980. Moreover, the world market in nickel (Cuba's second most important export) remained static, with the result that the projected production target of 100,000 tonnes by 1985 (compared with a current level of less than 40,000 tonnes) was postponed to the end of the decade.

Among measures taken to increase productivity and restore incentives to workers following the government reorganization, (i) wages were increased with effect from July 1, 1980, for the first time since 1963 and (ii) a free market system enabling small farmers to sell the remainder of their produce privately after fulfilling their commitment to the state was introduced in May. It was also announced on May 26, however, that prices of all agricultural and livestock products (including milk, vegetables and beans) would be raised as from Jan. 1, 1981.

The wage increases, announced in *Granma* at the end of March, provided for a rise in the minimum monthly wage in all sectors and for a rise in the maximum monthly wage in certain sectors only. The increases would, it was estimated, cost the state 600,000,000 pesos (about $900,000,000) in 1980.

Among other incentive measures introduced in May were higher responsibility payments and a system of job gradings, allowing greater remuneration for output and hard work; the issue of licences for craftsmen such as carpenters and electricians to take on private work officially; and changes in managerial responsibility, giving people in higher positions more control over recruitment and dismissal of employees. (This last measure effectively abolished the previous condition of total job security which, it was thought, was contributing to laxness at work.)

Dr Castro was reported to have said in a speech to the National Assembly in December 1979 that the planned growth of the economy for 1980 had been cut back to 3 per cent and that similar cuts would probably have to be applied for the duration of the next five-year plan (1981-85). He also reportedly said that plans were underway for a general development scheme for Cuba up to the year 2000 which would involve greater integration with the economy of the Soviet bloc. (Cuban Embassy, London - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Latin America Weekly Report - International Herald Tribune - Financial Times - UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London) (*Prev. rep. Government List 28214 A; Changes 29408 A, 29868 A; Refugee Exodus to USA 30474 A*)

A. LATIN AMERICA — Formation of Latin American Integration Association to supersede LAFTA

An agreement establishing the Latin American Integration Association (*Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración*, Aladi) to supersede the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was signed in Montevideo (Uruguay) on Aug. 12, 1980, by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. It was envisaged that the agreement would enter into force on Jan. 1, 1981, following ratification by the respective signatory countries.

Unlike LAFTA, which had originally aimed to eliminate tariff barriers between all its member states without exception by 1972, the new association provided for tariff concessions to be granted individually, taking into account the economies of the respective countries. It also classified its members into groups according to their level of development—these being (i) Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay (less-developed), (ii) Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (medium-developed) and (iii) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (more-developed)—with a view to the richer nations giving preferential treatment to the poorer.

LAFTA was set up under the Treaty of Montevideo which was signed on Feb. 18, 1960, by seven countries initially (Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia joining later) and which entered into force the following year [see 18370 A; 18752 B]. Its timetable for the removal of tariff barriers between member states fell behind schedule, however, and despite the extension of the 1972 deadline to 1980 under the 1969 Caracas protocol the organization failed to make substantial progress towards establishing a free trade area. Also in 1969 the Andean Group was formed as a sub-regional grouping within LAFTA [see 23433 A; 23732 C] and took the initiative at the time in co-ordinating industrial development and trying to accelerate the freeing of trade. [The Andean Group currently comprised Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela as full members—see page 30140.]

The stagnation of LAFTA was attributed to various factors, notably the disparate levels of development among members, communications and transport problems, protectionism, conflicting economic systems, and political and economic changes in individual countries (particularly Brazil and Argentina). The *Bank of London and South America Review* maintained, however, that LAFTA had nevertheless been successful in stimulating the growth of trade and industry as well as co-operation between central banks and the dissemination of technical information in South America.

The final decision to create Aladi had been taken at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of LAFTA held in Acapulco (Mexico) from June 16 to 27, 1980.

Sr Julio César Schupp, who had hitherto represented Paraguay on the permanent executive committee of LAFTA, was on Aug. 12 elected Secretary-General of Aladi.—(Times - Financial Times - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Bank of London and South America Review) (*Prev. rep. 28602 A; Andean Group Developments page 30140, 29914 A*)

B. SOVIET UNION — Change in Council of Ministers

It was announced on Sept. 10, 1980, that the USSR Council of Ministers had approved the appointment of Mr Mikhail Shkabardnya as Minister of Instrument Making, Means of Automation and Control Systems *vice* Mr Konstantin Rudnev who had died on Aug. 15, having held this ministerial post since 1965 [see 21035 A].—(Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Council of Ministers 30112 B*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

A. TURKEY — Assumption of Power by Leaders of Armed Forces - Arrests of Political Leaders - Countrywide Proclamation of Martial Law - Political, Economic and Internal Security Developments leading to Coup

The Turkish armed forces moved during the night of Sept. 10-11, 1980, to take control of the country through a five-man National Security Council led by Gen. Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff. Martial law was extended to all of Turkey's 67 provinces; major political leaders were taken into custody; and a large-scale round-up of suspected left-wing and right-wing militants took place. On Sept. 21 a mainly civilian Cabinet was formed, and it was announced that a Constituent Assembly would be established to draw up a new constitution.

This intervention by the military was the third in 20 years—the previous such occasions having been in 1960 when there followed a 17-month period of military rule [see 17501 A; 18647 A], and in 1971 when, however, the Government continued to be in the hands of civilians [see 24637 A].

The period leading to the military takeover had been marked in particular by (i) continuing economic difficulties; (ii) a seriously deteriorating internal security situation and (iii) political stalemate which had inter alia made it impossible for Parliament to elect a successor to President Fahri Korutürk upon the expiry of his term of office.

The policies of the minority Justice Party (JP) Government formed by Mr Süleyman Demirel in November 1979 [see 30133 A] had been strongly criticized not only by the opposition Republican People's Party (RPP) led by Mr Bülent Ecevit (Prime Minister from January 1978 to October 1979—see 29101 A; 30133 A), but also by independents and minor parties on which the Government depended for its voting majority in the National Assembly (Lower House of the Turkish Parliament). As a result, parliamentary approval was not forthcoming for a number of important legislative proposals, including measures to counter the country's increasing political terrorism.

These and other related developments are described below.

Economic Developments - Government Economic Policy and Rescheduling of External Debts

Although the state of the Turkish economy had been generally expected to improve after a number of devaluations of the Turkish lira and after the rescheduling of extensive foreign debts during 1979 [see 29921 A], there was no significant recovery during the second half of that year in the country's overall economic situation. Industrial production, which had increased by 3.8 per cent during 1978, was said by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—in its annual survey of Turkey published on May 20, 1980—to have fallen during 1979 by 2.8 per cent, due largely to the severe restriction of oil and other raw material imports resulting from the lack of foreign currencies [ibid]. Consumer (retail) prices rose during 1979 by 81.8 per cent, according to the OECD, reaching during the 12 months to April 1980 a level of increase of 117.4 per cent (although this last figure was attributable in part to the price increases entailed in the economic programme introduced by the Government in January 1980—see below).

Gross national product (GNP) rose during 1979 by only 1.7 per cent at market prices, and the provisional OECD estimate of the 1979 foreign trade deficit was US$2,808 million, compared with a deficit of $2,311 million in 1978. Turkey's total external debt was thus believed in February 1980 to exceed $14,000 million (compared with March 1979 estimates of $12,000 million—see 29921 A). Unemployment continued to increase from its 1978 level of about 20 per cent of the working population to about 25 per cent in early 1980, while much of the country's industry was badly affected by extensive power cuts during the exceptionally severe winter of 1979-80.

The continuing deterioration of the economic situation meant that Turkey failed to fulfil many of the conditions attached to earlier loans and credit agreements, with the result that, of the $961,000,000 pledged by OECD member countries in July 1979 [see page 29922], only about half had actually been released by February 1980. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had in July 1979 agreed on a 12-month standby arrangement authorising purchases by the Turkish Government of up to the equivalent of 250,000,000 special drawing rights (SDR), then worth about $327,500,000, also withheld in late 1979 the second of four tranches due under the agreement.

Talks held in December 1979 between Mr Demirel and an IMF delegation in Ankara were followed in January 1980 by a series of government measures which, while endorsed by the OECD for their "courageous attack on the serious economic problems facing the country", were described by Mr Ecevit on several occasions as endangering Turkish democracy, and contributed to growing industrial unrest. The measures were intended to liberalize the economy and to attract foreign investment while reducing, in accordance with the requirements of the IMF, the level of subsidies to the nationalized State Economic Enterprises (SEE), which had in 1979 made a total loss of about TL60,000 million (approximately $1,275 million at end-1979 exchange rates).

The Turkish lira was on Jan. 24 devalued against the US dollar by about 33 per cent, moving from a rate of TL 47.1 [see page 29922] to TL 70.0; the existing arrangement whereby oil importers and agricultural exporters had been able to obtain a special rate of TL 35.0 [ibid.] was abolished, while the concessionary rate for fertilizer and insecticide imports was changed from TL 35.0 to TL 55.0. Other currencies were not affected by the change, which was widely seen also as an attempt to counteract black market dealings.

The Government also announced on Jan. 24 an extensive programme of reforms which included the following:

(1) A special board was to be set up by the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, Industry and Technology, Energy and Foreign Affairs and by the Central Bank to facilitate foreign investment in Turkey.

(2) Foreign banks were to be allowed for the first time to establish branches in Turkey.

(3) Foreign oil companies were to be allowed to prospect for oil in the areas claimed by Turkey (but see also 29936 A), with 65 per cent of any oil thus obtained to be sold in Turkey.

(4) SEEs were to determine their own prices in accordance with world market values, and most government subsidies to them were to be discontinued. The OECD reported in its 1980 survey of the Turkish economy that, under the new rules, petrol, diesel and fuel oil had risen in price by between 45 and 120 per cent, fertilizer by 400 per cent, paper by 300 per cent, electricity by 120 per cent, textiles by 100 per cent, steel by 75 per cent and cement by 55 per cent.

The Government also released on Jan. 25 details of a plan for the settlement of some $1,900 million worth of debts in respect of foreign goods received but not yet paid for. Creditors were offered rapid settlement in Turkish lira or settlement over 10 years, with a 4½-year period of grace, in US dollars; however, by the end of August 1980 few creditors had accepted either option, even after the Government's offer of payment in any currency, and the deadline for the option was repeatedly postponed.

The IMF agreed on Feb. 21 to release the second tranche under the July 1979 agreement, and also approved on that date a new credit of SDR 71,625,000 ($93,800,000) from the Fund's compensatory financing facility. The IMF remained critical of Turkey's economic state, however, and claimed in a report published on April 2 that, despite minor adjustments of the exchange rates on Feb. 20, March 5, March 20 and April 2 (to TL 73.7 = US $1), "additional action may soon be required", adding in May a recommendation of a further 20 per cent devaluation and of a new upward revision of SEE product prices.

Following further adjustments to the parity of the lira which took place on April 12, April 20, April 29 and June 9 (the last of these bringing the dollar exchange rate to TL 78.0) and the announcement that the coal mining industry was to be denationalized, the IMF approved on June 19 a new standby credit of SDR 1,250 million ($1,625 million), to be released over a period of three years. SDR 1,211,400,000 of this sum was to be provided by the Fund's supplementary financing facility, the "Witteveen facility" [see 29555 B], and SDR 38,600,000 from the Fund's ordinary resources. At the request of Turkey, the July 19, 1979, standby arrangement was cancelled. The lira was again devalued on July 14 (against certain currencies other than the US dollar) and on Aug. 4 (to TL 80.0 = US $1), and was on Sept. 2 devalued by 2.4 per cent against sterling alone in a cross-rate adjustment.

Meanwhile the Turkish Government continued its negotiations with the OECD member countries for a revision of existing credit agreements, and in particular for the extension of the terms of existing loans such as that agreed in 1979.

It was announced on April 15 that a meeting of OECD member countries held in Paris had pledged a total of $1,160 million in aid and in extended credits (generally over longer periods than the loans offered in 1979). The largest contributors to the total amount were the United States and West Germany, each of which pledged $295,000,000, and Italy ($115,000,000), France and Japan ($100,000,000 each), Switzerland ($37,000,000) and the United Kingdom ($33,000,000). The European Community pledged an additional sum of $100,000,000 from the Community budget.

A further credit arrangement was signed in Paris on July 23, whereby 14 OECD member countries, the IMF, the World Bank, the Commission of the European Communities and the European Investment Bank agreed to reschedule Turkish debts totalling some $3,000 million and due for repayment before July 1983. The debts were understood to have been rescheduled for periods of eight to 10 years, with payments to begin after four or five years.

Turkey also negotiated during this period a number of agreements with individual countries, including (i) an arrangement announced by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayrettin Erkmen, on June 11, whereby Iran would provide an oil purchasing credit of $500,000,000 (to be repaid in agricultural and other products rather than currency); and (ii) the grant of an interest-free loan of $250,000,000 agreed on Aug. 25 by the Saudi Arabian Government.

Despite the measures adopted by the Government during the first six months of 1980, figures published on Aug. 5 by the national statistical office indicated that Turkey's position was continuing to deteriorate. The country's foreign trade deficit during the first half of 1980 was given as $1,540 million, which represented an increase of some 25 per cent over the comparable figure for 1979. (The 1979 foreign trade deficit had, however, been unusually low, due particularly to the unavailability of foreign currency with which to pay for imports.) It was further revealed in the report of the statistical office that foreign currency remittances sent home by Turkish workers abroad had fallen during the first half of 1980 by some 31 per cent compared with the same period in 1979.

Internal Political Developments - Failure to Elect President - Motions of Censure on Demirel Government - Cabinet Changes

The legislative capacity of the Turkish National Assembly was not only severely limited during the period from January to August 1980 by continuing bitter disputes between the ruling JP and the opposition RPP, but was also affected by the increasingly ambivalent attitudes adopted by the (Moslem fundamentalist) National Salvation Party (NSP) led by Mr Necmettin Erbakan and by the extreme right-wing National Action Party (NAP) led by Gen. Alparslan Türkes.

Although Mr Demirel's Government depended on the support of these two parties for the maintenance of its effective parliamentary majority [see 30133 A], there remained deep divisions which effectively frustrated a number of government policies. For example, the NAP persistently accused the Government of failing to take adequate action against left-wing terrorists, while the NSP strongly opposed various elements of the Government's economic policy, including particularly the strengthening of Turkey's links with Western economies, and consequently voted on several occasions with the opposition against the Government.

Mr Ecevit (the RPP leader) repeatedly called for the formation of a broad-based "government of reconstruction" comprising the JP, the RPP and the NSP, in an attempt to combat the country's increasingly severe economic and internal security problems, but could find no basis for agreement with the JP on this issue.

The most serious consequence of this inter-party disagreement was the failure of the National Assembly, despite well over 100 attempts, to elect a President of the Republic in succession to Mr Fahri Korutürk, who had been elected in 1973 [see 25853 A] and whose seven-year term of office expired on April 6, 1980. Consequently a considerable amount of the National Assembly's time was occupied in fruitless ballots, resulting in severe delays in the execution of its normal duties, while furthermore a large number of death sentences, bills and other matters which required the President's approval were also held up indefinitely.

Upon Mr Korutürk's retirement from office on April 6 Mr Ihsan Sabri Çaglayangil (JP), who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1971 [see 21037 A] and again from 1975 to 1977 [see 27093 A; page 28599] and who was currently president of the Senate (Upper House), took over as acting President of the Republic in accordance with constitutional provisions.

The 1962 Constitution [see 18647 A] stipulated that the President of the Republic was not eligible for re-election at the end of his period of office, and that his successor should be chosen by a joint session of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Grand National Assembly. To secure election, a candidate had to receive in either of the first two ballots at least two-thirds of the available votes (which in April 1980, including life senators and presidentially-appointed senators, totalled 634); should a third or subsequent ballot be required, an absolute majority of the available votes (i.e. in this case 318) would suffice.

No candidates for the presidency were presented by any party when the first ballot was held on March 23, and at the second ballot on March 25 the sole candidate, Mr Nurettin Yilmaz (independent) obtained only 80 votes. Both the JP and the RPP subsequently proposed candidates but consistently failed to find a candidate acceptable to both parties; consequently by May 21 the 80th ballot had still produced no result. Mr Demirel proposed thereupon that the Constitution should be amended so as to provide that, where no decision could be reached by the Grand National Assembly, the matter should be put to the popular vote.

Mr Ecevit bitterly attacked these proposals, accusing Mr Demirel on May 22 of deliberately blocking the election of the new President in order to create an atmosphere of crisis in which to promote unnecessarily harsh laws for the control of the country's troubled internal security situation. (Mr Demirel had already aroused strong opposition with his proposals to introduce state security courts in those provinces—see below—in which martial law was in force, but had been unable so far to obtain voting majorities for such policies.)

By June 9, when the 100th unsuccessful ballot for the presidency was held, the RPP candidate, Gen. Muhsin Batur, had on one occasion obtained 303 votes (compared with the 318 required), while one of a succession of JP candidates, Gen. Faik Turun, had once obtained 235 votes. Members of the NSP on occasions supported the RPP candidates rather than those of the JP, and ballots frequently failed to take place as scheduled due to the absence of a quorum in the Grand National Assembly.

The RPP proposed on June 16 that a motion of censure should be tabled against the Government, alleging the economic and judicial mismanagement of the country's difficulties; however, this debate also failed to take place on June 19 as scheduled, due to the absence of a quorum. Mr Demirel, who maintained that the RPP had no workable alternative to the policies of his Government, nevertheless instructed the JP on June 24 to vote for the holding of such a motion of censure, with the result that the National Assembly voted on that day by 407 votes to 6 in favour of holding the vote on July 2.

At this point the NSP leader, Mr Erbakan, declared that the Government "should be overthrown", and commenced negotiations with the RPP concerning the possible formation of an RPP/NSP "national solution" government, in which he was to be Prime Minister. (The NSP held 22 seats in the National Assembly and the RPP 205 following the defection on July 1 of two independent deputies to the RPP; the two parties could thus in theory have formed an absolute majority in the 450-seat National Assembly.) The RPP and NSP also discussed the promotion of Mr Rahmi Erdem (RPP) as joint candidate for the presidency.

The attitude of the NSP towards the Government's economic policy and the proximity of the vote on the censure motion were widely believed to have contributed to the decision of Mr Demirel to postpone the presentation of Tukey's formal application to join the European Communities (which was to have taken place on June 30); however, the NSP/RPP talks broke down shortly before the vote on the motion of censure, and the NSP voted on July 2 with the Government against the motion, which was accordingly rejected by 227 votes to 214 with four abstentions. Mr Erbakan said on July 2 that his party "[did] not consider it possible to overthrow the present Government, since no agreement [had] been reached on the establishment of a new Government".

Both the JP and the NSP proposed during August 1980 that the general elections due to take place in June 1981 (i.e. four years after those of June 1977—see 28597 A) should be brought forward to the second half of 1980. It was widely believed that both parties hoped to increase their share of the vote, although Mr Ecevit, whose RPP was numerically the strongest in the National Assembly, strongly resisted the bringing forward of the elections, maintaining generally that the internal unrest in the country [see below] was such that in many regions a fair election could not be guaranteed. A subcommittee set up by the parliamentary constitutional commission reported, however, on Aug. 28 that the proposals for early elections were unconstitutional.

The strengths of the various political parties in the National Assembly continued to fluctuate during this period as a number of independent deputies joined the ranks of specific parties, mainly the JP and RPP; these included Mr Abdulkadir Kaya, who on May 13 joined the JP, and Mr Serafettin Elçi (Minister of Public Works in Mr Ecevit's last Government—see pages 29102; 29923), who on July 8 joined the RPP.

Changes were also made during this period to the composition of the Turkish Cabinet, which was reduced in size by the resignation of three ministers.

The Ankara radio network referred on May 15, 1980, to the resignation of Mr Muhammet Kelleci, one of the six Ministers of State without Portfolio [see 30133 A], and added that his former ministerial functions would henceforth be exercised by the Prime Minister's Office.

It was subsequently announced on July 21 that Mr Mustafa Gülcügil, the Minister of the Interior, had resigned following the tabling of an RPP motion of censure against him. Mr Gülcügil had recently caused some offence to left-wing groups by alleging in a Turkish television programme that all of Turkey's political violence was caused by the left wing (whereas the RPP, on the other hand, maintained that the Government was ignoring the extent of right-wing violence which, it alleged, originated largely from the NAP and its youth organizations); Mr Gülcügil was replaced on Aug. 5 as Minister of the Interior by Mr Orhan Eren, previously a Minister of State without Portfolio, whose duties in the latter capacity were absorbed by Mr Koksal Toptan, another Minister of State.

In addition, Mr Erkmen resigned on Sept. 5 as Minister for Foreign Affairs following the passage in the National Assembly earlier that day of a motion of censure against him proposed by the NSP. The motion, which alleged that Mr Erkmen had involved Turkey too closely with Israel and with Western economies to the neglect of the Arab countries of the Middle East, was approved by 230 votes (principally RPP and NSP) to two, with 210 deputies, mostly from the JP and NAP, absent from the session.

Ankara radio reported on May 4 that the Democratic Party (DP) was to be disbanded. Although the party had initially formed part of the coalition Government formed in January 1978 by Mr Ecevit [see 29101 A], it had had no parliamentary representation in the National Assembly since the defection in September 1979 to the JP of its last remaining deputy, Mr Faruk Sükan [see page 29924].

It was further announced on May 8 that the (Marxist) Workers' Party of Turkey had been ordered by the Constitutional Court to disband on the grounds that its political programme included elements which contravened the Constitution. In particular the party had recently demanded that Kurdish language tuition be made available for schoolchildren of Kurdish descent.

Turkish Governments usually adhered firmly to the principle of national unity, affirming the existence of only one (i.e. Turkish) nationality; consequently any suggestion that any social group within Turkey's boundaries should be differentiated from the others on the basis of its ethnic descent was, as a rule, actively discouraged. President Korutürk had on Feb. 29 issued a strongly-worded statement concerning the circulation of "forged and divisive" communiqués which were presented as originating from the National Security Council (NSC, comprising both ministerial and military representatives), and warned of "merciless punishment" for "the organizers of divisive, treasonable activities and their collaborators". Subsequently a number of left-wing Turkish publications were banned during 1980 because of what was felt to be the inflammatory nature of their depiction of sectarian or ethnic differences.

Internal Security Developments - Assassination of Dr Erim

The political violence in Turkey which had resulted in some 1,500 deaths during 1979 [see 30133 A] continued during 1980 to escalate despite the internal security measures taken by the Demirel Government early in the year [ibid.], and despite also the arrest of large numbers of suspects by the police and by the martial law authorities. Estimates of the numbers of people killed in political violence during this period varied widely, but there was general agreement that the weekly average was considerably higher than during the comparable period in 1979, rising sharply in mid-1980 in a new wave of political murders which followed the killing on May 27 of Mr Gün Sazak, the deputy chairman of the NAP, and the killing on July 20 of Dr Nihat Erim, who was Prime Minister in 1971-72. Turkish police sources reported that some 100 people had died during one week in late July and 29 in separate incidents throughout Turkey on Sept. 2 alone.

Mr Gülcügil, the then Minister of the Interior, announced on June 18 that 9,342 persons whom he identified as "terrorists" had been arrested since the Demirel Government had taken office in November 1979.

The state of martial law which had been introduced in December 1978 in 13 of the country's 67 provinces [see 29574 A] and which by December 1979 applied to 19 provinces [see page 29923; 30133 A], was by September 1980 in force in 20. Serious disturbances occurred in Izmir (on the Aegean), while in Corum (north-east of Ankara) two major Moslem sects were involved in violence similar to that which had occurred in December 1978 at Kahramanmaras [see 29574 A] and which had resulted in 111 deaths.

Attacks on police officers, judges and the officials of political parties continued to increase in number during this period, but for the first time since the proclamation of martial law members of the Turkish armed forces also became subject to repeated attacks which extended furthermore to a number of prominent political figures.

There were few press reports during this period of violent incidents involving the Kurdish ethnic minority in eastern Turkey (although in fact the Turkish press generally avoided the term "Kurdish" as such); the recent series of attacks on Turkish embassies and consulates and on Turkish Airlines offices abroad, however, continued unabated, with responsibility being claimed by a number of groups describing themselves as Armenian organizations.

Amnesty International published on June 9 in London a report in which it expressed concern at what it described as the "widespread and systematic" torture of persons detained by the martial law authorities in Turkey; while acknowledging the size of the internal security problems faced by the authorities, it claimed that not all of those tortured had any direct connexion with the country's political violence.

Martial law, which according to the Constitution had to be renewed by the National Assembly every two months, was lifted on Feb. 20 in Sivas province (200 miles east of Ankara) but was extended to include Izmir and also Hatay (on the Mediterranean coast adjacent to Syria) following several weeks of political disturbances.

On Jan. 23, students at the Aegean University in the city of Izmir exchanged fire with police, this incident leading to a number of injuries and to 83 arrests. The Izmir police were reinforced during early February by troops after some 1,500 members of the left-wing Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) had occupied a state-owned textile factory following the dismissal of about 700 left-wing workers by a newly-appointed manager; the factory was eventually cleared on Feb. 11 by some 10,000 troops using armoured vehicles, no resistance being encountered and more than 500 of the occupying workers being arrested.

The situation in Izmir remained tense, however; the JP offices in the city were bombed on Feb. 11, and three policemen were killed on Feb. 16 while clearing parts of the city where barricades had been set up and fires lit. Order was nevertheless restored on Feb. 17 following the imposition of a curfew, with the 2,000 United States employees at the Yamanlar military base near the city [see 30548 B] being instructed to remain temporarily indoors.

Industrial unrest over the dismissal of textile workers also occurred in a number of other plants, notably in Istanbul where the occupation of a textile plant led on March 3 to the arrest of some 1,500 persons.

Meanwhile a series of strikes took place in Istanbul in protest at the price rises resulting from the Government's economic reforms, and Ankara was also badly affected by a strike of municipal employees who had not been paid due to the insolvency of the city corporation.

In view of the increasingly serious situation in Turkey all May Day rallies due to take place in martial law areas on May 1 were banned by the Government (as had also happened the previous year—see page 29923). DISK protested at the ban, but agreed to co-operate, although its headquarters in Istanbul were surrounded on April 30 by a military guard and its leader, Mr Abdullah Bastürk, was arrested on the same day.

It was announced on May 11 that 18 named terrorists would be shot on sight by the police or the armed forces unless they gave themselves up within 20 days. One of the persons involved, Mr Mehmet Ali Agca (previously described as Mr Agva), who had in July 1979 been arrested in connexion with the murder of Mr Abdi Ipekci, the editor of the newspaper *Milliyet* [see pages 29575; 29924], had in November 1979 escaped from prison, and had on April 28, 1980, been sentenced in absentia to death.

Gunmen who on April 16 murdered a US naval officer and his driver in Istanbul were subsequently captured and identified as members of the "Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit", which had in previous years often been involved in such anti-American activities [see pages 29923; 30134]. Earlier, the homes of two US embassy officials in Ankara had been bombed on Feb. 19, while on the same day cars belonging to US soldiers had been destroyed in Izmir.

A curfew was imposed in Corum on May 28 (i.e. the day after the murder of Mr Sazak), following a severe riot in which 22 persons, mostly members of the Alevi (Shia or Shi'ite) Moslem sect, were believed to have been killed, and in which mainly Alevi-owned shops and houses were destroyed. The rioting, which was finally quelled by the intervention of the Army, was believed to have started after rumours among the town's Sunni (orthodox) Moslem majority that Alevis had set fire to a mosque, and to have been subsequently exacerbated by political provocations.

The Sunni and Alevi sects had lived in Turkey in relative peace for several hundred years, but had, particularly since 1970, become politically polarized, the Sunnis generally tending to favour conservative and the Alevis left-wing policies [see also 29574 A]. Tension between the two sects had, despite the efforts of the Ecevit and Demirel Governments, continued to grow particularly in rural areas after the Kahramanmaras riots of December 1978 [ibid.].

The trial of some 800 persons accused of involvement in the Kahramanmaras massacre ended on Aug. 8, 1980, after hearings lasting some 14 months. The military tribunal at Adana [see page 29923] sentenced 22 of the accused on Aug. 8 to death and commuted a further 14 death sentences to terms of life or of 20 years' imprisonment, while 350 other persons received prison sentences of varying lengths and 411 were acquitted.

Further regions where disturbances were particularly frequent were Tunceli, Malatya, Zile, Siverek, Gazantiep and Diyarbakir (all in eastern central Turkey), while in Fatsa (Ordu province, on the Black Sea coast), troops were moved in on July 11 to dissolve a left-wing "commune" set up by the local authorities, and some 390 persons, including the mayor of the town, were arrested. Meanwhile the NAP claimed, in an article published in the newspaper *Hürriyet* during July, to have effectively gained complete control over Yozgat (east of Ankara), and to have raised a militia in the area (leading Mr Ecevit to refer to the "fascist occupation" of Yozgat).

Attacks on political figures in Turkey were, until the murder on May 27 of Mr Sazak, largely confined to the regional officers of the NAP and RPP. Among local NAP leaders killed between January and May were those of Fatsa on March 2; of Agri (eastern Turkey) on March 31; of a district of Ankara on April 1; of a district of Izmir on April 29; and of Yeminahalle on May 24. RPP casualties during the same period included regional leaders in Kayseri (south-east of Ankara) on May 8 and in Usak (east of Izmir) on May 20, and also a number of RPP mayors in several regions including the mayor of Denizli (south-east of Izmir) on May 27.

Other persons killed during the first five months of 1980 included police commissioners in Suluova (north-eastern Turkey) on Jan. 29, in Istanbul on Feb. 27, and in Urfa (east of Adana) on April 2; a lieutenant of the Turkish Army (the first such death since the proclamation of martial law) on March 20; Mr Ismail Gercekoz, the editor of the newspaper *Orta Dogu* on April 4; the public prosecutor of Niksar (north-east of Ankara) on April 8; Mr Umit Kaftancioglu, a prominent writer and radio producer, on April 11; and Miss Sevinc Ozgumer, a leader of a left-wing medical trade union, on May 23. A senior army officer, Maj.-Gen. Sabri Demirbag, was also shot and wounded on May 20.

Martial law was on April 26 lifted from Erzincan province (eastern Turkey), but was newly imposed on Agri, and was renewed in all of the other 19 provinces where it had been in force, being subsequently renewed on June 18 and on Aug. 18.

The funeral of Mr Sazak took place in Ankara on June 2 under heavy military guard, and was attended by some 50,000 mourners. Although the NAP leader, Gen. Türkes, appealed to the party's members to avoid provocative actions, the following weeks were characterized by an increase in the number of attacks on prominent RPP members which ultimately led to a series of counter-attacks involving both political extremes.

Mr Zeki Tekinel, the provincial leader of the RPP in Nevsehir (south-east of Ankara), was shot dead on June 17, and his funeral the next day, which was attended by numerous senior RPP politicians, was disrupted by right-wing extremists who shot at and stoned the mourners. Three RPP deputies from the National Assembly and one RPP senator were wounded in the attack, although Mr Ecevit, who was also present, was unhurt.

Mr Suat Karatasli, the regional leader of the RPP in Siverek (south-eastern Turkey) was shot dead on June 18, and on June 22 the (RPP) deputy mayor of Istanbul, Mr Bülent Demir, was also shot.

In what appeared to be a retaliation for these attacks a regional leader of the JP, Mr Selähattin Gundogan, was on July 14 shot dead in Sirvan (eastern Turkey); the next day Mr Abdurrahman Koksaloglu, an RPP deputy in the National Assembly, was killed in Istanbul, being thus the first serving deputy to die in Turkey's recent political violence.

The death on July 17 in Ankara of Mr Ebumuslim Kocaay, an NAP member and senior civil servant, in a shooting incident, was followed on July 20 by the murder of Dr Nihat Erim in Istanbul, responsibility for the latter attack being claimed by *Dev-Yol* (Revolutionary Left), a rural communist organization.

Although Dr Erim had been an RPP deputy before becoming Prime Minister in March 1971 upon the military intervention [see 24637 A], he had been accused by the extreme left wing of excessively harsh treatment while in power, and had resigned in April 1972 during a dispute over the refusal of the National Assembly to grant the Government greater powers for the handling of political terrorism [see 25329 A].

Several thousand troops were brought in to assist in the maintenance of order in Istanbul, but on July 22, the day of Dr Erim's funeral, the chairman of the largest Turkish metal workers' union and a co-founder and former chairman of DISK, Mr Kemal Türkler, was assassinated in a suburb of the city; responsibility for this murder was claimed by a previously unknown group, the "Turkish Islamic Army". On the same day Mr Recai Unal, a prominent left-wing journalist, was found strangled in Istanbul.

The two Houses of the Turkish Parliament met on July 23 for an emergency debate on the latest series of killings, and it was decided to ban all demonstrations on July 24, the day of Mr Türkler's funeral. Although many of Istanbul's shops and factories had closed down on July 23 in gestures of protest at his death, there were no disturbances during the funeral.

Casualties on all sides continued to increase sharply during the following weeks, and included the chief of police in Dortyol (near Adana), who was shot on July 30; a Turkish national intelligence agent who was shot, apparently by *Dev-Yol*, on July 31; the (RPP) mayor of Mardin (south of Diyarbakir), who was kidnapped and whose body was discovered on Aug. 1; the NAP regional leader in Gemlik (in north-western Anatolia), who was shot on Aug. 1; and Mr Sadik Ozkan, a trade union leader, who was shot in the centre of Ankara on Aug. 22. An indefinite curfew was imposed on Sept. 2 in Zile after the murder of a local lawyer and RPP member, and several thousand troops were drafted into Ankara on Sept. 3 following a left-wing demonstration which led to the bombing of the Association of Agricultural Engineers (thought to be generally right-wing) and the consequent deaths of four people.

Gen. Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff, publicly criticized Parliament on Aug. 29 for its failure to elect a President and to promote new security laws which he believed to be necessary; he added that the tasks of civil control had detracted measurably from the efficiency of the armed forces, and called for the ultimate abolition of martial law. (It was estimated in early September 1980 that about a quarter of Turkey's 475,000-man Army was deployed in civil control operations.)

Terrorist Activities of Turkish Groups outside Turkey

A number of groups using such names as the "Armenian Secret Army" and the "Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide" continued their terrorist activities mostly against Turkish institutions in other countries during this period, claiming generally to be seeking the establishment of a separate Armenian state in the east of Turkey and recalling the massacre in 1915 of some 1,500,000 Armenians by the Ottoman Turks. (The Turkish authorities, on the other hand, generally remained sceptical of these claims, sometimes pointing out that the Armenian question had remained dormant until after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974—see 26661 A; 26709 A.)

The Turkish ambassador to Switzerland, Mr Dogan Türkmen, was shot and slightly injured in an attack which took place in Berne on Feb. 6. The so-called "Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide" claimed responsibility for the attack, and a man named as Mr Max Kilndjian, a French citizen, was arrested in Marseilles two days later and charged on Feb. 19, also in Marseilles, with the attempted murder of Mr Türkmen.

The "Armenian Secret Army" claimed responsibility for bomb attacks on the airline offices in Rome of Swissair, Lufthansa (West German) and El Al (Israeli) on Feb. 18, and of Turkish Airlines on March 10.

The Turkish ambassador to the Holy See, Mr Vecdi Türel, was wounded on April 17 in a gun attack in Rome, responsibility for the attack being claimed by the "Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide". (Mr Türel's predecessor as ambassador to the Holy See had been shot dead in 1977—see page 28600.)

The so-called "Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia" claimed responsibility (i) for the murder on July 31 of Mr Galip Ozman, an attaché at the Turkish embassy in Athens (whose daughter also died four days later from injuries received in the attack), and (ii) an attack on the Turkish consulate in Lyons on Aug. 5, when a gunman wounded four people.

Meanwhile it was announced on June 23 by the Netherlands Ministry of Justice that a Lebanese named as Mr Mustafa Hassan Ammer had been extradited from the United States to the Netherlands, where he was to face trial in connexion with the murder on Oct. 12, 1979, of Mr Ahmet Benler, the son of the Turkish ambassador to the Netherlands [see page 30134].

Military Coup and Associated Developments - Appointment of Cabinet under Adml. Ülüsü

The Turkish radio network broadcast on Sept. 12 at 3.15 a.m. a communiqué from the National Security Council and signed by Gen. Evren, announcing that the armed forces had taken over power in Turkey to forestall any further deterioration of the situation. Martial law was extended to all 67 provinces, Parliament was dissolved, DISK and its smaller right-wing counterpart MISK were banned and a curfew was imposed (although this was lifted in the afternoon of the same day due to the absence of any reported armed resistance). The airport at Ankara was temporarily closed.

Later statements issued during the day reported that Mr Demirel, Mr Ecevit and Mr Erbakan had been removed to military bases and placed under house arrest "for their own safety", while Gen. Türkes, who disappeared shortly before he was due to be arrested, was ordered to hand himself over to the authorities, which he did on Sept. 14. Some 50 National Assembly deputies were thought to have been arrested upon the lifting of the political immunity which they normally enjoyed, and an intensive search for extreme right- and left-wing terrorists began in all parts of Turkey (some 2,000 persons being reportedly arrested in Corum alone).

Gen. Evren made a televised statement later on Sept. 12 in which he said that a provisional constitution would be introduced pending the drawing up of a new constitution which would incorporate changes to the electoral system and new legislation on political parties.

"Starting from today, for a temporary period until a new government and legislative body are formed, executive and legislative powers will be exercised by the National Security Council . . . under my command. . . . In the shortest possible time the executive responsibilities will be transferred to a cabinet which the Council will name," Gen. Evren said, reaffirming also Turkey's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—which was shortly to begin manoeuvres in Turkey), and adding that Turkey would honour all international agreements and pursue a policy of good relations with its neighbours on the basis of "mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs".

The five-member National Security Council, which was formally sworn into office on Sept. 18, comprised Gen. Evren (who was referred to in a radio broadcast on Sept. 14 as the Turkish head of state); Gen. Nurettin Ersin (Commander of the Land Forces); Gen. Tahsin Sahinkaya (Commander of the Air Force); Adml. Nejat Tumer (Commander of the Navy); and Gen. Sedat Celasun (Commander of the Gendarmerie). Gen. Haydar Saltik, a former Commander of the Land Forces, was Secretary to the Council.

Upon taking power the Council held talks with Mr Hakki Aydinoglu (the director of the Turkish Central Bank whom Mr Ecevit had appointed in 1979 and whom Mr Demirel had tried in vain to remove) and Mr Turgut Özal, the chief economic adviser to the Demirel Government; an announcement published on Sept. 15 in the Official Gazette instructed the civil servants now managing all government departments to consult Mr Ozal on all except routine matters. Gen. Evren also on Sept. 14 ordered all striking workers to return to work, and instructed all employers of such strikers to award a 70 per cent pay increase pending any agreements on a final wage settlement.

Mr Ali Dincer, the Mayor of Ankara, was one of several mayors who were replaced during the following days by army officers, and troops were moved into a number of "liberated zones" which had hitherto been dominated by extreme organizations of the left or the right wing. The immediate effect of the coup was a marked reduction in the extent of political terrorism, which appeared to cease altogether in some areas. No deaths were reported in Turkey on Sept. 12, although on Sept. 14 an army captain was killed in Fatsa and on Sept. 17 a police inspector was killed in Istanbul. Tanks were reported to have withdrawn from Ankara on Sept. 14.

Official reactions to the coup in other countries were subdued but rarely unfavourable. Both the United States and West Germany stressed immediately that the events would not hold up their economic aid to Turkey. A meeting of the nine Foreign Ministers of the European Community member countries issued a statement on Sept. 16 in which it "noted with concern" the recent developments in Turkey, but added that, providing the National Security Council abided by its pledge to restore democratic rule in a short time, the Community's commercial and political relations with Turkey would not be affected. The Soviet news agency Tass reported the military takeover fully but without passing comment.

It was announced on Sept. 21 that a 26-member Cabinet comprising both military officers and civilians had been appointed under the premiership of Adml. Bülent Ülüsü, who had until recently been Commander of the Turkish Navy. Details of the formation of this Cabinet will be given in a subsequent article.—(Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Times - Financial Times - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - IMF, World Bank - OECD, Paris) (*Prev. rep. Financial Situation 29921 A; Demirel Government, Internal Security, 30133 A*)

A. PERU — Presidential and General Elections - Inauguration of President Belaúnde Terry and New Congress - Announcement of Political Amnesty and Press Measures - Relations with USSR

In the first general elections to be held since 1963 Sr Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected President of Peru on May 18 and assumed office on July 28 from Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez, bringing to an end 12 years of military rule. Two Vice-Presidents and a two-chamber Congress consisting of 60 senators and 180 deputies were elected at the same time, Sr Belaúnde's centre-right Popular Action party (AP) becoming the dominant formation in both chambers.

Sr Belaúnde had previously been elected President in 1963 but was overthrown towards the end of his six-year term on Oct. 3, 1968, by Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado, who immediately dissolved Congress [see 23101 A].

Sr Belaúnde (68), an architect and university professor, served as a deputy from 1945 to 1948, and in 1956 he founded the AP and ran for the presidency, losing to Dr Manuel Prado [see 15000 A]. After losing again in the 1962 elections, this time to Sr Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance

(APRA), Sr Belaúnde claimed that the poll had been fraudulent [see 18906 A]; the armed forces supported this contention, annulled the results and called fresh elections for 1963, in which Sr Belaúnde won an outright victory [see 19516 B]. However, AP lacked a majority in Congress and the resulting political instability, coupled with unrest in the country's interior, were among the factors leading to the military takeover in 1968. Sr Belaúnde was deported to Argentina and spent the ensuing years teaching at US universities until returning to Peru in 1977.

From 1975 onwards, following the replacement of Gen. Velasco (the architect of Peru's "military socialism") by Gen. Morales Bermúdez [see 27341 A], the military regime became increasingly unpopular and was widely regarded as having lost impetus and direction. An undertaking had been given to return the country to civilian rule by 1980 [see 28239 A; 28547 A; 28877 A] and a Constituent Assembly was elected in 1978 [see 29202 A] which drafted a new Constitution (entering into force on July 28, 1980—see 30022 A) as a preliminary step to the handover of power. Sr Belaúnde and the AP withdrew from the 1978 elections before they took place.

A total of 15 candidates contested the presidential elections, Sr Belaúnde winning 45.4 per cent of votes cast (i.e. well over the 36 per cent of votes constitutionally required for a candidate to win outright). In second place, with 27.4 per cent, was Sr Armando Villanueva del Campo representing APRA, and in third place Sr Luis Bedoya Reyes of the Christian Popular Party (PPC) with 9.6 per cent.

Candidates of the following five left-wing parties took an aggregate of 15.8 per cent of the vote: Revolutionary Left Union (Unir), led by Sr Horacio Zevallos, which won about 4 per cent; Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT), led by Sr Hugo Blanco; Popular Front of Workers, Peasants and Students (FOCEP), led by Sr Genaro Ledesma; United Left (UI), led by Gen. Leónidas Figueroa; and Popular Democratic Unity (UDP), led by Sr Alfonso Barrantes Lingán. The remainder of the vote was won by seven smaller parties including the traditional right-wing National Odríista Union (UNO).

The electorate numbered 6,500,000, and 62 per cent of those eligible cast their votes. For the first time the electorate included illiterates (making up 13 per cent, although many more failed to register to vote), Peruvians residing abroad, and those aged between 18 and 21, it being reported that over 60 per cent of the electorate were eligible to vote for the first time.

In the congressional elections the 60 senators were elected on a regional basis and the 180 deputies by proportional representation. The distribution of seats following the elections was as follows (Frenatraca or FNTC—National Front of Workers and Peasants):

	Deputies	Senators
AP	98	26
APRA	58	18
PPC	10	6
Frenatraca	4	1
Unir	2	2
UI	2	2
PRT	3	2
UDP	3	2
FOCEP	0	1
	180	60*

* In addition former President José Bustamante y Rivero (1945-48) held a non-elective seat in the Senate, in accordance with a constitutional provision for former Presidents of constitutional governments to be made life senators.

APRA (also known as the Aprista Party), hitherto Peru's leading political force, had been weakened by internal dissension since the death in 1979 of its veteran leader, Sr Haya de la Torre [see 30022 A], and in the 1980 elections it registered its lowest vote ever. The split between left and right subsequently deepened at a party congress in Trujillo on Aug. 3-4 when a group of delegates led by Sr Andrés Townsend Ezcurra (one of APRA's vice-presidential candidates), Sr Luis Alberto Sánchez and Sr Ramiro Prialé left the meeting and tried to convene an alternative one in opposition to the "democratic left" faction of Sr Villanueva; nevertheless a pro-Villanueva candidate, Sr Fernando León de Vivero, was elected as the new general secretary of APRA. Five people were injured in a shootout between rival factions after the congress ended.

In January 1980 the left had formed itself into two electoral blocs, both of which had, however, disintegrated by the time the electoral lists closed on Feb. 28. The United Left Front (FUI) under Sr Ledesma had consisted of FOCEP, the pro-Moscow Communist Party (PC-*Unidad*) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR). The Revolutionary Left Alliance (ARI) under Sr Blanco had comprised three Trotskyist and three Maoist groups, these being respectively the Workers' Socialist Party (PST), the Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT), the Revolutionary Marxist Labour Party (POMR), the UDP, the Unir and the Anti-imperialist Revolutionary Forces for Socialism (FRAS).

The composition of FOCEP had changed since the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections (when it won 12 per cent of the vote), notably by the withdrawal of the Trotskyist groups which formed part of the ARI.

In a congressional ceremony on July 28, Sr Belaúnde and his two Vice-Presidents, Sr Fernando Schwalb López Aldana and Sr Javier Alva Orlandini, were sworn in for five-year terms by Dr Oscar Trelles Montes, the new president of Congress, who had been Prime Minister under Sr Belaúnde in 1963.

Guests from over 80 countries included President Luis Herrera Campins of Venezuela, President Julio César Turbay Ayala of Colombia, President Rodrigo Carazo Odio of Costa Rica, Sr Adolfo Suárez González (the Spanish Prime Minister) and Mrs Rosalynn Carter (wife of the US President). No prominent military representatives attended the ceremony, Gen. Morales Bermúdez's last act having been to attend mass in Lima Cathedral with the foreign delegations and the outgoing Government before the inauguration.

In his first address to the nation Sr Belaúnde on July 28 announced the re-establishment of a constitutional regime and press freedom [see below], the observance of human rights and the reintroduction of a Ministry of Justice. He called for a peaceful social climate in which to carry out his plans for creating 1,000,000 new jobs and for introducing a wages policy, and he announced that local elections would be held without delay (these being subsequently set for Nov. 23).

In the economic field Sr Belaúnde planned to expand the petroleum and mining sectors in a move to generate foreign exchange and to pay off the foreign debt (currently amounting to over $7,000 million). He announced plans to extend and improve the road network, to develop the jungle areas (a key policy feature of his previous mandate), to increase agricultural and food production and to provide incentives to industry. Educational and health programmes were foreseen, including a literacy campaign. Sr Belaúnde predicted that inflation, which had attained 67 per cent by the end of 1979, would reach 60 per cent by the end of 1980 (in contrast to the figure of 40 per cent given earlier by the outgoing Finance Minister, Dr Javier Silva Ruete).

A predominantly AP Government, which included, however, also two PPC ministers and three retired officers, was sworn in later on July 28, its composition being as follows:

Dr Manuel Ulloa Elias (AP)	Prime Minister, Economy, Finance and Commerce
Dr Javier Arias Stella (AP)	Foreign Affairs
Dr José María de la Jara y Ureta (AP)	Interior
Dr Luis Felipe Alarco (AP)	Education
Sr Eduardo Orrego Villacorta (AP)	Transport and Communications
Dr Niels Ericson (AP)	Agriculture
Dr Uriel García Cáceres (AP)	Health
Dr Alfonso Grados Bertorini (ind.)	Labour
Dr Felipe Osterling Parodi (PPC)	Justice
Dr Roberto Rotondo Mendoza (PPC)	Industry, Integration and Tourism
Sr Javier Velarde Aspillaga (AP)	Housing and Construction
Sr René Deústua (AP)	Fisheries
Sr Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (ind.)	Energy and Mines
Gen. (rtd.) Jorge Muñiz Luna	War
Adml. (rtd.) Mario Castro Mendoza	Navy
Gen. (rtd.) José Gagliardi	Air Force

Dr Ricardo Webb was appointed president of the Central Bank, Sr Carlos Pestana (AP) head of the Institute of National Planning and Popular Co-operation, and Sr Miguel Alva Orlandini head of the National Information Service (Sinadi).

Several members of the Cabinet had served under Sr Belaúnde during his first term of office. **Dr Ulloa**, a former newspaper director, had been Finance Minister at the time of the 1968 coup and subsequently went into exile until 1977. **Dr Arias Stella**, formerly Minister of Health, was currently secretary-general of Popular Action. **Sr Kuczynski** had been a manager of the Central Bank and spent the military years in exile; **Sr Deústua**, who had also been in exile, had worked for the Inter-American Development Bank.

Prior to the elections Gen. Fernando Velit Sabattini, the then Interior Minister, had resigned on May 5 after being accused of involvement in smuggling domestic appliances; he had been replaced by Gen. César Iglesias Barrón.

It was announced on Aug. 2 that Gen. Pedro Richter Prada, who had held the post of Prime Minister and other ministerial positions under the military Government, had been appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces (retaining his post as C.-in-C. of the Army—see 29564 A) *vice* Gen. Rafael Hoyos Rubio (for whose appointment in 1979 see 30063 A). Later in August it was announced that Gen. Richter, who was also secretary of the National Defence Council, would attend cabinet meetings.

Economic and Press Measures - General Political Amnesty

Dr Ulloa told the press at the end of July that price controls would be removed from basic food items and subsidies removed from petrol and public utility tariffs, but that to help offset the effect of these measures the minimum wage would shortly be increased. (Dr Ulloa subsequently announced in late August a 15 per cent wage increase for public and private sector workers together with a bonus of 8,000 soles per person—equivalent to about $30.)

Also at the end of July Sr Kuczynski, the Energy and Mines Minister, said that large-scale investment would be necessary in agriculture, housing and mining to create new jobs, and that foreign investors should be encouraged to take on large mining development projects, which had hitherto been the sole responsibility of the state concern Mineroperú and which had mostly come to a halt under the military Government.

Unemployment in Peru was currently estimated at 9 per cent of the national working population, although underemployment—i.e. casual employment or that remunerated by less than the minimum wage—was estimated to affect 50 per cent. *Le Monde* commented in July that although profound structural changes had taken place in Peru since 1968, such as the 1969 land reform which had ended the feudal land system [see 24164 C] and the nationalization of principal sectors, the daily average consumption of calories per head had fallen in the past 12 years from 2,200 to 1,300 and half the population was undernourished.

Following a poor performance over the years 1975-78 Peru's economy began to improve in 1979-80, largely due to increases in export revenue from minerals, oil and fish. At the end of 1979 Dr Silva Ruete had introduced financial measures designed to restore effective purchasing power, which was reported to have dropped by almost half since 1973; they included a cost-of-living bonus of 3,000 soles (about $12) a month for public and private sector employees, an increase in the minimum wage by 3,000 soles a month (to 18,000 soles in Lima) coupled with an automatic increase in income-tax allowances, and an increase in the ceiling on state pensions to 72,000 soles. In March 1980 Dr Silva Ruete announced a public spending programme of 45,000 million soles ($180,000,000) for job creation schemes, subsidization of the sugar industry and drought relief in the north.

In implementation of Sr Belaúnde's undertakings the new Government on July 29 returned to their former publishers and editors the country's seven major newspapers, which had been expropriated in 1974 [see 26683 A] and handed over to "organized sectors of the community" in 1975 [see page 27342 and also page 29203]. Those affected were *El Comercio, La Prensa, Correo, Ojo, Ultima Hora, Extra* and *Expreso*. It was also announced that the two main private television stations expropriated by the military Government were to be returned to private ownership.

Congress had also immediately upon convening on July 28 approved bills granting a general political amnesty and reinstating public sector workers, notably teachers belonging to the radical union SUTEP [see 30022 A and page 29203] who had been dismissed by the military Government. However, a broader left-sponsored bill providing for reinstatement of all dismissed workers including those in the private sector failed to win the approval of the Senate at this stage.

Dispute with Argentina

Following allegations in the Peruvian press in June that Peruvian intelligence agents had with the consent of the military Government collaborated with Argentinian agents in the abduction of a number of Argentinian exiles in Lima earlier that month, Sr Belaúnde (then President-elect) was reported to have made representations in Buenos Aires to ensure that President Videla did not attend his inauguration on July 28. With APRA and other opposition groups furthermore threatening to stage demonstrations if he attended, President Videla subsequently cancelled his projected visit to Peru.

The Peruvian Interior Ministry said on June 17 that three Argentinians, described as "subversive delinquents", had been detained in Lima and subsequently deported to Bolivia on the grounds that their documents were not in order. However, the outgoing Foreign Minister, Sr Arturo García, said that his department had no knowledge of the deportations, while Sra Lydia Gueiler, then President of Bolivia, denied that the three had entered Bolivia and stated that she would not attend Sr Belaúnde's inauguration unless an explanation was provided. [In the event Bolivia was not represented at the inauguration because of the overthrow of Sra Gueiler on July 17 by a military junta.] Amnesty International also claimed at the end of June that two other Argentinian exiles had been tortured to death by Argentinian agents at a Peruvian army centre near Lima. Sr Belaúnde promised that he would hold a full parliamentary investigation into the affair as soon as he took office.

One of those reportedly detained, Sra Noemí Esther Gianetti (54), was a member of the "Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo", an organization grouping relatives of missing persons in Argentina. Her dead body was subsequently found in a flat in Madrid on July 21.

Internal Security Incidents Prior to Elections

A number of internal security incidents which took place in February and March 1980 are described below.

On Feb. 7 a state of emergency was imposed and constitutional guarantees suspended in the south-eastern Andean town of Cuzco after 600 Civil Guards mutinied on Feb. 5 (the fifth anniversary of a similar episode in Lima—see 27001 A). The mutiny, which was in support of increased pay, the release of policemen allegedly held for labour agitation, and the dismissal of the director-general of the Civil Guard, Gen. Humberto Passano Nieto (whose brother was in custody on smuggling charges), came to an end after troops were brought in to the town.

In March a state of emergency was imposed in some of the jungle areas along the eastern flank of the country in order to facilitate police operations to halt the illegal cocaine trade by destroying coca plantations. At the same time Maj.-Gen. (rtd.) Frank Tweddle Granda, a former president of the national airline, Aeroperú, was arrested at Lima airport with a suitcase of cocaine.

During a period of intensive labour unrest in 1980 which continued right up to the presidential inauguration in July, a group of 10 striking telephone workers on Feb. 8 peacefully occupied part of the Spanish embassy in Lima and said that they would not leave until the Government gave attention to their pay demands. Six of the strikers who remained inside the embassy until Feb. 12 were removed by police without violence.

Further Purchase of Soviet Military Aircraft - Soviet Aid for Power and Irrigation Project

It was announced on March 12 that Peru had confirmed an order for the purchase from the Soviet Union of a further 16 Su-22 fighter-bombers worth $120,000,000, in addition to the 36 purchased in 1976 when provision was made for payment over 10 years at a 2 per cent interest rate [see page 28240]. According to *Le Monde*, other Soviet military matériel in use by the Peruvian armed forces included T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, SAM-3 and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, Mi-8 helicopters, and artillery.

Le Monde also stated that Peru had ordered 37 Mirage-5 ground attack aircraft from France since 1967, and that the first of six fast patrol vessels on order from France, designed to carry 45 crew and equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, had been delivered at the end of 1979.

A Soviet loan of $300,000,000 which had been agreed in April 1980 for the large-scale Olmos irrigation and power project was confirmed following the election of Sr Belaúnde. The project, the largest of its kind in South America, involved the construction of a tunnel to bring water from the Amazon basin in the north-east to the arid north Peruvian coast and would, it was estimated, take 15 years to complete at a cost of some $1,000 million.—(Peruvian Embassy, London - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Latin America Weekly Report - Bank of London and South America Review - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - El Diario de Marka, Lima) (*Prev. rep. 30022 A*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Government Change - New Government Spokesman in House of Lords

The appointment was announced on Sept. 22 of the Earl of Avon, son of the former Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary [see 28339 B], as a Lord in Waiting and government spokesman in the House of Lords on the environment, transport and the arts in succession to Lord Mowbray, Segrave and Stourton, who had resigned on Sept. 2 to take up a business appointment. (Times - Daily Telegraph) (*Prev. rep. 29681 A*)

A. SWITZERLAND — Opening of St Gotthard Road Tunnel

The St Gotthard road tunnel, currently the longest in the world, was completed during mid-1980 after more than 10 years of construction work and was officially opened to traffic on Sept. 5, 1980, by Dr Hans Hürlimann, the Swiss Minister of the Interior. The 10.1-mile (16.3-km) tunnel ran under the St Gotthard massif at a maximum height above sea level of about 1,175 metres, connecting Göschenen in the canton of Uri with Airolo in the southern canton of Ticino and providing an all-weather alternative to the 2,108-metre St Gotthard pass, with a saving of some two hours to traffic using the N2 motorway between the north and the south of Switzerland; it was thus expected to ease particularly the passage of heavy goods and seasonal tourist traffic between West Germany and Italy. The Seelisberg tunnel to the north-west of Airolo was due to open in December 1980. (Göschenen and Airolo had been joined by a rail tunnel since 1882.)



(*Carpress*)

Completion of the tunnel, which was started in May 1970 [see 24068 B; 29488 A], had been delayed due to unexpected geological conditions, and consequently the final cost of construction totalled 686,000,000 Swiss francs (about £175,000,000), compared with the 1969 estimate of 306,000,000 francs. Most of the costs were met by the Swiss Government; no tolls, however, were to be charged for its use.—(Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. 29488 A*)

B. TURKEY - UNITED STATES — Agreement on Use of US Military Bases in Turkey

An agreement was signed on March 29 by Mr Hayrettin Erkmen, the then Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr James W. Spain, the US ambassador to Turkey, permitting the United States to use 12 military bases in Turkey in return for a package of military and development aid which was not disclosed in detail but which was believed to include the $450,000,000 worth of assistance incorporated in the United States foreign military aid authorization bill for the fiscal year 1980 [see page 30135]. The agreement specified that the bases were to be used "only within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]", that each base was to be commanded by a Turkish officer, and that all use of the bases by the United States was to be subject to the approval of the Turkish authorities.

The bases concerned were the NATO air base at Incirlik, near Adana in southern Turkey; four intelligence-gathering stations at Sinop, Kargaburun, Belbasi and Pirinclik (Diyarbakir—see page 30135); and seven communications stations at Yamanlar (near Izmir), Karatas (near Adana), Sahintepe, Elmadag (near Ankara), Mahmudiye (central western Turkey), Alemdag (near Istanbul) and Kurecik (central eastern Turkey). The agreement did not cover a further 13 former US bases which had been considered of less importance.

The original 25 US bases in Turkey had been closed in 1975 [see 27337 A] following the refusal of the United States to lift an arms embargo imposed after the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey [see 26661 A; 26709 A]. A provisional arrangement for US use of the four intelligence bases had been agreed in late 1978 following the lifting of the embargo [see 29301 A], and its term of effect had since then been extended on a number of occasions [see page 30135] pending the finalization of the new agreement (an outline of which had been initialled on Jan. 10, 1980—ibid.), which was to operate for a term of five years.—(Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Times - Financial Times - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin) (*Prev. rep. 30133 A*)

C. ST KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA — General Election in Anguilla - Relations between Anguilla and St Kitts-Nevis - Internal Developments in St Kitts-Nevis

A general election was held in Anguilla on May 28, 1980, under the 1976 Constitution which had given the island de facto status as a separate British dependency while remaining de jure a part of the Associated State of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla [see 28267 A]. Six of the seven elective seats in the Legislative Assembly were won by the Anguilla United Party led by Mr Ronald Webster, the remaining seat being won by the leader of the Anguilla National Alliance, Mr Emile Gumbs.

Mr Webster and Mr Gumbs had each been originally elected to the outgoing Assembly for the People's Progressive Party, which had won six seats in the March 1976 general election (see 28267 A, where it is referred to as the Progressive People's Party); Mr Webster had subsequently been succeeded as Chief Minister by Mr Gumbs after losing a vote of confidence in February 1977 [ibid.]. It was reported by *The Guardian* of May 30 that the 1980 election campaign was "fought mainly on personalities".

The following elected members of the Legislative Assembly were appointed to the Executive Council after the election: Mr Ronald Webster (Chief Minister and Minister of Communications and Works); Mr Hubert Hughes (Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism); and Mr Claudius Roberts (Minister of Social Services). (The remaining members of the Executive Council were the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary and the Chief Secretary, all appointed ex officio, and Her Majesty's Commissioner for Anguilla, who presided over meetings of the Council and held responsibility for defence, external affairs, internal security, the public service, the judiciary and the audit.)

Mr Webster announced that it was his party's intention to seek full internal self-government for Anguilla, and that he had accordingly appointed Dr William Herbert as a constitutional adviser. Dr Herbert was also an adviser to the Government which had taken office in St Kitts-Nevis some months earlier [see 30275 A], and his new appointment was seen as an important step towards an eventual constitutional settlement of the long-standing dispute within the Associated State.

The new St Kitts-Nevis Government's policy on the Anguilla question had been set out by the Premier, Dr Kennedy Simmonds (in an interview published in *Insight* of May 1980), as follows:

> "This Government would place no stumbling-block in the way of Anguilla in respect of their desire to achieve a new constitution, whether it be independence, associated statehood, or being controlled from Britain, . . . but being a new Government, particularly a coalition, . . . it is unfair to expect us to undertake the final resolution of the Anguilla situation at this time by ourselves. Our position is that if the British Government want to go ahead and pass any bill . . . they would meet no resistance from us; in fact we would applaud it. We would welcome Anguilla on equal terms either as an independent country, an associated state or whatever. We look forward to continuing excellent relations between ourselves and Anguilla."

In recognition of the de facto constitutional position, the Simmonds Government deleted the word Anguilla from postage stamps issued in St Kitts-Nevis.

Other measures introduced by the Simmonds Government during its first months in office included the reduction of the voting age to 18 years and the abolition of personal income tax. The 1980-81 budget provided for revenue to be derived mainly from indirect taxation, including notably a 2 per cent charge on all outward foreign currency transactions, which was criticized by the opposition St Kitts Labour Party as a regressive measure which would have the greatest effect on the least well-off in view of the territory's almost total reliance on imported goods.

In mid-1980 Dr Simmonds stated that the previous Labour Government had "left debts, mainly in overdrafts, totalling 37,000,000 East Caribbean dollars" (i.e. about £6,000,000), while Mr Michael O. Powell (Minister of Agriculture, Lands, Housing, Labour and Tourism) accused the previous Government of "blatant corruption". Labour Party spokesmen dismissed these allegations as groundless, stating that their Government had in fact left a surplus of EC$1,900,000. (Insight - Guardian - Globe and Mail, Toronto - Times) (*Prev. rep. Anguilla 28267 A; St Kitts-Nevis 30275 A*)

NOV 24 1980
University of North Carolina

A. ANGOLA — Commencement of Elections to People's Power Organs - Government Reorganization - South African Incursions into Angolan Territory - Execution of Members of UNITA - Developments in Cabinda

It was announced on Aug. 19 by the official news agency Angop that a 206-member National People's Assembly would be installed in November 1980 to replace the existing Council of the Revolution as the supreme organ of state (as provided for in the Constitution promulgated at the time of independence in 1975), and that provincial people's assemblies would also be elected. Voting for electoral colleges which would choose the members of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies accordingly began on Aug. 23 in the southern province of Cunene, most candidates being members of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Party of Labour (MPLA-PT)—the country's sole legal political party.

A national commission to study the implementation of people's power had held its first session on Feb. 16, 1980.

Government Reorganization - Economic Difficulties

A number of ministerial changes were announced on July 8 and 12 including the appointment of a new Defence Minister to replace Cdr. Iko Teles Carreira, who was relieved of his post on Feb. 10, 1980, and whose functions had since then been controlled ad interim by President dos Santos and the Army Chief of Staff [see 30274 B]. In changes to the structure of the Council of Ministers (i) a Ministry of State Security was created, (ii) the Industry and Energy Ministry was divided into two and (iii) the Ministry of Housing and Construction was divided into a ministry and a secretariat. The membership of the Council of Ministers incorporating the latest changes was as follows:

* Lt.-Col. Manuel Alexandre Eduardo Rodrigues Quito	Interior
†Mr Kundi Paihama	State Security
* Col. Pedro Maria Tonha Pedale	Defence
Mr Paulo Teixeira Jorge	Foreign Affairs
Mr Roberto Antonio Victor Francisco Almeida	Planning
Mr Carlos Alberto van Dunen	Internal Trade
Mr Lopo Fortunato Ferreira do Nascimento	External Trade
Dr Diogenes Assis Boavida	Justice
†Cdr. Pedro de Castro dos Santos van Dunen Loi	Energy
Maj. José Alberto do Carmo Bento Ribeiro	Industry
* Maj. Domingos Evaristo Quimba	Provincial Co-ordination
* Mr Agostinho André Mendes de Carvalho	Health
†Mr Horacio Pereira Braz da Silva	Labour and Social Security
* Mr Manuel Alves dos Passos Barroso Mangueira	Construction
Mr Emilio José Guerra de Carvalho	Fisheries
Mr Manuel Pedro Pacavira	Agriculture
Mr Fernando Fausto Muteka	Transport and Communications
Mr Ambrosio Lucoque	Education
Mr Ismael Gaspar Martins	Finance
Mr Jorge Morais	Petroleum

*New appointment. †Changed portfolio.

Lt.-Col. Rodrigues Quito was hitherto Deputy Minister of Internal Order [see page 30028], **Mr Paihama** Interior Minister, **Col. Tonha Pedale** Deputy Defence Minister, **Cdr. Van Dunen Loi** Minister of Provincial Co-ordination, **Maj. Evaristo Quimba** provincial governor of Cuanza Norte, **Mr Braz da Silva** Minister of Housing and Construction and **Mr Barroso Mangueira** Deputy Minister of Housing and Construction.

The deputy ministers, among whom further appointments were announced in mid-September, were as follows: Mr Venancio da Mouro (Foreign Affairs), Mr João Fernandes* (Health), Mr Mariano Garcia Puku (Interior), Mr Joaquim da Silva Matias* (Basic Education), Mr Sebastião de Sousa* (Finance), Mr Augusto Teixeira de Matos* (Budget), Mr Florencio Gamaleal Gaspar Martins (Internal Trade), Mr Paulino Pinto João (External Trade), Mr Julio de Almeida (Transport), Mr Celestino Tavares Ribeiro* (Communications), Mr Geramo Gomes (Agriculture), Mr Graciano Mangue* (Forestry), Mr Luis Fonseca* (Construction). (* New appointment.)

Mr Lourenço José Ferreira Diandengue (previously Deputy Minister of State Security) was appointed Secretary of State for Housing, the other secretaries of state in the Council being Mr Antonio Jacinto do Amaral Martins (Culture), Mr Rui Alberto Vieira Dias Mingas (Physical Education and Sport), Mrs Maria da Assunção Vahekenny (Social Affairs).

The following new provincial governors (commissars) were also appointed: Mr Francisco Gomes de Oliveira e Silva (Luanda), Mr Jacinto Pascual Fortunato (Bengo—a new province created in June 1980 by dividing Luanda province, Caxito being designated its capital), Mr Noe [Nogueira] da Silva Saude (Cuanza Norte), Col. Ludi Kissasunda (Malanje). (Mr Silva Saude was previously Minister of Labour and Social Security.)

The government changes took place at a time of economic crisis when the country's security also continued to be threatened by South African incursions in the south as well as operations carried out by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the pro-Western guerrilla movement led by Dr Jonas Savimbi and allegedly supported by South Africa [see below].

At an extraordinary session of the central committee of the MPLA-PT in Luanda on May 28-30, 1980, it had been concluded that the economic crisis was due fundamentally to a drop in production, factors of a "structural and organizational nature", the "capitalist general crisis" and "continued South African acts of aggression", as well as "the poor performance of some sectors of the state apparatus". It was decided inter alia to "revise the structures of government", to give priority support to rural areas, to study ways of encouraging private initiatives in the economic field, to take urgent measures to "normalize supplies to the people and to economic and social sectors", and also to recommend the "reactivation of production farms" for the rehabilitation of those sabotaging or destroying state property or hindering the production process.

An extraordinary congress of the MPLA-PT was due to take place in December 1980 to approve economic plans for 1981-85.

Mid-1980 South African Incursions into Angola - UN Security Council Resolution - Earlier Angolan-South African Clashes

South African military forces entered Angola on June 7 across the Namibian border and over the following three weeks carried out the largest-scale operations to date in Angola's southern border provinces of Cunene and Cuando-Cubango. Angola protested to the UN Security Council at the incursions and claimed that 2,000-3,000 South African troops had been involved and that some 400 Angolan civilians and dozens of soldiers had been killed. South Africa claimed to have killed more than 360 SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) guerrillas and to have lost 17 men, a high figure compared with previous incidents.

The incursions took place against a background of UN efforts to bring about a ceasefire in the Namibia conflict and to establish a demilitarized zone along both sides of the Namibian-Angolan border [see page 29914], although no agreement had yet been reached with the main parties in the conflict, South Africa and SWAPO. Moreover, UNITA threatened to take "appropriate action" if any UN force interfered in "UNITA territory" and also demanded to be represented at talks. [UNITA's forces were thought to be concentrated in central Angola and in the extreme south, with some zones of influence also in the north and other areas.]

The entry of South African troops into Cunene province (on June 7) was officially disclosed to the South African Parliament on June 13 by the Prime Minister, Mr P. W. Botha, who said that SWAPO's operational headquarters had been destroyed in a "shock attack" during which Angolan troops had avoided contact with the South Africans.

On the same day the Angolan Defence Ministry claimed that three out of six South African Mirage fighter-bombers which attacked a refugee camp the previous week at Lubango (formerly Sá de Bandeira), some 300 miles north of the border, had been shot down; it was subsequently disclosed from Luanda on June 18 that in the confusion an Angolan civilian aircraft had also been shot down by Angolan guns, all those on board being killed.

A South African military spokesman said on June 14 that "the final phase of withdrawal, and the operation, can be considered completed". However, a communiqué from the Angolan Defence Ministry on June 27 claimed that a South African force had remained inside Angola since June 7; that between June 7 and 23 this force, numbering about 2,000 and supported by three Mirage squadrons, had carried out a number of actions in Cunene province, notably the occupation of Mulemba (west of Ngiva and some 20 miles north of the border) on June 8 by two parachute companies and of Chifufua on June 10; and that 300 civilians and seven Angolan soldiers had been killed and 250 people wounded when South Africans "attacked the population, killing indiscriminately old people, women and children and shooting cattle". The communiqué claimed that one of the aims of the invasion was to install UNITA in the area demarcated for the proposed demilitarized zone.

Furthermore, the Angolan authorities subsequently claimed that on June 24 another South African infantry brigade had entered Angola, supported by a tank regiment and two long-range artillery units, and that the invasion had at this stage spread eastwards to the neighbouring province of Cuando-Cubango. Luanda claimed that the village of Katomba was attacked on June 25, causing many casualties, and that M'Pupa village (some 40 miles from the border) was also raided by helicopters on June 27.

Mr Eliseo de Figueiredo, the Angolan permanent representative at the United Nations, called on June 26 for an urgent meeting of the Security Council and told the press on the next day that there was fierce fighting in the two southern provinces; he also alleged that more than 15 battalions of South African troops (i.e. of 750 men each) were massing at Grootfontein, some 150 miles south of the Namibian border. Mr Figueiredo said that if Angolan forces were unable to repulse South African troops Angola would call for outside help. (However, Mr Lucio Lara, a member of the MPLA-PT political bureau, said at the end of June that as long as fighting was restricted to the border provinces Cuban troops would not be brought into the fighting so as not to internationalize the conflict.)

In a letter to the Security Council on June 27 Mr R. F. (Pik) Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, denied Angola's charges of large-scale troop activities as "ludicrous" and stated that only a small combat force with air support was in southern Angola, fighting SWAPO, and that this was now withdrawing. South Africa had, he said, at no time acted against Angolan troops except on June 23 when, during anti-SWAPO activities, a helicopter was shot down and the pilot, in fighting his way out, killed several Angolan soldiers who had already shot dead the flight engineer.

Later on June 27 the Security Council passed a resolution by 12 votes to none with three abstentions (Britain, France and the USA) condemning South Africa's "persistent armed invasions" of Angola and demanding the immediate withdrawal of all its forces and the payment of compensation. The resolution also condemned South Africa for using Namibia as a "springboard for armed invasions and destabilization" against Angola and added that, in the event of further violations of Angolan sovereignty by South Africa, the Security Council would consider more effective measures including the imposition of sanctions.

At the end of June further Angolan Government statements and military sources said that, notwithstanding the Security Council's resolution (and a South African assurance to the Security Council on June 30 that all its forces had been pulled back), eight battalions of troops entering south of Savate and at two points east and west of Ngiva (the provincial capital) were occupying "vast areas" of Cunene and had installed a command post at Mulemba and occupied Mongua (60 miles west of Mulemba) and Evale; according to these accounts, between June 24 and 29 South African and Angolan troops had clashed violently in Mongua, leaving 19 Angolans dead and 23 wounded, while two South African helicopters had been shot down.

At a press conference on the border on July 2 Maj.-Gen. Jan Geldenhuys, then commander of South African forces in Namibia, said that a major blow had been dealt to SWAPO's army during the raids of the past three weeks and that a new SWAPO military campaign had been forestalled. At least 360 guerrillas had been killed (as well as 17 South Africans) and 300 tonnes of equipment seized, leaving the organization weakened and with its overall numbers estimated at less than 8,000; however, care had been taken, he said, to avoid contact with Angolan civilians and also with troops, with whom there had been only two clashes.

After the completion of the main South African operation border incidents involving SWAPO and South Africans persisted.

A South African spokesman said on July 28 that the previous day South African troops had pursued SWAPO guerrillas into Angola after the latter had shelled the town of Ruacana, just south of the border. In another operation, which South Africa said on July 31 was aimed at stopping SWAPO from infiltrating Kaokoland (north-west Namibia) by a new route from Lubango passing through Chitado, situated a few miles north of the border, the latter town was raided on July 30 by a small helicopter-borne force of South Africans, 27 guerrillas and Angolan soldiers being killed.

In mid-August (i.e. the week before the elections in Cunene province—see above) the Angolan Defence Ministry disclosed that South Africa had made repeated attacks on Ngiva and that air reconnaissance flights had increased over the past few days, covering towns more than 200 miles from the Namibian border. Another Defence Ministry communiqué of Sept. 3 said that at least 31 Angolans had been killed in these operations, including 15 in an attack on Xiède by two Mirages on Aug. 26.

Earlier South African Military Action in Angola - UNITA Hostilities against Government Forces

The Angolan news agency Angop reported on July 31 that during the period January to June 1980 South Africa had carried out 529 violations of Angolan territory. Unofficial estimates in the press said that over this period 432 guerrillas and 59 South Africans had been killed.

Earlier incidents involving South African troops in southern Angola between late 1979 and May 1980 are detailed below. (For incidents prior to September 1979 see 29913 A and page 29776.)

Mr Luis d'Almeida, the Angola ambassador to Belgium, said in early November 1979 that South Africa had begun air raids into Angola on Sept. 11, 1979, the day after President Neto's death [see 30027 A], and had bombed economic targets in an effort to take advantage of the political vacuum, weaken Angola's reconstruction process and frighten away potential investors. Angola claimed at the end of September that 60 people had been killed and 126 wounded in raids on towns in Cunene and Huíla provinces on Sept. 27.

Angola on Oct. 31, 1979, requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council and accused South Africa of launching a two-pronged attack deep into Angola using helicopter-borne troops, blowing up a railway tunnel and four bridges on the Lubango-Moçamedes road, and landing troops in Porto Alexandre and Virei; Angolan radio claimed that 18 civilians and two soldiers had lost their lives. Accordingly, the Security Council met on Nov. 2 and adopted by 12 votes to none with three abstentions (Britain, France and the USA) a resolution calling on South Africa to respect Angolan sovereignty and for urgent assistance to be given to Angola and the other southern African front-line states to strengthen their defence capacity.

A South African Army spokesman said on Nov. 29 that his troops had in the past week killed 68 guerrillas and destroyed SWAPO camps during hot-pursuit raids across Namibia's northern border; seven guerrillas and one South African had been killed on the Namibian side of the border.

During a border clash followed by a hot-pursuit operation on Feb. 7, 1980, a total of 19 guerrillas and six South Africans were killed, and at the end of the month Angola accused South Africa of killing eight people in air raids and of massing troops on the border.

Acting on a request from Angola the Security Council again convened on March 28, when it passed a resolution by 12 votes to none with three abstentions (Britain, France and the USA) condemning South Africa for its "premeditated, persistent and sustained invasions" of Angola and calling for an immediate end to such "provocative" acts. The preamble to the resolution expressed the conviction that the intensity and timing of the raids were aimed at frustrating a negotiated settlement of the Nambia conflict.

The Angolan Chief of Staff said at the end of May that an escalation of South African activities against Angola had begun earlier in the month, although officials in Cunene province had been reporting intense air raids since the beginning of 1980 as well as the shelling of major roads. He said that raids carried out on May 21 against small towns about 50 miles inside the Angolan border had left more than 200 people dead and many injured, and that many hostages had been taken.

Meanwhile UNITA's leader, Dr Savimbi, stated on Feb. 1 that 20,000 Angolans spearheaded by a force of 5,000 Cubans had been attacking his forces since early January on four fronts, in the central provinces of Benguela, Huambo, Bié and Moxico, in order to gain control of these areas and to prevent further sabotage of the Benguela railway and allow it to reopen. [For the subsequent reported reopening of the railway in July 1980, see 30561 A.]

The Governor of Huambo province, Lt.-Col. André Pitra, told journalists in July that government forces had made considerable advances against UNITA in the area in 1980, capturing 150 officers and their men as well as destroying their major bases, while the Governor of Bié, Col. Jamba Ya Mina, said that more than 1,000 members of UNITA had surrendered. Lt.-Col. Pitra added that the Government was also concentrating on bringing the peasant population out of the bush whither it had fled and overcoming the distrust of the MPLA-PT which had been instilled in them by UNITA. Some 800,000 peasants had already emerged in the two provinces since the New Year, according to the officials, and many were completely destitute.

The Angolan Foreign Minister, Mr Jorge, told a press conference in Freetown (Sierra Leone) on June 30 following a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Foreign Ministers [see 30557 A] that Cuban troops would stay in Angola until Namibia was independent and South Africa could no longer threaten Angola militarily; he said, however, that the majority of Cubans in Angola were civilians who would remain even after troops had left. (Dr Savimbi had claimed in November 1979 that there were 34,000 Cubans in Angola, compared with a figure of 20,000-30,000 put forward by Western intelligence sources.)

Reaffirming Angola's relations with Cuba, President dos Santos arrived in Havana on March 17, 1980, for a two-day visit.

Following the arrest of 124 people on June 25 in connexion with a UNITA bombing campaign mounted in Luanda, Huambo and other areas over the past two years [see 29501 A], (i) 16 members of UNITA were executed on Aug. 5 after being sentenced to death on July 29, when seven others received prison sentences of between 12 and 24 years and four were acquitted; and (ii) nine members of UNITA were executed on Aug. 24 after being sentenced on Aug. 21 in Huambo, five others receiving prison terms of between two and 20 years.

In response to the first death sentences UNITA threatened to plant bombs for each of its members condemned, the Angolan authorities reporting on Aug. 11 that a bomb had exploded on the previous night at the installations of the national oil company near Lobito, setting fire to oil tanks. After the executions had been carried out the movement said that its "tribunal of resistance to the Angolan people" had condemned to death and executed 15 prisoners belonging to the government armed forces.

(The death penalty had been restored in Angola in June 1978 by the late President Neto for crimes against state security and endangering the revolution. The penalty applied to civilians as well as foreigners in Angola who "committed treason, spied, damaged military installations or matériel, exposed the country to armed aggression, or spread false information damaging to the good name of Angola".)

The Situation in Cabinda

A communiqué delivered on April 1, 1980, to the office of Agence France-Presse (AFP) in Kinshasa (Zaïre) by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) stated that FLEC's president, Mr Henrique N'Zita Tiago (who had also been declared head of the provisional Cabinda Government established in 1977—see page 28489), had been mortally wounded on Dec. 21, 1979, in a clash with Cuban forces in the Cabindan bush. FLEC had confirmed Mr Tiago as its president at the second congress of the Cabindan armed forces on Feb. 15-20, 1979, in the "liberated zone" of Safica.

According to a communiqué of Aug. 11, 1979, a new splinter group of FLEC known as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda (MPLC) had been established on June 1 by the "Armed Forces for the Liberation of Cabinda" (FALC). It described itself as a "progressive" movement which was not hostile to the West, said that an executive committee had been elected, headed by Maj. Vicente Balenda, and claimed that FLEC itself was guilty of "irresponsible and overtly imperialist acts" and was exploiting Cabinda's resources. (Other FLEC splinter groups included the Military Command for the Liberation of Cabinda—see page 28893.)

Mr Francisco Xauter Lubota, reportedly the leader of FLEC operations in Cabinda, claimed in Brussels in June 1979 that FLEC's forces of about 7,000 men held 30 per cent of the territory of Cabinda and that there were 8,000 Cubans, 2,000 Angolan soldiers and 400 Hungarian military personnel in the enclave. He said that 150,000 Cabindans (half the enclave's population) had fled to Zaïre since 1975, that the Angolan Government was "illegally occupying" the enclave, and that the human rights of the Cabindans had been violated and its people subjected to "Marxist indoctrination" in Cuba and the USSR.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Cape Times - West Africa - Africa Confidential - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Le Monde - Financial Times) (*Prev. rep. Government Changes 29501 A, 30027 A, 30274 B; South Africa 29039 A, 29501 A, page 29776, 29913 A; Relations with Zaïre and Zambia 30426 A; OAU Resolutions on South African Incursions 30557 A*)

A. WORLD BANK — New Members

It was announced on Sept. 30, that Dominica, Seychelles and Zimbabwe had all become members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), with subscriptions, in terms of special drawing rights (SDRs) of SDR 1,600,000, SDR 1,100,000 and SDR 81,700,000 respectively; St Lucia had previously become a member in June 1980 with a subscription of SDR 2,900,000. Total membership of the World Bank was brought up to 138 as at the end of September. (World Bank, Washington) (*Prev. rep. 30250 A*)

B. ZIMBABWE - SOUTH AFRICA — Closure of Diplomatic Missions

The Zimbabwean diplomatic mission in Pretoria (South Africa) was closed on Sept. 3, 1980, as was the consulate in Cape Town (but not the trade mission in Johannesburg). The Government of Zimbabwe asked the South African Government to close its diplomatic mission in Salisbury on the same day, except for its trade section. Consular activities would, according to an announcement by the Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry, be handled by these remaining trade missions. The closure of the missions had been foreshadowed by Mr Robert Mugabe, the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, in speeches in late June and early July.

Mr Mugabe said in the Zimbabwe House of Assembly on June 26 that "we cannot have any political and diplomatic relations with South Africa until it puts its own political house in order and kills the repugnance and revulsion that we have to apartheid". (Although neither country had formally accorded diplomatic recognition to the other, both then maintained diplomatic missions with accredited representatives.) Mr Mugabe added, however, that trade and economic connexions between Zimbabwe and South Africa were a reality which could not be ignored, and that accordingly "to the extent that it is necessary to maintain that relationship, my country is prepared to allow representation at that level".

Mr Mugabe said in a televised news conference on July 5 in Salisbury that he had asked South Africa to close its diplomatic mission in Zimbabwe, and he repeated the assertion which he had made on July 2 at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Freetown, Sierra Leone [see 30557 A] that this mission was being used in a campaign by the South African Government to recruit people from Zimbabwe for its armed forces. Mr R. F. Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, said on July 6 that no such recruitment had taken place, although some applicants from Zimbabwe had been appointed to posts in the South African Defence Force.

With regard to the question of Zimbabwean support for South African liberation movements, Mr S. P. Botha, the South African Minister of Manpower Utilization, said in a speech on July 4 that a message had been sent to Mr Mugabe warning him that South Africa would not tolerate the existence in Zimbabwe of terrorist bases for attacks against South Africa. Mr Mugabe on July 5 reaffirmed earlier statements [see page 30374] that his country would provide support through the OAU for the liberation struggle in South Africa, but that bases would not be established inside Zimbabwe. (Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Cape Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. OAU 30557 A; Zimbabwe 30365 A*)

C. NORWAY — Cabinet Changes

In view of the resignation of three members of the minority Labour Cabinet on Oct. 2, the following new appointments were announced on Oct. 3: (i) Mr Arvid Johanson, vice-chairman of the Labour parliamentary group, became Minister of Petroleum and Energy *vice* Mr Bjartmar Gjerde; (ii) Mr Andreas Cappelen was succeeded as Justice Minister by Mr Oddvar Berrefjord, currently Governor of Telemark county and a former holder of the Justice portfolio in 1971-72; and (iii) Mrs Harriet Andreassen, secretary of the Norwegian trade union federation (LO), was appointed Minister of Labour and Municipal Affairs *vice* Mrs Inger Louise Valle.—(Norwegian Information Service - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. 29939 A*)

D. AFRICA — New Executive President of African Development Bank Group

Mr Willa D. Mung'omba (41) was appointed for a five-year term as Executive President of the African Development Bank Group with effect from Sept. 1, 1980. Mr Mung'omba, a Zambian lawyer and former senior commercial banking executive, had previously held various diplomatic posts and had represented Zambia at major conferences of international economic organizations. The former Executive President of the Group (which comprises the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund and the Nigerian Trust Fund), Dr Kwame D. Fordwor, had been dismissed in July 1979 and replaced ad interim by Mr G. E. Gondwe [see 29796 B].—(West Africa) (*Prev. rep. 29796 B*)

A. UNITED KINGDOM — Employment Bill - Provisions and Enactment - Codes of Practice on Picketing and Closed Shop - TUC Opposition

The Employment Bill, which was introduced in the House of Commons on Dec. 6, 1979, and enacted on Aug. 1, 1980, amended the law in relation to picketing and the operation of closed shops, and provided for payments towards the cost of secret trade union ballots. It also amended various provisions of the Employment Protection Act 1975 [see 27508 A]. The main changes had been promised in the Conservative Party's general election manifesto [see page 29634] and in the Queen's Speech of May 15, 1979 [see 29705 A], and the legislation was based on consultative documents published by the Department of Employment between July and October 1979.

The Bill's main provisions were as follows:

Trade Union Ballots. The Secretary of State for Employment would be empowered to set up a scheme for providing payments from public funds towards the cost of secret ballots held by independent trade unions on such matters as trade union elections, the calling or ending of a strike or other industrial action, amending union rules and amalgamations.

Codes of Practice. The Secretary of State would be able to issue codes of practice containing practical guidance for promoting the improvement of industrial relations. Such codes would be admissible in evidence in industrial tribunal or court proceedings and could be taken into account by tribunals or courts in determining questions to which they were relevant. However, they would not, in themselves, render anyone liable to proceedings. Before issuing or revising a code, the Secretary of State would be required to consult with the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) and publish a draft for consultations. The codes would then be subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament.

Closed Shops. A person employed or seeking employment where there was a union membership agreement (closed shop) would have the right not to be unreasonably excluded or expelled from a trade union. This new right would be additional to existing common law rights, and complaints of infringement would be heard by industrial tribunals which would be required to consider the matter on its merits and not just on the particular union rules which applied. Tribunals would have the power to declare complaints well founded and there would be a right of appeal, either on the facts or on points of law, to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

The grounds on which dismissal from employment for non-membership of a trade union was to be regarded as unfair where there was a closed shop would be enlarged as follows: where the employee genuinely objected on grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction to membership of any union whatsoever or of a particular union; where he was not, at the time of the agreement, a member of a union specified by it and had not been a member since; where, in the case of agreements coming into effect after the legislation became operative, the agreement was not approved in a secret ballot in which at least 80 per cent of those to be covered supported it.

Picketing. The Bill provided a new definition of lawful picketing covering specifically: a person picketing at his own place of work; a trade union official accompanying a member of his union who was picketing at his own place of work; an unemployed person picketing at his former place of work in furtherance of a trade dispute connected with his dismissal, redundancy or resignation; a person who did not have one fixed place of work, or for whom it was not practicable to picket at his actual place of work, who might picket at the premises of his employer from which he worked, or from which his work was managed. A picket who induced workers to break their contracts, by picketing somewhere other than at his own place of work, could be sued in tort (civil wrong).

Unfair Dismissal. The following amendments were made to the unfair dismissal provisions of the Employment Protection Act 1975:

(1) An industrial tribunal, in deciding whether or not an employer had carried out a dismissal fairly, should take into account such factors as the size and administrative resources of that employer.

(2) The onus on the employer in unfair dismissal cases of demonstrating to the tribunal that he acted reasonably in treating the reason for dismissal as justifying dismissal would be removed and, in future, it would be for the tribunal to decide whether or not the employer acted reasonably in all the circumstances.

(3) New firms with less than 20 employees would be exempt from the provisions for the first two years after they took on their first employee. During this period employees would accumulate service towards the qualifying period for making a complaint of unfair dismissal, but they would be able to exercise their rights only after the two years had expired. The exemption would cease if at any time the firm recruited more than 19 employees.

(4) The minimum length of a fixed term contract in which employees might agree to waive their right to complain of unfair dismissal if they were not re-engaged on the expiry of the contract would be reduced from two years to one.

(5) The basic award of compensation for unfair dismissal would be calculated on the same basis as redundancy payments. This calculation took into account the age of the employee, length of service and rate of pay, as provided initially under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 [see 20952 A and also page 27509]; these provisions—together with certain provisions of inter alia the Employment Protection Act 1975 and also of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 [see 26599 A; 26721 A] and of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976 [see 28006 A]—had been incorporated into the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 which had received the Royal Assent on July 31, 1978.

(6) Tribunals would be able to reduce the basic award in cases where the employee had unreasonably refused an offer of reinstatement from the employer. They would also be given discretion to reduce the award on the grounds of the employee's conduct where this would not come under the heading of fault which contributed to the dismissal. The minimum entitlement to two weeks' pay would be abolished.

Maternity Rights. The following changes were proposed in the procedure laid down in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, by which a woman might claim the right to return to work after having a baby:

(1) An employee should give written notice of her departure and intention to return.

(2) The notice of intention to return would be increased from seven days to 21.

(3) An additional written notification soon after confinement should be provided if requested by the employer.

The employee would not be entitled to return to work if she did not comply with these requirements. In addition, where a small firm with less than six employees found it not to be reasonably practicable either to take the employee back in her old job or to offer alternative work, or where any firm found it not to be reasonably practicable to offer her her old job but offered a suitable alternative which the employee accepted or unreasonably rejected, an employer would be relieved of a claim for unfair dismissal.

Coercive Trade Union Recruitment Activities. The Bill provided that a person could be liable to civil actions in the courts if he induced, or threatened to induce, an employee to break his contract of employment with the intention of compelling workers to join a particular trade union or unions. This would not apply where the employee whose contract of employment was broken, or threatened to be broken, worked for the same employer or at the same place as the workers who were being compelled to join a union.

Repeal of Previous Legislation. The Bill repealed the following provisions of the Employment Protection Act 1975: (i) the sections establishing a procedure for dealing with trade union recognition issues; (ii) the schedule enabling claims to be made that employers were not observing "recognized terms and conditions", or, in their absence, the "general level" of terms and conditions observed in the same industry and district.

Parliamentary Proceedings

The Bill was given a second reading in the House of Commons on Dec. 17, 1979, by 315 votes to 245 and was read a second time in the House of Lords on May 20, 1980, without a division.

Mr James Prior (Secretary of State for Employment), moving the second reading in the Commons, said that the Government had adopted a pragmatic and practical approach and had given interested parties every opportunity to express their views, but believed that "fundamental matters of principle are very much at stake".

He continued: "One principle is to ensure that the rights of the individual are respected and upheld, at the place of work as in every other facet of our lives. That has been our guiding principle. I believe that it is one which will receive support from both sides of the House. But the rights of the individual as an individual need to be balanced by the right of individuals to act together. . . . I do not believe that what we have witnessed in the last 20 years has been a balance. It is that which has worried successive Governments and this House throughout the whole of this unsettled period. The changes we propose are limited to those where experience has shown that the law is not working well, where privilege is being abused and suffering results, where the creation of new jobs is being inhibited by fear of the present law and what it means. Our proposals do not change the need for bargainers to behave sensibly, nor do they in any way absolve those who lead them from their responsibility of providing practical voluntary guidance on the use of the powerful weapons in their bargaining armoury.

"Our proposals are designed to improve industrial relations, but to do so by working with the grain rather than against it. So let no one use them as an excuse for abandoning the search for the good voluntary procedures which are the best protection against tough laws. These proposals have the support of the nation—their support is as strong among trade unionists as it is in the rest of the community. They command a majority, as far as one can understand, even among trade unionists who vote for the Labour Party. In no way has the support diminished with the passage of time. . . ."

Announcing that he intended to use the power in the Bill to produce a code of practice on the closed shop, Mr Prior added that, if no other authoritative, comprehensive and effective guidance was available, he would produce a code on picketing. Some Conservative MPs would have preferred the Government to go further on the closed shop and seek to outlaw it, but that was the approach tried in 1971 [in the Industrial Relations Act—see 24366 A; 25173 A] and it simply did not work. In this Bill, the Government was providing the individual with effective safeguards and proposing much more specific arrangements for the drawing up of any new closed shop agreement.

The closed shop proposals were particularly relevant to the issue of press freedom, continued Mr Prior, and the Government intended to provide specific guidance on this subject to ensure that press freedom was not infringed. Although the Bill included a power to repeal the relevant section of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976 [providing for a charter on the freedom of the press—see 28006 A], he did not intend to use this power until those in the industry had had an opportunity to see the draft code. If there was still a strong desire for a charter and a real possibility of reaching agreement on its terms, the Government would be prepared to consider it.

On picketing, Mr Prior said that the Bill limited lawful picketing to an employee picketing at his own place of work. The existing right to demonstrate or protest was unaffected. The Bill did not create any additional burden on the police because it did not create any new criminal offences. The Government proposed simply to restore the right to take civil proceedings when secondary picketing induced a breach of contract.

Mr Eric Varley, chief opposition spokesman on employment, said that the Bill would weaken and damage trade union and individual rights. Labour had no great objection to ballots, and his own trade union experience as an officer in the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) had involved secret ballots. But ballots were not the universal remedy for settling industrial disputes. There must be far greater misgivings about the provisions on union membership agreements. The proposals contained a glaring anomaly. If a worker decided he wanted to be a non-unionist he would have the opportunity to take action against a trade union, but if a worker who was a trade unionist asserted his right he would have no redress against an employer who refused to employ him because he was a trade union member. The sloppy thinking in this was, he said, a recipe for endless friction.

The picketing provisions, Mr Varley continued, would place an intolerable burden on rank and file policemen. It would be the police constable at the picket line who would have to cross-examine pickets to decide who met the conditions of the Act and who did not. The Bill was so vaguely worded that any decision an officer took would be disputed, and the matter would end up in a court of law. In the opposition's view, the Bill's proposals would not prevent a single industrial dispute which would have taken place without it, nor, despite the Bill's title, would it do anything to create jobs.

In the division the Government were supported by eight Liberals, while the *Plaid Cymru* and Scottish National Party (SNP) members voted with the opposition.

During the Bill's standing committee stage a new clause was added providing a statutory right for pregnant women not to be unreasonably refused paid time off during working hours to keep an appointment for ante-natal care prescribed by a doctor, midwife or health visitor.

During the report stage on April 17, 1980, the House approved by 301 votes to 223 a new clause on secondary industrial action, which provided that there should be immunity for the organization of such action only where the principal purpose of the action was to interfere with the supply of goods or services during the dispute between the employer in dispute and a first supplier or customer whose employees were taking the action, and where the action concerned was reasonably likely to achieve that purpose.

The clause was based on a consultative document published on Feb. 19, 1980, following a judicial decision upholding existing trade union immunities from civil action in respect of secondary industrial action.

In the case of Express Newspapers versus MacShane and Another (Mr Denis MacShane, president of the National Union of Journalists —NUJ—in 1978-79, and Mr Kenneth Ashton, the union's general secretary), the House of Lords on Dec. 13, 1979, unanimously allowed an appeal by the NUJ against a Court of Appeal judgment of Dec. 21, 1978; in this judgment, the Court of Appeal had itself upheld a High Court injunction of Dec. 14, 1978, which had required the union to lift an instruction to its members at the *Daily Express* not to handle Press Association copy during the strike of provincial journalists in December 1978-January 1979 [see 29593 A]. Although the NUJ had called out its provincial and Press Association members, about half the latter kept working and the agency continued to supply news. Therefore, to stop the use of that material the union issued its "blacking" instruction to other members not directly affected by the strike. Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, held in the Court of Appeal that there must be a "reasonable prospect or capability" of such action advancing a dispute for it to be protected by the law, and that the NUJ instruction was too remote to come into this category. However, the Law Lords confirmed the immunity from legal action granted to trade unions in respect of acts done "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute".

Lord Wilberforce said in the House of Lords decision that the words had appeared in legislation since 1875 and were contained in the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 [see 26599 A; 26721 A]. The question was: How far did that immunity extend? The test of whether an action was "in furtherance of a trade dispute" was whether the act done, pursuant to a genuine intention, was reasonably capable of achieving the objective.

Lord Scarman, describing the case as one of "secondary blacking", said that, once it was shown that a trade dispute existed, the person who took industrial action, not the court, was the judge of whether his acts would further the dispute. If he was acting honestly, Parliament left to him the choice of what to do. He added: "It would need very clear statutory language to persuade me that Parliament intended to allow the courts to act as some sort of backseat driver in trade disputes."

Mr Prior, moving the new clause on April 17, 1980, said that it concerned one of the most damaging areas of conflict and one which engendered great bitterness among employers, workers and the general public.

Secondary action, he said, whatever form it took, whether a strike, blacking, picketing or a combination of any of those, meant industrial action taken by employees who were not in dispute with their own employer. All too often in recent years secondary action had been used deliberately to spread the disruptive effects of disputes to the community at large. That was why it had led to such public concern. Without doubt, the most damaging form of secondary action was secondary picketing. With that, damage could be done to the business of a customer or supplier or a company with no connexion with the employer in dispute. That damage could be done where there was not the slightest shred of sympathy among the work force or their trade union representatives for those involved in the original dispute. Employees in firms far removed from the dispute were called upon to stop handling or working on certain goods. As a result, the production schedules of their firms were upset, orders lost and ultimately jobs put at risk.

There was a deep-rooted trade union tradition of industrial action to prevent goods being supplied to or from an employer in dispute. The new clause recognized this tradition where secondary action was employed because the primary action was only partially effective. But the clause withdrew immunity from secondary action if it was used only as a vehicle to spread the disruptive effects of industrial action beyond those actively supplying to or receiving goods from the supplier in dispute during the dispute. The principle underlying the clause was that secondary action was justifiable only to the extent that it was used to put direct pressure on the employer in dispute for him to settle.

Dealing with the MacShane case, Mr Prior said: "In 1976 the immunity conferred by Section 13 of the 1974 Act was extended to cover inducing breaches not only of contracts of employment—as the 1906 [Trade Disputes] Act had provided—but of commercial contracts as well. As a result, the scope of the immunity was made unnecessarily and dangerously wide. It is, we believe, unnecessarily wide for trade union officials doing their job of protecting the interests of their members in a dispute, and it is dangerously wide for the rest of the community who have to bear the consequences of industrial disruption which is spread well beyond those involved in the original dispute. In terms of the law, the full implications of the 1976 Act did not become clear until the House of Lords judgment in the MacShane case. Before that, in a series of cases in 1978 and 1979, the courts, particularly the Court of Appeal, had held that whether industrial action was 'in furtherance' of a trade dispute depended on whether or not it satisfied certain tests. For a time it seemed that the immunity created by the 1976 Act might not apply if the action taken was too remote from the original dispute, or incapable of affecting it, or pursued for too extraneous a motive. As these tests were applied by the Court of Appeal, it seemed that the immunity could extend as far as secondary action involving first suppliers or customers of the employer in dispute, but not beyond that.

"However, the House of Lords in the MacShane case found that, under existing statute law, the only test of whether action was in furtherance of a trade dispute was a subjective one. If the person calling the industrial action honestly believes that it will in some way further an imminent or existing trade dispute, that is enough to ensure that he has immunity. So long as he believes this, it does not matter how remote the industrial action is from the original dispute or that it involves people—both employees and employers—who have no means of influencing the outcome of that dispute. It does not matter even if the principal motive for calling the action has nothing to do with the original dispute, so long as the person who calls it believes that it will further the dispute in some way, however slight. In other words, our fears about the virtually unlimited immunity created by the 1976 Act were shown to be fully justified. The MacShane judgment appears to affirm that statute law gives to trade unions virtually unlimited authority to damage whomsoever they choose, as much as they choose, without fear of penalty, if in their judgment—which no court may question—such action seems to be in their interest. In effect, the law as it now stands is a licence to spread industrial action far and wide beyond the original dispute, putting at risk the jobs and businesses of people who are in no way connected with it. No responsible Government could allow the law to remain in that state, and I would suggest that that view must also apply to the opposition."

Sub-section 1 of the new clause, Mr Prior continued, stated that a person who induced a breach of contract in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute—someone who called industrial action—would no longer have immunity if the contract was a commercial contract rather than a contract of employment and it was breached by unlawful secondary action.

Sub-section 2 defined secondary action as the inducement of a breach of contract of employment with an employer not in dispute. The clause did not apply to primary action. If the employees were not employed by the employer in dispute, there was no immunity unless the secondary action met the requirements in Sub-sections 3, 4 and 5.

Sub-section 3 held that secondary action was lawful only if its principal purpose was directly to prevent or disrupt supplies between the employer in dispute and his supplier or customer and if it was likely to achieve that purpose.

Sub-section 4 dealt with special circumstances of companies in common ownership. If work was diverted from one company to an associated company there would be immunity for secondary action designed directly to prevent or disrupt supply of goods or services which would otherwise have been provided by the employer in dispute; it would furthermore be lawful for this secondary action to be taken either at the associated company or the company which was the recipient of the goods. Without this provision it would be possible for a group of companies to nullify the effect of primary action at one company by diverting production to another company without any possibility of lawful secondary action.

Sub-section 5 dealt with the relationship between the clause and the previous one on picketing [see above], and established that pickets who were in dispute with their own employer and who were picketing lawfully at their own place of work would continue to enjoy the immunity provided by the 1974 Act, as amended. Without this they could be put at risk, under the definition of secondary action, of losing immunity if they were, for example, to turn back someone not employed by a supplier or customer of the employer in dispute.

To summarize, Mr Prior concluded, the effect of the clause boiled down to this. Primary action would continue to have the immunity which it had at present. Secondary action would continue to have immunity if it satisfied three main conditions: first, that it was taken by employees of first suppliers or customers of the employer in dispute; secondly, that its principal purpose was directly to prevent or disrupt the supply of goods or services between the employer in dispute and his supplier or customer during the dispute; and, thirdly, that it was likely to achieve that purpose. Secondary action would have to satisfy all three conditions to gain immunity. One of the underlying principles of the Bill was to restore a legal remedy to those people who were hit by some of the most damaging abuses of the present law. The new clause was fully in keeping with that approach. However, it did not attempt an easy way out by the simple and easily constructed position of removing immunity for all but primary disputes. The clause genuinely sought a position which was balanced and reasonable. A simple repeal of the immunities for all secondary action would not be right, because, just as it was unreasonable to leave trade unions with more power than they needed in the vain hope that they would not misuse it, so also it would be unreasonable to weaken them to the extent that they were unable to defend their members against attack.

Mr Varley said that the opposition's judgment was that the clause was potentially an extremely dangerous development. It meant new statutory tests of motives which individual actions would have to satisfy to attract immunity. It was a narrow formula and he was advised that it had never been tried before in English law. It would place the question of the legality of industrial action entirely in the hands of the courts and the judges, and would lead to uncertainty about what action was lawful and what was not.

Later on April 17 an amendment to the clause, moved by Mr John Gorst (Conservative), making trade union funds available to compensate employers affected by unlawful secondary action was defeated by 475 votes to 35 (all Conservative backbenchers), with the opposition voting with the Government.

Two other Conservative backbench amendments were defeated with opposition support during the report stage, as follows:

(1) A new clause, moved by Mr John Browne, providing for the holding of a secret ballot before industrial action was taken if requested by 15 per cent of the total membership of a union whose participation in action in furtherance of a trade dispute might be required under the rules of the union, or 500 union members, whichever was the lesser number, was rejected on April 22 by 491 votes to 48 (43 Conservatives and five Liberals).

(2) An amendment, moved by Mr Gorst, providing that existing closed shop agreements would be null and void if they had not been confirmed by a secret ballot within two years of the passing of the Bill was rejected on April 23 by 477 votes to 49 (46 Conservatives and three Liberals).

The Bill was given a third reading on April 30 by 319 votes to 251, the Government being supported by four Liberals and two Official Unionists, while Mr Gerard Fitt (Socialist) joined the *Plaid Cymru* and SNP members in voting with the opposition.

During the committee stage in the Lords on June 3 a government new clause requiring an employer of more than 20 workers to comply with a request from a recognized union to provide a place on his premises where union members might vote in a secret ballot was approved without a division, while during the report stage on July 8 an amendment, moved by Lord Spens, a cross-bench peer, outlawing all secondary industrial action was defeated by 249 votes to 41 (Conservatives and cross-benchers), with the Government being supported by Labour and Liberal peers and six bishops.

Having passed its remaining stages in the Lords on July 14, and the Commons having considered the Lords amendments on July 28, the Bill, as stated above, received the Royal Assent on Aug. 1. Its provisions, with the exception of the clause dealing with the charter on press freedom, became operative between Aug. 1 and Oct. 1.

Codes of Practice on Picketing and Closed Shop

The draft codes of practice on picketing and the closed shop promised by Mr Prior in his second reading speech [see above] were published on Aug. 5. Introducing them, Mr Prior said:

". . . The code on the closed shop emphasizes that existing closed shops should be operated tolerantly and flexibly with proper regard to the views of those who do not want to join a trade union and provision for periodic review, and that new closed shops should only be set up if there is overwhelming support for them amongst those who would be affected. The code on picketing explains the law, both civil and criminal, as it affects pickets themselves and those who are affected by picketing. It makes it clear that everyone in this country has a right to cross a picket line if that is what he wishes to do, free from any interference by others. If the guidelines are followed by everyone concerned, we should see the end of the abuses of the closed shop and picketing which have caused so much public concern in recent years. That will not happen overnight. But everyone stands to gain, trade unions and their members most of all, from the observance of standards of tolerance and flexibility in the conduct of industrial relations."

Excerpts from both codes are given below.

Code on Picketing

"**Introduction.** The code is intended to provide practical guidance on picketing in trade disputes for those who may be contemplating, organizing or taking part in a picket, and for those who as employers or other workers or members of the general public may be affected by it. There is no legal 'right to picket' as such but peaceful picketing has long been recognized as being lawful. However, the law imposes certain limits on how and where lawful picketing can be undertaken so as to ensure that there is proper protection for those who may be affected by picketing, particularly those who want to go to work normally. It is a civil wrong, actionable in the civil courts, to try to persuade someone to break his contract of employment or to try to secure the breaking of a commercial contract. But the law exempts from this liability those acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, including pickets, provided that they are picketing only at their own place of work. The criminal law, however, applies to pickets just as it applies to everyone else: they have no exemption from the provisions of the criminal law (for example, as in the case of obstruction). . . .

"**Picketing and the Civil Law.** Section 15 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, as amended by the Employment Act 1980, provides the basic rules for lawful industrial picketing: (i) it must be undertaken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute; (ii) it must be carried out by a person attending at or near his own place of work, or in the case of a trade union official additionally at or near the place of work of a member of his trade union whom he is accompanying on the picket line and whom he represents; (iii) its only purpose must be peacefully obtaining or communicating information or peacefully persuading a person to work or not to work. Picketing commonly involves persuading employees to break their contracts of employment by not going into work and by disrupting the business of the employer who is being picketed, interfering with his commercial contracts with other employers. If pickets follow the rules they are protected from being sued in the civil courts for these civil wrongs.

"**Attendance at or near his own Place of Work.** It is lawful for a person to induce a breach of contract in the course of picketing only if he pickets at or near his own place of work. . . . Section 15 of the 1974 Act, as amended by the Employment Act 1980, distinguishes two specific groups of employees: those (for example, mobile workers) who work at more than one place; and those for whom it is impractical to picket at their own place of work because of its location. It declares that it is lawful for such workers to picket those premises of their employer from which they work or from which their work is administered. In practice this will usually mean those offices of their employer from which they receive their instructions or pay packet or the depot or garage from which their vehicle operates. . . .

"**Trade Union Officials.** It is often helpful to the orderly organization and conduct of picketing for a trade union official to be present on a picket line where his members are picketing. Section 15 of the 1974 Act, as amended, therefore makes it lawful for a trade union official to picket at any place of work provided that: (i) he is accompanying members of his trade union who are picketing lawfully at or near their own place of work; and (ii) he personally represents those members within their trade union. If these conditions are satisfied, then a trade union official has the same legal protection as other pickets who picket lawfully at or near their own place of work.

"**Lawful Purpose of Picketing.** The only purposes of picketing declared lawful by Section 15 are: peacefully obtaining and communicating information; and peacefully persuading a person to work or not to work. Picketing which is accompanied by, for example, violent, threatening or obstructive behaviour is unlawful. Pickets may seek to explain their case as persuasively as possible, but they have no powers to require other people to stop or compel them to listen or to do what they have asked them to do. If, even before a picket has put his case, a person decided to cross the picket line, he must be allowed to do so. A picket who threatens or intimidates someone or obstructs an entrance to the workplace commits a criminal offence. Not only is he liable for criminal prosecution, but he may also be liable to be sued for inducing or attempting to induce a breach of contract.

"**Seeking Redress.** An employer or an employee whose interests are harmed by picketing which does not comply with the rules described above has a civil law remedy. He may start an action for damages against those responsible and also ask the court to make an order stopping the unlawful picketing. An order will normally be sought against the person on whose instructions or advice the picketing is taking place, but it will usually apply not only to him but to any others acting on his behalf or on his instructions. If a person knows that such an order has been made against someone and yet aids and abets him in breaking it, he may be in contempt of court himself and liable to be punished by the court. Thus an order can apply to people beyond those named in it, and an organizer of picketing cannot avoid liability by, for example, changing the members of the picket line each day.

"**Picketing and the Criminal Law.** If a picket commits a criminal offence he is just as liable to be prosecuted as any other member of the public who breaks the law. The immunity provided under the civil law does not protect him in any way. The criminal law protects the right of every person to go about his lawful daily business free from interference by others. No one is under any obligation to stop when a picket asks him to do so, or if he does stop, to comply with the picket's request, for example, not to go into work. Everyone has the right, if he wishes to do so, to cross a picket line in order to go into his place of work. A picket may exercise peaceful persuasion, but if he goes beyond that and tries by means other than peaceful persuasion to deter another person from exercising those rights he may commit a criminal offence. Among other matters it is a criminal offence for pickets (as for others): to use threatening or abusive language or behaviour directed against any person, whether a worker seeking to cross a picket line, an employer, an ordinary member of the public or the police; to use or threaten violence to a person or to his family; to intimidate a person by threatening words or behaviour which cause him to fear harm or damage if he fails to comply with the pickets' demands; to obstruct the highway or the entrance to premises or to seek physically to bar the passage of vehicles or persons by lying down in the road, linking arms across or circling in the road, or jostling or physically restraining those entering or leaving the premises; to be in possession of an offensive weapon; intentionally or recklessly to damage property; to engage in violent, disorderly and unruly behaviour or to take any action which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace; to obstruct a police officer in the execution of his duty.

"A picket has no right to require a vehicle to stop or to be stopped. His right is limited to asking a driver to stop by words or signals. A picket may not physically obstruct a vehicle if the driver decides to drive on or, indeed, in any other circumstances. A driver must exercise due care and attention when approaching or driving past a picket line, and may not drive in such a manner as to give rise to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury.

"**Role of Police.** It is not the function of the police to take a view of the merits of a particular trade dispute. They have a general duty to uphold the law and keep the peace, whether on the picket line or elsewhere. The law gives the police discretion to take whatever measures may reasonably be considered necessary to ensure that picketing remains peaceful and orderly. The police have no responsibility for enforcing the civil law. An employer cannot require the police to help in identifying the unlawful pickets against whom he wishes to seek an order from the civil court. Nor is it the job of the police to enforce the terms of an order. Enforcement of an order on the application of the plaintiff is a matter for the court and its officers. The police may, however, be called on by the court to assist its officers by preventing a breach of the peace. An organizer of pickets should always maintain close contact with the police. Prior consultation with the police is always in the best interests of all concerned. In particular, the organizer and the pickets should seek early advice from the police on where they should stand on a picket line in order to avoid obstructing the highway, and agree with them a limit on the number of pickets.

"**Limiting Numbers of Pickets.** The main cause of violence and disorder on the picket line is excessive numbers. In any situation where large numbers of people with strong feelings are involved, there is a danger that things can get out of control, and that those concerned will run the risk of arrest and prosecution. This is particularly so whenever people seek by sheer weight of numbers to stop others going into work or delivering or collecting goods. In such cases, what is intended is not peaceful persuasion, but obstruction, if not intimidation. Such a situation is often described as 'mass picketing'. In fact, it is not picketing in its lawful sense of an attempt at peaceful persuasion, but mass demonstration, which may well result in a breach of the peace. The number of pickets at an entrance to a workplace should, therefore, be limited to what is reasonably needed to permit the peaceful persuasion of those entering and leaving the premises who are prepared to listen. As a general rule, it will be rare for such a number to exceed six, and frequently a smaller number will be sufficient. While the law does not impose a specific limit on the number of people who may picket at any one workplace, it does give the police considerable discretionary powers to limit the number of pickets in any one place where they have reasonable cause to fear disorder. It is for the police to decide, taking into account all the circumstances, whether the number of pickets in the particular case is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The police will often discuss with the picket line organizer what constitutes a reasonable number of pickets in any one case. But it should be clear that, if a picket does not leave the picket line when asked to do so by the police, he is liable to be arrested for obstruction either of the highway or of a police officer in the execution of his duty, if the obstruction is such as to cause, or be likely to cause, a breach of the peace."

Code on Closed Shop

"**Purpose of Code and Government Policy.** A closed shop is an agreement or arrangement under which employees are required to join a union as a condition of getting or holding a job. The purpose of this code is to give practical guidance to those concerned in industry with their operation in the light of the relevant provisions of the Employment Act. The publication of this code does not mean that the Government support the closed shop. The Government remains opposed to the principle underlying it. That people should be required to join a union as a condition of getting or holding a job runs contrary to the traditions of personal liberty in this country. It is one thing for a union to maximize its membership by voluntary means. What is objectionable is to enforce membership by means of a closed shop. Closed shops damage the image of trade unionism itself. The Government believe that these views are increasingly shared by employers and by many trade unionists. Nevertheless, closed shops are a fact of our industrial life and there are employers and trade unions who believe that such agreements can help create stability in industrial relations. At present, upwards of 5,000,000 workers are covered by closed shops agreements and it is essential that legislation on the closed shop should be drawn so as to be effective in practice and not liable to be circumvented.

"**Unfair Dismissal or Action short of Dismissal.** It is unfair in the circumstances listed below to dismiss an employee for not complying with a requirement to be or become a member of a union. An employee so dismissed has a right of complaint against the employer to an industrial tribunal. Similarly in these circumstances an employee has a right of complaint to an industrial tribunal if, in a closed shop, action short of dismissal is taken against him by his employer in order to compel him to be or become a union member. The circumstances in which these rights apply are where:

"(i) The employee genuinely objects on grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction to being a member of any trade union whatsoever, or of a particular trade union; (ii) the employee belonged to the class of employee covered by the closed shop agreement before it took effect, and has not been a union member since; (iii) the closed shop agreement came into effect for the first time after the relevant provisions of the Act came into force, and has not been approved by a secret ballot of all employees affected showing that at least 80 per cent of those entitled to vote supported the agreement.

"**Unreasonable Exclusion or Expulsion from Union.** The Employment Act 1980 provides individuals with new statutory rights in relation to their unions. Any person who is employed or is seeking employment in a job where it is the practice, in accordance with a closed shop agreement, to require membership of a specified trade union or unions, has the right not to have an application for membership of the union unreasonably refused and the right not to be unreasonably expelled from that union. An individual may present a complaint to an industrial tribunal against a trade union that he has been unreasonably excluded or expelled from that union, within the period of six months of the refusal or expulsion. Where the tribunal finds the complaint well founded, it will make a declaration that his exclusion or expulsion was unreasonable.

"Where such a declaration has been made by the tribunal, or by the Employment Appeal Tribunal on appeal, the person who made the complaint may make an application for compensation for any loss he has suffered. Such an application may not be made before the end of the period of four weeks following the date of declaration or after the end of the period of six months following the date of the declaration. If, following the tribunal's declaration, the complainant has been admitted or readmitted to the union by the time he applies for compensation, the application shall be to the industrial tribunal which may award compensation to be paid by the union up to a statutory maximum [i.e. as currently laid down under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act]. If, following the declaration, the complainant has not been admitted or re-admitted to the union, the application shall be to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which may award compensation to be paid by the union up to a higher maximum which is also fixed by the legislation.

"**Scope and Content of Agreements.** Any new closed shop agreements should be clearly drafted. The agreement should therefore:

"(1) Indicate clearly the class of employees to be covered. This can be done by reference, for example, to the grade or location or bargaining unit concerned. An agreement should not necessarily cover all employees at a location or in a grade. Some examples of groups which might well be excluded are professional, managerial, part-time staff, or personnel staff. All exclusions or exemptions should be clearly stated in the agreement.

"(2) Make clear that existing employees, and those who can show that they have genuine objections on grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction to union membership, will not be required to be union members.

"(3) Make clear that where an individual has been excluded or expelled by his union, no other action, whether by the union or the employer, will be taken against him before any appeal or complaint regarding the exclusion or expulsion has been determined.

"(4) Provide that an employee will not be dismissed if expelled from his union for refusal to take part in industrial action.

"(5) Set out clearly how complaints or disputes arising from it are to be resolved. It should provide appropriate procedures which give the individual concerned an adequate right to be heard and enable any question about non-membership of a union to be fairly tested. Such procedures can usefully provide for independent arbitration of an individual's objection to union membership.

"(6) Provide for periodic reviews [see below]. If the parties agree that an alternative to union membership would be the payment to a charity by individual non-unionists of a sum equivalent to the union membership subscription, the agreement should clearly recognize that such a payment would be voluntary. The agreement between the parties cannot limit the statutory right of the individuals concerned.

"**Operation of New or Existing Agreements.** Closed shop agreements should be applied flexibly and tolerantly. Before any potential new employee is recruited he should be told of any requirement to become a union member and any relevant arrangements which apply to the operation of the closed shop. Employers and unions who have negotiated a closed shop, and employees in scope of it, should not impose unreasonable requirements on those who are not parties or in scope of the agreement. A requirement of union membership should not be imposed on the employees of contractors, suppliers and customers of an employer. Employers and unions should not contemplate any disciplinary action before procedures for resolving disputes and grievances which arise under the agreement are exhausted. Employers and unions should take no action against an employee who has been expelled or excluded from a union, until any appeal under union appeal procedures, including those provided by the TUC (Trades Union Congress), has been determined and any industrial tribunal proceedings on the case have been completed.

"**Review of Closed Shop Agreements and Arrangements.** All closed shop agreements, new or existing, should be subject to periodic review. Reviews should take place regularly every few years, and more frequently if changes of the following types occur: (i) changes in the law affecting closed shops, like those of the Employment Act 1980; (ii) changes in the parties to a closed shop agreement—for example, where the business of the original employer is taken over by another; (iii) a significant change in the nature of the work performed by those covered in the agreement with consequential changes in the occupational structure; (iv) changes in the composition of the work force, for example, where skills required are altered by substantial technological change; (v) a substantial turnover of the labour force since the agreement or arrangement was entered into.

"**Closed Shop and Freedom of the Press.** The freedom of the press to collect and publish information and to publish comment and criticism is an essential part of our democratic society. All concerned have a duty to ensure that industrial relations are conducted so as not to infringe or jeopardize this principle. Journalists, whereever employed, should enjoy the same rights as other employees to join trade unions and participate in their activities. However, the actions of unions must not be such as to conflict with the principles of press freedom. In particular, any requirement on journalists to join a union creates the possibility of such a conflict. Individual journalists may genuinely feel that membership of a trade union is incompatible with their need to be free from any serious risk of interference with their freedom to report or comment. This should be respected by employers and unions.

"A journalist should not be disciplined by a trade union for anything he has researched or written for publication in accordance with professional standards. Editors have final responsibility for the content of their publications. An editor should not be subjected to improper pressure—that is, any action or threat calculated to induce him or her to distort news, comment or criticism, or, contrary to his or her judgment, to publish or to suppress or to modify news, comment or criticisms. Editors should be free to decide whether or not to join a trade union. The editor should be free to decide whether or not to publish any material submitted to him for publication. He shall exercise this right responsibly with due regard for the interests of the readers of the publication, the employment or opportunities of employment of professional journalists, and the agreed policy of the publication."

Both codes were expected to be submitted for parliamentary approval during the next session beginning in November 1980.

TUC Opposition to Employment Act

The TUC at its annual congress on Sept. 1 passed a motion calling on the general council to mount a "sustained and vigorous campaign of non-co-operation" with the Government, including, if necessary, industrial action, and demanding the repeal of the Act by the next Labour Government. The general council had on Feb. 27 rejected by 35 votes to three a proposal that unions should not reject out of hand state finance for secret ballots. Those voting for the proposal were Mr Frank Chapple, general secretary of the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU), and Sir John Boyd and Mr Terence Duffy, general secretary and president respectively of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW).—(Times - Financial Times - Department of Employment Gazette - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. Queen's Speech 29705 A; 1974 and 1976 Acts 26599 A; 26721 A; 28006 A; 1979 TUC Guides on Picketing and Closed Shops 29593 A*)

A. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY — Special Economic Summit Conference - Assembly of Heads of State and Government - Meeting of Committee on Western Sahara Question

A special economic summit conference of heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was held in Lagos (Nigeria) on April 28-30, 1980, following a preparatory meeting at ministerial level which began on April 21.

The conference, convened to discuss strategies for economic development in Africa, was held in accordance with a proposal made the previous year by Lt.-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, then the Nigerian head of state, and approved by the 16th annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Monrovia (Liberia) in July 1979 [see 29840 A].

The conference was attended by delegations from 48 of the 49 OAU member countries and from Zimbabwe, which had attained independence on April 18 [see 30365 A] and which was subsequently formally admitted to membership of the OAU in June [see below]. Those present included some 25 heads of state, as well as Mr Edem Kodjo, the OAU Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, and Dr Edouard Saouma, the Director-General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

The country not represented at the conference was Liberia, where a new regime led by Master Sgt. Samuel Doe had assumed power in a military coup on April 12 [see 30405 A], killing former President Tolbert and subsequently executing 13 former ministers and party officials. A delegation under the leadership of Mr Gabriel Baccus Matthews, the new Liberian Minister of Foreign Affairs, flew to Lagos for the OAU conference but was refused permission to enter the country by the Nigerian authorities [ibid.].

President Tolbert had also been Chairman (President) of the OAU at the time of his death, his one-year term of office having commenced in July 1979 at the OAU conference in Monrovia [see 29840 A]. There was no precedent for the death in office of an OAU Chairman, but it was decided on April 28 that President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, one of the current OAU vice-chairmen, should preside over the Lagos conference and should act as interim OAU Chairman until the election of a new Chairman at the organization's forthcoming 17th annual Assembly in Freetown (Sierra Leone) in July 1980 [see below]. The conference on April 29 observed a minute's silence called for by President Sekou Touré of Guinea in memory of the late President Tolbert.

In his opening speech as host of the conference, President Shagari of Nigeria said on April 28 that the end of the struggle for political liberation in Africa was in sight, but that the meeting marked the beginning of a second phase, "the commencement of Africa's struggle for economic independence".

He urged that African states should reorganize their economic priorities and set the guidelines for intensive contacts and co-operation with one another; he warned also that the peoples of the Third World, whom he described as "the victims of mass exploitation", would not accept continuing abject poverty, and he called on the developed world to join in working out an equitable redistribution of the world's wealth.

Mr Kodjo said that Africa was the continent of poverty par excellence, with 18 of the world's 25 poorest countries [see also 29051 B] despite its rich resource endowment. He asserted that the cause of Africa's contradictions lay in "the lack of organization, the lack of method, the lack of joint venture".

The speech made on April 28 by Gen. Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian Vice-President and leader of his country's delegation, was interrupted when the delegations from Algeria, Libya and Morocco walked out in protest over Egypt's policy in the Middle East [see 29646 A; 29941 A; and also 29840 A for similar walk-out at previous OAU meeting].

The conference ended on April 29 with the adoption of a Lagos Plan of Action for the implementation of the Monrovia strategy for the economic development of Africa.

The plan of action followed recommendations made earlier in April at a meeting in Addis Ababa of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). It set out guidelines for an African development strategy in two main stages, with emphasis during 1980-90 on strengthening sub-regional groupings in central, eastern, northern and southern Africa, while closer integration between such groupings, joint projects, and harmonization of financial and monetary policies, were the objectives for the subsequent decade from 1990 to the year 2000. In a Protocol on an African Economic Community, the OAU heads of state and government reaffirmed their commitment to establish such a community by the year 2000.

Specific proposals aimed inter alia at (i) increasing food production towards self-sufficiency by 1990—the current level of food self-sufficiency for the continent (including South Africa, a net exporter) being estimated at 75 per cent at most; (ii) improving rail and road networks and telephone and other communications; (iii) harmonizing industrial development, with the aim of increasing Africa's share of world industrial production from the current estimated level of 0.6 per cent to 1 per cent by 1985 and 2 per cent by the year 2000, and (iv) expanding intra-African trade, with target dates for the elimination of trade barriers throughout the continent by 1990.

The OAU Secretary-General, who at the Monrovia conference in July 1979 had been charged with drawing up (in collaboration with the ECA Executive Secretary) annual specific programmes for economic development at the sub-regional, regional and continental level, was given the additional task of co-ordinating the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action.

35th OAU Council of Ministers Meeting - 17th Annual Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government

The 35th ordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers was held in Freetown (Sierra Leone) on June 23-29, 1980, in preparation for the 17th annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government which commenced on July 1 and lasted until July 4. The ministerial meeting passed a total of 44 resolutions, notably concerned with the situation in Chad and in southern Africa, while Zimbabwe was also formally admitted as the 50th member state of the OAU.

The 34th OAU Council of Ministers meeting had been held on Feb. 6-15 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and had been concerned in particular with the Zimbabwean elections, held under British administration in what was then officially known as the British dependent territory of (Southern) Rhodesia [see 30365 A, and particularly page 30371 for OAU resolution passed on this occasion]. In addition the Council of Ministers convened in Addis Ababa on March 10 an extraordinary session (the 13th such) to examine "the conduct and results" of the Zimbabwean elections, these results (announced on March 4—see page 30373) being welcomed by delegates as a victory for Africa and for the cause of liberation.

Decisions of Ministerial Meeting

The decisions reached at the 35th Council of Ministers meeting (which was held under the chairmanship of Dr Abdulai Conteh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone) are described below under cross-headings.

Chad. Ministers resolved that member states in a position to do so should contribute towards a required budget of $60,000,000 to finance an African peacekeeping force, and that an appeal would be made to the United Nations Security Council if sufficient funds had not been raised within two months.

The accord on national reconciliation signed in Lagos between 11 Chad factions on Aug. 21, 1979 [see 30064 A], had broken down in March 1980 amid renewed fighting between forces supporting respectively Mr Goukouni Oueddei, President of the Government of national unity, and Mr Hissène Habré, who had also been a leading member of the Government of national unity as Minister of State for National Defence, Ex-Servicemen and Disabled Soldiers [ibid.]. On March 30, Congolese ceasefire enforcement troops had begun an evacuation from Chad; their presence had been intended to form part of a neutral African force in which Benin and Guinea were also to participate. The subsequent proposal to send a renewed African peacekeeping force to Chad was made at the OAU economic summit meeting in Lagos in April and had reportedly been welcomed by President Oueddei (who was attending the meeting); it was also reported from Lagos on April 30 that a special OAU budget had been set up to finance peacekeeping operations in Chad, and that the task of arranging a new ceasefire had been entrusted to an *ad hoc* committee comprising the Presidents of Guinea, Nigeria and Togo under the chairmanship of President Senghor.

Namibia. Ministers reaffirmed their support for the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, and for the armed struggle conducted by SWAPO for the liberation of that country. They condemned as an attack on Angola recent cross-border operations by the South African forces in Namibia [see 30549 A], and resolved to send an OAU mission to assess the extent of damage suffered by Angola in such operations.

South Africa. Ministers called for increased supervision of oil tanker traffic with South Africa as a preparatory measure towards an oil embargo of that country; it was also agreed that studies should be prepared on the possible impact of such a boycott on the economies of Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe (all land-locked countries bordering South Africa). Ministers decided that delegations should be sent to Western countries to make protests over the continued supply of arms to the South African regime.

Western Sahara. An application for membership of the OAU was submitted by Mr Hakim Brahim as Foreign Minister of the Saharan

Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which had been proclaimed in 1976 [see 27746 A] by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario). This application was opposed in particular by the Government of Morocco, which was involved in a continuing military struggle with Polisario forces in Western Sahara [see 29917 A]; Morocco reportedly threatened to leave the OAU if the SADR was admitted, and also asserted that the SADR did not fulfil the criteria for membership as it was not an independent sovereign state [see also below].

Ministers referred the issue to the OAU ad hoc "committee of wise men" set up in 1978 to seek a settlement of the Western Sahara question [see 29258 A; 29565 A; page 29918]. At its most recent meeting, held in Monrovia on Dec. 4-5, 1979, and attended by representatives of Polisario and of Algeria (but not of Morocco) as interested parties, this committee had adopted on Dec. 5 a resolution recommending the immediate implementation of a ceasefire and the recognition of the rights of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination by means of a referendum.

Middle East. Ministers reaffirmed the condemnation already expressed by the OAU [see 29480 A] of "all partial agreements and separate treaties violating the national rights of the Palestinian people", as well as of what they described as the genocide and discrimination practised against the Palestinian people by Israel.

Miscellaneous. A Sierra Leonean proposal for the creation of an OAU security council (analagous to that of the UN) was referred for further discussion at the next meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa in February 1981. Also referred for later discussion were a Libyan request for OAU support for claims for compensation for damage sustained during World War II, and consideration of an African human rights charter (little progress having reportedly been achieved in drafting such a charter pursuant to a resolution passed at the 1979 OAU Assembly—ibid.).

Attendance at Assembly of Heads of State and Government - Opening Session of Assembly

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government was attended by delegations from all 50 OAU member states, including 16 delegations led by heads of state and eight led by heads of government.

Those present included Presidents Kerekou of Benin, Ahidjo of Cameroon, Oueddei of Chad, Sir Dawda Jawara of The Gambia, Limann of Ghana, Sekou Touré of Guinea, Ratsiraka of Madagascar, Moussa Traoré of Mali, Ould Kaydalla of Mauritania, Machel of Mozambique, Shagari of Nigeria, Habyarimana of Rwanda, Senghor of Senegal, Stevens of Sierra Leone, Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia, as well as the heads of government of the Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Morocco, Swaziland, Upper Volta and Zimbabwe (whose Prime Minister, Mr Robert Mugabe, was given a special welcome by delegates). Also present were Dr Waldheim and Mr Kodjo as well as Mr Sam Nujoma, the president of SWAPO, and Mr Oliver Tambo, the president of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC).

The delegation of Liberia was led by Mr Baccus Matthews (the Foreign Minister), it having been announced in Monrovia on June 30 that Master Sgt. Doe was unable to attend the summit meeting himself because of pressing business in Liberia. Earlier concern over a possible controversy at the meeting, in the event of Master Sgt. Doe deciding to attend, had resulted in a visit to Liberia on June 27 by Presidents Stevens and Sekou Touré and also President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Eyadema of Togo. These four, at a meeting with Master Sgt. Doe, reportedly impressed upon him that he should take measures to demonstrate respect for human rights, in particular by releasing political prisoners, if he sought acceptance at the OAU meeting. Mr Gabriel Nimley, the Liberian Minister of Information, said in Monrovia on June 30 that Liberia would not submit to pressure on human rights issues which were ignored elsewhere in Africa.

At the opening session of the Assembly on July 1, President Stevens was elected by acclamation for a one-year term as chairman of the OAU; he took over from President Senghor, the acting interim chairman, who gave the annual chairman's report covering the preceding year.

Delegates observed one minute's silence on July 1 when President Stevens paid tribute to the memory of the late President Neto of Angola (who had died on Sept. 10, 1979—see 30027 A) and the late President Tolbert of Liberia; however, it was reported that the Ethiopian and Liberian delegations remained seated.

The Western Sahara Issue

Following a speech by President Machel on July 2, in which he called on the OAU to condemn what he described as Morocco's policy of colonialism in Western Sahara, the debate at the Assembly on July 2-4 was dominated by the Western Sahara issue.

President Machel said that the partition of Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania had been undertaken in typical colonialist fashion and in contravention of the OAU Charter, but that Mauritania had subsequently taken "the honourable decision, which we all praise, to renounce its claims". Nevertheless, he said, Morocco continued to try to dominate the people of Western Sahara by force, and was pursuing a policy of genocide. He added that the OAU should welcome the SADR as its 51st member.

Mr Maati Bouabid, the Prime Minister of Morocco, exercising the right of reply as leader of his country's delegation, said that Western Sahara was sovereign Moroccan territory and that President Machel's remarks constituted an interference by one OAU member state in the internal affairs of another. He added that Mozambique itself had what he called "shameful relations with South Africa" and that President Machel was in no position to criticize others.

Mr Mugabe called for the withdrawal of Moroccan troops from Western Sahara and for an end to what he described as Moroccan aggression and aggrandizement. In his speech (which was concerned primarily with southern Africa—see below) he also announced that Zimbabwe was to accord recognition to the SADR.

President Senghor proposed on July 3 that the question of the admission of the SADR should be deferred and a new negotiating initiative launched under the chairmanship of President Stevens. This initiative would involve bringing together all parties to the dispute, i.e. Mauritania, the Polisario Front, Algeria (which supported the Polisario Front), Morocco, and the organizations regarded by Morocco as representative of the people of Western Sahara [see below]. A special OAU summit meeting would be called if negotiations made progress towards a ceasefire and the organization of a referendum in the Western Sahara.

After further debate, Mr Kodjo revealed in answer to a question that 26 OAU member states (the number required for a simple majority for the admission of a new member to the OAU under Article 28 of the organization's charter—see 19463 A) had notified him that they favoured the admission of the SADR. (It was reported that three member states—Chad, Mali and Zimbabwe—had adopted this position during the conference, the other 23 being Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. The Government of Equatorial Guinea, which had announced in November 1978 its recognition of the SADR—see page 29566—had reportedly subsequently reversed this decision.)

The Moroccan delegation argued that the admission of the SADR would require a decision on the interpretation of the OAU Charter, since the SADR could not be considered as an independent sovereign state; interpretations of the Charter, it was emphasized, required a two-thirds majority of member states under Article 27 [see 19463 A]. Morocco also reaffirmed that it would leave the OAU if the SADR was admitted; among the countries reportedly supporting the Moroccan position were Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia.

Heads of state and government eventually accepted by consensus on July 4 a compromise put forward by President Shagari, according to which the ad hoc "committee of wise men" was charged with organizing a meeting of all interested parties in Freetown within three months.

The compromise resolution noted the report of the committee's December meeting [see above], and welcomed the fact that Morocco had expressed willingness to participate in the work of the committee. It was envisaged that a special OAU summit meeting could be convened if progress were achieved at the forthcoming Freetown talks. Mr Peter Onu, the OAU Assistant Secretary-General, said at a press briefing on July 4 that the question of the admission of the SADR had been put in abeyance. (For meeting organized by the committee in Freetown in September 1980, see below.)

Southern Africa

President Stevens referred in his opening speech on July 1 to the fact that OAU states had as a common objective the total liberation of the continent, while Mr Mugabe said on July 2 that "now that we have only South Africa and Namibia in the southern part [of Africa] to rid of colonialism, Zimbabwe wishes to propose that a definite concrete programme of supportive action be worked out at this conference".

Mr Mugabe, after expressing his gratitude for the support received from the OAU and its liberation committee in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, added that the attainment of independence by Zimbabwe had "broadened the southern African freedom frontier and increased the influence and pressures on the South African racist regime". Mr Mugabe said that these pressures were directed towards achieving the necessary democratic changes in South Africa and the evolution of the Namibian question "in a manner acceptable to the

Namibian people, led by SWAPO, and in accordance with the United Nations [Security Council] Resolution 435 of 1978" [see page 29463]. However, he continued, "far from admitting the wrongness of her evil policies South Africa is on the contrary challenging its neighbours and organizing subversion, sabotage and armed activities in order to destabilize our economies and political systems", and he referred in particular to what he described as open attacks by South African troops on Angola [see 30549 A] and Zambia, and to South African support for "gangsters" in those countries and also in Mozambique, as well as to "recent incursions" in Swaziland and Lesotho.

With regard to alleged South African interference in Zimbabwe, Mr Mugabe asserted that attempts had been made to disrupt the independence celebrations in Zimbabwe, and that South Africa had been carrying out a "systematic clandestine recruitment campaign on our territory"; some 5,000 persons recruited from Zimbabwe were now part of the South African forces being used to fight in defence of apartheid in Namibia and Angola, he said. (For Mr Mugabe's announcement in the Zimbabwean capital of Salisbury on July that his Government had decided to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa, see 30551 B.)

The actions of South African troops in Angola were also criticized by Dr Waldheim, speaking in the debate on Namibia on July 2; the debate had been opened by Mr Nujoma, who asserted that the struggle for liberation would be intensified both in Namibia and in South Africa itself.

In addition to endorsing (on July 4) the resolutions on southern Africa passed by the Council of Ministers [see above], the Assembly on July 3 approved an air traffic study prepared by Mr Kodjo, which concluded that a total African air traffic embargo on South Africa would be "the most severe blow so far in the campaign to isolate apartheid South Africa".

The study noted that flights to South Africa by 11 major European airlines and the Israeli airline El Al could be made economically unviable if African states implemented a ban on landing and overflying by such flights. South African Airways (SAA) had already been compelled to operate a longer route as a consequence of policies adopted by the OAU in 1963 [see 19699 A], although the study noted that SAA flights were allowed to land in Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritius, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, and that the national airlines of Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Mauritius operated direct flights to South Africa. The Assembly agreed that Mr Kodjo should convene a conference of aviation experts of OAU member states, from which recommendations for appropriate action would be submitted to the 1981 (Nairobi) OAU Assembly.

Other Decisions of Assembly

Resolutions passed by the Assembly on July 4 (including endorsements of resolutions passed by the Council of Ministers) included inter alia decisions on the following subjects;

Chad. Mr Kodjo stated in his annual report on July 2 that Chad was "a country dying under our very eyes" and that only $300,000 had been collected towards the $60,000,000 needed to finance an OAU peacekeeping force. The Assembly accordingly endorsed the resolution passed by the Council of Ministers, with the amendment that an appeal for UN assistance would be made within one (rather than two) months if sufficient funds could not be raised for an independent OAU initiative.

Diego Garcia. The Assembly called for the demilitarization of the island of Diego Garcia and for its unconditional return to Mauritius. (Diego Garcia had been part of the British Indian Ocean Territory since 1965, having been purchased for Anglo-American defence purposes from the then British colony of Mauritius—see 21102 A. It was the site of an Anglo-American naval communications facility—see 24400 D—and the expansion of US facilities on the island—see page 30235—was intended to develop its role as the centre of US military policy in the Indian Ocean region—see also 30378 A. The Indian Ocean had, however, been declared to be a zone of peace by the UN General Assembly in its resolutions 34/80 A and 34/80 B on Dec. 11, 1979—see page 30222.)

Dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogaden Region. The Assembly resolved that the OAU eight-member "good offices committee" set up in 1973 to mediate in this dispute [see 25955 A] should organize a meeting in Lagos on July 30, under the chairmanship of President Shagari, between representatives of the Governments of Ethiopia and of Somalia. (The meeting was subsequently postponed and was held on August 18-20, when resolutions were passed which essentially reaffirmed the principles of the OAU for the resolution of disputes between member states; this was claimed by both conflicting parties to be a vindication of their own position.)

Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development. The Assembly endorsed this plan [see above] as an important step in the economic liberation of Africa.

Fourth Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Western Sahara

The "committee of wise men" (the OAU ad hoc committee on Western Sahara—see above) held its fourth meeting in Freetown on Sept. 9-12, 1980, under the chairmanship of President Stevens.

The meeting was attended by Presidents Sekou Touré of Guinea, Moussa Traoré of Mali, and Shagari of Nigeria, and by Sudanese and Tanzanian representatives. Also present as interested parties were Presidents Bendjedid Chadli of Algeria and Ould Kaydalla of Mauritania, a Moroccan delegation led by Mr Bouabid (the Prime Minister) and Mr Mohammed Boucetta, the Foreign Minister, a delegation from the Polisario Front led by Mr Mohamed Abdelazziz (the organization's secretary-general), and delegations from 10 organizations regarded by the Moroccan Government as represesentative of the people of Western Sahara. These groups included the Association of the Natives of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Aosario—see page 29920), the *Front de libération du Sahara* (FLS), the *Front de libération et de l'unité* (FLU), the *Parti de l'unification nationale du Sahara* (PUNS) and the *Mouvement de résistance des hommes bleus* (Morehob), the three last-named [see 27413 A] having been supported by Morocco against Spain in the then Spanish Sahara until 1975 [see also 27575 A].

The committee formulated a six-point plan for a ceasefire under UN supervision and a referendum organized under OAU auspices.

The plan stipulated that (i) a referendum should be "fair and general", (ii) a ceasefire should be implemented from December 1980, (iii) all armed forces of conflicting parties should be withdrawn to bases and barracks, (iv) a UN force should supervise the ceasefire, (v) the referendum should be organized by the OAU with assistance from the United Nations, and (vi) Mr Kodjo should inform the parties concerned of the decisions of the Committee.

The plan was reportedly welcomed by spokesmen for the Mauritanian Government and for the Polisario Front, but Mr Boucetta said that it contained nothing new, and he criticized what he described as attempts by the OAU to "flee from its responsibilities" by handing the problem over to the UN. He also asserted that OAU initiatives required the approval of a two-thirds majority of member states at a summit meeting (the next scheduled meeting being the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Nairobi in July 1981); his Government, he added, had always sought a peaceful solution, and calls for a ceasefire should therefore be addressed not to it but to the Polisario Front.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - La Vanguardia - Cape Times - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Archiv der Gegenwart - Economist - Africa Confidential - West Africa - Africa - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. OAU 16th Assembly 29840 A; Western Sahara 29917 A*)

A. BELGIUM — Constitutional and State Reforms providing Devolved Powers for Flanders and Wallonia

The two Houses of the Belgian Parliament reached agreement during July and early August 1980 on a number of state reforms which established the devolution of numerous governmental powers to the (Dutch-speaking) Flemish and (French-speaking) Walloon regions of Belgium. The state reforms were preceded during June and July by a number of constitutional reforms relating to the financial and legislative powers of the regions, to the definition of the linguistic communities within Belgium and to the establishment of a new court of arbitration with jurisdiction over disputes between the regions.

The state reforms, which were passed after several weeks of continuous and heated debate, were based essentially on the proposals which had been drawn up in April 1980 by the Belgian Prime Minister, Dr Wilfried Martens, and which had resolved a severe political crisis within the coalition Government by suggesting that Flanders and Wallonia should progress towards autonomy but that the disputed question of creating a third autonomous region of Brussels (the mainly French-speaking national capital) should be temporarily left aside [see 30423 A].

Whereas there had for many years been general agreement on the principle of devolved powers for Flanders and Wallonia, the proposals concerning Brussels had caused repeated political crises and had led directly to the resignation in October 1978 of Mr Léo Tindemans, the then Prime Minister [see 29376 A], as well as to difficulties for his successors, Mr Paul Vanden Boeynants and Dr Martens [see 29503 A; 30249 A; 30423 A]. Dutch speakers in Belgium feared that a Brussels region, if created, would elect a French-speaking regional council and that the country's French-speaking community, which comprised 44 per cent of the population, would thus control two of the three regional assemblies (i.e. Brussels and Wallonia).

The Senate (Upper House) began its deliberation of the proposed state reforms on July 18 and, after six days of continuous debate, approved on July 25, by 137 votes to 22 with three abstentions, a set of reforms which then passed on July 31 to the Chamber of Representatives (Lower House). There the proposals met with bitter opposition from the small parties which comprised the opposition, and particularly from the French-speaking *Front démocratique francophone* (FDF) of Brussels (which had formed part of Dr Martens's first coalition Government until January 1980 when it had withdrawn after disputes over the Government's regionalization policy—see 30249 A). The FDF contended that the other French-speaking parties in the current six-party coalition Government (which comprised the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking Christian Social, Socialist and Liberal parties—see 30423 A) were deserting Brussels by accepting a partial solution which did not define the status of the capital. Nevertheless, the Chamber of Representatives on Aug. 5 approved after lengthy debate a final draft of the reforms, voting by 156 to 19, with five abstentions, in their favour. The Chamber of Representatives also approved on Aug. 3 by 152 votes to 21, with two abstentions, a financial reform [see (ii) below] which was itself approved by the Senate on Aug. 7 by 132 votes to 23 with two abstentions.

The reforms approved by both Houses of Parliament provided (i) that the two regions of Flanders and Wallonia were to set up directly-elected regional councils by October 1982 at the latest, and (ii) that the two new councils should ultimately control finances totalling some 10 per cent of the national budget and concerning inter alia roads and urban projects, cultural matters and public health. Education, defence, foreign affairs and overall financial policy remained, however, in the control of the central Government.—(Le Monde - Guardian - Times - Financial Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Regionalization Policy, Formation of Six-Party Coalition Government 30423 A*)

A. MALI — Government Reorganization - Student Unrest - Sentences in Corruption Trial

President Moussa Traoré of Mali announced on Aug. 2, 1980, a reorganization of the Government, including the appointment of five new ministers and the allocation of different portfolios to five existing members of the Government.

The new appointments were as follows (with any previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

Mr Drissa Keita	Finance and Commerce
Mr Sekoro Diakite	State Enterprises
Lt.-Col. Sory Ibrahima Sylla (Army Chief of Staff)	Interior
Mrs Gakou Nee Fatou Niang	Information and Telecommunications
Mr Nijai Maiko	Sports, Arts and Culture
Lt.-Col. Sekou Ly (Interior and Town Planning)	National Education
Mr Madi Diallo (Finance and Commerce)	Stockbreeding and Water and Forest Resources
Mr Ahmed Mohamed Ag Hamani (Information and Telecommunications)	Planning
Mr Jibril Diallo (Public Works and Tourism)	Public Works and Transport
Mr Robert (Keble) Ndaw (Planning and Transport)	Industrial Development and Tourism

Secondary and higher education institutions were officially closed on Dec. 6, 1979, following strikes and protests in Bamako (the capital of Mali) by pupils and students, while a number of students held following violent clashes with the security forces were drafted into the Army and posted to garrisons away from the capital.

The strike had been called on Nov. 16 by the *Union nationale des élèves et étudiants du Mali* (UNEEM), the students' organization which had continued its activities clandestinely after the Government had ordered that it should be dissolved in January 1979.

Schools and colleges were officially reopened on Jan. 14, 1980, but several hundred students were reportedly arrested after a demonstration on March 9, and the student strike was resumed in protest over the death in detention on March 16 of Mr Abdoul Karim Camara (22), the UNEEM secretary-general.

Mr Camara had been among those arrested on March 9; his death was officially reported on March 21, with no details given, but it was reported that he had died under torture. Another detainee, Miss Rokya Konyate (20), the secretary-general of the students' committee at a lycée in Bamako, was also reported to have died after being tortured, although there was no official confirmation of her death.

Malian students occupied the Malian embassy in Dakar (Senegal) for several hours on March 24 to protest over the death of Mr Camara and to demand the release of other detainees. The human rights organization Amnesty International announced in London on March 25 that it had sent a telegram expressing its concern to President Moussa Traoré over reports that at least 18 people had been shot, stabbed or tortured to death by security forces; Amnesty International also called for an inquiry into the death of Mr Camara.

Classes were reportedly resumed at schools and colleges in Bamako on March 31, after President Moussa Traoré had announced on March 29 that all the detained pupils and students would be released.

Four former government ministers and others on trial for alleged corruption and misappropriation of funds [see 29644 B; 29789 B] received sentences before a special state security court on June 28, 1980; the sentences included the death penalty for Mr Kissima Doukara and Mr Nouhoum Diawara.

Mr Doukara, who had been Minister of the Interior, Security and Defence from 1970 to 1978, had earlier been sentenced to death for alleged participation in an attempted coup d'état in February 1978 [see 29329 A], as had Mr Tiécoro Bagayoko, the former director-general of the security services, who now received a sentence of 10 years' hard labour. Mr Karim Dembele, the former Minister of Transport and Public Works, who was also implicated in the February 1978 conspiracy [ibid.], now received a three-year prison sentence, while Col. Joseph Mara, the former Minister of Justice, was sentenced to five years' hard labour. Sentences passed in March 1979 in this corruption case [see 29644 B] had been annulled in June 1979 [see 29789 B].

President Moussa Traoré announced on Feb. 9, 1980, that 13 detainees were to be released, including Capt. Malick Diallo, who had taken part with the then Lt. Moussa Traoré in the coup in November 1968 which overthrew former President Modibo Keita [see 23203 A], and who had subsequently been Commissioner for Information, before being sentenced in 1972 to forced labour for life for alleged involvement in an attempted coup [see 27386 B].—(Le Monde - West Africa - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 29789 B*)

B. TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS — New Chief Minister - Constitutional Developments

The death was announced on May 11, 1980, of Mr James A. G. S. McCartney (34), the Chief Minister and Minister of Home Affairs and Communications of the Turks and Caicos Islands (a British dependency with a land area of 193 square miles and a population of 7,155, situated to the south-east of the Bahamas). He was killed in an air crash near Philadelphia while returning home from Washington, where he had held talks with US State Department officials on matters connected with current proposals for the attainment of early independence by the Turks and Caicos Islands [see below].

Mr McCartney's death reduced the representation of his People's Democratic Movement (PDM) to five out of the 11 elective seats on the Legislative Council, the remaining five such seats being held by the Progressive National Party (PNP —known until late 1978 as the People's National Party). Under the Constitution [see below], the appointment of a new Chief Minister was determined by a vote of the elected members of the Legislative Council, but the equal party-political division among them following Mr McCartney's death led to a deadlock pending a by-election in his former constituency. This was held on June 12 and resulted in a victory for the PDM over the PNP by 161 votes to 88, after which Mr McCartney's successor as leader of the PDM, Mr Oswald O. Skippings (hitherto Minister of Health, Education, Welfare and Local Government), was elected Chief Minister by six votes to five.

At the last general election held in September 1976 the PDM had won five seats, the PNP four and independents two; the independent members had subsequently joined the PDM, while one PDM member had joined the PNP.

The 1976 election had followed the introduction of a new Constitution under which the Legislative Council consisted of 11 members elected by universal adult suffrage, three nominated members appointed by the Governor after consultation with the elected members, and three ex-officio members (the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary). In addition the members elected a Speaker, who did not have to be a member of the Legislative Council.

The Executive Council was presided over by the Governor, and comprised also (i) a Chief Minister and three other ministers drawn from the elected members of the Legislative Council and (ii) the three ex-officio members of the Legislative Council. The Governor exercised reserved powers in respect of external affairs, internal security and the public service, but was otherwise generally required to act on the advice of the Executive Council.

The main political issue in the Turks and Caicos Islands in mid-1980 concerned the territory's future constitutional development, the PDM's established policy being to seek full internal self-government. It was reported by *Insight* of January 1980 that the Thatcher Government in Britain had recently sought during discussions with Mr McCartney to make the granting of full internal self-government dependent upon the territory's rapid progress thereafter to full independence, and had moreover indicated that substantial financial aid disbursements could not be expected if the territory chose to retain dependent status.

It was subsequently reported that Mr McCartney appeared ready to accept a modified version of the British proposals, whereby the territory would attain full internal self-government as a UK associated state in early 1981 with a view to proceeding to full independence in mid-1982.

This reported proposal was, however, strongly criticized by the opposition PNP, which maintained that the territory lacked the financial, institutional and defence resources for a viable independence, and Mr Skippings stated after his appointment as Chief Minister that the PDM would seek a mandate at the next general election to submit the issue to the decision of the people in a referendum. The general election was due to be held not later than the first week of January 1981, following the dissolution of the Legislative Council on Oct. 5.—(Insight - Times - Guardian - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Latin America Newsletters)

A. ZAÏRE — Government Changes - Alleged Human Rights Violations - New Exile Group - Relations with Angola and Zambia

Following the announcement during August 1980 of modifications in the structure of the Zaïre's sole and ruling party, the *Mouvement populaire de la révolution* (MPR), changes were also announced in late August in the composition of the Executive Council (Cabinet).

Appointments to the Executive Council, announced by President Mobutu on Aug. 27 except where otherwise stated, were as follows (with any previous responsibilities shown in parentheses):

Mr Nguza Karl I Bond (Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation)	First State Commissioner
Mr Inonga Lokongo L'Ome (Ambassador to Belgium)	Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation
Mr Duga Kugbe Toro	Territorial Administration
Mr Mozagba Ngbuka (Mines)	Justice
Mr Lwamba Katansi	Mines
Mr Emony Mondanga (Governor of the Bank of Zaïre)	Foreign Trade
Gen. Babia Zongbi Malobia (National Defence and Veterans' Affairs) . .	Social Affairs
Mr Bokana Wondangela	General Planning
*Mr Kilolo Musampa Lubemba . .	Civil Service

* This appointment was made on Aug. 28, the Civil Service portfolio having been newly created on that day by a decree issued by President Mobutu.

The portfolio of National Defence and Veterans' Affairs was taken over once again by President Mobutu, who had held it prior to the appointment of Gen. Babia in January 1980 [see 30426 A], and who also retained responsibility for Territorial Security. The Department of National Guidance (headed by Mr Elebe Ma Ekonzo) was redesignated as the Department of Information, according to a decision announced on Aug. 12 by the MPR political bureau.

President Mobutu also announced on Aug. 27 the names of nine governors and 18 regional commissioners for the country's eight regions and for the city of Kinshasa. The President's eldest son, Mr Mobutu Niwa, became Zaïre's roving ambassador, and Mr Sambwa Pida Mbangui became Governor of the Bank of Zaïre (a post which he had already held in 1970-77).

The party changes, which were introduced after secret meetings of the MPR political bureau on July 31-Aug. 4, included the establishment of a central committee (whose 114 members representing "all existing forces in the nation" were appointed by President Mobutu on Sept. 2) and the creation of a new party executive secretariat; Mr Bo-Boliko Lokonga Monse Mihambo, formerly the First State Commissioner, was on Aug. 27 appointed to the new post of MPR executive secretary.

Alleged Human Rights Violations - Formation of New Organization by Opposition in Exile

Allegations first made in a report by the human rights organization Amnesty International on May 20, 1980 [see 30426 A], that hundreds of political prisoners had died as a result of conditions in Zaïrean detention centres, were repeated the following month but were described as slanders by government spokesmen.

The French section of Amnesty, in a statement released in Paris on June 24, called on President Mobutu to end what it called serious violations of human rights and to declare an amnesty for all political prisoners, and also claimed that Zaïrean security forces had killed dozens of people in suppressing peaceful demonstrations.

[It had earlier been announced by the MPR political bureau in Kinshasa on Aug. 12 that all first-year students at the educational institutions closed by the Government in April after demonstrations —ibid.—were to serve for one year in the Army.]

Mr Nguza Karl I Bond, then the State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, said in Paris on Aug. 24 that the allegations made by Amnesty International stemmed from the hatred of certain international leftists for Zaïre; he said that, as a former detainee himself [see 29506 A], he knew that conditions in Zaïrean prisons were not as bad as alleged, and he asserted that a number of those named in the report as political prisoners had been released, while others had never been in detention at all.

It was announced in Brussels on July 3 by exiled opponents of President Mobutu that a new organization had been formed, to be known as the *Conseil pour la libération du Congo-Kinshasa* (CLC) and with the declared aim of re-establishing democracy and fundamental human rights in Zaïre.

The CLC had been established following meetings between exile groups in Brussels during June, and included the *Front national de libération du Congo* (FNLC), the group responsible for the attack in Shaba province in 1978 [see 29125 A], as well as the *Mouvement national pour l'union et la réconciliation au Zaïre* (MNUR), the *Parti révolutionnaire du peuple* (PRP), the *Parti socialiste congolais* (PSC) and the *Étudiants congolais progressistes* (ECP). Mr Mungul Diaka, a former State Commissioner in the Zaïrean Government who had escaped from the country in January 1980 after being dismissed and accused of fraud and maladministration [see 30426 A], was named as the president of the new CLC.

Relations with Angola - Reported Reopening of Benguela Railway - Border Dispute with Zambia

Following a visit by President Mobutu to Luanda (Angola) on July 3, the Governments of Angola and Zaïre issued a joint communiqué announcing their decision "to continue diplomatic relations from now on at ambassadorial level".

The communiqué also expressed satisfaction with the improvement of security along the Angola-Zaïre border, and with progress relating to the repatriation of refugees in both countries. It was later announced on July 7 that the Benguela railway, closed since 1975, was once again technically operative [ibid.] and that a cargo of Zaïrean exports had arrived by rail at the Angolan port of Lobito.

It was reported from Lusaka (Zambia) on Aug. 11 that border posts had been set up by Zaïre some 30 kilometres inside Zambian territory in the extreme north of the country in the disputed border area of Kaputa. Subsequent reports from Zambia in late August indicated that Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda were to meet in October to discuss both the Kaputa area and the nearby Lake Mweru border area, on the basis of recommendations made by the Zambia-Zaïre Permanent Joint Commission after its meeting in June in the Zaïrean town of Lubumbashi [which was incorrectly rendered as Lumumbashi on page 30427].—(Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - New York Times - West Africa - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30426 A*)

A. IRAQ — Elections to New National Assembly and to Kurdish Provincial Council - Defection of Kurdish Minister - Relations with Other Countries - Internal Security Developments

Elections were held in Iraq in June-September (i) for a new 250-member National Assembly and (ii) to the Legislative Council in the (Kurdish) Autonomous Region in the north of the country.

These elections were held on the basis of legislation first published on Dec. 5, 1979, which provided (i) that there should be a National Assembly of not less than 250 members, elected by free and direct suffrage every four years, and that members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) should be members of the Assembly; and (ii) that in the three (Kurdish) governorates of Arbil, Dihok and Sulaymaniyah 50 members should be elected to the Legislative Council (hitherto appointed —see 26531 A; page 29240) by free and direct suffrage and secret ballot for a three-year term.

The respective bills were presented for popular debate and, after minor amendments, were ratified by the RCC on March 16, 1980; these bills laid down in particular qualifications for membership of the two bodies, including "belief in the principles of the revolution of July 17-30, 1968" [see 22868 A], and stated that the National Assembly would, alongside the RCC, perform the legislative duties while the Legislative Council would inter alia "exercise the powers of making legislative decisions to develop the Autonomous Region [and] its culture, character and local traditions". The Assembly would "supervise the state's institutions; propose and enact laws in accordance with the Constitution; ratify the state budget as well as international treaties and agreements; debate the state's internal and foreign policy; summon any cabinet member for clarification or questioning; and propose the relieving of any cabinet member of his post".

Elections to the National Assembly—the first since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 [see 16230 A; 16305 A]—took place on June 20, when some 840 candidates contested the 250 seats. Although candidates did not identify themselves with political parties, it was estimated that control of the Assembly was exercised by adherents of the ruling *Baath* party; successful candidates included 14 women. At the opening session on June 30 Mr Naeem Haddad, a Deputy Prime Minister, member of the RCC and secretary-general of the National Progressive Front, was elected as the Assembly's Speaker; he subsequently relinquished his post as Deputy Prime Minister.

Elections to the Kurdish Legislative Council were held on Sept. 19, with a total of 194 candidates contesting the Council's 50 seats.

It was announced in Damascus (Syria) on Aug. 26 that Mr Aziz Rasheed Aqrawi, a Minister of State of Kurdish origin (listed on page 30103 as Mr Aziz Rasheed), had "taken refuge" in Syria and had denounced the Iraqi regime particularly for having attempted to place the country "in the zone of US influence" and for having sold oil to the United States at prices below those current in the international markets; Syria, he said, was "the bastion of Arab steadfastness, of the Palestinian revolution and of the Lebanese and Iraqi national movements".

Foreign Relations

In July and August 1980, Iraqi diplomats were expelled from both Austria and West Berlin following the discovery of alleged attempts to cause explosions at, respectively, the Iranian embassy in Vienna and a meeting of Kurdish students which was being held in West Berlin.

Mr Sami Hanna Attalah and Mr Hamid Tarrad were expelled from Austria on July 31 for having allegedly attempted to arrange the delivery of an explosive device to the Iranian embassy in Vienna; two Austrian diplomats were in the following days declared personae non gratae and expelled from Baghdad.

The first secretary at the Iraqi embassy in East Berlin (Mr Khalid J. Jaber) and a technical officer at the embassy (Mr Hay-Ali Mahmoud) were arrested in West Berlin on Aug. 1 while allegedly seeking to hand over a suitcase containing a small quantity of explosives for use against Kurdish students. The two men were in possession of diplomatic papers issued in East Berlin (although they were not considered by the West Berlin authorities to enjoy diplomatic immunity), and a spokesman for the Iraqi embassy in East Berlin described the arrests as a breach of normal diplomatic practice. The West German Government confirmed on Aug. 15 that it had proposed to the West Berlin Senate that Mr Jaber and Mr Mahmoud (who had meanwhile been charged with attempted murder, causing a danger of explosion and illegal possession of arms) should "for foreign policy considerations" be expelled, and they departed without trial on Sept. 17.

Also in July-August, Iraq's diplomatic relations with Egypt and Syria underwent considerable strain.

Egypt announced on July 13 that it had expelled 18 Iraqi diplomats (no reason being made public), and Iraq in response required nine Egyptian diplomats to leave Iraq. (Full diplomatic relations between the two countries had been suspended in 1977 following the Tripoli "rejectionist" conference—see page 29164.)

Iraq on Aug. 18 ordered Syria to withdraw and replace all its diplomatic personnel at the embassy in Baghdad following the discovery of a large quantity of arms, ammunition and poisonous material at the embassy. The Syrian authorities, for their part, claimed that the weapons and explosives had been planted in the embassy, and on Aug. 21 declared personae non gratae the Iraqi ambassador in Damascus and his diplomatic staff.

Among earlier cases of expulsions were those of Iraqi diplomats from London and of British diplomats from Baghdad in July 1978, and of Iraqi guards from Paris in August 1978 [see 29303 A; pages 30106-07]. Other earlier incidents included the following.

(1) The Canadian Government on June 20, 1978, expelled an official at the Iraqi embassy in Ottawa (Mr Abdul Latif M. Al-Niaimi) for having engaged in "questionable intelligence activities" (another official—Mr Tariq Abu al-Khail—having been similarly expelled in August 1977), and the Canadian chargé d'affaires in Baghdad (Mr W. A. McKenzie) was declared persona non grata in July 1978.

(2) Three Iraqi diplomats in Stockholm were on Feb. 5, 1979, ordered to leave Sweden immediately following the arrest of members of an alleged espionage ring, while three of the four Swedish embassy staff in Baghdad were in turn declared personae non gratae on Feb. 19 and required to leave Iraq by the end of that month.

(3) Following the death in Sofia on Dec. 3-4, 1979, of two Iraqi students, the Iraqi ambassador was (as announced on Dec. 5) withdrawn from Sofia on the grounds that the death of one of the students was caused by a group of Iraqi communists "in collusion with the official Bulgarian apparatus". (Subsequently President Zhivkov of Bulgaria paid an official visit of friendship to Iraq on May 28-31, 1980, in the course of which various co-operation agreements were signed, together with a protocol on co-operation between the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Arab *Baath* Socialist Party.)

Shortly after the imposition in May 1979 of prison sentences on two Britons for "subversive activities" and "industrial espionage" [see page 30107], Lord Carrington, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, paid a visit to Baghdad in early July, in the course of which the Iraqi Government was understood to have agreed to lift its selective embargo against British imports [ibid.] and also to review the case of one of the two prisoners, Mr Christopher Sparkes. However, another British businessman, Mr John Smith, was arrested in Baghdad on July 12 and was on Feb. 28, 1980, sentenced to life imprisonment for bribery of government officials.

Mr Douglas Hurd, Minister of State, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated in an adjournment debate in the House of Commons on July 4, 1980, that there was no question of Britain agreeing to any suggestion to exchange Mr Sparkes for an Iraqi (Mr Salem Ahmad Hassan) who had been sentenced in London on March 16, 1979, to life imprisonment for the murder of Col. Abdul Razzak al Nayef [see page 30106]; this refusal, he said, was based not only on legal grounds but also on the grounds that "if it became known that the British Government were willing to hand over people convicted in our courts of terrorist offences, the dangers facing British subjects travelling abroad would be greatly increased". During a visit to Iraq later in July Mr Hurd was understood to have urged the Iraqi Government to release both Mr Sparkes and Mr Smith on humanitarian grounds.

Internal Security Developments

In the first months of 1980 a marked increase was noted in the number of executions carried out in Iraq, particularly following the decision by the Revolutionary Command Council at the end of March that the death penalty would be applied to persons affiliated to the Dawah Party and to those propagating its ideas and facilitating its mission. (The Dawah Party was supported principally by Shia—Shi'ite—Moslems, who were in a majority particularly in the south of Iraq, whereas the country's ruling elements were predominantly Sunnis. The Government moreover accused the Dawah Party of aligning itself with the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.)

Between April and July 1980 the Dawah Party or the "Iraqi *Mujaheddin*" group, which presented itself as being linked to the party, claimed responsibility for a number of attacks both within Iraq and on Iraqi targets in other countries.

In particular (i) a grenade attack on April 1 slightly injured Mr Tariq Aziz, an Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, while he was addressing students at Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad; (ii) an employee at the Iraqi embassy in Rome was shot dead on June 4 by two assailants who were apparently seeking to leave an explosive device at the embassy; (iii) three attackers were shot dead by Iraqi security guards after forcing their way into the British embassy in Baghdad on June 19; and (iv) an Iraqi diplomat was killed in an explosion in a flat in Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) on July 27. In addition, there was speculation that the Dawah Party or the Iraqi *Mujaheddin* were likewise responsible for the shooting dead near Beirut airport on July 28 of Mr Musa Shaib, a leading member of the pro-Iraqi Lebanese regional command of the *Baath* party.

It was reported in mid-April 1980 that Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al Sadr, the spiritual leader of the Iraqi Shias, had been executed along with others, in a move understood to be connected with recent disturbances in Baghdad and elsewhere and with previous disturbances in the southern holy city of Karbala [see page 30106].—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) *(Prev. rep. 30103 A)*

A. PETROLEUM — World Supply and Demand Trends in 1979 - Comparative Usage of Primary Energy Sources - Petroleum and Natural Gas Reserves - Deployment of Surplus Oil Revenues

Figures published in mid-1980 in the British Petroleum Company's *Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry 1979* showed that world petroleum production and consumption rose to new record levels in 1979 notwithstanding the local supply shortages which had been experienced in various countries during the first half of the year in consequence of the interruption of exports from Iran [see 29981 A, where statistics given in the previous edition of the *Review* are also summarized]. Certain of the comparative statistics for 1978 given below differ from those given previously as a result of updating.

World oil production rose by 4.1 per cent to 3,221,700,000 tonnes in 1979, compared with 3,095,400,000 tonnes in 1978. The Soviet Union remained the largest producer in 1979, but United States output (excluding natural gas liquids) fell by 2 per cent from 432,400,000 tonnes in 1978 to 423,700,000 tonnes (13.2 per cent of the world total) in 1979, when Saudi Arabia again displaced the United States as the second largest producer. The *Review*'s regional analysis of production was as follows:

	Production (million tonnes)		Percentage change	Percentage of world total
	1978	1979	1978-79	1979
Middle East . .	1,058.9	1,076.4	+1.7	33.4
Soviet Union . .	572.5	586.0	+2.4	18.1
North America* . .	562.5	569.1	+1.2	17.7
Africa	297.1	324.4	+9.2	10.1
Latin America/ Caribbean . .	251.5	280.0	+11.2	8.7
Western Europe† . .	89.6	115.9	+29.3	3.6
South-East Asia . .	103.4	106.5	+2.9	3.3
China	104.1	106.1	+1.9	3.3
Australasia . .	21.4	21.9	+2.5	0.7
Eastern Europe . .	21.0	20.0	−5.0	0.6
South Asia. . . .	12.9	14.9	+15.1	0.5
Japan	0.5	0.5	—	‡

* Including US output of natural gas liquids.

†Including Yugoslavia.

‡Less than 0.1 per cent.

The aggregate output of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) rose by 3.3 per cent to 1,544,500,000 tonnes in 1979, compared with 1,495,600,000 tonnes in 1978, but fell slightly as a proportion of total world production from 48.3 per cent to 47.9 per cent. This increased output, equivalent to an average 31,285,000 barrels per day (bpd; 1 barrel = 159 litres or an average 0.136 tonnes), was achieved despite a 40.2 per cent fall in Iranian production, which was offset by increased output from most other major OPEC producers. In particular, Saudi Arabia increased its output by 14.3 per cent to an average 9,510,000 bpd over the whole year (despite the announcement of official production ceilings of 9,500,000 bpd during the first, third and fourth quarters and only 8,500,000 bpd during the second quarter—see 29981 A), while Iraq made the largest proportionate increase (of 32.7 per cent) to displace Iran as the second largest OPEC producer. Details of the output of all 13 member countries are given in the following table.

	Production (million tonnes)		Percentage change	1979 Percentage of:	
	1978	1979	1978-79	world total	OPEC total
Saudi Arabia . .	409.8	468.3*	+14.3	14.5	30.3
Iraq	127.6	169.3*	+32.7	5.3	11.0
Iran	260.4	155.6	−40.2	4.8	10.1
Venezuela	115.4	125.4	+8.6	3.9	8.1
Nigeria	95.1	114.2*	+20.2	3.5	7.4
Kuwait	97.0	114.1	+17.6	3.5	7.4
Libya	95.2	99.6	+4.6	3.1	6.4
United Arab Emirates . .	88.8	88.5†	−0.3	2.8	5.7
Indonesia	81.0	78.8	−2.7	2.4	5.1
Algeria	57.2	56.4	−1.4	1.8	3.6
Qatar	23.4	24.6	+5.2	0.8	1.6
Ecuador	10.0	10.5*	+4.4	0.3	0.7
Gabon	10.8	10.2	−5.3	0.3	0.7
Neutral Zone‡ . .	23.9	29.0	+21.3	0.9	1.9

* New record level.

†Of which Abu Dhabi 70.2, Dubai 17.6 and Sharjah 0.7.

‡Production shared between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The following table gives comparative production figures for nine selected non-OPEC countries (for Soviet, US and Chinese figures see above).

	Production (million tonnes)		Percentage change	Percentage of world total
	1978	1979	1978-79	1979
Canada	74.4	86.0	+15.5	2.7
Mexico	66.0	80.5*	+22.0	2.5
United Kingdom . .	53.3	77.9*	+46.0	2.4
Egypt	24.2	25.5*	+5.4	0.8
Argentina	23.6	24.5*	+3.8	0.8
Norway	17.2	18.8*	+9.4	0.6
Oman	15.8	14.8	−6.3	0.5
Brunei	10.1	11.9*	+17.2	0.4
Trinidad and Tobago	11.6	10.8	−7.3	0.3

*New record level.

World oil consumption rose by 1.2 per cent in 1979 to a total of 3,119,600,000 tonnes, compared with 3,083,200,000 tonnes in 1978. Excluding the Soviet Union, East European countries and China (which together accounted for 20.6 per cent of the 1979 total), consumption rose by 0.2 per cent. Among the member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) [see 30320 B for list], only Switzerland, Turkey and the United States reduced their oil consumption in 1979; see 29981 A for IEA members' agreement to reduce their "demand for oil on the world market" by about 5 per cent. The following table gives consumption figures for 10 major oil-consuming countries.

	Consumption (million tonnes)		Percentage change	Percentage of world total
	1978	1979	1978-79	1979
United States . .	888.8	862.9	−2.9	27.7
Soviet Union . .	419.2	441.0*	+5.2	14.5
Japan	262.7	265.4	+1.0	8.5
West Germany . .	142.7	146.9	+2.9	4.7
France	119.0	118.1	−0.7	3.8
Italy	99.8	101.2	+1.4	3.2
United Kingdom . .	94.0	94.1	+0.1	3.0
China	84.7	91.1*	+7.5	2.9
Canada	86.9	89.9*	+3.5	2.9
Spain	47.0	47.3	+0.6	1.5

* New record level.

Overall world primary energy consumption rose by 3.2 per cent to 6,960,400,000 tonnes oil equivalent in 1979, compared with 6,743,500,000 tonnes in 1978. The comparative usage of different energy sources was as follows:

	Million tonnes oil equivalent 1978	1979	Percentage change 1978-79	Percentage of world total 1979
Oil	3,083.2	3,119.6	+1.2	44.82
Coal	1,879.3	1,976.6	+5.2	28.39
Natural gas ..	1,231.4	1,296.6	+5.3	18.63
Water power ..	399.8	411.8	+3.0	5.92
Nuclear power ..	149.8	155.8	+4.0	2.24

The following table gives the world's estimated "published proved" reserves of oil (excluding shale oil and tar sands) and natural gas at the end of 1979.

	Oil: thousand million tonnes	Per cent	Gas: million million cubic feet	Per cent
United States	4.2	5.0	194.9	7.6
Canada	1.1	1.3	88.1	3.4
Total North America ..	(*5.3*)	(*6.3*)	(*283.0*)	(*11.0*)
Latin America/Caribbean ..	7.9	8.7	144.5	5.6
Total Western Hemisphere..	(*13.2*)	(*15.0*)	(*427.5*)	(*16.6*)
Western Europe	3.2	3.6	135.9	5.3
Middle East	49.2	55.7	739.8	28.7
Africa	7.6	8.8	210.4	8.1
Soviet Union	9.1	10.3	900.0	34.9
Eastern Europe..	0.4	0.5	10.0	0.4
China	2.7	3.1	25.0	1.0
Other Eastern Hemisphere ..	2.6	3.0	128.2	5.0
Total Eastern Hemisphere ..	(*74.8*)	(*85.0*)	(*2,149.3*)	(*83.4*)
World totals	88.0	100.0	2,576.8	100.0

Following the major oil price rises during 1979 [see 29981 A] there was a sharp increase in oil exporters' revenues and cash surpluses. The June 1980 edition of the Bank of England's *Quarterly Bulletin* provisionally estimated the aggregate current-account balance-of-payments surplus of the oil-exporting countries (defined as the 13 OPEC members plus Bahrain, Brunei, Oman and Trinidad and Tobago) as $74,000 million in 1979 and their net external borrowing as $5,000 million. Of the $79,000 million thus estimated to be available for investment, details of identified placements totalling $53,800 million are included in the following table.

	1978 flow*	1979 flow†	End-1979 level†
		($ thousand million)	
United Kingdom:			
British Government stocks	−0.3	0.4	1.7
Treasury bills	0.2	—	0.4
Sterling deposits	0.2	1.4	4.1
Other sterling investments‡	0.1	0.4	2.4
British Government foreign currency bonds..	—	—	0.2
Foreign currency deposits	−2.0	14.8	45.7
Other foreign currency borrowing	—	0.2	2.4
United States:			
Treasury bonds and notes	−1.5	−1.1	8.3
Treasury bills	−1.0	3.3	6.6
Bank deposits	0.8	4.9	14.3
Other‡	3.0	1.8	26.2
Other countries:			
Bank deposits	5.0	16.4	123.7
Special bilateral facilities and other investments‡ §	8.8	11.7	
International organizations	0.1	−0.4	
Total	13.4	53.8	236.0

* Revised.

†Provisional.

‡Includes holdings of equities and property.

§ Includes loans to less developed countries.

It was estimated that about 80 per cent of the oil-exporting countries' foreign assets were held in industrialized countries at the end of 1979, with the United Kingdom and the United States together accounting for 47.6 per cent of the total identified placements (as shown in the third column of the above table).—(British Petroleum Company, London - Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin) (*Prev. rep. 29981 A; IEA 30131 A*)

A. AUSTRIA — Cabinet Change

Herr Alfred Dallinger, the chairman of the Union of Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees, was on Oct. 9, 1980, appointed Minister for Social Affairs in the Socialist Party Cabinet which had governed Austria under Dr Bruno Kreisky since 1970 [see 23964 A; 24938 A; 27444 A]. Herr Dallinger succeeded Dr Gerhard Weissenberg (61), also a former trade union official, who had died on Oct. 1, having held his ministerial position since August 1976 [see 28031 A]. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 30030 B*)

B. SURINAM — Composition of New Cabinet - Appointment of Constitutional Committee

The Surinam Cabinet led by Dr Henk Chin-a-Sen which had, as described in 30506 A, been appointed in March 1980 but which had on Aug. 15 been remodelled after severe internal disputes, was reported during September 1980 to be composed as follows:

* Dr Henk Chin-a-Sen	Prime Minister and General Affairs
†Mr André Haakmat	Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Army and Police
Mr Franklin Leeflang	Internal Affairs
†Mr M. J. B. Chehin	Finance and Economic Affairs
Mr Harold Rusland	Education and People's Development
Mr Albert van Dijk	Agriculture, Husbandry, Fisheries and Forestry
†Ms Siegmien Power-Staphorst	Social Affairs and Housing
Mr Mohamed Ataoellah ..	Public Works and Communications
* Mr Henry Illes	Labour and Health
Mr Herman Adhin	Construction
†Mr André Kamperveen ..	Youth, Sport and Culture

* Changed responsibilities. †New appointment.

The following also held posts as Deputy Ministers in the new Government: Sgt. Laurens Neede, one of the original members of the National Military Council (Police); Capt. Eddy Ruimveldt, formerly Minister of Defence (Army); and Ms Nell Stadwijk-Kappel (Youth).

Dr Chin-a-Sen also held, as described on page 30507, the post of President of the Republic.

The original Chin-a-Sen Government had been installed by the eight-man National Military Council (NMC, comprising a group of officers and non-commissioned officers which had in February overthrown the Government of Mr Henck Arron), but the Cabinet had, like the NMC itself, since been subject to a succession of internal disputes over issues including the role to be played by the (now abolished) *Staten*, or Parliament, and Surinam's relationships with the left-wing governments of such non-aligned Caribbean countries as Cuba, Jamaica and Grenada, leading on Aug. 15 to the cabinet reorganization and to the appointment of Dr Chin-a-Sen as President *vice* Mr Johan Ferrier [ibid.].

It was announced on Aug. 23 that a six-member committee had been appointed by the NMC to draw up a new constitution in place of that which had been suspended on Aug. 15 with the introduction of the state of emergency. Mr Haakmat informed foreign reporters on Sept. 8 that the *Staten* had been replaced by an advisory assembly whose exact composition and powers he did not closely define.—(Guardian - Daily Telegraph - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Latin America Regional Report) (*Prev. rep. 30506 A*)

C. ANDORRA — New Viguier de France - Elections to General Council

M. René Lalouette on May 19, 1980, replaced M. André Prunet-Foch as Viguier de France, i.e. as the representative in Andorra of the French co-prince (President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing).

Following elections held on Dec. 14, 1979, to 14 of the 28 seats on Andorra's General Council (Parliament) the group supporting Sr Estanislau Sangrà Font, the current Syndic-General (head of the Council), was reported to have lost its majority to the Conservative group led by Sr Julià Reig, although the four councillors representing Andorra La Vella were expected to continue to follow an independent line in the Council.

In the six parishes which voted 2,186 (74.1 per cent) of the total electorate of 2,950 went to the polls, some 83 per cent of the votes being valid, 13.2 per cent blank and 3.7 per cent void. In the seventh parish, Sant Julià de Lòria, no candidates were presented, with the result that its four councillors were directly appointed.

The Andorran Democratic Association (ADA), the principality's only political association, had been dissolved prior to the elections and the Democratic Party of Andorra (PDA) formed in its place, even though Andorran law technically prohibited the formation of political parties and trade unions. (La Vanguardia, Barcelona - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. 29488 B, 28884 A*)

A. POLAND — Industrial Unrest leading to Government Crisis - Resignation of Mr Gierek and Mr Babiuch - Legalization of Independent Trade Unions

A wave of severe industrial unrest occurred in Poland during July, August and September 1980, leading to a major national crisis in the course of which both the Prime Minister, Mr Edward Babiuch (appointed in February—see 30297 A) and the First Secretary of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), Mr Edward Gierek, resigned their posts. Mr Babiuch was succeeded on Aug. 24 by Mr Jozef Pinkowski and Mr Gierek on Sept. 6 by Mr Stanislaw Kania, and major reorganizations of the Cabinet and the PUWP leadership also took place during the period to mid-October. The Government was finally obliged to accede to most of the strikers' demands, however, including the right to form independent trade unions, as distinct from the official trade unions which were effectively controlled by the PUWP.

The strikes began over wage disputes following a rise in meat prices, but rapidly assumed more overtly political dimensions; in addition to the legalization of independent trade unions the strikers also called for the lifting of censorship in the Polish press, the release of imprisoned dissidents, the strengthening of the position of the Roman Catholic Church (which had in recent years become increasingly critical of various government policies), and changes of government priorities in social welfare. The demands were backed up by wide-scale and often well-organized stoppages which almost totally paralysed not only the traditionally militant Baltic ports of Gdansk (Danzig) and Szczecin (Stettin) but also the normally unmilitant coal, copper and sulphur mining industries of Silesia (in south-western Poland).

A feature which distinguished the 1980 strikes from the 1970 and 1976 disputes [see 24389 A; 27893 A] was the absence of any violent confrontation between strikers and police; dissident groups set up guidelines on the peaceful conduct of strikes, and the Roman Catholic Church maintained close contact with some strike groups.

Broadening of Unrest Prior to Strikes

The industrial unrest in Poland was preceded by a period in which dissatisfaction with government policies was expressed by an increasingly broad section of Polish society. In particular such dissident groups as the Social Self-Defence Committee (SSDC), which had been formed in 1977 from the Workers' Defence Committee [see 28713 A] but which had hitherto often been regarded as a largely intellectual organization, found increasing support in the country's industrial sphere and maintained its dissident activities despite the frequent arrest of its members. Meanwhile the Roman Catholic Church, which had since 1977 adopted an increasingly critical stance towards the Government's internal security policies [see 28792 A; 29852 A], intensified its criticisms during this period, attacking on numerous occasions what it described as a repression of free speech in Poland.

The Government's intellectual advisory body "Experience and the Future" (DIP) had in June 1979 warned of the growing public dissatisfaction with government policies [see 30297 A], and the discussion documents circulated by the PUWP prior to its eighth national congress (held in February 1980) had moreover met with widespread scepticism among the general public, particularly in Gdansk and Szczecin, where Mr Gierek, the First Secretary of the PUWP, had been forced to admit to serious errors in government policy [ibid.]. The Prime Minister, Mr Piotr Jaroszewicz, had in February been replaced by Mr Babiuch after accepting much of the blame for these errors, and the Cabinet was remodelled in April 1980 [ibid.], but the internal unrest in Poland continued to grow throughout the first eight months of 1980.

Student and dissident groups announced during December 1979 their plans to hold on Dec. 18 in the Gdansk shipyards a service of commemoration for the workers killed during the 1970 demonstrations and strikes in Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin [see 24389 A].

The 1970 strikes, which had taken place in protest at the major price increases announced by the then Government, had led directly to the resignation of Mr Wladyslaw Gomulka, then First Secretary of the PUWP, and of the Prime Minister, Mr Jozef Cyrankiewicz, and the President, Marshal Marian Spychalski, as well as to the appointment of Mr Gierek as First Secretary of the PUWP and of Mr Jaroszewicz as Prime Minister [ibid.].



(*Carpress*)

The ceremony on Dec. 18, 1979, was attended by some 4,000 people; however, many SSDC members and other known dissidents were arrested before and during the ceremony (most being released without charges after a short detention), and about 25 workers at the Elektromontaz plant in Gdansk were dismissed for having taken part. The staff of Elektromontaz announced on Jan. 25 the formation of a five-member "workers' committee", whose membership included Mr Lech Walesa (one of the organizers of the 1970 demonstrations who had since lost his job in the Gdansk shipyards), in order to campaign for the reinstatement of the 25 workers.

Another of the organizers of the 1970 demonstrations, Mrs Anna Walentynowicz, was also dismissed from her post as a crane operator at the shipyards during January 1980 and transferred to a post outside the city; however, Mrs Walentynowicz was reinstated on Jan. 31 after a four-hour protest strike by some 100 shipyard workers.

The unofficial "Confederation of Independent Poland" organized a conference for the Western press in Warsaw on Feb. 27 at which it planned to announce its candidacy in the March 23 elections to the *Sejm* (Parliament—see page 30299—for which all official candidates were nominated by the PUWP-dominated National Unity Front). The meeting was banned by the Polish authorities, however, and two of its leaders were arrested.

Mr Adam Wojciechowski, the chairman of the Polish section of Amnesty International, and Mr Anatol Lawina, a contributor to the unofficial publishing organization *Nowa* [see page 30297], were sentenced on March 30 to two months' and three months' imprisonment respectively for distributing leaflets recommending that the public boycott the elections. *Nowa* was again subjected to official pressure during June, when Mr Miroslaw Chojecki, its editor, and Mr Bogdan Grzesiak were convicted of obtaining a damaged mimeograph machine from a government press and of using it to print illegal publications. They were each fined 15,000 zlotys (about £[illegible]00) on June 12, and also received suspended 18-month prison sentences.

Mr Jacek Kuron, the chairman of the SSDC, was one of 10 dissidents arrested on April 13 on suspicion of intending to participate the next day in a memorial service on the 37th anniversary of the Katyn massacre (in which some 6,000 Polish officers had been executed—responsibility being attributed variously to either German or Soviet troops); 30 persons who attended the ceremony on April 14 were also arrested. Mr Kuron, Mr Adam Michnik and Mr Chojecki had earlier been among SSDC members arrested on March 27 but released shortly afterwards, while Mr Edmund Zadrozynski, another SSDC member, was in mid-April also arrested and accused of numerous criminal acts including burglary, deception and organizing gangs of thieves.

A meeting of the Roman Catholic bishops in Poland on May 7-8 issued a statement in which it condemned "the recent intensification of repressive measures" adopted by the Polish authorities and said that the solution of the country's problems would require reforms involving the general public more directly in decision-making. They called for an atmosphere of calm, trust and dialogue, but added that this could only be achieved if human rights were respected.

Associated Press obtained on June 15 a copy of what purported to be a confidential 75-page document compiled by DIP which warned that, unless the Government took rapid and effective action, "the negative changes [in Polish society] will progressively grow and may reach the avalanche stage, which would threaten open social conflict". The report spoke of an "unequal" relationship with the Soviet Union and criticized the level of censorship in the Polish press, alleging that this had led to a widespread mistrust of the reliability of the news media.

Strikes following Meat Price Increases

A series of wage claims and associated industrial action took place in numerous parts of Poland during July and early August 1980 in response to a government announcement that the distribution system for the retail sale of meat was to be reorganized in such a way that the prices paid for certain popular cuts rose by up to 60 per cent.

The availability of meat supplies for Polish consumers had for many years been a matter of acute concern to the public [see also 30297 A]; in 1976 an attempt by the Government to increase food prices by reducing the heavy government subsidies had resulted in such serious riots that the proposed increases were rapidly withdrawn [see 27893 A]. Since then an increasing number of so-called "commercial shops" had been opened in Poland, in which the best varieties of meat (otherwise scarce in Poland, since they were usually exported in exchange for Western currencies) were available to Polish consumers at market prices (i.e. considerably more than was charged by the state-subsidized butchers). Under the July 1980 arrangement, which was not immediately implemented in all parts of Poland, the sale of various popular varieties by the subsidized butchers was to be discontinued altogether so that these varieties could henceforth be bought only at market prices.

Workers in numerous plants throughout Poland immediately formed unofficial committees which pressed for wage increases to offset the price rises, and many, facing management refusals, adopted strike action.

One of the first stoppages began on July 1 at the Ursus tractor factory near Warsaw, whose workers had also strongly resisted the 1976 price rises [see 27893 A]. Further stoppages included those at the Polmo car component factory in Tczew (18 miles south of Gdansk), and at a paint factory and petrochemical plant in Wloclawek (north-west of Warsaw); little clear indication of the initial scale of the stoppages could be obtained, however, since the Polish authorities rejected the reports of strikes, conceding only that "discussions" had affected the production of certain plants.

Although the pattern of the disputes remained unclear for several days, it appeared that in most cases work was quickly resumed upon the offer and acceptance of wage increases ranging between 5 and 10 per cent. The Government was thought to have set up a committee to examine the situation (having in December 1979 expressed an intention to restrict wage rises during 1980 to a level of 2-3 per cent).

Sporadic strikes and go-slows were still occurring on July 9, when Mr Gierek made a television statement in which he promised higher wages for the lower-income workers but added that the country's economic situation ruled out the possibility of more extensive wage increases. An article published on July 11 by the PUWP newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* warned that the wage increases already granted would "further increase inflation, lower the value of the zloty and make the queues longer".

The SSDC said on July 10 that some 20,000 workers at the FSO Zeran car plant in Warsaw had rejected a 5 per cent pay offer and continued their strike, and reported on July 15 that altogether 33 factories were affected by strike action on that day.

The first public service strikes occurred in mid-July in the industrial city of Lublin (eastern Poland, about 40 miles from the Soviet border), when almost all rail, bus and trolleybus drivers in the city stopped work. Railway engines were left blocking the lines to the Soviet Union, and troops were called in to maintain food supplies to the city as the strikers blockaded the railway station. The strikers put forward a list of demands including considerable wage increases but, following an appeal by the Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee which was published in the local press on July 17, they provisionally accepted a compromise pay offer of about 10 per cent and returned to work pending a final settlement and the outcome of a promised official inquiry into their grievances.

Further rail strikes occurred during the next week at Chelm (east of Lublin) and at Ostrow-Wielkopolski, near Poznan (Posen) in western Poland, where maintenance engineers presented a 20 per cent pay demand. Tram drivers at Gdansk and the neighbouring Baltic ports of Gdynia and Sopot were said by the SSDC to have reached a 10 per cent settlement within 30 minutes of beginning a strike on July 30.

Possibly the largest of the over 100 strikes during July was that which occurred on July 21 at the Stalowa Wola steelworks, where the 30,000 employees rejected a management offer of a 10 per cent wage increase but settled on July 23 for a 15 per cent award. A strike at a helicopter factory in Swidnica, near Wroclaw (Breslau), was resolved during late July by acceptance of a 15 per cent pay offer, but the 20,000 workers at the plant stopped work again on Aug. 7 in protest at the alleged failure of the management to implement the agreed increase or to compensate the workers for days lost in the July strike. The issue was settled the same day and the plant resumed normal production. Further major disputes arose during early August in the textile-producing city of Lodz (60 miles south-west of Warsaw) and in Wroclaw.

Growth of Unofficial "Inter-Factory Committees" - Cabinet and Politburo Changes - Settlement of Strikes at Gdansk and Szczecin

Whereas the July stoppages in Poland had centred mainly on wage claims, there was increasing evidence during the following weeks of further motives for the unrest, including particularly the wish of the employees of numerous plants to set up unofficial "workers' committees" which would replace the official trade unions (generally PUWP-controlled and pro-government) in conducting wage negotiations with managements. However, the Polish authorities at that stage consistently maintained that such bodies would not represent the true interests of the working class, that the causes of the unrest were purely matters of economic policy, and that there was no "political" motivation in any of the disputes.

Trybuna Ludu published on Aug. 4 an article in which it admitted that shortcomings in the Polish administration, including inefficiency, inequality and sometimes corruption, had contributed to the unrest, but questioned the validity of industrial action as a means of countering the country's problems.

In an interview given to the foreign press but not reported by the Polish newspapers Mr Jerzy Lukaszewicz, a member of the Politburo, openly used the term "strikes" in describing the current situation, and added that the Lublin disturbances had been considerably more extensive than had so far been officially admitted. He said that "workers have been seeking to redress economic grievances", but stressed that none of the striking groups had made "political" demands, accusing the SSDC and certain of the Western news media of distorting the issues. (Both Mr Lukaszewicz and the editor of *Trybuna Ludu* resigned their positions during the following weeks—see below.)

Mr Kuron (chairman of the SSDC) told Western press reporters on Aug. 5 that the recent developments in Polish industry had left the workers "stronger, more confident and better able to organize their own resistance". He had recently published in the underground journal ***Robotnik*** advice to strikers on the conduct of wage negotiations (but had stressed the need for discipline and for the avoidance of carrying disputes onto the streets, as this had provoked the armed confrontations which had marked the 1970 and 1976 protests). A number of members of the *Robotnik* editorial staff were arrested on Aug. 5, although all were released within two days.

Although the Lublin railwaymen [see above] had for some time been campaigning for the right to elect independent delegates to the official trade unions, workers in a number of enterprises went beyond this claim, demanding the right of the unofficial "workers' committees" to form inter-factory organizations which would negotiate directly with the authorities on such issues as a complete revision of the trade union system in Poland. The most forceful proponents of this argument were the shipyard workers in the Gdansk region and those in Szczecin, both of whom achieved at the end of August significant concessions in this respect.

The 17,000 workers at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk stopped work on Aug. 14 and occupied the shipyard, presenting to the management and Government a list of demands, some of which were interpreted as being clearly political in nature. The demands included (i) the disbanding of the official trade unions in favour of freely elected independent unions; (ii) the closure of the "commercial shops" and the restoration of meat prices to their former official or subsidized levels; (iii) a general wage increase of 2,000 zlotys (about £30) per month in Gdansk; (iv) increased pensions and family allowances; (v) the reinstalment of three shipyard workers including Mrs Walentinowicz (who had again been dismissed); (vi) the erection of a monument in

Gdansk to the workers killed in the 1970 riots; and (vii) the publication of all these demands by the Polish mass media. Following discussions with the shipyard management, the strike committee also demanded to speak to Mr Babiuch or to other high-ranking government officials in order to discuss more wide-ranging aspects of their demands. Meanwhile a number of sympathy strikes broke out in the Gdansk region; about 50,000 workers were said to be on strike in the area on Aug. 15, while by Aug. 20 the action had spread to 258 plants employing 120,000 people.

News of the strike and of the strikers' demands were broadcast on the radio and television networks on Aug. 14, and Mr Babiuch appeared on Aug. 15 in a television interview in which he sharply criticized the "interruptions of work" and warned the workers to return to their employment, claiming that the public was not sufficiently aware of the severe financial pressures on the Polish economy. Mr Babiuch insisted, as Mr Gierek had done, that the food price rises would not be withdrawn and accused Poland's adversaries of exploiting the situation to the country's disadvantage. In what was widely regarded as a reference to the Soviet Union Mr Babiuch warned that the situation was worrying "Poland's friends", but added that "our allies believe that we shall be able to resolve our difficulties on our own". (The Soviet news media had until this date made no reference to any of the strikes.)

Some confusion broke out in the Lenin shipyard on Aug. 16 when the strike committee accepted a pay offer but recommended that the strikers should continue to withhold their labour in order to press their other demands. Mrs Walentynowicz had by now been reinstated and had been elected to the strike committee.

With Gdansk local radio reporting on Aug. 17 that "the climate of discussion in certain plants [had] become alarming", an emergency session of the Politburo held the same day in Warsaw resulted in a decision to send a government commission to Gdansk. Led by Mr Tadeusz Pyka (a Deputy Premier and candidate member of the Politburo), the committee opened its negotiations with the strikers on Aug. 18.

The workforces of 21 enterprises in the Gdansk area presented on Aug. 17 an extended list of 16 demands which included the following additional points: (i) the reopening of telephone and telex communications in the Gdansk area (which had been disconnected several days previously); (ii) guarantees of the right to strike for all workers; (iii) the abolition of censorship; (iv) the release of political prisoners; and (v) automatic salary increases following any future increases in prices. A further demand for the free access of all religious groups to the mass media was dropped on Aug. 23 in response to a request by the Roman Catholic Church.

Mr Gierek, who had spent the period from July 25 to Aug. 15 "resting" in the Soviet Union, cancelled a visit to West Germany which had been planned for Aug. 19 and in which he had intended to negotiate for West German assistance to the Polish economy. Mr Gierek said in a Polish television interview on Aug. 18 that the disputes had forced the cancellation of the visit, and strongly criticized what he described as "anarchic and anti-socialist groups" for the unrest, adding that "nobody can count on compromise and surrender in the face of political demands".

Meanwhile a further series of strikes was occurring in Szczecin, where the employees of 12 enterprises formed an "inter-factory strike committee" and presented a list of demands similar to those made at Gdansk; workers at the major Nowa Huta steelworks in southern Poland also presented a total of 37 demands to the Government and the factory management.

The Soviet news agency Tass began on Aug. 19 to publish its first reports on the "stoppages", as they were described, and throughout the following weeks attacked what it described as the hostile campaign of the Western news media in their coverage of the events. Russian-language radio broadcasts from Western transmitters were jammed, leading to protests inter alia from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which described the jamming of BBC Russian-language broadcasts on Aug. 20 as a contravention of the provisions on the exchange of information which had been part of the 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [see page 27307].

The Polish Government continued throughout this period to reject the "inter-factory strike committees" as negotiating partners, but continued to discuss the claims put forward by individual strike committees. Warsaw radio reported on Aug. 21 that the government commission in Gdansk had talked with over 50 of these, but added that Mr Pyka was to step down from the commission, being replaced by Mr Mieczyslaw Jagielski, another Deputy Premier (and Politburo member) who had successfully completed the negotiations at Lublin the previous month.

As the Polish press reports on the strikes became more detailed, public anxiety showed signs of increasing; there was a shortage of food supplies in Warsaw due to "panic" purchasing (some 70 ships being reportedly stranded at Gdansk); SSDC members became increasingly subject to arrest; and by Aug. 22 some 150,000 people in the Gdansk area, as well as about 30,000 in Szczecin, were on strike. Mr Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the editor of the journal *Polityka*, spoke in an article published on Aug. 21 of "a danger of permanent social and political destabilization", while the Roman Catholic Church issued on Aug. 22 a statement warning of "possible disturbances and fraternal bloodshed" which could be avoided only by the exercise of restraint by all sides.

Following a meeting of the Council of State on Aug. 24 it was announced that an extensive revision of the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) had taken place in which Mr Babiuch (who had been appointed in February—see page 30299) had resigned as Prime Minister and had been replaced by Mr Jozef Pinkowski. The following changes were also announced:

(i) Mr Marian Krzak was appointed Minister of Finance in succession to Mr Henryk Kisiel, who became a Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Planning Commission *vice* Mr Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk; (ii) Mr Pyka was relieved of his duties as Deputy Premier, while Mr Tadeusz Grabski and Mr Aleksander Kopec were appointed Deputy Premiers (Mr Kopec being succeeded as Minister of Engineering by Mr Henryk Gawronski); (iii) Mr Jozef Czyrek was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs *vice* Mr Emil Wojtaszek; and (iv) Mr Jerzy Gawrysiak was appointed Chairman of the State Prices Commission *vice* Mr Eugeniusz Grochal. Prof. Wieslaw Sadowski became Chairman of the Statistical Office *vice* Mr Stanislaw Kuzinski, and Mr Jozef Barecki became Chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs in succession to Mr Maciej Szczepanski, who was under suspicion of involvement in a large-scale embezzlement of state funds. (Mr Barecki, who was succeeded in his former post as editor of *Trybuna Ludu* by Mr Wieslaw Bek, was in late September transferred to an appointment as a government spokesman; the new Chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television was named as Mr Zdzislaw Balicki.)

Mr Pinkowski (51) trained as an economist before holding a series of posts in the Ministries of Purchase, Agricultural Products and the Food Industry; he became a member of the PUWP Central Committee in 1974 and was in February 1980 appointed a candidate member of the Politburo [see page 30298]. **Mr Krzak** (49) had been Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance since 1969. **Mr Grabski** (51) was provincial Governor of Poznan between 1972 and 1975, and had since 1979 been director of an automated systems works. **Mr Gawronski** (47) had held senior provincial posts in the PUWP since 1977. **Mr Czyrek** (52) had been Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1971.

At a meeting of the PUWP Central Committee which was held also on Aug. 24, the following changes were also made to the membership of the Politburo and Secretariat [for subsequent changes in September and October see below]:

Mr Babiuch, Mr Lukaszewicz, Mr Jan Szydlak and Mr Wrzaszczyk were removed from full membership of the Politburo, while Mr Stefan Olszowski (who had been removed in February—see page 30298) was reappointed and Mr Pinkowski (previously a candidate member) became a full member.

Mr Pyka and Mr Zdzislaw Zandarowski were replaced as candidate members by Mr Jerzy Waszczuk and Mr Andrzej Zabinski (both of them secretaries of the Central Committee).

Mr Lukaszewicz, Mr Pinkowski and Mr Zandarowski lost their positions as secretaries, while Mr Emil Wojtaszek (a candidate member of the Politburo and former Foreign Minister—see above) became a secretary.

Mr Grabski was appointed a member of the Central Committee.

Mr Jagielski's government commission had on Aug. 23 received for the first time a delegation from the "inter-factory committee" in Gdansk, and the two parties proceeded thereafter with bilateral negotiations, reaching in late August a 21-point agreement which was initialled on Aug. 30 and was signed after parliamentary approval on Aug. 31 by Mr Walesa, the leader of the strike committee, and by Mr Jagielski. The text of the document began:

"The activities of the trade unions in Poland have not fulfilled the hopes and expectations of the workers. It has been found necessary to call up new, self-governing trade unions which would become authentic representatives of the working class. . . . In the future we see a possibility of co-operation between the two [i.e. official and independent] trade unions."

The document, in which the Gdansk negotiators explicitly acknowledged the undisputed "leading force" represented by the PUWP in

Poland, contained, besides a wage agreement, government commitments to recognize legitimate new unions and to guarantee the right of workers to join them without fear of discrimination, and specified that existing strike committees would be entitled to form the basis of any such union. The Government also undertook inter alia (i) to submit to Parliament within three months a bill on the revision (and effective moderation) of the censorship laws; (ii) to guarantee free public access to certain administrative documents; (iii) to permit the broadcasting of Roman Catholic church services on Sundays; and (iv) to submit for reconsideration by the Ministry of Justice the cases of a number of named persons arrested or convicted in connexion with human rights activities, including those involved in the 1970 and 1976 disturbances. A final section provided government assurances of wage increases for lower-paid workers as well as increased government provision of medical, educational, housing and pension facilities and a commitment to introduce a standard five-day working week in 1982. The question of meat sales from "commercial shops" was to be examined, and a general improvement in food and consumer product distribution was to be attempted.

A 28-point agreement of a similar nature was signed on Aug. 30 by government representatives and by the inter-factory committee in Szczecin, and by Sept. 1 both regions were largely back to normal working. Tass continued, without direct reference to the new agreements, to criticize in strong terms the strikers, alleging on Sept. 1 in an article published in the Soviet Communist Party newspaper *Pravda* that Western provocateurs were involved in the Polish disputes.

Strikes in Silesia - Resignation of Mr Gierek - Further Politburo Appointments

Despite expectations to the contrary the industrial unrest in Poland continued to worsen after the signing of the Gdansk and Szczecin agreements, extending in particular to the important coal- and copper-mining regions of Silesia, which had until late August remained largely uninvolved in the disputes.

Coal miners in Silesia had seldom taken industrial action in the past; even in 1976 they had not been involved in the unrest over food prices [see 27893 A], partly because they were generally somewhat better paid than other workers and partly because of considerably better availability of foodstuffs in that region. There had, however, for some time been evidence of discontent among the workforce, and a survey published in late 1979 by the weekly magazine *Kultura* had found that only 36 per cent of the Silesian coal miners described their relations with management as satisfactory: about 30 per cent of the workforce changed jobs each year, and frequent pay rises were offered to attract labour. A particular source of discontent was a new four-shift system which was introduced in the mines during 1980 and which, although it increased production, was claimed by the miners to mean (i) that pit maintenance had become unsatisfactory and (ii) that most miners had to work on Sundays.

The first reports of strikes in a coal mine were made on Aug. 29, and by Sept. 2 a total of 32 enterprises, including 19 collieries, were reported to be out of action. Mr Kopec travelled to Katowice (the industrial city at the centre of Silesia) on Sept. 2 and on Sept. 3 reached an agreement with the largest inter-factory strike committee which was believed to be based on the Gdansk agreement but to contain additional clauses on health and safety and on extra remuneration for optional Sunday working.

Mr Pinkowski confirmed to the *Sejm* on Sept. 5 that the Gdansk, Szczecin and Silesian agreements applied in principle to workers in all parts of Poland (although, he said, the concessions would be introduced gradually in each different enterprise). He reaffirmed the Government's commitment to the terms of the agreements and promised increased priority for agriculture and housing, greater planning autonomy for individual factories and a rise in the minimum wage level, to take effect in January 1981.

Nevertheless strikes continued in many parts of Silesia and some were still in progress at the end of September; many workers were believed to be uncertain as to whether the Gdansk and Szczecin agreements applied also to other parts of the country, while in certain plants, such as a ball-bearing factory in Kielce (southern Poland), managements and local branches of the official trade unions objected to the establishment of independent trade unions.

It was announced on Sept. 6 after a meeting of the PUWP Central Committee that Mr Gierek had resigned as First Secretary of the PUWP due to illness, and that he had been succeeded by Mr Stanislaw Kania (53), a member of the Politburo and a secretary of the Central Committee. Mr Gierek had the previous day been taken into hospital suffering from what was described as "a serious heart complaint". It was further announced on Sept. 6 that Mr Andrzej Zabinski (recently appointed a candidate member of the Politburo—see above) and Mr Kazimierz Barcikowski (a Deputy Premier and candidate member of the Politburo) had been appointed full members of the Politburo, while Mr Jerzy Wojtecki (director of the PUWP Central Committee's department of agriculture and food economy) and Mr Zdzislaw Kurowski (a member of the Secretariat) were appointed full secretaries to the Central Committee.

Mr Kania joined the Polish Workers' Party in 1945 and held a succession of posts within the party structure, being in April 1971 elected a secretary to the PUWP Central Committee with responsibility for the security services [see 24874 A]. He became in 1971 a candidate member and in 1975 a full member of the Politburo [see pages 25138; 27642]. Mr Kania's influence within the party was thought to have increased considerably in recent months; he had, for example, on a number of occasions presided over meetings which would normally have been chaired by Mr Gierek.

Mr Kania told the Central Committee on Sept. 7 that the party's main objective was now to regain the confidence of the public. In a television address read on his behalf the same evening he admitted that "serious mistakes in economic policies and distortions in public life were the cause of the huge strike wave which rolled across Poland from July and still continues". Although Mr Kania appeared to avoid publicity during his first weeks in office he visited Gdansk and Katowice shortly after his appointment to confer with local party officials.

Formation of Independent Trade Unions - Subsequent Developments - Estimated Production Losses

A considerable number of independent trade union movements came into being during September, and in many areas special counselling services were set up by dissident and Catholic groups to give advice on the working of the new agreements. Activists claimed that in some plants, such as the Ursus tractor factory, over 80 per cent of the workforce had left the official trade unions for the new independent bodies. Among the new groups was an independent Union of Scientific Workers which was founded at a conference held on Sept. 6-7; some 200 members of the (official) Union of Cultural Workers also called at a special conference on Sept. 11 for the establishment of an independent writers' union. The 150,000-strong dockers' and sailors' union formally voted on Sept. 16 in Gdynia to become an independent union.

Faced with the prospect of heavy losses of membership, many of the official trade unions amended their policies on labour relations during this period. Mr Romuald Jankowski, who had on Aug. 26 succeeded Mr Jan Szydlak as chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions and who was a member of the PUWP Central Committee, said on Sept. 11 at a press conference that the official trade unions would consider strike action as a last resort in industrial disputes (having previously dismissed strikes as an action against the worker-controlled enterprises and thus as self-destructive), and called for the co-operation of the old and the new unions through a system of central organization.

The Polish press agency PAP announced on Sept. 14 a new set of procedures for the constitution of independent trade unions. According to the new rules any new trade union would be obliged to register with the Warsaw district court, giving lists of the names of active members and an outline of the organization's activities. The court would, pending the enactment of definitive parliamentary rulings to be passed later in the year, be entitled to reject applications from organizations whose aims were deemed hostile to the Polish Constitution.

A national conference of the new organizations was held in Gdansk on Sept. 17 and was attended by some 250 delegates, the meeting being chaired by Mr Walesa. The conference established on Sept. 18 a national confederation of independent trade unions, the "National Committee of Solidarity" (Solidarnosc), and elected Mr Walesa as its chairman, but also passed a resolution complaining of a lack of co-operation from the authorities in the realization of the new trade union rights.

Official trade unions at the Kielce factory, where the strike was still in progress, were alleged to have intimidated workers intending to form a new trade union, and numerous allegations of minor harassment by factory managements were made by other delegates. It was subsequently learned on Sept. 23 that the first application from an independent trade union (from Katowice) for registration with the Warsaw district court, as required by the new regulations, had been refused by the court, which objected to the union's proposals to operate on a nationwide basis, to allow memberships from various unrelated professions and to finance itself by means other than only membership subscriptions.

Solidarnosc also submitted on Sept. 24 a formal application for registration with the Warsaw court, and announced on Sept. 28 that a one-hour token strike was to take place on Oct. 3 in protest at the failure of the authorities so far to implement the wage increases agreed at the end of August. Some hours later it was announced on the national television network that some 8,000,000 workers would receive a pay rise by the end of October, and that all state sector employees would receive a wage increase by the beginning of 1981 instead of by June 1981 as originally planned. The average increase was, according to PAP, to be about 650 zlotys (£9) per month.

The one-hour strike took place nevertheless on Oct. 3 in protest at what was felt to be inadequate press coverage of the activities of the new unions, and most of the Gdansk enterprises as well as selected plants in Silesia, Poznan and Warsaw stopped work. No incidents were reported.

Mr Kopec announced to PAP in late September that the production losses resulting from the strikes had totalled 61,000 million zlotys (about £850,000,000) in value. He said that the lost production included 2,800,000 tonnes of coal, 135,000 tonnes of steel, 27,000 tonnes of fertilizers and 1,465 tractors.

It was also known that a substantial proportion of the agricultural harvest in 1980 had been lost due to heavy floods covering nearly 500,000 hectares (over 1,250,000 acres) of farmland and resulting in the declaration of a state of emergency during late July in 22 of the country's 49 provinces. Mr Adam Kowalik, the Minister for Internal Trade, was quoted on Sept. 26 as saying that shortages of food supplies were expected later in the year and that his Ministry was considering ways of reducing meat consumption.

Press Coverage of Strikes - International Reactions

A clear liberalizing trend was observed in the Polish press during early September following the signature of the Gdansk and Szczecin agreements, and reporting of the crisis became steadily more detailed and occasionally outspoken; for example, the Warsaw newspaper *Zycie Warszawy* on Sept. 25 published an article which sharply attacked the most recent reactions of certain official trade unions to the new organizations. Earlier, the Polish radio network had on Sept. 21 begun, as agreed, its Sunday transmissions of the Roman Catholic mass.

Nonetheless, there was, as indicated above, a noticeable reluctance in the Polish press to refer directly to the new unions; many observers linked this reluctance with the publication during late September of a strongly-worded *Pravda* article which stressed Lenin's insistence on Communist Party control of trade unions and which contained an implied criticism of the Polish authorities for having accepted independent trade unions.

Press coverage in the neighbouring Warsaw Treaty states remained throughout the crisis somewhat more selective than in Poland. In East Germany, as in the Soviet Union, self-critical speeches by Mr Gierek and other senior politicians were often heavily edited prior to transmission, emphasis being placed on allegations of Western involvement in the disputes. *Rude Pravo* and *Neues Deutschland*, the party organs of the ruling Communist parties in Czechoslovakia and East Germany respectively, published during late September transcripts of a *Pravda* editorial which underlined in strong terms the defence and political links of Poland with the other Warsaw Treaty states. Moreover, Western press reporting (which often made extensive use of the SSDC and other dissident sources for its information) was generally dismissed by Tass as an unwarranted and provocative intrusion in Poland's domestic affairs.

The principle of foreign non-intervention in Polish affairs was in turn frequently emphasized in official Western reactions to the Polish crisis. In the United States President Carter told a conference of the (US) Polish National Alliance on Sept. 21 that the United States expected other countries to allow Poland to solve its own problems without intervention. The State Department had earlier said that it was monitoring "very closely" all military activities in the Soviet and East German areas close to the Polish border, and a State Department spokesman had on Sept. 11 confirmed to reporters that Soviet officials had by that date twice been informed by the US that "restraint was necessary by all outside parties".

The labour disputes were believed to have prompted the postponement of a visit to Poland by the French President, M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, which had been planned to take place at the end of September. The postponement, which was announced on Sept. 10, appeared to reflect the French wish to forestall any accusations of involvement in the crisis, and coincided with the arrival in Moscow of a team of Polish delegates, including Mr Jagielski, to discuss Soviet assistance to Poland.

Messages of support to the Polish strikers, particularly those in Gdansk, were sent by numerous trade union organizations in Western countries.

In the United States the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union announced on Aug. 21 a boycott on all handling of imports from Poland in support of the Gdansk strikers, and on Sept. 4 the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO—with a total affiliated membership of some 13,500,000) voted in Washington to set up a fund for the assistance of the Polish independent trade unions. In the United Kingdom the general council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) announced on Sept. 5 at its annual conference in Brighton its decision, after heated internal debate, to cancel a planned visit to Poland by a TUC delegation in view of difficulties presented by the Polish authorities (which had proposed the shortening of the visit from six days to one).

The International Labour Organization (ILO) expressed on Sept. 2 its approval of the Gdansk agreement, which it described as "a remarkable and real victory" for the Polish labour movement.

Removal of Gierek Supporters from PUWP Central Committee - Further Cabinet Changes

Several members of the PUWP Central Committee generally regarded as loyal to Mr Gierek were dismissed on the recommendation of Mr Olszowski at a session of the Central Committee which was held on Oct. 6. All of those removed were publicly criticized for errors of policy while in office.

Mr Babiuch, Mr Zandarowski, Mr Lukaszewicz, Mr Pyka, Mr Wrzaszczyk and Mr Jan Szydlak (formerly chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions—see page 30300) were dismissed from the Central Committee, while it was agreed that Mr Gierek's membership would be reviewed when his health improved. Mr Szczepanski was, like his former deputy as Chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television Affairs, Mr Eugeniusz Patyk, strongly criticized in detail for various alleged corrupt practices, and both were removed from the Central Committee (Mr Patyk having been a candidate member only).

Mr Zdzislaw Grudzien, formerly first secretary of the PUWP in Katowice, was relieved of his Politburo membership at his own request, being replaced as first secretary in Katowice by Mr Zabinski (who was in turn succeeded as secretary to the Central Committee by Mr Barcikowski). Mr Stanislaw Gabrielski became a member of the Secretariat, while Mr Wladyslaw Kruk and Prof. Roman Ney were appointed candidate members of the Politburo.

Mr Gabrielski (36) and Mr Kruk (48) were agricultural specialists, while Prof. Ney (49) was rector of the Academy of Mining and Metallurgy.

The *Sejm* approved on Oct. 8 Mr Pinkowski's proposals that the following changes should be made to the composition of the Council of Ministers.

(i) Mr Miroslaw Milewski was appointed Minister of the Interior *vice* Mr Stanislaw Kowalczyk, who became a Deputy Premier; (ii) Dr Wladyslaw Jablonski was appointed Minister of Light Industry *vice* Mr Stanislaw Mach, who also became a Deputy Premier; (iii) Dr Jan Zaleski became Minister of Food Industry and Purchases *vice* Mr Roman Malinowski, who took on additional responsibilities in his existing capacity as a Deputy Premier; (iv) Mr Barcikowski and Mr Grabski were recalled from their posts as Deputy Premiers in view of their recent appointment as secretaries of the PUWP Central Committee; (v) Dr Mieczyslaw Glanowski was appointed Minister of Mining *vice* Mr Wlodzimierz Lejczak; (vi) Mr Zbigniew Szalajda became Minister of Metallurgy *vice* Mr Franciszek Kaim; and (vii) Mr Jozef Tejchma became Minister of Culture and Art *vice* Mr Zygmunt Najdowski.

It was also announced on Oct. 8 that Mr Jagielski, in addition to his duties as Deputy Premier, was to become Poland's permanent representative to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), and also that Mr Jan Kaminski and Mr Wiktor Sielanko, the chairmen of the two major co-operative unions, had asked to be released from the ministerial status to which their positions had been raised in April 1980 [see page 30299], in view of the recently increased tasks of the official trade unions.

Mr Milewski (52), a lieutenant-general in the Civic Militia, joined the Ministry of the Interior in 1959 and became Under-Secretary of State in that Ministry in 1971. **Dr Jablonski** (48), a textile engineer and lecturer, worked in the Planning Commission from 1966 to 1972 and became in 1973 Deputy Minister of Light Industry. **Dr Zaleski** (54) had led the department of technology at the Ministry of Food

Industry and Purchases since 1968. **Dr Glanowski** (51) held numerous posts in the coal mining industry before becoming in 1971 Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Mining. **Mr Szalajda** (46) had worked since 1956 in the management of steelworks. **Mr Tejchma** (53), a secretary to the Central Committee, was from 1972 to 1979 a Deputy Premier [see 25228 A], from 1974 to 1978 Minister of Culture and Art [see 27000 A] and from February 1979 to April 1980 Minister of Education and Training [see 29545 C]; he was removed from the Politburo, together with Mr Olszowski, in February 1980 [see page 30298], and was subsequently appointed Polish ambassador to Switzerland.

The *Sejm* also approved on Oct. 8 an important constitutional amendment which in effect increased its own powers by providing direct parliamentary control over the Supreme Chamber of Control.

The Supreme Chamber of Control, whose function was to oversee all matters of state policy, had in 1976 been made subordinate to the Prime Minister instead of, as previously, to the Council of State. This development had at the time been widely regarded as diminishing the power both of the *Sejm* and of the Supreme Chamber of Control itself (since it was thus directly subordinated to government policy). The new amendment effectively overturned the 1976 rulings, and reflected the stated wish of the *Sejm* to bring in a series of intensive investigations of corruption in government departments.

The *Sejm* confirmed on Oct. 8 as Chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control Gen. Mieczyslaw Moczar, who had been its Chairman since 1971 and who was thought to have spent several years compiling his own evidence of official corruption. (Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Economist - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Le Monde - Soviet Embassy Press Department - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 1976 Unrest 27893 A; Independent Trade Union Movements 28513 A, 28713 A; Cabinet, Politburo Changes, Economy 30297 A*)

A. NEPAL — Reintroduction of Multi-party System rejected in Referendum - Cabinet Reorganization

In a referendum held on May 2, 1980, the Nepalese electorate decided by 2,433,452 votes to 2,007,965, with about 372,000 spoiled or invalid papers, not to approve the reintroduction of a multi-party system but to retain a modified form of the existing non-party *panchayat* system.

As explained on page 29812, under the system introduced in 1960 there were assemblies (*panchayats*) at village, provincial and national levels, with the National Assembly (*Rashtriya Panchayat*) being partly elected by the members of the provincial assemblies and partly nominated by the King.

The referendum had been foreshadowed by King Birendra on May 24, 1979, and its date had been fixed on April 2, 1980. Meanwhile, on Dec. 16, 1979, the King had announced that in future—subject to the promulgation of the necessary laws—the *Rashtriya Panchayat* would be directly elected on the basis of adult suffrage and the appointment of the Prime Minister by the King would be on the recommendation of the *Rashtriya Panchayat*, to which the Council of Ministers would be responsible.

During the referendum campaign, which ended officially on April 29, there were a number of violent incidents in which several people were reported to have lost their lives, but the actual voting passed off generally peacefully and there was an estimated 67 per cent turnout. (On April 13 King Birendra had announced a general amnesty for all Nepalese accused of political offences; this was believed to affect between 200 and 300 people, of whom about half were in prison in Nepal and the remainder were in exile, mostly in India.)

On May 14, when the results of the referendum were declared, King Birendra said in a broadcast that he would take advice from appropriate sections of the community regarding the "necessary amendments" to be made to the Constitution in order to implement the changes announced by him in December 1979, and on May 21 an 11-member Constitution Reforms Commission was set up in this connexion under the chairmanship of the acting Chief Justice, Mr Basudev Sharma.

In the same broadcast, the King warned against any action being taken by "elements [which] are out to create problems regarding the peaceful evolution of our democracy".

A reorganization of the Cabinet originally formed under the premiership of Mr Surya Bahadur Thapa in June 1979 [see 29810 A], was announced in a communiqué issued on June 1, 1980. (There had previously been a minor reallocation of responsibilities in January, when some ministers had resigned because their membership of the *Rashtriya Panchayat* had expired.) Following the June 1980 reorganization the principal responsibilities were distributed as follows:

Mr Surya Bahadur Thapa	Prime Minister, Royal Palace Affairs and Defence
Mr Nayan Bahadur Swanr	Law and Justice
Mr Nava Raj Subedi	Home and *Panchayat* Affairs
Mr Jog Meher Shrestha	Works and Transport
Mr Harish Chandra Mahat	Water Resources
Mr Netra Bikram Thapa	General Administration
Mr Balaram Gharti Magar	Local Development
Mr Marich Man Singh	Education
Mr K. B. Shahi	Foreign Affairs
Mr Hem Bahadur Malla	Land Reforms
Mr Vijaya Prakash Thebe	Food and Agriculture
Mr Makeswar Prashad Singh	Forests
Mr Ramananda Prashad Yadav	Health
Dr Ram Prasad Rajbahak	Minister of State for Industry, Commerce and Tourism
Mr Dambar Bahadur Malla	Minister of State for Communications
Mr Yadav Prasad Pant	Minister of State for Finance

There were in addition seven assistant ministers.

New members of the Government included Mr Nayan Bahadur Swanr, a former chairman of the *Rashtriya Panchayat*; Mr Nava Raj Subedi, who had been a minister prior to 1973 [see 23329 A; 24849 B]; and Mr Yadav Prasad Pant, a former ambassador to Japan. Among ministers changing responsibilities, Mr Surya Bahadur Thapa had previously held the Finance and Royal Palace Affairs portfolios in addition to being Prime Minister, while Mr Jog Meher Shrestha had been Minister of Home and *Panchayat* Affairs and Mr Balaram Gharti Magar Minister of Defence and Health.—(The Hindu, Madras - The Statesman, Calcutta - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. 29810 A*)

B. CYPRUS — Resumption of Inter-communal Talks - Extended Mandate for UNFICYP - Cabinet Reorganization - Cabinet Change in Turkish Cypriot Federated State

The inter-communal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives, which had been in recess since June 1979 [see 29812 A], were resumed in Nicosia on Aug. 9, 1980, following agreement on a procedural formula proposed by Sr Hugo Gobbi, special representative in Cyprus of the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim.

Announcing the resumption on Aug. 6, the UN spokesman in Nicosia said that after the opening meeting on Aug. 9 the talks would be adjourned and would resume on Sept. 15 "for sustained and substantive talks on all aspects of the Cyprus problem".

At the meeting on Aug. 9, which was attended by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators, respectively Mr George Ioannides and Mr Umit Onan, the following statement outlining Dr Waldheim's "understanding of the common ground that was worked out in the course of consultations which took place over the past several months" was read by Sr Gobbi:

"(*a*) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high level agreements of Feb. 12, 1977 [see 28290 A], and May 19, 1979 [see 29812 A].

"(*b*) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem.

"(*c*) Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the inter-communal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole.

"(*d*) Both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the inter-communal talks.

"The practical implementation of the concepts in (*b*) and (*c*) above will be dealt with in the context of the substantive consideration of the constitutional and territorial aspects and will be reflected in the substantive positions and proposals of the parties concerning the various items on the agenda.

"Concerning the matters to be discussed the Secretary-General understands, on the basis of the May 19 agreement, that these will include the following subjects:

"(*a*) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha [the Greek Cypriot part of Famagusta] under UN auspices, in accordance with the provisions of Point 5 of the May 19 agreement.

"(*b*) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of Point 6 [of the May 19 agreement], which states that special importance will be given to this matter.

"(*c*) Constitutional aspects.

"(*d*) Territorial aspects.

"Concerning procedure it is understood that the four items above should be dealt with concurrently in rotation at consecutive meetings. At an appropriate early stage committees or working groups will be set up by the interlocutors."

President Kyprianou told a press conference on Aug. 9 that the Greek Cypriot side was going into the negotiations with all good will, aiming at a substantive and meaningful dialogue.

Dealing with the term "bizonal", differences over the interpretation of which had frustrated earlier attempts to resume the talks, he said that the word referred to the territorial aspect only, and added: "Since the principle of federation is accepted with regard to the constitutional structure, it would be inconceivable to have a partition federation. Therefore, the only interpretation that can be given to 'bizonal' when referring to the territorial aspect is that it means two regions."

Mr Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, stated on Aug. 10 that Mr Kyprianou's statement proved that the parties had a divergence of 350 degrees, and not 180, on the main issues.

Extended Mandate for UNFICYP

The UN Security Council approved on June 13, 1980, a resolution extending the mandate of the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further six months until Dec. 15, 1980, following a recommendation to that effect from Dr Waldheim. A similar resolution extending the force's mandate from Dec. 15, 1979, until June 15, 1980, had been approved by the Council on Dec. 14, 1979. [For UN General Assembly resolution on Cyprus of November 1979, see page 30223.]

New Cabinet

President Kyprianou announced on Sept. 9 a cabinet reshuffle, involving the appointment of seven new ministers. The membership of the new Cabinet was as follows:

*Mr Nicos Rolandis	Foreign Affairs
*Mr Christodoulos Veniamin	Interior and Defence
*Mr Afxentis Afxentiou	Finance
†Mr Stelios Katsellis	Minister to the Presidency
Mr Nicolaos Konomis	Education
Mr George Hadjicostas	Communications and Works
Mr Constantinos Kittis	Commerce and Industry
Mr Nicos Pattichis	Agriculture and Natural Resources
Mr George Stavrinakis	Labour and Social Insurance
†Mr George Tombazos	Health
Mr Andreas Demetriades	Justice
Mr Petros Stylianou	Secretary of State for the Interior and Defence

* No change. † Changed portfolio.

The post of Secretary of State for Education [see 29019 A] was abolished. Mr Tombazos and Mr Katsellis had previously been respectively Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Secretary of State for the Interior and Defence. The latter's predecessor as Minister to the Presidency had been Mr Ioannides.

Cabinet Change in Turkish Cypriot Federated State

Mr Ozel Tahsin, a deputy of the ruling National Unity Party (NUP), entered the Cabinet of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State on July 31, 1980, as Minister of Labour and Social Security, a portfolio held since December 1978 by the Prime Minister, Mr Mustafa Cagatay [see 29458 A].—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Cyprus Government Public Information Office, Nicosia - UN Information Centre, London - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cyprus 29812 A; UN General Assembly Resolution page 30223; Cabinet 30186 B, 29019 A; Turkish Cypriot Federated State Cabinet 29458 A*)

A. HONDURAS — General Paz García appointed Interim President - New Cabinet - The Refugee Problem

Following Constituent Assembly elections on April 20, 1980, in which the Liberal Party (PL) won the most seats [see 30483 A], power was formally transferred from the ruling military junta to the Assembly on July 20. The Assembly subsequently on July 25 elected Gen. Policarpo Paz García, who had (as president of the military junta) been head of state since 1978 [see 29328 A], as interim President of Honduras by 68 votes (Liberal Party and National Party) to none, with the three deputies of the Innovation and Unity Party (PINU) abstaining. It was envisaged that President Paz García would remain in office for one year while a new constitution and electoral law were drafted, following which presidential and legislative elections would take place in 1981.

After a three-week delay resulting from a disagreement as to whether the Constituent Assembly or Gen. Paz García should name the Government, a compromise was reached and the membership of the new Cabinet, containing two military officers, six Liberals and six National Party (PN) appointees, was accordingly announced on Aug. 15 as follows:

Col. César Elvir Sierra	Foreign Affairs
*Col. Mario Flores Theresín	Defence and Public Security
†Sr Valentín Mendoza (PN)	Finance and Public Credit
Sr Mario Iván Casco (PN)	Communications, Public Works and Transport
Sr Rubén Mondragón (PN)	Economy and Trade
Sr Efraín Reconco Murillo (PN)	Economic Planning
Sr Edgardo Zúñiga Rodenzo (PN)	National Agrarian Institute
†Sr Armando Alvarez Martínez (PN)	Information, Culture and Tourism
Sr Serapio Hernández Castellano (PL)	Justice
Sr Oscar Mejía Arellano (PL)	Interior
Sr Rafael Pineda Ponce (PL)	Education
Sr Rodrigo Castillo (PL)	Natural Resources
Sr Juan Andonie Fernández (PL)	Public Health
Sr Aristides Mejía Castro (PL)	Labour and Social Welfare

*Changed portfolio. †No change.

The Honduran immigration authorities said in July that government resources were overburdened by the 4,500 refugees who had entered the country from El Salvador during 1980 and also by Nicaraguan refugees who were entering Honduras at a rate of 200 a month and whose numbers had reached 7,500 since the fall of President Somoza in July 1979 [see 29805 A]. The volume of US military aid to Honduras was reported to have increased considerably since early 1980 in response to reports that arms were being smuggled through the country to left-wing opponents of the El Salvador regime.—(Latin American Newsletters - Le Monde - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30483 A, 29900 B, 29328 A*)

B. COSTA RICA — Cabinet Changes - Banana Plantation Strikes

Sr Bernd Niehous was sworn in as Foreign Minister on Aug. 1 *vice* Sr Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier, who had resigned on July 17. In earlier changes, (i) Sr Fernando Altmann Ortiz was appointed to the new Ministry of Energy on May 27 and (ii) Sr Carlos Arguedas Le Franc took office as Interior Minister on June 1 following the resignation of Sr Juan José Echeverría Brealy on May 23.

Subsequent to industrial action in several sectors in mid-1979 [see 29900 A], a four-week strike of 20,000 workers on the (US) Standard Fruit and United Brands banana plantations took place in December 1979-January 1980. The strike was estimated to have cost the country $6,000,000 in lost banana export earnings and was attributed by the Government to "communist agitators", six people including three Cubans being expelled from the country in January. About 5,000 plantation workers were involved in another seven-week strike in July-August over wage demands.—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Times - Le Monde - Latin American Newsletters) (*Prev. rep. 29900 A, 28975 A*)

A. MEXICO - VENEZUELA — Joint Agreement on Concessionary Oil Supplies to Region - Visits by President López Portillo to Cuba, Costa Rica and Brazil - Visit by Brazilian President to Venezuela

Mexico and Venezuela on Aug. 3 signed an agreement to supply nine countries—Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Panama—with their total oil requirements amounting to 160,000 barrels per day (bpd), or about 8,000,000 tonnes a year. The nine countries would pay for the oil at the current market price but 30 per cent of the amount would be returned in the form of a five-year loan at 4 per cent interest, with the proviso that if the loans were used for primary development projects, particularly in the energy field, they would be extended over 20 years at a 2 per cent interest rate.

Venezuela would initially provide 130,000 bpd of the total amount and Mexico the remaining 30,000 bpd; however, it was estimated that with the rapid increase in Mexico's oil production (which was already higher than Venezuela's—see below) the two countries would be supplying half each by mid-1981. The agreement would take the form of separate contracts negotiated between Venezuela or Mexico and the individual countries on an annual basis.

President López Portillo of Mexico maintained at the signing ceremony in San José (Costa Rica), which was also attended by President Herrera Campins of Venezuela, that if other countries belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC—of which Venezuela but not Mexico is a member) followed their example in concluding agreements of this nature the international economic problems from which developing countries suffered could be alleviated.

Venezuela was also preparing to renew the 1975 Puerto Ordaz agreement which had provided over $600,000,000 in oil import financing to several of the above countries over the past five years by setting an artificial price of $6 per barrel and treating the difference between that and the market price as a long-term loan at interest rates of between 7.3 and 8.6 per cent. On renewal the agreement would cover most Caribbean countries and would, it was envisaged, provide around $1,000 million in oil assistance.

Moreover, in other Venezuelan assistance to Caribbean countries, basic agreements covering areas such as agriculture, energy, technology and tourism were prepared in September 1979 by a Foreign Ministry mission to certain islands, these being subsequently signed during separate visits to Venezuela by the Prime Ministers of St Lucia [see 30482 A], Surinam, Grenada, Antigua, Dominica and Montserrat.

In mid-1980 Trinidad and Tobago agreed to provide its partners in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) with concessionary oil (as well as other products such as asphalt and fertilizers) under agreements concluded within the framework of the Caribbean Aid Project (CAP—see 29790 A). Under these agreements oil was supplied at the January 1979 market price and the difference between this and the current market price was paid off over a 15-year period at 2-3 per cent interest, with a three-year period of grace before repayment commenced.

Mexican oil production had attained 2,200,000 bpd by the end of July 1980. The price per standard barrel was increased on Jan. 1, 1980, from $24.60 (announced in October 1979—see page 30055) to $32, and there were subsequent increases on May 15 (to $33.50) and on July 1 (to $34.50).

Production in Venezuela, which in 1979 had averaged 2,350,000 bpd, fell to 2,100,000 bpd by the end of July 1980 (a figure 9.9 per cent lower than that for July 1979). The price of Venezuelan oil was determined in line with OPEC decisions, the 57th OPEC Conference in Algiers having in June 1980 established a base price of $32 per standard barrel of crude, with value differentials of not more than $5 per barrel bringing the price to a maximum of $37 per barrel.

The Mexican-Venezuelan agreement was signed at the conclusion of a tour of the region by President López Portillo which included state visits to Costa Rica (July 25-26), Brazil (July 27-30) and Cuba (July 31-Aug. 3) as well as stop-overs in Venezuela, Panama and Nicaragua and another final stop-over in Costa Rica for the signature of the agreement. During this tour, which was the first practical demonstration of a new active foreign policy strategy on the part of Mexico, President López Portillo expressed his country's support for the left-wing regimes of the region as well as its repudiation of the junta in El Salvador (currently supported by the United States—see page 30323—and Venezuela).

In **Cuba**, the most controversial stage of the tour (announced during the US-Cuban dispute over Cuban refugees in April-May 1980—see 30474 A), President López Portillo and President Castro signed a joint communiqué reiterating "the support of the people and Government of Mexico in the fight of the Cuban people to obtain the unconditional return of the territory occupied against their will by the [US] Guantánamo naval base" [see page 30086] and calling for an end to the US trade embargo against Cuba [see page 18717] as well as an end to alleged violations of Cuban airspace by US surveillance aircraft [see page 30086]. The communiqué demanded that the "right of the Salvadorean people to decide their own destiny without foreign intervention" should be respected, condemned the July 17 military coup in Bolivia (which overthrew the Government of President Lidia Gueiler), and expressed support for the independence of Belize.

Reiterating many of the principles of the non-aligned movement the communiqué noted that "important political and social changes" were taking place in the hemisphere, and both parties expressed sympathy and support for the region's aspiration to political and economic independence and to full control of its natural resources and national economies in the face of "plundering by transnational monopolies".

Sr López Portillo said in a speech at a reception in Havana on July 31 that Mexico "will not stand for anything being done to Cuba because we will feel it is being done to us". At a press conference at the end of his visit he confirmed that Cuba had not requested concessionary oil as this was supplied by the Soviet Union [see 27807 B; 27595 A], but that Mexico would be willing to consider a request for such supplies.

Dr Castro stated in a speech during the visit that Cuba would give priority to Mexico's sugar requirements (it having been announced from Havana in late June that Cuba had for the first time sold 400,000 tonnes of raw sugar to Mexico).

(Under a new scheme which entered into effect in early August Mexico and Cuba began to exchange tourists on a regular basis, each country paying the expenses of its visitors in order to avoid the need for foreign exchange. The Cuban Government also announced in mid-1980 that it intended to open tourist offices in Europe, the USA and Mexico City and to simplify entry procedures to Cuba in order to expand its tourism industry.)

In **Costa Rica**, President López Portillo and President Carazo Odio disagreed over support for the Salvadorean junta but discussed the formation of a common front in the tuna dispute with the United States.

The latter dispute had broken out when Mexico stated that as from July 7 it would arrest any tuna boats fishing within 200 miles of its coast unless a fee was paid and a portion of the catch allocated to Mexico. Following the arrest in July of several US tuna boats by Mexico, the confiscation of the catch and the imposition of large fines, the United States announced a ban on the import of Mexican tuna (making up about one-third of total Mexican sales). [For Mexico's extension of a 200-mile exclusive offshore zone in 1976, see 27870 B; for 1976 US-Mexican fisheries agreement, see page 28170.]

Whereas the USA recognized Mexico's claim to a 200-mile zone for general purposes, it stated that it would only recognize a 12-mile limit with respect to tuna fishing because of the migratory nature of the tuna. This attitude had also caused disputes between the United States and other tuna-fishing nations including Canada, Costa Rica and Peru.

In **Brazil**, which currently imported some 20,000 bpd of oil from Mexico (about 2 per cent of its total oil import needs—see 30032 A) President López Portillo agreed to increase sales to 100,000 bpd, in return for which Brazil would supply iron ore, bauxite and food to Mexico. The two countries signed a joint communiqué which inter alia expressed support for a new "more just and equitable" international economic order.

President López Portillo had already visited **Nicaragua** in January 1980, when an agreement on the supply of oil and other aid had been concluded [see page 30318].

During a visit to Venezuela on Nov. 6-8, 1979, by President Figueiredo of Brazil (the first by a Brazilian head of state this century, although President Carlos Andrés Pérez had met President Ernesto Geisel in Brasília in November 1977), Venezuela agreed to increase oil sales to Brazil to 50,000 bpd in 1980 (5 per cent of the latter's import needs) and to increase that figure if extra supplies became available. A joint declaration was signed on co-operation in heavy oil technology (notably in the Orinoco oil belt), energy conservation (with interest being expressed in Brazil's alcohol fuel programme—see 30032 A), trade, and regional integration through the Andean Group [see 30139 B] and the Amazon Pact [see 29225 B]. The basis for a trade package reportedly worth $2,000 million was also elaborated.—(Latin America Weekly Report - Insight - Financial Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Guardian - New York Times - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. Mexico Oil 30054 A*)

A. INDIA — Elections to State Assemblies - New State Governments - Cabinet Appointments - Disturbances in North-Eastern States - Communal Riots - Other Internal Developments, May to September 1980

Elections to the Legislative Assemblies of nine of India's 22 states, which had been dissolved on Feb. 17 [see page 30329], were held on May 28 and 31, and resulted in a spectacular victory for the Congress (I) led by Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister. The Congress (I) won over two-thirds of the seats in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, and a majority in Bihar, Maharashtra and Punjab [see map on page 30325]; in Tamil Nadu the *Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (ADMK) obtained a majority.

In all of these nine states the Congress (I) had won a majority of the seats in the January 1980 election to the *Lok Sabha* (Lower House of Parliament) while control of the respective Legislative Assemblies had been exercised by other parties—namely the Janata Party in Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the *Lok Dal* in Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, the Progressive Democratic Front in Maharashtra, the *Akali Dal* in Punjab and the ADMK in Tamil Nadu. [For 1975 election in Gujarat see page 27366; for 1977-78 elections in the other eight of these states see 28752 A; 29341 A.]

Negotiations between the opposition parties for an electoral alliance broke down, although local agreements were reached in a number of states. In consequence 2,226 seats were contested by nearly 16,000 candidates, including over 7,000 independents. Polling was countermanded in nine constituencies, and two candidates were returned unopposed.

The majority of the Congress (I) candidates were reported to have been selected by Mr Sanjay Gandhi, the younger son of the Prime Minister. Mr H. N. Bahuguna, who had resigned as general secretary of the Congress (I) on May 1 and from the party and from the *Lok Sabha* on May 19 [see page 30330], said that he had been completely ignored in the selection of candidates, and alleged that Mr Gandhi controlled "not only the party but even the government machinery".

The elections took place in an atmosphere of general apathy, and except in Tamil Nadu and Punjab less than half the electorate voted. They were the most violent elections in India's history, however, over 50 people being killed in party clashes, bomb explosions and police firing during the campaign and the voting. Four candidates in Bihar and four in Uttar Pradesh were among those killed.

Among the opposition parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—formed in April 1980 [see page 30329]—emerged as the largest opposition group in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, the *Lok Dal* in Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, the Congress in Maharashtra, the Janata Party in Gujarat and the *Akali Dal* in Punjab. The Janata Party (Secular)—formed by Mr Raj Narain in April 1980 [ibid.]—won only four seats in Uttar Pradesh and one in Bihar.

Details of the election results and the new Governments in the nine states are given below. The following abbreviations of party names are used: Bharatiya Janata Party—BJP; Communist Party of India—CPI; Communist Party of India (Marxist)—CPI(M); *Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam*—ADMK; *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam*—DMK; Gandhi-Kamaraj National Congress—GKNC.

Bihar. Number of seats 324, Congress (I) 167, *Lok Dal* 42, CPI 23, BJP 21, Congress 14, Janata 13, *Jharkhand Mukti Morcha* 13, CPI(M) 6, Janata (S) 1, Forward Bloc 1, Marxist Co-ordination 1, independents 19. Elections were countermanded in three constituencies.

The Congress (I) fought the elections in alliance with the *Jharkhand Mukti Morcha*, a break-away faction of the *Jharkhand* Party, which represented the tribal peoples. It was announced on June 16 that a Janata member, a BJP member and four independents had joined the Congress (I).

Dr Jagannath Mishra was sworn in as Chief Minister on June 8, and formed a Congress (I) Government consisting of 18 ministers, 15 ministers of state and six deputy ministers. Dr Mishra had previously been (Congress) Chief Minister of Bihar in 1975-77 [see pages 27596; 28435; 28752].

Gujarat. Number of seats 182, Congress (I) 140, Janata 22, BJP 9, *Lok Dal* 1, independents 9. Polling was countermanded in one constituency.

Mr Madhavsinh Solanki, who had previously been (Congress) Chief Minister for three months in 1976-77 [see pages 28349; 28437], formed a Congress (I) Government on June 7 consisting of eight ministers, six ministers of state and eight deputy ministers.

Madhya Pradesh. Number of seats 320, Congress (I) 246, BJP 60, Janata 2, CPI 2, *Lok Dal* 1, Republican 1, independents 8.

Mr Arjun Singh was sworn in as Chief Minister on June 9, and formed a Congress (I) Government consisting of 11 ministers and 14 ministers of state.

Maharashtra. Number of seats 288, Congress (I) 186, Congress 47, Janata 17, BJP 14, Peasants' and Workers' Party 8, CPI 2, CPI(M) 2, independents 12.

The Congress (I), which had won only one of the six *Lok Sabha* seats in Bombay in the general elections [see page 30326], won 26 of the 34 Assembly seats in the city and its suburbs. The Congress achieved its only notable success in Maharashtra, under the leadership of the former Chief Minister, Mr Sharad Pawar.

Because of differences inside the Congress (I) over the choice of the new Chief Minister, the legislature party decided to refer the question to Mrs Gandhi, who nominated Mr Abdur Rehman Antulay, a general secretary of the party and a member of the *Rajya Sabha* (Upper House of Parliament). He was sworn in as Chief Minister on June 9, and formed a Government consisting of 12 ministers and nine ministers of state. Mr Antulay was the first Moslem to become Chief Minister of the state.

Orissa. Number of seats 147, Congress (I) 117, *Lok Dal* 13, CPI 4, Janata 3, Congress 2, independents 7. Polling was countermanded in one constituency.

The Congress (I) won more seats in the Assembly than any party had previously done, the undivided Janata Party having won 110 seats in the 1977 elections [see page 28753]. Mrs Nandini Satpathy, the former Chief Minister, was one of the two successful Congress candidates.

Mr Janaki Ballav Patnaik, Minister for Tourism and Civil Aviation in the central Government, was elected leader of the Congress (I) Legislature Party on June 6, and formed a Government three days later consisting of eight ministers, 10 ministers of state and a deputy minister.

Punjab. Number of seats 117, Congress (I) 63, *Akali Dal* 37, CPI 9, CPI(M) 5, BJP 1, independents 2.

The Congress (I) was less successful in Punjab than it had been in the January elections, when it won 12 out of the 13 *Lok Sabha* seats, the result of the Assembly elections being closer than in any other state. The Congress (I) polled 45 per cent of the vote, the other parties 46 per cent and independent candidates 9 per cent. The *Akali Dal* fought the elections in alliance with the two Communist parties.

Mr Darbara Singh of the Congress (I) was sworn in as Chief Minister on June 7, and seven ministers on June 10.

Rajasthan. Number of seats 200, Congress (I) 133, BJP 32, Janata 8, *Lok Dal* 7, Congress 6, CPI 1, CPI(M) 1, independents 12.

Mr Jagannath Pahadia, Minister of State for Finance in the Congress (I) central Government, was sworn in as Chief Minister on June 6, and three ministers and five deputy ministers on June 18.

Tamil Nadu. Number of seats 234, ADMK 129, DMK 38, Congress (I) 30, CPI(M) 11, CPI 10, GKNC 6, Tamil Nadu Congress (Kamaraj) 3, Forward Bloc 3, Janata 2, Moslem League 1, independent 1.

The result of the elections was a reversal of that of the general elections, in which the Congress (I), DMK and Moslem League, which had formed an alliance, together won 37 of the 39 *Lok Sabha* seats, whilst the ADMK, which was allied with the Janata Party and the two Communist parties, won only two [see page 30327]. The Congress (I) again fought the Assembly elections in alliance with the DMK and the Moslem League, but the ADMK on this occasion was allied with the Communist parties, the GKNC, the Tamil Nadu Congress (Kamaraj) and the Forward Bloc, whilst the Janata Party fought on its own. (The Gandhi-Kamaraj National Congress and the Tamil Nadu Congress (Kamaraj) were state parties which had broken away from the Congress.) The ADMK and its allies thus won 162 seats, and the Congress (I) and its allies 69.

The ADMK leader, Mr M. G. Ramachandran (previously Chief Minister in 1977-80—see page 28754), was again sworn in as Chief Minister on June 9, and formed a Government of 17 ministers.

Uttar Pradesh. Number of seats 425, Congress (I) 306, *Lok Dal* 59, Congress 13, BJP 11, CPI 7, Janata 4, Janata (S) 4, independents 17. Voting was countermanded in four constituencies.

With 306 seats out of 421 contested (73 per cent), the Congress (I) greatly improved on its result in the general elections, when it won 51 *Lok Sabha* out of 85 (60 per cent). This development was attributed to the splits which had taken place since January in the Janata Party and the *Lok Dal* [see page 30329] and to the failure of the opposition parties to reach agreement on an electoral alliance, with the result that the opposition vote was more sharply divided than in any previous election. A record number of candidates (4,615) were nominated; in all the constituencies except one there were at least four candidates, and in one there were 28.

The Congress (I) Legislature Party on June 6 unanimously elected Mr Sanjay Gandhi its leader, and asked Mrs Gandhi, if she felt that his services could not be spared, to nominate any other suitable person, who would be deemed to have been duly elected. Mrs Gandhi, who had already stated on the previous day that her son would not be given any post in the central or state Governments, nominated Mr Viswanath Pratap Singh, a member of the *Lok Sabha*, who formed a Congress (I) Government on June 9 consisting of 10 ministers and six ministers of state.

Lifting of President's Rule

With the formation of the new Governments, President's rule—which had been introduced on Feb. 17—was lifted in all the nine states. Whereas at the beginning of the year the Congress (I) had held power only in Andhra Pradesh [see 29341 A] and as part of a coalition Government in Meghalaya [see page 29978], after the May elections it held office alone in 13 of the 22 states, including Karnataka, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim [see pages 30328-9], and as part of a coalition in Meghalaya and in Manipur [see page 30328]. Left-wing coalitions headed by the CPI(M) held power in Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal and local parties in Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland and Tamil Nadu, whilst Assam was under President's rule.

Resignation of Nagaland Government - Ministry formed by Mr Jasokie

The Chief Minister of Nagaland, Mr S. C. Jamir, who had held office only since April 18, resigned on June 5, following the loss of his majority [see page 30334]. Mr John Bosco Jasokie, leader of the Naga National Democratic Party (NNDP), who had previously been Chief Minister for 10 days in 1975 [see page 27597], formed a 16-member Government on the same day. The NNDP had a strength of 35 in the 60-member Assembly, in which one seat was vacant and a Congress (I) member, against whom an election petition was pending, had no voting rights.

General Elections - Voting Figures

Official statistics for the general elections in January showed that the electorate totalled 355,047,579, of whom 202,406,341 (57 per cent) voted and 197,483,629 (55.6 per cent) cast valid votes. The results achieved by the six major national parties were as follows:

Party	Contested	Elected	Forfeited deposit	Votes	Percentage
Congress (I) . .	491	352	7	84,288,364	42.68
Congress . .	212	13	143	10,450,405	5.29
Janata . .	431	31	115	37,384,739	18.93
Lok Dal . .	293	41	152	18,599,046	9.42
CPI	48	11	17	5,122,685	2.59
CPI(M) . .	63	36	9	12,156,988	6.16

These results include those for two constituencies where voting was postponed until Feb. 24 [see page 30327].

Cabinet Appointments

Mrs Gandhi on June 8 appointed three new ministers of cabinet rank, six ministers of state and six deputy ministers, the ministerial appointments being as follows:

Cabinet Ministers

Mr Vidya Charan Shukla	Civil Supplies
Mr Narain Dutt Tiwari	Planning
Mr Kedar Pande	Irrigation

Ministers of State

Mr Dalbir Singh	Petroleum and Chemicals
*Mr T. Anjaiah	Labour
Mr Buta Singh	Shipping and Transport
Mr Chandulal Chandrakar . .	Tourism and Civil Aviation
Mr Vikram Mahajan	Energy
Mrs Ram Dulari Sinha	Information and Broadcasting

*Mr Anjaiah was on Oct. 11, 1980, sworn in as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, in succession to Dr Chenna Reddy, the Congress (I) Chief Minister who had taken office in March 1978 [see page 29341] and who had resigned earlier in October.

Mr Shukla (50), as Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting during the emergency of 1975-77, was responsible for the imposition of press censorship [see page 27369]. He lost his seat in the 1977 elections, and was afterwards reprimanded by the Congress Working Committee for misuse of power [see page 28436]. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment in 1979 for criminal conspiracy, but his appeal was upheld by the Supreme Court [see pages 29966; 30330; and below]. **Mr Tiwari** was Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1976-77 [see page 27598], and **Mr Pande** Chief Minister of Bihar in 1972-73 [see 25253 A; 26050 A].

Mr Anant Prasad Sharma, Minister for Shipping and Transport, took over in addition the Tourism and Civil Aviation portfolio, which Mr J. B. Patnaik had resigned on his appointment as Chief Minister of Orissa [see above].

The Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled on Sept. 5 that Mr Shukla's election to the *Lok Sabha* in January 1980 [see page 30326] was invalid, as at the time of his nomination he had been a convicted felon and therefore ineligible to stand. The judge maintained that the subsequent reversal of his conviction by the Supreme Court was irrelevant, as this could not have been anticipated when he was nominated, but granted a stay of operation of the judgment for 21 days to seek directions from the Supreme Court.

Budget for 1980-81

In his budget for 1980-81, introduced on June 18, the Finance Minister, Mr Ramaswamy Venkataraman, imposed additional taxes totalling Rs 2,232 million (about £120,000,000), mainly in the form of excise duties, while lowering direct taxes. [For introduction of budget in February 1979 by previous Government, see page 29966.]

The exemption limit for income tax on personal incomes was raised from Rs 10,000 to Rs 12,000, and the surcharge on personal incomes reduced from 20 per cent to 10 per cent. The exemption limit for wealth tax was raised from Rs 100,000 to Rs 150,000. The special excise duty of 5 per cent of the basic excise duty was raised to 10 per cent, but a wide range of articles of common consumption were exempted. Postal and telephone charges were increased. Total receipts were estimated at Rs 198,270 million and total expenditure at Rs 214,670 million, leaving a deficit of Rs 16,400 million.

The annual plan outlay was increased to Rs 73,400 million, to be financed by a budgetary provision of Rs 53,220 million and internal and other resources of public sector undertakings of Rs 20,180 million. Central assistance to state plans would total about Rs 30,940 million. A major feature of the annual plan would be a national rural employment programme, for which Rs 3,400 million was provided in the budget. Defence expenditure was increased to Rs 36,000 million.

Death of Mr Sanjay Gandhi

Mr Sanjay Gandhi was killed on June 23 when an aircraft in which he was performing aerobatics crashed over New Delhi.

Mr Gandhi (33), one of the most controversial figures in Indian politics, first achieved prominence when in 1970 he was granted a licence for the production of a small car, the Maruti. The car was never put on the market, and an inquiry found in 1979 that he had adopted fraudulent means to promote his business interests [see pages 27783; 28434; 29967]. From 1975 onwards he played an increasingly active part in politics, and was generally regarded as Mrs Gandhi's most influential adviser. As leader of the Youth Congress he was largely responsible during the emergency of 1975-77 for the mass sterilization campaign and the wholesale demolition of buildings in Delhi—two of the Government's most unpopular measures [see pages 28352-53; 29348]. When he attempted to enter Parliament in the 1977 elections he was defeated in the Amethi constituency [see page 28431], and resentment of his influence on Mrs Gandhi contributed to bring about a series of splits in the Congress, when the Congress for Democracy broke away in 1977, the Congress (I) broke with the Congress in 1978 and Mr Devaraj Urs and his followers left the Congress (I) in 1979 [see page 28350; 28953 A; page 29968]. Mr Gandhi was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for criminal conspiracy in 1979, and a large number of other charges were brought against him [see page 29966].

He won the Amethi seat in the 1980 elections [see page 30327], and was believed to have strongly influenced the selection of the Congress (I) candidates in the general elections and the subsequent state elections and of the ministers in the central Government and the Chief Ministers of the states. His appeal against the sentence of imprisonment on him was upheld by the Supreme Court in April, and all the other charges against him were dismissed, withdrawn or lapsed with his death [see page 30330]. Although Mrs Gandhi rejected the proposal that he should become Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh [see above], she appointed him a general secretary of the Congress (I) on June 13.

Mr Gandhi was given what *The Statesman* described as ''an unofficial state funeral'' on June 24, his ashes being distributed to more than 20 places throughout India and scattered in holy rivers and lakes. At a public meeting on June 25 ministers and senior Congress (I) members described him as "a reincarnation of God", and compared him to Christ, the Buddha, Mahatma Gandhi and Marx. The *Lok Dal* strongly protested on June 29 against what it called "the systematic attempt made by the central and state Governments to foster the Sanjay legend by throwing all norms and propriety to the wind".

The Government announced on June 24 that a court of inquiry headed by a High Court judge would investigate the circumstances of Mr Gandhi's death, but later the same day stated that an inspector of accidents appointed by the Director-General of Civil Aviation would carry out the inquiry in accordance with the normal procedure. Opposition members in the *Rajya Sabha* demanded on June 27 the setting up of a court of inquiry, alleging that the Director-General of Civil Aviation had been forced to go on leave because he had protested against Mr Gandhi's violation of safety regulations, and that Mr Gandhi had disregarded the regulation forbidding aerobatics over residential areas.

Elections to Rajya Sabha

Following the Assembly elections on May 28 and 31 [see above], the biennial elections to approximately one-third of the seats in the *Rajya Sabha*, together with five by-elections, in which the Assemblies formed the electoral college, were held in Bihar, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh on July 4. No elections were held in Gujarat, where the members from the state were due to retire in 1981, and voting in the other state Assemblies had taken place on March 28.

The distribution of seats in mid-August after the July elections was as follows: Congress (I) 121, Congress 21, Janata 17, *Lok Dal* 15, BJP 14, CPI(M) 9, CPI 7, ADMK 7, DMK 6, *Akali Dal* 3, National Conference 2, Moslem League, Kerala Congress, Forward Bloc, Naga National Democratic Party, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Republican Party and Socialist Party 1 each, independents 6, nominated 8, vacant 1. (Of the 12 members nominated by the President four had joined the Congress (I).) With 121 members the Congress (I) was thus two seats short of an absolute majority in the 244-member *Rajya Sabha*.

Disturbances in North-Eastern States

The situation in the north-eastern states [for map of which see page 30333] remained tense throughout the summer. [For earlier recent developments see pages 30255-56 and 30332-34.] Violent clashes between Assamese and Bengalis occurred in Assam in May and June; in Tripura hundreds of Bengali immigrants were massacred by tribals early in June; Mizo terrorists murdered 10 people in the same month; and Naga separatists based in Burma raided villages in Nagaland. Some progress towards a settlement was made in July, however. The agitation against foreigners in Assam was suspended on July 20, and the similar agitation in Manipur two days later, whilst the Mizo National Front agreed on July 30 to stop all underground activities. Details of developments in the individual states are given below.

Assam - Suspension of Anti-foreign Agitation

The agitation in Assam led by the All-Assam Students' Union (AASU) and the All-Assam *Gana Sangram Parishad* (AAGSP) for the expulsion of foreigners continued throughout May, June and the first half of July. (The foreigners in question were basically immigrants from Bangladesh—formerly East Pakistan.)

Thousands of people courted arrest during May 5-9 by demonstrating outside government offices, and on May 21 a nine-day campaign of non-co-operation with the Government was launched, bringing government offices, banks and post offices to a standstill. Volunteers meanwhile continued to picket pumping stations to prevent the flow of crude oil from Assam to the rest of India, and to obstruct the movement of jute, timber, plywood and bamboo out of the state.

The agitation led to clashes between the Assamese- and Bengali-speaking sections of the population. After an outbreak of violence on May 17 at Tinsukia, in Dibrugarh district, rioting and arson spread through the more westerly Goalpara, Kamrup, Nowgong and Darrang districts, where the majority of the Bengali population lived. The rioting reached its height during May 26-29, but sporadic incidents continued throughout the following month, at least 52 people being killed up to June 6. Further rioting broke out at Lakhimpur on June 21 when a volunteer force organized by the AASU marched through the town in defiance of a ban on demonstrations, two people being killed when the police opened fire. The north-eastern region was completely cut off from the rest of India on July 4-6, when pickets succeeded in halting rail and air services.

A resolution extending President's rule in the state, which had been introduced on Dec. 12, 1979 [see page 30255], for another six months was adopted by the *Lok Sabha* on June 10 and by the *Rajya Sabha* on the following day. The President's ordinance of April 6 banning strikes in essential public services in the state [see page 30333] was approved by the *Lok Sabha* on July 4 and by the *Rajya Sabha* on July 9. The Assam State Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Bill, which empowered the President to legislate for Assam without reference to Parliament even when the two Houses were in session, was adopted by the *Lok Sabha* on July 5 and by the *Rajya Sabha* on July 9, despite strong resistance from the opposition parties in both Houses of Parliament.

Following secret talks with Mr Dorendra Singh, the Congress (I) Chief Minister of Manipur (appointed in January 1980—see page 30328), the AASU and the AAGSP announced on July 20 that they would suspend the agitation, except for the blockade on oil, jute, timber and plywood exports. The Government replied on July 30 with an announcement that it would release all detainees who had not been involved in violence, on the understanding that the agitation would be ended in all its aspects except the blockade of crude oil. Formal talks between Mr Yogendra Makwana (Minister of State for Home Affairs in the central Government) and AASU and AAGSP leaders opened in Shillong (Meghalaya) on Aug. 18, but broke down almost immediately. Five AASU leaders were arrested on Aug. 20, and two others on Aug. 23.

Rioting broke out on Aug. 26 in Margherita, in Dibrugarh district, and spread to the nearby towns of Makumtilla and Ledo, three children being burnt alive at Makumtilla when a mob set fire to a house. Troops were called in on the following day to restore order in the three towns.

Talks between the Home Minister, Mr Zail Singh, and delegations of the AASU and the AAGSP began in New Delhi on Sept. 17. At the opening session the Assamese spokesmen proposed that the national register of citizenship of 1951 and the 1952 electoral rolls should be accepted as the guiding documents for identifying foreign nationals, whose names would be struck off future electoral rolls.

Manipur - Student Agitation suspended - State declared Disturbed Area

The attacks on the homes of non-Manipuris in Imphal which began on April 27 [see page 30334] continued until May 2 and spread to surrounding areas, a village with a predominantly Nepalese population being burnt down on April 30. The Governor of the north-eastern states, Mr Lallan Prasad Singh, promulgated an ordinance on April 28 providing for preventive detention, 151 people being detained.

At talks between Mr Dorendra Singh and the student organizations which had been agitating for the expulsion of foreigners from the state, it was agreed on July 22 that the Government would begin identifying foreigners from Aug. 1 and that the students would suspend their agitation. The state Government on Aug. 25 ordered all foreigners living in the Northern district who were not in possession of valid documents to leave the state by Sept. 23.

The two secessionist organizations, the People's Liberation Army and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kungleipak (Prepak), both of which were believed to have received guerrilla training from Chinese experts in Tibet, meanwhile continued their terrorist activities. They carried out numerous armed robberies of banks and government offices, and were thought to have used the money to purchase arms and ammunition in Thailand and China. They differed in their aims, however, the Prepak demanding independence for Manipur and the People's Liberation Army independence for the whole north-eastern region. The Prepak was also divided into two hostile factions led by Mr Maipak Sharma and Mr Rajkumar Tulachandra Singh respectively, which fought each other as well as the police. The C.-in-C. of the Maipak faction (Mr Leishabi Singh) was killed in a gun battle with the police on July 23, whilst Mr Tulachandra was expelled by his own followers after he had been taken prisoner.

The state Government on June 11 offered an amnesty to all rebels who surrendered with their arms within 15 days, but this produced virtually no response. The entire state was declared a disturbed area on Sept. 8.

Mizoram - Terrorist Activities - Ceasefire Agreement

The illegal Mizo National Front (MNF) was responsible for three acts of terrorism in June, bringing the number of its victims since January to 28. Three government officials were murdered at Lunglei on June 13; three non-Mizo passengers on a bus were shot dead on the Aizawl-Silchar road on June 18; and four soldiers were killed in an ambush on June 21.

Two representatives of Mr Laldenga, the president of the MNF, who was living in New Delhi [see page 29979], had meanwhile visited the Front's headquarters in the Arakan Hills to discuss the possibility of peace talks. Mr Laldenga stated on June 25 that the MNF national council and executive committee had agreed at meetings on June 13-14 to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of its notices ordering all non-Mizos to leave Mizoram. Mr Zail Singh announced in the *Lok Sabha* on July 30 that following talks between Mrs Gandhi and Mr Laldenga it had been agreed that the MNF should stop all underground activities and that the security forces should suspend operations against the MNF from midnight on the following day.

Nagaland - Terrorist Activities by Naga Maoists

A Maoist faction led by Mr Muivah Tangkul and Mr Issak Swu, which had seized control of the Naga underground forces in Burma [see page 30256], was reported in July to have killed over 200 supporters of the exiled Naga leader Mr A. Z. Phizo and burnt down 150 villages. The Chief Minister of Nagaland, Mr Jasokie, stated on Aug. 8 that 474 Nagas from Burma had taken refuge in the Tuengsang district of Nagaland.

The Maoists raided a village in Nagaland on May 13, killing four people. A small force which attacked another village near the Burmese border on Sept. 3 was repulsed by village guards, six people being killed on each side, and while withdrawing was ambushed and wiped out by a pro-Phizo force.

Tripura - Tribal Uprising - Massacre of Bengalis

Several hundred Bengalis (over 2,000 according to some estimates) were murdered by tribals in the South and West districts of Tripura during June 6-10, in what was described as the worst massacre in the history of independent India.

The primary cause of the massacre was the tribal population's resentment of the mass immigration of Bengalis, especially from Bangladesh, who now formed about two-thirds of the population, controlled the state's economy and had taken over much of the former tribal land. The Left Front Government in 1979 secured the passage of the Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Act, which set up an autonomous district in the areas with a predominantly tribal population, but its measures to protect the tribals' interests met with strong opposition from the *Amra Bangali*, an organization advocating the creation of a Bengali state [see page 29980]. The *Tripur Sena*, a separatist tribal organization, began terrorist activities in 1979 [see pages 30256; 30334], and the tension in the state was further increased by the anti-immigrant agitation in Assam.

Attacks by armed tribals on villages with a large Bengali population began on June 6. The village of Mandai was raided and burnt down on June 8, at least 350 people being killed; at the nearby village of Burakha about 500 huts were burnt down and many people killed; and at Sachindranagar about 150 people were murdered. The worst massacre, however, was believed to have occurred at Atharacard, where about 1,000 bodies were reported to have been discovered in a mass grave. In Agartala, the state capital, and surrounding areas hundreds of houses were burnt down on June 7, the Army being called in to restore order. Over 200,000 people who had lost their homes had to be accommodated in government relief camps, whilst about 40,000 tribals were believed to have fled to the forests to evade arrest.

Mr L. P. Singh declared South and West Tripura a disturbed area on June 9, and empowered the state Government to use armed force to check violence, about 3,500 troops and Central Reserve Police being flown into the state on the same day. Several hundred people were arrested, including leading members of the *Tripura Upajatia Juba Samiti*, the tribal organization which formed the opposition in the state Assembly [see page 29342].

Posters appeared in many areas in the middle of June ordering all non-tribals to leave by June 26 and threatening that those who did not would be exterminated.

Attacks on tribal villages attributed to *Amra Bangali* supporters took place on June 29-30 and were followed by counter-attacks on Bengali villages by tribals, six people being killed and at least 3,000 families rendered homeless.

An armed gang ambushed a bus south of Agartala on July 2, killing 10 people. The security forces arrested 134 suspected extremists on July 9 in simultaneous raids on their hideouts, and another 175 after three army patrols had been ambushed on the following day. A policeman was killed in an attack on a police camp on July 29.

Communal Riots in Uttar Pradesh and Kashmir

Communal riots which broke out at Moradabad (in Uttar Pradesh, 100 miles east of Delhi) on Aug. 13 spread to other towns in the state (particularly in western districts) and to Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Kashmir, causing about 180 deaths in the following month.

The Moradabad riots began on Aug. 13 when a pig (regarded by Moslems as an unclean animal) strayed into the grounds of a mosque where Moslems were at prayer. Accusing the police of driving the pig in, the Moslems attacked a police station and stoned and fired at the police, who first used tear gas and then opened fire. Rioting continued in the town until Aug. 18.

Fighting broke out in New Delhi on Aug. 13 following a dispute between the congregation of a mosque and Harijans, seven people being seriously injured. On the following day Moslems stoned and set fire to Hindu shops in Old Delhi, and two people were killed when the police opened fire.

In western Madhya Pradesh two people were killed in communal riots at Mhow on Aug. 14.

In Uttar Pradesh outbreaks of arson and looting occurred during Aug. 15-17 in Sambhal, Bareilly, Kanpur and Meerut, whilst in Aligarh snipers fired from rooftops on police patrols on Aug. 16-19, killing two policemen. Allahabad was placed under a curfew on Aug. 19, after a rumour had spread that a piece of pork had been found in a mosque, and when it was relaxed on Aug. 21 fighting broke out in which six people were killed. The situation in the state gradually improved after Aug. 22, but sporadic incidents continued, two people being killed in clashes in Moradabad and Allahabad on Aug. 27 and a policeman shot dead in Amroha on Sept. 3. At least 10 people were killed in new rioting in Aligarh on Sept. 8, seven being burnt to death when their houses were set on fire, whilst in Moradabad nine were killed in street battles and police firing on Sept. 10 and three in a bomb explosion on Sept. 14, bringing the total number of deaths in the city since Aug. 13 to 144. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mr V. P. Singh, on Sept. 14 submitted his resignation to Mrs Gandhi (who, however, did not accept it).

In Kashmir mobs attacked a police station and the homes of Hindus in Srinagar on Aug. 17, five people being killed when the police opened fire. The state Government on the following day banned all public meetings for a month, including an international Islamic youth conference which was due to begin in Srinagar on Aug. 22. The conference had been convened by the *Jamaat-i-Tulaba*, the student wing of the pro-Pakistani *Jamaat-i-Islami*, which had announced plans on Aug. 5 for "an Iran-type revolution for the liberation of Kashmir from illegal occupation and enslavement by India". The president of the *Jamaat-i-Tulaba*, Sheikh Tajamul Islam, was arrested on Aug. 22. An ordinance issued on Aug. 23 made incitement of hatred between religious communities a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for a minimum of four years and a maximum of 10, a fine and confiscation of printing presses.

The Cabinet announced on Aug. 28 that it would introduce a constitutional amendment empowering the Government to send troops to disturbed areas and to set up special courts to try people accused of inflaming passions on religious or ethnic grounds. Mr Zail Singh stated on Sept. 12 that a specially trained police force with "a truly secular and national outlook" would be recruited from the minority communities, Harijans and tribal peoples to quell communal riots.

The National Security Ordinance, which was promulgated by President Sanjiva Reddy on Sept. 22, empowered the central and state Governments to detain Indian or foreign nationals for a maximum period of 12 months to prevent actions in any manner prejudicial to the security of the state or the maintenance of public order or supplies and essential services. Detentions would be reviewed by advisory boards of not less than three members, with a serving high court judge as chairman. The authority ordering the detention was required to communicate the grounds on which the order had been made to the person detained within five days, or in exceptional circumstances within 10 days, and to allow him to make a representation against the order.

Baba Gurbachan Singh, the leader of the Nirankari Sikhs, and his bodyguard were shot dead outside his home in New

Delhi on April 24. Four men were subsequently arrested. Attacks on the Nirankaris by orthodox Sikhs, who regard them as heretics, led to riots in Amritsar, Kanpur and New Delhi in 1978 in which 34 people were killed [see page 29352], and five attempts had been made on the life of Baba Gurbachan Singh since 1975.

Supreme Court's Ruling on 42nd Amendment

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on May 9 ruled that Sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act of 1976, which gave Parliament unlimited powers to amend the Constitution [see 28141 A], were unconstitutional.

Section 4 provided that no law giving effect to any of the directive principles of state policy laid down in the Constitution should be deemed to be void on the ground that it took away or abridged any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Section 55 laid down that no amendment to the Constitution should be called in question in any court on any ground, and that there should be no limitation whatever on the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution. These sections had been revoked by the *Lok Sabha* in 1978, but were subsequently reinstated by the *Rajya Sabha* [see pages 29349-50; 29966].

The Chief Justice, Mr Justice Y. V. Chandrachud, said that Section 55 was beyond the amending power of Parliament because it conferred power on Parliament "to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure", and that Section 4 destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. The order, with which Mr Justice A. C. Gupta, Mr Justice N. L. Untwalia and Mr Justice P. S. Kailasam concurred, said that fuller reasons for the decision would follow later. Mr Justice P. N. Bhagwati reserved his opinion, and said that he would pass final orders when he delivered a reasoned judgment.

The Government filed a petition on Sept. 5 seeking a review of the judgment by a larger bench of not less than seven judges.

Death Sentence held Constitutional by Supreme Court

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court ruled on May 9 that the death sentence as a punishment for murder was not unconstitutional.

Mr Justice Chandrachud, Mr Justice Gupta, Mr Justice Untwalia and Mr Justice R. S. Sarkaria held in their judgment that the death penalty did not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and was not an unreasonable, cruel or unusual punishment. They laid down, however, that murder should normally be punished with life imprisonment, and that the death sentence should be imposed only if there were special reasons for doing so. The court must have regard to every relevant circumstance relating to the crime and the criminal, and might impose the death sentence only if "the offence is of an exceptionally depraved and heinous character and constitutes, on account of its design and the manner of its execution, a source of grave danger to society at large". Mr Justice Bhagwati gave a dissenting judgment.

Alleged Misconduct by Police

A national scandal was caused by an incident at Baghpat (Uttar Pradesh), near Delhi, on June 18, when the police were alleged to have shot three men in cold blood and publicly stripped and beaten a woman, whom they afterwards raped.

Eyewitness reports quoted in *The Statesman* said that the woman, Mrs Maya Tyagi, was sitting in a car in Baghpat market while her husband was drinking with two friends, when a police officer in plain clothes addressed her in an objectionable way. Mr Tyagi and his friends attacked him, whereupon he ran to the police station and returned with a number of policemen, who shot two of the men in the back and the third while he stood with both arms raised. They then dragged out Mrs Tyagi, beat her, stripped her and made her walk naked to the police station, while armed policemen held back the crowd. Several hours later she was found lying naked and bleeding in the courtyard of the police station, where she alleged that she had been raped. The police, on the other hand, alleged that the three men were dacoits, who had opened fire on them; that they had returned the fire in self-defence; and that Mrs Tyagi had been beaten and stripped by the onlookers.

The Uttar Pradesh Government on July 2 ordered a judicial inquiry, and two days later transferred seven policemen alleged to have been involved in the incident, but rejected demands for their suspension. One of them, a sub-inspector, was shot dead near Meerut on Aug. 27. The case aroused particular indignation because it coincided with several others in which women were alleged to have been raped, stripped or beaten by policemen. Mr Zail Singh announced in the *Lok Sabha* on July 10 that the Government would introduce legislation to provide for deterrent punishment for those who committed rape or atrocities on women.

The report of an inquiry into the attack on a procession of blind people by the New Delhi police on March 16 [see page 30332], which was published on July 30, said that there had been no justification for the use of force, and commented that "the incident unfortunately reflects a settled conviction that our police habitually deal with each and every issue indiscriminately in their traditional unfriendly way".

Relaxation of Prohibition Laws

The prohibition of alcohol policy which had been promoted by Mr Morarji Desai while Prime Minister [see page 29969] was relaxed in many of the states after the general elections. The Finance Minister, Mr R. Venkataraman, made it clear soon after assuming office that the states were under no obligation to enforce further dry laws, and that in cases where states did introduce prohibition the central Government would not pay compensation designed to offset any resultant loss of excise revenues.

In Pondicherry, where prohibition had been introduced by the Governor while the territory was under President's rule [see page 29970], it was abolished from April 25. Prohibition was also abolished by the new Government in Bihar, where it had been introduced in 1979 [ibid.], on the grounds that it had lost the state about Rs 300,000,000 a year in revenue and had given rise to large-scale smuggling and corruption. The number of dry days when liquor might not be sold was reduced from 164 a year to 92 in Delhi, from 120 to 16 in Punjab and from 76 to 30 in Meghalaya, whilst in Goa all the dry days except Mahatma Gandhi's birthday were abolished.—(The Hindu, Madras - The Statesman, Calcutta - Indian and Foreign Review - India Weekly - Indian High Commission, London - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian) (*Prev. rep. 30325 A*)

A. NETHERLANDS — Cabinet Change - Announcement of Restrictions on National Defence Spending

Dr Pieter de Geus, a former director-general of the finance department of the Dutch Ministry of Defence and a member of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA—the larger of the two parties forming the Netherlands coalition Government), was on Aug. 25 appointed Minister of Defence in succession to Mr Willem Scholten (also CDA), who had held this post since March 1978 [see 28924 A]. Mr Scholten had in June been appointed vice-chairman of the Council of State (the highest consultative body in the Netherlands), a post which he was to assume on Oct. 1.

Dr de Geus announced on Sept. 3 that, due to the Government's decision to cut public expenditure in 1981 [see 30410 B], it would be necessary to restrict national defence spending, leading to the possible delay of planned purchases of armoured vehicles and of 111 United States F-16 fighter aircraft. He added that this would mean that the Netherlands would be unable in 1981 to comply with the 1977 undertaking of member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to increase their defence spending by an annual average of about 3 per cent in real terms [see 28417 A; 28815 A].—(Le Monde - Financial Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet, Government Spending Cuts 30410 B*)

B. JAPAN — Cabinet Change

Mr Sunao Sonoda, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was on Sept. 19, 1980, appointed Minister of Health and Welfare in succession to Mr Kunikichi Saito, who had resigned on the same day.

Mr Saito, who had been appointed on July 17 in the Cabinet formed on that date by Mr Zenko Suzuki [see 30453 A] and who had also been Minister of Health and Welfare from 1972 to 1974 [see 25677 A; 26253 A] and secretary-general of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) in 1978-79 [see 29475 A], resigned after admitting to receiving undeclared donations totalling some 15,000,000 yen (about $65,000) from the director of a private clinic who was under investigation for alleged illegal practising. (According to Japanese law all political donations from any one source exceeding 1,500,000 yen in any year must be declared.)

Mr Sonoda (66) was Minister of Foreign Affairs from November 1977 to November 1979 [see 28785 A; 29475 A], having earlier been Minister of Health and Welfare in 1969-70 [see 22483 A] and Chief Cabinet Secretary in 1976-77 [see 28157 A]. (Guardian - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune) (*Prev. rep. Suzuki Cabinet 30453 A*)

A. PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS — Recent United Kingdom and Norwegian Exploration and Production Developments

Major aspects of the build-up of substantial production of offshore crude petroleum and natural gas by Britain and Norway in the late 1970s are described below, together with UK onshore developments. [For earlier maps of North Sea oil and gas activities, see pages 26627, 25343 and 22973; for detailed map of the Norwegian sector, see page 30583 below.]

1980 Estimates of UK Continental Shelf Oil Reserves and Production Potential - Recent New Discoveries - Production Developments

In the Government's eighth "brown book" on UK continental shelf (UKCS) developments published on June 30, 1980, the quantity of recoverable oil reserves originally in place in the UK sector was estimated to be in the range of 2,200-4,400 million tonnes, of which by the end of 1979 some 179,000,000 tonnes had been lifted since the start of production in mid-1975 [see page 27725]. Remaining recoverable reserves in fields discovered to date were put at 1,200-2,400 million tonnes (i.e. 1,200 million tonnes proven, 625,000,000 tonnes probable and 575,000,000 tonnes possible), while the possible reserves in future discoveries were estimated at between 800,000,000 and 1,800 million tonnes (of which a substantial portion might lie in water depths of more than 1,000 feet).

Of the cumulative end-1979 production of 179,000,000 tonnes, some 78,000,000 tonnes were produced in 1979 from 14 offshore fields, compared with 54,000,000 tonnes from 12 fields in 1978. Total production in 1980, during which three additional fields were expected to come on stream, was forecast as 80,000,000-85,000,000 tonnes, which would rise to 85,000,000-105,000,000 tonnes in 1981 and progressively in succeeding years to a range of 95,000,000-135,000,000 tonnes in 1984.

UK oil production in 1979 represented 2.4 per cent of total world output and was greater than that of four members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (namely Algeria, Qatar, Ecuador and Gabon) and only slightly less than Indonesian production [see 30563 A].

Because of the effects of industrial recession and other demand-reducing factors, North Sea oil production had already exceeded total UK consumption for short periods in mid-1979 and in the second quarter of 1980. On the basis of the mid-1980 annual UK oil consumption rate of some 94,000,000 tonnes, consistent net self-sufficiency would be achieved during 1981 and would be maintained thereafter for between 22 and 47 years on the basis of current estimates of the range of possible reserves. Although Britain would continue to import supplies of heavier grade oils from the Middle East and elsewhere to meet certain industrial requirements, these would be offset in balance-of-payments terms by exports (mainly to other members of the European Community, Scandinavia and the United States) of the high-quality light crude obtained from the North Sea. (The first export shipment of British North Sea oil was made in late April 1976, when British Petroleum sent unrefined crude from its Forties field to West Germany.)

Whereas the 1975 "brown book" had given proven UKCS oil reserves as 1,060 million tonnes [see page 27725], this figure had been increased to 1,350 million tonnes in the 1976 report and maintained at around that level in succeeding annual reports, the proving of some new discoveries being offset by downward reappraisals of other fields. The upper range of possible total reserves originally in place in the UKCS had been given as 4,500 million tonnes in the 1975 report and maintained at that level until being scaled down to 4,400 million tonnes in the 1979 report, when the lower range of total possible reserves was reduced from 3,000 million to 2,400 million tonnes because of a changed statistical presentation under which non-proven discoveries were henceforth evaluated "very conservatively".

Because of slippage in platform-building and pipeline-laying programmes compounded by other technical difficulties, forecasts of annual production levels had been progressively revised downwards in successive "brown books". Thus, whereas the 1974 report had forecast that 1980 production would be in the range 100,000,000-140,000,000 tonnes [see page 26625], by 1979 this estimate had been reduced to 85,000,000-105,000,000 tonnes and by 1980 (as stated above) to 80,000,000-85,000,000 tonnes. Successive forecasts of likely annual production in the early 1980s also showed a similar scaling down of anticipated levels.

The following table shows the 14 North Sea fields which were on stream by mid-1980, together with production details and the operator's estimate of total recoverable reserves originally in place, as given in the 1980 "brown book"; also listed are the other fields with proven reserves which were expected to begin production in the early 1980s.

			Production		
	Start year	First peak year	Peak rate (tonnes per year)	Aggregate by end-1979 (tonnes)	Recoverable reserves[1] (tonnes)
In production					
Argyll	1975	1977	1,100,000	3,900,000	—[2]
Auk	1976	1977	2,300,000	5,700,000	8,000,000
Beryl	1976	1980	5,000,000	10,700,000	66,000,000
Brent	1976	1984	23,000,000	14,000,000	229,000,000
Claymore	1977	1980	4,500,000	7,400,000	55,000,000
Cormorant South	1979	1982	3,000,000	40,000	12,000,000
Dunlin	1978	1980	5,900,000	6,300,000	41,000,000
Forties	1975	1978	24,000,000	78,300,000	240,000,000
Heather	1978	1982	1,700,000	1,000,000	12,000,000[3]
Montrose	1976	1979	1,400,000	3,400,000	12,100,000
Ninian	1978	1981	17,700,000	7,800,000	155,000,000
Piper	1976	1979	13,000,000	34,100,000	88,000,000
Statfjord UK	1979	1988	27,000,000[4]	40,000	412,000,000[4]
Thistle	1978	1982	8,700,000	6,500,000	69,000,000
Under development					
Beatrice	1981	1981	3,900,000	—	21,000,000
Brae	1983	1983	4,900,000[5]	—	36,000,000[5]
Buchan	1980	1981	2,200,000	—	6,800,000
Cormorant North	1982	1986	7,300,000	—	55,000,000
Fulmar	1981	1984	8,600,000	—	70,000,000
Hutton NW	1982	1983	5,100,000	—	37,500,000
Magnus	1983	1984	5,900,000	—	60,000,000
Maureen	1982	1982	4,000,000	—	21,000,000
Murchison	1980	1982	7,200,000[4]	—	51,000,000[4]
Tartan	1980	1981	4,000,000	—	27,000,000

[1] Figures provisional in certain cases.

[2] Currently under reassessment after several production wells had (starting in March 1977) begun to produce water.

[3] Upper range of recoverable reserves given as 16,000,000 tonnes.

[4] For both Statfjord and Murchison, figures for peak production and reserves refer to the combined UK and Norwegian sectors of the fields [see below], although end-1979 production for Statfjord refers to offtake from UK sector only.

[5] Figures refer only to the portion of the Brae field (i.e. the southern) for which development approval had been given to date [see below].

Of the 14 producing fields listed above, the Argyll, Auk, Beryl, Brent, Claymore, Cormorant South, Dunlin, Forties, Heather (originally known as "Unocal 2/5"), Montrose, Ninian, Piper and Thistle fields had been discovered and confirmed in the later 1960s and early 1970s [see pages 26625-26], whereas the major Statfjord field had first been confirmed as extending from the Norwegian into the UK sector in February 1975.

Statfjord UK. Originally discovered by a group headed by Mobil and Statoil (the Norwegian state oil enterprise) in the Norwegian sector to the north of the Brent field in April 1974 [see page 26631], Statfjord was later evaluated as the largest field yet found in the North Sea, with total estimated oil reserves in excess of 400,000,000 tonnes as well as large quantities of associated gas. On Feb. 24, 1975, it was announced that the Statfjord field extended into acreage on the UK side of the median line then licensed to a group comprising, as equal partners, Conoco, Gulf and the National Coal Board (NCB)—the NCB's interest being subsequently transferred to the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) in January 1976 [see page 27731].

Prior to the start of production in November 1979 (by on-field tanker loading), an intergovernmental unitization agreement was signed in Oslo on Oct. 16, 1979, confirming an initial equity split already agreed by the companies concerned under which 15.9 per cent of the oil would be regarded as coming from the UK sector and 84.1 per cent from the Norwegian, although the agreement allowed for revision of these proportions throughout the life of the field.

Of the 10 fields listed above as likely to come on stream in 1980-83, (i) the Magnus and Maureen fields had been discovered in the early 1970s [see page 26626]; (ii) the Cormorant North field was an extension into an adjoining block of Cormorant South, both blocks being licensed to Shell-Esso; and (iii) the Hutton NW field was situated in a block licensed to a consortium led by Amoco, the British Gas Corporation (BGC) and Mobil and was an extension of the Hutton field in an adjoining block licensed to the Conoco-BNOC-Gulf group [see also page 26626], the latter field being at a relatively early stage of development. Details of the other six fields are given below.

Beatrice. This field was discovered in September 1976 in inshore waters off north-east Scotland some 25 miles south of Wick in a block then licensed to a group led by Mesa UK. In the course of

1979 the BNOC took over from Mesa as operator for the field, acquiring a 28 per cent stake, the remaining interests being held by Kerr McGee Oil, Deminex, BP and Hunt Oil. Production from the field was expected to start in 1981, the oil being transported to Nigg Bay on the Moray Firth by a 45-mile pipeline which had been substantially completed in 1979.

Brae. The discovery of the Brae field about 150 miles east of the Orkneys and close to the UK-Norwegian median line was announced in May 1975 by a consortium led by Pan Ocean. After subsequent changes in the rights to the relevant block, the principal licensees as at mid-1980 were Marathon Oil, the BNOC and Bow Valley Exploration. Production from the southern part of the field was scheduled to begin in 1983, with the oil being transported ashore by pipeline via the Forties field. Initial appraisal of the central and northern parts of the field (which were not covered by the southern sector development plan approved by the Secretary of State for Energy in January 1980) suggested that the whole Brae complex could prove to be one of the largest oilfields in the North Sea.

Buchan. The discovery of the Buchan field about 35 miles north-east of Forties was confirmed in August 1974 by Transworld Petroleum, the operator for a group which also included BP, City Petroleum, CanDel Petroleum and St Joe Petroleum. Production from the Buchan field (which extended into an adjoining block licensed to Texaco) was expected to begin in late 1980 by on-field tanker loading.

Fulmar. Discovered in November 1975 in a block licensed to Shell and Esso (as equal partners) in the central UK sector of the North Sea to the west of the Norwegian Ekofisk field, the Fulmar field was later found to extend into an adjoining block licensed to Amoco, the BGC, Mobil, Amerada and Texas Eastern. Installation of the main platform was due to be completed in 1980 and production was scheduled to start in 1981 by tanker loading.

Murchison. Licensed to the Conoco-BNOC-Gulf partnership and named after the 19th-century Scottish scientist Sir Roderick Murchison, this field had been discovered in September 1975 in the northern North Sea sector to the north-east of the Shetlands and straddled the UK-Norwegian median line. Initial production from the field began in late September 1980, with the oil being pumped to the Sullom Voe terminal in the Shetlands via the Dunlin field, and was expected to build up to a rate of 6,000,000 tonnes a year in 1981. An intergovernmental equity agreement signed in Oslo on Oct. 16, 1979, in respect of the portion of the field lying in the Norwegian sector (in a block licensed to a consortium comprising Statoil, Amerada Hess, Amoco, Conoco, Esso, Mobil, Saga, Shell and Texas Eastern) provided that 83.75 per cent of Murchison production would be British oil and the remaining 16.25 per cent Norwegian.

Tartan. Originally discovered in November 1974 in a block licensed to Texaco to the south-west of the Piper field, the Tartan field was expected to begin production in late 1980, with the oil being transported by pipeline to the Flotta terminal in the Orkneys via the Claymore field and associated gas being pumped to St Fergus via the Piper field.

Other Discoveries. Other North Sea oilfields currently still under appraisal were: (i) the **Alwyn** field, confirmed in November 1973 after its discovery to the south of Ninian had been announced the previous month by a French consortium led by Total [see page 26626]; (ii) BP's **Andrew** field, discovered in June 1974 (and declared commercial in October 1974) in a block to the west of Maureen and in May 1975 found to extend into an adjoining block licensed to a consortium led by Phillips Petroleum; (iii) the **Beryl B** field (also known as Beryl North) to the north of the main Beryl field, discovered in May 1975 in a block under licence to a group led by Mobil; (iv) BNOC's **Clyde** field (immediately to the east of the Fulmar and Auk accumulations), discovered in May 1979; (v) Hamilton Brothers' **Crawford** field some 30 miles south of the main Beryl field, confirmed in April 1975; (vi) Shell-Esso's **Tern** field, discovered in April 1975 about 12 miles north-west of Cormorant North; and (vii) the **Toni-Thelma-Tiffany** accumulations discovered by Phillips to the south of the Brae field, of which Toni and Thelma had been announced in July 1976 and Tiffany (in the north of the same block) in June 1979.

The 1980 "brown book" also listed 40 other as yet unnamed "significant" oil discoveries announced by the end of 1979, explaining that the description "significant" was related to "the flow rates achieved in well tests", which were "not necessarily an indicator of the potential commerciality of the find". The new discoveries of the mid to late-1970s were made almost exclusively in the central and northern sectors of the North Sea where proven fields were situated, although in July 1977 BP announced the first significant oil strike west of the Shetlands (some 40 miles north-west of Sullom Voe), where as yet relatively few blocks had been licensed for exploration. As regards the western UKCS, a limited amount of exploration in the Western Approaches off the south-west coast of England had not resulted in any strikes by mid-1980, although in the Irish Sea a major natural gas field (Morecambe) had been discovered in September 1974 [see page 30582 below].

Overall capital investment in the UKCS in 1979 (for both oil and gas exploration and development) was estimated in the 1980 "brown book" at about £2,000 million (compared with some £2,300 million in 1978), representing about 6 per cent of UK capital investment. Cumulative investment in the UKCS to the end of 1979 expressed in 1979 prices was estimated at over £15,000 million, in addition to which a further £3,000 million had been spent on exploration. In 1979 UK offshore-related investment was expected to be about 6 per cent of gross domestic fixed capital formation.

UK Government's Depletion Policy - Plans to regulate Rate of North Sea Production

Through the 1970s successive British Governments actively promoted the rapid development of North Sea oil reserves and stressed the importance of the rate of production rising above UK consumption levels as quickly as possible. By mid-1980, however, with Britain on the verge of consistent net self-sufficiency in oil, the Government was actively considering steps to regulate offtake in fields discovered after 1975 to ensure that high levels of UKCS production would be prolonged at least until the end of the century.

The depletion policy of the Conservative Government which took office in May 1979 was outlined in a written parliamentary answer given by the Secretary of State for Energy, Mr David Howell, on July 23, 1980, as follows:

"We expect that from later this year UK oil production will regularly reach a level equal to UK consumption. Thereafter, on present forecasts production would rise to a peak in the mid-1980s, giving a significant surplus over UK consumption in the 1980s as a whole. We are likely to become net importers of oil again about 1990.

"Recent events underline the fragilities of the world energy scene. The Government believe that, on strategic and security of supply grounds, it is in the national interests to prolong high levels of UKCS production to the end of the century. This requires action to increase exploration, which we have already taken, and to defer some oil production from the 1980s. Such action accords fully with the recommendations to maximize indigenous hydrocarbon production on a long-term basis and with our other international commitments, including [the undertaking to make] net exports of 5,000,000 tonnes in 1985 as agreed in the European Community and the International Energy Agency [see 30131 A].

"There are of course major uncertainties about future levels of North Sea production and UK consumption. There can therefore be no rigid plan. We shall continue close supervision over reservoir performance at existing fields and scrutinize new applications for field developments to ensure good oilfield practice consistent with optimum oil and gas recovery in the national interest. We shall also continue to take decisions on a case by case basis, but giving greater emphasis to the need to limit the sharpness of the peak in production. We shall of course honour the assurances given by [the then Secretary of State for Energy, Mr Eric Varley] on Dec. 6, 1974 [see page 27728], on the basis of which heavy investment has been undertaken by the oil companies.

"In particular, the Government will consider delaying the development of fields discovered after the end of 1975, which are not covered by the assurances given by [Mr Varley]. The Government will also continue to tighten control on gas flaring [i.e. the practice of burning off associated natural gas in certain North Sea oilfields—see page 30582 below].

"The Government have taken no decisions on whether to have production cutbacks which, under the assurances given by the previous administration, cannot be made before 1982.

"I believe that this flexible approach is the right one and takes account of both the needs of those involved in the difficult business of oil production and, more important, the long-term national interest."

Fifth and Sixth Offshore Licensing Rounds - Labour Government's New Licensing Conditions - Invitations for Seventh Round - Conservative Government's Modification of Conditions

The fifth and sixth licensing rounds for UK continental shelf exploration and production were carried out in 1976-77 and 1978-79 respectively, a total of 44 blocks (each of 250 square kilometres or about 100 square miles) being allocated in the fifth round and 42 in the sixth. These allocations represented a considerable reduction as compared with the four earlier rounds in 1964, 1965, 1970 and 1970-71 respectively, in which licences had been awarded in respect of a total of 863 blocks [see 20334 A; 21075 A; page 25341].

Details of the first to sixth licensing rounds are set out in the following table.

Licensing round	Blocks on offer	Blocks applied for	Blocks licensed
First (1964)	960	394	348
Second (1965)	1,102	127	127
Third (1970)	157	117	106
Fourth (1971-72) . .	436	286	282
Fifth (1976-77)	71	51	44
Sixth (1978-79)	46	46	42

For the fifth and sixth rounds the then Labour Government introduced new licensing conditions, a principal aspect of which was a requirement that the BNOC or other state-owned concerns should have a majority stake in licences; moreover, in April 1978 allocations were made outside the normal licensing rounds of an additional 11 blocks exclusively to the BNOC and one to the British Gas Corporation (BGC). However, the Conservative Government which came to power in May 1979 announced in December of that year that in the seventh licensing round due to be completed in 1980 a majority state interest in licences would no longer be mandatory.

Fifth Round. On the basis of a consultative document published in May 1976, new conditions attaching to fifth-round licences were set out in the Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, which were laid before Parliament on July 29, 1976, and which entered into force on Aug. 19, 1976. These specified inter alia that licences would be granted on the basis that the BNOC or one of its subsidiaries was, either alone or jointly with another state corporation or subsidiary, a co-licensee entitled to a 51 per cent share in all the benefits of the licence [see below for application of 51 per cent provision to earlier rounds under participation agreements]; moreover, the Secretary of State could decide to grant a licence solely to a state corporation or subsidiary.

It was also specified that fifth-round licensees would be required (i) to reach an agreement with the Department of Energy on a compulsory exploration programme in the blocks allocated, and (ii) to reach a joint operating agreement with the BNOC to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State.

The response to the fifth-round offer (made on Aug. 20, 1976) was proportionately comparable to that in previous rounds, there being 53 applications for 51 blocks from a total of 133 companies acting either individually or in consortia. After detailed appraisal of the applicants Mr Tony Benn (then Secretary of State for Energy) on Feb. 9, 1977, announced the provisional award of 28 licences for 44 blocks, of which 40 were allocated to 64 companies grouped in 22 consortia (21 including the BNOC and one the BNOC and BGC jointly as 51 per cent co-licensees), one exclusively to the BGC and three exclusively to the latter's subsidiary, Hydrocarbons GB. The blocks thus allocated comprised some 9,000 sq. km. in the North Sea, Irish Sea, Cardigan Bay, English Channel and the area west of Scotland (the blocks not taken up including eight in the Western Approaches off the south-west coast of England, where the delimitation of the UK and French sectors of the continental shelf had not yet been finalized—see below).

Following the satisfactory conclusion of the necessary agreements with the Department of Energy and the BNOC, the fifth-round licence awards were confirmed in stages between November 1977 and late 1978.

In addition to having a 51 per cent stake in most of the licences, the BNOC was also for the first time to be an operator on its own account in six of the blocks allocated in the fifth licensing round. Moreover, Mr Benn announced on Sept. 16, 1976, that as regards acreage allocated in the fifth round the BNOC would no longer have the option of deferring its share (51 per cent) of development costs. Mr Benn described this decision as a "turning-point in the development of Britain's oil policy" and rejected suggestions that it had been taken in the face of the strong criticism of the BNOC's right of deferment previously voiced by many private oil companies. One effect of the decision would be to increase the Government's share of revenue from any eventual discoveries in fifth-round blocks (in the form of royalties, corporation tax and petroleum revenue tax), since private oil companies would no longer be offsetting whole development costs against such payments.

Separate Awards to BNOC and BGC. On April 5, 1978, Mr Benn announced a further award of licences (i) to the BNOC for 11 blocks, four of which were located in very deep waters north and west of Shetland, five in the central sector of the North Sea and two in the Western Approaches, and (ii) to the BGC for one block in the Irish Sea off Morecambe Bay. At the same time Mr Benn announced that holders of first-to-fourth round licences proposing to dispose of part or all of their licence interests would be required to give the BNOC or the BGC as appropriate the first opportunity to negotiate for the acquisition of some or all of the licence share on offer. He added that "this policy will help to improve the national equity share in earlier licences—which at present amounts to only about one-eighth of the area licensed".

Sixth Round. On the basis of a further consultative document published in May 1978, revised conditions attaching to sixth-round licences were set out in the Petroleum (Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1978, which were laid before Parliament on July 5, 1978, and which entered into force on July 26, 1978. These effected an increase in the application fee for seaward production licences, required additional information (i.e. audited accounts) to be submitted with applications for licences and made clear that approval could be given separately to the operator for the exploration and development stages of activities conducted under licences.

The sixth licensing round was formally initiated by Mr Benn on Aug. 2, 1978, and by the deadline of Nov. 20, 1978, a total of 55 applications covering all 46 blocks on offer had been received from 94 companies acting individually or in consortia. Conditional awards were announced on March 26, 1979, under which 26 licences covering 42 of the 46 blocks were allocated to 59 companies, with the BNOC holding a majority stake in each (except where BGC interests counted towards the required majority state participation) and being designated the operator in six blocks. Confirmation of the sixth-round licences, which covered some 24,000 sq. km. in the North Sea and in hitherto largely unexplored areas north-west of the Shetlands and in the Western Approaches, were subsequently announced in stages beginning on July 26, 1979, virtually all the awards being confirmed by the end of the year.

Seventh Round. After consultations with interested parties on the basis of preliminary proposals published on Dec. 5, 1979, Mr Howell announced detailed arrangements for the seventh licensing round on May 1, 1980, under which (i) companies would have the opportunity, on the same basis as in previous rounds, to apply for 80 blocks listed by the Secretary of State (including some in the hitherto unexplored area to the north of the 62°N parallel), of which a maximum of 70 would be eventually licensed; (ii) companies would also be able to apply for blocks of their choice in the generally well-explored area of the northern North Sea between the 56°N and 62°N parallels and east of the Greenwich meridian, it being proposed that at least 20 such blocks would be licensed for an initial payment of £5,000,000 per block; (iii) the BNOC and BGC would have the same opportunity to apply as private sector companies but would no longer have a mandatory majority interest in future licences (as foreshadowed by Mr Howell in July 1979—see page 29832 and below); and (iv) the BNOC would have an option to take at market value up to 51 per cent of the petroleum produced under new licences. The seventh-round arrangements were set out in the Petroleum (Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1980, which were laid before Parliament on May 23, 1980, and came into force on June 14, 1980.

By the closing date of Aug. 11, 1980, a record number of 125 applications had been received from a total of 204 companies or consortia in respect of 95 blocks, of which 55 had been specifically designated by the Government and a further 40 selected by the applicant companies.

As at the end of 1979, out of 642,806 sq. km. of the UKCS designated for exploration, some 65,000 sq. km. were covered by production licences held by 223 licensees either singly or in consortia. Interests equal to about 28,000 sq. km. were held by British companies, while foreign-based companies accounted for some 37,000 sq. km.

Maintenance of OPEC-related Price for North Sea Oil - Government's Revenue Take

Between the start of UKCS oil production in mid-1975 and mid-1980 the price of North Sea crude almost quadrupled in line with the Government's policy of linking the price per barrel to the rate for equivalent Nigerian and Libyan oil set within the framework of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Whereas the first North Sea oil had cost around $10.50 per barrel, successive increases applied over the ensuing five years (notwithstanding objections from other European Community member states) brought the rate for a 35-gallon barrel of Forties reference crude to $36.25 with effect from May 20, 1980. [For increases in OPEC and other world prices to late 1979, see 29981 A.]

However, although further increases were decided by OPEC at its Algiers meeting in June 1980 (as a result of which Nigerian and Libyan crude was raised to a ceiling of $37 per barrel), the BNOC announced its intention in early July of maintaining the $36.25 reference price in the light of the growing weakness of the spot market price. (By virtue of its 51 per cent participation agreements with North Sea operating companies—see page 30581 below—and its own direct interests in various fields, the BNOC was currently responsible for the sale of about two-thirds of North Sea oil and was regarded as the price setter for marketed crude.)

The total proceeds from the sale of North Sea oil produced to the end of 1979 were some £11,000 million, including £5,700 million in 1979 alone. On the basis of the May 1980 reference price and the prevailing exchange rate of £1 = $2.40, the value of recoverable oil reserves still in place in the UKCS—i.e. between 2,000 and 4,200 million tonnes—was calculated at between £200,000 million and £440,000 million.

The 1980 "brown book" gave total government revenues attributable to UKCS oil and gas production up to and including the 1979-80 financial year as £3,070 million, taken in the form of royalties, petroleum revenue tax (PRT) and corporation tax. Of this total some £2,230 million was estimated to have accrued in the financial year 1979-80 (compared with an estimated yield of £8,200 million from value added tax and of £20,600 million from income tax).

The following table shows the break-down of revenues attributable to the UKCS over the relevant four-year period.

	Royalties	PRT	Corporation Tax	Total (rounded)
		£ million		
1976-77	71	—	10	80
1977-78	228	—	10	240
1978-79	289	183	50	520
1979-80	628	1,435[1]	166	2,230

[1] A change in the collection procedures for PRT [see pages 30154-55] meant that three payments rather than two fell due in 1979-80.

Of the three components of the Government's revenue take from UKCS production in the period 1976-80, royalties were levied at 12½ per cent of well-head value [see 20334 A] and corporation tax at 52 per cent. The PRT rate was increased from 60 per cent to 70 per cent effective Jan. 1, 1980 [see pages 30390, 30396] following an earlier increase from the original rate of 45 per cent to 60 per cent effective Jan. 1, 1979 [see pages 29823, 29827]; moreover, the BNOC's initial exemption from PRT had been ended with effect from July 1, 1979 [ibid.].

The 1980 "brown book" explained that the relatively small contribution to government revenues to date from PRT and corporation tax was accounted for by the structure of the taxes, which were not paid until after capital and other allowances had been used, with the result that payments did not fall due until a few years after a field had started production. To accelerate the collection of PRT in succeeding years, legislative steps were taken by the Government in the first half of 1980 requiring companies to make advance payments of a proportion of PRT due, it being argued that the cash position of oil companies had improved substantially because of the rapid rise in oil prices [see pages 30396; 30154-55]. [For description of the PRT as introduced under the then Labour Government's 1975 Oil Taxation Act, see pages 27726-27.]

Figures published by *The Financial Times* in March 1980 based on oil industry estimates showed that on the assumption of unchanged government taxation policy, an annual 10 per cent increase in the price of oil and a UKCS production level of 135,000,000 tonnes by 1984, total government revenues from UKCS oil production would rise from £4,900 million in 1981 to £14,700 million in 1984; of the latter figure £7,900 million would accrue from PRT, £4,300 million from corporation tax and £2,500 million from royalties.

Completion of UK Participation Negotiations - Acquisition by BNOC of Majority Stake in North Sea Interests of 62 Companies - Other BNOC Developments

As stated on pages 27730-31, the then Labour Government had started negotiations with North Sea oil companies in late 1974 with a view to achieving majority state participation through the BNOC in first-to-fourth round licences covering actual or prospective commercial oilfields. Over the following three-and-a-half years complex and often contentious negotiations with the various companies concerned resulted in the gradual achievement of the Government's objective, the 62nd and final participation agreement (with ICI Petroleum) being signed on July 10, 1978. (As described above in the section on licensing, the award of licences in the fifth and sixth rounds was subject to mandatory state participation, this condition being dropped for seventh-round licences by the incoming Conservative Government.)

Whereas the Government's negotiating team was initially headed by Mr Harold Lever (then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), it was announced on May 4, 1976, by James Callaghan (who had succeeded Mr Harold Wilson as Prime Minister the previous month) that the team would henceforth be led by Mr Benn (who had been appointed Secretary of State for Energy in June 1975). Mr Lever retained his seat on the negotiating team, the other ministerial members of which were then Mr Joel Barnett (then Chief Secretary to the Treasury) and Dr J. Dickson Mabon (then Minister of State for Energy).

Although each participation agreement was tailored to the individual circumstances of the company concerned, in general they gave the BNOC the right to take at market price up to 51 per cent of each company's share of crude from producing fields, subject in many cases to "sale-back" provisions under which a company could buy back a proportion (up to 100 per cent in some cases) of the oil taken by the BNOC. The BNOC also became entitled to full membership, with an independent vote, of the operating committees which managed fields, pipelines and terminals.

A major landmark in the negotiations was the announcement by Mr Benn on July 1, 1976, that the terms of an agreement had been reached with BP covering both "upstream participation" by the BNOC in BP interests and "downstream" cooperation between the two companies.

Under the agreement (which was subsequently signed by the interested parties on June 1, 1977), the BNOC acquired an option to take as from Jan. 1, 1977, up to 51 per cent of BP's oil from the UKCS, net of royalty oil taken in kind; but in recognition of BP's planning requirements, in 1977 and 1978 the BNOC would sell back to BP affiliates 100 per cent of option oil taken. Thereafter, if the option was exercised, the BNOC would sell to BP affiliates in 1979-81 a proportion of the North Sea oil taken, subject to the supply by BP to the BNOC of oil of the same value from other sources and subject to a force majeure clause providing for protection of the national interest. Further arrangements beyond 1981 would be a commercial matter between the two companies.

As regards "downstream" activities, the BNOC and BP would seek to establish a long-term basis for collaboration, with BP providing training facilities for BNOC staff and a non-voting presence for BNOC in its refining and marketing counsels, subject to the proviso that the BNOC did not operate "downstream" in the United Kingdom either independently or in joint venture with other companies. [At the time of the agreement, BP was a majority state-owned company (as to 48.15 per cent by the Government and 20.13 per cent by the Bank of England); for the sale by the Labour Government of 17.28 per cent of the government holding in June 1977, see 28676 A; for the sale of a further 5 per cent by the Conservative Government in November 1979, reducing the total state holding to 46 per cent, see page 30153.]

An initial demand by BP that participation crude taken by the BNOC should attract a premium price was not incorporated into the agreement, but BP spokesmen expressed satisfaction that the terms eventually agreed would leave the company no worse off financially.

Conservative Government's Moves to reduce Role of BNOC - Proposals for Private Capital Participation - Appointment of New BNOC Chairman

As stated on page 29832, Mr Howell on July 26, 1979, announced the incoming Conservative Government's decision to reduce the role of the BNOC in various ways (notably by ending its preferential position in future licensing rounds) and its intention of bringing about wider ownership of the BNOC either through the disposal of assets or the introduction of private capital. As regards the latter intention, it subsequently became known that the Government was examining plans for forming a separate company based on the BNOC's exploration and production interests, which would have private capital participation, while the BNOC would continue as a wholly state-owned enterprise confined mainly to oil trading activities.

Whereas it had originally been expected that some form of private sector participation in the BNOC would be implemented speedily as part of the Government's efforts to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), Mr Howell announced in a written parliamentary answer on March 25, 1980, that because of the full parliamentary timetable it would not be possible to introduce legislation in the current session, although it remained the Government's intention to do so as soon as possible.

Pending legislative action on the Government's ultimate intentions, it had been announced on Sept. 14, 1979, that the BNOC had been instructed to make forward sales of oil worth £400,000,000-£500,000,000 with a view to reducing the PSBR by a corresponding amount in the current financial year [see page 30153]. By late November 1979 arrangements had been completed for these sales (almost all to refineries in the UK), which would realize the upper end of the Government's target (i.e. £500,000,000), payable over the following few months for crude deliveries beginning in April 1980.

It was subsequently confirmed by the Energy Department on Sept. 28 that the Government had opted for an issue of revenue bonds in the BNOC as presently constituted rather than a sale of equity, although the latter option had not been abandoned for the longer term. It was understood that the Government's decision reflected the complexities encountered in drawing up proposals for a sale of equity shares in a new company based on the BNOC's exploration and production interests (which would have involved the renegotiation of the existing participation agreements with 62 private oil companies).

Addressing the Conservative Party's annual conference in Brighton on Oct. 9, Mr Howell confirmed that revenue bonds linked to the BNOC's performance would be put on sale (on terms and at a date still to be determined) with the aim of giving "a further opportunity for the British public on a very wide scale to share in the risks and rewards of their enterprise, as well as providing a unique investment medium for the small investor". He also stated that a bill would be introduced in the next parliamentary session under which the Government would seek reserve powers to sell equity shares in the corporation, but added that the Government "does not want to surrender control of the BNOC as a national oil body because we are a major oil producer and we believe a body of that kind is a vital part of our equipment".

Strong opposition both to the sale of BNOC equity and to any division of the corporation had been expressed not only by the opposition Labour Party but also by the BNOC itself. Following Mr Howell's July 1979 announcement, the then BNOC chairman, Lord Kearton, had stated on July 27, 1979, that it was "always unwise to sell shares in something just as it starts to make profits"; moreover, with reference to the reduction in the BNOC's role, Lord Kearton had accused private oil companies of telling "outrageous lies" in an attempt to blame the BNOC's "so-called privileges" for their own failure to maintain a high level of exploration in the UKCS.

Mr Philip Shelbourne (55), a merchant banker without previous direct experience of the oil industry, was appointed chairman and chief executive of the BNOC with effect from July 1, 1980. He succeeded Mr Ronald Utiger, a part-time board member who had been acting chairman and chief executive since November 1979 following the retirement of the BNOC's first chairman, Lord Kearton [for whose appointment, see page 27730].

Annual accounts published in April 1980 showed that for the first year since its establishment (on Jan. 1, 1976) the BNOC made a net profit in 1979—of £13,600,000 on total sales of £3,245 million compared with a net loss of over £3,000,000 on sales of £432,000,000 in 1978 (when the corporation began trading in oil). According to the accounts, it was anticipated (i) that $400,000,000 of the $825,000,000 borrowed by the BNOC in 1977 from a consortium of US and UK banks would be repaid by mid-1981, and (ii) that by the end of 1981 the Government would have been repaid all of the £451,000,000 made available to date through the National Oil Account to finance BNOC activities.

UK Natural Gas Production and Reserves - Development of New Fields

The UK Government's 1980 "brown book" estimated the quantity of recoverable gas reserves originally in place in the UKCS at between 1,100,000 million and 2,400,000 million cubic metres (c.m.), which had been reduced by cumulative production to the end of 1979 to a range for remaining reserves of 750,000-2,100,000 million c.m. [1 c.m. = 35.31 cubic feet]. These estimates represented a slight increase compared with figures given in the 1979 report, principally in view of upward reassessment of recent discoveries.

In addition to the five southern basin fields which had been in production since the late 1960s or early 1970s (i.e. West Sole, Leman Bank, Hewett, Indefatigable and Viking—see pages 25341-42 and maps on pages 22973 and 25343), the Rough and Frigg fields had come on stream in October 1975 and September 1977 respectively, while in 1978 production of associated gas from the Piper oilfield had also started. Cumulative production from these eight fields (together with small quantities of associated gas from other oilfields) had reached 319,751 million c.m. by the end of 1979, of which over 40 per cent (140,861 million c.m.) came from the Leman Bank field alone. During 1979 gas produced from the UKCS provided 81 per cent of the British Gas Corporation's total supplies. (Since 1964 gas had also been imported in liquified form from Algeria—see 20370 C.)

The **Rough** and **Frigg** fields had been discovered in May 1968 and July 1971 respectively, the former in southern basin acreage licensed (as at mid-1980) to a consortium comprising the BGC, Amoco, Amerada and Texas Eastern [see also page 26628] and the latter in the north-eastern sector of the North Sea, where it was found to straddle the UK-Norwegian median line [ibid.]. An initial UK-Norwegian unitization agreement signed on Dec. 12, 1977, provided that 39.18 per cent of Frigg production would be deemed to flow from the UK sector (licensed to the French Elf-Aquitaine-Total partnership) and 60.82 per cent from the Norwegian sector (licensed to the same consortium plus Norsk Hydro and Statoil, known collectively as the Petronord-Statoil group). Total recoverable reserves in the Frigg field were estimated at some 200,000 million c.m., its peak production potential of 46,000,000 c.m. a day being reached in the course of 1980 via a twin UK-Norwegian pipeline to the BGC's terminal at St Fergus on the Aberdeenshire coast.

Of 27 other "significant" gas or condensate discoveries made by the end of 1979 and currently still under development or appraisal, 16 were situated in or near the southern basin producing sector and 10 in central and northern North Sea waters, the latter being predominantly condensate fields. These included the following named fields (block operator and confirmation date being given in parentheses): *southern basin*—**Scram** (Arco, July 1967); **Sean** (Shell, April 1969); **Broken Bank** (Arco, July 1970); **Swarte Bank** (Conoco, January 1971); **Amethyst** (BNOC, October 1972); and **Audrey** (Phillips, March 1976); *central and northern sectors*—**Lomond** (Amoco, May 1972); and **Bruce** (Hamilton Brothers, July 1974).

In addition, the **Morecambe** natural gas field had been discovered in the Irish Sea 30 miles off Morecambe Bay in September 1974 in a block licensed to the BGC's Hydrocarbons GB subsidiary, it being anticipated that this field, which was thought to contain reserves of 140,000 million c.m., would begin production in late 1983.

In the course of 1979, the Government took steps to restrict the practice of flaring (i.e. burning off) natural gas in certain North Sea oilfields where it was found in association with oil, notably by requiring operators to reinject gas for later recovery. The average rate of flaring rose to 18,000,000 c.m. a day in 1979 (equivalent to about 7 per cent of oil production) compared with 12,500,000 c.m. a day in 1978, but the new government measures had considerably reduced the rate by the end of the year.

With a view to making productive use of the larger deposits of associated natural gas, a pipeline system connecting the Brent field in the far north-eastern sector of the UKCS with the St Fergus terminal was expected to become operational in 1981.

Constructed by Shell-Esso and known as the "far north liquid and associated gas" (FLAG) system, the Brent-St Fergus link would also be tied in with the so-called "western leg" system of gas pipelines which had been laid in 1979 to connect Brent with the nearby Cormorant South, Hutton and Ninian oilfields. Further south, associated gas from the Piper and Claymore oilfields was already being pumped into the main Frigg-St Fergus pipeline via a connecting system which would also eventually carry gas from the Tartan oilfield.

UK Onshore Activities - Development of Wytch Farm Field in Dorset - Change in Licensing Arrangements

Oil production from onshore UK fields increased only marginally in the late 1970s to 120,000 tonnes in 1979 but was scheduled to rise significantly thereafter to 250,000 tonnes in 1980 and to 330,000 tonnes in 1981. Almost exclusively responsible for this rise was the BP-BGC Wytch Farm field near Poole Harbour in Dorset, which began production in May 1979 after test drillings had established that it was comparable in size to the smaller North Sea fields.

Situated in an area where small quantities of oil had been produced for a number of years, the Wytch Farm field had been discovered in January 1974 [see page 27732], following which test drillings to deeper levels had by May 1978 resulted in an upgrading of the field's peak potential production capacity to 800,000-1,000,000 tonnes a year and its total reserves to some 13,000,000 tonnes.

Further licences for landward exploration in various parts of the country were awarded by the Government at regular intervals in the period 1976-80. Although the number of wells drilled remained small compared with offshore activity (falling to four in 1979 compared with 11 in 1978), exploration activity was expected to be stimulated in the 1980s by the Wytch Farm discovery, especially as onshore exploration and development costs were a fraction of those incurred offshore.

Apart from the Wytch Farm area and the established small oil-wells of the East Midlands and Lincolnshire, by mid-1980 strikes of onshore natural gas had been made at Cousland (Midlothian), at Eskdale and Lockton (on the Yorkshire coast) and also at Bletchingley (Surrey). Moreover, in late May 1980 it was announced by a group headed by Carless Exploration that encouraging results had been obtained from an oil strike at Humbly Grove near Basingstoke (Hampshire), 60 miles to the north-east of the Wytch Farm field.

In a written parliamentary answer on Aug. 7, 1980, the Minister of State for Energy, Mr Hamish Gray, announced that the BNOC's option to a 51 per cent equity interest in onshore licenses would be replaced "by an arrangement under which the BNOC will, if the Secretary of State so requires, have an option to take at market price up to 51 per cent of petroleum produced under all new licences", although the BNOC would continue to have the right to apply for licences on the same basis as private sector companies. This change in the provisions introduced by the previous Labour Government brought the relationship between the BNOC and private oil companies vis-à-vis onshore activities onto the same footing as that now obtaining vis-à-vis offshore licences [see page 30580 above].

Settlement of UK-French Delimitation Dispute - UK-Irish-Danish Dispute over Rockall

The longstanding dispute between the United Kingdom and France over the delimitation of the continental shelf in the English Channel and the Western Approaches was finally settled in March 1978 by a five-member international arbitration court sitting in Geneva which had been set up by the two Governments concerned in July 1975. In response to a British submission, the court made certain adjustments to an original decision on July 1977 concerning the boundary north and west of the Channel Islands but confirmed its original delimitation of the Atlantic median line, to which the British Government had also objected.

In objecting to the court's original award (which was published on July 25, 1977), the British Government claimed in particular (i) that the court's cartographer had failed to take account of the curvature of the earth's surface when drawing the Atlantic boundary on the basis of the court's written decision and had thus increased the French sector by some 300 square miles of potentially hydrocarbon-bearing waters, and (ii) that the boundary drawn around the Channel Islands did not take account of a 12-mile fishing limit accepted in the court's written judgment.

After further oral hearings the court finally decided on March 22, 1978, that the UK submission concerning the Channel Islands was admissible and made appropriate adjustments to the boundary in that area, but at the same time it found that it had no power to correct the median line in the Western Approaches. The effect of the court's decision was to divide an area of some 40,000 square miles of the English Channel and the Western Approaches (to a distance of 70 nautical miles into the Atlantic) almost equally between the two countries, it being claimed by the French Government that France had "clearly gained more by arbitration than Britain had offered in negotiations".

Following the settlement of the UK-French dispute, negotiations continued between the British and Irish Governments on the implementation of an agreement in principle reached in 1977 to establish a similar international arbitration court to settle various differences over the delimitation of the UK-Irish median line, notably in the Western Approaches and in the waters north of Ireland. As regards the latter area, particular difficulties had arisen as a result of the Irish Government's longstanding rejection of the British contention that the tiny uninhabited island of Rockall (which had been annexed to the Crown in 1955 and incorporated into Scotland in 1972—see 14436 C; 25122 B) was part of the UK continental shelf and should therefore be a factor in the determination of the UK sector.

Also involved in the Rockall dispute was Denmark, which claimed that the island was a natural extension of the Danish Faroe Islands and should not be used as a base-point for the determination of UK economic and fishery zones.

Norwegian Sector Developments - Start of Exploration North of 62°N Parallel

Production from the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, which had started in 1971 by on-field tanker loading [see page 26630], increased sharply in the late 1970s following the opening of the Ekofisk-Teesside oil pipeline in October 1975 [see page 27725], in which year Norway became a net exporter of crude petroleum. Of cumulative end-1979 oil production totalling 77,200,000 tonnes, some 18,800,000 tonnes were produced in 1979 (0.6 per cent of world output—see 30563 A) compared with current annual Norwegian consumption of under 8,000,000 tonnes, and this rate of offtake was expected to increase to about 35,000,000 tonnes in 1981. Production of natural gas from the Norwegian sector began in 1977 and in terms of tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) slightly exceeded oil output in 1979, by the end of which year cumulative gas production had reached 37,600 million c.m.

Probable recoverable hydrocarbon reserves originally in place in the Norwegian continental shelf south of the 62°N parallel were officially estimated at Jan. 1, 1980, as between 4,000 million and 5,000 million toe, while original proven reserves in the same area were thought to total about 1,700 million toe, equally distributed between oil and gas. Of the original proven reserves, 585,000,000 tonnes of oil and 445,000 million c.m. of gas were believed to lie in fields either on stream or designated for early production.

According to government calculations, the size of Norway's known hydrocarbon reserves would make it possible to achieve production rates of 70,000,000 toe a year in the late 1980s and of 90,000,000 toe a year in the early 1990s and to maintain this range into the next century. The 70,000,000-90,000,000 toe range for eventual annual output was regarded by both the Government and the *Storting* (Parliament) as corresponding to their joint desire for a moderate pace of hydrocarbon production.

As at Jan. 1, 1980, there were nine oil and/or gas fields in production in the Norwegian sector, namely the seven fields of the Ekofisk oil and gas complex (Ekofisk itself, Cod, Tor, Eldfisk, West Ekofisk, Edda and Albuskjell), the Statfjord oil and gas field and the Frigg gas field; two others were at an advanced stage of development, namely Murchison (oil) and Valhall A (oil and gas), the former beginning initial production in late September 1980 [see page 30579 above] and the latter being expected to come on stream in late 1981. As stated above, the UK-Norwegian Statfjord, Murchison and Frigg fields had been the subject of initial unitization agreements under which the proportions deemed to flow from the Norwegian sector were determined as 84.1, 16.25 and 60.82 per cent respectively.

Because of the unfavourable configuration of the seabed between Norwegian fields and the Norwegian coast, the bulk of production from the Norwegian sector was landed directly in the United Kingdom via the Ekofisk-Teesside oil pipeline [see page 26630] and the Frigg-



····· = median lines between national sectors

(*Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy*)

St Fergus gas pipelines, while Ekofisk gas was pumped directly to Emden (West Germany) via a pipeline which became operational in September 1977. With a view to achieving direct landing of a proportion of Norwegian sector output, plans were developed in the late 1970s for a major pipeline system between the Statfjord oil and gas field (where oil production was by on-field tanker loading) and the Sotra islands near Bergen. However, no decision to proceed with construction had been taken by late 1980, when plans for a major "gas-gathering" pipeline system to link other Norwegian fields were also under consideration.

In addition to the above fields, several other significant discoveries had been made in the Norwegian sector south of the 62°N parallel, these including the Ula, South-East Tor, Flyndre, Valhall, Hod, Bream, Brisling and Balder oilfields (in most of which substantial quantities of gas had also been found) and the Sleipner, Heimdal, North-East Frigg, East Frigg and Odin gas fields (the first two of which also contained substantial quantities of oil).

As at Jan. 1, 1980, a total of 47,000 million Norwegian kroner (nearly $10,000 million at current rates of exchange) had been invested in permanent installations and pipelines for the 11 Norwegian fields under or designated for production (and a further Kr 6,700 million in exploration), representing about 61 per cent of anticipated final total investment in these fields. The early stages of activity in the Norwegian sector were dominated by foreign companies, which were the operators of all 121 wells drilled up to the end of 1974; from 1975 onwards Norwegian companies were the operators in 42 of the 115 wells drilled. [For abortive plan in 1978-79 for Swedish participation in oil activities in the Norwegian North Sea sector through the Norwegian acquisition of a share in the Swedish motor company Volvo, see page 29366; 29508 B.]

In the first two Norwegian licensing rounds, 70 blocks had been awarded in 1965 and 14 in 1969-71 [see page 25345]. Thereafter, 20 blocks were licensed in the third round carried out in stages between late 1974 and 1977 and eight in the fourth round in April 1979. Moreover, in separate awards in this period (i) two blocks containing the Norwegian sector of the Statfjord field were licenced to a group headed by Statoil (the state oil company) and Mobil in August 1973 [see page 26631], and (ii) one block (34/10, the so-called Norwegian "gold block" immediately to the south of Statfjord) was awarded to Statoil-Norsk Hydro-Saga in June 1978 with a view to giving this all-Norwegian consortium direct experience of development and production activities.

Whereas all the blocks licensed up to the fourth round were situated below the 62°N parallel, in the fifth licensing round initiated by the Government on June 9, 1979, applications were invited for 26 blocks north of this line. Subsequently, the award of three of these blocks was announced on Jan. 18, 1980 (two off Hammerfest and one on the Haltenbanken off Troendelag county), with Statoil having a 50 per cent stake in each.

Notwithstanding considerable opposition from environmentalists, fishermen and others to the extension of exploration into far northern waters, the Government's policy for the fifth round was approved by the *Storting* on March 13, 1980, by 76 votes to 26. Test drilling in the first of the far-north blocks started in late May 1980.

New conditions attached to fifth-round licences strengthened those governing the previous two rounds [see pages 26630-31] in various ways, notably in that (i) Statoil would have the right to equity participation of up to 85 per cent, (ii) the Government would have the right to postpone development of a commercial field and to establish the production profile for a field brought on stream, (iii) at least 50 per cent of research and development activities associated with blocks licensed was required to be conducted in Norway, and (iv) companies were required to participate financially in the Government's oil-spill contingency arrangements for the area north of the 62°N parallel.

In the period 1971-79 the total gross production value of hydrocarbon exploitation in the Norwegian sector (i.e. the aggregate value of production plus income from pipeline operation) was officially estimated at about Kr 60,000 million, rising from Kr 62,000,000 in 1971 to some Kr 23,700 million in 1979. Over the same period government revenues from oil and gas production totalled some Kr 16,000 million, rising from Kr 14,225,000 in 1971 to Kr 6,481,875,000 in 1979, the latter figure representing about 13 per cent of the overall state budget.

Exports of oil and gas became a major factor in Norway's balance of trade in the late 1970s, amounting to some 22.5 per cent of total export value in 1979 compared with 5.6 per cent in 1975.

Ekofisk Blow-out - Alexander Kielland Rig Disaster - Strikes by Oil Workers

Oil production activities in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea experienced two major setbacks in the period 1977-80, namely a massive "blow-out" in the Ekofisk field in April 1977 and the capsizing of the Alexander Kielland accommodation platform in March 1980 with the loss of 123 oil workers.

The blow-out in Phillips Petroleum's Ekofisk field occurred on April 22, 1977, in one of 15 production wells under the field's Bravo platform, from which crude oil began to gush into the North Sea at a rate of up to 2,000 tonnes a day. Efforts to cap the well, led by a team of US experts, were hampered by adverse weather conditions and various technical difficulties and were not successful until April 30, by which time some 12,000 tonnes of oil had escaped. Responsibility for the blow-out, which was estimated to have cost Phillips about $100,000,000 and the Norwegian Government up to Kr 100,000,000 in lost revenues, was attributed by a government-appointed commission of inquiry which reported in October 1977 to human error and faulty technical procedures. In the light of the Bravo blow-out both the Norwegian and the UK Governments subsequently instituted stricter safety requirements for offshore production platforms.

In by far the worst accident to date in the North Sea, the Alexander Kielland semi-submersible mobile rig, which was being used as an accommodation platform for workers on Phillips' Edda field, capsized on March 27, 1980, in heavy seas 200 miles south-west of Stavanger, after one of its five supporting legs had buckled and then fractured. Of over 200 men on the platform it was subsequently established that 123 had died in the accident, most of them trapped in the 10,000-ton structure as it toppled over into waters 80 metres deep. An official inquiry into the occurrence was immediately instituted by the Norwegian Government and urgent checks were carried out on rigs of a similar design currently in service. The disaster revived opposition to projected hydrocarbon exploration north of the 62°N parallel [see above], but an opposition move to postpone the start of drilling in that area on safety grounds was defeated in the *Storting* on May 6.

Output from the Ekofisk, Statfjord and Frigg fields was completely halted from July 3, 1980, by a strike of 2,000 production and maintenance workers in support of a 33 per cent pay increase. After production losses valued at over $300,000,000, work in these three fields resumed on July 20 following the Norwegian Government's decision to refer the dispute to compulsory arbitration. However, a separate strike by 2,000 other Norwegian workers on mobile development rigs in both the Norwegian and the UK sectors, which had begun on July 10 in support of similar pay increases, was not resolved until Aug. 14, when work was resumed after pay rises of 23-30 per cent had been agreed.—(Department of Energy, London - Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Oslo - Financial Times - Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Economist - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. 27725 A, 26625A*)

A. BOLIVIA — Military Takeover following Presidential and Congressional Elections

Following presidential elections on June 29 in which Dr Hernán Siles Zuazo of the moderate left Democratic Popular Unity (UDP) front won the largest number of votes but failed to achieve an absolute majority, the armed forces took power on July 17 from the interim head of state, President Lidia Gueiler Tejada, and installed a military junta headed by Gen. Luis García Meza (50).

Sra Gueiler had been appointed President in November 1979 by the National Congress as a temporary solution to a political crisis (arising in turn from inconclusive presidential elections in July-August 1979—see 29853 A—and a subsequent unsuccessful coup attempt—see 30137 A), and had announced at the beginning of 1980 that elections would take place on June 29 [see 30137 A]. Developments during her seven months of office and following the military takeover are described below.

Changes in President Gueiler's Government - Internal Unrest - Presidential and Congressional Elections

The first few months of 1980 were marked by political and economic instability, bomb attacks and other internal unrest (attributed variously to the extreme left and the extreme right), and persistent rumours that a military coup was imminent. President Gueiler reorganized her Cabinet in February and again in April in anticipation of the June elections, the "historic" faction of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR-H) and its allies continuing to dominate the Cabinet.

The five new members of the Government appointed in February were Gen. (rtd.) Antonio Arnez Camacho (Defence), Sr Juan Carlos Navajas (Trade and Industry—independent), Sr Isaac Sandóval Rodríguez (Labour—independent), Sr Mario Vizcarro (Agriculture—MNR-H) and Sr Fernando Salazar (Integration—MNR-H). Subsequently, Sr Adolfo Aramayo was appointed Finance Minister on March 10 *vice* Sr Augusto Cuadros Sánchez, and Gen. Arnez became acting Interior Minister following the resignation of Sr Jorge Selum Vaca Díez on March 21.

Among the new ministers appointed on April 7 after the Cabinet offered its resignation on March 26 were Rear-Adml. (formerly Capt.) Walter Núñez Rivero (Defence), Sr Gastón Araoz (Foreign Affairs) and Sr Jorge Gutiérrez del Rio (Mining and Metallurgy), Gen. Arnez being confirmed as Interior Minister.

Gen. García Meza, the head of the military academy, rose to prominence when he replaced Gen. Rubén Rocha Patiño as C.-in-C. of the Army on April 14 (a post which he had already held briefly in November 1979—see 30137 A) against the opposition of President Gueiler and many provincial commanders. Subsequently, on April 29, Gen. García Meza and Sr Juan Lechín Oquendo, the leader of the Bolivian Workers' Central (COB) who had threatened to call a general strike if a coup were staged, signed an agreement witnessed by President Gueiler pledging mutual respect for the democratic process and reaffirming the traditional military-peasant alliance.

Meanwhile, the kidnapping and murder by armed men of Father Luis Espinal, a Jesuit journalist, on March 21 led to an outcry from the Church, the trade unions, many political parties and the press and to the formation by these groups shortly afterwards of the National Committee for the Defence of Democracy (Conade). The murder was followed by an attempted army uprising in Santa Cruz on March 23, which was blocked by elements of the army high command.

Congress on June 10 unanimously rejected a proposal by Gen. Waldo Bernal Pereira (who became C.-in-C. of the Air Force in May *vice* Gen. Jaime Niño de Guzmán) that the elections should be postponed for at least a year while the country was "totally reorganized" and that Sra Gueiler should remain in power during this time. The President on June 12 reiterated her intention that "free and fair" elections should take place as planned, and on June 13 the C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces, Gen. Armando Reyes Villa, said after a meeting with her that her decision would be respected.

At the same time Sra Gueiler rejected an armed forces' demand for the expulsion of the new US ambassador to La Paz, Mr Martin Weissman, who since his arrival in March had consistently expressed support for the electoral process.

Accordingly, after a violent electoral campaign in which a dozen people were killed and some 50 injured, elections took place on June 29 to choose a new President (from among 13 contenders), a Vice-President, 27 senators and 130 deputies. As in the 1979 elections [see 29853 A], Dr Siles Zuazo obtained the highest vote in the presidential contest (38.7 per cent), while Dr Víctor Paz Estenssoro of the MNR-H took second place with 20.1 per cent.

Provisional returns for the major parties in the congressional elections showed that the UDP had obtained an aggregate of 57 seats in the two houses of Congress, the MNR-H 44, Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) 30 and Socialist Party-One (PS-1) 11.

Other major presidential candidates won the following percentages: Gen. Hugo Banzer Suárez (ADN) 16.9, Sr Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz (PS-1) 8.0, Sr Adolfo Siles Salinas (Offensive of the Democratic Left, OID) 2.64, Sr Walter Guevara Arce (Authentic Revolutionary Party, PRA) 2.62. There were five presidential candidates representing Indian groups (Indians constituting about two-thirds of the population).

The electoral court on July 13 declared Dr Siles Zuazo the winner, but since he had failed to obtain more than half of the valid votes it fell to the new Congress to meet on Aug. 4 to elect a President from among the three leading contenders. Dr Paz Estenssoro withdrew from the contest to facilitate this task.

Military Takeover - Measures taken by New Junta

Before Congress was able to convene, however, the military seized power on July 17 in a coup which began in Trinidad (Beni department), where key installations were occupied by the sixth army division and a statement was issued calling on the armed forces to assume power and reject the results of the elections. Later that day troops took up positions in La Paz and entered the presidential palace, arresting Sra Gueiler and her Cabinet who were holding an emergency session. Armed men also attacked the COB headquarters and took away a number of trade union and party leaders including Sr Lechín, while in the fracas Sr Quiroga was fatally wounded.

In a broadcast on July 18 Sra Gueiler relinquished power to a three-man "junta of national reconstruction" comprising Gen. García Meza (who was sworn in as President the same day by Gen. Reyes Villa), Gen. Bernal and Rear-Adml. Ramiro Terrazas (C.-in-C. of the Navy). The junta said in a statement that it had taken power because of economic disintegration and leftist subversion and it announced the cancellation of the election results, the dissolution of Congress and the imposition of a curfew and martial law. The 1967 Constitution would, it said, be enforced in so far as it did not contravene the aims and objectives of the new Government.

On Sept. 28 a statute was issued declaring the junta "the supreme governing body" for at least three years, with powers to appoint the President.

Other measures taken by the junta included the imposition of strict radio and press censorship, and the formal banning of the COB (on July 24), while on Aug. 19 the trade unions were suspended, the universities were closed indefinitely with a view to the replacement of their "Marxist ideology" by a "nationalist, Christian and humanistic doctrine", student organizations were dissolved and university staff were dismissed.

Also on Aug. 19 it was announced that trade union representatives would be replaced by government-appointed delegates for the purposes of wage negotiations and that the COB headquarters would be demolished. A reorganization of the judiciary began on Sept. 9 with the replacement of the Supreme Court judges appointed by Sra Gueiler.

Gen. García Meza in a speech on July 18 denounced Sra Gueiler's Government for allowing "communism, Castroism and anarchy"; he said that the time of "electoral adventures" was over and that Bolivia was to be transformed into a modern industrial society under a system of democracy with order and security. Gen. García Meza subsequently compared himself in a press interview to President Pinochet of Chile (for whose assumption of power in 1973 see 26149 A) and said that he would remain in power for 20 years if necessary to remove the "Marxist cancer" from Bolivia.

The following new Cabinet was appointed on July 18 (an Aeronautics Ministry being subsequently created in October):

Brig.-Gen. Javier Cerruto Calderón de la Barca	Foreign Affairs and Worship
Col. Luis Arce Gómez	Interior, Migration and Justice
Gen. Oscar Larrain	Planning
Gen. José Sánchez Calderón	Finance
Gen. Armando Reyes Villa	Defence
Gen. Augusto Calderón	Labour and Union Affairs
Col. Carlos Morales Núñez del Prado	Mining and Metallurgy
Capt. Líder Sosa	Energy and Hydrocarbons
Col. Ariel Coca	Education and Culture
Col. Mario Guzmán	Industry, Commerce and Tourism
Col. René Guzmán	Transport and Communications
Capt. Avelino Rivero	Welfare and Health
Gen. Arturo Veizaga Barrón	Housing
Col. Julio Molina	Peasant Affairs and Agriculture
Capt. Francisco Mariaca	Economic Integration
Sr Fernando Palacios	Information and Sport
Col. Mario Escobari Guerra	Secretary to Presidency
Gen. Waldo Bernal Percia	Aeronautics

A general strike was called by the COB for July 18 (which was declared a national holiday by the junta) and there was street fighting against troops in some areas of La Paz over the next few days; however, many people returned to work on July 22. Strong resistance was staged in the tin mining areas south-east of La Paz, continuing into August with many casualties being unofficially reported in some localities. Although the Government said at the end of July that the mines were in operation again following the conclusion of agreements between miners' and military representatives, other reports said that in some mines workers were holding out underground without food or supplies.

As many as 2,000 people were reported to have been arrested by the end of July, among them a dozen priests and nuns, the head of the Bolivian human rights assembly (Father Julio Tumiri) and, temporarily, about 30 journalists. The Interior Minister said on Aug. 5, however, that only 500 people were detained (and that only 30 had died in the coup, compared with opposition estimates of at least 1,000), and on Sept. 9 a list was published containing the names of 235 detainees, among them Sr Lechín, Sr Simón Reyes (the Communist leader of the mineworkers' federation) and two former ministers. Strong condemnation of human rights violations was expressed by the Archbishop of La Paz, Mgr Jorge Manrique, and by the Bolivian episcopal conference, which accused the Government on Sept. 10 of "violent killings of citizens, arbitrary arrests, physical and psychological torture and persecution".

Dr Siles Zuazo, who fled to Peru in September, had announced from hiding on Aug. 5 that he had formed a clandestine government of national unity together with his vice-presidential candidate, Sr Jaime Paz Zamora (who was in Washington), while on Aug. 21 a secret meeting of Congress confirmed him as constitutional President of Bolivia. Sra Gueiler remained in the papal nunciature until leaving for France on Oct. 4, where she asserted that she had relinquished power under duress.

International Reactions to Coup

The United States immediately withdrew its ambassador from La Paz (on July 18) and announced the suspension of all aid to Bolivia, the State Department on July 23 "deploring" the disruption of the democratic process and the reports of "widespread, even savage, violations" of human rights. The US military training mission was withdrawn on July 25 and a "substantial reduction" of embassy staff in La Paz announced.

Subsequently, the State Department on Aug. 13 announced the termination of all co-operation with Bolivia on narcotics control because of "numerous and continuing allegations" about involvement of the military in the drug trade, which "call into question the degree of co-operation which may be expected from this Bolivian regime in the control of drug traffic". The State Department also on Aug. 14 expressed concern at the "complicity of the Argentinian authorities" in human rights violations in Bolivia and at "persistent information" showing that Argentina had played an "important role" in the coup.

Argentina on July 28 became the first country to recognize the new Bolivian Government, and on Aug. 6 President Videla offered food and financial assistance to Bolivia, stating that if Dr Siles Zuazo had taken power "ideas contrary to our way of life and the permanence here of a military government" would have placed Argentina at risk.

The Bolivian regime was also recognized by Paraguay (July 29), Brazil (July 30), Uruguay (Aug. 1) and El Salvador (Aug. 22), while the regime itself severed relations with Nicaragua on Aug. 2. Bolivia's ambassadors in Switzerland, Britain, Spain and Mexico resigned in protest at the coup.

At a special meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington on July 24-25, a motion deploring the coup was approved by eight votes to three (Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay), with Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay abstaining. The heads of state of Bolivia's co-partners in the Andean Group (i.e. Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) met in Lima on July 30 after the inauguration of President Belaúnde Terry of Peru [see 30545 A] and, together with President Carazo Odio of Costa Rica and Sr Adolfo Suárez González, the Spanish Prime Minister, issued a declaration condemning the interruption of the democratic process in Bolivia; the Andean Group's Parliament also met in Bogotá on Sept. 1 with the participation of three Bolivian deputies in exile and called on the OAS to send a commission to Bolivia to investigate violations of human rights. Capt. Sosa, the Bolivian Energy Minister, subsequently said on Sept. 2 that Bolivia would withdraw from the Andean Group because it had interfered in the affairs of a member state and that it would join a "Southern Cone pact", which had first been referred to on Sept. 1 by the Paraguayan Defence Minister, Gen. Marcial Samaniego, during a visit to Buenos Aires.—(Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Latin American Newsletters - Financial Times - New York Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. 30137 A*)

A. EGYPT — Appointment of New Cabinet under President Sadat - Referendum on Constitutional Changes - Internal Security Developments - Election of Consultative Council

President Sadat on May 12, 1980, accepted the resignation of the Government of Dr Mustapha Khalil (who had held the premiership since October 1978—see 29998 B) and on May 14 appointed a new Cabinet with himself as Prime Minister. Six Deputy Prime Ministers were appointed in the new administration, these including Gen. Kamel Hassan Ali (hitherto Minister of Defence and War Production), who was also allocated the Foreign Affairs portfolio previously held by Dr Khalil since February 1979 [ibid.].

Addressing the People's Assembly on May 14, President Sadat said that under his personal direction the new Cabinet would give priority to the country's serious economic and social problems in a "battle for prosperity"; in the latter context, he announced cuts in the prices of 77 basic commodities, a 25 per cent increase in the minimum wage, a 10 per cent bonus for private sector workers and a range of improved social security benefits. He also announced the lifting of the state of martial law which had remained in force throughout the country since the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war (although it was reimposed on June 17 in the inhabited regions along Egypt's border with Libya in the light of continuing tension between the two countries).

In an earlier move to curb growing internal opposition to the Government, the People's Assembly on April 29 approved a code of ethics (known as the "Law of Shame") under which various forms of "anti-social" behaviour became punishable offences. Those accused of such offences—which included preaching anti-religious philosophy, inciting opposition to the state's economic, political and social system and disseminating "false" or "extremist" statements deemed to have damaged national unity or social peace—would be tried by a special tribunal headed by the Socialist Public Prosecutor and would be liable to imprisonment, fines, house arrest, suspension from political activity, dismissal from employment (in the case of state employees) and restrictions on overseas travel.

The full composition of the new Cabinet, which included seven new appointments excluding the President, was as follows [for previous list as of June 1979, see page 29999]:

Prime Minister. President Anwar el Sadat.

Deputy Prime Ministers. Dr Ahmed Fouad Mohieddin (Cabinet Affairs and Local Government, charged with presiding over cabinet meetings in the Prime Minister's absence, Minister of State for *Al-Azhar* Affairs); Gen. Kamel Hassan Ali* (Foreign Affairs); Mr Fikri Makram Ubayd* (People's Assembly Affairs); Gen. Mohammed Nabawi Ismail* (Interior and Services); Mr Ahmed Ezzedin Hassan Hilal* (Petroleum and Production); Dr Abderrazzak Abdel Meguid* (Economy, Finance and Planning).

Ministers. Gen. Ahmed Badawi (Defence and War Production); Dr (Mrs) Amal Osman* (Social Insurance, Minister of State for Social Affairs); Mr Hasaballah Mohammed al-Kafrawi* (Reconstruction, Minister of State for Housing and Land Reclamation); Mr Soleiman Metwali Soleiman* (Transport, Communications and Maritime Transport); Mr Mohammed Abdel Hadi Samahah* (Irrigation, Minister of State for Sudanese Affairs); Mr Ali Gamal al-Nazer* (Tourism and Civil Aviation); Mr Anwar Abdel Fattah Abu Sihli* (Justice); Mr Mohammed Taha Zaki (Industry and Mineral Resources); Mr Mohammed Mahir Osman Abazah (Electricity); Mr Ahmed Nouh (Supply and Internal Trade).

Ministers of State. Dr Mustapha Kamal Hilmi* (Education and Scientific Research); Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali* (Foreign Affairs); Dr Mahmoud Mohammed Daoud* (Agriculture and Food Sufficiency); Mr Saad Mohammed Ahmed* (Manpower and Vocational Training); Mr Mohammed Omar Abdel Akher* (People's Assembly Affairs); Mr Mansur Mohammed Manmoud Hassan* (Culture and Information); Dr Mamdouh Kamel Jabr* (Health); Dr Gamal al-Sayed Ibrahim (War Production); Dr Zakariya al-Barri (*Waqfs*).

*Member of outgoing Cabinet.

Dr Mohieddin (53), a former Governor of Alexandria, had held several ministerial portfolios in the 1970s, including those of Health and People's Assembly Affairs. At the time of his appointment he was chairman of the foreign affairs commission of the People's Assembly, to which he had first been elected in the Nasser era.

Earlier, on April 30, President Sadat had promoted the head of the Suez Canal Authority, Mr Manshur Ahmed Manshur, to the rank of Deputy Prime Minister and had extended his chairmanship of the authority's board of directors for a further two years.

In adjustments to the leadership of the ruling National Democratic Party announced on May 16, (i) Vice-President Mohammed Hosni Mubarek was appointed secretary-general *vice* Mr Ubayd, who became chairman of the party's permanent council, and (ii) Dr Khalil became deputy chairman responsible for foreign contacts.

In a series of military appointments on May 18, Lt.-Gen. Mohammed Abdel-Karim Abu Ghazalah (hitherto military attaché in the United States) was made Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in succession to Gen. Badawi (the new Minister of Defence and War Production), who had held the post since October 1978 [see page 29999].

In a national referendum held on May 22 the Egyptian electorate gave overwhelming approval to a series of amendments to the 1971 Constitution [for which see 25065 A] under which inter alia President Sadat would be able to serve an unlimited term, Islamic law became the principal source of legislation and provision was made for the creation of an elected Consultative Council. Official results showed that of 10,467,442 people who voted (about 87 per cent of those eligible), 10,339,055 (98.96 per cent of valid votes) had voted in favour and 108,657 against, while 19,730 votes had been invalid.

Under the main constitutional amendments (which had been adopted almost unanimously by the People's Assembly on April 30), (i) the stipulation that a President could not serve more than two successive six-year terms was amended to allow a President to be re-elected for "further terms", this change obviating the need for President Sadat (who had been re-elected for a second six-year term in September 1976 after having first become President in 1970—see 27985 C; 24261 A) to stand down in 1982; and (ii) the *Sharia* (Islamic legal code) was henceforth to be described as "the" principal source of law instead of "a" principal source. In addition, a new clause was added to the Constitution providing for an elected Consultative Council (*Shura*) which would have the role of advising on the preservation of the principles of the July 1952 and May 1971 revolutions [see 12361 A; 24653 A].

Three other constitutional amendments also adopted (partly in final implementation of principles approved in previous referendums held in May 1978 and April 1979—see pages 29430-31; 29999-30000) provided (i) for the deletion of the stipulation that all political activity must be exercised through the (now defunct) Arab Socialist Union, thus giving constitutional validity to the limited multi-party system already introduced in the late 1970s; (ii) for the country's basic system to be described as "socialist democratic" instead of "democratic socialist"; and (iii) for the creation of a "supreme press council", whose functions would include safeguarding the freedom of the press within the context of the press now being regarded as the country's "fourth authority" or estate.

Although the official results of the referendum appeared to show that the proposals had obtained support from Egypt's Coptic Christian community (estimated at about 10 per cent of the total population of some 42,000,000), reservations over the elevation of the status of Islamic law were expressed by Coptic leaders. These had intensified after President Sadat, in his May 14 speech to the People's Assembly, accused Pope Shenouda III and other Coptic clergy of seeking to partition Egypt and to set up a Christian state with Asyut (Upper Egypt) as its capital—a charge strongly denied by the Coptic leaders.

Whereas the change in the status of Islamic law was seen in part as reflecting the Government's desire to placate growing opposition from Islamic fundamentalist groups, the authorities took stern measures to quell extremist Moslem attacks on Christians in various parts of the country. At the same time, the Government sought to prevent the development of an alliance between Islamic extremists and left-wing opposition elements [see page 30000], many activists of both movements being arrested in the course of 1980.

Serious disturbances in Alexandria in mid-January 1980 following bomb attacks on two Christian churches had resulted in several deaths and the arrest of hundreds of Islamic militants (predominantly students) as well as the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate sectarian strife. Attempts by the authorities to ban extremist Moslem and Christian activities in the universities were largely unsuccessful, and violent demonstrations were mounted by Islamic fundamentalists in March 1980 in protest against the arrival in Egypt of the former Shah of Iran [see page 30527].

During 1980 arrests and trials were regularly reported of left-wing activists, notably members of the small opposition National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) and others accused of belonging to the banned Egyptian Communist Party. Moreover, on April 19, 1980, the Supreme State Security Court dealt with the remaining batch of detainees arrested in connexion with the January 1977 food price riots [see 28264 A], 20 persons said to be members of clandestine communist organizations being sentenced to prison terms of one to three years and a further 156 defendants being acquitted in what was interpreted as a measure of clemency. [For earlier trials arising out of the January 1977 disturbances, see pages 29433-34.]

In a further development, Gen. Saadeddin Shazli, the former Egyptian Army Chief of Staff whose impending court martial in absentia had been announced in October 1979 [see pages 30000-01], informed a press conference in Damascus on March 27, 1980, that he had formed a National Front of opposition forces with the objective of overthrowing the Sadat regime. However, it was reported in early July 1980 that Gen. Shazli had been "brought to Cairo" by Egyptian secret agents, who were also believed to have been responsible for the abduction of two other National Front members from Beirut the previous month.

In elections for the new Consultative Council held on Sept. 25, which were largely uncontested by the opposition parties, the ruling National Democratic Party won all 140 seats. The Council held the first session of its six-year term on Oct. 7. (Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) *(Prev. rep. 29998 B)*

A. MALAYSIA — Federal Cabinet Changes - Installation of Supreme Head of State

In federal government changes announced on Sept. 15, 1980, the Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein bin Onn, resumed responsibility for Defence (which he had previously held until July 1978—see page 29406) and relinquished responsibility for the Federal Territory, which was assumed by the former Minister of Defence, Datuk Amar Haji Abdul Taib bin Mahmud. Other changes were as follows:

(i) Datuk Abdul Manan bin Othman (hitherto Minister of Public Enterprises) was appointed Minister of Agriculture *vice* Datuk Shariff Ahmad, who became Minister of Land and Regional Development; (ii) Datin Paduka Rafidah Aziz (a Deputy Minister of Finance) was appointed Minister of Public Enterprises; (iii) Datuk Mokhtar Hashim (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) was appointed Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports; and (iv) Datuk Pengiran Othman bin Pengiran Haji Raof was appointed as an additional Minister without Portfolio in the Prime Minister's Department.

Ministers who left the Cabinet were Tan Sri Abdul Kadir bin Yusof (Land and Regional Development), Datuk Abdul Samad bin Idris (Culture, Youth and Sports), and also Datuk Sri Haji Hamzah bin Haji Abu Samah (Law), who was reported to have tendered his resignation on health grounds. The Ministry of Law was abolished.

All of those affected by the cabinet changes and most of those affected by the consequent changes among deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries were members of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant component of the National Front coalition. Among those appointed deputy ministers was Haji Suhaimi bin Datuk Haji Kamaruddin, the leader of the youth division of UMNO and the nephew of Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris, the former Chief Minister of Selangor who had been imprisoned for fraud, forgery and corruption in 1978 [see 29028 A]. In the July 1980 election for the leadership of the UMNO youth division some 42 per cent of the votes had been cast for Datuk Harun, and it was reported that Haji Suhaimi's subsequent appointment as a Deputy Minister of Agriculture arose partly from the UMNO leadership's desire to strengthen his position via-à-vis Datuk Harun's supporters within the party.

Tuanku Haji Ahmad Shah Al-Musta'in Billah Ibni Al-Mahrum Sultan Abu Bakar Ri'ayatuddin Al-Mu'adzam Shah, who had become Malaysia's *Yang di-Pertuan Agong* (Supreme Head of State) in early 1979 [see 29704 A; 29604 D], was ceremonially installed in office on July 10, 1980.—(Malaysian High Commission, London - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Times - Standard Chartered Review) *(Prev. rep. Cabinet 30314 A, 29405 A; Monarchy 29704 A)*

B. CANADA — Federal By-election

A federal by-election in the Ontario constituency of Hamilton West on Sept. 8 resulted in the Liberal Party winning the seat from the Progressive Conservatives, the voting figures being as follows: Dr Stanley Hudecki (Liberal) 12,617, Mrs Jacqueline Isbester (Progressive Conservative) 9,971, Mrs Marion Simpson (New Democratic Party) 8,264—Liberal majority 2,646. The by-election had been caused by the resignation of Mr Lincoln Alexander, a former Minister of Labour [see 29767 A], on being appointed chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board of Ontario. At the general election on Feb. 18, 1980, Mr Alexander had a majority over Dr Hudecki of 520. Dr Hudecki is an orthopaedic surgeon.

Party strengths in the Canadian House of Commons following the by-election were: Liberals 148; Progressive Conservatives 102; New Democrats 32.—(Globe and Mail, Toronto) *(Prev. rep. 1980 General Election 30290 A)*

A. COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE — 34th Session - Energy Supply Problems

The 34th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) was held in Prague on June 17-19, 1980, and was attended by the Prime Ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and also by a Vice-Chairman of the Cuban Council of Ministers, Sr Carlos Rafael Rodríguez Rodríguez. A delegation was present from Yugoslavia, which had associate status, and observers from Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Laos, Mozambique and South Yemen also attended.

As at the 33rd session in 1979 [see 29845 A], the main topic of debate was energy supplies during the 1980s. The Soviet Union, which provided its CMEA partners with most of their oil needs at about half the world market price, gave a guarantee that it would supply them with nearly 400,000,000 tonnes of crude oil over the next five-year plan period (1981-85).

While this appeared to be considerably less than the 20 per cent increase anticipated in 1979 by the Soviet Premier, Mr Alexei Kosygin, over and above the 370,000,000 tonnes supplied for the 1976-80 period [ibid.], a Soviet economic expert, Prof. Oleg Bogomolov (of the Institute of World Socialist Economics), said in articles in August and September that the USSR would hold to its promised increase of 20 per cent but that most of this would be in the form of other energy sources such as electricity and natural gas. Prof. Bogomolov also predicted that by 1990 the USSR would be supplying the other Comecon countries with only 50 per cent of their oil needs, but he dismissed US forecasts that Soviet oil production would start to decline after reaching a peak of 606,000,000 tonnes in 1980. [For Soviet oil production in 1978-79, see 30563 A.]

Opening the session the Czechoslovakian Premier, Mr Lubomir Strougal, said that the main targets of the 1976-80 plan had been attained and he urged closer co-operation between member states to meet the "new and more exacting" economic and technological demands over the coming years. Subsequently Mr Rudolf Rohlicek (Czechoslovakia), the current chairman of the CMEA Executive Committee, reported on the Council's activity since the last session, stating that the co-ordination of individual states' five-year plans for 1981-85 had reached its final stage, that the principal guidelines for scientific and technological co-operation up to 1990 had been laid down, and that it was now necessary to draft a plan for solving fuel and energy problems for the year 2000 onwards. The role of nuclear power and co-operation in this field was, he said, increasing.

Despite the favourable assessment by Mr Strougal of Comecon's achievements during 1976-80, and a statement by Mr Kosygin on June 17 that the Soviet Union expected its own national income and industrial output to exceed the 1975 level by 21 and 25 per cent respectively by the end of that period [see also 28146 A and 30112 B], other sources reported that the overall national income (equivalent to gross national product) of the Comecon countries had grown by only 2.5 per cent in 1979 (compared with 5 per cent in 1978 and a projected target of 4.4 per cent for 1979) and that industrial output had increased by only 3.6 per cent in 1979 compared with 5.5 per cent in 1978. The total projected growth for the 1976-80 period was 30 per cent, but figures for the first four years of this period showed a growth of only 19 per cent, much of this deficiency being attributed to bad winters in the European CMEA countries in 1978-79 [see also 29845 A] as well as to a poor economic performance on the part of the Soviet Union, whose growth for 1979 amounted to less than 2 per cent.

In his speech on June 17 Mr Kosygin said that in seeking to solve the problems of energy, fuel and raw materials supplies the CMEA had not hitherto permitted "uncontrolled price changes in our reciprocal trade" but that it was "only natural" within the co-ordinated economic framework of the CMEA to "take into account the objective factors in the change of the world energy and raw materials situation, the increased cost of producing fuels and raw materials, and the availability of these resources". He said that Comecon considered its most important tasks to be the implementation of long-term co-operation programmes, the search for further reserves and the improvement of the structure of joint production and of consumption. In the 1980s production and scientific and technical progress would have to be accelerated and more stringency imposed in the use of energy and materials.

Mr Kosygin said that during 1981-85 Soviet trade with its CMEA partners would increase by some 40 per cent and would be worth some 260,000 million roubles (about $400,000 million at current official rates of exchange); deliveries of crude oil would be maintained "at the high level attained in 1980", reaching 400,000,000 tonnes, and the Soviet Union anticipated delivering large amounts of iron ore, rolled and non-ferrous metals, cotton and other products. In return, the CMEA countries would supply the Soviet Union with equipment worth 60,000 million roubles for oil refining and the transport, computer and food industries, as well as "necessary goods" worth 40,000 million roubles.

[Soviet trade with its CMEA partners rose in 1979 by 6.5 per cent to a value of 41,700 million roubles. However, the CMEA countries' share of total Soviet foreign trade fell to 52 per cent in that year (from 56 per cent in 1978), reflecting higher prices paid by the West for Soviet raw materials. Protocols signed for 1980 between the USSR and individual Comecon countries showed a projected rise in the value of bilateral trade (for example, by 11 per cent in the case of Soviet-East German trade) but this increase would, it was believed, be accounted for by an imminent increase in the price of Soviet oil. The CMEA countries' debt to the West at the end of 1979 amounted to $65,000 million—a 10.2 per cent increase over the 1978 figure. The Soviet debt to the West was estimated at the end of 1978 at between $17,000 million and $20,000 million, while Poland was reported to have debts of a similar magnitude—see also 30297 A.]

Mr Kosygin added that "recent experiences" showed that imperialist forces were trying to undermine economic co-operation between the West and the Eastern bloc by violating existing agreements, but that the Soviet Union would never yield to economic pressure from the USA; economic sanctions might hamper certain projects temporarily but would never prevent Eastern Europe from reaching its economic goals. [For US and other sanctions against the USSR in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis, see 30229 A and page 30387.]

The Romanian Prime Minister, Mr Ilie Verdet, said in his speech that Romania had failed to solve its own crude oil import problems within the CMEA framework and had been forced to seek its sources of supply in countries outside the Council. He emphasized, however, that Romania was prepared to co-operate in joint efforts to capitalize on the CMEA's fuel and energy resources [see also page 30337].

Romania had in 1979 for the first time bought oil from the Soviet Union, amounting to some 400,000 tonnes, and was believed to have been allocated 1,000,000 tonnes for 1980.

Iran on April 23 [see also page 30531] announced an agreement to sell Romania 100,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd)—a 60 per cent increase on the current volume supplied—at the full current cash price of $35 per barrel (rather than in exchange for goods). Iran also signed bilateral economic co-operation and trade agreements with Czechoslovakia (on April 18) and East Germany (on April 23), an industrial protocol with the USSR on June 20, and an agreement with Bulgaria on July 6 under which the latter's imports of Iranian oil were doubled to 40,000 bpd.

Romania on June 26 signed a five-year trade protocol with East Germany during a three-day visit to Bucharest by Herr Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Under the agreement, two-way trade was to rise over the five years by at least 40 per cent, i.e. to a minimum of $8,750 million, with provision for a further increase to $10,500 million.

In line with other Hungarian calls over recent months for a reform of Comecon structures, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr György Lázár, said in his speech on June 18 that the accounting and credit systems of the CMEA must be improved.

A communiqué was adopted at the end of the session which, as well as reiterating many of the themes dealt with in delegates' speeches, also noted (i) that intergovernmental agreements had been signed on improving oil refining processes and on co-operation for the accelerated development of science and technology in Cuba and (ii) that Afghanistan had been accepted as an observer at Comecon meetings. A long-term agreement was also signed on the development of computer technology and micro-processors which would be worth an estimated 15,000 million roubles in mutual deliveries in the near future.

Agreement between Romania and Neighbours on Petrol Sales to Tourists

The disputes between Romania and its East European neighbours arising from the restrictive measures imposed in 1979 by Romania on the purchase of petrol by tourists on its territory [see pages 29846-47] were reported in April 1980 to have been largely solved when most of the countries involved agreed to recompense Romania with goods for petrol bought by their nationals with coupons.—(Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin) (*Prev. rep. 29845 A; Economic Details (Hungary) 30413 A, (Poland) 30297 A, (Romania) 30336 A, (USSR) 30112 B*)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro
DEC 18 1980

A. UGANDA — Assumption of Power by Military Commission - Appointment of New Interim Government - Election Campaign - Postponement of Polling - Famine in Karamoja Region

It was announced in the Ugandan capital of Kampala on May 13, 1980, that President Binaisa had been relieved of his authority the previous day by the Military Commission of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF—see 30279 A; page 29671), and in the succeeding days a new Government was established under the leadership of Mr Paulo Muwanga, the chairman of the Military Commission (and former Minister of Labour—see 30279 A). Mr Muwanga stated on May 19 that this Government was interim in character and was committed to holding general elections, for which four parties began active campaigning in June; however, it was officially acknowledged on Sept. 18 that an election timetable providing for polling on Sept. 30 could not be implemented, and a new timetable was announced with polling scheduled for Dec. 10, 1980. These and other developments are described below.

Assumption of Power by Military Commission - Appointment of New Government

The assumption of power by the Military Commission on May 12 followed a military takeover of the Uganda Radio offices on May 10 and the broadcasting of announcements in the name of the Military Commission, repudiating a decision by President Binaisa to dismiss Brig. David Oyite-Ojok, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

President Binaisa, who was reported to have made brief visits to Kenya and the Sudan before announcing this decision on May 10, had justified the dismissal of Brig. Oyite-Ojok (whom he appointed as ambassador to Algeria) in terms of bad relations between the armed forces and the civilian population, and a general deterioration in the security situation (with press reports referring to a "wave of terror" in Kampala in April and early May, and to looting and killing by Ugandan soldiers supposedly conducting a search for illegally-held weapons on May 2). However, Brig. Oyite-Ojok (and also Mr Muwanga) were reportedly among the supporters of former President Dr Milton Obote (President from 1966 to 1971), who opposed President Binaisa's intention of holding elections within a one-party UNLF framework rather than as a direct contest between individual parties [see page 30281]. A proposal to this effect (which was also opposed by those intending to contest the elections as the Democratic Party—see below) had been passed on April 18 by the National Consultative Council (NCC—for formation and expansion of which see pages 29837; 30280) by 50 votes to 19 (with over 50 NCC members absent), and a ban on all political gatherings was announced on May 4; this was described as an empty threat by Dr Obote, who said in Tanzania on May 7 that he would return to Uganda on May 27 and begin work on organizing his Uganda People's Congress (UPC) for the forthcoming elections.

From May 10 onwards, Mr Binaisa remained at the President's official residence at Entebbe, guarded by Tanzanian troops (it being stated on May 22 that he had been removed to other accommodation where he was kept under house arrest), while reports on May 13 stated that Ugandan soldiers under the leadership of Brig. Oyite-Ojok were in full control of Kampala. A statement signed by Mr Muwanga as chairman of the Military Commission was issued on May 13, declaring that the Binaisa Government had been dissolved, that executive authority would be entrusted to a Presidential Commission, and that the new Government would allow individual parties to contest an election campaign.

In this statement, Mr Binaisa's Government was accused of corruption and of promoting tribalism, as well as of degrading and ridiculing the armed forces. Mr Muwanga said on May 15 that the Military Commission had felt compelled to act against what he described as arbitrary and dishonest rule, but that this action did not constitute a military coup since the Commission was a political body, which had been set up at the founding conference of the UNLF at Moshi (Tanzania) in March 1979 [see page 29671]. The members of the Commission were (in addition to Mr Muwanga) Mr Yoweri Museveni, the vice-chairman (and former Minister of Regional Co-Operation and previously of Defence—see pages 29672; 30280), Brig. Oyite-Ojok, Maj.-Gen. Tito Okello (the commander of the Uganda National Liberation Army—see page 29672), Col. William Omaria (former Deputy Minister of Defence—see page 30280) and Col. Zeddi Maruru; it was reported on May 13 that the Commission was to be expanded to include all the army battalion commanders.

The Military Commission issued on May 18 a declaration entitled "Legal Notice Number One" proclaiming the powers of the new Government.

The declaration stated that the Military Commission would appoint a Presidential Commission of three persons, and that this body would exercise executive power through a Cabinet of Ministers, appointed by the Presidential Commission in accordance with the advice of the Military Commission. The Military Commission would direct the Cabinet on all matters of policy; cabinet meetings would be held under the chairmanship of the chairman of the Military Commission (i.e. Mr Muwanga) and all members of the Military Commission would be entitled to participate. Legislative powers were vested in the NCC, but legislation would require the assent of the Presidential Commission (which could in turn be overruled by the Military Commission). The proclamation also stated that (i) legal actions could not be brought in respect of actions associated with the assumption of power by the Military Commission, and (ii) any person having held political office under former President Amin (between Jan. 25, 1971, and June 3, 1979) was debarred from participation in the interim Government, with the exception of members of the Military Commission (Mr Muwanga having himself been a Foreign Ministry official and subsequently ambassador to Paris before going into exile in London in 1975).

Also published on May 18 was the composition of a new Cabinet, in meetings of which the members of the Military Commission had the right to participate [see above] although without specific ministerial responsibilities. Incorporating subsequent minor adjustments [see below], the new Cabinet comprised 11 new members and 13 members of the previous Government, as follows:

Dr David Anyoti . .	. . Information and Broadcasting
Mr Eriya Kategaya . .	. . Commerce
Mr John Luwuzila Kirunda	. . Labour
Mr Masete Kuuya . .	. . Rehabilitation
Mr Ntege-Lubwama . .	. . Health
Mr Kintu Musoke . .	. . Transport
Dr B. A. Obonyo . .	. . Industry
Mr Lawrence Sebalu . .	. . Finance
Mr Samuel Tewungwa . .	. . Internal Affairs
Mr Ado Tiberondwa . .	. . Culture and Community Development
* Mr Ephraim Kamuntu . .	. . Tourism and Wildlife
* Mr James Obua-Otuwa	. . Co-operatives and Marketing
* Dr Albert Picho Owiny	. . Regional Co-operation
†Mr Otema Alimadi . .	. . Foreign Affairs
†Mr Stephen Omoding Ariko	. . Justice
†Mrs Edna Namirembe Bidamazire	. . Education
†Dr Tarsis Kabwegyere . .	. . Lands and Natural Resources
Mr Sam Mugwisha . .	. . Agriculture
†Dr E. R. Nkwasibe . .	. . Animal Industry and Fisheries
†Mr Anthony Ocaya . .	. . Planning and Economic Development
†Mr Wilson Okwenje . .	. . Public Service and Cabinet Affairs
†Mr Akena Pojok . .	. . Posts and Telecommunications
†Mr Bidandi Sali	. . Local Administration
†Mr Abraham Waligo . .	. . Works and Housing

* Held different portfolio in previous Government.

† Held same or similar portfolio in previous Government.

Mr Mugwisha was appointed as Minister of Agriculture on May 19 *vice* Mr Mathias Ngobi, who was transferred to the post of Minister for Presidential Affairs (from which he later resigned on June 26, reportedly for family reasons). Also on May 19, (i) Dr M. Apiligar and Mr Raphael Bidamazire were appointed as Ministers of State in the Office of the Military Commission, (ii) three special assistants to the Military Commission were appointed with responsibility respectively for economic, political and diplomatic affairs, and (iii) 15 deputy ministers were appointed.

The members of the Presidential Commission, whose appointment by the Military Commission was announced on May 22, were Mr Saulo Musoke and Mr Policarp Nyamuchoncho (both senior judges) and Mr Yoweri Wacha-Olwol (a civil servant).

Attitudes of Tanzanian, Kenyan and Sudanese Governments

According to press reports on May 17, Mr Binaisa sent letters appealing for assistance to the Governments of the Sudan, the United Kingdom and the United States at the time of the Military Commission's assumption of power, and asserting that President Nyerere of Tanzania was "aiding and abetting the rebels". Prof. Yusuf Lule, who was Mr Binaisa's predecessor as President of Uganda from April to June 1979 [see 29669 A; 29837 A], said in Nairobi (Kenya) on May 18 that the Government of Tanzania could have prevented a coup (some 10,000 Tanzanian troops still being stationed in Uganda—see 30279 A) and that it thus bore some of the responsibility for what had taken place.

Press reports indicated that, while the Tanzanian Government denied having had prior knowledge of events in Uganda, President Nyerere had insisted at a meeting with leaders of the Military Commission on May 16-17 in Arusha (Tanzania) that the new interim Government should remain committed to holding elections, and also that there should be no political trials of former regime members.

The Tanzanian resident Minister in Uganda (and Minister of State in the Tanzanian Cabinet), Mr Hussein Shekilango, and a senior Tanzanian consular official in Kampala, were killed in an air crash when returning to Tanzania on May 11. In another development Mr Edward Rugumayo and Mr Omwony Ojok, then chairman and secretary respectively of the NCC, who were both in Tanzania at the time of the Military Commission's assumption of power in Uganda, reportedly rejected an appeal by the Military Commission for all NCC members to attend a meeting on May 22.

President Moi of Kenya announced on June 1 that he would discuss the situation in Uganda at a meeting on June 6 in Arusha with President Nyerere, President Nemery of the Sudan, and Ugandan leaders. However, President Moi said on June 5 that he would not attend this meeting after all since it was "not opportune"; this was widely interpreted as a reaction to the Tanzanian Government's refusal to invite former Presidents Lule and Binaisa to the meeting. At the Arusha meeting, which included Mr Muwanga and Brig. Oyite-Ojok, President Nyerere reportedly rejected proposals made by President Nemery for an agreement on the release of Mr Binaisa and the withdrawal of Tanzanian troops from Uganda.

President Nemery flew from Arusha to Nairobi (with Mr Rugumayo and Mr Omwony Ojok also travelling on the same plane as the Sudanese delegation) to meet President Moi on June 7. A joint communiqué issued after their meeting called for the release of Mr Binaisa and the holding of free and fair elections in Uganda, and expressed concern that the existing Ugandan interim Government might not observe a proper electoral neutrality (it having been widely reported that the Military Commission and the new Government were dominated by supporters of Dr Obote). Subsequent Kenyan press articles, calling for the replacement of Tanzanian forces in Uganda by an international force to ensure that elections were free and fair, gave rise to mutual recriminations between Tanzanian and Kenyan government spokesmen during July. However, after President Nyerere had met with Uganda Democratic Party (DP) representatives on July 27, Mr Benjamin Mkapa, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, went to Uganda in early August, reportedly to investigate allegations that the Ugandan Government was not acting impartially in its organization of the elections.

Election Campaign and Postponement of Polling

Four parties having declared their intention of contesting the elections, it was agreed between the party leaders and the Military Commission (as reported on June 23) that the formation of additional parties would not be permitted, and that an Electoral Commission should organize and supervise electoral preparations and polling (which was scheduled for Sept. 30).

The four parties were (i) the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), a socialist-inclined party formed in 1960 by Dr Obote [see 17802 A] which was Uganda's ruling party from independence in 1962 [see 19033 A] until Maj.-Gen. Idi Amin's military coup in 1971 [see 24450 A], (ii) the Democratic Party (DP), predominantly Roman Catholic and conservative in outlook, which had been the official opposition party from independence until it was banned in 1969 [see 23792 A], (iii) the Conservative Party (CP), formed at Moshi in March 1979 [see page 29671] and led by Mr J. Mayanja-Nkangi, a former Prime Minister of the then Kingdom of Buganda (central Uganda—see map on page 29672) from 1964 to 1966 [see 20656 A; 21429 A], and (iv) the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), formed on June 5, 1980, by Mr Museveni.

Dr Obote returned on May 27 from Tanzania to Uganda, where he was welcomed by a large crowd and officially greeted by Mr Alimadi on behalf of the Government; Dr Obote held his first (UPC) election rally in Kampala on June 8.

The anticipated return to Uganda of Prof. Lule (scheduled for June 17) led to speculation that he would be chosen as the DP presidential candidate (and also provoked violent incidents in Kampala in which 14 of his supporters were reportedly killed by soldiers). However, Prof. Lule cancelled his intended return when on June 17 the Military Commission imposed conditions described by him as unacceptable, namely that he should "clear up some of his former statements" which had allegedly incited people against the Tanzanian Army and against certain Ugandan leaders. In the absence of Prof. Lule, Mr Paul Semogerere (47), an NCC member and former cabinet minister [see 29837 A and also 30279 A], was then elected by the DP as its presidential candidate.

Allegations that the UPC was being favoured in election preparations led to a confrontation within the NCC and the Cabinet on Sept. 16-17, following which a new election timetable was announced.

Mr Muwanga on Sept. 17 called for the resignation of 11 ministers and deputy ministers who had opposed the Military Commission's proposals for election procedure in a debate in the NCC the previous day. Following a meeting between Mr Muwanga and Mr Semogerere on Sept. 18 it was announced that those concerned would not be required to resign after all, and that they would in future abide by the principle of collective government responsibility; however, DP and UPM members of the NCC boycotted its meetings and demanded the annulment of legislation passed in their absence (notably relating to the number of parliamentary seats allocated to each region in the forthcoming elections).

The Electoral Commission announced on Sept. 18 a timetable for election preparations leading to polling on Dec. 10; meanwhile a Commonwealth delegation arrived in Kampala on Sept. 17 to discuss Commonwealth assistance in the organization of these elections.

In the Karamoja region of northern Uganda, which was experiencing with particular severity a famine extending across parts of northern Kenya, southern Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, the distribution of international food relief was reportedly hampered by a breakdown of security and by the alleged manipulation of the allocation of supplies by the Ugandan authorities for party political reasons. UN relief operations were suspended in July, but resumed in mid-August after the Ugandan Government promised better protection for food lorry convoys; in the latter connexion a French military contingent was sent to the area to assure improved security for the disbursement of French Government aid.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Cape Times - Africa Confidential - Africa - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30279 A*)

A. THE COMMONWEALTH — Second Meeting of Asian and Pacific Heads of Government

Heads of government of Commonwealth countries in the Asia-Pacific region held their second regional summit conference in New Delhi from Sept. 4 to 8, 1980, under the chairmanship of the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi.

In addition to the 12 countries represented at the first such meeting in Sydney in February 1978 [see 28931 A]—namely Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Malaysia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Western Samoa—the 1980 meeting was also attended by the heads of government of Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Vanuatu, which had all become Commonwealth members upon their attainment of independence [see 29371 A; 29427 A; 30187 A; and also 30321 A]. (Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides, became the 44th member of the Commonwealth on July 30, 1980.)

In a final communiqué issued on Sept. 8, the 16 heads of government "welcomed the valuable opportunity provided by this meeting to discuss in an informal atmosphere matters of common interest to them, including problems of a global nature". The wider topics discussed were listed in the communiqué under the following headings: world and regional political trends; the Indian Ocean; Afghanistan; Kampuchea; refugees; the South Pacific; Zimbabwe; the Middle East; the international economic situation; trade policy; commodities and the [UNCTAD] Common Fund; and economic and technical co-operation among developing countries.

On the **Indian Ocean**, concern was expressed over the "further build-up of great-power military presence" in the area "despite the expressed wishes of the littoral and hinterland states", and a renewed call was made for the creation of a "zone of peace".

On **Afghanistan** [see 30381 A; 30362 A; 30229 A], the heads of government, while noting that "there were differing perceptions as to the circumstances leading up to the present situation", expressed their "full support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and other countries of the region" and "urged the concerned parties to work towards a settlement which would ensure that the Afghan people would determine their own destiny free from foreign interference and intervention".

On **Kampuchea** [see 29613 A], the communiqué stated that "to bring about durable peace and stability in South-East Asia there was an urgent need for a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem which would ensure the sovereignty, independence and neutrality of Kampuchea'', and in particular for ''the withdrawal of foreign forces from that country''.

On the **South Pacific,** the heads of government ''agreed that it was vital for the peace and stability of the region that all peoples of the South Pacific were afforded the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination as laid down in the United Nations Charter''.

On the **international economic situation** the heads of government endorsed the recommendation of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues [i.e. the Brandt Commission—see 30457 A] ''for a limited and representative informal summit'' on current issues. They also drew attention to the recent Commonwealth report on similar matters [see 30456 A], and commended in particular its ''innovative approach to the recycling process'' in the international monetary system ''for urgent consideration by the international community''.

It was reported that the wording of the sections of the communiqué dealing with Afghanistan and Kampuchea was based on a compromise necessitated by the Indian Government's policy of refraining from direct public condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan [see pages 30382; 30240; 30237] and by its recent recognition (in early July 1980) of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin Government in Kampuchea.

However, other heads of government attending the conference, including notably the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew (speaking in open session), criticized the respective roles of the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the strongest terms, and these heads of government were understood to have insisted that there was full discussion of such issues despite the Indian Government's apparent wish that the conference should concentrate largely on questions of economic and functional co-operation.

The text of the second half of the communiqué, dealing with specific Commonwealth regional issues, is summarized below.

Regional Trade. The heads of government ''noted with concern that protectionism was on the increase, particularly against the labour-intensive or lower-cost exports of countries of the region'', and urged developed countries to ''make a determined effort to liberalize trade through the adoption of positive adjustment policies''. In accepting the recommendations in the report of the consultative group on trade [established under Australian chairmanship at the Sydney meeting—see 28931 A], the heads of government paid particular attention to its reference to ''the long-standing and persistent protectionist policies of the major industrialized countries against competitive exports of industrial and agricultural products of member countries of the region''.

Recognizing that economic co-operation between member countries needed to be strengthened as part of the process of improving access to developed country markets, they agreed ''on the need for the consultative group to examine and report on measures to facilitate the liberalization of trade within the region''; they also decided that the group's terms of reference should be broadened ''to include economic development issues in order that the potential for development of member countries may be explored in a more effective manner''.

Industrial Co-operation. Recognizing ''the importance of mutual co-operation in the industrial development of the region'', the heads of government ''noted with satisfaction the establishment of the Industrial Development Unit (IDU) within the Commonwealth Secretariat'' [under the aegis of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation—see page 29906]. They also (i) ''acknowledged the need for making special efforts for the industrial development of small island developing countries in the region''; (ii) ''noted that the Asian Development Bank and the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation would be undertaking an industrial survey to identify projects to enable island countries to take advantage of the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Agreement''; and (iii) decided to set up a working group on industry (with Papua New Guinea acting as convenor) with a view to providing ''a means of continuing mutual co-operation in industrial development of the region and a continuing forum for the exchange of ideas among member countries''.

Energy. Underlining the ''crucial character'' which the question of energy had now assumed in the global scene, the heads of government endorsed the report of the consultative group on energy [co-ordinated by India] and welcomed the establishment of the Regional Renewable Energy Resources Information System. They agreed that the group ''should intensify its activity in the period ahead and not only continue to stress the issues identified in the Sydney communiqué but also examine new initiatives for wider utilization of renewable energy technologies, including technology transfer on mutually beneficial terms''. They also agreed that the scope of the group's activities should be widened to include certain aspects of conventional energy.

Agricultural Research and Development. The heads of government agreed that ''with the prospect of an increasing imbalance between food supplies and population growth'' and in view of the overwhelming dependence of many countries of the region on agricultural exports for foreign-exchange earnings, ''a greater co-operative effort in this area would be both timely and beneficial''. Having considered a number of proposals put forward by President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh, the heads of government requested the Commonwealth Secretary-General to appoint an expert study group drawn from the countries of the region ''to examine and recommend a programme of action designed to establish purposeful collaboration among countries of the region, increase and diversify agricultural production and processing, and alleviate rural poverty through agricultural development, including the development of fisheries''.

Illicit Drugs. The heads of government reviewed the report of the working group on illicit drugs [co-ordinated by Malaysia] and ''recognized that drug abuse on a pervasive scale threatened the security, stability and resilience of a nation''. They reiterated ''the need to foster closer co-operation and to explore the possibility of enacting fresh legislation or amending the existing legislation, where necessary, for the effective implementation of the working group's recommendations within the framework of the existing international and regional agencies'', and agreed that the group should be reconvened at least once a year.

Terrorism. The report of the working group on terrorism [co-ordinated by Singapore] was reviewed and endorsed by the heads of government, who ''commended the degree of co-operation which was evident from the interchange among officials'' and ''agreed that regional member countries should take appropriate action in the light of recommendations of the group and keep in close touch during forthcoming deliberations on this subject in relevant international bodies''.

Assistance for Small Island Developing States. The heads of government ''commended the desire of Pacific island countries for greater self-reliance through increased mutual co-operation among themselves'' and welcomed their initiative for a Pacific Regional Advisory Service proposed at the Honolulu Conference in March 1980 [see below], through which they ''would assist each other in providing for their need for specialist skills and other manpower requirements''.

[A regional conference on Pacific development issues had been held from March 26 to 29, 1980, in Honolulu (Hawaii) under the auspices of the Centre for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West (the ''East-West Centre'', founded in 1960 ''to promote understanding among the peoples of Asia, the Pacific area and the United States through cultural and technical interchange''). Countries and territories represented were American Samoa; Australia; Canada; the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas; Cook Islands; Fiji; France; Guam; Hawaii; Japan; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna; New Hebrides; New Zealand; Norfolk Island; Palau; Solomon Islands; Tonga; Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; Tuvalu; the United Kingdom; the United States; and Western Samoa. Delegates or observers were also present representing the South Pacific Commission, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation and various other interested agencies and organizations. The conference agreed to establish (i) a programme planning committee, made up of government officials from seven of the participating Pacific territories, to draw up strategies for co-ordinated action on problems of rural development, urbanization, transport and communications, regional co-operation, trade restrictions, skilled manpower shortages, population pressures, development assistance, and energy costs and supplies, and (ii) a six-member ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, to review follow-up actions on a six-monthly basis. A further general conference was planned for 1981.]

Other Matters. The heads of government also (i) emphasized that all regional programmes outlined at the meeting should be ''developed in close collaboration with the Secretariat . . . to ensure maximum harmonization with other relevant Commonwealth activities''; (ii) ''recognized that if the impetus of the programme for regional co-operation is to be maintained, additional resources will be required by the Commonwealth Secretariat and in particular the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation''; and (iii) ''expressed the view that regional co-operation should allow for co-operation with non-Commonwealth countries and organizations''.

Follow-up. The heads of government ''agreed on the need to continue and strengthen the liaison facilities required to ensure appropriate follow-up action and requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with member countries and subject to the availability of resources, to make available the necessary liaison facilities''.

It was agreed to hold the next Commonwealth regional summit meeting in Fiji in 1982.—(Commonwealth Secretariat, London - Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Pacific Islands Monthly) (*Prev. rep. 28931 A*)

A. ETHIOPIA — Internal Political and Security Developments - Continuing Conflict in Eritrea - Further Hostilities on Somali Border - Foreign Relations

Steps towards the creation of a mass political party in Ethiopia [see pages 30018; 29358] were taken on Dec. 18, 1979, with the formal proclamation by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) that a Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) had been constituted. Appointments to COPWE were reportedly made in January 1980, and the names of its officials were published at the conclusion of the first COPWE congress in Addis Ababa on June 16-19, 1980.

Lt.-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian head of state, became chairman of the COPWE executive committee, to which he then nominated six further members, all of whom were also members of the PMAC Standing Committee, namely Capt. Fikre Selassie Wogderess (the PMAC secretary-general, whose last name has previously been given as Wodgeress), Capt. Legesse Asfaw, Lt.-Col. Fisseha Desta (the PMAC assistant secretary-general, who had been appointed on Jan. 2, 1980, as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and not as its senior Minister, as indicated in 30158 A, the latter post having been retained by Ato Hailu Yemenu), Brig. Tesfaye Gebre Kidan (who had on Jan. 2 been appointed as Minister of Defence—ibid.), Lt.-Col. Berhanu Bayih and Lt.-Col. Addis Tedla.

Other organs of COPWE included a 93-member standing committee, a series of subcommittees (concerned with ideology, organization, discipline and control, foreign affairs, mass association affairs, nationalities, justice, defence, finance, and political affairs within the armed forces), an editorial board and a general assembly reportedly comprising some 1,500 delegates. The standing committee included some 30 PMAC members and the majority of the members of the Council of Ministers, including Maj. Girma Yilma, the Minister of Information and National Guidance, and also Cdr. Lemma Gutema, the former Minister of the Interior (these two having been the alleged victims of a bomb attack in September 1979—ibid.).

After illegal pamphlets had reportedly been circulated in Addis Ababa, the country's capital, claiming that certain appointments to COPWE had been based more on personal loyalty to Lt.-Col. Mengistu than on ideological credentials, a number of arrests were made in February 1980.

Lt.-Col. Demesie Deresa, a member of the PMAC central committee, was subsequently sentenced on July 11 to 20 years' imprisonment for corruption, as was another PMAC member, while four other officials received death sentences for counter-revolutionary activities. It was noted that numerous other officials reportedly arrested in February (including Ato Zegeye Asfaw, the then Minister of Justice) belonged mostly to the Oromo ethnic group, and that an Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was involved in increasing guerrilla activity in southern Ethiopia. The OLF was said to have links with liberation movements in Tigre province, in Eritrea and in the Ogaden, and an OLF office had been opened in Mogadishu (Somalia) in January.

In government appointments announced by the PMAC on Aug. 25, 1980, Ato Getachew Kibret became Minister of Law and Justice, and Ato Abebe Kebede became Minister of Domestic Trade.

With fighting continuing both in Eritrea and in the Ogaden region [see below], the Ethiopian Government also faced an insurgent campaign of growing intensity in Tigre province south of Eritrea, where guerrillas of the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) claimed to control most of the countryside and also to have captured a number of towns during January-August 1980 [see also 30015 A].

Towns reported captured, according to TPLF communiqués released in Khartoum (Sudan), included Alomata (south of Tigre in Wollo province on the Adigrat-Addis Ababa road) in January, Enticcio (in northern Tigre between Adigrat and Adowa) in February, Hauzien (between Adigrat and Makalle) in July and Abi Addi (between Makalle and Axum) in August. TPLF communiqués claimed that the Ethiopian forces, using sophisticated Soviet-supplied equipment allegedly including Mi-24 helicopter gunships, had mounted a series of unsuccessful offensives and had suffered heavy casualties, notably in March and September; the TPLF also claimed to have held the town of Axum for nine hours on July 12-13 and to have captured two Soviet doctors during this action.

Military Successes by Eritrean Secessionists - Disputes among Factions - Improvement in Ethiopian Relations with the Sudan

The northern town of Nakfa, to which the secessionist Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) had been driven back in late 1978 [see 30015 A], was successfully defended by EPLF forces in late 1979 against a renewed Ethiopian Government two-pronged offensive from the south and from the Red Sea port of Marsa Taklai (near the Sudanese border). In heavy fighting in December 1979 and January 1980, the Ethiopian forces were compelled to withdraw south to Afabet and to evacuate from Marsa Taklai, reportedly with the assistance of Soviet naval vessels.

This development was reportedly followed by a lull in the fighting in Eritrea, although (i) fighting was reported in the Danekil area north of Assab in February, (ii) the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Command (ELF-RC), which had in 1979 agreed with the EPLF on the establishment of a joint command [ibid., but see also below], claimed in April to have conducted successful attacks on Ethiopian forces near Asmara, and (iii) the EPLF claimed further successes in ambush attacks in July. Meanwhile in a statement on Aug. 4 the EPLF alleged that Ethiopian forces reported to be regrouping at Asmara were being re-equipped with Soviet supplies including Mi-24 helicopter gunships, tanks, jet aircraft and nerve gas and other chemical warfare agents.

Alleged friction between secessionist groups, leading to clashes in April and August 1980 between ELF-RC forces on the one hand and EPLF and TPLF units on the other, was reportedly connected with the question of opening negotiations with the Ethiopian Government on the future of Eritrea. [For description of the main groups, see page 29357 and map on page 28422.]

Mr Ahmed Nasser, the ELF-RC leader, said in Beirut (Lebanon) on April 4 that his organization would "settle for nothing short of self-determination and negotiations without prior conditions"; he reaffirmed his rejection of proposals for regional autonomy first put forward by the Ethiopian Government in May 1976 [see 27912 B]. Both the ELF-RC and the EPLF remained publicly committed to a memorandum reportedly presented jointly by them to President Jaafar Mohammed al-Nemery of the Sudan in November 1979, demanding recognition of the two organizations as sole legitimate representatives of the Eritrean people, and acceptance of Eritrea's right to self-determination. However, it was alleged that consultations involving ELF-RC and Ethiopian Government representatives, notably in Moscow in February 1980, were connected with possible Soviet mediation in Eritrea; it was also alleged by EPLF spokesmen that ELF-RC forces were deliberately avoiding conflicts with Ethiopian forces.

Mr Osman Saleh Sabeh, the leader of the (non-Marxist) Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF), said in Abu Dhabi in March that he was willing to enter talks with the Ethiopian Government on independence for Eritrea. It was later reported (in May) that the ELF-PLF had split into two groups, the one remaining loyal to the leadership of Mr Osman Saleh Sabeh based in Egypt and Dubai, the other led by Mr Osman Agyp who was based in Iraq.

A visit by Lt.-Col. Mengistu to the Sudan on May 24-27, 1980, following bilateral Ethiopian-Sudanese contacts earlier in the year, marked an improvement in relations between the two countries, whose disputes (primarily over the use of supply routes through the Sudan by the Eritrean secessionists, and the presence of large numbers of Eritrean refugees in the Sudan) had in early 1979 not proven amenable to attempted conciliation [see 30015 A] by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Gen. Abdel Majid Khalil, the Sudanese First Vice-President and Minister of Defence, visited Addis Ababa in March, after Ethiopian officials had visited Khartoum in late January, and on May 6-8 a meeting was held in Khartoum of the joint Ethiopian-Sudanese ministerial consultative committee (which had been revived by an agreement in March after having originally been set up in 1965—see 21611 A). This committee agreed inter alia that the voluntary repatriation of refugees should be encouraged, that problems arising between the two countries should be settled by consultation, and that the boundary commission set up in 1966 [ibid.] should meet in Addis Ababa in December 1980. The work of the joint ministerial committee was welcomed by Lt.-Col. Mengistu and President Nemery in a joint communiqué issued on May 28 following the visit of the former to Khartoum, and it was also reported that the two Governments had agreed not to allow arms supplies to the Eritrean secessionists across the Sudanese border; notwithstanding these developments, however, the Eritrean secessionists reportedly continued to use supply lines through the Sudan.

Hostilities on Ethiopian-Somali Border over Disputed Ogaden Region

With reports indicating an intensification of fighting in the Ogaden area (in south-eastern Ethiopia bordering on Somalia—see 30015 A), Ethiopian forces claimed to have repulsed an invasion by Somali troops between May 27 and July 17, 1980. The Somali Government, on the other hand, asserted that fighting in the Ogaden (to which it referred as Western Somalia) involved not Somali troops but forces of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which claimed repeated successes against Ethiopian forces. Mogadishu radio also maintained that frequent Ethiopian air attacks were made into Somalia during March-August [see also 30316 A], and that an alleged Ethiopian invasion of Somalia had been defeated on Aug. 27. (For attempted OAU mediation in the Ogaden dispute see 30557 A.)

According to the Ethiopian News Agency on Aug. 7, an attack launched by 14,000 Somali troops on May 27 had penetrated some 120 miles into Ethiopia, but had been driven back by July 17 after five major military engagements in which over 1,300 Somali troops were killed. This alleged invasion (which was reportedly confirmed by Western intelligence sources) was described by Dr Feleke Gedli Ghiorgis, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, on Aug. 8 as an act of unprovoked aggression; while the Ethiopian Government had exercised restraint in its response, he said, "there are limits to our patience".

A Somali Government statement released in Nairobi (Kenya) on Aug. 12 asserted that these Ethiopian allegations were a fabrication and a pretext for a planned Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Mogadishu radio reported on Aug. 27 that Ethiopian troops had invaded north-western Somalia with support from fighter-bombers, but that their advance had been halted by Somali forces; the report stated that 90 Ethiopians and 24 Somalis had been killed in this action (which was in turn denied by the Ethiopian Government—see below).

The WSLF claimed (in Mogadishu on June 29) that its forces had killed over 8,000 Ethiopian and Cuban troops in the Ogaden area in April and May, but referred also to a marked increase in the number of Ethiopian Government troops being deployed against it, and to an alleged Ethiopian "scorched-earth policy" notably involving the poisoning of wells and waterholes, intended to drive out the ethnic Somali inhabitants of the region.

Reports indicated a continuing flow of refugees (estimated at some 1,500 per day in mid-June) from the Ogaden into Somalia, where the refugee problem had already been described by Mr Poul Hartling, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as the worst in the world [see 30316 A]. According to the Somali Government, the problem was aggravated by Ethiopian air attacks, as well as by serious drought [see also 30589 A]; the long rains due in March-April arrived over two months late, by which time it was estimated that hundreds of refugees were dying every day. Meanwhile the Ethiopian Government had also appealed in May for international assistance to contend with the effects of drought and famine; it was reported that in many areas famine was severe and that the drought had led to the loss of the majority of livestock, but the Ethiopian estimate of 5,000,000 people affected was generally regarded as exaggerated.

Foreign Relations

Following the announcement by the United States State Department on Aug. 22 that the USA had agreed to provide military assistance to Somalia in return for access to military base facilities [see 30596 A], the Ethiopian Government protested against this agreement, which it described as an act of provocation against Ethiopia.

Lt.-Col. Mengistu reportedly sent messages of protest both to President Carter and to US congressional leaders, while Ethiopian Government representatives travelled to a number of countries (including Britain and France) during September to express their concern that Somalia might use US-supplied arms to attack Ethiopia. In a statement released by the Ethiopian embassy in Nairobi on Aug. 28 it was asserted that the Somali Government had fabricated claims about Ethiopian attacks [see above] in order to justify the agreement with the United States and to emphasize its need for military assistance. In a speech on Sept. 12, Lt.-Col. Mengistu said that the USA aimed to support a Somali invasion of Ethiopia, and he added that this "could plunge the entire world into the abyss of war".

The US ambassador to Ethiopia, Mr Frederic L. Chapin, had been recalled at the request of the Ethiopian Government on July 29, 1980, leaving the US embassy operating under a chargé d'affaires.

Whereas the US State Department attributed the request for Mr Chapin's recall to a dispute over compensation for foreign assets nationalized in Ethiopia [see page 30019], the Ethiopian Government referred in its own announcement to "the continual interference of the United States in Ethiopian internal affairs and the provocative and aggressive US military presence in the Indian Ocean" [see 30378 A; 30596 A].

The signature of a 20-year treaty of friendship and co-operation between Ethiopia and East Germany was announced on Nov. 15, 1979, and the treaty was ratified on Aug. 14, 1980.

The treaty was concluded during a visit to Ethiopia on Nov. 12-15 by a delegation led by Herr Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), and followed an earlier declaration issued during Lt.-Col. Mengistu's visit to Eastern Europe in November 1978 [see page 30017]. It provided in particular for "co-operation in politics, economics, trade, science, culture, technology and other spheres", and its signature was reportedly followed by an increase in the number of East German military advisers in Ethiopia. (A similar 20-year treaty of friendship and co-operation was also signed on Nov. 17, 1979, between East Germany and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which Herr Honecker and his delegation had visited after the conclusion of their official visit to Ethiopia.)

The treaty of friendship and co-operation signed between Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in December 1979 [see 30197 A] was ratified at a ceremony in Addis Ababa on Sept. 2.

Dr Feleke Gedli Ghiorgis announced in Damascus (Syria) on Aug. 26, 1980, that diplomatic relations were to be established between Ethiopia and Syria. On the same day, however, the ruling *Baath* party in Syria reaffirmed its support for the Eritrean secessionist movement [but see also page 29358] and called on "the factions of the Eritrean revolution to step up their efforts to achieve the goal of national unity".—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Le Monde - New York Times - Africa - Africa Confidential - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Government Appointments 30158 A; Ethiopia-Somalia 30316 A; Internal Security, Foreign Relations 30015 A*)

A. BURMA — Amnesty for Political Prisoners, Insurgents and Other Prisoners - Return to Burma of U Nu - Cabinet Changes

Under orders issued by the State Council on May 28, 1980, an amnesty was granted to political prisoners and to insurgents who surrendered within 90 days, while the sentences of other prisoners were reduced and death sentences were commuted. During the three-month period of the amnesty, a total of 2,189 people were officially stated to have "returned" either from within the country or from abroad.

The most prominent of these was U Nu (73), who had been Prime Minister almost continuously from Burma's achievement of independence in 1948 until his overthrow by Gen. Ne Win in 1962 [see 18675 A]. He had been held in detention from 1962 until 1966 [see 21699 B] and had left Burma in 1969 [see 23959 A]; in the early 1970s he had been involved in unsuccessful operations against the Government of Gen. Ne Win [see 26311 A] but latterly had been living in India. U Nu arrived in Burma on July 29 and on Aug. 11—together with other former opponents of the Government—had a meeting with Gen. Ne Win.

Among other anti-government politicians and insurgents who "returned" were (i) Mr Bo Thet Tun, a member of the central committee of the Burmese Communist Party; (ii) leading members of the Communist Party in the Arakan, of rebels in the eastern Shan state (notably Mr Lo Hsi Ming) and of the Karen National Union; and (iii) leaders of the People's Patriotic Party (PPP—the successor organization to the People's Democratic Party of U Nu—see also 27737 A), including Brig.-Gen. Saw Kya Doe (a former deputy chief of staff), Mr Bo Hmu Aung (a former Minister of Defence in 1958 —see 16393 A; 19855 A) and Gen. Yan Naing [see also 27737 A].

In changes to the reorganized Cabinet formed by U Maung Maung Kha in March 1978 [see 28962 B] (i) on Oct. 25, 1978, U Tun Tin, the Minister of Planning and Finance, was appointed additionally Deputy Prime Minister and Col. Khin Mang Gyi was appointed Minister of Trade (this portfolio having been temporarily assumed by U Ye Gaung, the Minister of Agriculture and Forests—see 29201 B); (ii) on March 19, 1979, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare (U Mahn San Myat Shwe) and the Minister of Information and Culture (U Mya Maung) exchanged portfolios; (iii) on March 19, 1980, U Lay Maung replaced Brig.-Gen. Myint Maung as Foreign Minister and Brig.-Gen. Thura Saw Pru became Minister of Transport (this post having previously been held by Brig.-Gen. Khin Ohn); and (iv) U Ye Gaung (the Minister of Agriculture and Forests) assumed additional responsibility for Education following the resignation of the Education Minister, Dr Khin Maung Win, in July 1980.—(Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 28962 B, 29201 B; Internal Security 28378 B, 27737 A; Withdrawal from Non-Aligned Movement page 30042*)

A. UNITED NATIONS — World Conference of the UN Decade for Women

The World Conference of the UN Decade for Women (1976-85) was held in Copenhagen (Denmark) on July 14-31, 1980, and a programme of action was adopted by majority vote for the second half of the decade (to 1985).

Following the World Conference of the International Women's Year in Mexico City in June-July 1975 [see 27268 B], the UN General Assembly had on Dec. 16, 1975, passed its resolution (3520) proclaiming the UN Decade for Women (with the sub-title "Equality, Development, Peace") and providing for a conference to be held in 1980 to mark the mid-point of the decade [see page 27594]. The objectives of this conference were (i) to evaluate progress made in the light of the World Plan of Action adopted at the Mexico City conference [see 27268 B], and (ii) to formulate a revised programme of action for the next five years; a draft programme was formulated by the conference's 23-nation preparatory committee at its three meetings held between June 1978 and April 1980.

The conference, for which the sub-themes were employment, health and education, was addressed at its inaugural session on July 14 by Queen Margrethe II of Denmark, Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, and Mr Anker Joergensen, the Danish Prime Minister. Mrs Lise Oestergaard, the Danish Minister of Cultural Affairs, was elected to chair the conference, of which Ms Lucille Mathurin Mair (Jamaica) was the secretary-general. The general debate from July 14 to 25 included 173 speakers, with 136 governments being represented as well as (with observer status) the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). Work began on July 15 in the two conference committees on national and international action respectively; meanwhile a Mid-Decade Women's Forum, providing for less formalized consideration of relevant issues, was held at the Amager University Centre in Copenhagen on July 14-24, with the participation of members of non-governmental organizations.

The Copenhagen Programme of Action, adopted in the early morning of July 31 by 94 votes to four (Australia, Canada, Israel and the United States) with 22 abstentions (including the member countries of the European Communities), comprised 218 paragraphs and notably included special measures to assist (i) refugees and displaced women, (ii) women in southern Africa and (ii) Palestinian women living inside and outside Israeli-occupied territories.

The programme called inter alia for an increase in the UN budget for women's projects, the recognition by all states of their rights and responsibilities with regard to refugee women and children, the implementation of women's health and welfare programmes, and increased aid to family planning projects; it also requested the UN General Assembly to convene an international conference on sanctions against South Africa, and called attention to the situation of women and children living under that country's apartheid regime.

Countries voting against adoption of the programme expressed their regret over what they described as the politicization of the conference.

The programme itself included an introductory paragraph proposed by India, stating inter alia that "freedom and development can only be established where racism, neo-colonialism, Zionism and hegemonism are abolished", and a section providing that UN aid programmes for Palestinian women should be implemented in consultation and co-operation with the PLO; these controversial aspects were included after votes respectively of 69 to 24 with 25 abstentions, and 76 to four with 24 abstentions. The conference also passed 48 resolutions, one of these having originated with a US proposal for "positive steps to overcome the dual burdens of discrimination based on race as well as on sex"; the US delegation had withdrawn its proposal after it had been modified by a number of amendments, but the Angolan delegation then reintroduced the proposal in its amended form, including a condemnation of Zionism, and this was passed by 66 votes to five against (including the USA) with 39 absentions.

The general debate had also been marked by several political demonstrations; thus a number of delegations walked out during speeches by the Egyptian and the Israeli delegates, and delegates from socialist-bloc countries left the hall in protest before a speech by a delegate from the regime of Democratic Kampuchea. [For dispute over credentials of the Kampuchean delegation at the 34th regular session of the UN General Assembly in 1979, see page 30221.] The conference was also interrupted on July 18 by a protest against the military coup which had taken place the previous day in Bolivia [see 30584 A].

The conference agreed by consensus to recommend that the General Assembly at its 35th regular session (opening in September 1980—see 30594 B) should consider convening in 1985 another conference to review and appraise the achievements of the UN World Decade for Women.—(UN Information Centre, London - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Development Forum) (*Prev. rep. World Conference of the International Women's Year 27268 B; 1979 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women page 30225*)

B. UNITED NATIONS — Opening of 35th Regular Session of UN General Assembly - Approval of Membership of St Vincent and the Grenadines

The 35th regular session of the UN General Assembly was opened in New York on Sept. 16, 1980, immediately following the end of the General Assembly special session on international development issues [see 30595 A].

At the opening session Rüdiger Freiherr von Wechmar, the West German permanent representative at the UN, was unanimously elected President of the Assembly in succession to Mr Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania. His candidacy was unopposed following the withdrawal on Sept. 5 of Sr Jaime de Piniés, the Spanish permanent representative at the UN.

The Assembly on Sept. 16 admitted St Vincent and the Grenadines (which had become independent in October 1979—see 30178 A) as the 154th member of the United Nations, as recommended by the UN Security Council in February [see 30361 C]. (The admission of Zimbabwe as the 153rd UN member had taken place on Aug. 25 at the Assembly's special session on international development issues—see 30595 A.)

Freiherr von Wechmar in his opening address said that the world was entering a difficult decade fraught with dangers; there should, he urged, be no substantial further delays in initiating negotiations on the creation of a new, more just and balanced international economic order, and he called for high level meetings to generate the necessary political will for such negotiations. (For similar proposals advanced by the Brandt Commission—the Independent Commission on International Development Issues—see 30457 A.) He also criticized as "appalling" the failure of developed countries to meet internationally-agreed official development assistance targets of 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product by 1980 [as established in 1968-69 by the Pearson Commission on International Development—see 23684 A]. With regard to the Middle East, he said he hoped that the Assembly would be able to contribute to a comprehensive settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 [see pages 22473; 25029] and providing "a just, secure and lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians". He also hoped that the Assembly would register further steps towards the independence of Namibia, towards the abolition of apartheid and towards disarmament. In a press conference on Sept. 18 he noted that his election as President of the General Assembly was a further indication that the Federal Republic of Germany had fully returned to the community of nations, that the Second World War was "a sad memory in history, a repetition of which is to be avoided at all costs", and that the Federal Republic was ready to serve the UN in its pursuit of peace, understanding among nations, security and progress.

In his annual report to the General Assembly, Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, said that the preceding year gave "some reasons for celebration and many for anxiety".

In the first category he welcomed the independence of Zimbabwe [see 30365 A], and what he described as striking progress in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. However, he said, a growing uncertainty and lack of direction in international society was reflected in deteriorating relations between some of the more powerful nations, in the continuing deadlock on vital economic matters, in the persistence of certain regional conflicts, in humanitarian disasters stemming from political and military conflict, and in an increasing incidence of politically motivated violence and terror. He said that in a teeming world in transition, the task of the UN should be to tilt the balance towards improvement and away from disorder, and he pointed out that the range of current UN activity encompassed global problems and far exceeded anything envisaged when the organization was first created.

The Assembly's steering committee on Sept. 17 approved an agenda of 130 items for debate at the session, including items on the situation in Afghanistan and in Kampuchea.—(UN Information Centre, London - Times - Guardian - New York Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. UN General Assembly Special Session on Development Issues 30595 A; 34th Regular Session 29998 A; 30221 A*)

A. UNITED NATIONS — General Assembly Special Session on International Development Issues - Admission of Zimbabwe

The UN General Assembly met from Aug. 25 to Sept. 15, 1980, in New York for its 11th special session, devoted to international development issues and intended to establish (i) the procedures and agenda for global negotiations on international economic co-operation and development, due to be held in 1981, and (ii) a new international development strategy for the 1980s, the Third UN Development Decade.

The seventh special session of the General Assembly, held in September 1975, had also dealt with development and international co-operation [see 27389 A]. The eighth, ninth and tenth special sessions had all been held in the period April-July 1978 and dealt respectively with the financing of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon [see page 29649], with Namibia [see page 29041] and with Disarmament [see 29261 A].

The special session was presided over by Mr Salim Ahmed Salim, the then President of the General Assembly, and was held in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 34/207 of Dec. 19, 1979 [see pages 30224-25] following an original decision in Resolution 32/156 of Dec. 19, 1977 [see page 28842].

The Assembly on the opening day of the special session admitted Zimbabwe (which had become independent in April 1980—see 30365 A) as the 153rd member of the United Nations.

General Debate

A total of 134 speakers took part in the general debate, which continued until Sept. 5.

Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, said in his opening address on Aug. 25 that it was the crucial task of the Assembly to show its capacity for overcoming the current crisis in the world economy; achievements in this sphere, he added, would contribute to reducing international political tensions. Issues to which priority should be given, according to Dr Waldheim, included the need to make the international monetary system both more stable and more responsive to the needs of developing countries; he emphasized also the importance of energy resources being available to all, and the fundamental role of agriculture and rural infrastructure for economic growth in the poorest countries.

Mr Edmund Muskie, the United States Secretary of State, said on the same day that responsibility for the international economy must be shared by all countries. The members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), he said, could meet their unique responsibility by adopting stable price policies, avoiding causing traumas in the international economy, reaching agreements with consumers, increasing their aid expenditure and ensuring that oil revenues were recycled to the benefit of developing countries. He also urged the countries of the socialist bloc to increase their trade and aid links with the developing countries, and to help in stabilizing international commodity prices. Mr Muskie said that the USA would support a pledge by all countries to restrain trade protectionism; he emphasized also that the most urgent task facing the international community was dealing with the spectre of famine in Africa.

Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, the Indian Minister of External Affairs and current chairman of the Group of 77 developing countries (which comprised 120 countries with the inclusion of Zimbabwe), criticized what he called the short-sightedness of developed countries; they should recognize, he said, that what they regarded as concessions to developing countries would ultimately be for their own benefit in terms of expanding export markets and employment opportunities.

Mr Gaston Thorn, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, speaking on Aug. 26 on behalf of the European Communities, called for the adoption of suitable and concrete measures which would promote the mutual interest of both developed and developing countries.

President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh, the only head of state to attend the special session, said in his speech on the same day that the financial resources needed to cover the expenditure on development of the world's poorest countries corresponded to less than 1 per cent of world annual military expenditure. In line with the recommendations of the Brandt Commission [the Independent Commission on International Development Issues—see 30457 A], he proposed the creation of an international development fund and the taxation of international trade and arms expenditure. He called for the immediate doubling of aid (in untied grant form) from industrialized (including socialist) countries to the least developed countries (LDCs —for list see 29051 B), as well as increased OPEC investment in LDCs and the provision for them of oil supplies at half price.

Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, speaking on Aug. 27, expressed concern over trade protectionism and over the level of arms expenditure, and he proposed the compilation of an international register showing the expenditure of each country on arms and arms trade, and on economic development assistance.

Mr Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia, the Foreign Minister of Algeria, said inter alia that a genuine reform of the international monetary system was necessary to ensure an equitable distribution of power; without this, he said, the monetary system would continue to function according to the particular interests of a restricted group of countries, and attempts to make changes in other sectors could thus prove ineffective.

Mr Victor Maltsev, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, said that he opposed efforts to perpetuate the existing international division of labour and to create a favourable climate for the activities of foreign companies in developing nations. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries would continue economic and technical assistance to developing countries, he said, on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit and in forms "which have already proven their worth in practice". However, he added, there could be no grounds for developing countries to make demands on socialist countries similar to those which they made on capitalist countries "in the context of compensation for damage caused as a result of colonial exploitation . . . as well as compensation for the losses which are sustained by the developing countries as a result of the present activities of multinational corporations".

Failure to Agree Procedure for Forthcoming Global Negotiations

Commencing on Aug. 27, delegates began discussions on the formulation of a new international development strategy [see below] and on procedures for the forthcoming global negotiations on international economic co-operation and development. Although it was generally envisaged that these negotiations would be concerned with five main aspects (namely energy, the transfer of technology, aid, food availability and the functioning of the international monetary system), the special session was unable to discuss this agenda because of disagreement on fundamental procedural issues.

Whereas the Group of 77 advocated the incorporation of all aspects of the agenda in negotiations at a UN conference in New York, certain industrialized countries (principally West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) envisaged holding the negotiations within existing specialized institutions where relevant, thereby recognizing the competence of these institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the monetary sphere), instead of conferring political authority upon a UN conference.

The procedural disagreement, which had already emerged in preparatory meetings of the UN "committee of the whole" [see page 28842] prior to the special session, dominated the discussions at the session itself, with the proceedings being extended past the scheduled closing date of Sept. 5 while delegates sought a compromise formula to avert the deadlock.

A formula drafted by Mr Bogdan Crnobrnja (Yugoslavia) was on Sept. 13 accepted as the basis of a compromise agreement by the Group of 77 and seven member states of the European Communities (not including West Germany and the United Kingdom). The formula provided that the UN conference would be the forum for co-ordinating and conducting the discussions, functioning according to the procedures of the General Assembly and seeking consensus agreement on all important matters. A European Community spokesman said on Sept. 13 that this should not prejudice the competence of the specialized institutions, which must participate in the negotiations whenever a question arose concerning their competence, while their autonomy of decision must be fully respected in the final phase of the conference.

With the socialist bloc countries and China declaring their support for the position of the Group of 77, the compromise formula nevertheless failed to obtain the agreement of three countries (West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States), and when the special session closed on Sept. 15, the matter was referred at the request of the Group of 77 for consideration at the General Assembly's 35th regular session (which began on Sept. 16—see 30594 B).

New International Development Strategy - Resolutions on Least Developed Countries

The special session reached general agreement on a new international development strategy for the 1980s, but deferred the formal adoption of the strategy, the matter being referred to the Assembly's 35th regular session.

Objectives set out in the strategy included the attainment by aid donors of the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance (ODA); donors were urged to reach this target (originally established in 1968-69 by the Pearson Commission on International Development—see 23684 A) within the first half of the 1980s if possible, and certainly not later than the second half of the decade. The strategy called for a subsequent further increase in ODA to 1 per cent of GNP (without specifying a target date) and improved adaptation of aid forms to recipient needs, while the developmental importance of private investment was also recognized.

Other facets of the strategy included trade policies to promote increased and diversified production in developing countries, improved developing country access to technology, special attention to the problems of landlocked and island countries and those categorized as most seriously affected by increases in prices of essential imports (MSAs—for list see 29051 B), action to reduce mortality rates, and the elimination of hunger and malnutrition "as soon as possible and certainly by the end of this century".

The special session passed without a vote two resolutions on the least developed countries, calling for implementation of the programme of special measures agreed in 1979 by the Fifth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V—see page 29891), and referring to the Assembly's 35th regular session a series of proposals for immediate action put forward by Dr Waldheim.—(UN Information Centre, London - Le Monde - Times - Guardian - Sunday Times - Financial Times - New York Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London) (*Prev. rep. General Assembly 34th Regular Session 30221 A; Seventh Special Session 27389 A; Brandt Commission Report 30457 A*)

A. UNITED STATES - KENYA - SOMALIA — Agreements on US Use of Bases in Kenya and Somalia - Despatch of Pre-positioning Ships to Diego Garcia

During the first part of 1980 the United States continued to seek arrangements with Kenya and Somalia on the use of base facilities, and agreements with these two countries were initialled on June 26 and Aug. 21 respectively. These agreements (which did not involve the permanent stationing of US forces) in turn complemented that reached with Oman earlier in June [see 30378 A] and were made within the framework of the US policy of building up military facilities in the areas bordering the Indian Ocean [ibid.].

Although no details of the agreement with Kenya were made public, it was explained by the State Department in Washington that implementation of the agreement would "be a matter of mutual and continuing consultation between the two Governments", and that there would be an "expanded relationship" between the two countries in the development of security assistance and economic co-operation.

In 1976 the United States had agreed to supply Kenya with 12 F-5 fighter aircraft [see 27873 A], and in 1978 [see page 28992] it was agreed that delivery, which began on March 31 of that year, would be accelerated.

Negotiations with Somalia were protracted and centred in large part (i) on the extent of the financial assistance which the United States would provide (it being reported in May that Somalia had asked for as much as $2,000 million over a 10-year period), and (ii) on Somali policy regarding the Ogaden (where Somalia was in conflict with Ethiopia—see 30015 A; 30592 A).

Under the agreement eventually initialled, the United States undertook to supply to Somalia $20,000,000 in the form of military sales credits in the current fiscal year (ending on Sept. 30, 1980), together with $5,000,000 in budgetary support and a further $20,000,000 credits in the next (1981) fiscal year. The agreement (as announced by the US State Department on Aug. 22) did not contain any formal security commitment on the part of the United States, but was understood to allow the USA to use the Berbera naval base (originally constructed by the Soviet Union before the abrogation of the Somali-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in November 1977—see 28760 A) and also the port of Mogadishu, together with associated airfields. As regards the Ogaden, Somalia gave "firm [oral] assurances" that neither regular Somali troops nor US equipment would be used inside Ethiopia. (For earlier suspension of a US military aid arrangement over this issue in 1978, see 29706 A.)

The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated on May 29, 1980, that six or seven US cargo ships would be sent to Diego Garcia (part of the British Indian Ocean Territory) beginning in July. In reply to a question on this matter in the House of Lords on June 16 Lord Carrington, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, said that the United States had a long-term programme for strengthening its military capability in the Indian Ocean area [see also page 30235], and he continued: "This programme includes the pre-positioning of equipment to be available for use by forces deployed rapidly to the region in an emergency. At Diego Garcia such equipment will be held in converted merchant ships which will periodically be rotated within the Indian Ocean area. They do not constitute a naval task force. Her Majesty's Government were fully consulted over the proposal to send these ships to Diego Garcia in accordance with the provisions of the 1976 exchange of notes." (This exchange of notes, signed on Feb. 25, 1976, formalized the British Government's previously announced agreement to US plans for the expansion of the facility at Diego Garcia—see 27323 A; 27871 A; this agreement in turn defined the scope and purpose of the expanded facility and provided for consultation and joint decision on its use.)—(New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. 30378 A; OAU Resolution on Diego Garcia 30557 A*)

B. VENEZUELA — New Defence Minister and President of Lower House

Gen. Tomás Abreu Rascanieri was appointed Minister of Defence on June 26 to succeed Gen. Luis Enrique Rangel Bourgoin, who had himself been appointed in 1979 on the retirement of Gen. Fernando Paredes Bello.

The president of the Chamber of Deputies, Sr Carlos Canache Mata, resigned on July 8 after being censured by Congress the previous day for exceeding his authority with regard to a recent congressional inquiry into a shipbuying scandal, in which the former Democratic Action (AD) President of Venezuela, Sr Carlos Andrés Pérez, was alleged to have enriched himself.

The Pérez administration was alleged to have purchased in 1977 a Norwegian refrigerator ship, the *Sierra Nevada*, at a figure on paper of $8,000,000 more than the market price and to have used this money for corrupt purposes. A congressional debate beginning on April 14, 1980, considered the report of a special congressional committee (which had found Sr Pérez morally, politically and administratively responsible for the incident) but decided on May 8 by the votes of 132 of the 238 members present, with the abstention of most AD representatives, that Sr Pérez had political responsibility only.

Sr Canache Mata (AD) was accused of acting in Sr Pérez's favour and curtailing the inquiry by sending the *Sierra Nevada* dossier prematurely to the Attorney-General's office, which on June 13 ruled that Sr Pérez would not be prosecuted.

Sr Armando Sánchez Bueno, also of the AD, was sworn in on July 11 as the new president of the Lower House.—(New York Times - Financial Times - Le Monde - Latin America Weekly Report - Guardian - Bank of London and South America Review) (*Prev. rep. 30273 B, 29603 A*)

C. IRISH REPUBLIC — Cabinet Changes

Mr Charles Haughey, the *Taoiseach* (Prime Minister) announced on Oct. 15 the following cabinet changes arising from the death on July 13 of Mr Joseph Brennan, *Ceann Comhairle* (Speaker) of the *Dail* (Lower House of Parliament) since July 1977 [see page 28528]: (i) Mr Padraig Faulkner, hitherto Minister for Defence, was nominated as *Ceann Comhairle*, the nomination being approved by the *Dail* on Oct. 16; (ii) Mr Sylvester Barrett, hitherto Minister for the Environment, succeeded Mr Faulkner as Defence Minister: and (iii) Mr Raphael Burke, hitherto Minister of State at the Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, was promoted to the Cabinet as Minister for the Environment *vice* Mr Barrett.—(Irish Times) (*Prev. rep. 30110 A*)

D. AFRICA — Meeting of Heads of State of Former Portuguese Colonies

The second meeting of heads of state of the five former Portuguese colonies in Africa—namely President dos Santos of Angola, President Machel of Mozambique, President Pereira of Cape Verde, President Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and President Pinto da Costa of São Tomé and Príncipe—took place in Maputo (Mozambique) on March 30, 1980. As at the previous meeting in June 1979 [see 30004 A], the main theme of debate was closer co-operation in economic and social development, and an agreement was signed to serve as a basis for closer relations in trade, finance and transport, while the possibilities of co-operation in other fields were also explored.—(West Africa - Archiv der Gegenwart, Bonn) (*Prev. rep. 30004 A*)

JAN 2 1981

A. WEST GERMANY — Federal Elections to Bundestag - Munich Bomb Explosion

In general elections to the *Bundestag* (Lower House of the Federal Parliament) held on Oct. 5, 1980, the Social Democratic/Free Democratic (SPD/FDP) coalition which had been in office since 1969 [see 23665 A] increased its parliamentary majority by obtaining a total of 271 of the 497 seats.

Although after the elections the combined opposition formed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) remained the largest single parliamentary group, the CDU suffered considerable losses, so that the combined strength of the two parties fell to 226 seats, compared with 243 seats won in the 1976 general elections [see 28107 A].

The SPD raised its parliamentary strength to 218 seats, compared with 214 in 1976, while the FDP made particularly strong gains, achieving 10.6 per cent of the vote and increasing its *Bundestag* representation from 39 deputies (1976) to 53.

The Green Party (*Die Grünen*), which had been formally constituted as a national party in January 1980 [see 30347 A] and which was contesting its first federal election after several electoral successes at *Land* and local council level [see 30024 A; 30347 A], failed to obtain the 5 per cent of the valid vote which was required by West German law as a minimum for representation in the *Bundestag*, obtaining only 1.5 per cent of the votes; the newly-formed Citizens' Party (*Bürgerpartei* or BP—see 30452 A) also failed to make a significant impact on the electorate.

The results of the elections were as follows, with the (revised) 1976 general election results given for comparison (SPD—Social Democrats; CDU—Christian Democrats; FDP—Free Democrats; CSU—Christian Social Union; *Die Grünen*—Green Party; DKP—German Communist Party; NPD—National Democratic Party; BP—Citizens' Party; *Volksfront*—Popular Front; KBW—Communist League of West Germany; EAP—European Workers' Party; CBV—Christian Bavarian People's Party):

	1980			1976		
	Seats	Per cent	Votes	Seats	Per cent	Votes
SPD	218	42.9	16,262,096	214	42.6	16,099,019
CDU	174	34.2	12,992,334	190	38.0	14,367,302
FDP	53	10.6	4,030,608	39	7.9	2,995,085
CSU	52	10.3	3,908,036	53	10.6	4,027,499
Die Grünen	0	1.5	568,265	—	—	—
DKP	0	0.2	72,230	0	0.3	118,581
NPD	0	0.2	67,798	0	0.3	122,661
BP	0	*	11,623	—	—	—
Volksfront	0	*	9,344	—	—	—
KBW	0	*	8,285	0	0.1	20,018
EAP	0	*	7,814	0	*	6,811
CBV	0	*	4,019	0	*	6,686†
Others	—	—	—	0	0.2†	58,414†

* Less than 0.1 per cent. † Unrevised figures only.

Altogether 37,942,452 (87.8 per cent) of the 43,207,080 persons eligible to vote submitted valid votes, compared with 90.7 per cent in 1976.

Each voter in the Federal Republic had two votes; the first was given to a particular candidate within the voter's constituency, so that 248 of the normal complement of 496 seats were filled on a constituency "first-past-the-post" basis, on the strength of the first votes. The second vote was given on a *Land* basis to a particular party list and these second votes were processed by the "d'Hondt" system of proportional representation to fill the remaining 248 seats. (Voting figures in the above table refer to second votes.) In Schleswig-Holstein, however, an anomaly arose in the distribution of seats by second votes, but was resolved in accordance with the Basic Law (Constitution) by providing an extra seat for that *Land* (a so-called "overhang" seat), so that the final total of deputies elected to the *Bundestag* was 497 instead of the normal 496.

Due to the special four-power status of West Berlin its electorate had no vote in the federal elections; instead the West Berlin House of Representatives appointed a body of 22 representatives (without voting rights in the *Bundestag*) whose composition by political parties corresponded as closely as possible to that prevailing in the House of Representatives itself. Consequently 11 CDU, 10 SPD and one FDP deputy were sent to the *Bundestag*. (For 1979 elections to West Berlin House of Representatives, see 29604 A.)

Whereas the SPD, FDP, DKP, EAP, NPD, *Volksfront* and *Die Grünen* submitted lists of candidates (i.e. for election by second votes) in all 10 federal *Länder*, the CDU submitted lists in all *Länder* except Bavaria and the KBW in all *Länder* except the Saarland. The CSU and CBV contested the election only in Bavaria, while the BP stood only in Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria. The German Union (DU), the Independent Workers' Party (UAP) and the German Freedom Party (DFP) submitted no lists but put up candidates in individual constituencies.

The provisional election results meant that the CDU/CSU group in the Federal Assembly (*Bundesversammlung*)—comprising all the members of the *Bundestag* (including those from West Berlin) and also a similar number of representatives from the Länder nominated by the *Land* parliaments on the basis of proportional representation [see 29749 A]—was reduced in strength from 526 seats to 511. The CDU/CSU group thus lost its absolute majority in the Assembly (one of whose major responsibilities was the election of the President of the Republic—ibid.), the SPD now holding 453 seats (compared with its previous total of 450), the FDP 69 (formerly 56) and *Die Grünen*, as previously, three seats.

The FDP exceeded its 1976 proportion of the second votes cast in all 10 *Länder*, while the CDU/CSU equally lost ground in all *Länder*, as is shown by the following table, in which the 1980 percentage vote won by each of the four largest parties is compared with its 1976 performance (given in parentheses):

	SPD	CDU*	FDP
Bremen	52.5 (54.0)	28.7 (32.5)	15.0 (11.8)
Hamburg	51.7 (52.6)	31.2 (35.8)	14.1 (10.2)
North Rhine-Westphalia	46.8 (46.9)	40.6 (44.5)	10.9 (7.8)
Schleswig-Holstein . .	46.7 (46.4)	38.9 (44.1)	12.7 (8.8)
Saarland	48.3 (46.1)	42.3 (46.2)	7.8 (6.6)
Lower Saxony	46.9 (45.7)	39.8 (45.7)	11.3 (7.9)
Hesse	46.4 (45.7)	40.6 (44.8)	10.6 (8.5)
Rhineland-Palatinate . .	42.8 (41.7)	45.6 (49.9)	9.8 (7.6)
Baden-Württemberg . .	37.2 (36.6)	48.5 (53.3)	12.0 (9.1)
Bavaria	32.7 (32.8)	57.6 (60.0)	7.8 (6.2)

* CSU in Bavaria.

The election campaigns of most of the larger parties centred to a large degree on the respective personal qualities of Herr Helmut Schmidt (SPD), the Federal Chancellor, and of the CDU/CSU joint candidate for the chancellorship, Herr Franz-Josef Strauss. Herr Strauss, who was the *Land* Premier of Bavaria and leader of the CSU, had in July 1979 [see 30086 A] been appointed CDU/CSU candidate in place of the 1976 candidate, Dr Helmut Kohl (CDU), but, despite being officially endorsed by all regional CDU organizations, he received only limited support from CDU voters, particularly in the northern *Länder*.

The outcome of the 1980 election was therefore widely regarded as a severe personal defeat for Herr Strauss, who announced on the evening of Oct. 5 his intention to confine his activities henceforth to CSU matters and to *Land* politics in Bavaria (thus confirming his pre-election assertion that he would not take up a seat in the *Bundestag* in the event of a CDU/CSU defeat). Herr Strauss also stated after the election that the CDU and CSU would continue to form a joint group and rejected suggestions that the CSU intended to promote itself as a "fourth party" in competition with the CDU in all parts of the Federal Republic.

The personality of Herr Strauss proved controversial not merely within the CDU and CSU but also in his confrontations with members of other parties in the pre-election period, during which he was both the object and the originator of a number of harsh personal attacks, several of which led to legal actions. The SPD and the FDP encouraged the electorate to vote "against Strauss", whom Herr Schmidt described as too unpredictable to be entrusted with West Germany's foreign affairs; moreover, public addresses given by Herr Strauss were repeatedly and often violently disrupted by mainly left-wing demonstrators, as on Sept. 14, 1979, in Essen; on Feb. 23, 1980, in Mannheim; on May 19 in West Berlin; on Aug. 25 in Hamburg (when an anti-Strauss demonstration involving some 15,000 persons led to violence which resulted in 102 police injuries); on Sept. 9 in Hanover; and on Sept. 25 in Bremen (where, in an earlier development, some 250 policemen had been injured on May 6 in violence surrounding a military swearing-in ceremony which had already been criticized by the local SPD).

The loss of support experienced by *Die Grünen* since its foundation in January 1980 was generally attributed to the severe internal disagreements surrounding its adoption of a strongly left-wing political programme [see 30347 A]; non-left-wing elements of the party continued to resign their membership, and at a conference held in late June the party chairman, Herr August Haussleiter, also resigned his position, being succeeded by Herr Dieter Burgmann.

The failure of *Die Grünen* appeared in turn to have contributed to the considerable increases in support won by the FDP, which recorded its largest share of the vote since 1961 (when it had obtained 12.8 per cent—see 18369 A). Earlier in 1980 the FDP had been seriously concerned by its failure in the 1980 North Rhine-Westphalia *Land* elections [see 30452 A] to obtain the 5 per cent minimum vote and had since then conducted a vigorous campaign for second votes.

Notwithstanding the personal clashes between Herr Schmidt and Herr Strauss, the election campaign produced only a limited degree of political debate, partly because the major parties were in basic agreement on a number of key topics.

The FDP, the CDU and the CSU agreed on the desirability of nuclear power as a means of decreasing West Germany's dependence on imported oil; the SPD endorsed this view but recommended, in reflection of strong anti-nuclear feeling on the left wing of the party, that the option of an extensive development of nuclear power should be deferred pending further examination of means of disposing of nuclear waste. On matters of defence and foreign policy all parties emphasized the need to maintain a balance of power in Europe and to adhere to West Germany's commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); however, the CSU and CDU accused Herr Schmidt of underestimating the country's defence requirements and of making unnecessary concessions to the Soviet Union during the talks on East-West disarmament which he had held on June 30-July 1 with President Brezhnev and with other Soviet leaders [see 30471 A], and of damaging West Germany's relations with the United States.

Differences between the SPD and the other main parties on financial policy were highlighted by a dispute surrounding a pastoral letter which was read in all West German Roman Catholic churches on Sept. 21 and which criticized the Government in connexion with West Germany's rapidly increasing government borrowing requirement. The letter (which had been published in the press beforehand) was strongly attacked by Herr Schmidt, who maintained that the high level of government spending helped to keep down unemployment and who expressed the view that the Roman Catholic bishops should remain uninvolved in state politics, as they had generally done since the mid-1960s. Herr Strauss supported the letter, however, and claimed to have evidence that the Government was planning to discontinue its collection of church taxes (this suggestion being strongly refuted by the SPD and FDP).

The SPD, FDP, CDU and CSU reached agreement on March 19 on a code of fair practice for the elections in which they undertook inter alia (i) to limit campaign expenditure in effect to the amounts spent in the 1976 elections; (ii) to avoid slander or libel in campaigns, and to place various restrictions on the use, content and quantity of campaign posters; (iii) to ban campaigning in factories and other places of work; and (iv) to set up a joint body of referees which was to oversee the campaigns and to handle complaints. The referee body, which took up its functions on May 22, was only empowered to issue warnings, however, and had only limited influence on the conduct of the election.

Explosion at Munich October Festival

At least 13 people were killed and over 200 injured in a bomb explosion which occurred on Sept. 26 on the site of the annual Munich October Festival. The bomb, which exploded outside the main entrance as large numbers of people were leaving the festival, was believed to have been planted by members of the extreme right-wing "Hoffmann military sport group" (*Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann*), which had been declared illegal in January 1980 [see page 30354] and one of whose members was killed in the explosion. The police questioned other known members of the group (whose leader, Herr Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, was temporarily detained on Sept. 26) and the Bavarian *Land* Government offered a reward for information leading to the conviction of those responsible.

Both Herr Strauss and Herr Schmidt immediately issued statements condemning the attack, and they and Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher (the Foreign Minister and FDP chairman) attended a memorial service for the dead which was held on Sept. 30. Whereas Herr Strauss launched a strong attack on the Federal Minister of the Interior, Herr Gerhard Baum (FDP), alleging that the latter was responsible for the development of an atmosphere in which such an atrocity could occur, Herr Schmidt maintained that the explosion should not be turned into an election issue.

Dissolution of Communist Party of Germany

The Communist Party of Germany (KPD), which had been formed in 1970, voted during a conference held on March 7-9 to cease its operations as a political party. The party had adopted a mainly Maoist doctrine but since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in September 1976 [see 28053 A] had undergone a severe internal crisis and had adopted the Albanian model of communism. It was not related to the KPD which had been banned in 1956 [see 15086 D], the latter having its ideological descendants in the DKP (formed in 1968—see 22992 A; 23350 B), which contested the 1980 elections.—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph) (*Prev. rep. 1976 Elections 28107 A; Cabinet 30091 A; Internal Security 30351 A*)

A. SOLOMON ISLANDS — Formation of New Government following General Election - Purchase from IMF to meet Export Shortfall

A general election was held on Aug. 6, 1980, following the expiry of the four-year term of the legislature elected in June 1976 as the Legislative Assembly [see 28131 A] and subsequently renamed the National Parliament upon the Solomon Islands' attainment of independence in July 1978 [see 29371 A].

As stated in 28131 A, most of the 38 members of the outgoing legislature had originally been elected as independents, and the relatively minor role of party politics in Solomon Islands affairs was subsequently emphasized by the formal inauguration of an Independent Group (led by a former minister, Mr Willie Betu), as the largest single grouping in Parliament. The various party groupings in Parliament at the time of the dissolution were as follows: (i) Solomon Islands United Party (SIUPA), led by the Prime Minister, Mr Peter Kenilorea; (ii) National Democratic Party (NADEPA), led by Mr Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, the official Leader of the Opposition in Parliament; and (iii) People's Alliance Party (PAP), whose sole MP was Mr David Kausimae, a former minister.

The PAP was co-led by Mr Kausimae, formerly leader of the Rural Alliance Party, and Mr Solomon Mamaloni, formerly leader of the People's Progressive Party, who had agreed to merge these parties to form the PAP in late 1979. Mr Mamaloni, a former Chief Minister, had resigned from the outgoing Parliament in 1977 after losing the 1976 election for the premiership to Mr Kenilorea.

The general election on Aug. 6 resulted in the defeat of about two-thirds of the members of the previous Parliament, and gave none of the three political parties a clear majority, the effective control of Parliament thus remaining with the independent members. Those defeated in the election included Mr Betu, Mr Kausimae and Mr John Saunana (Minister for Education and Training). The election was contested by 244 candidates—more than ever before—and there was a turnout of about 60 per cent among almost 100,000 registered voters.

The members of the new Parliament met in late August to elect a new Prime Minister, Mr Kenilorea being returned to office by 25 votes to five cast for Mr Mamaloni. Mr Kenilorea subsequently formed a new Cabinet consisting of members of SIUPA and members of a group of independents led by Mr Francis Hilly (for whose resignation from the previous Kenilorea Government in 1978 see page 29372), who became Deputy Prime Minister. The full membership of the new Cabinet was as follows:

* Mr Peter Kenilorea (SIUPA) . .	Prime Minister
Mr Francis Hilly (ind.)	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Health
†Mr Benedict Kinika (SIUPA) . .	Finance
Mr G. Beti (ind.)	Education
* Mr Paul J. Tovua (SIUPA) . .	Natural Resources
* Mr Waeta Ben (ind.)	Agriculture and Lands
* Mr Pulepada Ghemu (SIUPA) . .	Foreign Trade, Industry and Labour
Mr Moffat Bonunga (SIUPA) . .	Transport and Communications
Mr Philip Kapini (ind.)	Home Affairs
Mr Lawry Wickham (ind.)	Law and Information
Mr Denis Lulei (ind.)	Youth and Cultural Affairs
Mr Tom Harehiru (SIUPA) . .	Works and Public Utilities

* No change. † Altered responsibilities.

Mr Kinika had previously been Deputy Prime Minister in addition to holding the Finance portfolio.

It was reported by *Pacific Islands Monthly* of October 1980 that the new Government was expected to adopt domestic policies giving a higher priority to the issue of administrative decentralization (for the importance of which in Solomon Islands politics, see 29371 A).

Purchase under IMF Compensatory Financing Facility

The International Monetary Fund on April 10, 1979, announced its agreement to a purchase by the Solomon Islands Government equivalent to 1,050,000 special drawing rights (SDR) under the compensatory financing facility. The announcement stated: "After having registered a surplus in its overall balance of payments of SDR 4,000,000 in 1977, the Solomon Islands experienced a deficit of SDR 1,900,000 in 1978. The deterioration occurred because export earnings levelled off in 1978, while imports and payments for services increased and the net inflow of non-monetary capital declined. After rising rapidly since the early 1970s, export earnings stagnated in 1978 because of the decline in earnings from fish and timber. For both commodities, there were price declines in 1978."—(Pacific Islands Monthly - IMF, Washington) (*Prev. rep. 29371 A; IMF Membership page 29300*)

A. OLYMPIC GAMES — Partial Boycott - New IOC President

The XXIInd Olympiad was held in Moscow from July 19 to Aug. 3, 1980, the XIIIth winter Olympics having taken place in the USA at Lake Placid (New York state) from Feb. 13 to 24, 1980.

The US call for a boycott of the Moscow Games as a sign of international disapproval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979-January 1980 [see 30229 A; 30362 A; 30381 A] had led to intense political controversy in the months preceding the Games. In the event, 62 countries and territories stayed away (many of these in support of the boycott, although certain countries gave economic or other reasons for not participating) and 81 countries, including all the European Community members except West Germany, took part. Many national Olympic committees decided to send athletes to Moscow in defiance of the express wishes of their respective Governments (notably those of Australia, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom—see page 30385).

The 62 countries and territories which did not attend were as follows: Albania, Antigua*, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize*, Bermuda*, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Cayman Islands*, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China†, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, West Germany, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong*, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands Antilles, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates. United States, Uruguay, (US) Virgin Islands, Zaïre.

* UK associated state or dependency with independent Olympic committee.

† China had been readmitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on Nov. 26, 1979, after withdrawing in 1958 [see page 17210]. Taiwan and also Iran, Mozambique and Qatar were not invited to the Games because they had failed to meet IOC regulations.

Of those countries attending, 10 teams (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, San Marino, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) did not march in the opening parade, Ireland, Portugal and the UK being each represented by one official carrying the Olympic flag. Six other teams (Andorra, Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Puerto Rico and Spain) paraded under Olympic rather than national flags. Individual athletes from boycotting countries were not permitted to compete [see page 30386].

The number of participants was the lowest since the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne, which were attended by 67 nations [see 15749 A], although only 88 had taken part in the 1976 Games in Montreal due to political controversies [see 28004 C].

The highest numbers of medals were won by the Soviet Union (80 gold, 69 silver, 46 bronze), East Germany (47 gold, 36 silver, 43 bronze), Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Britain was in seventh place (with five gold, seven silver and nine bronze), followed by Cuba, Italy and France.

Lord Killanin, the outgoing president of the IOC who had opposed a boycott of the Games on the grounds that sport should be independent from political considerations, was succeeded in his post by Sr Juan Antonio Samaranch (60), hitherto the Spanish ambassador to Moscow, who took over on Aug. 4 for an eight-year term. Lord Killanin had at the opening ceremonies for the Games praised the nearly 6,000 athletes who had shown "independence" in resisting pressures and coming to the Games, and at the closure of the Games on Aug. 3 he called on all athletes to unite in peace to avoid what he described as a "holocaust".

The 1984 winter Olympics were due to be held in Sarajevo (Yugoslavia) and the summer Olympics in Los Angeles.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London) (*Prev. rep. XXIst Olympiad 28004 C; Election of Lord Killanin page 25570*)

B. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION — Lifting of Size Restrictions on West German Warships - Soviet Criticism

Meeting in London on July 21, the Council of the Western European Union (WEU)—comprising Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom—unanimously agreed to abolish with immediate effect WEU protocol restrictions on the permitted size of West German warships. As formally required, a recommendation to this effect had been submitted to the Council by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Bernard Rogers, and the step had earlier been approved by the WEU Parliamentary Assembly on June 2 by 55 votes to six.

A protocol placing various restrictions on West German armaments had formed part of the 1954 Paris Agreements providing inter alia for West German and Italian membership of the five-nation Brussels Treaty Organization and thus for the creation of the WEU, which was inaugurated the following year [see 13809 A; 13850 A; 13869 A; 14237 A]. These restrictions were subsequently relaxed under a series of protocol amendments so that at the time of the WEU Council's July 1980 meeting the clause on West German warship sizes stipulated (i) a 3,000-tonne limit on combat vessels except for eight destroyers of up to 6,000 tonnes and one training ship of up to 5,000 tonnes, (ii) a 6,000-tonne limit on permanent auxiliary vessels, and (iii) a 1,800-tonne limit on submarines.

The WEU Council's decision did not affect other clauses of the protocol under which West Germany continued to be prohibited from manufacturing any nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, long-range and guided missiles, strategic bombers and nuclear-powered warships.

The decision to lift the restrictions on West German warship sizes was strongly attacked on July 24 by *Pravda* (the daily organ of the Soviet Communist Party), which said that it had "dangerous political consequences" and would open the way for the re-creation of the "big fleet" which had played an important role in German preparations for two world wars. (Times - Financial Times - Le Monde - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin) (*Prev. rep. 19684 C*)

C. SWEDEN — Discovery of Foreign Submarine in Territorial Waters

The Swedish Minister of Defence, Mr Eric Krönmark, on Sept. 29, 1980, issued an open warning to an unknown foreign power in connexion with the presence of an unidentified foreign submarine which had been located in Swedish territorial waters on Sept. 18. Subsequently, it was announced on Oct. 6 that the submarine appeared to have left Swedish waters and that the search for it had been abandoned.

The Swedish Navy had located the submarine in a high-security area of the Stockholm archipelago and had surrounded it using patrol boats, helicopters and a destroyer; repeated requests for identification having been ignored, depth charges were dropped near the vessel in an attempt to force it to surface. Mr Krönmark (on Sept. 29) described the incident as "the most serious violation of Swedish territorial waters since the end of the Second World War", and indicated that, unless it identified itself, the submarine might be depth-charged in such a manner as to cause damage and possible danger to the lives of the crew.

The Swedish Navy was reported to record an annual average of about 10 infringements of Swedish territorial waters by submarines of different nationalities, while the Swedish Air Force had in 1979 reportedly intervened on 77 occasions in respect of violations of Swedish air space.—(Times - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung)

A. NORTHERN IRELAND — Security Situation, April to September 1980 - Constitutional Developments - Renewal of Direct Rule - Meeting between British and Irish Prime Ministers

During the six-month period from April to September 1980 Provisional IRA violence in Northern Ireland continued with bomb explosions and attacks on the security forces, while there were also further sectarian killings. [For developments in the preceding six months, see 30311 A.] The principal incidents of violence in the six months from April 1980 are given below.

April 4. A police reservist was shot dead in Carrickfergus (Co. Antrim). *April 9.* Gunmen killed a policeman and wounded three others in an ambush in west Belfast. *April 11.* A police reservist, who was also a senior official with the NI Housing Executive, was shot dead in central Belfast. *April 15.* Bombs severely damaged hotels in Armagh, Lisburn (Co. Antrim) and Strabane (Co. Tyrone). *April 17.* A former member of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was shot dead near his home in Newtownbutler (Co. Fermanagh). *April 29.* A 45-year old unemployed plumber was shot dead in his bedroom in a Protestant district of east Belfast.

May 7. Bomb explosions wrecked two bridges on the railway line between Belfast and Dublin. *May 9.* A police driver was shot dead at Carrickfergus. *May 19.* A 57-year old man was killed by gunmen after being kidnapped from his home in Crossmaglen (south Armagh).

June 4. Mr John Turnly, a Protestant landowner and chairman of the executive of the Irish Independence Party [see page 29024], was killed by three gunmen near his home at Carnlough (Co. Antrim), in which connexion three men, including two brothers, appeared in a Belfast court on Sept. 30 charged with Mr Turnly's murder. *June 7.* A part-time UDR member was shot dead in his hardware store in Newtownbutler. *June 26.* Mrs Miriam Daly, a lecturer at Queen's University, Belfast, and a member of the executive of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), was shot dead in her home in west Belfast.

July 19. A soldier on compassionate leave was shot dead in a bar in Londonderry. *July 21.* Another soldier was killed by a booby-trap bomb in County Tyrone near the border with the Irish Republic.

Aug. 3. Gunmen killed an off-duty UDR member near the village of Pettigo (Co. Donegal) on the Republic's side of the border. *Aug. 10.* A soldier was killed by a bomb explosion at Forkhill (south Armagh). *Aug. 24.* Gunmen killed a 22-year old Roman Catholic man on the doorstep of his home in Larne (Co. Antrim). *Aug. 27.* A 16-year old Roman Catholic boy was shot dead in his home in Lurgan (Co. Armagh).

Sept. 12. The body of Mr Wallace Allen, a police reservist who had been abducted by gunmen on Aug. 31 while driving a milk lorry near Newtownhamilton (south Armagh), was discovered near the border —the Provisional IRA having stated on Sept. 4 that Mr Allen had died on Aug. 31 from injuries received while "resisting arrest". *Sept. 17.* Fire bombs gutted a three-storey office building in the centre of Belfast. *Sept. 23.* A police reservist was shot dead near his home near Magharaveely (Co. Fermanagh), about two miles from the border. *Sept. 30.* Mr Robin Shields, station officer at the Belfast central ambulance depot and a former police reservist, was killed by two gunmen in his office at the Royal Victoria Hospital.

Sir Brooks Richards (62), a deputy secretary in the Cabinet Office and a former British ambassador to Greece, became security co-ordinator for Northern Ireland on June 16 in succession to Sir Maurice Oldfield, who had resigned on health grounds after having held the post since October 1979 [see 30049 A].

Further Constitutional Proposals - Renewal of Direct Rule

Following the adjournment on March 24, 1980, of the constitutional conference attended by representatives of three of the four main NI political parties [see 30311 A], the Government published on July 2 a further consultative document setting out two options for the participation of the Roman Catholic minority in a devolved government. Excerpts from the document, entitled *The Government of Northern Ireland. Proposals for Further Discussion* (Cmnd. 7950), are given below.

Summarizing the results of the constitutional conference, the document said: "The conference had the merit of bringing together, for the first time for some years, leading members of all but one [the Official Unionist Party (OUP)] of the main NI political parties for detailed and sustained discussion of the problems involved in establishing a new administration in Northern Ireland. These exchanges were of value to the Government and, it is hoped, to the parties. They did not lead to a negotiated agreement for a future pattern of government. That was never expected. The conference was aimed at establishing the highest level of agreement between the parties rather than identifying a single detailed scheme of government to which all would subscribe. But the parties made clearer to one another, and to the Government, where they stood on the various issues that arose, what would be acceptable to them, and what would not.

"**Proposals for Further Discussion.** First, there should be a transfer of powers of government in Northern Ireland to an administration based on a single province-wide elected Assembly. The desire for a transfer of powers comparable in scope, though not necessarily identical in detailed arrangement, with the 1920 and 1973 constitutions [for the latter see 26035 A; 25829 A] is widely expressed. There was general opposition among the parties who took part in the conference to a transfer of powers and functions on the lines of local government in Great Britain. The creation of more than one sub-provincial assembly would entail expense, disruption and confusion. Northern Ireland can and should be regarded for governmental purposes above the level of the district councils as a single entity. The restructuring of local government consequent upon the report of the review body on local government in Northern Ireland 1970 (the Macrory Report) took place in 1973 [see page 25290; 25964]. It was an inherent part of the post-Macrory structure that a Northern Ireland Assembly would constitute a single top tier authority of democratic scrutiny and control of services to be managed henceforth on a province-wide basis. Local differences and needs can be catered for where appropriate by special arrangements in the administration of particular services. As regards the size of a provincial Assembly, past experience in Northern Ireland and the needs of adequate representation suggest that it could appropriately contain about 80 members.

"Second, in the light of the special political considerations that apply in Northern Ireland, the method of election to the Assembly should be the single transferable vote form of proportional representation. This method is familiar and well-established in Northern Ireland, having been used since 1973 for all elections except those to Westminster. There is no sufficient reason to depart from it now.

"Third, a new Assembly and the executive body derived from it should have responsibility over a range of subjects broadly similar to that transferred in 1973, i.e. principally agriculture, commerce, education, employment, environmental matters including housing, health and social services, although there might be a need for some changes to take account of subsequent developments. A transfer on this scale would enable the existing administrative machinery of the NI departments now under the direct control of the Secretary of State to come under the control of the new body, which would thus be able to make a concerted effort to tackle the distinctive problems afflicting the province after years of unrest.

"Fourth, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would continue to be wholly accountable to Parliament at Westminster for the responsibilities and functions which he will continue to exercise. These would be those reserved and excepted matters, notably law and order, for which he would be directly responsible and the consideration of the total NI public expenditure requirement, in consultation with members of the NI Executive and in the context of UK expenditure programmes. The Secretary of State would need the means to ensure that actions of the administration in the transferred field did not jeopardize the exercise of the Government's responsibilities in the reserved or excepted fields, e.g. to ensure that the UK's international obligations were observed.

"Fifth, the Secretary of State would convene under his chairmanship representative leading members of the Assembly as an advisory council for consultation on those matters for which he will remain ministerially responsible and accountable to Parliament.

"Sixth, the Assembly should have power as in 1974 to legislate on transferred matters. The political parties in Northern Ireland have expressed a desire for legislative powers to be exercised again locally rather than at Westminster. Past tradition and practice and present needs point in the direction of transferring legislative power. From 1921 to 1972 [i.e. until the introduction of direct rule from Westminster—see 25197 A], and again during the short life of the 1974 NI Executive [see 26301 A; 26573 A], there was a separate legislature at Stormont. For the past eight years the practice of separate NI legislation has been maintained through an Order in Council procedure precisely to enable a local legislature to resume the function as soon as devolved government was restored; and there is, over a wide range of subject matter, a separate corpus of statute law for Northern Ireland. Moreover, the existing administrative institutions in Northern Ireland are designed to service a local system of government with corresponding legislative powers. For all these reasons the Government concludes that it would be appropriate to confer legislative as well as executive powers on a NI Assembly.

"Seventh, the executive direction of the NI Departments would be the responsibility of individual members of the Assembly, acting as heads of the NI Departments.

"Eighth, there should be departmental committees of the Assembly. Irrespective of the form which the Executive may take, there will be an important role for committees formed of elected representatives of all significant parties to scrutinize the actions of the Executive and offer advice to the administration. The powers of the committees, which could between them cover all the NI Departments, could include calling for papers and persons; scrutinizing departmental policy including the departmental estimates; holding hearings on proposed legislation; and taking the committee stage of measures not taken on the floor of the Assembly. They might also have allotted time in the Assembly for debating their own proposals for legislation. Their chairmen, and perhaps deputy chairmen, might be salaried and, together with the members, could be either proportionately representative of the Assembly as a whole or equally distributed between the parties supporting the Executive and the opposition. The choice would be determined by the method of selecting the Executive.

"Ninth, the existing safeguards and remedies against discrimination on religious or political grounds should be maintained. There may in addition need to be some form of appeal to the Secretary of State, or to Westminster, against discriminatory acts on the part of the Assembly, or Executive. The form that this might best take would depend on the shape of the arrangements adopted for the formation of the Executive.

"In the nine aspects outlined above the requirements and interests of both communities appear to the Government to coincide, and moreover to be capable of being accommodated in a system of efficient and responsible government. The Government also believes that the policies of the four main parties are broadly compatible with a system containing these nine features, although there would be differences of view on some matters of detail, provided that agreement could be reached on a system of government as a whole, including the question of formation of the Executive. It is on this that the differences among the major parties are most clearly and significantly displayed, as the following paragraphs make clear.

"The Alliance Party draw attention to the fundamental community division which they say is at the root of the political problem and can be resolved only by the creation of political institutions based upon the principle of partnership. The Alliance Party say that an administration drawn from all substantial elected groupings on the principle of proportionality would create political structures which both sections of the community would support. At the conference they made detailed proposals for an executive committee system of government based on proportionality.

"The SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) say that the essential requirement is to create a political process which will allow mutual confidence and trust to develop in Northern Ireland, leading to lasting peace and stability. This can only be achieved through a period of partnership between the two communities. At the conference the SDLP, while not regarding partnership as a natural end in itself, advocated a cabinet-type partnership administration reflecting proportionately the strength in the Assembly of all parties willing to participate in such an administration.

"The DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) say that if any system is to be acceptable it must not seek to deny to an elected majority the rights which democracy bestows on the majority; the Executive should be formed by that party or group of parties which has been placed in the majority in the elected forum. The DUP accordingly proposed at the conference a cabinet style administration formed by a majority grouping in the Assembly.

"In their proposals sent to the Prime Minister in December 1979, the OUP advocated a form of devolved government with a cabinet system of administration formed by the leader of the largest group of members returned to the Assembly.

"Thus the four parties are far from agreeing on the crucial question how arrangements are to be made in a new system of administration for the involvement of representatives of the minority community. They will need significantly to narrow the difference between them if the Government is to be able to introduce in the next session of Parliament legislation which would transfer substantial powers back to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland. However, the Government is resolved to pursue its efforts to find a basis on which a generally acceptable system could be established, and in this document offers suggestions for the involvement of the representatives of the minority community for further discussion and negotiation.

"**Provision for Minority Participation.** The Westminster model of forming the Executive which is favoured by some NI parties is the classic form of democracy—majority rule. It is based on the premise that a majority can enforce its will and that a political system should reflect that reality by institutionalizing the predominance of the will of the majority. It is the natural concomitant of the development of a political party system in which the parties reflect and advocate distinct approaches to the matters—e.g. management of the economy, provision of public services—for which the executive is responsible. It favours the development of a responsible opposition, challenging the Government and ready to take over from it. The prevailing view is that this system meets the political needs of Great Britain well, and it is common to many political systems elsewhere in the world.

"The special features of political life in Northern Ireland mean that application there of the majority rule system would be almost certain to put control of the administration in the hands of representatives of the majority community permanently. This is not inevitable; in certain circumstances representatives of the minority community could gain places in the administration—a party or parties representing elements in the majority community might choose to form a coalition administration with minority representatives. But given the present basis of political party allegiance in Northern Ireland that is an unlikely outcome of any election. It is far more probable that the representatives of the minority community would be, as they were between 1921 and 1972, in the minority in any elected Assembly with representatives of the majority community unwilling to form a coalition with them. The majority rule system would therefore in practice exclude them from the Executive.

"This consequence of applying the Westminster system in the Northern Ireland context makes it vital, in the Government's view, that any scheme for the government of Northern Ireland should, while retaining the support of the majority community, depart substantially from the Westminster model. Two alternative approaches to the involvement of the minority in government are set out below. Each is intended to secure the responsible participation of the minority community in the administration of Northern Ireland. The first would achieve this aim by ensuring that any party represented in the Assembly which won a certain proportion of the popular vote had a seat or seats in the Executive. The second would achieve the same aim by securing that, while minority representatives had no guaranteed place in the Executive, the power of the Executive was balanced against that of another institution within the Assembly in which the minority, being in opposition, was assured a prominent place.

"Either of these methods of securing minority participation in government will seem strange judged by conventional Westminster criteria. But the political situation in Northern Ireland is itself unconventional in some crucial respects. First, there is the absence already referred to of the normal prospect of alternation of parties in power; the likelihood is that the parties representing the minority community will constitute a permanent political minority in permanent opposition. Next, what chiefly distinguishes the NI political parties from one another is their attitude to the question of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland—a matter which will be outside the competence of a devolved administration. The range of responsibilities likely to be transferred at the outset to a NI administration, though of substantial extent, has not in the past given rise to great ideological differences on socio-economic grounds among the main parties; and this may well prove to be the future pattern also, especially when account is taken of the extent of NI financial dependence on the UK Government and the constraints placed upon the freedom of action of a NI administration by the expectations of 'parity' of services. Indeed, there will be a strong managerial element in the primary task of a NI Executive: the allocation of resources among contending socio-economic priorities within a total sum determined by Westminster. These considerations lead to the conclusion that a system of government markedly different from the Westminster model is justified not only by the political circumstances of Northern Ireland but also by reference to the nature of the task of government.

"**Responsibility shared within the Executive.** The first alternative course to Westminster style majority rule which the Government puts forward is a system which guarantees any party winning a certain proportion of the popular vote a seat in the Executive. Thus a party with, say, 25 per cent of the popular vote would be assured of a quarter of the Executive seats.

"There are various ways of providing for an Executive along these lines to be formed. One way would be by direct popular election, thus preserving the primacy of the ballot box. Simultaneously with the election of the Assembly the electorate would be asked to vote separately, and by a system of proportional representation on a province-wide basis, for candidates for the Executive. Direct election in this way would ensure that each member of the Executive owed his place to support in the province as a whole.

"Another way would be to have a single (PR) election to the Assembly and then form the Executive by reference to the strengths of the parties elected to the Assembly. This would not require any external intervention. Either the Assembly members could elect the Executive from their own midst, using an appropriate mechanism to allocate portfolios to the successful candidates; or a simple mathematical formula could be used to allocate Executive portfolios to those parties which obtained a qualifying number of members in the Assembly. In either case faith would be kept with the ballot box, since the composition of the Executive would reflect the views of the electorate who had determined the make up of the Assembly.

"These are means of achieving an Executive in which all significant viewpoints are reflected and which, therefore, should be capable of undertaking its tasks with the support of both communities. The key consideration is this. If, as the Government is disposed to believe, adoption of a system which ensured that the minority community had places on the Executive would crucially affect the attitude of the minority towards acceptance of the political institutions of Northern Ireland, then that constitutes a powerful reason why the majority community should put aside its misgivings—understandable though these are—and accept a system of a proportionately constituted Executive. The prize to be gained, in terms of the cohesion of Northern Ireland and the prospects for reconciliation and reconstruction, could be a rich one. All sections of opinion in Northern Ireland should therefore consider carefully whether a proportional system of government would not be the best way to unite both sides of the community in support of new political institutions.

"**Responsibility shared within the Assembly.** An alternative approach, while not giving the minority community any guarantee of seats in the Executive, would involve them in government by some other equally adequate means. For the minority community, seats in the Executive have come to assume a symbolic importance and they are understandably reluctant to acquiesce in a system which they fear would place their representatives in a position of permanent and powerless opposition in the Assembly. Nevertheless, the Government believes that the holding of Executive seats is not the only way for minority representatives to participate in and influence the process of government in both the legislative and executive forms. Genuine opportunities for such participation are provided in the following very different approach to the decision taking process in government.

"The suggestions in the following paragraphs are designed to deal with the situation in which, for lack of agreement on a proportional system, the Executive is to be formed from the party, or parties, commanding a majority in the Assembly, and in consequence an effective degree of involvement of the minority must be guaranteed at other points in the system.

"One possibility sometimes mooted would be to require that the Chief Executive, when he had appointed the members of his team, should obtain the support not merely of a simple, but of a weighted, majority in the Assembly. This would oblige him to obtain some support from minority representatives. However, if such support could only be obtained at the price of allowing the minority to participate in the Executive, then either stalemate would result, because the majority parties declined to share power in that way, or, if the majority parties did agree, the problem of minority participation in government would have been solved—in which case the proportional Executive system set out above would probably have been acceptable. Either way this possibility does not appear relevant for the present purpose.

"The problem is to devise a way in which, without the minority parties being represented directly in the Executive, they can, while formally in opposition, share responsibility for the administration sufficiently to satisfy themselves that the interests of the minority community are adequately reflected in the decisions of government. To achieve this it becomes necessary to create a novel institution in which powers may be vested in order to serve as a balance against those to be exercised by the Executive; but to do so in a way which would secure a constructive relationship and avoid deadlock.

"It has already been suggested that there should be departmental committees of the Assembly with a range of powers. These committees would not themselves be appropriate bodies to fulfil the role of the new institution now needed; but if the chairmanships and deputy chairmanships of those committees were allocated equally between Assembly members of those parties supporting the Executive and those opposing it, then those chairmen and deputy chairmen could together form a new body, the Council of the Assembly, with a chairman drawn from its membership but with no additional voting power. Composed in this way it would thus be equally divided between those Assembly members supporting and opposing the Executive, and to be effective any proposition on which it had to decide would have to attract 50 per cent + one votes.

"The precise powers of the Council of the Assembly are for discussion. As a minimum it would have an advisory role, with the Executive required to consult it on certain occasions or topics, but with no requirement that the Executive accept that advice. This, however, would not be enough to bring about that involvement of the minority community in the task of government which is the objective, and if the minority is to possess real influence through their presence on it, it would need to have some or all of the following powers:

"(*a*) A power whereby the Council could delay legislation, though not appropriation measures, for a certain period. Though of limited effect, this would focus public attention on anything to which the minority objected. (*b*) A power to refer proposed legislation back to the Assembly, or to refer proposed legislation or executive decisions, if considered to be discriminatory, to an outside appeals body of a judicial or political nature. (*c*) A provision requiring that, before being passed by the Assembly, all legislation and the public expenditure programme would require the Council's approval. This would give the Council a blocking power, since the 50 per cent membership of the parties supporting the Executive would be insufficient to give approval. It is to be hoped that in practice such a power would never be used, but that the possibility that it might be used would be sufficient to lead the two sides to an accommodation on any issue between them. However, in order to ensure that deadlock did not bring government to an unacceptable halt, this power would have to be made subject in the last resort to override by order made by the Secretary of State, which could perhaps be subject to parliamentary approval at Westminster.

"The existence of such a Council would be an incentive to the Executive to frame and implement its policies by consultation and discussion among the principal parties in the Assembly and in the committees of the Assembly so as to minimize intervention from the Council and avoid confrontation. The members of the Assembly, those holding office in the Executive and those holding office in the departmental committees, would have an interest in consulting together so as to achieve a high level of accommodation and co-operation. The salaried status of the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the departmental committees, the representation within their ranks of the minority community, and the formal powers of the Council of the Assembly comprising all the chairmen and deputy chairmen should mark the effective involvement of the minority and secure it a powerful voice in the formulation of policy decisions about the government of the province and in day to day administration. The Secretary of State might initially be required to act as arbiter and would have the formal powers to do so, but it would be in all the local parties' interests to develop conventions and procedures to avoid having to involve Westminster in the settlement of disputes."

Parliamentary Debate on Consultative Document

The House of Commons debated and took note of the consultative document on July 9.

Mr Humphrey Atkins (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland), opening the debate, said that, in considering whether they could agree on a transfer of power within the framework of the Government's proposals, the political leaders and people of Northern Ireland would do well to ask themselves what would be the consequences of a failure to agree. There was no advantage to either community in Ulster in sitting tight in the hope of a better bargain later on. He continued: "I say to the majority community that I do not see any Government at Westminster transferring power to institutions in Northern Ireland that do not provide for minority participation in a meaningful way. I say to the minority that I do not see, in practical terms, how a broadening of the canvas of discussion so as to bring in all of Ireland makes it any easier to solve the difficult problem of how to provide for the government of the divided community in the North."

It would be said, Mr Atkins continued, that the document's proposals were complicated and unusual. They were, but then so was the situation in Northern Ireland. The first option set out considered ways of sharing responsibility within the Executive, while the second shared responsibility between the Executive and the Assembly. The composition of the Executive would reflect the support for the various parties in the electorate at large. Contrary to what was sometimes said about this approach, the power of the majority would not be inhibited. The majority in the Assembly would be accurately reflected in a majority on the Executive, and the latter would require the approval of the former for its policies. He did not suggest that such a system would be appropriate for the formation of a sovereign government operating in the context of an adversarial Parliament. But Northern Ireland's circumstances were different. This would be a subordinate administration without responsibility for defence, fundamental management of the economy and the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. This method of forming an executive would be unconventional by Westminster standards. It would have more familiar features to those who lived in countries where coalition was the common form of government or where the executive as well as the deliberative and legislative body was directly elected.

The second approach was devised to meet a situation in which agreement that the minority should be represented in the Executive did not exist. It sought to give the minority a prominent place within another arm of the constitutional system which would also guarantee it an effective degree of involvement in the administration of the province. The power of the Executive, formed by the leader of the largest party or parties in the Assembly, would be balanced by a new institution—the Council of the Assembly—which it was suggested might have power to delay legislation or refer it back or block it. Each option provided a different degree of power to the minority representatives. In certain circumstances, the Secretary of State should have the power to override subject to the approval of Parliament. He did not believe that this was a recipe for deadlock. If there was a proposal that the opposition felt was really damaging to their interests, then they could use their power to make the majority think again. Was this not precisely what they wanted to ensure? In any case, deadlock could never be complete because the Secretary of State's power of override could be called into use.

Mr Brynmor John, chief opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland, said that the opposition would support a properly devolved Assembly, although one of the key elements was that there must be substantial agreement before such a scheme was brought forward. The onus rested on the community leaders in Northern Ireland to shed their intransigent attitudes and modes of expression. If these talks were to succeed, they would need to display patience and tolerance.

Mr James Molyneaux, the OUP leader, said that those who led and those who represented the political parties in Northern Ireland should not be saddled with responsibility without having the power to match it. The reality was that the Westminster system generally provided the best known guarantee of the rights of minorities and majorities, whatever their colour, creed or religion.

The Rev. Ian Paisley, the DUP leader, said that it was evident that the new Assembly would have no security powers, although any effective government in Northern Ireland must be able to deal with the defence and safety of its people. His party did not want responsibility without power. To set up an advisory forum and pretend that it would be effective would be ridiculous.

Following the debate, the House approved without a division the Northern Ireland Act 1974 (Interim Period Extension) Order 1980 renewing the period of direct rule for a further year until July 1981. The Order was similarly approved by the House of Lords on July 11. [For 1979 extension see 30049 A.] Mr Atkins on July 22 began talks with the NI parties on the new constitutional proposals.

Meeting between British and Irish Prime Ministers

Northern Ireland was among the subjects discussed at a meeting in London on May 21 between the UK and Irish Prime Ministers, Mrs Margaret Thatcher and Mr Charles Haughey respectively. Mrs Thatcher was accompanied by Mr Atkins and Lord Carrington, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and Mr Haughey by his Foreign Minister, Mr Brian Lenihan.

The following communiqué was issued at the conclusion of the meeting:

"The *Taoiseach* [i.e. Mr Haughey] and the Prime Minister agreed that they wished to develop new and closer political co-operation between their two Governments. They agreed to hold regular meetings on a continuing basis, accompanied by other ministers as appropriate. They had a useful and constructive exchange of views about the prospects for political progress in Northern Ireland. While agreeing with the Prime Minister that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the *Taoiseach* reaffirmed that it is the wish of the Irish Government to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace. The *Taoiseach* and the Prime Minister recorded agreement on the importance they attach to the unique relationship between the peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic, and on the need to further this relationship in the interest of peace and reconciliation."

The two Prime Ministers also "noted with satisfaction the efforts being made by the two Governments, both separately and in co-operation, in the field of security".—(Times - Guardian - Irish Times - Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin - Hansard) *(Prev. rep. 30311 A)*

A. FRANCE — Partial Senate Elections - Government Changes

Indirect elections were held on Sept. 28 for 98 seats in the French Senate (the size of which rose from 295 to 305 members), comprising 95 seats in metropolitan France, one each for the overseas territories of French Polynesia and the Wallis and Futuna Islands and one for the overseas department of French Guiana. Two other senators, representing French citizens living abroad, had been designated by the *Conseil supérieur des français à l'étranger* on June 24, thus giving a total of 100 Senate seats whose mandate was renewed for a nine-year term. [For the previous triennial Senate elections in September 1977, see 28741 A.]

The electorate for the 1980 elections, which were contested by a total of 392 candidates, consisted of 41,720 members of 41 departmental electoral colleges made up of National Assembly deputies, members of departmental *conseils-généraux* and representatives of local commune councils. In metropolitan France the elections concerned the "A" series of departments beginning with the letters A to I (except for Essonne and Hauts-de-Seine).

A law enacted in July 1976 had created 33 new Senate seats, of which 12 were filled in 1977 and a further 10 in the 1980 elections; the other 11 were scheduled to be filled in 1983, when the Senate would thus total 316 members.

The elections resulted in the opposition Socialist Party consolidating its position as the largest formation in the Senate, although Socialist gains were limited as a result of the refusal of the Communists to support Socialist candidates in run-off voting. (For Socialist-Communist dissension during and after the 1978 National Assembly elections, see pages 29318-19, 29326-27.) Nevertheless, the "majority" parties currently participating in the French Government retained a substantial overall majority in the Senate, with gains registered by the Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la république* (RPR) and the Radical Party compensating for losses recorded by the Republican Party (PR), the *Centre des démocrates sociaux* (CDS) and the *Centre national des indépendants et paysans* (CNIP); at the same time there was an increase in the number of senators elected under the designation of the *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF), the umbrella organization formed by the PR, CDS and other centrist groups in 1978 [see pages 29317, 29327].

Seats won by the various parties and groupings were as follows (with seats vacated given in parentheses): Socialists 30 (21), RPR 12 (6), PR 12 (14), CDS 11 (12), Radicals 8 (4), UDF 6 (3), CNIP 6 (10), Left Radicals 5 (6), various "majority" 5 (7), various opposition 2 (3), Communists 1 (1). One of the seats at issue had been vacant before the elections.

Following the elections the numerical strength of the various Senate groups, including attached (*rattaché*) and associated (*apparenté*) members, became as follows:

	New Senate	Old Senate
Socialists	69	60
Communists	23	23
Democratic Left[1]	39	40
Centrist Union[2]	67	59
Republicans and Independents	52	51
RPR	41	33
Independent Republicans of Social Action[3] ..	—	16
Unattached (*non-inscrits*)	13	11
Total	304[4]	293[5]

[1] Including a sub-group of 13 Left Radicals.

[2] CDS, UDF and other centrist senators.

[3] Predominantly CNIP, whose losses in the elections reduced the group to below the required minimum of 15 members, so that its remaining members joined other "majority" groups or became unattached senators.

[4] One seat vacant.

[5] Two seats vacant.

M. Alain Poher (Centrist Union) was re-elected president of the Senate on Oct. 2 by 193 votes to 75 for M. Edgar Tailhades (Socialist) and 24 for Mme Hélène Luc (Communist).

Government Changes

The decision of three of the four government members elected to the Senate on Sept. 28 (out of five who stood) to take up their seats in the Upper House necessitated changes in the composition of the Government, which were announced on Oct. 2 as follows:

(i) M. Joël Le Theule (RPR), hitherto Transport Minister, became Minister of Defence *vice* M. Yvon Bourges (RPR); (ii) M. Daniel Hoeffel (UDF-CDS), hitherto Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, was appointed Minister of Transport; (iii) M. Jean-François Deniau (UDF-PR), hitherto Minister of External Trade, was appointed to the new post of Minister-Delegate (attached to the Prime Minister) responsible for administrative reforms; (iv) M. Michel Cointat (RPR) entered the Government as Minister of External Trade; and (v) M. Rémy Montagne (UDF-CDS) entered the Government as Secretary of State for Health and Social Security.

At the same time (i) three Secretaries of State left the Government and were not replaced, namely M. Marc Becam (RPR, Local Authorities), M. Marcel Cavaillé (UDF-PR, Housing) and M. Jacques Pelletier (presidential majority, Education); (ii) M. Jacques Legendre (RPR), Secretary of State for Employment Training, was detached from the Minister of Labour and Participation and placed under the Prime Minister; and (iii) Mme Monique Pelletier (UDF-PR), Minister-Delegate responsible for the condition of women [see page 29325], was elevated to the status of sixth-ranking minister in the Cabinet.

M. Cointat (59) had previously been Minister of Agriculture in 1971-72 under the premiership of M. Jacques Chaban-Delmas [see 24404 A; 25373 A]; **M. Montagne** (63), an ardent pro-European, had first been elected to the National Assembly in 1958 and at the time of his appointment was a member of its finance commission.

MM. Bourges, Becam and Pelletier had all decided to take up Senate seats to which they had been elected on Sept. 28, whereas M. Cavaillé resigned his government post notwithstanding his failure to secure election. A fifth government member, M. Robert Galley

(RPR), had successfully contested the Senate elections but had decided to retain his post as Minister of Co-operation, his seat in the Upper House being therefore taken by his alternate (*suppléant*).

At the beginning of 1980 (i) M. Jean Matteoli (RPR) had resumed his duties as Minister of Labour and Participation on Jan. 21, which had been held ad interim by M. Christian Beullac (the Education Minister) following the former's incapacitation shortly after his appointment in November 1979 [see 30067 A]; and (ii) M. Jean-Marie Poirier (50) was appointed to the (non-governmental) post of presidential spokesman in late January in succession to M. Pierre Hunt, who had carried out this function since May 1978 [see page 29325].—(Le Monde) (*Prev. rep. 1977 Senate Elections 28741 A; Cabinet 30067 A*)

A. MOROCCO — Constitutional Amendments approved in Referendums - Amnesties for Political and Other Prisoners - Trials of Students - Cabinet Change

In referendums held on May 23 and May 30 the Moroccan electorate overwhelmingly endorsed proposals put forward by King Hassan respectively (i) to lower the age of majority for the royal accession and reform the regency council, and (ii) to extend by two years the term in office of deputies of the Chamber of Representatives (Parliament). (The electorate of almost 7,000,000 included members of the armed and national security forces and also the Moroccan emigré population, all of whom had hitherto been barred from voting.)

In the referendum held on May 23 Moroccans were asked to approve an amendment to the 1972 Constitution [for which see 25155 A], which would (i) reduce the age of majority of the heir to the throne from 18 to 16 years (Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed being then already 16 years nine months old); (ii) modify the composition of the regency council, which would henceforth be presided over by the first president of the Supreme Court (the post of president having hitherto been entrusted to the oldest and nearest male relative of the King, currently Prince Moulay Abdullah, King Hassan's brother who had recently been ill); and (iii) confine the functions of the regency council to acting as a "consultative body at the side of the King" while the latter was between the ages of 16 and 20 (rather than 18-22 as was formerly the case).

A total of 96.93 per cent of the electorate cast their votes on May 23, of whom 99.71 per cent voted in favour of the amendments proposed. The referendum was boycotted by the (leftist opposition) *Parti du progrès et du socialisme* (PPS).

Commenting on the forthcoming referendum in an address to the nation on May 13, King Hassan had said that the reasons for making changes to the regency council, and in particular to the post of president of the council, were to make it "more democratic", to "strip it of its personal nature" and to make it "more objective", thereby increasing its effectiveness and protecting it "from eventualities which would affect it if remained tied to the fate of one particular person whose appointment is predetermined".

The referendum was presented by the pro-government media as an "occasion for the Moroccan people to exercise its democratic rights and display its allegiance to the King". No official reason was, however, given for the lowering of the age of majority of the heir to the throne, this change giving rise to considerable speculation that King Hassan intended abdicating, was seriously ill or feared an assassination attempt.

The May 30 referendum called for the extension of the term of the Chamber of Representatives from four to six years, and for the president of the Chamber to be elected every three years instead of annually, in order to "improve continuity and stability in Parliament". This change meant that those deputies elected in the 1977 elections [see 28477 A] would remain in office until 1983 and that the elections due to take place in 1981 would be postponed to 1983.

Under the 1972 Constitution the Chamber of Representatives consisted of 264 members, 176 of these being elected by direct universal suffrage and the remaining 88 by an electoral college of communal and municipal councils and professional bodies, themselves elected every six years. [For communal and municipal council elections in 1976, see 28127 B.]

In the May 30 referendum 91.17 per cent of the electorate cast their votes, 96.74 of these being in favour of the amendment. The referendum was boycotted by the PPS and also by another leftist opposition party, the *Union socialiste des forces populaires* (USFP)—with respectively one and 16 seats in the Chamber of Representatives—who both, moreover, contested the authenticity of the referendum results.

Amnesties for Political and Other Prisoners - Trials of Students

As a result of royal clemency measures an estimated 91 political prisoners were released in July and August 1980, the majority of these being members of the USFP who between 1973 and 1977 had received prison sentences for alleged anti-state activities [see 25892 A; 26131 C; 28027 B; 28260 A; 29801 A]. According to *Le Monde* of Aug. 17-18, however, some 150 political prisoners remained incarcerated, most of these being members of the Marxist-Leninist *Ilal Amam* movement, several members of which had been among those sentenced in February 1977 for conspiring to overthrow the Government [see 28260 A].

Prominent among those released (although himself not a member of the USFP) was Mr Abdellatif Laabi, who had formerly been an editor of the cultural review *Souffles* and a member of the banned Communist Party, and who had been sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in Casablanca in August 1973 charged inter alia with "an attempt against the internal security of the state" [see 26131 C]. The pardon did not include Mr Abraham Serfaty, another leading left-wing activist and former associate of Mr Laabi, who was serving a term of life imprisonment for plotting to overthrow the Government [see 26131 C; 28260 A; and also page 29802].

Prior to the announcement of the amnesties in 1980 the French-based Committee against Repression in Morocco had reported on Dec. 7, 1979, that six other political prisoners, who had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment in 1977 [see 28260 A], had been freed from prison on Dec. 3 after their sentences had been reduced by two years.

The same committee had previously stated that three political prisoners, namely Mr Sion Assidon, Mr Najib Bribri and Mr Rahal Jibri, had absconded in the first part of October 1979 while hospitalized in Rabat. Mr Jibri was said to have been killed while attempting to escape and Mr Assidon and Mr Bribri to have been recaptured several days later. In late October Mr Moïse Benita and a Frenchwoman, Mlle Sylviane Debus, were sentenced in Rabat to respectively three months' and six months' imprisonment for their alleged complicity in the escape attempt but both were provisionally released on Dec. 11; the following day Mlle Debus was expelled from Morocco and returned to France.

The release of Moroccan political prisoners had been demanded by certain trade union bodies and in particular by the main students' union, the *Union nationale des étudiants marocains* (UNEM), which organized a series of strikes and boycotts of lectures in early 1980 to press inter alia for amnesties for political prisoners (and exiles), among whom were a number of students. Several of the students detained, the majority of whom belonged to Marxist-Leninist movements, were brought to trial in the first part of 1980 and some were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three months to a year as well as fines.

According to *Le Monde* of Aug. 14, 1980, a total of 329 acts of clemency for prisoners not convicted of political activities were approved by King Hassan to mark the end of Ramadan. Of these, 118 were released, and 211 others had their sentences reduced.

New Appointment to Cabinet

It was reported on Feb. 25, 1980, that Mr Moulay Ahmed Alaoui had that day been appointed Minister of Tourism in Place of Mr Abdeslam Znined (spelt Znided in 29801 A).—(Le Monde - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Constitution 26711 A; Clemency Measures, Cabinet 29801 A; Political Trials 28260 A*)

B. YUGOSLAVIA — New LCY President

It was announced on Oct. 20, 1980, that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) had elected Mr Lazar Mojsov (59) as its President for a one-year term of office. Mr Mojsov, a member from Macedonia elected to the LCY Presidium in June 1979 [see 29842 C], succeeded Mr Stevan Doronjski (from the autonomous province of Vojvodina), who had been appointed acting President of the Presidium in October 1979 [see 30050 A] and who had in June 1980, following the death of President Tito, taken on the (newly created) full title and duties of President of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee [see 30472 A]. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. 30050 A, 30472 A*)

A. SOUTH KOREA — Extension of Martial Law - The Kwangju Uprising - Resignation of President Choi Kyu Hah - General Chun Doo Hwan elected President - Mr Kim Dae Jung sentenced to Death - Adoption of New Constitution - Other Political Developments, March to October 1980

Following a wave of strikes and widespread student demonstrations, martial law was extended throughout South Korea on May 17, 1980, all political activities were banned and many political leaders were arrested, including the prominent dissident Mr Kim Dae Jung. These measures led to a popular uprising in Kwangju, which was suppressed by the Army on May 27. Political power was assumed on May 31 by a Special Committee for National Security Measures controlled by the armed forces, which carried out a sweeping purge of the political parties, the civil service and the press. President Choi Kyu Hah (who had been elected in December 1979—see 30216 A) resigned on Aug. 16, and Gen. Chun Doo Hwan (head of the Army Security Command) was elected to succeed him on Aug. 27. Mr Kim Dae Jung was condemned to death on Sept. 17 on a charge of conspiring to seize power. After being approved by a referendum, a new Constitution came into force on Oct. 27, when the National Assembly and all political parties were dissolved. Details of these and other recent political developments are given below.

Political Developments, March to April 1980

President Choi appointed on March 13 a committee to advise him on the revision of the 1972 Constitution [see 25607 A], which included representatives of the political parties, trade unions, the universities, the press, the legal profession, industry and commerce, and the churches, with the Prime Minister, Mr Shin Hyon Hwack, as chairman. Its appointment, however, led to controversy between the Government and the National Assembly, which claimed the right to draw up the new constitution and had already set up a committee for the purpose. Mr Shin refused on April 23 to give evidence before the Assembly committee, but finally did so on May 3.

Both the two main parties suffered from internal divisions during this period. The ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in April expelled four members of the Assembly, including Mr Lee Hu Rak, a former director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), who had strongly attacked the party leader, Mr Kim Chong Pil. The opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) was divided into factions supporting respectively Mr Kim Young Sam, the party president, and Mr Kim Dae Jung, both of whom were regarded as possible candidates for the presidency. Mr Kim Dae Jung stated on April 7 that he and other "unaffiliated opposition elements" had given up their intention to join the NDP.

President Choi on April 14 appointed Lt.-Gen. Chun Doo Hwan acting director of the KCIA. The post had been vacant since Dec. 13, 1979, when the previous acting director, Gen. Lee Hee Song, had been appointed Army Chief of Staff and martial law administrator [see page 30219], and the agency had since been run by its deputy director, Mr Yun Il Kyun. As Gen. Chun was already head of the Army Security Command, his new appointment gave him complete control over national security.

Labour and Student Unrest

An unprecedented wave of strikes occurred in factories and mines during April 1980 in support of demands for wage increases to cope with the cost of living, which had risen by 12 per cent in the past three months and 28 per cent in the past year. Almost all the disputes were settled peacefully after the employers had agreed to make concessions to the strikers' demands, but two led to serious violence.

After the police had intervened to break up a sit-in strike by coalminers at the north-eastern town of Sabuk, four days of rioting occurred on April 21-24 in which a policeman was killed and 52 people injured. The strike ended when the management agreed to grant a 20 per cent wage increase backdated to January and to increase annual bonuses. On April 29 about 1,000 striking steelworkers clashed with the police in Pusan (the major port on the south-east coast), wounding 11 of them. Seven of the Pusan rioters were sentenced by a military court on June 9 to prison terms ranging from one to seven years, and on June 17 the Martial Law Command announced that 81 people had been provisionally charged with leading the Sabuk riots.



(*Le Monde*)

Demonstrations by students began on March 19, and by the middle of April had spread to more than half the universities and colleges in the country. The students' demands were at first confined to academic issues, including the removal of staff who had collaborated with the regime of President Park Chung Hee (who was assassinated in October 1979—see 30216 A—after over 18 years in power), the abolition of compulsory military training for students and student representation on university councils. A number of university presidents resigned in consequence of the agitation, and on May 1 the Minister of Education, Dr Kim Ok Gil, announced that the period of military training would be reduced from four hours a week to two and that third-year students would be exempt.

From May 1 onwards the demonstrations assumed a political character, as the students put forward demands for the resignation of Mr Shin Hyon Hwack and Gen. Chun Doo Hwan, the immediate lifting of martial law, freedom of the press and free trade unions. The demonstrations were generally peaceful, but a number of clashes with the police occurred when the students attempted to leave university premises and to demonstrate in the streets.

A mass meeting of students at Seoul University decided on May 13 to organize three days of demonstrations, and later the same day over 2,000 students demonstrated in the centre of the city, 40 of them being arrested. About 30,000 students marched through the streets on May 14, and clashes with the police continued for several hours. An even larger demonstration took place on the following day, the number of the demonstrators, who included workers as well as students, being estimated by the police at 70,000. In battles between the demonstrators and the police (again according to police figures) 403 people were injured, of whom 372 were policemen, and a policeman was killed when a youth, who was later arrested by the students, commandeered a bus and drove it through a police cordon. Similar demonstrations took place in Kwangju (in the south-west), where 30,000 students demonstrated and the police were stoned, Chonju (south-west), Taegu (south-east) and Suwon and Inchon (both near Seoul).

In a broadcast in the evening of May 15 Mr Shin Hyon Hwack appealed for order and promised that the Government would "meet the people's aspirations by shortening to the maximum extent what possibly can be shortened in the political schedule". The student leaders called off the demonstrations on the following morning. Later in the day Mr Kim Dae Jung and Mr Kim Young Sam issued a joint statement calling for the speedy adoption of constitutional amendments which would allow a presidential election to be held before the end of the year, the resignation of Mr Shin and Gen. Chun, the immediate lifting of martial law and the release of political prisoners.

Martial Law extended - Arrest of Mr Kim Dae Jung and Mr Kim Chong Pil - Resignation of Government - Cabinet formed by Mr Park Choong Hoon

From midnight on May 17 martial law, which had been in force since Oct. 27, 1979, except in the southern island of Cheju [see page 30217], was extended throughout the country. (The martial law administrator became as a result directly responsible to the President rather than to the Defence Minister as hitherto.) Under Martial Law Decree No. 10 all political activity, including indoor and outdoor meetings for political purposes, was banned; indoor and outdoor meetings with no political purpose, except ceremonial occasions and religious functions, had to be notified; press and radio reports were subjected to precensorship; the universities were closed (the closure being eventually revoked on Aug. 28); strikes and absence from work without a reason were banned; and the spreading of rumours, slandering the former and present heads of state and any other incitement or act undermining public order were prohibited. Persons violating the decree were subject to arrest, detention and search without warrant and "stern punishment".

In a broadcast on May 18 President Choi asserted that North Korea was "manoeuvring to create a decisive moment for a southward invasion by inspiring, praising and stirring up the campus disturbances", and that leading South Korean politicians had "incited and stimulated the social unrest". He gave an assurance, however, that "there will be no change in political development". US embassy officials in Seoul commented that "we have no confirming evidence of a North Korean military threat".

It was officially announced on May 18 that Mr Kim Chong Pil, Mr Lee Hu Rak and seven other political figures had been arrested on charges of corruption, and Mr Kim Dae Jung and six others on charges of inciting student and labour unrest. Dissident sources stated on May 19, however, that at least 100 people had been arrested, including five opposition members of the Assembly.

The martial law authorities on May 19 ordered the closing of the National Assembly, which was due to begin a new session on the following day, and the headquarters of the Democratic Republican and New Democratic parties.

An attempt by Mr Kim Young Sam to hold a press conference at his home on May 20 was ended by troops, who ejected the journalists present and sealed off the house, placing him under virtual house arrest. He succeeded in smuggling out a statement, however, in which he protested against the martial law decree as "a betrayal of the restoration of democracy".

It was announced in the afternoon of May 20 that Mr Shin Hyon Hwack and his Cabinet had resigned. President Choi on May 21 appointed Mr Park Choong Hoon acting Prime Minister, and announced a new Cabinet composed as follows:

Mr Park Choong Hoon	Prime Minister
†Mr Kim Woun Gie	Deputy Premier and Economic Planning
* Mr Park Tong Jin	Foreign Affairs
* Gen. Kim Chong Hwan	Home Affairs
Dr Lee Seung Yun	Finance
Mr Oh Tak Keun	Justice
* Gen. Choo Young Bok	Defence
†Dr Rhee Kyu Ho	Education
Mr Chong Jong Taik	Agriculture and Fisheries
* Mr Chung Jae Suk	Commerce and Industry
†Mr Yoo Yang Soo	Energy and Resources
* Mr Choi Chong Wan	Construction
* Mr Chin Eui Chong	Health and Social Affairs
†Mr Kim Jae Myung	Transport
Lt.-Gen. Yun Heung Jong	Communications
Mr Lee Kwang Pyo	Culture and Information
* Mr Kim Yong Hyu	Government Administration
* Mr Sung Chwa Kyung	Science and Technology
Mr Choi Wan Bok	National Unification
Mr Kim Jwah Kyum	Minister without Portfolio

* No change. † Took new portfolio.

Mr Park Choong Hoon (61), a former air force major-general, served as Deputy Premier for a period from 1967 [see 23496 A], and before his appointment to the premiership had been president of the Korean Traders' Association. He was officially described as acting Prime Minister pending his approval by the National Assembly.

Among the ministers who took new portfolios, **Mr Kim Woun Gie** had previously been Finance Minister, **Dr Rhee Kyu Ho** Minister of National Unification, **Mr Yoo Yang Soo** Minister of Transport and **Mr Kim Jae Myung** Director of the Office of Veterans' Administration.

The US Secretary of State, Mr Edmund Muskie, said at a press conference on May 20 that he was deeply concerned that South Korea was "moving away from liberalization policies which I think are essential to its long-term political health", and expressed the hope that "those in authority will find it expedient and appropriate to move in the direction of political liberalization".

The Kwangju Uprising

The extension of martial law and the arrest of Mr Kim Dae Jung provoked a popular uprising on May 19 in Kwangju (about 165 miles south of Seoul), the capital of South Cholla province, which after heavy fighting was suppressed by troops on May 27.

South Cholla is a poor and over-populated agricultural province, whose inhabitants have a reputation for radicalism, and was the scene of a major peasant uprising in 1894. For centuries there has been a traditional hostility between Cholla and the neighbouring province of Kyongsang, in which President Park Chung Hee was born and from which he selected most of his senior officers, including Gen. Chun Doo Hwan. Mr Kim Dae Jung, President Park's leading political opponent, on the other hand, was born at Mokpo, in South Cholla, and derived much of his political support from the province. South Cholla benefited very little from the period of rapid industrial growth under President Park's rule, as most major development projects were awarded to other provinces, Kyongsang being the main beneficiary, and in consequence both South Cholla's economic backwardness compared with other provinces and its hostility to Kyongsang were increased.

About 5,000 students demonstrated in Kwangju on May 18 in protest against the extension of martial law and the arrest of Mr Kim. Although incidents occurred in which two police posts and a riot control vehicle were destroyed, the demonstration was generally peaceful. Parachute troops from Kyongsang were flown into the city, however, and attempted to suppress the demonstration using, according to eye-witness accounts, indiscriminate violence.

As a result of public indignation at the troops' conduct, the demonstrations, which hitherto had been confined to students, developed on May 19 into a mass uprising, in which thousands of workers and students, armed only with stones and sharpened bamboo sticks, fought the troops and police and burned down a pro-government broadcasting station. Some of the local police were reported to have handed over their weapons to the rebels, or even to have fought on their side. By May 21 the rebels' numbers had risen to about 200,000, or a quarter of the city's population, and thousands of supporters, including miners armed with dynamite, had flocked in from the countryside to join them. After the rebels had raided armouries and a factory, where they seized rifles, light machine-guns, ammunition and army vehicles, the troops took refuge in the provincial government headquarters, from which they were evacuated by helicopter during the night, leaving the rebels in control of the city.

The revolt spread on May 21 throughout South Cholla, as the residents formed citizen militias and seized control of at least 16 towns. In the port of Mokpo about 30,000 demonstrators attacked the local administrative offices on May 22, set fire to the police station and the local KCIA headquarters, and forced the police to escape to the sea in boats. Disturbances were also reported to have occurred on the same day in Chonju, the capital of North Cholla province, and Pusan, in South Kyongsang, which had previously been the scene of serious riots in October 1979 [see page 30216].

Following the evacuation of Kwangju by the Army, the city was completely surrounded by troops. According to unofficial reports, a massive attack on the city was planned for the night of May 21-22, but was countermanded after the US ambassador, Mr William Gleysteen, had had a long meeting with President Choi. The State Department spokesman, Mr Hodding

Carter, said on May 22 that the United States was "deeply concerned" at the strife in Kwangju, and urged all parties involved to "exercise maximum restraint and undertake a dialogue in search of a peaceful settlement". The US Defence Department revealed on the same day, however, that Gen. John A. Wickham, head of the combined US-South Korean command, had agreed to release four South Korean regiments in the command for use in "crowd control and security work".

Mr Hodding Carter said on May 22 that the United States would "react strongly, in accordance with its treaty obligations, to any external attempt to exploit the situation". The North Korean official news agency declared on the following day that the Government had no intention of intervening in South Korea's internal affairs, and a US Defence Department spokesman confirmed that there was "no evidence that North Korea may try to take advantage of the situation".

A citizens' committee headed by the Catholic Archbishop of Kwangju, Mgr Yoon Kong Hie, and including religious leaders, professors and students began negotiations on May 22 with the local martial law commander, Brig.-Gen. So Chun Yol. Their demands were reported to include the removal of Gen. Chun Doo Hwan from his posts; the lifting of martial law; the formation of an interim government led by democratic politicians; the release of Mr Kim Dae Jung and all other detainees; the reopening of the universities; freedom of the press, full compensation for the families of those killed and wounded in Kwangju; and a guarantee that no retaliatory measures would be taken. If these conditions were accepted, the committee undertook to persuade the citizens to restore their weapons.

The talks between the citizens' committee and Gen. So produced no result, as the latter, while accepting in principle the demand for compensation, rejected the political demands. He gave an assurance on May 24, however, that unless the citizens fired first the troops would not open fire or enter Kwangju. In a broadcast on the following day President Choi appealed to the citizens to hand over their arms to the authorities, and promised that the Government would render "maximum rehabilitation and relief" for the damage which had been done.

Despite Gen. So's assurance, tanks and infantry moved into Kwangju at 3.30 a.m. on May 27 and reoccupied the city. The only serious resistance was encountered at the provincial government building, where about 200 students held out for 90 minutes against forces 10 times their number, supported by artillery and helicopters which machine-gunned the building from the air.

A statement issued on May 31 by Gen. Lee Hee Song attributed the revolt to North Korean spies and "impure subversive elements" co-operating with them, and to followers of Mr Kim Dae Jung acting under his orders. It gave the number of casualties as 144 civilians, 22 soldiers and four policemen killed, and the number of persons arrested as 1,740 of whom 1,010 had already been released. The citizens' committee, however, stated that 261 bodies had been found, 100 of which had not been identified, whilst the Japanese Catholic Committee for Justice and Peace claimed on June 5 to possess evidence that at least 475 people had been killed.

Execution of Mr Kim Jae Kyu

It was announced on May 20 that the Supreme Court had rejected by 10 votes to four the appeals of Mr Kim Jae Kyu, the former director of the KCIA, and his four accomplices (Mr Park Son Ho, Mr Lee Ki Ju, Mr Kim Tae Won and Mr Yu Song Ok) against the death sentences passed on them for the assassination of President Park Chung Hee [see page 30220]. According to unofficial reports, the court's decision had been taken several weeks earlier, but had not been announced until after martial law was extended for fear that it would provoke protest demonstrations. The five men were hanged on May 24. [Col. Park Hung Ju, who had likewise been sentenced to death, had been executed on March 6—ibid.]

Establishment of Special National Security Committee

The Government announced on May 31 the establishment of the Special Committee for National Security Measures as an advisory body to the President to "facilitate the co-ordinating mechanism between the Cabinet and the martial law authorities".

The 15 ex-officio members included President Choi as chairman, Mr Park Choong Hoon as vice-chairman, Gen. Lee Hee Song, Gen. Chun Doo Hwan, the Deputy Premier, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Justice, Defence, Education and Culture and Information, the chiefs of staff and the secretary-general to the President. There were also 10 appointed members, all but one of whom were generals. With 14 of the 25 members, the armed forces commanded a majority on the committee.

President Choi announced on June 5 that the Special Committee had formed 13 subcommittees. The chairman of the subcommittees, together with 16 appointed members and the deputy secretary of the Special Committee, would form the standing committee of the Special Committee, with Gen. Chun as its chairman and with a clear majority of military members.

In a broadcast on June 12 President Choi stated that the Government would expedite work on the new constitution, which would be referred to a national referendum and finalized by the end of October; elections would be held during the first half of 1981, and a new government formed by the end of June.

Gen. Chun submitted his resignation as acting director of the KCIA on June 2, while retaining his post with the Army Security Command. Gen. Yoo Hak Seong was appointed to succeed him on July 14, and was retired from the Army immediately. Gen. Chun, who was promoted on Aug. 6 from lieutenant-general to full general, said in an interview two days later that South Korea "obviously requires the leadership and control of the military", but declared that "I have no political interest as such".

The "Purification Campaign"

The "purification" subcommittee of the Special Committee launched a wideranging purge of public life in June which covered political figures, the KCIA, the civil service and the teaching profession.

The Martial Law Command announced on June 18 that Mr Kim Chong Pil, Mr Lee Hu Rak and the seven other public figures arrested on May 17 [see above] had amassed fortunes totalling 85,311,540,000 won (about US $140,000,000) by abusing their powers while in office, and that Mr Kim alone had accumulated 21,646,480,000 won ($36,000,000) and had accepted bribes from 41 firms since 1973, and that Mr Lee Hu Rak had amassed 19,435,100,000 won. They would not be prosecuted, however, as they had agreed to donate their fortunes to the state and not to hold any public office in future. Other people who had amassed wealth in similar ways would be pardoned if they voluntarily returned it to the Government.

Following their release, Mr Kim, Mr Lee and two other deputies who had been arrested with them tendered their resignation from the National Assembly, and Mr Kim resigned the presidency of the DRP. Six DRP members of the Assembly, eight NDP members and three former ministers were arrested on corruption charges on July 19, and were officially stated on Aug. 21 to have resigned from the Assembly and from their party posts. It had previously been announced on Aug. 5 that another NDP deputy who had been involved in sexual and bribery scandals would resign from all public posts held by him.

The KCIA announced on June 20 that it had "resolutely carried out a self-purification", and that over 300 of its members had been dismissed or retired in order to eliminate incompetence, corruption and collaboration with external political forces. The announcement closely followed the disgrace of two of its former directors, Mr Kim Chong Pil and Mr Lee Hu Rak, and the execution of a third, Mr Kim Jae Kyu [see above].

The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr Chung Jae Suk, resigned on July 5, no reason being given, and was succeeded by Mr Shin Byong Hyun, Governor of the Bank of Korea. The Special Committee announced on July 9 that 232 senior public officials, including a minister, six deputy ministers and three provincial governors, had been dismissed for corruption or incompetence or had voluntarily resigned. The statement named only 15 of those dismissed, who, it stated, were under investigation to answer possible criminal charges, but official sources confirmed that Mr Chung Jae Suk was the minister referred to.

The dismissal of 4,760 lower-ranking officials, including police officers, tax officials, customs officers and employees of the Seoul administration and provincial governments, was announced on July 15; that of 431 bankers, brokers and insurance officials on July 19; that of 1,819 executives and employees of state-run banks, corporations and other organizations on July 22; that of 1,212 officials of state-run agricultural and fisheries co-operatives on July 31; and that of 611 school principals and teachers on Aug. 1. It was stated on the following day that the purge, which had affected 8,667 public employees, had ended, but that private businesses and the news media would carry out a similar "purification".

The police launched a campaign of mass arrests of alleged "hooligans" at the beginning of August. A Special Committee spokesman stated on Oct. 13 that 40,570 hooligans, 1,155 extortionists and 4,000 drug pedlars, smugglers and habitual gamblers had been detained, nearly 30,000 of whom had been sent to military camps for "re-education". The majority of these had since been released, but over 6,000 had been sent on to labour camps, and 2,210 "hardened cases" would be tried by military courts.

The Campaign against the Press

The martial law regime imposed a strict censorship on the press, despite a sit-in strike in protest by journalists on May 19-28. Reporters' descriptions of the Kwangju revolt were suppressed and replaced by the official version, which attributed it to North Korean agents and the alleged intrigues of Mr Kim Dae Jung. Reports of events in South Korea in foreign publications entering the country were also suppressed, and the Japanese Kyodo agency was ordered on May 30 to close its Seoul bureau, the head of the bureau being expelled from the country. Eight journalists were arrested on June 9 for spreading "groundless rumours" about the Kwangju uprising, and diplomatic sources stated on July 24 that nearly 60 journalists had been detained.

On the Government's orders, the Korean Newspapers' Association and the Korean Broadcasters' Association announced on July 30 that they would "voluntarily eliminate whatever obstacles we may have in journalistic circles as well as irregularities in our effort to successfully attain our historic goals of national security and social purification". The announcement was followed by a wholesale purge, in which 419 journalists were reported on Aug. 12 to have been dismissed from 20 newspapers and broadcasting stations, including the editor, the political cartoonist and 23 other members of the staff of the country's leading newspaper, *Dong-A Ilbo*.

The Government banned 172 weekly and monthly magazines and other publications on July 31 as "lewd, vulgar and obscene" or "creating social confusion and class consciousness". Although some of these were of a pornographic type, others were publications maintaining a high literary and intellectual standard. On Aug. 19 the Government ordered the closure of 617 publishing firms. Mr Peter Galliner, the director of the International Press Institute, stated on Sept. 9 that over 30 per cent of South Korean journalists had been driven out of the profession, and that many had been killed or imprisoned.

Mr Kim Tae Hong, the president of the Journalists' Association of Korea, went into hiding after the Kwangju revolt, but was arrested on Aug. 27. He was charged on Oct. 9 with planning to help Mr Kim Dae Jung seize power.

Further Arrests - Mr Kim Young Sam's Withdrawal from Politics

Mass arrests continued during the summer; dissident sources estimated on June 26 that over 700 people were detained in Seoul and about 500 in Kwangju. The martial law authorities issued on June 17 a list of 329 wanted persons, including two members of the Assembly, who were ordered to give themselves up by the end of the month; it was stated on July 3 that 247 of them had surrendered, and that 144 had already been released.

Mr Kim Young Sam announced on Aug. 13 that he had decided to resign the presidency of the NDP and to retire from politics. His retirement, following that of Mr Kim Chong Pil and the arrest of Mr Kim Dae Jung, removed from the political scene the last of the three men who had been regarded before May 17 as probable candidates for the presidency. Three NDP members of the Assembly and a Democratic Unification Party member who had been arrested had previously resigned their seats on July 2.

Resignation of President Choi - Gen. Chun Doo Hwan elected President

President Choi Kyu Hah announced on Aug. 16 his decision to resign in order "to help set an example for the peaceful transfer of power". In accordance with the Constitution, he was succeeded as acting President by the Prime Minister, Mr Park Choong Hoon.

Gen. Chun Doo Hwan was nominated as a candidate for the presidency on Aug. 18 by over 400 members of the National Conference for Unification, which formed the electoral college, and his candidature was endorsed on Aug. 21 by the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. As the Constitution required that the President should be a civilian, he formally retired from the Army on the following day.

As no other candidate had been nominated, Mr Chun was elected President by the National Conference for Unification on Aug. 27 by 2,524 votes out of 2,525 delegates present (the other vote being declared invalid because his name was incorrectly written) and was sworn in on Sept. 1. In his inaugural speech, after promising to conduct a "democratic welfare state", he reaffirmed that the draft constitution would be submitted to a referendum in October; that political activities would be allowed to resume as shortly as practicable after it was adopted; and that martial law would be lifted "once the political situation has stabilized and there is no longer any danger of disturbances".

Mr Chun (49) was commissioned in 1955, and commanded a regiment of South Korean troops fighting in Vietnam in 1970-71. He was appointed head of the Army Security Command in March 1979, and in this capacity conducted the investigation into President Park's assassination on Oct. 26. He made use of his position to carry out a virtual coup on Dec. 12, when he arrested Gen. Chung Seung Hwa (then Army Chief of Staff and martial law administrator), accusing him of complicity in the assassination [see page 30219], and thereby prepared the way for his rise to supreme power.

Cabinet formed by Dr Nam Duck Woo

Mr Park Choong Hoon and his Cabinet tendered their resignation on Sept. 2. A new Cabinet was formed on the same day by Dr Nam Duck Woo, composed as follows:

Dr Nam Duck Woo	Prime Minister
†Mr Shin Byong Hyun	Deputy Premier and Economic Planning
Mr Lho Shin Yong	Foreign Affairs
Mr Suh Chung Hwa	Home Affairs
* Dr Lee Seung Yun	Finance
* Mr Oh Tak Keun	Justice
* Gen. Choo Young Bok	Defence
* Dr Rhee Kyu Ho	Education
* Mr Chong Jong Taik	Agriculture and Fisheries
Mr Suh Suk Joon	Commerce and Industry
Mr Park Bong Hwan	Energy and Resources
Mr Kim Joo Nam	Construction
Mr Chun Myung Kee	Health and Social Affairs
Mr Ko Kun	Transport
Mr Kim Ki Choul	Communications
* Mr Lee Kwang Pyo	Culture and Information
* Mr Kim Yong Hyu	Government Administration
Mr Lee Chung Oh	Science and Technology
Mr Lee Bum Suk	National Unification
Mr Choi Kwang Soo	Minister without Portfolio

* No change. † Took new portfolio.

Dr Nam Duck Woo (56), an economist, was appointed Finance Minister in 1969 [see 23685 A] and Deputy Premier and Minister of Economic Planning in 1974 [see 26938 D], retaining this post until 1978 [see 29795 A]. **Mr Chun Myung Kee**, the Health Minister, was an NDP member of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly met on Sept. 20 for the first time since the extension of martial law, and ratified Dr Nam's appointment on Sept. 22. Since its previous meeting its membership had been reduced from 231 to 202 by the "purification campaign".

Mr Kim Dae Jung sentenced to Death - Sentences on Kwangju Rioters

The martial law authorities announced on July 4 that Mr Kim Dae Jung and 36 of his followers would be tried by a military court on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Government and seize power.

The communiqué made the following allegations against Mr Kim: (i) That he was an "ardent Communist", had been associated in 1945 with the Sinmin Party, the predecessor of the South Korean Workers' (Communist) Party, and had taken part in disturbances in Mokpo in 1946 in which several police posts had been set on fire. (ii) That when he stood for the National Assembly in 1967 he had made use of the services of a North Korean spy later executed in 1972. (iii) That in 1973 he had collaborated with North Korean sympathizers in Japan in founding the National Congress for the Restoration of Democracy and the Promotion of the Unification of Korea (*Hanmintong*). (iv) That he had collected 1,200 million won from politicians and businessmen to finance his campaign for the presidency. (v) That he had instigated the student disturbances in Seoul. (vi) That he had bribed students to organize the demonstration in Kwangju on

May 18; had sent about 40 "hoodlums" to Kwangju, who had set fire to public buildings, looted vehicles and weapons and turned the demonstration into a riot; and had sent about 10 of his followers to spread "malicious rumours" among the demonstrators. (vii) That he had violated the currency laws by bringing Japanese and US money into the country.

Several foreign Governments expressed concern after the publication of the charges, and again after Mr Kim and 23 of his followers were formally indicted on Aug. 1. A US State Department spokesman described the charges as "pretty far-fetched", and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Masayoshi Ito, said on Aug. 12 that if Mr Kim were sentenced to death "the decision will seriously impair relations between Japan and South Korea". A South Korean spokesman rejected such "premature expressions of concern" as "tantamount to an attempt to manipulate the judicial processes of a friendly country".

The trial of Mr Kim and 23 of his supporters opened before a military court in Seoul on Aug. 14. Mr Kim was charged with plotting rebellion and violating the National Security Law, the Foreign Exchange Control Law and the martial law decrees; 12 of the other accused with plotting rebellion; 19 with violating the martial law decrees; and one with violating the Anti-Communist Law. The accused included four former members of the National Assembly, two Protestant clergymen, four professors, a novelist, a poet and six students.

During the trial no witnesses or evidence were produced by the prosecution except the alleged confessions made by the accused, who were not permitted to call witnesses in their defence. In reply to the charges against him, Mr Kim admitted that he had been associated with a left-wing movement in 1946, but denied that he had taken part in the Mokpo riots in that year or that he had ever been a Communist, pointing out that he was a practising Catholic. He confirmed that he had founded the *Hanmintong* in the United States in 1973 and had worked to prepare for the formation of a similar organization in Japan, although in fact it had not been founded until after he was kidnapped in Tokyo and brought to South Korea [see 26285 A]. Its aim, however, had been to oppose "the dictatorial regime of Park Chung Hee" and not South Korea as such, and he had had no idea that some of the people with whom he worked were suspected of Communist sympathies.

Whilst admitting that he had attended political meetings, made speeches and distributed some political funds to supporters in preparation for his election campaign, Mr Kim categorically denied that he had ever plotted to overthrow the Government, advocated the use of violence or encouraged student demonstrations. The demonstrations, he suggested, had been caused by the students' impatience at the Government's failure to lift martial law and at the obscurity of its timetable for political reforms, which had given "grounds for suspicions about its pledges to democratize the country". In reply to an allegation that he had paid a student, Mr Chong Dong Nyun, to start an uprising in Kwangju, he said that he had never even met Mr Chong. Mr Kim admitted that he had probably violated martial law decrees against holding meetings without permission, and that he had broken the Foreign Exchange Control Law by not converting $10,000 sent to him by his brother-in-law and a small sum in Japanese yen into won.

Mr Kim told the court that he had been kept in an underground cell for 60 days after his arrest, questioned for 15 hours a day, stripped naked and threatened with torture, until he "signed some documents against my will with the belief I would be able to deny them in court". The other accused similarly claimed that they had been forced to sign "confessions".

Mr Kim was sentenced to death on Sept. 17, and the other accused to prison terms ranging from two to 20 years. Gen. Lee Hee Song confirmed the sentences two days later. The hearing of appeals against the sentences opened on Oct. 24 before a military appeals court, which on Nov. 3 upheld the death sentence on Mr Kim and the prison sentences on 16 of the other defendants but reduced the sentences on the remaining seven. The decision of the military appeals court meant that Mr Kim's case would go automatically to the (civilian) Supreme Court (to which the other defendants also had the right of appeal); if the latter court confirmed the death sentence, President Chun would then be required to approve the execution order.

While the trial was in progress a violent propaganda campaign was conducted against Mr Kim. The newspapers were ordered to print verbatim the 156-page indictment against the accused, but press reports of the trial were censored to give the impression that they had admitted the charges against them.

The sentence on Mr Kim provoked strong protests in Japan, where it was regarded as a breach of an assurance given by President Park's regime in 1973, after his abduction from Tokyo, that he would not be prosecuted for his political activities abroad [see 26285 A]. The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Zenko Suzuki, said in a broadcast on Sept. 22 that the South Korean Government had been informed that if the death sentence were carried out it would "adversely affect the economic relations between South Korea and Japan", and that the Japanese Government would be "forced to impose restrictions on our offers of economic assistance".

In Washington Mr Muskie expressed "deep concern" at the sentence on Sept. 17. Many Governments and organizations sent appeals for clemency to South Korea, including the Swedish, Norwegian, Yugoslav and Australian Governments, the European Parliament, the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International, and the French embassy in Seoul announced on Oct. 14 that a planned visit to South Korea by the French Foreign Minister, M. Jean François-Poncet, had been postponed indefinitely.

Mr Chong Dong Nyun [see above], another student and three workers were sentenced to death by a military court on Oct. 25 for taking part in the Kwangju revolt. The martial law authorities also confirmed that seven other people had been sentenced to life imprisonment and 163 to prison terms of five to 20 years. The trials had been held in strict secrecy at a military base situated on the outskirts of Kwangju.

Adoption of New Constitution

The draft of the new Constitution prepared by the committee set up by President Choi was published on Sept. 29, its main features being as follows:

Preamble. References to the ideas of the student uprising of 1960 and the "military revolution" of 1961 [see 17399 A; page 18212] were removed. The new regime was described as the Fifth Republic, the reference being to the previous constitutions of 1948, 1960, 1962 and 1972 [see 9641 A; 17664 A; page 19643; 25607 A].

Rights and Duties of Citizens. (1) The provision in the 1962 Constitution that confessions made under duress should not be admitted as evidence, which was omitted in 1972, was restored.

(2) A new clause provided that no one should suffer unfavourable treatment because of an act committed by a relative.

The President. (1) The President would be elected by an electoral college of 5,000 members themselves elected by universal suffrage, which would be disbanded when the President was sworn in. Members of the college must be over 30, and might be members of a political party. [Members of the National Conference for Unification, which the college replaced, were forbidden under the 1972 Constitution to be associated with any party.] Presidential candidates must be nominated by at least 5 per cent of the members of the college.

(2) The President would hold office for a single term of seven years. [Under the 1962 Constitution he might serve for three four-year terms; that of 1972 extended his term to six years, and did not limit the number of terms which he might serve.]

(3) The President might take emergency measures only in time of armed conflict or a similar emergency (and not, as previously, to prevent such a situation). Emergency measures should be in force for as short a time as possible, and would be void if not approved by the National Assembly.

(4) The President might dissolve the Assembly, with the Cabinet's approval. He might not dissolve it within a year of its election, however, or dissolve it twice for the same reason. [The President's power to dissolve the Assembly had previously been unlimited.]

The National Assembly. (1) The Assembly would be elected for four years (instead of six as previously). The provision that one-third of the members would be elected by the National Conference for Unification was abolished.

(2) The Assembly might pass a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, but only after he had been in office for a year.

(3) The Assembly might question the Government on its handling of specific issues.

The Judiciary. The Chief Justice would be appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Assembly for a five-year term. Supreme Court judges would be appointed by the President on the Chief Justice's recommendation, and other judges by the Chief Justice (instead of by the President as previously). Judges might not be dismissed except by conviction or impeachment.

Advisory Bodies. The President would be assisted by an Advisory Council on State Affairs, under the chairmanship of the previous

President, and by an Advisory Council on Peaceful Unification Policy.

Amendment of the Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution might be proposed either by the President or by the Assembly, and must be submitted to a national referendum. An amendment proposed by the Assembly must be approved by a two-thirds majority of its members. Amendments altering the presidential term of office would not apply to the incumbent President.

Announcing the new Constitution, President Chun said on Sept. 29 that if it were approved by a referendum the National Assembly and the existing political parties would be dissolved. In the Assembly's absence its legislative duties would be performed by the Legislative Council for National Security, which would be formed by reorganizing the Special Committee for National Security Measures. Politicians would be allowed to start campaigning and forming new parties at least three months before the presidential election, but "those politicians who have been conspicuously reponsible for the past political and social corruption or chaos" would be barred from future political activity.

President Chun announced at a press conference on Oct. 16 that martial law would be lifted in Cheju from midnight of that day, restoring the situation which existed before May 17, and would be lifted completely before the presidential election. Political activities would resume in December, after the promulgation of laws on political parties; the presidential election would be held by March 1981 and parliamentary elections in late April or May; and a government would be formed by the end of June. He suggested that a multi-party system would be preferable to a two-party system, which had led to "political polarization and confrontation". It would be "natural" for the President to be affiliated with a political party, but it might also be desirable for the President to "conduct state affairs from a position beyond any partisan affiliation".

The new Constitution was approved by an overwhelming majority at a national referendum on Oct. 22, and came into effect on Oct. 27. According to official figures, 17,829,354 votes (91.6 per cent) were cast in favour in a turn-out of 19,453,926 (representing 95.5 per cent of the total eligible electorate of 20,373,869).

Also on Oct. 27 the inaugural session took place of the Legislative Council for National Security comprising 81 members appointed by President Chun. Members of the Council were drawn from various walks of life and included 20 political figures and 10 members of the former Special National Security Committee.—(Newsreview, Seoul - Times - Daily Telegraph - Guardian - Financial Times - Le Monde - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 30216 A*)

A. CUBA — Ending of Refugee Exodus - Relations with United States and Venezuela

The Cuban Government on Sept. 26, 1980, closed the port of Mariel (west of Havana), putting an end to the refugee exodus in the course of which 123,000 Cubans had since April 21, 1980, left by boat for the United States [see 30474 A]. The exodus had lost impetus in June after the US Coast Guard began to patrol the seas, but small boats had continued to arrive in Florida over the next three months.

Some 16,000 refugees remained in resettlement camps throughout the USA and 2,000 in federal prisons. The Carter Administration announced on Sept. 18 that those refugees currently in Florida camps would be resettled in a proposed new camp in Puerto Rico, and that the Federal Government would cover all costs incurred by individual states as the result of the refugee influx. The measures applied equally to Haitian refugees, who continued to arrive in the USA during 1980 [see 30411 A], their numbers being unofficially put at over 30,000.

The 386 Cubans who took refuge in the US interests section in the Swiss embassy in Havana on May 2, 1980 [see 30474 A], left in small groups over the ensuing months, the last of them leaving on Sept. 23. Mr Wayne Smith, head of the interests section, said that no measures were taken against them by the Cuban Government. Some of these refugees subsequently left the country on a US flight on Sept. 24 after the Cuban Government had agreed that those with dual US-Cuban citizenship could be evacuated.

For the first time ever, Cuba on Sept. 18 handed over to the United States two men who had the previous day hijacked to Cuba a Delta Airlines Boeing 727 en route from Atlanta (Georgia) to Charleston (South Carolina) with 114 people on board. The hijack was the latest in a series carried out by expatriate Cubans who wished to return home [see pages 30475-76], others having taken place on Aug. 26, Sept. 8 and Sept. 13. Although the 1973 US-Cuba anti-hijacking treaty had been unilaterally abrogated by Cuba in 1977 [see 25827 B; 28132 A; 29868 A], the Cuban Communist Party organ *Granma* warned on Sept. 16 that henceforth anyone hijacking aircraft to Cuba would receive a heavy prison sentence or would be handed over to the USA.

In another concessionary move towards the United States, Cuba on Oct. 27 released all 33 US citizens serving prison sentences in Cuba and allowed 30 of them to fly to the United States (the other three choosing to remain in Cuba).

Cuba on Sept. 27, 1980, announced the recall of its diplomatic personnel from Venezuela following the decision of a Venezuelan court to acquit four men accused of placing the bomb which killed 73 people on board a Cuban airliner over Barbados in 1976 [see 28132 A]. The Cuban Government threatened to sever diplomatic relations fully if the Venezuelan supreme military tribunal ratified the lower court's decision [both countries' ambassadors having already been recalled in early 1980—see 30474 A].

Three of the men were Venezuelan citizens and the fourth was Mr Orlando Bosch, a Cuban exile who was believed to be linked with the anti-Castro Omega-7 terrorist group. The latter organization had recently claimed responsibility for the murder in New York on Sept. 11 of a Cuban diplomat with the United Nations mission.

Relations between Cuba and Venezuela deteriorated still further after a conference of Cuban exiles was allowed to take place in Caracas in mid-October under the chairmanship of Maj. Huber Matos, the former Cuban political prisoner [see 30068 A], at which a plan was approved to create the necessary conditions for an uprising of the Cuban people against its Government.—(New York Times - Le Monde - Times - La Vanguardia, Barcelona - International Herald Tribune - Latin America Weekly Report) (*Prev. rep. 30474 A; Haitian Refugees 30411 A*)

B. ISRAEL — Cabinet Changes

The Israeli Defence Minister, Mr Ezer Weizman (a member of the *Herut* faction of the ruling *Likud* front), resigned on May 25, 1980, giving as the immediate reason his opposition to defence expenditure cuts currently being applied but also making it clear that he disagreed with other important aspects of the Government's internal and external policies [see also page 29954]. After the Cabinet had opposed a proposal by Mr Menahem Begin (the Prime Minister) that Mr Weizman should be succeeded by Mr Itzhak Shamir (the Foreign Minister since March 1980—see 30260 A) and the latter by Mr Itzhak Moda'i (Minister of Energy, Infrastructure and Communications), Mr Begin announced on June 1 that he would himself act as Defence Minister until agreement was reached on a new appointment to the post.

In a further cabinet change, the *Knesset* (Parliament) on Aug. 13 approved by 56 votes to 39 the appointment of Mr Moshe Nissim (of the Liberal Party component of *Likud* and hitherto Minister without Portfolio since January 1978—see 28846 C) as Minister of Justice *vice* Mr Shmuel Tamir. Mr Tamir, who had been appointed Justice Minister when the then Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) joined the Begin Government in October 1977 [see 28711 A], had resigned on July 31 on the grounds that the Democratic Movement (as the DMC became in mid-1978—see 29499 A) was over-represented in the Cabinet (in which it also held two other portfolios).

Mr Tamir's decision to leave the Government followed the defection of two Democratic Movement deputies in June 1980, which had cut the parliamentary strength of the party from six (to which it had been reduced in November 1979—see page 30108) to four—i.e. three ministers and one backbencher. Mr Begin's committed support in the 120-seat *Knesset* was thus reduced to 63, comprising 43 *Likud*, 12 National Religious Party, four *Agudat Israel* and four Democratic Movement members (Mr Tamir indicating that he would continue to support the Government).—(Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Jerusalem Post) (*Prev. rep. Cabinet 30260 A*)

A. MOZAMBIQUE — Government Changes - Economic Problems - New Currency - Internal Opposition - Foreign Relations

As part of a government reorganization carried out in early 1980 President Samora Machel on April 3 dismissed Mr Marcelino dos Santos (the Minister of Planning and Chairman of the National Planning Commission) and Mr Jorge Rebelo, the Minister of Information. Both men were regarded as leading ideologues within the ruling Frelimo party (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and retained senior posts in the party hierarchy—Mr dos Santos (a former Vice-President, and considered the most pro-Soviet member of the Council) being appointed party secretary for economic affairs and Mr Rebelo party secretary for ideological work.

Two weeks previously, on March 20, President Machel had dismissed the Ministers of Internal Trade (Mr Manuel Augusto dos Santos) and of Public Works and Housing (Mr João Batista Cosme), while the Minister of Health, Dr Hélder Fernando Brigido Martins, resigned to take up a post in the World Health Organization.

The membership of the Council of Ministers incorporating these changes was as follows:

* Mr Mariano de Araújo Matsinha	Interior and Minister-Resident in Sofala
Mr Albert Joaquim Chipande	Defence
† Mr Jacinto Soares Veloso	Security
Mr Joaquim Alberto Chissano	Foreign Affairs
Mr Teodato Unguana	Justice
Mrs Graça Simbine Machel	Education and Culture
* Mr Julio Zamith Carrilho	Public Works and Housing
* Mr Mario Fernandes da Graça Machungo	Planning and Agriculture
* Mr José Luis Cabaço	Information
Dr Rui Baltasar dos Santos Alves	Finance
Mr Salomão Munguambé	External Trade
Mr Manuel Jacques Caranda da Silva	Internal Trade
Mr Alberto Cassimo	Labour
† Mr Luis Maria Manuel Alcantara Santos	Ports and Land Transport ‡
† Mr Rui Quijares Gomes de Lousa	Posts, Telecommunications and Civil Aviation ‡
* Mr Antonio José Lima Rodrigues Branco	Industry and Energy
Mr Pascual Manuel Mucumbi	Health
Dr José Oscar Monteiro	Minister of State for Presidency
† Mr Joaquim Tenreiro de Almeida	Secretary of State for Fisheries
Mr Sebastião Marcos Mabote	Vice-Minister of Defence
Mr Armando Guebuze	Armed Forces Political Commissar
Mr Sergio Vieira	Governor of Bank of Mozambique

*Changed or additional portfolio. † New appointment.
‡ Newly-created portfolio.

Mr Veloso was also director of the People's National Security Service (Snasp). **Mr Branco** had been Secretary of State for Fisheries since November 1979. **Mr Mabote** was Chief of the General Staff.

Other Secretaries of State were Mr Abdul Magid Osman (Coal and Hydrocarbons), Mr João dos Santos Ferreira (Cotton) and Mr Gaspar Mateus Zimba (Cashew-nuts).

Mr Cosme, the former Minister of Public Works and Housing, was appointed Governor of Tete province, the other governors being as follows: Mr Armando Panguene (Cabo Delgado), Mr Feliciano Salomão Gundana (Nampula), Mr Alberto Sitole (Inhambane), Mr Oswaldo Tanzama (Zambezia), Mr João Pelembe (Gaza), Mr Aurelio Manava (Niassa), Mr José Moiane (Maputo), Mr Manuel Antonio (Manica), Mr Matsinha (Sofala).

The changes took place as part of a campaign launched by President Machel at the beginning of 1980 to combat inefficiency, bureaucracy and corruption, particularly in government departments, as a move towards solving the country's economic problems. They were also attributed to a recent policy shift towards closer links with the West [see below] and towards the separation of party and state posts in the interests of greater efficiency.

In a lengthy speech on March 18 President Machel criticized the performance of state enterprises (which had been nationalized following independence in 1975), denounced the "ultra-leftist" policy of "excessive" state involvement as being responsible for inefficiency, and announced that many small businesses would be returned to private hands. He urged companies to make themselves profitable and called on managers to fulfil their appropriate responsibilities, and invited expatriates to return to Mozambique to open businesses.

In order to combat the problems of food distribution and queueing in Maputo (the capital), where the population (currently estimated at 1,200,000) was increasing faster than food and facilities could be provided, President Machel at the same time announced the creation of "green zones" outside the urban area, where those detained for corruption, the underproductive, the underemployed and "marginals" would be sent to take up farming. A census was initiated in Maputo on March 24 which would be used in introducing food rationing and for the better distribution of food supplies.

Over 100 government officials and others were detained in the first few months of 1980 following unscheduled visits by the President to factories, shops and warehouses, in some of which he was reported to have discovered hoards of consumer goods which were in short supply throughout the country. In May three leading Frelimo officials in Sofala province (including the president of Beira city council) were suspended for corruption, while on May 20 a member of Frelimo's central committee, Mr Francisco Langa, committed suicide after being investigated for embezzlement.

The national airline company Deta was in May dissolved and a new company, Linhas Aéreas de Moçambique (LAM), created in its place. Mr José Bacelar was appointed as the new director, the previous director being dismissed for "incompetence and arrogance".

Many consumer prices in June 1980 underwent their first substantial increase since independence in a government move to raise payments to farmers, factories and middlemen. Earlier, in January, the price of petrol had almost doubled and motoring restrictions had been imposed in an effort to cut Mozambique's oil consumption.

An improvement in the Mozambican economy was anticipated as a direct result of the ending of the war in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and the latter's achievement of independence in April 1980 [see 30365 A].

President Machel stated on Dec. 20, 1979, that during incursions into Mozambique by Rhodesian security forces in the course of this war, 1,338 Mozambicans had been killed, 1,538 wounded and 751 kidnapped. He estimated Mozambique's direct war damages at $50,000,000 and indirect damages (due to lost trade, tourism and transit income) at $550,000,000. [Mozambique had also with international assistance supported some 150,000 refugees from Zimbabwe/Rhodesia—see page 30371.]

A new currency unit known as the metical was introduced in Mozambique over a period of three days in June, for the purpose of which borders, ports and airports were closed from June 16 to 18 while the changeover took place. Named after the "mithgal", a unit of currency used by Arab traders in pre-colonial days, the metical retained the same value as the escudo, which it replaced; escudo coins remained in use, but new bank notes were issued.

Internal Opposition to President Machel's Regime - Relations with Zimbabwe

During 1980 the Mozambique Government continued to face armed opposition from the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MRNM or Andrea Group—named after its late leader, Mr Andrea Matsangai), a dissident group formed after independence. Whereas Mozambique had previously attributed support and training for the MRNM to the Government in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia [see pages 29760-61 and 30073], it subsequently accused South Africa of supplying the group. In making the latter allegation (in May 1980) Mozambique claimed that South Africa had a base for training anti-government forces of both Mozambicans and Zimbabweans in northern Transvaal, south of the Zimbabwean border town of Beitbridge.

South Africa for its part warned Mozambique in a note on Feb. 19, 1980, against harbouring terrorists who, it claimed, were "conducting murderous operations and acts of sabotage" against South Africa from bases in Mozambique. The note followed an attack by the African National Council (ANC) the previous weekend on Ingwavuma, some 20 miles from the Mozambique border, and the earlier discovery of an alleged ANC arsenal in the same area, which led South Africa to believe that an intensification of guerrilla activity with the support of Mozambique and also of Angola was imminent. [For ANC activities in South Africa, see pages 30518-19.]

Following an MRNM attack on May 13, 1980, on a dam near Mavuze, in which two turbines were destroyed and power to Beira was cut off for 14 hours, an extensive Mozambique Army operation was set in motion, although the rebels were believed to have escaped to Zimbabwe. Furthermore, in an effort to prevent the rebels from mounting their activities from Zimbabwe, President Machel and the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Mr Robert Mugabe, held a meeting in Beira on May 23, which resulted in an agreement being reached on joint operations between the two countries to halt rebel activity.

A Mozambique delegation headed by Mr Veloso and Mr Guebuze subsequently flew to Salisbury on May 27 to work out detailed plans for joint operations with Mr Emmerson Munangagwa (Minister of State at the Prime Minister's Office) and Zimbabwean army and intelligence heads. At the same time it was reported that units of the (White) Rhodesian Light Infantry had already been deployed in south-eastern Zimbabwe from where rebels were believed to be mounting raids into Gaza province.

Mozambique stated on July 10 that its forces had killed 272 rebels and captured over 300 in an attack on the MRNM's main camp on Sitonga Mountain, in west Manica province.

In addition to the 10 people executed in Mozambique on March 31, 1979, for sabotage and espionage [see page 29761] 26 others, among them a number of Rhodesians and a Portuguese, were sentenced by revolutionary courts and executed during 1979 on similar charges. (The People's Assembly had on Feb. 28, 1979, passed a law providing for the imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes against the security of people and state and for those whose reintegration into society appeared impossible. Revolutionary military courts were subsequently set up under a law of March 30, 1979.)

President Machel paid a state visit to Zimbabwe from Aug. 4 to 9 as the first head of state to visit the country since its independence. Six agreements were signed covering information, trade, energy, banking and air and land transport, and President Machel also presided over the renaming of Jameson Avenue as Samora Machel Avenue.

Relations with West - Presidential Visit to Eastern Europe

Lord Soames, at that time Governor of Southern Rhodesia, visited Mozambique briefly on March 24 at the invitation of President Machel, who together with other front-line heads of state had been active in bringing about a settlement in Rhodesia [see 30165 A; 30365 A]. At a press conference following talks, Lord Soames said that even though Mozambique was not associated with the European Economic Community under the Lomé Convention [see pages 29423 and 28047; 27050 A] European Development Fund aid might be arranged for Mozambique's ports and railways, on the grounds that these served other adherents to the convention such as Zaïre and Zambia. Lord Soames said that he had also discussed with President Machel and Mr Chissano the possibility of Mozambique becoming an adherent to the convention.

Mr Richard Luce, the UK Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (with responsibility for Africa), visited Mozambique in mid-September and told the Government that, although Britain hoped to increase its own aid to Mozambique, the latter's adherence to the Lomé Convention would facilitate assistance and investment.

Mozambique's close links with East Germany and other eastern bloc states had so far meant that it had refused to sign the Lomé Convention because of an annex containing a unilateral declaration by West Germany that the convention covered *Land* Berlin. The West German contention that West Berlin was a *Land* (state) of West Germany had also resulted in Mozambique failing to obtain aid from West Germany because the former objected to the wording of proposed aid agreements.

Mr Chissano visited France from Aug. 31 to Sept. 2, 1980, for talks with President Giscard d'Estaing and French ministers on co-operation and also on the situation in southern Africa.

During the visit plans were elaborated for the financing by France's central economic co-operation fund of electricity and other development projects and aid to the shrimping industry, and France also offered 2,000 tonnes of food aid to help the 1,500,000 people afflicted by a two-year drought in Mozambique's interior, notably in Inhambane province in the south of the country. (The Mozambique Government had appealed to the international community at the end of August for 175,000 tonnes of grain, 40,000 tonnes of other food and 17,000 tonnes of seed, medicines and agricultural equipment to combat the effects of the drought.)

President Machel paid official visits to Bulgaria (on Sept. 10-13), Romania (Sept. 13-17) and East Germany (Sept. 17-20). Instruments of ratification of the treaty of friendship and co-operation with East Germany, which was signed on Feb. 24, 1979 [see 29707 A], had been exchanged in East Berlin on Aug. 23, 1979.—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Financial Times - Cape Times - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre, London) (*Prev. rep. Council of Ministers 29340 A, 29119 A; Relations with Romania 29702 A, with East Germany 29707 A, with South Africa 29621 B; Independence 27245 A*)

A. ROMANIA — Internal Security Developments - Formation of Free Trade Union - Defections of Romanian Citizens - President Ceausescu's Visit to France

Amnesty International published a report on June 30, 1980, in which it alleged that the measures adopted by the Romanian authorities against political and religious dissidents had increased in recent years. Although charges of "anti-state propaganda" appeared to be less frequently preferred, the report claimed that dissidents were nowadays more commonly indicted on criminal charges such as "parasitism" (i.e. not working) or homosexuality and that, beside "corrective labour" and dismissal or transfer from jobs, increasing use was being made of psychiatric detention as a means of suppressing human rights activities.

The report also criticized the treatment of members of the unofficial "Free Trade Union of Romanian Workers", which had been formed in March 1979 by Mr Ion Cana and Mr Gheorge Brasoveanu and which had published a manifesto calling inter alia for the legalization of such unofficial trade unions and for the right to free association.

The organization had in April 1979 sent an open letter to President Ceausescu protesting at the frequent arrest of its members; these latter included Mr Cana and Mr Brasoveanu, who were said in March 1979 to have been confined in psychiatric institutions, and also Mr Nicolae Dascalu, who succeeded them as chairman of the unofficial union but who was in June 1979 sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for allegedly passing state secrets to Amnesty International.

Meanwhile, a succession of Romanian citizens defected during the period from 1978 to 1980 to non-Warsaw Treaty states, most of the defectors being Romanian sportsmen, musicians and singers who absconded, largely to West Germany, while touring abroad. There were, however, a number of other highly-publicized incidents, including the following.

Shortly after the defection to the United States in August 1978 of Lt.-Gen. Mihai Ion Pacepa, a high-ranking secret service official [see 29288 B], the West German newspaper *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* (circulating largely among Romanian émigrés) published in October 1978 a report claiming that the seven-member crew of President Ceausescu's personal motor yacht had during the previous month defected to Turkey in the yacht (which had subsequently been returned to the Romanian authorities).

On Feb. 24, 1980, the third secretary of the Romanian embassy in Washington, Mr Nicolae Ion Horodinca, applied for political asylum in the United States, as did his wife on March 6. Mrs Horodinca had fainted at Washington airport on March 3 shortly before she had been due to return to Romania and had been taken to hospital for observation together with her three-year-old son. On March 5 the Virginia police had foiled an attempt to abduct the son by six men who later admitted to being connected with the Romanian embassy.

In a major incident on July 3, 1980, a total of 21 people all belonging to the same family escaped from Romania by flying at low altitude across Hungary to Austria in a single-engined crop-spraying aircraft. The escapees, who were temporarily housed in an Austrian transit camp, said on July 14 that they wished to emigrate to Australia.

President Ceausescu paid a state visit to France on July 23-26, 1980, in return for one undertaken to Romania in March 1979 by President Giscard d'Estaing. In addition to reaffirming the "convergence of interests" between their countries, the two leaders undertook to intensify mutual economic co-operation (in which connexion it was noted that aggregate Franco-Romanian trade had doubled over the previous five years as envisaged under agreements signed in July 1975—see 27785 A). During the visit demonstrations were staged in Paris by Romanian exiles and others in protest against alleged contraventions of human rights in Romania.—(Guardian - Times - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung) (*Prev. rep. Internal Security 29288 B, 28823 A; France-Romania 27785 A*)

A. LIBYA - SYRIA — Tripoli Declaration of Unity - Libyan and Syrian External and Internal Developments

President Assad of Syria and the Libyan leader, Col. Moamer al-Kadhafi, issued a declaration in Tripoli (Libya) on Sept. 10 providing for the merger of their two countries into a unified state. The initiative for the merger had come from Col. Kadhafi in a speech delivered in Tripoli on Sept. 1, to which President Assad had immediately responded in the affirmative.

The Tripoli declaration stated (i) that the two countries would merge into one state “in which authority will be vested in the people”; (ii) that the new state would “exercise full sovereignty” and “have a single identity at the international level”; (iii) that “the two countries' commands will form one revolutionary command”; and (iv) that the unitary state would have a “general national congress” and a “single executive power”.

The declaration also asserted that the new state would form a base for the “Arab revolutionary movement” and for “confronting the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland and for liberating Palestine”, and would be “open to every Arab state wishing to join”. To these ends the new state would “work to consolidate the pan-Arab front for steadfastness and confrontation in its capacity as a major Arab link in the confrontation of the tripartite Camp David scheme represented by US imperialism, the Zionist enemy and Sadat's agent regime [i.e. the Egyptian Government]”. [For Libyan and Syrian participation in Arab opposition to the September 1978 Camp David Middle East peace agreements and to the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, see pages 29658-60 and 29951-53 respectively.]

The motives of the Syrian and Libyan leaders in undertaking the merger were generally ascribed to their current sense of relative political isolation within the Arab world, notwithstanding the fact that both countries were leading members of the broader Arab front opposed to the Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation. In recent years both Syria and Libya had participated in several purported mergers with other Arab states, but none had been carried through to reality.

In the period from 1958 to 1976 Syria had entered into four separate unity agreements with Egypt, each of which had involved other Arab states—notably Libya under the 1971 Federation of Arab Republics [see 28392 A for summary of these agreements]. Syria had also established a “joint supreme command council” with Jordan in August 1975 [see 27755 B] and signed a “charter for joint national action” with Iraq in October 1978 [see page 29659], the latter attempt at a merger being abandoned by late 1979 [see page 30102].

Apart from the abortive 1971 federation with Syria and Egypt, Libya had also in recent years entered into unfulfilled unity agreements with Egypt in August 1972 [see 25445 A; 26141 A; page 26246] and with Tunisia in January 1974 [see 26466 A; 26980 B].

Although Libya and Syria both border the Mediterranean Sea, the two countries are separated by some 600 miles, while their respective capitals—Tripoli and Damascus—are situated some 1,300 miles apart.

A Libyan Government official was quoted on Sept. 17 as saying that the name of the new entity formed by the Libyan-Syrian merger would be the “Arab Masses State”. Later in the month it was reported that Libya had undertaken to pay off Syrian debts totalling nearly $1,000 million owed for recent arms purchases from the Soviet Union agreed in October 1979 [see page 30102].

Assassinations of Libyan Exiles in Western Europe - Expulsions of Libyan Representatives from Britain and the United States - Internal Security and Political Developments

A wave of assassinations of opponents of the Libyan regime occurred in Western Europe in the first half of 1980 following the issuing of warnings by Col. Kadhafi from mid-February that all opponents of the present Government currently living abroad should make arrangements to return to Libya by June 11, 1980, or face “physical liquidation”. The strains which these murders and other related incidents provoked in Libya's relations with several Western countries were exacerbated by the fact that under a directive issued by Col. Kadhafi on Sept. 2, 1979, many Libyan embassies had subsequently been taken over by “people's committees” which in some cases were suspected of being involved in the assassination campaign.

Some at least of the victims of the Libyan assassination campaign were believed to have been associated with the Libyan National Democratic Movement, which had been set up by exiled opponents of Col. Kadhafi in 1977 and which was reported to have greatly expanded its operations in a number of countries in the first half of 1980.

In **Britain** two anti-Kadhafi Libyan nationals were murdered in London in April 1980, namely (i) Mr Mohammed Mustapha Ramadan (35), a journalist and broadcaster, who was shot dead on April 11 outside the Central Mosque in Regent's Park, and (ii) Mr Mahmoud Nafa (40), a lawyer, who was shot dead in his Kensington office on April 25. Two Libyan nationals arrested immediately after the first killing and a third detained immediately after the second were each sentenced to life imprisonment on Sept. 16 after pleading guilty to murder at the Central Criminal Court in London. During the trial the prosecution stated that the three accused were members of an assassination squad of six men who had entered Britain in February 1980 posing as tourists.

Following investigations into the circumstances of the murders, Mr Douglas Hurd (Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) announced in the House of Commons on May 12 that the Libyan authorities had “agreed to withdraw four Libyans connected with their mission in London who have been involved in activities which are incompatible with their functions”. Subsequently, three British diplomats were among 20 UK citizens expelled from Libya on June 2.

In a further development, the secretary of the Libyan “people's bureau” (i.e. embassy) in London, Mr Musa Kusa, was on June 13 ordered to leave Britain within 48 hours after he had stated publicly the previous day that Libyan “revolutionary committees” based in Britain had passed death sentences on two other opponents of the Libyan regime currently living in London. As quoted by *The Times*, Mr Kusa had said (on June 12) that he approved of the decision to assassinate the two Libyans, whom he described as former government officials guilty of misappropriating funds who now presented themselves as “spokesmen for the anti-revolution”. On June 15 Mr Kusa returned to Tripoli, where the previous day Libyan demonstrators had attacked the British embassy with petrol bombs.

In **Italy** five Libyan expatriates, most of them businessmen and all known opponents of Col. Kadhafi, were murdered in the period March to June 1980, namely (i) Mr Mohammed Salem Rtemi, whose body was found in the boot of his car in Rome on March 21; (ii) Mr Abdel Aref Ghalil, who was shot dead in the Via Veneto in Rome on April 19; (iii) Mr Abdallah Mohammed Kazmi, who was shot dead in Rome on May 10; (iv) Mr Mohammed Fouad Bujar (a Libyan who had recently taken Tunisian citizenship), who was found murdered in a Rome hotel on May 20; and (v) Mr Ezzedin Lahderi, who was shot dead in Milan's central railway station on June 11 (on which day another Libyan, Mr Mohammed Bygte, was shot and injured in Rome). Immediately after the fourth murder the Italian Government recalled its ambassador from Tripoli for consultations.

In **West Germany** a former Libyan diplomat, Mr Omran el-Mehdawi, was shot dead in a Bonn shopping centre on May 10, while in **Greece** Mr Abdel-Rahman Abu Bakr, a Libyan factory worker, was found in his Athens flat on May 21 with his head almost severed. Moreover, two recent murders of Libyans in **Lebanon** were also widely attributed to Libyan assassination squads.

In the **United States** two members of the Libyan “people's bureau” in Washington were expelled from the country on April 5 after having distributed literature to Libyan students calling for the “elimination of enemies of the revolution abroad”. On May 4 the State Department announced that two days previously four of the five remaining members of the “people's committee” thought to be in control of the Libyan mission had been given 72 hours to leave on the grounds that they had engaged in “unacceptable activities”. After the latter group had initially refused to leave the Libyan mission in Washington, police and FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) agents surrounded the building and on May 8 set a 24-hour deadline for the departure of the four Libyans. The following day it was announced that the Libyan authorities had agreed to withdraw the four men by May 11 and to enter into an agreement regularizing the diplomatic status of 24 other Libyans serving in the mission.

In its May 4 announcement concerning the second batch of expulsions the State Department also announced that the two remaining US diplomats in Tripoli were being withdrawn immediately. (The United States had “suspended” diplomatic relations with Libya in early December 1979 and reduced its diplomatic staff to about 10 following an attack on the US embassy in Tripoli on Dec. 2 by Libyan demonstrators supporting Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran; it had further reduced its representation to two in early February 1980 following attacks on Western diplomatic buildings in Libya in the wake of the Libyan-backed insurgency in the Tunisian town of Gafsa—see pages 30262-64.)

In apparent retaliation for the US actions, 25 American citizens were expelled from Libya on May 12 after being accused of espionage and terrorist activities; at the same time it was confirmed that two other US citizens were under arrest in Tripoli on spying charges.

In a statement broadcast on June 11 (i.e. the deadline for the return of exiled opponents of his regime), Col. Kadhafi called on the “revolutionary committees” to halt their overseas assassination campaigns, although he specified two exceptions to this instruction: (i) "those who are convicted by a revolutionary court", and (ii) "those who are proved—by any means, even if it is not a revolutionary court—to have had dealings with the Egyptian, Israeli or US authorities"—the latter category being deemed to have committed "high treason" and thus to "deserve death wherever they are".

In other statements in May and June 1980 Col. Kadhafi said that Libya was seeking compensation of "thousands of billions of dollars" from Britain, West Germany and Italy for damage caused by the fighting on Libyan soil during World War II and warned that if adequate compensation was not agreed through negotiations it would be seized by force.

As regards the internal situation in Libya, upwards of 2,000 people were reported to have been arrested in the first half of 1980 in what the Libyan authorities described as a campaign against corruption and similar offences, whereas exiled sources maintained that the regime was acting to repress mounting political opposition. In mid-August 1980 several hundred people were reported to have been killed in an unsuccessful army revolt centring on Tobruk near the Egyptian border, which was said to have been crushed by loyal troops supported by East German military advisers.

For its part, the Libyan Government consistently dismissed reports of internal unrest as being inspired principally by the Egyptian Government in the light of continuing serious tensions along the Libyan-Egyptian border, where Libya was currently constructing a 180-mile defensive wall against the military threat allegedly posed by Egypt. (For Egypt's reimposition of martial law along its border with Libya in June 1980, see 30586 A.)

Libyan Government Changes

A meeting of the General People's Congress held in Tripoli on Jan. 1-6, 1980, concluded with a decision to make the following changes in the General People's Committee (i.e. Council of Ministers):

(i) Mr Abdessalem Mohammed al Zagaar became Secretary (Minister) of Petroleum *vice* Mr Ezzedine al Mabrouk (who had held the post since January 1970—see 23836 A); (ii) Mr Abu Zeid Umar Dorda (hitherto Secretary of Municipalities) took over responsibility for Economy from Mr Abu Bakr as Sharif; (iii) Mr Mohammed Heidi Douik became Secretary of Municipalities; (iv) Dr Abdelhefid Zliti was appointed Secretary of Education *vice* Dr Mohammed Ahmed as Sharif; (v) Mr Mohammed Mahmoud Hijazi became Information Secretary *vice* Mr Muhammad Ali ash-Shuwaydi; and (vi) Mr Boukhari Salem Houdah was appointed Secretary of Communications and Marine Transport *vice* Mr Nur al Fituri al Madani.

Syrian Internal Developments - Mounting Violence between Government Forces and Moslem Brotherhood - Assassination of Former Prime Minister in Paris

The Syrian internal security situation deteriorated sharply during 1980 as the Government met fierce resistance to its attempts to eradicate the Moslem Brotherhood (an extremist organization based in the country's majority Sunni Moslem community and opposed in particular to the political dominance of the minority Alawite sect—see pages 30100-01). Led from his exile in Aachen (West Germany) by Mr Issam Attar, the Moslem Brotherhood responded by escalating its campaign of assassinations and violence against various targets identified with the Government (notably officials of the ruling *Baath* party, pro-government Moslem religious leaders and Soviet military advisers) and was also reported to have been involved in an unsuccessful attempt on the life of President Assad in June 1980. For several weeks in March-April the northern centres of Moslem Brotherhood strength such as Aleppo, Hama and Homs were reported to be in a state of insurrection, while a renewed government offensive against the Brotherhood in July-August was described by Western correspondents as bringing Syria to the brink of civil war.

It was reported in early February that since the beginning of the year Moslem Brotherhood activists has assassinated at least 12 Soviet military advisers (the number of which in Syria had recently increased from 1,500 to 2,000 following the reaching of a new Syrian-Soviet arms supply agreement during President Assad's visit to Moscow in October 1979—see page 30102). Although in mid-February the Government announced various liberalization measures designed to placate the opposition (including the release of over 100 liberal and leftist political prisoners), an anti-Brotherhood offensive by the Syrian security forces in late February led to the outbreak of general insurrection on March 8 in Aleppo and other northern cities, where government buildings and police stations were attacked and economic activity paralysed. Over the following weeks violence and general unrest spread over a wide area of northern Syria, forcing the Government to send in heavy armoured brigades detached from the Syrian-Israeli front. It was estimated by Western correspondents that during this phase about 100 Moslem extremists and some 80 government or party officials were killed in the fighting, many by summary execution.

Although the Government attempted during April to enter into a dialogue with opposition groups, violent clashes continued to occur between the Moslem Brotherhood and the security forces (headed by the President's brother, Dr Rifaat Assad), in one of which the Syrian authorities claimed that Capt. Ibrahim Youssef, the presumed leader of the June 1979 massacre of 63 Alawite army cadets in Aleppo [see page 30101] was among three Brotherhood members killed in an ambush in Idlib (south-west of Aleppo) on June 2.

In early July the Syrian security forces mounted a further offensive against the Moslem Brotherhood following what was reported in the Western press as an attempted assassination of President Assad on June 26. According to these reports, a member of the presidential guard threw a grenade at the President as he was driving to Damascus airport with President Kountché of Niger, the explosion slightly injuring the former's foot. A number of senior army officers were subsequently reported to have been arrested in connexion with the attempt, in which the Moslem Brotherhood was thought to have been implicated.

As part of the renewed offensive the Syrian People's Council (Parliament) on July 7 approved a law instituting the death penalty for membership of the Moslem Brotherhood, with the proviso that those who left the movement within a month would be pardoned. Although the Government claimed that under this amnesty (which was later extended until Aug. 27) several hundred Brotherhood members had surrendered to the authorities, violent clashes continued in northern Syria in July and August in which several hundred Brotherhood and other opposition activists were reported to have been killed, executed or arrested.

Among those killed was the military leader of the Brotherhood, Mr Hisham Jumbaz, who according to a government statement was among five Brotherhood members killed during a raid on their hideout in Homs on Aug. 16. Moreover, according to Western press reports in early September, some 200 of those who had surrendered under the amnesty were massacred by security forces on Aug. 14 at a camp in Raqqa (east of Aleppo).

Mr Salah Bitar (68), a co-founder of the *Baath* party who had served four terms as Prime Minister of Syria between 1963 and 1966 and who was known to be seeking to create a "national front" of exiled personalities opposed to President Assad, was shot dead in Paris on July 21 by an unknown assailant. The murder of Mr Bitar (who had lived in exile since 1966 when his right-wing *Baath* faction had been finally overthrown by the left-wing faction currently in power—see 21655 A) was widely seen as part of a government-sponsored assassination campaign against external opposition. The existence of the campaign—reportedly under the command of Dr Rifaad Assad—was specifically confirmed by President Assad in a statement to the *Baath* leadership on July 24.

Whereas the killing of Mr Bitar was apparently the first such assassination outside the Middle East region, several earlier murders of Syrian journalists working for anti-Assad newspapers in the Lebanon were also believed to have been carried out by Syrian agents. Such intimidation, which was seen as an extension of the rigid press censorship enforced in Syria itself, was also experienced by Western media correspondents in Beirut, several of whom were subjected to threats and violent attacks in the first half of 1980.—(Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Sunday Times - Observer - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. 1971 Libya-Syria-Egypt Federation 24820 A; Libya Internal 29665 A; Syria Internal 30100 A*)

A. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC — Cabinet Changes

In June 1980 Sra Rosa Julia de la Cruz was appointed Secretary of State (Minister) for Interior and Police *vice* Sr Secundino Gil Morales, who became director of the state sugar council. At the same time Sr Manuel Fernández Marmol (president of the ruling Dominican Revolutionary Party) was appointed Secretary of State for Industry and Commerce, Sr Vicente Sánchez Baret took over the Sport portfolio, and Dr Carlos Despradel became president of the Central Bank.—(Latin America Weekly Report - Bank of London and South America Review) (*Prev. rep. 30256 B, 29568 B*)

A. DISARMAMENT — Second Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Representatives of about three-quarters of the 115 states party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [see 22787 A] met in Geneva from Aug. 11 to Sept. 7, 1980, to review the achievements of the treaty 10 years after its entry into force on March 5, 1970 [see 23965 A]. The first review conference had taken place in May 1975 [see 27249 A].

The following alphabetical list shows those countries which had signed and ratified, i.e. acceded to, the NPT—the United Kingdom, the USA and the Soviet Union being the only nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty and also the depositary governments. Accession dates are given for those countries which had ratified and acceded since the beginning of 1977. [For earlier accessions see 27409 A; page 27814; 28304 B.]

Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh (Aug. 31, 1979), Barbados (Feb. 21, 1980), Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde (Oct. 24, 1979), Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Oct. 23, 1978), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, The Gambia, East Germany, West Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia (July 12, 1979), Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, South Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein (April 20, 1978), Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama (Jan. 13, 1977), Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal (Dec. 15, 1977), Romania, Rwanda, St Lucia (Dec. 28, 1979), San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Soviet Union, Sri Lanka (March 5, 1979), Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland (March 9, 1977—see 28304 B), Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey (April 17, 1980), Tuvalu (Jan. 19, 1979), United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vatican, Venezuela, Vietnam*, Western Samoa, South Yemen (June 1, 1979), Yugoslavia, Zaïre.

* The position of Vietnam remained technically ambivalent, since the NPT had been ratified in 1971 by South Vietnam only.

Surinam acceded to the treaty on June 30, 1976 (and not immediately upon becoming independent from the Netherlands on Nov. 25, 1975, as erroneously stated on page 27814), by a "statement of succession" to all obligations entered into on its behalf by the Netherlands Government; Tuvalu acceded under a similar procedure after becoming independent from the UK in October 1978 [see 29427 A]. Seychelles did not, as incorrectly stated in 28304 B, accede to the treaty on independence in 1976.

Those countries which had neither signed nor ratified the NPT included the two other major nuclear powers—the Chinese People's Republic and France (although the latter had affirmed its intention to respect the treaty's provisions—see page 22789)—and the following nuclear-threshold countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan [see also page 28482]. The NPT had been signed but not ratified by Colombia, Egypt (also a nuclear-threshold nation), Kuwait, Trinidad and Tobago and North Yemen.

(Under the NPT those countries with nuclear weapons agreed not to transfer nuclear explosive devices to non-nuclear-weapon states, which in turn agreed not to receive or develop them. Non-nuclear-weapon states agreed to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities to ensure that fissile material was not diverted to develop nuclear weapons. The treaty also called for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for nuclear-weapon states to assist the peaceful nuclear programmes of non-nuclear-weapon states, especially developing countries. Finally, the nuclear powers undertook to negotiate on effective measures to halt the arms race and bring about nuclear disarmament.)

At the opening session Mr Ismat Kittani of Iraq—one of the first countries to accede to the NPT (on Oct. 29, 1969)—was elected chairman of the conference. Messages were addressed to the conference by President Brezhnev, President Carter and Dr Kurt Waldheim (the UN Secretary-General), while Dr Sigvard Eklund, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which monitors the treaty, delivered a speech.

Dr Eklund proposed a demonstration explosion of a nuclear device to "unleash a massive reaction" against such weapons and to give the information media of the world an idea of the "destructive power" of the new nuclear weapons. He pointed out that there were 50,000 nuclear weapons on earth with a total explosive capacity 1,000,000 times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 [see 7366 A].

Dr Eklund told the conference that over 95 per cent of nuclear plants in all the non-nuclear-weapon states, whether parties to the NPT or not, were under IAEA safeguards and that 69 of the NPT parties had IAEA safeguards agreements in force. Dr Eklund also said that 26 states had already signed the international convention on the protection of nuclear material against theft or diversion by terrorists [see 30099 D].

Mr Brezhnev reiterated in his message that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear weapons against those who had renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons and who did not have them on their territories; he said that the Soviet Union was ready to conclude an agreement with any country in this respect and also to work for the conclusion of an international convention on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states. **President Carter** stressed that the use of nuclear power in meeting energy needs must be based on "confidence that international nuclear co-operation will not be misused for military purposes" and said that the USA would give its fullest support to achieving the treaty's objectives.

During the conference delegates from the non-nuclear-weapon states (many of them developing and non-aligned countries) accused the USA, the Soviet Union and Britain of failure to fulfil their treaty obligations to reduce nuclear arsenals and ban nuclear tests, and also of protecting their own nuclear monopoly by restricting the supply of peaceful nuclear technology to non-weapon countries [for example, under the 1978 US Non-Proliferation Act—see 29205 A and page 29550]. They also complained that suppliers of nuclear fuel and technology such as the USA and Canada insisted on tougher safeguards than those required by the IAEA [see page 30434].

As a result of these and other divisions the delegates as a body refused to endorse a new package of proposals designed to halt nuclear proliferation (which included a broad undertaking not to export nuclear materials to non-parties to the NPT unless they opened all their installations to IAEA inspectors) and they also failed to issue a final conference document.

The non-nuclear-weapon states, led by Mexico, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, demanded that the conference should formally censure the three nuclear powers and called (i) for the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests (53 of which had been carried out in 1979—see 30195 A); (ii) for the negotiation within the Geneva Committee on Disarmament of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, rather than its continued exclusive negotiation as at present by the UK, the USA and the USSR [ibid.]; (iii) for the inclusion in a final conference document of a commitment by the USA and the USSR to honour the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II—see 30117 A) pending its ratification by the US Senate, which had been deferred because of the Afghanistan crisis [see 30229 A]; and (iv) for the conference to demand an end to nuclear co-operation with Israel and South Africa. [For speculation on possible South African and/or Israeli nuclear test in September 1979, see page 30196.]

Mr Ignac Golob (Yugoslavia) described the conference as a failure because it had neither been an objective review nor produced recommendations for improving treaty obligations, and claimed that the treaty had been "only selectively and partially applied"; he demanded that measures be taken to improve the balance of rights and duties between the nuclear powers and the non-weapon states.

Mr Gheorghe Dolgu (Romania) said that the imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear states had assumed new dimensions and he expressed the view that there was no automatic link between the provision of nuclear technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Sr Felipe Valdivieso (Peru) said that his country might cease to participate in the treaty because of the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfil their side of the obligations under the NPT; since 1968 the non-weapon signatories had had to submit to the "requirements and whims" of the great powers, and he expressed indignation that there was still no agreement other than a verbal one to protect the non-weapon states.

Mr Douglas Hurd (UK) stressed that the guidelines on nuclear exports adopted after the first review conference by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group [Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA—see pages 29026 and 28482] were not intended to be monopolistic but to ensure predictability of supply and reduce damaging competition among suppliers.

Despite the absence of a formal consensus, progress was reported to have been made towards agreements on an international plutonium storage system, incentives for other non-nuclear-weapon countries to adhere to the NPT, and drafting measures to protect fissionable materials in transit. Western diplomats said that the participants' support for non-proliferation remained undiminished and that they had agreed to tighten safeguards against the abuse of exported nuclear technology while ensuring that it was shared for peaceful purposes.

Mr Ralph Earle II, the chief US delegate (and also director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), issued a statement to the effect that the conference had "broadly endorsed the importance of the NPT and called for universal adherence to it". He regretted that the "intransigence" of "a few" nations had prevented a consensus being reached, but the conference had, he said, provided useful impetus for the ratification of SALT II, for initiating SALT III negotiations, and for achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The next review conference was due to take place in 1985, a Mexican proposal that the participants should meet again in 1981 after a year's "reflection" being rejected.—(UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London - IAEA, Vienna - Times - Guardian - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - US International Communication Agency - UN Information Centre, London - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - UK Survey of Current Affairs) (*Prev. rep. 27249 A; Nuclear Developments 30431 A*)

Corrigendum. The full number of countries participating in the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation (INFCE) programme was 66, and not 46 as stated in 30431 A. The 59 countries participating in the final conference in February 1980 included 39 of the 40 countries listed in 29025 A (i.e. all except Iran), as well as Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Iraq, Libya, New Zealand, Niger, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia and Zaïre. Iran and six others—Albania, Cyprus, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Morocco and Paraguay—had participated in earlier meetings or other activities related to INFCE.

The five international organizations participating in INFCE were the Commission of the European Communities, the IAEA, the International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency (both of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD), and the United Nations. In addition, the INFCE programme was closely followed by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).

A. **ALGERIA — Extraordinary FLN Congress - Approval of Five-year Plan - Efforts to increase Exported Gas Price - Cabinet Reorganization - Other Internal Political and Security Developments - Agreement with France on Immigrant Workers - Earthquake Disaster**

An extraordinary congress of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN—Algeria's sole legal party) was held in Algiers on June 15-19, 1980, and was attended by 3,993 delegates, including 800 representatives of the armed forces. Initially called to examine the draft five-year plan for 1980-84 [see below], in the event the congress also adopted various amendments to the FLN statute designed to make the party "more dynamic", these including the granting of full effective powers over the party to President Bendjedid Chadli, the FLN secretary-general. [For the fourth FLN congress held in January 1979, see page 29779.]

The congress was seen as consolidating the authority of President Chadli (who had become head of state in February 1979 following the death of President Boumedienne—see 29777 A) and as marking the end of the "Boumedienne era", the former President's name being omitted from debates at the congress. Moreover, in the context of the liberalization programme which President Chadli had gradually introduced since coming to power, congress delegates were invited to voice their criticism of Algeria's political, economic and social shortcomings. (Recent liberalization measures had included the easing of restrictions on the exit of Algerians from the country; the freeing from house arrest in July 1979 of the former President, Mr Ben Bella [see page 29780], from whom all restrictions were finally lifted on Oct. 25, 1980; and the granting of amnesties to certain political exiles [see page 29780], among the latter being Col. Tahar Zbiri [ibid.], the leader of an unsuccessful revolt in 1967 [see 22985 A], who was given a complete pardon in October 1980.)

On the final day of its proceedings the congress adopted amendments to the party statute which provided inter alia (i) that the political bureau would henceforth be composed of between seven and 11 members (against 17-21 previously—see page 29779); (ii) that the secretary-general would select rather than propose the members of the political bureau for endorsement by the central committee; and (iii) that the secretary-general was empowered to make any changes in other party leadership bodies or party structure which he considered necessary.

Having redefined its role as purely advisory rather than decision-making, President Chadli on June 29 announced the composition of the new political bureau which, in addition to himself, comprised the following: Mr Rabah Bitat, Col. Abdallah Belhouchet, Col. Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, Mr Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, Mr Mohammed Saïd Mazouzi and Mr Boualem Ben Hamouda. All had been members of the political bureau appointed in January 1979 [for full membership of which, see page 29779].

The new political bureau met for the first time on July 16 (the day after a cabinet reorganization—see below) and later that day further changes were announced involving the reduction of the number of FLN committees from 12 to five, none of which were henceforth to be headed by members of the political bureau, and included the removal of Col. Yahiaoui from the post of party co-ordinator (Mr Ammar Ben Ouadah being named as chairman of the committee of party discipline).

The reappointment to the political bureau of Col. Yahiaoui and also Mr Bouteflika was generally unexpected. Both had been members of the former Revolutionary Council (which had reportedly been dissolved by mid-1979) and had opposed the nomination of Col. Chadli as presidential candidate in 1979 [see page 29778]; differences between the two men—Col. Yahiaoui advocating "pure and hard" Arab socialism for Algeria, and Mr Bouteflika favouring political and economic liberization—had already caused a serious rift in the political bureau, and Col. Yahiaoui was also known to have come into conflict with President Chadli. Mr Bouteflika had moreover been removed from the Cabinet in January 1980 upon the abolition of the post of Minister Counsellor to the President to which he had been appointed in March 1979 [see page 29778], having previously served as Foreign Minister for 13 years under President Boumedienne.

In a further change on July 16 Mr Mohammed Cherif Messadia, who had until the previous day served as Minister of Ex-Servicemen, was given responsibility for the permanent secretariat of the central committee.

Approval by FLN Congress of Economic Plan for 1980-84 - Negotiations on Price of Natural Gas Exports

The new economic plan for the five-year period 1980-84 was presented to the FLN congress by Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi, Minister of Planning and Organization of National Territory. Finalization of the draft had been delayed for over two years by various factors, Algeria's previous economic plan having covered the four-year period 1974-77 [see 26777 A].

In approving the draft the congress gave its support to a new direction in economic policy espoused by President Chadli. Under this new policy the importance of the private sector was recognized and, in particular, greater emphasis was given to developing agriculture, water resources and small, labour-intensive units, in contrast to the concentration on heavy industry and economic centralization which had characterized the policies pursued under President Boumedienne.

The plan envisaged that out of a total of $104,000 million allocated to government spending over the five-year period, $39,000 million would be allocated to industry (including $15,700 million for hydrocarbons), but emphasis would be placed on improving Algeria's low productivity and on completing projects begun under the previous plan. Industry would be decentralized away from the northern coastal area, while many large state corporations were to be reorganized and split up into smaller companies, notably the state oil and gas company Sonatrach (although Mr Belkacem Nabi, the Minister of Energy and Petrochemicals, would retain executive control of the company).

Agriculture and irrigation projects would receive $12,000 million and there would be structural reforms to moderate previous policies of collectivization (which had caused the abandonment of some 40 per cent of Algeria's arable land and a sharp decline in food production—see also 27373 C). Basic agricultural wages would be maintained at a level equal to those of industrial workers, and farmers would henceforth be able to market their produce themselves without using state marketing boards. Housing, education and health would be allocated $33,000 million, about half of which would be used to improve the critical housing situation in Algeria.

Overall it was hoped to increase economic growth to an annual level of 10 per cent in 1980-84 (compared with the rate of 7.2 per cent a year achieved in the period 1967-78), mostly by means of gas exports (anticipated increased revenues from which would also be used to pay off part of the country's foreign debt currently totalling some $22,000 million).

In the latter context, the congress also endorsed efforts undertaken by the Government during 1980 to secure an increase of over 100 per cent in the price paid for Algerian natural gas by overseas customers, notably Gaz de France and El Paso of the United States, to bring it into line with the current price of Algerian crude oil. In pursuance of these efforts the Algerian

Government had on April 1, 1980, virtually suspended deliveries to Gaz de France and El Paso (for earlier agreements with which see 20370 C; page 25085; 25421 A; 25748 A; 26777 A).

Although supplies to France returned to normal in late August on the basis of a compromise agreement (regarded as temporary by Algeria) for a price increase of about 12 per cent, negotiations were still in progress with El Paso in late October. Moreover, on Sept. 10 the Algerian Government announced that it would not be able to proceed with deliveries of liquified natural gas to West Germany and the Netherlands which had been due to commence in 1983. (These and other aspects of Algerian gas supply agreements will be dealt with in a subsequent article.)

Appointment of Reorganized Cabinet under Col. Abdelghani

The composition of the Cabinet appointed in March 1979 under the premiership of Col. Mohammed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani [see pages 29778-79] underwent a number of major changes on Jan. 13, 1980, and was further reorganized following the FLN congress, although the latter changes were fewer than had been generally expected. As announced on July 15, the membership of the Cabinet was as follows:

*Col. Mohammed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani	Prime Minister
Dr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi	Minister Counsellor to the President
*Mr Boualem Ben Hamouda	Interior
*Mr Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia	Foreign Affairs
*Lt.-Col. Selim Saadi	Agriculture and Agrarian Revolution
*Mr Brahim Brahimia	Irrigation
Mr Mohammed Kourtbi	Public Works
*Mr Belkacem Nabi	Energy and Petrochemicals
*Mr Saïd Aït Messaoudène	Light Industry
*Mr Mohammed Liassine	Heavy Industry
*Mr Mohammed Hadj Yalla	Finance
*Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi	Planning and Organization of National Territory
*Mr Abderrazak Bouhara	Health
*Mr Abdelhak Brehri	Higher Education and Scientific Research
*Mr Mohammed Kharroubi	Secondary and Primary Education
*Mr Mouloud Oumeziane	Labour and Vocational Cadres
Mr Abdelaziz Khallaf	Commerce
Mr Adennour Bekka	Posts and Telecommunications
*Mr Ahmed Ali Ghazali	Housing, Construction and Town Planning
Mr Bakhti Nemiche	Ex-Servicemen (*Mujahidin*)
Mr Abderahman Chiban	Religious Affairs
*Mr Jamal Houhou	Youth and Sport
*Col. Abdelmajid Allahoum	Tourism
*Mr Salah Goudjil	Transport
*Mr Baki Boualem	Justice
Mr Boualem Bessaiah	Information and Culture

Secretaries of State

Mr Mohammed Tayebi Larbi	Secretary-General to the Government
Mr Ahmed Ben Frikka	Maritime Fishing
*Mr Mohammed Rouighi	Woods and Afforestation
Mr Mohammed Larbi Ould Khalifa	Culture and Folklore†
Mr Hajj Slimane Cherif	Secondary and Technical Education†
Mr Mohammed Narbi	Vocational Training†
Mr Ali Oubuzar	Foreign Trade†

*Member of preceding Cabinet, in some cases with different responsibilities.

†New portfolio.

Col. Abdelghani had until Jan. 13 concurrently held the Interior portfolio; his removal from this latter office had been regarded as a significant demotion since the role of the Prime Minister was mainly to act as an auxiliary to the President. In his capacity as Interior Minister Col. Abdelghani had been held responsible for certain abuses of power during the "cleaning-up" campaign launched in major towns and cities in the latter part of 1979 [see below]. As indicated above, Col. Abdelghani had been excluded from the reduced FLN political bureau appointed following the June congress.

Dr Ibrahimi, who had similarly not been reappointed to the FLN political bureau, had been one of two Ministers Counsellor to the President until Jan. 13, when he had been given further party appointments. (The other outgoing Minister Counsellor to the President in January was, as stated above, Mr Abdel Aziz Bouteflika.)

Mr Ben Hamouda had taken over the Interior portfolio from Col. Abdelghani on Jan. 13 (before which date he had been chairman of the FLN committee of education, training and culture since March 1979—see page 29779); as stated above, he retained his membership of the FLN political bureau in June.

Mr Brahimia had become Minister of Irrigation on Jan. 13 and was thereupon succeeded as Secretary of State for Woods and Afforestation by **Mr Rouighi**. (Prior to this Mr Brahimia had concurrently been acting Minister of Irrigation following the removal from this office on Oct. 14, 1979, of Mr Sid Ahmed Ghozali.)

Mr Ghazali had hitherto been Minister of Public Works while **Mr Boualem** had held the Religious Affairs portfolio. **Mr Larbi** had been Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform until March 1979 and had also lost his membership of the FLN political bureau in June 1980.

Also on July 15 President Chadli re-established the General Staff (which had been abolished after the 1967 coup attempt—see 22985 A) and announced the appointment of two Deputy Ministers of Defence (the President himself holding the Defence portfolio), these being Col. Abdallah Belhouchet (a member of the new FLN political bureau and Inspector-General of the Army) and Col. Kasdi Merbah (hitherto in command of military security). In June Col. Merbah had been removed from the FLN political bureau but had thereupon been made responsible for logistics and military industries.

Implementation of Measures to accelerate Arabization following Protests by Arab-language Students - Unrest among Berber Minority - "Cleaning-up" Campaign in Towns and Cities

Major sources of internal disturbances in Algeria from late 1979 included (i) demands by students for an acceleration of the Government's programme to promote the use of the Arabic language, (ii) unrest among the Berber minority in the north-east of the country and (iii) the launching of a campaign by the Government to clean up Algerian towns and cities.

Demands for Promotion of Arabic Language. In November 1979 unrest broke out at Algiers University (and later spread to provincial campuses), where students at Arab-language faculties began strike action to protest at the lack of opportunities open to them in what they described as a "French-oriented" society. They demanded the full and prompt Arabization of Algerian administration and education and greater opportunities to obtain the better-paid and higher-ranking positions usually allocated to French-educated candidates (and moreover complained about the poor accommodation and other facilities available to them). (Both Arabic and French were officially used in Algeria, although under the 1976 National Charter Arabic was the national and official language—see page 28160.)

Although President Chadli denounced the students' protest action, he nevertheless reaffirmed Algeria's commitment to Arabization and in late 1979 and early 1980 a number of measures were introduced to this end. A meeting of the FLN central committee on Dec. 26-30, 1979, acknowledged "all the weaknesses and shortcomings of the education system" which had led to "social discrimination" and to the "detriment of the official national language of Algeria" and announced long-term plans for Arabization at all levels of education. Moreover, President Chadli was reported in January 1980 to have ordered the Arabization of the courts, where lawyers who spoke only French would henceforth be required to employ Arabic-speaking colleagues to speak for them in court.

Berber Unrest. Partly as a result of the Government's Arabization programme and the relative tolerance shown towards the striking Arab-language students, serious unrest broke out in early 1980 in the north-eastern province of Kabylie, the homeland of most of Algeria's Berber population (comprising almost a quarter of the total Algerian population of around 20,000,000), who demanded recognition of their language and culture. The Berbers were the oldest inhabitants of Algeria and were ethnically distinct from the Arabs who overran northern Africa in the seventh century AD, having since then adhered to their culture and their (semito-hamitic) Kabyle language. After a history of opposition to the French they played a major role in the (1954-62) war of independence against France (one of their leaders, Mr Krim Belkacem, being one of the "historic nine" leaders of the revolution—see page 18908), although after independence they led an uprising against President Ben Bella [see page 19807]. This revolt had been instigated by Dr Hocine Aït Ahmed, a leading Berber figure in the revolution against France and likewise one of the "historic nine", who was also leader of the (illegal) *Front des forces socialistes* (FFS) and who had lived in France since his escape from prison in 1966 [see page 22987 and also 27905 A].

The latest unrest began on March 10, 1980, when the Governor of Kabylie banned the holding of a lecture on ancient Berber poetry in

Tizi Ouzou, the principal city in the province. Berber students at Algiers University thereupon took strike action, protesting at the "repression" of Berber culture, and the action quickly spread to Kabylie, where incidents and protests multiplied throughout March and the first part of April, culminating in a one-day general strike on April 16. Four days later, on April 20, security forces moved into the University and hospital in Tizi Ouzou to put an end to continuing strikes and "sit-ins", some unconfirmed Algerian sources claiming that up to 200 people had been injured and 32 killed in the operation, whereas government spokesmen denied that there had been any casualties. This action by the security forces sparked off a series of violent riots in Tizi Ouzou and elsewhere, which led to the province being virtually sealed off from the rest of the country for several days.

Although the protesters stated that their demands were cultural rather than political and stressed that they did not wish to undermine the "national unity" of Algeria, the state-controlled media asserted that the Berber agitation represented a plot to "destabilize" Algeria which had been organized by "external influences", France and French-based organizations, in particular the FFS, being among those accused of involvement. Moreover, on April 17 President Chadli stated that while he supported democracy he nevertheless condemned those who submitted their problems "to the streets" and threatened the unity of the country.

Nevertheless in the wake of the latest violent incidents the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Mr Abdelhak Brehri, in early May announced certain measures designed to appease the Berber students. These included in particular a promise to create a chair of Kabyle studies at Tizi Ouzou university and to re-establish the chair at Algiers University. The Minister also pledged that greater coverage would be given to Berber culture in the mass media, while certain assurances on the Government's Arabization programme were also given.

The University of Tizi Ouzou was reopened in the first part of May and a high level of calm had returned to the area by the middle of 1980, although sporadic Berber protests continued thereafter.

"Cleaning-up" Campaign. On the basis of a directive issued by President Chadli on Aug. 28, 1979, the Algerian authorities in early September launched a "cleaning-up" operation in Algiers intended to establish order and discipline. Police with dogs were sent into the capital to round up "social scourges" and "parasitic elements"—among them large numbers of young unemployed—to enforce traffic regulations and to organize the clearing away of filth and rubbish from houses and shop doorways. The campaign, which was directed by Col. Abdelghani (who then held the Interior portfolio as well as the premiership) and Col. Yahiaoui (then co-ordinator of the FLN), continued in Algiers for several weeks and was later extended to other towns and cities.

By early October 1979 over 1,000 people, principally young men, had been rounded up and brought before courts where the majority were understood to have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment or to terms in labour camps.

The campaign was reported to have given rise to a marked improvement in the level of cleanliness and in the distribution of goods and circulation of traffic in Algiers and elsewhere, while money was also understood to have been allocated to the renovation of certain quarters of the capital. Although the campaign was welcomed by many Algerians (some even joining in to help the police), others protested at alleged "brutal interventions" by the police and at the detention of "innocent" citizens.

Agreement between France and Algeria on Immigrant Workers

An agreement was signed in Algiers on Sept. 18, 1980, between the French Foreign Minister, M. Jean François-Poncet, and his Algerian counterpart, Mr Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia, which was aimed at encouraging Algerian immigrant workers in France to return home, with a view to easing France's own high unemployment rate. Currently there were more than 800,000 Algerians residing in France, about half of whom were in employment. (Further immigration to France from all sources had been banned since July 1974—see page 27361.)

It was also hoped that this agreement, which had been negotiated over the previous 15 months, would improve the strained relations between the two countries resulting in particular from disagreements over the price of Algerian gas exports and from Algerian allegations of French involvement in the Berber unrest [see above].

The agreement covered a probationary period of three years during which time the French Government would, at a cost of an estimated 70,000,000 francs (about £6,500,000), provide Algerians with financial incentives to return home, while in return Algeria would complete the unfreezing of French bank accounts held since independence was achieved in 1962 (for earlier agreements on which, see 26483 A and pages 27360-61). The agreement involved the provision of vocational training in Algeria for those who returned, an increase in the repatriation grant (to 10,000 francs) and the offer of low-interest loans to Algerians who could prove that they were able to set up small enterprises on their return. Algeria for its part would offer customs and tax concessions to those returning.

El Asnam Earthquake Disaster

Two severe earthquakes, measuring 7.5 and 6.5 respectively on the (open-ended) Richter scale (as recorded by US monitors), struck a predominantly rural area in north-western Algeria within the space of four hours on Oct. 10, 1980, devastating an area with a radius of some 40 miles. Further tremors shook the area over the following few days but caused little further damage. On Oct. 24 Algerian authorities put the number of known casualties at 2,590 dead and 8,252 injured and estimated the number of homeless at nearly 100,000.

The epicentre of the earthquakes was near El Asnam, the largest city in the area (some 120 miles south-west of Algiers) with a population of some 120,000, where most of the casualties occurred. At least 25 per cent of all buildings in El Asnam were destroyed, while a further 50 per cent were seriously damaged and rendered uninhabitable. [El Asnam, then called Orléansville, had previously been virtually destroyed by an earthquake in 1954 when over 1,000 people had been killed, and had thereafter been renamed and rebuilt with French assistance—see 13932 A.]

President Chadli announced a seven-day period of mourning and immediately ordered a massive relief operation (responsibility for which was entrusted to Mr Ben Hamouda, the Minister of the Interior) and himself travelled to the disaster area. Assistance also arrived speedily from several other countries, with relief teams, money and supplies being sent from Red Cross societies and other organizations in at least 20 countries.

In El Asnam a rescue workforce of some 40,000 people worked day and night to remove rubble and wreckage and to dig survivors and bodies from the ruins, while medical centres and tent villages were set up to help the injured and homeless (although a number of the latter fled the city after further tremors were felt there); looters were dealt with harshly, several reportedly being shot on sight. While the emergency operation in El Asnam was regarded as being both speedy and efficient, assistance was slow to reach the outlying area, where many villages had become inaccessible by road due to landslides and collapsed bridges.

Following the earthquakes, the Government announced on Oct. 10 that El Asnam would be rebuilt at another, as yet unspecified, location to avoid the possibility of a further similar disaster.—(Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Times - Sunday Times - Daily Telegraph - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts) (*Prev. rep. Internal Political and Security Developments 29777 A; 1974-77 Economic Plan 26777 A; Gas Export Agreements 26777 A; Immigrant Workers in France 27360 A; 1954 Earthquake Disaster 13932 A*)

A. EAST GERMANY - WEST GERMANY — Cancellation of Herr Schmidt's Planned Meeting with Herr Honecker - Tension over Revised East Germany Entry Regulations

It was announced in Bonn on Aug. 22, 1980, that a meeting scheduled for Aug. 28-29 between Herr Helmut Schmidt, the West German Federal Chancellor, and Herr Erich Honecker, the First Secretary of the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and Chairman of the Council of State, would not take place as planned. Herr Schmidt's cancellation of the meeting, which would have been the most senior meeting of East and West German representatives on German soil for a decade, was widely seen as having been made in the context of the industrial and political situation in Poland [see 30565 A], but was also a direct response to last-minute alterations in the programme for the visit which had been proposed by the East German authorities.

Although it had been expected by government sources in Bonn that the meeting would take place on Aug. 27-29 in the small town of Dierhagen, near the Baltic industrial port of Rostock, the official invitation issued on Aug. 11 to Herr Schmidt and Dr Otto Graf Lambsdorff (the West German Minister for Economic Affairs) was valid only for Aug. 28 and 29 and specified as the venue a top-security hunting lodge on Lake Werbellin, about 50 km north of East Berlin, which was used mainly by senior East German politicians.

Since a visit to East Berlin might be construed as de facto recognition of the East German Government's claim that East Berlin was the East German capital, Herr Schmidt elected to travel to the meeting by train directly from Hamburg and without entering East Berlin (which the Bonn Government regarded as having four-power status equivalent to that of West Berlin).

Whereas it had been intended in Bonn that Herr Schmidt would also visit Güstrow and Rostock on the way back to West Germany, the official East German invitation (as announced in the East German media on Aug. 19) omitted all mention of any such intention, and it was subsequently learned on Aug. 22 that Rostock had been struck from the itinerary by the East German authorities.

In announcing Herr Schmidt's decision to cancel the meeting with Herr Honecker, the West German Government spokesman, Herr Klaus Bölling, said (on Aug. 22) that "the time is not appropriate in view of the latest developments in Europe". Commentators noted that the strikes in Poland had intensified during the previous week with the presentation on Aug. 14-17 of far-reaching political demands by the strikers in Gdansk (Danzig) and Szczecin (Stettin)—which, like Rostock, were major industrial ports on the Baltic coast.

Although Herr Schmidt had originally announced on Dec. 4, 1979, that he was to hold talks with Herr Honecker during early 1980 [see 30087 A], West German expectations of a meeting in February had faded following the intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan dating from late December 1979 [see 30229 A; 30362 A; 30381 A], which had led to the West German decision to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow [see page 30385]. Consequently, West Germany's relations with a number of Warsaw Treaty states became increasingly strained during early 1980, during which period a number of scheduled ministerial contacts were cancelled or postponed.

As the year progressed, however, relations between East and West Germany had improved and official-level contacts had resumed. These had included a visit on April 17 by Dr Günter Mittag, a member of the SED Politburo and the East German Council of State and Herr Honecker's chief economic adviser, who met Herr Schmidt in West Germany and thus became the most senior East German politician to meet a West German Chancellor since Herr Willy Stoph, the then East German Prime Minister, had met the then West German Chancellor, Herr Willy Brandt, in 1970 [see 24001 A; 24149 A]; moreover, on April 30 the East and West German Governments had signed three agreements under which West Germany was to provide a total of 507,000,000 Deutschemarks ($282,000,000) for the improvement of road, rail and motorway links between the two states and between West Berlin and the Federal Republic [see also page 30058].

Herr Honecker had repeatedly spoken of the desirability of a meeting with Herr Schmidt, particularly in view of what he called on May 21 "the responsibility of the two German states for peace at a time when the international situation has grown more complicated". Herr Schmidt had indicated that, as well as economic questions, he intended to discuss such matters as the continued facilitation of visits between East and West Germany and the implications for West Germany of East Germany's nuclear power programme.

Although East German media reports of the cancellation of Herr Schmidt's visit stressed the latter's assertion that it signified no crisis in inter-German relations, shortly after the West German federal elections held on Oct. 5 [see 30597 A] the East German authorities provoked strong adverse reactions in West Germany by introducing stringent new currency exchange regulations in respect of cross-border travel.

Whereas previously all persons visiting East Germany had been obliged to exchange, at a ratio of 1 : 1, a daily minimum of DM 13 for East German marks (DM 6.50 for East Berlin), the East German Finance Ministry announced on Oct. 9 that, starting from Oct. 13, the compulsory minimum exchange for both areas would be raised to DM 25 (about £6.25) per day. West Germany's permanent representative in East Berlin, Herr Günter Gaus, presented a strong official protest to the East German Government on Oct. 10, and Herr Schmidt on Oct. 12 accused East Germany of seriously damaging relations between the two German states. (Facilitated access to East Germany had been a keynote of the agreements signed by the two Governments in 1971 and 1972—see 24701 A; 24813 A; 25095 A; 25355 A; 25621 A.)

The West German Government immediately rejected a demand made by Herr Honecker on Oct. 14 that the Federal Republic should recognize the sovereignty and citizenship of the Democratic Republic (the Federal Republic having consistently refused to recognize more than one German nationality). The following day Herr Bölling said that no economic sanctions would be adopted to reinforce the West German demands that the currency exchange increases should be rescinded.—(Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Guardian - Times - Financial Times - New York Times) (*Prev. rep. East-West German Relations 30055 A, 30087 A*)

A. CHILE — Plebiscite on New Constitution - Other Internal Developments - Lifting of UK Embargo on Arms Sales to Chile

In a national plebiscite held on Sept. 11, 1980—the seventh anniversary of the military coup which overthrew the Government of President Salvador Allende [see 26149 A]—a new Constitution allowing President Augusto Pinochet to remain in office at least until 1989 was approved by a substantial majority. According to final official figures issued on Oct. 15, a total of 4,204,879 votes (67.04 per cent) were cast in favour and 1,893,420 (30.19 per cent) against the Constitution, the remaining 173,569 votes (2.77 per cent) being invalid. Included among those counted in favour were 83,812 blank papers.

The electorate numbered some 6,750,000, including all Chileans aged 18 and over. Voting was obligatory, failure to vote being punishable by fines or imprisonment. The ballot papers carried only the words "yes" and "no" (with appropriate symbols for illiterates).

Announcing the plebiscite in a televised broadcast on Aug. 10, President Pinochet said that, if approved, the new Constitution would begin to enter into force six months later (i.e. on March 11, 1981) and that he would then remain in office for an eight-year period of "slow and gradual evolution" towards a democratic form of government. The President warned that a rejection of the Constitution would mean "a return to the juridical and political situation which existed in the nation on Sept. 10, 1973" and to the "1,000 black days" of the Allende Government "with all its anguish and miseries".

The text of the Constitution was published on Aug. 11. It provided in particular that, at the end of the eight-year "transitional" period, the junta (which from 1981 would be separate from the presidency) would in 1989 nominate a single presidential candidate; if confirmed by plebiscite this candidate would remain in power until 1997, when free presidential elections would take place, but if the candidate was rejected President Pinochet himself would remain in office for another year and would call such elections within that time.

During the eight-year "transitional" period the main provisions of the Constitution would not enter fully into force, but 29 "transitional provisions" would be effective. These would inter alia allow President Pinochet to be himself re-elected by the junta as the presidential candidate in 1989. (As regards the latter provision, the main text of the Constitution prohibited presidential re-election, and the President stated on Sept. 11 that he did not in fact intend to stand in 1989.)

Other basic provisions of the Constitution were (i) that the first four-yearly elections to a 120-member Chamber of Deputies would take place 180 days after the end of the transitional period (i.e. at the end of 1989); (ii) that 26 members of the Senate would be freely elected, nine others would be appointed, and all former Presidents would be designated senators for life; (iii) that the President could dissolve Congress once during his term of office; (iv) that the armed forces would participate in the development of the nation by means of a National Security Council consisting of the President, the junta, and the presidents of the Supreme Court and the Senate; (v) that "totalitarian" groups were prohibited and their members banned from a series of jobs and public offices, while other political parties would only be allowed to resume activities after the end of the transitional phase.

The Constitution also recognized but severely restricted the freedom to strike and to assemble and freedom of information and expression, notably in that employees of the state and of essential sectors were not permitted to strike and in that the courts were authorized to take action against those diffusing information "undermining morals, public order and national security, people's private lives and the secrecy of the courts". The President could proclaim a state of emergency or exception and order detentions for up to 20 days without charge (compared with five days previously), while military tribunals could take severe measures against terrorists, who would be excluded from bail, parole or amnesty. Finally, the Constitution institutionalized the country's free-market economic policies, reaffirmed respect for human rights and prohibited abortion.

The new Constitution, which replaced the 1925 text suspended in 1973, had been drafted by a Council of State established in 1975, whose membership included two former Presidents, Sr Gabriel González Videla (1946-52) and Sr Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (1958-64) [see 27644 A]. The initial draft, presented to President Pinochet on July 9, 1980, envisaged a transitional period of five years, followed by elections for a President who would hold office for a six-year term; however, after studying the draft President Pinochet and the junta decided that this timetable was too precipitate.

During August the content of the Constitution and the way in which the plebiscite was being staged provoked criticism within Chile, notably from the Christian Democratic Party led by Dr Eduardo Frei Montalva (the President of Chile from 1964 to 1970 who had refused to participate in the Council of State—see 27644 A) and from the Roman Catholic Church. The Government countered this criticism by warning that disorder and street violence would return and that the economy would revert to chaos if the Constitution were rejected.

Dr Frei addressed an authorized public meeting of several thousand people on the subject of the plebiscite on Aug. 28, when he called for the formation of a civilian-military transitional government to restore full democracy to Chile within the next two to three years. The meeting subsequently turned into an opposition demonstration, which was broken up by police, and other such demonstrations took place in August and September, a number of people being arrested and some sent into internal exile. All the country's universities were closed from Sept. 8 to 22 in an effort to forestall student protests over the plebiscite.

On Aug. 23 the Chilean episcopal conference issued a document expressing doubts over the legitimacy of the plebiscite and over the way in which three major questions—those of a new Constitution, its transitional provisions and the issue of presidential power—were all to be answered by a single "yes" or "no". The document also claimed that the opposition were not being allowed proper use of the information media. (Relations between the Church and the military regime had deteriorated sharply in 1980 because of the increasing number of attacks being perpetrated against members of the clergy and church premises—see also below.)

Gen. Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, who had been a member of the junta until he was dismissed by Gen. Pinochet in 1978 for his dissident views [see 29266 B], announced on Sept. 2 that he intended to vote against the Constitution because it would "provide for the concentration of absolute power".

President Pinochet signed the Constitution on Oct. 21 after rejecting a report from the Christian Democrats which alleged fraud and irregularities in the plebiscite and which criticized the absence of a proper voting register.

On Oct. 16 the junta announced that Sr Andrés Zaldívar Larrain, the Christian Democratic Party president who was on tour in Europe, would not be allowed to re-enter Chile unless he signed a document accepting the results of the plebiscite and the authority of the Government and of the Constitution. Sr Zaldívar was accused inter alia of making denigratory statements about Chile to a Mexican newspaper and thus of threatening Chile's internal security.

The Chilean Cabinet offered its resignation on Sept. 15 as a formality, all its members being confirmed in their posts. Subsequently, on Oct. 20, Gen. René Vidal Basauri was appointed Secretary-General to the Cabinet *vice* Gen. Sergio Badiola Brodberg (a post which Gen. Vidal had previously held prior to 1979—see 29601 A).

Internal Security Developments - Lifting of British Embargo on Arms Sales to Chile - Austrian Cancellation of Tank Contract

The assassination in Santiago on July 15 of the head of the army intelligence school, Lt.-Col. Roger Vergara Campos (43), and his driver was attributed by the Government to the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and led to the arrest of several hundred people for questioning as well as to a series of attacks and kidnappings by right-wing groups, notably against ecclesiastical targets.

Lt.-Col. Vergara had recently led an investigation into tax fraud involving members of the former secret police organization DINA (which was dissolved in 1977 and replaced by the National Intelligence Centre, CNI—see 28762 A). Following his murder the head of the CNI, Gen. (rtd.) Odlanier Mena Salinas (who was removed from his post on July 23 and was succeeded by Brig.-Gen. Humberto Gordón Rubio), stated that he did not think that the left was responsible.

Many of the attacks were claimed by a right-wing "Avengers of the Martyrs Commando", including the temporary kidnapping at the end of July of two journalists connected with church radio stations and of six students, one of whom died of wounds inflicted while he was being held. The Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, said that he himself had received death threats and that his parents' grave had been desecrated. About 20 policemen were taken into custody on Aug. 12 and faced charges of perpetrating right-wing terrorist acts—the chief of police, Gen. (rtd.) Ernesto Baeza, also resigning in this connexion.

The Chilean human rights commission stated on June 18 that 1,200 people had been arrested, 217 university teachers expelled from the country and 76 people sent into internal exile since the beginning of the year. (Due to an increase in MIR activities and the killing of a policeman on April 28, more than 500 people were rounded up in anticipation of May Day disturbances, and Cardinal Silva Henríquez cancelled a May Day mass after government officials had, he said, warned him that it might be a focus for violence, for which they could take no responsibility. A total of 37 people were sent into internal exile after May Day events.)

Following the resumption of full diplomatic relations between Britain and Chile in early 1980 [see 30284 A], the British embargo on arms sales to Chile imposed in 1974 [see page 26659] was lifted on July 22, on the grounds that the human rights situation in Chile had improved.

Controversy was subsequently aroused when it was disclosed in August that, only days before the lifting of the embargo, a student with dual British-Chilean nationality, Miss Claire Wilson (21), had been arrested on July 16 and tortured by the Chilean police before being released on July 18 after the intervention of the British consul. Both Amnesty International and the opposition Labour Party accused the Government of deliberately suppressing the information and called for the resignation of Mr Nicolas Ridley (Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) as the person responsible.

Miss Wilson, who was pregnant, told Amnesty International that after undergoing torture she had been forced to witness the torture of her child's father, Sr José Miguel Benado (30), who was arrested with her on charges of left-wing extremism and entering the country illegally. Following her release on July 18 she left a court deposition with the British embassy on July 22, describing her treatment, but she refused to leave Chile without Sr Benado.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office said on Sept. 7 that the British ambassador had protested about Miss Wilson's treatment to the Chilean Foreign Ministry on July 29 and that a further protest had been made to the Chilean ambassador in London on Aug. 6. Furthermore, it denied on Sept. 8 that it had suppressed information on Miss Wilson's case, stating that on July 18 the British consul in Santiago had been unaware of the imminent lifting of the embargo; that Miss Wilson had initially made no allegations of torture when she was released; and that details of her court deposition had only arrived in London on July 23.

The Austrian Government on Aug. 20 announced the cancellation of a $167,000,000 contract to sell 100 tanks and 300 machine guns to Chile because they might be used "for purposes other than self-defence".—(Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - Financial Times - International Herald Tribune - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Latin America Weekly Report) (*Prev. rep. 30284 A; 1978 Plebiscite 28847 A*)

A. IRISH REPUBLIC — Donegal By-election - Seat retained by Fianna Fail

A parliamentary by-election held on Nov. 6, 1980, in the five-member constituency of Donegal resulted in the seat being retained by the ruling *Fianna Fail* with an increase in the party's first preference votes compared with the 1977 general election. The by-election was caused by the death of Mr Joseph Brennan, the former *Ceann Comhairle* (Speaker) of the *Dail* [see 30596 C].

On the first count Mr Clement Coughlan (*Fianna Fail*) polled 23,456 votes, Mr Dennis McGinley (*Fine Gael*) 20,022, Mr Patrick Kelly (Independent *Fianna Fail*) 14,198, and Mr Seamus Rodgers (*Sinn Fein* the Workers' Party) 2,401. Following the elimination of Mr Kelly and Mr Rodgers, Mr Coughlan was elected on the third count with 29,219 votes against 24,085 for Mr McGinley, a majority of 5,134. There was a 75 per cent turnout. Mr Coughlan (37) is a schoolteacher and a Donegal county councillor.—(Irish Times) (*Prev. rep. By-elections 30028 A*)

B. SINGAPORE — New Government Appointment

The secretary general of the National Trades Union Congress, Mr Lim Chee Onn, was appointed Minister without Portfolio on Sept. 15, 1980, while retaining his union post. A spokesman for the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, said that this appointment was "aimed at preserving the vital symbiotic relationship that has been established between the political and trade union leadership" in Singapore.—(Singapore Bulletin - Guardian) (*Prev. rep. 30460 A, 30508 C*)

A. NIGERIA — Return to Civilian Rule under New Constitution - Federal and State Election Results - Formation of Government by President Shagari

The Federal Republic of Nigeria, which had been under military rule since Jan. 15, 1966 [see 21211 A], returned to civilian rule under a new democratic Constitution on Oct. 1, 1979 (the 19th anniversary of independence and the fourth anniversary of the announcement by the late Gen. Murtala Mohammed of the timetable for the transition—see 27833 A). Details are given below of the provisions of the new Constitution, the resumption of party politics, the results of the various elections and the formation of a civilian Government.

Lifting of Ban on Party Politics - Promulgation of Amended Constitution

The Head of the Federal Military Government, Lt.-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (who was subsequently promoted a full general in April 1979), announced on Sept. 21, 1978, that the ban on party political activities and the state of emergency in force since January 1966 had been lifted with immediate effect and that a new Constitution incorporating a number of amendments introduced by the Supreme Military Council (SMC) would be promulgated, also with effect from Sept. 21, and would enter into force on Oct. 1, 1979. The Constituent Assembly convened in October 1977 [see 28628 A], which had held no further meetings since its indefinite adjournment on June 5, 1978 [see 29207 A], was formally dissolved.

The SMC made 17 amendments to the Constituent Assembly's final constitutional draft, which had been officially submitted for its consideration on Aug. 29, 1978.

These amendments included (i) the rejection of the Assembly's amendment (i.e. to the draft Constitution published in 1976—see 28089 B) making English the sole language for the business of the National Assembly [see page 29207]; (ii) the rejection of an amendment which would have given the judiciary control over its own capital expenditure; (iii) the deletion of a provision setting out procedures for the incorporation into Nigeria of territory from another sovereign state; (iv) the rejection of a proposal to relate federal armed forces recruitment directly to relative state population figures [see page 29208]; (v) the deletion of a controversial Assembly amendment [see page 29209] disqualifying from elective office those found guilty of misconduct since Oct. 1, 1960 [i.e. since independence—see 17679 A]; (vi) various additions to the code of conduct for public officials designed to strengthen its effectiveness in combating corruption; (vii) the reduction to 10 of the total membership of the Federal Civil Service Commission [see page 29208]; and (viii) the entrenchment in the Constitution of four military decrees, including the Land Use Decree 1978 [see page 29213].

On the other hand, the SMC accepted such fundamental Constituent Assembly amendments as the increase in the membership of the federal House of Representatives and the lowering of the age limits for presidential and senatorial candidates [see page 29207], and announced that the electoral decree promulgated in January 1978 [see page 29210] would be amended accordingly, while other decrees which were rendered "irrelevant" by the new Constitution would be repealed.

Gen. Obasanjo said in a broadcast to the nation on Sept. 21, 1978, that the SMC's amendments to the Constitution had been made in the light of the military leadership's "responsibility to the nation" to lay the strongest foundations for "the attainment of good government, orderly progress and harmony of the nation" after its withdrawal from politics. He criticized the "unpatriotic and selfish" stances adopted by various factions within the Constituent Assembly during the proceedings of that body, and appealed to politicians to learn from Nigeria's past experiences, including particularly the civil war (of 1967-70), and not to "embark on politics of deceit, false hopes, empty promises and unattainable goals which will eventually lead to unrealizable expectations, bitterness, discontent and unhappiness of the electorate". He added that the military Government would not in the coming year "allow any individual or group of individuals to subjugate the higher national interest . . . to their selfish and narrow interests".

Principal Provisions of New Constitution

The following is a summary of the provisions of the Constitution promulgated on Sept. 21, 1978, as the basis of the return to civilian rule.

Chapter I - General Provisions

Part I of this chapter (sections 1-3 of the Constitution) established the supremacy of the Constitution and the indivisible, indissoluble and federal structure of the republic, with a schedule defining the territories of the 19 states and the Federal Capital Territory. It was stated that "[Nigeria] shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution".

Part II (sections 4-12) defined the powers of the federal republic. Federal legislative power was vested in a National Assembly comprising a Senate and a House of Representatives, and a schedule listed the broad areas of legislation reserved exclusively to the National Assembly under 64 specific headings, plus "any other matter with respect to which the National Assembly has power to make laws in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution". Legislative power in the states was vested in each state's House of Assembly in respect of matters not included in the exclusive federal list, and a schedule defined 11 broad areas of concurrent legislation, setting out the respective powers of the National Assembly and the state Assemblies. It was stated that federal legislation prevailed over state legislation in the event of inconsistency. Retrospective legislation "in relation to any criminal offence whatsoever" was declared to be unconstitutional.

Federal executive power was vested in the President and state executive power in the state governors, the latter being required to exercise their powers so as "not to impede or prejudice" the authority of the federal executive or to "endanger the continuance of a federal government in Nigeria". The President could not declare a state of war without the support of both Houses of the National Assembly sitting in joint session. The prior approval of the Senate was necessary for the deployment of any member of the armed forces on combat duty outside Nigeria.

Judicial power was vested in the courts, of which the following were defined as "the only superior courts of record in Nigeria": (i) the Supreme Court of Nigeria; (ii) the Federal Court of Appeal; (iii) the Federal High Court; (iv) the High Court of a state; (v) the Sharia Court of Appeal of a state [for which see Chapter VII below]; and (vi) the Customary Court of Appeal of a state [ibid.]. The courts did not have powers (i) to pass judgment on questions concerning the implementation of the fundamental objectives and directive principles set out in Chapter II [see below], except where such powers were specifically defined in the Constitution, or (ii) to hear any action questioning the competence of the (military) authorities to make any existing law introduced since Jan. 15, 1966.

The Constitution guaranteed the operation of democratically elected local government councils, and obliged each state to adopt appropriate legislation. A schedule defined the main functions of a local government council.

The Constitution listed the requirements for the creation of a new state within the federation as follows: (i) the submission to the National Assembly of a request by at least two-thirds of the members representing the area demanding such action in the Senate, the House of Representatives, the relevant state House of Assembly and the relevant local government councils; (ii) the approval of such a proposal by "at least two-thirds majority of the people of the area where the demand for the creation of the state originated" in a referendum; (iii) the approval of the referendum result by "a simple majority of all the states of the federation supported by a simple majority of the members of the Houses of Assembly" and (iv) the adoption of a resolution by a two-thirds majority of each House of the National Assembly.

Any request for the adjustment of the boundaries of an existing state was required to be originated as in (i) above, but could be approved by simple majorities in both Houses of the National Assembly and in the state Assembly in respect of the area concerned.

No bill to amend the constitutional provisions relating to the creation of new states or the alteration of state boundaries, the procedure for amending the Constitution, or the provisions of Chapter IV [see below] could be passed without the support of a four-fifths majority of all the members of each House of the National Assembly and the approval of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states. Other constitutional amendments required a two-thirds majority of all the members of each House of the National Assembly and the approval of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states.

It was laid down that neither the federal Government nor any state Government "could adopt any religion as state religion".

The power to make laws for the maintenance of public order and security and the provision of essential supplies and services in "the federation or any part thereof" was vested in the National Assembly. The National Assembly was also empowered to legislate on matters not included in the list of exclusive federal powers in order to fulfil national defence requirements in time of war. The National Assembly could make laws for the "peace, order and good government" of any state whose House of Assembly was "unable to perform its functions by reason of the situation prevailing in that state".

No external treaty could have effect without the adoption of the necessary legislation by the National Assembly, and no treaty provision covering matters not included in the list of exclusive federal powers could have effect without the ratification of a majority of the state Houses of Assembly.

Chapter II - Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy

The provisions of this chapter (sections 13-22) were required to be observed in the exercise of all legislative, executive and judicial powers.

It was stated that the Nigerian state was "based on the principles of democracy and social justice"; that sovereignty "belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives all its powers and authority"; that the security and welfare of the people was the primary purpose of government; and that the participation of the people in their government should be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

It was stated that "the composition of the Government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies". Each state and local government organ was similarly required to take account of "the diversity of the peoples within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of the federation".

The principal political objectives of the state were defined as the prohibition of "discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties" and the abolition of "all corrupt practices and abuse of power". In order to promote national integration, the state had a duty to "(i) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the federation; (ii) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the federation; (iii) encourage intermarriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic association or ties; and (iv) promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or other sectional barriers".

The principal economic objectives of the state were to "(i) control the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity; (ii) without prejudice to its right to operate and participate in areas of the economy other than the major sectors of the economy, manage and operate the major sectors of the economy; and (iii) without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas of the economy within the major sectors of the economy, protect the rights of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the major sectors of the economy". It was further laid down that economic policies should be directed towards ensuring "(i) the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development; (ii) that the material resources of the community are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good; (iii) that the economic system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of a few individuals or of a group; and (iv) that suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, and unemployment and sick benefits are provided for all citizens".

The National Assembly was required to legislate for the creation of a body to "review from time to time the ownership and control of business enterprises operating in Nigeria and make recommendations to the President on the same".

The principal social objectives of the state were to ensure that "(i) every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law; (ii) the sanctity of the human person shall be recognized and human dignity shall be maintained and enhanced; (iii) governmental actions shall be humane; (iv) exploitation of human or natural resources in any form whatsoever for reasons other than the good of the community shall be prevented; and (v) the independence, impartiality and integrity of courts of law and easy accessibility thereto shall be secured and maintained". Specific objectives were laid down with respect to employment, medical care and the provision of free education at all levels "as and when practicable". It was stated that the press and other media should "at all times be free to uphold the fundamental objectives contained in this chapter and uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government to the people". The "national ethic" was defined as "discipline, self-reliance and patriotism".

The foreign policy objectives of the state were defined as follows: "the state shall promote African unity, as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international co-operation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations."

Chapter III - Citizenship

Sections 23-29 of the Constitution dealt with citizenship.

Chapter IV - Fundamental Rights

Sections 30-42 contained comprehensive guarantees of various rights, listed under the following broad headings: the right to life; to dignity of the human person; to personal liberty; to a fair hearing; to private and family life; to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; to freedom of expression and the press; to peaceful assembly and association; to freedom of movement; to freedom from discrimination; and to compensation for property compulsorily acquired under the law. The National Assembly was required to make provision for the granting of legal aid to "any indigent citizen" in respect of an application for redress concerning an alleged infringement of the provisions of Chapter IV.

Chapter V - The Legislature

Part I of this chapter (sections 43-83) dealt with the National Assembly. The membership of the Senate was laid down as five senators, aged at least 30, from each state, and the membership of the House of Representatives as 450 members, aged at least 21, subject in each case to the provisions of Chapter VIII regarding the Federal Capital Territory [see below]. Those ineligible to stand for election included public servants and persons convicted of an offence involving dishonesty, or found guilty of a contravention of the code of conduct for public officers [see under Chapter VI below], within the preceding 10 years.

The respective Houses of the National Assembly would elect from among their own members a President and Deputy President (Senate) and a Speaker and Deputy Speaker (House of Representatives), who could be removed from office by a two-thirds majority vote of the House concerned. The Constitution provided that the business of the National Assembly should be conducted "in English, and in Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba when adequate arrangements have been made therefor".

Bills could originate in either House of the National Assembly, and once passed by both Houses with agreed amendments would be sent to the President for his assent within 30 days. In the event of the President withholding his assent to a bill, it could be enacted by the National Assembly alone if again passed by a two-thirds majority in each House. Special procedures were laid down in respect of money bills. Provision was made for the appointment of committees of each House and joint committees of both Houses, although only a joint finance committee with equal representation was constitutionally required to be established.

The Senate and the House of Representatives were each required to sit for not less than 181 days per year over their four-year terms (which could be extended under certain circumstances in time of war by up to "six months at any one time").

The President could address the National Assembly on national affairs or important government policies, and federal ministers could be invited to explain the conduct of their ministries to either House. Members of the National Assembly were required to resign if appointed President or Vice-President of the federation, governor or deputy governor of a state, a federal minister or a state commissioner; if they were absent without just cause from more than one-third of the sittings of the House concerned during one year; or if they transferred their allegiance from the political party for which they were elected to another party during the parliamentary term.

Constituency boundaries for federal elections were subject to review by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), which was required to base its consideration of equal population distribution between constituencies on the results of the 1963 population census [see 19961 A] pending the holding of a fresh census following the entry into force of the new Constitution. The FEDECO was responsible for the registration of voters (aged at least 18) and the conduct of elections, including the fixing of election dates, which should fall not more than 60 days before the dissolution of the existing legislature and not later than the date of the dissolution.

Part II of Chapter V (sections 84-121) concerned the state Houses of Assembly, each of which would contain three times the number of seats which that state had in the federal House of Representatives. The procedures of the state legislatures were closely based on the federal system, with the provision that business be conducted in English and such additional languages as a particular Assembly might resolve to adopt. State Assembly electoral matters were the responsibility of the FEDECO.

Chapter VI - The Executive

Part I of this chapter (sections 122-161) dealt with the federal executive, and provided for the direct election, by universal adult suffrage and with the whole country regarded as one constituency, of a President as head of state, chief executive of the federation and C.-in-C. of the federal armed forces. Presidential candidates must be Nigerian citizens by birth who met the qualifications for membership of the Senate and who were aged at least 35 years. Presidential elections would be held between 60 and 30 days before the expiry of the incumbent's term of office, the precise date being fixed by the FEDECO.

In the event of only one candidate being nominated, he would require (i) a majority of the total "yes" votes over the total "no" votes cast in the election and (ii) not less than a quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all the states in order to secure election to the presidency. If a single candidate failed to fulfil these conditions fresh nominations would be required. In the event of two candidates being nominated, condition (i) was modified to require "a majority of the votes cast at the election", while condition (ii) continued to apply. When more than two candidates stood for election, condition (i) required "the highest number of votes cast"; condition (ii) again continued to apply.

In the event of an inconclusive contested election, a run-off election was required to be held within seven days in which the members of both Houses of the National Assembly and of each state Assembly, voting simultaneously, would decide the outcome by a simple majority. Where three or more candidates had contested the first election, the candidates in the run-off election would be (i) the person who had received the highest total number of votes and (ii) that candidate among those remaining who had received a majority of votes in the highest number of states (the candidate with the highest overall popular vote taking precedence when more than one candidate fulfilled the latter condition).

[As described on page 30627 below, the procedure for electing the President was subsequently amended by the SMC shortly before the Constitution's entry into force, following a controversy arising out of the August 1979 election.]

The presidential term was four years (with any successor to an incumbent who died or otherwise left office serving for the balance of the latter's term), extendable by the National Assembly for up to six months at any one time in certain circumstances in time of war, and no person could serve for more than two elected terms.

There was also a Vice-President, elected as the "running-mate" of the President, who would succeed to the presidency if a premature vacancy occurred. (If both offices became simultaneously vacant the President of the Senate would act as President for up to three months pending a fresh election.) Procedures were laid down for the removal from office of the President or Vice-President on grounds of "gross misconduct", involving principally "a grave breach of the provisions of this Constitution", or of permanent incapacity to fulfil their duties. In the former case, action could be initiated by not less than one-third of the members of the National Assembly to propose the establishment of an independent commission to investigate allegations of misconduct, the establishment of the commission and the adoption of a report by it upholding such allegations each requiring a two-thirds majority of all the members of each House. In the latter case, a two-thirds majority of the federal executive council (i.e. government ministers) could call upon the President of the Senate to establish an expert medical panel to examine the President's fitness to continue in office.

The President was empowered to appoint such federal government ministers as he determined, provided that (i) such appointments were confirmed by the Senate (which had 21 working days in which to reject a nomination); (ii) at least one minister was appointed from each state, "who shall be an indigene of such state"; and (iii) nominees satisfied the qualifications for election to the federal House of Representatives (although if they had been elected to a federal or state legislature they were required to resign upon their appointment).

The President was empowered also to appoint one or more special advisers to assist him, the maximum number of such advisers and their remuneration to be determined by the National Assembly.

The Constitution provided for the establishment of the following nine federal executive bodies: (i) Council of State; (ii) Federal Civil Service Commission; (iii) Federal Electoral Commission; (iv) Federal Judicial Service Commission; (v) National Defence Council; (vi) National Economic Council; (vii) National Population Commission; (viii) National Security Council; and (ix) Police Service Commission. A schedule set out the composition and powers of each body. Their chairmen and members (other than ex-officio members) were for the most part appointed by the President, subject to the confirmation of the Senate, which was not however required for appointments to the bodies listed under (i), (v) and (viii) above.

The Council of State was chaired by the President, with the Vice-President as vice-chairman and the following other members: (i) all former federal Presidents and Heads of Government; (ii) all former Chief Justices holding Nigerian citizenship; (iii) the President of the Senate; (iv) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; (v) all the state governors; (vi) the federal Attorney General; and (vii) one person appointed by each state Council of Chiefs from among their own number. The Council was empowered to advise the President on the exercise of his powers, particularly in respect of the national population census, the prerogative of mercy, the award of honours, and the appointment and functioning of the Federal Electoral Commission, the Federal Judicial Service Commission and the National Population Commission.

The Federal Electoral Commission and the National Population Commission were each required to include one member from each state of Nigeria. The Federal Civil Service Commission, the Federal Judicial Service Commission and the Federal Electoral Commission were guaranteed complete independence in making appointments and taking disciplinary action, while the National Population Commission was guaranteed independence in matters connected with the organization of censuses.

It was laid down that all revenues collected by the federal Government (with certain minor exceptions) should be distributed among the federal and state governments, and the local government councils in the states, "on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly", provided that the net proceeds of certain specified taxes were distributed among the states on the basis of derivation. The federal Government was empowered to make grants in aid of state revenues on terms prescribed by the National Assembly.

The President was empowered to appoint and to remove from office (i) the secretary to the federal Government; (ii) the head of the federal civil service; (iii) ambassadors and comparable principal diplomatic representatives (subject to confirmation by the Senate); (iv) the permanent secretaries or chief executives of federal government ministries or departments; and (v) his personal staff.

All federal and state office-holders and employees from the President downwards were required to observe a comprehensive code of conduct for public officers set out in a schedule to the Constitution which also provided for the establishment of an administrative Code of Conduct Bureau and a judicial Code of Conduct Tribunal. The main features of the code were a ban on engaging in private business, or receiving emoluments in respect of another public office, while in public employment; the banning or restriction of the acceptance of loans, gifts or benefits; the prohibition of bribery, abuse of powers and membership of "incompatible" societies; and the requirement to make periodic declarations of assets (including those of spouse and unmarried children under 21). In addition the President and Vice-President, the state governors and deputy governors, federal ministers and state commissioners and members of the federal and state legislatures were, together with any other public officers or persons as might be specified by the National Assembly, prohibited from holding bank accounts outside Nigeria.

Part II of Chapter VI (sections 162-192) dealt with the state executive structure, which was patterned very closely on the federal model. (Thus the procedure for electing a state governor, aged at least 35, was comparable to a federal presidential election, with a requirement to obtain at least a quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all local government areas in a state and with a run-off election, if necessary, being conducted within the relevant state House of Assembly.) The state ministers, whose appointment by the governor was subject to the confirmation of the House of Assembly, were styled commissioners.

The executive bodies to be established in each state were a State Civil Service Commission, a State Council of Chiefs (with advisory powers principally concerning matters of customary law), a State Electoral Commission (with responsibility for the administration of local government council elections) and a State Judicial Service Commission.

Part III of Chapter VI (sections 193-200) dealt with (i) the national population census, the results of which the President was obliged to reject if so advised by the Council of State on grounds of inaccuracy or "perverseness"; (ii) the Nigeria Police Force, which was the only police force permitted to be established in any part of the federation, and in which a State Police Commissioner had the right to request federal confirmation of orders given to him by his state government; (iii) the armed forces, whose composition was required to "reflect the federal character of Nigeria", such composition to be monitored by a body set up by the National Assembly; and (iv) political parties.

Regulations for the formation of political parties stipulated inter alia that they should register with and submit detailed financial accounts to the FEDECO; that their membership should be open to every citizen of Nigeria; that their name, emblem or motto should not contain any express or implied ethnic, religious or regional connotation; and that their headquarters should be located in the federal capital. Non-compliance with these conditions disqualified any association from functioning as a political party. Party constitutions were required to provide for the holding of democratic elections of officials at least every four years, and for the membership of governing bodies to be drawn from at least two-thirds of all the states of Nigeria. Party programmes were required to reflect the provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution. No party could hold funds or other assets outside Nigeria or receive funds or assets remitted from outside Nigeria. The organization of persons to use or display physical force or coercion to promote any political objective or interest was banned.

Chapter VII - The Judicature

Part I of this chapter (section 210-233) dealt with the federal courts, and provided inter alia that the Chief Justice should be appointed by the President subject to the confirmation of a simple majority of the Senate. The Supreme Court was stated to have original jurisdiction in any dispute concerning the respective legal rights of the federal and state Governments. The sections dealing with the Federal Court of Appeal incorporated the controversial provision of the draft constitution [see page 29208] which empowered this court, when comprising not less than three federal appeal judges "learned in Islamic personal law", to hear appeals from a state Sharia Court of Appeal. (The Federal Court of Appeal was similarly empowered to hear appeals from state Customary Courts of Appeal provided that it comprised for this purpose not less than three judges learned in customary law.)

Part II of Chapter VII (sections 234-249) dealt with the state courts, and provided inter alia for the establishment of Sharia and customary appeal courts in those states which required them. Detailed provisions were laid down concerning the qualifications for judicial appointments to the Sharia courts and the extent of these courts' jurisdiction in respect of questions of Islamic personal law where all the parties to the proceedings had agreed to accept such law in the court of first instance.

Part III (sections 250-260) dealt inter alia with the jurisdiction of state courts in respect of federal causes and with the enforcement of the decisions of federal courts throughout Nigeria.

Chapter VIII - Federal Capital Territory and General Supplementary Provisions

Part I of this chapter (sections 261-264) dealt with the Federal Capital Territory (as designated in 1976—see page 27835), which was to be treated for constitutional purposes as a state of Nigeria, with the legislative, executive and judicial powers vested in state officials and organs elsewhere being vested in the corresponding federal officials and organs in respect of the capital territory. The capital territory would return one member to the Senate and at least one member to the House of Representatives.

Part II (sections 265-267) contained miscellaneous provisions, including a definition of the President's powers to proclaim a state of emergency (subject to confirmation by a two-thirds majority of all the members of each House of the National Assembly) and a definition of the immunity from prosecution of a serving President, Vice-President, state governor or deputy governor.

Parts III and IV of Chapter VIII (sections 268-279) contained transitional and other final provisions, including a subsection stating that four decrees of the military Government—the National Youth Service Corps Decree 1973, the Public Complaints Decree 1975, the Nigerian Security Organization Decree 1976 and the Land Use Decree 1978—could not be altered or repealed except through a constitutional amendment bill introduced under Chapter I of the Constitution. Oct. 1, 1979, was specified as the date of entry into force of all sections of the Constitution except section 262, which declared: "the Federal Capital Territory shall be the capital of the federation and the seat of Government of the federation"; this provision would take effect on a date to be specified by the President and confirmed by the National Assembly.

Formation of Political Parties

In the weeks following the lifting of the ban on party politics over 50 political associations were formed, of which 19 submitted formal applications for registration to the Federal Electoral Commission by the deadline of Dec. 18, 1978 (which was announced in November by the FEDECO chairman, Mr Michael O. Ani). Only five parties were, however, judged by the FEDECO to meet all the criteria for registration, including the requirement to be nationally representative. Each of these parties included prominent figures from Nigeria's past (i.e. pre-1966) political history, although not all were so constituted as to represent a clear successor to a single former party.

The formation of the new parties was so dominated by a concern to negotiate appropriate alliances in order to avoid charges of ethnic particularism that ideological and policy considerations initially assumed a relatively minor significance, with none of the five parties taking up positions radically removed from the broad centre of the political spectrum. Various left-wing associations failed to obtain separate registration, while the Nigerian Labour Congress declared a policy of strict neutrality in the forthcoming election campaigns.

The five registered parties were as follows:

Greater Nigeria People's Party (GNPP). The GNPP was formed by Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (53), a wealthy businessman and a former Northern People's Congress (NPC) federal minister under civilian rule, following a split in the Nigerian People's Party [see below] which was widely regarded as leaving the Ibrahim faction in the weaker position to win wide popular support. The main emphasis of the GNPP's programme was on the need to strengthen national unity, while its approach to specific policy issues was generally regarded as conservative. Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim was the party's national chairman and presidential candidate, with Dr Ben U. Nzeribe of Imo State as his running-mate for the vice-presidency.

National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The NPN was formed by what *West Africa* described as "a remarkable collection of senior and respected politicians from all over the country". In addition to many prominent members of the former NPC, the new party included representatives of all the other main pre-1966 parties—i.e. the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which had drawn its main support from the east of the country; the Action Group (AG) and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), which had opposed each other in the west; and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which had opposed the NPC in the north. Support for the NPN was particularly strong among the former NPC, NNDP and UMBC leaderships, whereas the founders of the NCNC, AG and NEPU—respectively Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Alhaji Aminu Kano—each associated themselves with rival parties [see below].

The NPN manifesto described the party as the only one "formed out of nationwide consultation and consensus", which if elected would work for an "open society" and a "prosperous and self-reliant" economy based on "a strong agricultural sector and rapid industrialization", with encouragement for private enterprise and foreign investment. The party was generally regarded as standing somewhat to the right of centre.

The national chairman of the NPN was Chief Augustus M. A. Akinyole, a former NNDP leader from Ibadan (Oyo State) who had served as a federal minister prior to 1966. The NPN presidential candidate was Alhaji Shehu Shagari (54), who had served as an NPC federal minister prior to 1966 and subsequently as a federal commissioner under military rule in 1970-75. He was a member of the Constituent Assembly which debated the 1979 Constitution. His running-mate for the vice-presidency was Dr Alex Ifeanyichukwu Ekwueme (46), a distinguished Ibo architect from Anambra State who had not previously played an active part in politics.

Nigerian People's Party (NPP). As originally constituted, the NPP was an alliance between various groupings, including a National Union Council for Understanding led by Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim [see above]; "Club 19", which had been formed by a group of Constituent Assembly members from every state of Nigeria, including notably a number of well-known former NCNC politicians, to oppose the establishment of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal [see page 29208]; a Committee for National Unity led by Chief Adeniran Ogunsanya (a former federal minister) and consisting mainly of former NCNC supporters of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe; and a Progressive Front including among its members a former federal commissioner under military rule, Alhaji Lateef Olufemi Okunno.

The original NPP split into factions at its inaugural convention in November 1978 following opposition by a body of opinion led by Chief Ogunsanya to an attempt by Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim to become both the party's chairman and its presidential candidate (on the grounds that he was the major contributor to party funds and also well known to the electorate in the north of Nigeria). Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim and his faction thereupon withdrew to form the GNPP [see above], while the Progressive Front also split, with Alhaji L. O. Okunno joining the NPN. The NPP then proceeded at a further convention in December 1978 to elect Chief Olu Akinfosile, a former NCNC federal minister, as its chairman, and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as its presidential candidate; Dr Azikiwe (74), who had been Nigeria's President (with largely ceremonial powers) at the time of the 1966 coup, had not taken an active part in the formation of the NPP. Prof. Ishaya Audu, a former vice-chancellor of Ahmadu Bello University (in the north), was chosen as Dr Azikiwe's running-mate for the vice-presidency.

People's Redemption Party (PRP). The PRP was founded by Alhaji Muhammed Aminu Kano (58), the former NEPU leader, who had served as a federal commissioner under the military Government in 1967-74 and as a member of the Constituent Assembly which debated the 1979 Constitution. He had initially associated himself with the NPN, but withdrew from that party shortly after its launching because of "fundamental differences" of opinion, reportedly centring on the generally conservative orientation of the NPN, and in particular on that party's commitment to accord "full recognition and respect to traditional rulers" (whose influence Alhaji Aminu Kano opposed despite his own status as a member of the northern aristocracy in Kano State). It was also reported that former NPC elements within the NPN had made it clear that they did not favour Alhaji Aminu Kano's assumption of a prominent role in that party's affairs.

Alhaji Aminu Kano was elected leader of the PRP at its inaugural convention in December 1978, and Mr Sam Ikoku, a left-wing Ibo economist formerly prominent in the AG (who had also initially associated himself with the NPN) was elected general secretary of the party. Alhaji Aminu Kano and Mr Ikoku were subsequently selected in February 1979 as the PRP's presidential and vice-presidential candidates respectively, the delay in their selection being apparently caused by the holding of inconclusive negotiations for a possible merger with another party or parties.

Mr Ikoku was a former member of the National Progressive Front, one of several smaller left-wing associations which were absorbed into the PRP together with former NEPU elements. The PRP adopted policies somewhat to the left of the other four registered parties, its ideology being described by Alhaji Aminu Kano as "democratic humanism . . . which teaches self-reliance and the takeover of our economy from the grip of the neo-colonialists" and its aim as the "building up [of] a really firm foundation for socialist democracy".

Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). The UPN was founded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo (69), the founder of the AG and the best-known politician from western Nigeria, who had served as federal Leader of the Opposition under civilian rule and had held office as a federal commissioner under the military Government from 1967 to 1971, but had refused to serve on the constitution drafting committee established in 1975 [see page 27836]. The UPN evolved from a "National Committee of Friends" which was believed to have been involved in clandestine political organizing throughout the period of military rule [see page 29208 for allegations that Chief Awolowo "controlled" a group of Constituent Assembly members], and it was able to announce its programme within 24 hours of the legalization of party politics.



(*Federal Department of Information, Lagos*

Chief Awolowo was elected as the party's leader and presidential candidate in October 1978, with Chief Phillip Umeadi, a little-known Ibo lawyer from Onitsha, as his running-mate for the vice-presidency. Although former AG elements were prominent in the UPN (while its support among northerners in particular was notably poor), Chief Awolowo took pains in his election campaign to dissociate the UPN from the pro-Yoruba reputation of the former AG among northern and Ibo voters and to stress the new party's commitment to national unity. The UPN proclaimed itself to be a democratic socialist party, but was generally regarded as standing only slightly to the left of centre. Its four main policy aims were free education at all levels, integrated rural development, free medical services and full employment.

Federal Cabinet Change

The Federal Commissioner (minister) for Mines and Power, Alhaji Shehu Kangiwa (appointed in mid-1978—see page 29211), resigned from this post in November 1978 in order to enter politics [see below for his subsequent election as NPN Governor of Sokoto State]. His successor as Federal Commissioner for Mines and Power, appointed on Nov. 21, 1978, was Prof. J. Tseayo of the University of Jos.

Conduct and Outcome of Elections

The FEDECO announced in April 1979 that elections would take place on the following dates in July and August (with provision being made for gubernatorial and presidential run-off elections to be held one week after an inconclusive popular election): (i) federal Senate (95 seats—i.e. five per state), July 7; (ii) federal House of Representatives (449 seats—i.e. with the 450th seat left vacant pending the entry into force of the constitutional provisions concerning the Federal Capital Territory), July 14; (iii) state Houses of Assembly (1,347 seats—i.e. three members for each member of the House of Representatives), July 21; (iv) state governors (19), July 28; and (v) federal President, Aug. 11.

The five registered parties (by whom all candidates in the elections had to be nominated) submitted their master lists of candidates to the FEDECO in early June 1979, containing a total of 8,728 names (compared with a maximum possible total of 9,655 had each party contested every seat or office including running-mates for state governorships and the federal presidency). The FEDECO then undertook a two-week screening of nominees' credentials, as a result of which 1,028 candidates were disqualified and parties were given deadlines to nominate replacements for them.

Those disqualified were one presidential candidate (Alhaji Aminu Kano of the PRP), 15 gubernatorial candidates, 17 gubernatorial running-mates, 120 senatorial candidates, 300 candidates for the federal House of Representatives and 575 state Assembly candidates. Most of those concerned (including Alhaji Aminu Kano) were found to have failed to provide satis factory evidence that their income tax affairs were in order in respect of the previous three years. Alhaji Aminu Kano subsequently took successful legal action to establish his eligibility while a legal dispute already in progress with the FEDECO over the tax affairs of the NPP leader, Dr Azikiwe (who was given a conditional clearance to stand for election) was also later resolved in the candidate's favour.

Candidates disqualified from standing for election to the federal House of Representatives included the former Biafran secessionist leader, Gen. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (living in exile in Ivory Coast), who had been nominated by the GNPP in Anambra State but was held by the FEDECO to be ineligible on the grounds that he had been dismissed from the federal armed forces (which he subsequently denied).

The parties' election campaigns were for the most part conducted in an orderly manner, as were the various rounds of polling, the military Government having in February 1979 promulgated (i) a Public Order Decree laying down uniform regulations to govern the conduct of electioneering and political meetings throughout the federation and (ii) a Public Security (Detention of Persons) Decree which was seen as further evidence of the military leadership's determination to ensure a peaceful transition to civilian rule. These decrees superseded various state edicts which had been introduced following early allegations of illegal campaign practices. The leaders of the five registered parties had in late 1978 agreed to co-operate in ensuring free and fair elections following a meeting with military leaders. All aspects of the electoral process itself were organized by the FEDECO, whose independence was strictly respected by the Government.

There was a generally poor overall turnout in the various rounds of voting in July and August, ranging from about 26 per cent in the Senate elections to 35.52 per cent in the presidential election (see page 29210 for provisional voter registration figures for each state). Moreover, voting patterns were strongly influenced by regional and ethnic considerations, with each of the five parties drawing its greatest support in its leader's home area and only the NPN (which obtained the highest number of votes cast nationally in each of the elections) achieving a significant level of support across most of the federation. In the first four rounds of voting NPN senators were elected in 12 out of 19 states, NPN federal representatives in 16 states, NPN state Assembly members in 17 states, and NPN governors in seven states. Every state elected a governor and an Assembly majority of the same party except Kaduna, where a PRP governor faced an NPN majority in the state legislature, and Gongola, where no single party had a majority.

The overall state of the parties as a result of the first four elections (and the outcome of subsequent electoral petitions) was as follows:

	GNPP	NPN	NPP	PRP	UPN
Senate	8	36	16	7	28
House of Representatives ..	43	168	78	49	111
State Assemblies	156	489	226	143	333
State Governorships ..	2	7	3	2	5

The following is a state-by-state analysis of the above totals:

Anambra—Senate NPP 5; House of Representatives NPP 26, NPN 3; House of Assembly NPP 73, NPN 13, GNPP 1; Governor NPP (Mr Jim Nwobodo).

Bauchi—Senate NPN 5; House of Representatives NPN 18, GNPP 1, NPP 1; House of Assembly NPN 45, GNPP 9, NPP 4, PRP 2; Governor NPN (Alhaji Tatari Ali).

Bendel—Senate UPN 4, NPN 1; House of Representatives UPN 12, NPN 6, NPP 2; House of Assembly UPN 34, NPN 22, NPP 4; Governor UPN (Prof. Ambrose Alli).

Benue—Senate NPN 5; House of Representatives NPN 18, NPP 1; House of Assembly NPN 48, GNPP 6, NPP 3; Governor NPN (Mr Aper Aku).

Borno—Senate GNPP 4, NPN 1; House of Representatives GNPP 22, NPN 2; House of Assembly GNPP 59, NPN 11, PRP 2; Governor GNPP (Alhaji Mohammed Goni).

Cross River—Senate NPN 3, GNPP 2; House of Representatives NPN 22, GNPP 4, UPN 2; House of Assembly NPN 58, GNPP 16, UPN 7, NPP 3; Governor NPN (Dr Clement Isong).

Gongola—Senate GNPP 2, UPN 2, NPN 1; House of Representatives GNPP 8, UPN 7, NPN 5, NPP 1; House of Assembly GNPP 25, UPN 18, NPN 15, NPP 4, PRP 1; Governor GNPP (Alhaji Abubakar Barde).

Imo—Senate NPP 5; House of Representatives NPP 28, NPN 2; House of Assembly NPP 78, NPN 10, GNPP 2; Governor NPP (Mr Samuel Mbakwe).

Kaduna—Senate NPN 3, PRP 2; House of Representatives NPN 19, PRP 10, NPP 2, GNPP 1, UPN 1; House of Assembly NPN 66, PRP 15, GNPP 9, NPP 6, UPN 3; Governor PRP (Alhaji Balarabe Musa).

Kano—Senate PRP 5; House of Representatives PRP 39, NPN 7; House of Assembly PRP 123, NPN 11, GNPP 3, UPN 1; Governor PRP (Alhaji Abubakar Rimi).

Kwara—Senate NPN 3, UPN 2; House of Representatives NPN 8, UPN 5, GNPP 1; House of Assembly NPN 25, UPN 15, GNPP 2; Governor NPN (Alhaji Adamu Atta).

Lagos—Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 12; House of Assembly UPN 36; Governor UPN (Alhaji Lateef Jakande).

Niger—Senate NPN 5; House of Representatives NPN 10; House of Assembly NPN 28, GNPP 2; Governor NPN (Alhaji Awwal Ibrahim).

Ogun—Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 12; House of Assembly UPN 36; Governor UPN (Chief Bisi Onabanjo).

Ondo—Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 22; House of Assembly UPN 65, NPN 1; Governor UPN (Mr Michael Ajasin).

Oyo—Senate UPN 5; House of Representatives UPN 38, NPN 4; House of Assembly UPN 117, NPN 9; Governor UPN (Mr Bola Ige).

Plateau—Senate NPP 4, NPN 1; House of Representatives NPP 13, NPN 3; House of Assembly NPP 35, NPN 10, GNPP 3; Governor NPP (Mr Solomon Lar).

Rivers—Senate NPN 3, NPP 2; House of Representatives NPN 10, NPP 4; House of Assembly NPN 25, NPP 16, UPN 1; Governor NPN (Chief Melford Okilo).

Sokoto—Senate NPN 5; House of Representatives NPN 31, GNPP 6; House of Assembly NPN 92, GNPP 19; Governor NPN (Alhaji Shehu Kangiwa).

After the results of the first three rounds of voting were announced, the UPN leader, Chief Awolowo, called upon the GNPP, the PRP and the NPP to co-operate in a tactical voting agreement with the aim of defeating the NPN's gubernatorial candidates and presidential candidate. Differing proposals for various other forms of alliance (e.g. between the NPN and the NPP) were also the subject of secret discussions at this point, but with the exception of limited co-operation between the GNPP and the UPN in certain gubernatorial elections no agreements were reached, and the candidates of all five parties contested the presidential election, the overall voting figures for which were as follows.

	Votes	Per cent
Alhaji Shehu Shagari (NPN)	5,688,857	33.8
Chief Obafemi Awolowo (UPN) ..	4,916,651	29.2
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (NPP)	2,822,523	16.7
Alhaji Aminu Kano (PRP)	1,732,113	10.3
Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (GNPP).. ..	1,686,489	10.0

The following table gives the state-by-state outcome of the presidential election:

	Total Vote	Candidates' Percentages of Vote*				
		GNPP	NPN	NPP	PRP	UPN
Anambra	1,209,038	1.67	13.49	82.88	1.20	0.75
Bauchi	998,683	15.44	62.48	4.72	14.34	3.00
Bendel	669,511	1.23	36.19	8.60	0.73	53.23
Benue	538,879	7.89	76.39	11.71	1.35	2.57
Borno	710,968	54.04	34.71	1.35	6.52	3.35
Cross River	661,103	15.14	64.40	7.66	1.01	11.76
Gongola	639,138	34.09	35.52	4.35	4.34	21.67
Imo	1,153,355	3.00	8.80	86.67	0.89	0.64
Kaduna	1,382,712	13.80	43.12	4.72	31.66	6.68
Kano	1,220,763	1.54	19.94	0.91	76.41	1.23
Kwara	354,605	5.71	53.62	0.52	0.67	39.48
Lagos	828,414	0.48	7.18	9.57	0.47	82.30
Niger	383,347	16.50	74.88	1.11	3.99	3.69
Ogun	744,668	0.53	6.23	0.32	0.31	92.11
Ondo	1,369,849	0.26	4.19	0.86	0.18	94.51
Oyo	1,396,547	0.57	12.75	0.55	0.32	85.78
Plateau	548,405	6.82	34.73	49.17	3.98	5.29
Rivers	687,951	2.18	72.65	14.35	0.46	10.33
Sokoto	1,348,697	26.61	66.58	0.92	3.33	2.52

* Not all state percentages total 100, due to rounding.

As shown in the state-by-state results, Alhaji Shehu Shagari won more than 25 per cent of the votes cast in the presidential election in 12 states, and 19.94 per cent in a thirteenth state (Kano), and the FEDECO declared that he had been duly elected President under the relevant constitutional provision [see page 30623 above] on the grounds that the threshold of one quarter of the votes cast in two-thirds of 19 states was equivalent to one quarter in 12 states plus one-sixth (i.e. one quarter of two-thirds) in a thirteenth.

This interpretation of the Constitution (which the FEDECO stated to be based on the "ordinary meaning" of two-thirds of

19 as 12⅔) was at variance with the widely accepted assumption which had hitherto prevailed in Nigeria that 13 states (i.e. the nearest whole number) was the intended meaning of "two-thirds" in this context. The latter interpretation was cited by all four of the defeated parties in the presidential election, and a formal petition challenging the FEDECO's ruling was lodged with the Federal Election Tribunal by Chief Awolowo (as the runner-up) on behalf of himself, Dr Azikiwe and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (although not of Alhaji Aminu Kano).

This petition was, however, unanimously rejected by the Tribunal (made up of three judges), and a subsequent appeal by Chief Awolowo to the Supreme Court challenging the Tribunal's ruling on nine points of law was also rejected (although with one dissenting opinion among the seven judges). In making the appeal, Chief Awolowo had argued inter alia (i) that a state constituted a corporate body or legal person and could thus not be fractionalized; (ii) that the Federal Election Tribunal had misdirected itself when it had held that the dominant requirement was the number of votes cast in each state, since "two-third states would be synonymous with two-thirds of the total votes cast in that state and not the physical or territorial area of such state"; and (iii) that the Tribunal had failed to interpret correctly the phrase "each of at least two-thirds of all the states".

(It was later revealed by Mr Michael Ani that the FEDECO had had to formulate its interpretation of what constituted two-thirds of 19 states when considering parties' registration applications in late 1978, and he said that if 13 states rather than 12⅔ had been adopted as a threshold one of the five parties which had contested the elections would not have been deemed sufficiently representative to qualify for registration.)

Following the controversy over the presidential election result, the military Government issued a decree on Sept. 28, 1979—i.e. only three days before the Constitution's entry into force—amending the constitutional provisions relating to presidential elections.

As regards the ambiguity over the threshold provision, the decree deleted the words here italicized in the phrase "*each of at least* two-thirds of all the states", while alterations were also made to the provision for the holding of a run-off election with the members of the federal and state legislatures acting as an electoral college, which had been widely criticized as likely to lead to "vote-buying" and other undesirable practices, with the possibility that the candidate with the largest popular vote might ultimately be defeated. The amended provision was for any run-off election between the two leading candidates to be held by popular vote, if necessary in two rounds, the first being subject to the threshold of one quarter of the vote in two-thirds of the states and the second being decided by a simple majority of the total popular vote. Similar amendments were made to the procedures for gubernatorial elections in the states.

Certain other less fundamental amendments were also made at the same time, including the addition of four areas of legislative responsibility to the exclusive federal list set out in a schedule to Chapter I of the Constitution.

Installation of President Shagari - Retirement of Former Military Leaders - Subsequent Military Appointments

President Shagari and Vice-President Ekwueme took office on Oct. 1, 1979, following their swearing-in by the Chief Justice, Mr Atanda Fatayi-Williams, at a ceremony in Lagos. In an inaugural broadcast to the nation later that day, President Shagari thanked the leaders of the outgoing military administration for "keeping their word as true men of honour" in the implementation of their timetable for Nigeria's return to civilian rule, adding that "history will indelibly record this nation's gratitude to their exemplary leadership, dedication, statesmanship and courage".

President Shagari said that his administration would seek to solve "the problems of creating a national government, a viable economic base and the integration of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria in fairness and without acrimony" which had "overwhelmed" the country's previous civilian rulers, and he made a strong appeal for national unity, including co-operation in the national interest between the winning and the losing parties in the recent elections. Outlining his administration's domestic policies, he said that the key sectors to which priority would be given were agriculture, housing, education, health, industry and the development of the Federal Capital Territory.

Gen. Obasanjo retired from the armed forces after the ceremonial transfer of power to President Shagari, although as a former head of government he would remain in public life as a member of the Council of State [for which see page 30623 above]. During his last weeks in office Gen. Obasanjo had undertaken a farewell tour of all 19 states of the federation, during which he had reiterated his many previous appeals for national unity following the military's withdrawal from politics, and had called in particular upon the members of the armed forces to give their full loyalty to the new civilian administration.

Many other senior members of the military leadership, including Lt.-Gen. Theophilus Danjuma (Chief of Army Staff) and Maj.-Gen. Shehu Yar'Adua (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), also retired from the armed forces on Oct. 1, 1979. The new Chief of Army Staff, Lt.-Gen. Alani Akinrinade, was subsequently appointed Chief of Defence Staff by President Shagari in April 1980, when the following Chiefs of Staff were appointed to the three services: Lt.-Gen. G. S. Jalo (Army), Commodore Akin Aduwo (Navy) and Group-Capt. A. Bello (Air Force).

The estimated strength of the Nigerian Army at the time of the return to civilian rule was 160,000 following reductions under the military Government's demobilization exercise [see page 29211], and was subsequently reported to have been further reduced to 145,000 by late 1980.

Co-operation Agreement between NPN and NPP - Appointment of Federal Government Ministers and Special Presidential Advisers

The inaugural session of the National Assembly, originally scheduled by the military Government for Oct. 2, 1979, was postponed by President Shagari until Oct. 9 under powers vested in him by a recently promulgated amendment to the transitional provisions of the Constitution. This one-week postponement permitted the continuation of intensive inter-party discussions which culminated in the announcement by the then NPP chairman, Chief Akinfosile, that his party had concluded a comprehensive "co-operation agreement" with the NPN whereby the two parties undertook to "work together in the interest of the unity, peace, stability and progress of the country".

Although it was made clear by both sides that the agreement did not constitute a formal coalition, it nevertheless gave the NPN federal administration effective working majorities of 52 out of 95 seats in the Senate and 246 seats out of 449 in the House of Representatives at the commencement of the National Assembly's term. Dr Joseph Wayas (NPN) was elected President of the Senate with NPP support on Oct. 9, while Mr Edwin Ume-Ezeoke (NPP) was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives with NPN support. Conversely, an NPP Deputy President and an NPN Deputy Speaker were also elected. The three remaining parties voted together for common candidates in these elections—the UPN putting forward the unsuccessful candidates for the posts of Senate President and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, the PRP the candidate for Senate Deputy President and the GNPP the candidate for Speaker of the House.

Despite this early emergence of de facto "majority" and "minority" alliances in each House, it was decided not to adopt the terms majority and minority leader but to elect parliamentary leaders from each separate party, while the various parliamentary committees were established on the basis of proportional representation between the five parties.

Among the first tasks of the Senate was consideration of President Shagari's list of ministerial nominations, which, in accordance with the NPN-NPP co-operation agreement, included members of both parties.

A number of nominees were initially rejected outright by the Senate (including Chief Richard Akinjide, the unsuccessful NPN candidate for the governorship of Oyo State, who as his party's legal adviser had played a prominent role in establishing the validity of President Shagari's election, and Mr Paul Unongo, the then secretary general of the NPP), while several others were the subject of prolonged hearings. However, Chief Akinjide and Mr Unongo were eventually confirmed in office following their renomination by the President, and by early January 1980 Senate approval had been obtained for the swearing-in of a total of 24 federal cabinet ministers, 17 non-cabinet ministers and also 10 special presidential advisers appointed in accordance with Chapter VI of the Constitution [see page 30623 above]. The full list of appointments was as follows.

Cabinet Ministers

Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau	Agriculture
Mr Samuel Mafuyai	Civil Aviation
Mr Isaac Shaahu	Commerce
Alhaji Akanbi M. Oniyangi	Communications
Prof. Iya Abubakar	Defence
Dr I. C. Madubuike	Education
Mr Samuel Adebisi Ogednegbe	Employment, Labour and Productivity
Prof. Ishaya Audu	External Affairs
Mr John Jatan Kadiya	Federal Capital Territory
Prof. Sunday Matthew Essang	Finance
Mr D. C. Ugwu	Health
Dr Wahab Olaseinde Dosunmu	Housing and Environment
Alhaji Adamu Ciroma	Industries
Alhaji Bello Maitama Yusuf	Internal Affairs
Chief Richard O. Akinjide	Attorney General and Minister of Justice
Alhaji Mohammed Ibrahim Hassan	Mines and Power
Mrs Adenike Ebun Oyagbola	National Planning
Prof. Emmanuel C. Osammor	Police Affairs
Mr Victor Masi	Public Works
Dr Sylvester Ugoh	Science and Technology
Mr Paulinus Chinulu Amadike	Social Welfare, Youth, Sports and Culture
Mr Paul Unongo	Special Duties (Steel Development)
Alhaji Umaru A. Dikko	Transport
Alhaji Nadgi Mamudu	Water Resources

Non-Cabinet Ministers

Mr Emmanuel Aguma	Agriculture
Chief Olu Awotesu	
Alhaji Ahmadu Nahuce	Commerce
Chief Enteng Okoi-Obului	Communications
Mr Claudius Agboola Bamgboye	Education
Alhaji M. B. Usman	
Dr Paul T. Michaulum	Employment, Labour and Productivity
Dr Abubakar Usman	External Affairs
Chief Patrick Bolokor	
Mr Ademola Thomas	Finance
Alhaji Ali Baba	
Alhaji Ahmed Musa	Housing and Environment
Dr I. Igbani	Industries
Chief (Mrs) Janet Akinrinade	Internal Affairs
Alhaji Ashiek Jarma	Public Works
Alhaji I. A. Dan-Musa	Social Welfare, Youth, Sports and Culture
Malam Garba Wushishi	Transport

Special Advisers to the President

Dr Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe	National Assembly Liaison
Dr Chuba Okadigbo	Political Affairs
Prof. G. A. Odenigwe	
Alhaji Yahaya Dikko	Petroleum and Energy
Chief Olu Adebanjo	Information
Prof. E. C. Edozien	Economic Affairs
Dr J. Ojama	
Chief Theophilus Adeleke Akinyele	Director of Budget and Adviser on Budget Affairs
Dr Bukar Shuaibu	National Security
Dr O. Olaifa	Statutory Boards

A substantial majority of President Shagari's ministers were members of his own National Party of Nigeria, among whom **Prof. Iya Abubakar** was a former vice-chancellor of Ahmadu Bello University, **Alhaji Adamu Ciroma** was a former governor of Nigeria's central bank and **Chief Richard Akinjide** was a former federal minister under (pre-1966) civilian rule. Among the special presidential advisers, **Dr Kingsley Mbadiwe** (also a former federal minister) was one of the best known former NCNC politicians to have participated in the formation of the NPN.

In addition to Mr Unongo, cabinet ministers appointed from among the membership of the NPP were Mr Mafuyai, Dr Madubuike, Prof. Audu (the NPP's vice-presidential candidate—see above) and Mr Amadike; the party's non-cabinet ministers included Mr Aguma, Chief Okoi-Obului, Dr Usman and Mrs Akinrinade.

Subsequent Ministerial Changes

Mr Unongo was on Aug. 27, 1980, appointed Minister of Mines and Power *vice* Alhaji Mohammed Ibrahim Hassan, but resigned from his new appointment some days later. Alhaji Ashiek Jarma, hitherto the non-cabinet Minister of Public Works, was then appointed Minister of Mines and Power, with additional interim responsibility for Steel Development. These developments followed press publicity regarding allegations of wrongdoing made against Mr Unongo in an anonymous letter. It was subsequently stated than an official investigation had found "nothing of substance" in them.

Two additional non-cabinet ministers were sworn in in July 1980—Dr Emmanuel Yahaya Atanu (Water Resources) and Malam Mamman Ali Makele (Office of the President). At the same time Dr Paul Michaulum was transferred from the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity to the Ministry of Health. Earlier, one of the non-cabinet ministers of External Affairs, Dr Abubakar Usman, had died in an air crash in May 1980.—(West Africa - Africa - Africa Confidential - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Nigerian High Commission, London - Financial Times - Times - Guardian - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde) *(Prev. rep. 29207 A)*

A. INDIA — Cabinet Appointments - Mr Anjaiah appointed Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh

The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, carried out on Oct. 19 a reorganization of her Cabinet which had originally been formed in January 1980 [see page 30327] and had been expanded in March and June [see pages 30328; 30574]. The new appointments were as follows:

Cabinet Ministers

Mr Shankarrao Bhaorao Chavan	Education
*Mr B. Shankaranand	Health and Family Welfare
*Mr Prakash Chandra Sethi	Petroleum, Chemicals and Fertilizers
*Mr Veerendra Patil	Shipping and Transport
*Mr Bhishma Narain Singh	Works and Housing, and Parliamentary Affairs
*Mr Anant Prasad Sharma	Civil Aviation and Tourism
*Mr Narain Dutt Tiwari	Planning and Labour

Ministers of State

*Mr C. P. N. Singh	Science and Technology
*Mr Z. R. Ansari	Irrigation
*Mrs Ram Dulari Sinha	Labour
Mr Bhagwat Jha Azad	Supply and Rehabilitation
Mr Shivraj Patil	Defence
Mr Sawai Singh Sisodia	Revenue and Expenditure
Mr Baleshwar Ram	Agriculture
Mrs Sheila Kaul	Education
Mr Khurshid Alam Khan	Commerce

* Took new portfolio.

Mr S. B. Chavan (61), the only new minister of cabinet rank, was Chief Minister of Maharashtra from February 1975 to April 1977; left the Congress three months later to form the Maharashtra Socialist Congress; and served as Finance Minister in Mr Sharad Pawar's Progressive Democratic Front Ministry in that state from August 1978 to August 1979, when he resigned and joined the Congress (I) [see pages 27597; 28438; 28755; 29342; 29976].

Four deputy ministers were also appointed. Mrs Gandhi retained the Defence portfolio, while there were still no full cabinet-rank ministers separately in charge of Industries or of Steel and Mines.

In the June 8 cabinet appointments, Mr Kartik Oraon, Minister of State for Tourism and Civil Aviation, had become Minister of State for Communications, being succeeded in his former post by Mr Chandulal Chandrakar.

Mr T. Anjaiah, the Minister of State for Labour, had previously resigned, following his appointment on Oct. 11 as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh [see page 30574]. He succeeded Dr M. Chenna Reddy, who had been forced to resign after allegations of corruption had been brought against him by dissident Congress (I) members of the state Assembly, including 15 members of his Government.—(The Statesman, Calcutta - The Hindu, Madras) *(Prev. rep. 30573 A)*

B. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS — Appointment of New General Manager

It was announced on Nov. 11, 1980, that Dr Günter Schleiminger (59) would become General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements on March 1, 1981, upon the retirement of M. René Larre who had held the post since 1971 [see 24594 C]. Dr Schleiminger, a West German, had been Assistant General Manager since 1975 and prior to that an Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund.—(Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Le Monde - International Herald Tribune) *(Prev. rep. 24594 C)*

A. IRAN — Parliamentary Elections - Appointment of Prime Minister - Formation of New Cabinet - Internal Security Developments

Elections to the 270-seat Iranian *Majlis* (Parliament) were held in two stages on March 14 and May 9, 1980, under the new Constitution approved by referendum in December 1979 [see page 30213], and were contested by some 3,300 candidates.

By May 28, on which date the *Majlis* held its first session, some 245 seats had been filled (two of them by women). Over half of these seats (130) were claimed by the Islamic "grand coalition", comprising principally the clergy-dominated Islamic Republican Party (IRP) led by Ayatollah Mohammed Hossein Beheshti (who was also secretary of the Revolutionary Council and head of the Supreme Court and who did not himself stand as a candidate) together with a number of smaller clerical factions and independents; the IRP itself claimed 85 of these 130 seats. Followers of President Bani-Sadr (who was elected as one of Tehran's 30 deputies) had joined together in a little-known "Co-ordinating Office of the President's People" which claimed at least 74 seats; this result was widely viewed as representing a significant defeat for the President, whose authority since his election on Jan. 25 [see page 30214] had been persistently challenged by the hardline clergy in the IRP.

Overall representation in Parliament was difficult to assess as many candidates were either endorsed by several different groups at one time or themselves claimed allegiance to more than one party. The consequent confusion over the affiliation of candidates was thought to have largely benefited the "grand coalition" and also to have contributed greatly to the poor turnout of the electorate; out of the registered voters, estimated by Iranian authorities at between 19,000,000 and 20,000,000 (encompassing all Iranians over 16 years of age, of whom over half were illiterate), some 10,000,000 voted in the first round and only 6,000,000 in the second (when voting took place in rather under two-thirds of the total constituencies).

In the first round on March 14 a total of 98 candidates received the required majority of 50 per cent plus one of the votes cast. The two leading contenders in the remaining constituencies were to have gone on to oppose each other in a second round on April 4, but due to slow vote-counting and, more particularly, to allegations of cheating and rigging in the first round, the second ballot was not held until May 9, elections in 25 constituencies having by this date been postponed indefinitely because of irregularities. (Among these were seats in at least three Kurdish towns—Saqqez, Baneh and Marivan—where elections had been cancelled prior to the first round because of the presence there of "armed gangs".)

The allegations of cheating in the first round were directed in particular against the IRP, which was accused of displaying only lists of its own candidates at polling stations, of fraudulent vote-counting and of duping large numbers of illiterate voters into voting for the IRP's choices. The complaints were lodged in particular by the Islamic *Mujaheddin Khalq*, a progressive popular movement with left-wing tendencies attracting support from the educated middle classes and the young. The leader of the *Mujaheddin Khalq*, Mr Massoud Rajavi, claimed that biased officials had credited votes for him to rival candidates and thereupon called for the elections to be annulled. (Shortly before the elections Mr Rajavi had been denounced by rivals as an agent of Savak—the national intelligence and security agency set up under the former Shah—while a number of party workers and candidates had been harassed or arrested for allegedly distributing literature on the day of the elections, contrary to regulations. See also below for further agitation against the *Mujaheddin* and other left-wing groups.)

In addition to making allegations of cheating, minority groups also protested that the two-stage electoral system put them at a great disadvantage, this view being supported by President Bani-Sadr and by the then Foreign Minister, Mr Sadeq Qotbzadeh. There were also complaints that the IRP had monopolized radio and television, so that its candidates were the best known to the voters, while the *Tudeh* (pro-Soviet communist) party, which generally supported the Government, was angered by an appeal made to the electorate on the eve of the polls by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (the country's spiritual leader) to vote for "those who are faithful to Islam and the Constitution" and who are "free from tendencies of the left and right".

On March 16 President Bani-Sadr said that elections would be annulled in those areas where cheating was proved to have taken place, and to this end the Revolutionary Council set up a seven-man investigative commission. Although the commission had not completed its work by the second round and did not supervise the May 9 polling as had been advocated by President Bani-Sadr, voting on that day was said to have been fairer and a great deal easier, with lists of all candidates being displayed at polling stations.

Legislative powers were transferred to the *Majlis* from the Revolutionary Council (which had in effect governed since November 1979—see pages 30142-43) following (i) the completion on July 17 of the formation of a 12-member Council of Guardians, comprising six theologians (who had been appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini on Feb. 19) and six jurists, the main function of the new council being, according to the Constitution, to ensure that legislation was consistent with Islamic precepts [see also page 30144], and (ii) the election on July 20 (by 146 of the 196 votes cast) of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani as Speaker of the *Majlis*.

Prior to the latter's appointment the acting Speaker had been Dr Yadollah Sahabi, Minister successively of Revolutionary Projects and of Research and Study under Dr Mehdi Bazargan in 1979 [see pages 30141 and 30142]. Ayatollah Rafsanjani had been a member of the Revolutionary Council, and although appointed Supervisor of the Interior Ministry in November 1979 [see 30143] he had subsequently resigned from this post on Feb. 26 to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections, being thereupon succeeded by Hojatolislam Mohammed Reza Mahdavi Khani, who was similarly a member of the Revolutionary Council and who was also a member of the Council of Guardians.

After receiving full legislative powers the *Majlis* on July 22 formally swore President Bani-Sadr into office.

Earlier, the *Majlis* had set up an investigative committee to examine the credentials of numerous members who had been challenged for a variety of reasons, resulting in the ousting or resignation of several of those elected.

Prominent among those challenged was Rear-Adml. Ahmad Madani (a former Commander of the Iranian Navy, Defence Minister and Governor of Khuzistan and later a military adviser to Ayatollah Khomeini), who was asked to appear before the committee by July 12 following allegations that he had connexions with US officials; Rear-Adml. Madani denied these allegations and refused to take his seat in the *Majlis*. On July 13 the *Majlis* voted to expel Mr Khoshrow Qashqai, a leader of the Qashqai tribe in south-western Iran [see map on page 30301] and deputy from Fars province, because of alleged connexions with Savak and other links with the former Shah's regime.

On Aug. 24 Mr Ali Akbar Moinfar, then Oil Minister, survived a challenge to his credentials after certain deputies had alleged that he had co-operated with Savak and had mismanaged his Ministry. Earlier, according to a report in *The Guardian* of Aug. 17, Mr Eshagh Faramandpur, representing Iran's Jewish community, was rejected by Parliament for allegedly having links with Israel and Zionist organizations before the revolution.

Appointment of Mr Radjai as Prime Minister

Mr Mohammed Ali Radjai was on Aug. 20 appointed Prime Minister following a secret ballot in the *Majlis* on Aug. 11 in which out of 196 deputies present 153 had voted in his favour with 24 against and 19 abstaining. (The previous Iranian Prime Minister had been Dr Mehdi Bazargan who had resigned on Nov. 5, 1979—see page 30142—whereafter the country had effectively been governed by the Revolutionary Council.)

Mr Radjai (47) had been born in Qazvin, west of Tehran. He studied science at a Tehran college and in the 1960s began teaching mathematics at schools both in the capital and in Qazvin. During this period he became active in the opposition movements as a result of which he served three terms of imprisonment totalling some four years, having last been released shortly before the fall of the monarchy in February 1979. He had been appointed acting Minister of Education and Training in the Bazargan Cabinet in September of that year [see page 30142] continuing in a similar post after November 1979, and in the 1980 parliamentary elections he had been elected a deputy for Tehran. Although not a formal member of the IRP he was considered to be close to the party, being viewed as an Islamic fundamentalist and a hardliner on most issues.

Mr Radjai had not been the first choice of President Bani-Sadr but the latter had on Aug. 9 reluctantly agreed to his nomination after failing, during some three months of confrontation with the hardline factions in the *Majlis*, to have a candidate of his own choice adopted. (Under the Constitution it was for the President to nominate the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, such nomination being then subject to parliamentary approval.)

Among several leading figures approached by President Bani-Sadr in connexion with nominations for the premiership was Hojatolislam

Sayed Ahmad Khomeini, son of Ayatollah Khomeini and known to be a close associate of the President, but Ayatollah Khomeini totally rejected the idea of any members of his family taking a part in the Government. On July 26 President Bani-Sadr proposed as a compromise candidate Mr Mostafa Mir-Salim, Deputy Interior Minister and chief of police, and a leading member of the IRP although he had generally taken an independent line within the party. Two days later, however, the President was forced to withdraw Mr Mir-Salim's nomination after the latter was rejected by the *Majlis* which thereupon set up a committee (in which Ayatollah Khomeini declined to be represented) to study the qualifications of some 12 other possible candidates. Mr Radjai emerged as the favoured candidate in an unofficial vote on Aug. 7 (receiving 107 of the 155 votes cast) after an earlier proposal that Mr Jalaleddin Farsi be nominated had been rejected by President Bani-Sadr. (Mr Farsi had been proposed by the IRP as its presidential candidate in January 1980 but had been prevented from standing because of his father's original Afghan nationality—see page 30214.)

In a letter accepting the nomination of Mr Radjai on Aug. 9, President Bani-Sadr said that "as it is apparent from the will of the special chosen committee of the *Majlis*, I hereby introduce Mr Radjai for the premiership", the wording of this letter drawing a sharp protest from most IRP deputies on Aug. 10.

Formation of Radjai Cabinet

After considerable debate Mr Radjai and President Bani-Sadr agreed upon a list of 14 ministers, in addition to the Prime Minister, who were on Sept. 10 approved by the *Majlis*, following which the Revolutionary Council was on Sept. 11 reported to have dissolved itself. Two further ministers—those of Oil and of Plan and Budget Organization—were endorsed on Sept. 25, the new Iranian Cabinet thus comprising 17 members (i.e. including the Prime Minister), several of whom had been members of the previous Cabinet formed in November 1979 [see page 30143]. Those not reappointed included Mr Qotbzadeh (who had said earlier that he would not seek reappointment as Foreign Minister) and Mr Moinfar (hitherto Oil Minister), the composition of the new Cabinet then being as follows:

Mr Mohammed Ali Radjai	Prime Minister
Dr Hassan Arefi	Higher Education and Culture
Mr Abbas Douzdouzani	National Guidance†
Dr Hadi Manafani	Health
Dr Mohammed Ali Fayazbakhch	Welfare
*Mr Mahmoud Qandi	Posts and Telecommunications
Col. Javad Fakouri	Defence
*Mr Moussa Kalantari	Roads
Mr Mohammed Shahab Gonabadi	Housing and Urban Development
Mr Mohammed Reza Nehmatzadeh	Industry
Mr Mohammed Salamati	Agriculture
*Hojatolislam Mohammed Reza Mahdavi Kani	Interior
*Mr Hassan Abbaspour	Energy
Mr Mohammed Javad Tondguyan	Oil
Mr Moussa Khayyer	Plan and Budget Organization
Mr Behzad Nabavi	Minister of State for Executive Affairs
*Mr Mahmoud Ahmad Zadeh	Minister of State in charge of National Steel Company

* Member of previous Cabinet, in some cases appointed subsequent to November 1979.

† Ministry dissolved on Oct. 1 [see below].

In addition to the above, Tehran radio on Sept. 29 reported the appointment by Mr Radjai of Mr Mahmoud Karimi-Nuri as a Deputy Prime Minister and Supervisor of the Oppressed Foundation, while on Nov. 5 Mr Radjai was said to have introduced two more ministers to the *Majlis*, namely Mr Ebrahim Ahadai as Minister of Justice and Mr Mohammed Mir-Mohammed Sadeqi as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. On Nov. 25 the *Majlis* voted in favour of appointing Hojatolislam (Dr) Mohammad Bahonar as Minister of Education and Training (a post which Mr Radjai had initially allocated to himself).

On Oct. 1 Mr Douzdouzani announced that he was closing his Ministry because it was "un-Islamic" and needed reorganizing. The Ministry controlled Iranian news sources and foreign journalists.

Although President Bani-Sadr had been quoted as saying after the appointment of Mr Radjai that he would give the Prime Minister a "free hand" in choosing his Cabinet, differences between the two men nevertheless prevented Mr Radjai from presenting his Cabinet within 10 days of his appointment as required under the Constitution.

Mr Radjai had on Aug. 31, prior to seeking President Bani-Sadr's approval, presented the *Majlis* with a list of 19 ministers (which did not include a Minister of Defence or a Minister of State for the National Steel Company) but the President rejected certain of Mr Radjai's choices, protesting in particular at the proposed appointments of a 27-year-old candidate (Mr Ashgar Ebrahimi) as Minister of Oil and of Mr Hossein Moussavi Khamenei as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter having as editor of the IRP organ *Islamic Republic* persistently criticized the President's policies. As an impasse developed over the composition of the Cabinet Ayatollah Khomeini, who had on July 20 told the *Majlis* to reject any ministers proposed by President Bani-Sadr who were not "100 per cent Islamic", declared that the President need only approve those ministers whom he found acceptable. On Sept. 7 President Bani-Sadr accordingly (as explained above) announced a list of 14 men, the majority of whom had previously been nominated by Mr Radjai, but at the same time continued to express his reservations about their ability to govern. (On Sept. 8 the President moreover declared at a rally in Tehran that by vetoing seven men proposed by Mr Radjai he had "prevented the domination of the same minority group which has its grip everywhere and is trying to take over the reins of power through totalitarianism".)

Internal Security Developments

In mid-1980 Ayatollah Khomeini launched an Islamic "cultural revolution", urging widespread purges to rid Iranian institutions of "counter-revolutionaries" and all vestiges of the former Shah's regime, to enforce strict observance of Islamic principles and to install law and order in the country. A large number of people were arrested (and several hundred executed) for offences against the new regime or for activities under the former one, while other action was at the same time taken against minority groups and opponents abroad. [See 30141 A and page 30215 for earlier such developments.] Nevertheless, the Government continued to be opposed, notably by the ethnic minority groups inhabiting the border regions of Iran who were pressing for political and economic concessions [see 30301 A]. Of these groups the Kurds and Arabs in western Iran were particularly active in 1980, the unrest in these areas being complicated by the conflict between Iran and Iraq which in September developed into full-scale hostilities. [Details of the Iran-Iraq war and of preceding events will be dealt with in a subsequent article.]

These major internal security developments are summarized below.

Purges and Islamization Measures. In a speech on June 27 Ayatollah Khomeini sharply criticized the Government, the Revolutionary Council and President Bani-Sadr for failing to establish a "truly Islamic country" and ordered immediate changes in government departments. On June 29 a total of 485 employees of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) were dismissed, while on July 1 the dismissal was reported of 340 Post Office employees, 235 employed in the Ministry of Roads and Transport and 35 working for Iranian radio and television. The Foreign Ministry was subject to particular criticism for not showing enough "revolutionary zeal", and many ambassadors were accused of "idling" and of failing to defend the revolution (as a result of which the ambassador to France, Mr Shamzeddin Amiralai, resigned on July 24); moreover, the then Foreign Minister, Mr Qotbzadeh (who on April 29 escaped an attempt on his life by unidentified gunmen at the start of a two-day visit to Kuwait), was on Aug. 7 called to defend the record of his Ministry before the *Majlis*.

The education system was another major target of the purges, and by the end of June some 500 students, lecturers and other staff members had been dismissed from Tehran University. Earlier, on April 18, the Revolutionary Council had, in response to statements by Ayatollah Khomeini, ordered all universities to close by June 5 in order that a fully Islamic system could be introduced before the beginning of the new academic year. At the same time all political groups were ordered to close their offices and cease their activities at the campuses by April 21; this directive applied to about 18 groups, the majority of them left-wing, and their reluctance to move from the universities provoked violent intervention by extremist fundamentalist groups—many of them members of the *Hezbollah* (Party of God), claiming allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini—who attempted to eject the left-wingers by force.

Left-wing groups were subjected to frequent harassment throughout 1980, members of the *Mujaheddin Khalq* in particular being physically attacked by members of the *Hezbollah* on a number of occasions, and disturbances were especially serious at a rally organized by the *Mujaheddin* in Tehran on June 12. Criticism by Ayatollah Khomeini forced several of the groups to close their offices on June 26, while on July 4 Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri called for their dissolution and a number were thereafter thought to have continued their operations underground. (Ayatollah Montazeri had on May 23 been appointed Friday prayer leader in the holy city of Qom, giving rise to speculation that he might become the country's spiritual leader in succession to Ayatollah Khomeini who had been in poor health since his hospitalization for a heart ailment earlier in the year.)

Calls by Ayatollah Khomeini for the reorganization of the armed forces and the re-establishment of discipline within their ranks resulted in a number of dismissals and new appointments in 1980. On June 1 First Capt. Bahram Afzali Khoshkbijari was appointed Commander of the Navy in place of Rear-Adml. Vakili Tabatabai, who had held the post for only a few weeks (a former Navy Commander, Adml. Mahmoud Alavi, having been arrested on Feb. 24), while at the same time Second Capt. Mostafa Medani-Nejad became Deputy Commander of the Navy. On June 19 Brig. Valiollah Fallahi, hitherto Army Chief of Staff, was appointed Joint Chief of Staff in succession to Maj.-Gen. Mohammed Hadi Shadmehr who became President Bani-Sadr's senior military adviser, while Brig. Ghassem Ali Zahir-Nezhad was in turn appointed Army Chief of Staff (retaining his responsibilities as head of the gendarmerie). At the same time Col. Javad Fakouri (who later became Minister of Defence in Mr Radjai's Cabinet—see above) was named as the new Air Force Commander in succession to Maj.-Gen. Amir Bahmar Bagheri, who had recently resigned (and who was said to have fled from Iran in July).

On June 17 Mr Abou Charif (whose real name was Mr Abbas Zamani) resigned as head of the Revolutionary Guards (Pasderan); his resignation followed an appeal by Ayatollah Khomeini on June 16 in which he called on the Guards to be more "vigilant against plotters" within their ranks and sharply criticized them for intervening in clashes between the *Mujaheddin Khalq* and fundamentalist Moslem groups at a Tehran political rally on June 12 [see above]. On June 29 Mr Charif was succeeded by Capt. Kazem Bodjnouri and himself became deputy leader of the Guards.

Dismissals of members of the armed forces (up to 100 a day according to some reports) had been stepped up following announcements on June 12 and July 10 that the Government had uncovered a conspiracy by military men—predominantly members of the Air Force—based in western Iran who, it was alleged, aimed to return to power Dr Shapour Bakhtiar, who had served as Prime Minister under the Shah from January to February 1979 [see pages 29740-44] and who was currently living in exile in Paris where he led a campaign against the Islamic regime and where, on July 18, he escaped an assassination attempt [see below]. (Dr Bakhtiar was subsequently reported on Aug. 8 to have announced the formation of a national resistance movement and called on Iranians to help overthrow their current regime, having earlier in the month said that he wanted to form a provisional government in exile which on coming to power in Iran would set up a constituent assembly under the 1906 Constitution—i.e. that in force prior to 1979.) Over 300 people were arrested in connexion with the alleged conspiracy, among them two cousins of Dr Bakhtiar, and by early September almost a third of these had been executed [see below].

On Sept. 8, however, Ayatollah Khomeini was reported to have ordered an end to "arbitrary arrests" and prosecution of members of the armed forces while earlier, on Aug. 22, Ayatollah Montazeri had appealed for an end to what he described as excesses in the campaign of purges because "some of the country's best brains are being expelled from their jobs".

In connexion with Islamization measures all women employed in government departments were ordered to wear Islamic dress as from July 8, prompting a protest by some 2,000 women in Tehran on July 5. On July 8 over 130 women who reported for work in the Army and police force dressed in what was considered "un-Islamic clothing" were dismissed. A number of laws were also introduced to ensure the segregation of men and women during social activities (including the celebration of weddings). The Ministry of Arts and Culture announced on June 24 that cinemas throughout Iran were to close down, this step being apparently taken under the pressure of extremist Islamic groups who had already secured the closure of several cinemas and had confiscated a considerable amount of film.

Executions. Reports in the Western press in early August 1980 estimated that since the revolution of February 1979 more than 1,250 people had been executed in Iran, their offences including (i) connexions with the former regime (which concerned in particular members of the security forces—although a number of other "agents" of the Shah, who had not committed murder, torture or embezzlement, were freed in an amnesty on March 18); (ii) activities against the new regime, affecting principally members of the armed forces accused of plotting to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini [see above], left-wingers and members of minority groups; (iii) drug trafficking; and (iv) sexual offences. The executions were carried out notwithstanding protests from abroad (Amnesty International for instance on Aug. 29 calling for an end to such actions), and some opposition was also expressed within Iran itself.

Among those put to death in 1980 were a number of women, including (on May 8) a former Education Minister under the Shah in the early 1970s, Mrs Faroukh Parsa, who was accused inter alia of corruption, co-operation with Savak and spreading prostitution While most executions (some held publicly) were carried out by a firing squad, a number of people were put to death by hanging, and on July 3 authorities in Kerman (south-eastern Iran) stoned to death four people, among them two women, for sexual offences.

Over 300 of those executed had been found guilty of dealing in drugs, and most of the executions were carried out in mid-1980 following the appointment of Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, the former head of the revolutionary courts, as head of an anti-narcotics squad he was understood to have personally ordered most of the executions despite being told by President Bani-Sadr that his role was only to investigate the offences. (On Aug. 11, however, 400 of those arrested on narcotics charges were released in an amnesty to mark the end of the month of Ramadan.)

Out of more than 300 people arrested in connexion with the planned coup [see above] 96 had been executed by Sept. 3 (although Ayatollah Khomeini had on July 19 advocated that all found guilty of involvement with the coup should be put to death). Among those executed were Gen. Sayed Mahdeyoun, who had briefly served as Air Force Commander after the revolution [see page 29745] and Lt.-Gen Ahmad Mohaqeqi, a former commander of the gendarmerie. (Earlier a number of other officers who had served under the Shah had been executed, among them Gen. Kamal Nezami, a former martial law administrator in Qom, and Gen. Hushang Hatam, former Armed Forces Chief of Staff.)

Other people executed in 1980 included over 10 members of the Bahai faith, most of these being accused of complicity in the planned military coup, and a number of Jews, who had mostly been accused of connexions with Israel [see below for persecution of minority religions].

Six people were executed in Abadan on Sept. 4 on charges of responsibility for a fire in a cinema in the city on Aug. 19, 1978, in which 377 people had reportedly perished [see page 29385].

Action against Minority Religious Groups. There were some 450,000 Bahais in Iran, 200,000 Christians, 60,000 Jews and 20,000 Zoroastrians, the latter three groups being officially recognized in the Constitution.

The Bahais, many of whom had held senior posts in management, administration and medicine under the Shah, were considered particularly heretical by the Shia Moslem majority who accused them, because of their progressive views and advocacy of non-involvement in politics, of encouraging prostitution and being unrevolutionary and also of being pro-Zionist (the Bahais having in the late nineteenth century moved the centre of their religion to Haifa, then in Palestine, because of persecution in Iran). Partly in response to a call by a leading cleric in mid-1980 for Moslems to "chase the Bahais" from all administrative positions and to "deliver them to the revolutionary courts", many Bahais were dismissed from their jobs and had their property confiscated, while their shrines were desecrated and their main investment company was closed down. Moreover several leading Bahais were arrested, including 11 on Aug. 21, of whom nine were members of the Bahai national spiritual assembly, while several were executed, accused inter alia of involvement in the planned military coup [see above].

On May 1 gunmen seriously wounded Miss Jean Waddell, the (British) secretary of the Rev. Hassan Dehqani-Tafti, the Anglican bishop of Iran who had gone into exile following an attempt on his life in Isfahan the previous October, while on May 6 gunmen sho and killed Mr Bahram Dehqani-Tafti, the son of the exiled bishop as he was driving home from a Tehran college where he worked part-time. On Aug. 6 Miss Waddell was detained by Revolutionary Guards on espionage charges; on Aug. 10 two other British members of the Anglican church, Dr John Coleman and his wife, Mrs Audrey Coleman, who had worked as missionaries in Yazd were summoned to Tehran and held there (these arrests occurring shortly after the detention of Iranian students in Britain who had been demonstrating outside the US embassy in London). By the end of August Iranian authorities had detained the three remaining leading Anglican churchmen and had also expelled three other Anglican missionaries and over 30 Catholic priests and nuns. On Sept. 3 the Ministry of National Guidance stated, however, that some foreign missionaries would be allowed to stay in Iran provided that they did not take part in illega activities.

The free movement of Jews within Iran was considerably reduced while a number wishing to emigrate to Israel were on Sept. 17 prevented from doing so on the grounds that this was a "Zionist act" According to an *International Herald Tribune* report of June 29 between 50 and 70 Jews had been arrested in Iran and a small numbe were known to have been executed.

Attempted Assassination of Dr Bakhtiar - Assassination of M Tabatabai in United States. Shortly after being accused of involvement in the military coup [see above] Dr Shapour Bakhtiar, the forme Prime Minister, escaped an assassination attempt on July 18 when gunmen, posing as journalists, tried to force their way into his daughter's flat in Paris. Dr Bakhtiar and his household were unhurt but a woman neighbour was killed as the gunmen opened fire on the flat and, in a subsequent gun battle with police guarding the premises, one policeman was killed and two injured. A fourth policeman, however, succeeded in capturing three assailants while two more were arrested later. Ayatollah Khalkhali who had previously on June 10 claimed that he had sent a "death squad" to Dr Bakhtiar and his followers disclaimed on July 18 any involvement in the assassination attempt as did the Iranian Government. Also on July 18 a group calling itself the "Guardsmen of Islam" said that they had passed a death sentence on Dr Bakhtiar, but the latter insisted that the assassination attempt had been financed and organized by "Khomeini and his clique".

On July 22 Mr Ali Tabatabai, who had formerly served as press attaché at the Iranian embassy in Washington and who was an outspoken critic of the Khomeini regime, was shot dead in his Washington home by a man posing as a postman. Mr Tabatabai, who had lived in the United States for some time, headed an organization known as the Freedom Foundation, which aimed at restoring a "democratic regime" in Iran, and was described as being a supporter of Dr Bakhtiar and, despite his earlier connexions with the Shah, an opponent of the former Iranian regime. On July 23 US police arrested two Americans believed to be implicated in the shooting but were said to be still seeking the alleged assassin, an American who worked at the Iranian embassy in Washington (and later at the Algerian embassy which took over Iranian interests in the United States following the breaking of diplomatic relations between the two countries on April 7—see page 30529).

Fighting in Kurdistan. Following a series of clashes between government forces and Kurdish guerrillas earlier in the year, the Government in late April launched an offensive against several towns in Kurdistan causing considerable loss of life (the death toll being over 1,000 according to some reports) and prompting appeals by the Kurdish community for outside help.

The fighting in April had begun as units of the Iranian Army (which had largely been withheld from fighting in the Kurdish provinces) were (as officially stated) being transferred to the Iraqi border because of tension there. Suspecting that this was, however, a pretext by the Government for reoccupying Kurdish areas which its troops had lost at the end of the previous year (despite having launched a successful offensive in August-September—see 30301 A), Kurdish rebels offered passive resistance by blocking roads. Fighting however broke out around Sanandaj and Saqqez [see map on page 30303], where Kurds besieged army garrisons and where on April 19-22 over 100 people were killed. Government forces were then understood to have brought in helicopter gunships and Phantom jets to attack these and other towns, having reportedly first urged the civilian population to flee, and by the beginning of June had gained control of Sanandaj, Saqqez and also Baneh and Sardasht although guerrillas remained in control of the villages and mountain regions. Much of the fighting on the Government's side was, as in the past, carried out by Revolutionary Guards; certain members of the Army were said to have defected, refusing to bomb or attack Kurdish towns, and a military court was set up to try them.

Efforts to conduct peace negotiations and organize a ceasefire were complicated by certain opposition from the Revolutionary Guards who had reportedly been told by Ayatollah Beheshti on May 21 that the Government was not prepared to hold peace talks with the Kurds until the entire western region of Iran had been "purged". Moreover the *Komala*, a Marxist-Leninist Kurdish movement, had similarly expressed its objections to a ceasefire, although the Kurdish *Fedayeen* and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), with which it was joined in a military alliance, had entered into negotiations with the Government. (The Iranian Government had previously attempted to split the three main Kurdish groups—for which see page 30301—by "courting" the less radical KDPI, at least seven leading members of which, among them Mr Ghani Bolourian, the deputy for Mahabad, had defected to the *Tudeh* party because they objected to the KDPI's appeal in February for its members to continue harassment of government forces by pursuing a guerrilla war from the mountains.)

Although the Government made no further major offensives following the fall of Baneh on May 28, sporadic clashes between the rival sides nevertheless continued and in August the Government was said to have regained Mahabad, the principal Kurdish city, housing the headquarters of most Kurdish groups. Moreover, the Government had kept up an economic blockade of many Kurdish towns, preventing vital food and medical supplies from reaching the inhabitants.

A number of Kurds had been arrested in the course of 1980, several of these being put to death, but the Kurdish guerrillas frequently retaliated by putting to death Revolutionary Guards.

Unrest among Arab Minority - Siege of Iranian Embassy in London by Arab Resistance Group. The sabotage campaign by certain members of the Arab minority continued throughout 1980 in the oil-rich province of Khuzistan at the head of the Gulf, although on a lesser scale than the previous year. Oil installations remained principal targets—some 12 pipelines being blown up in four days in early March alone—while there were sporadic bomb attacks in major towns and cities. Among those arrested on sabotage charges, four were executed on April 17 and a further four on July 23. Two particularly serious bomb blasts occurred in Ahwaz on June 24 and July 30, causing some 20 deaths and injuries to many more. (Over 90 people were killed in an explosion in Gatscharah on the southern edge of the province on Aug. 18 when an ammunitions dump belonging to a construction company was ignited. The owner of the company was subsequently arrested although it was not clear if sabotage had been involved.)

On April 30 a group of armed Iranians (calling themselves the Group of the Martyr) who wished to draw attention to the demands of the Arab minority, seized the Iranian embassy in London, taking 26 hostages, among them four Britons (one of whom was a member of the Metropolitan Police's diplomatic patrol group) and demanding the release of 91 fellow Arabs imprisoned in Khuzistan. They also demanded that the captives be flown to London where an aircraft was to be provided to fly them all out of the country; if these demands were not met they threatened to kill their hostages and blow up the embassy.

Iranian officials, who generally accused Iraq of complicity in the embassy attack, made it clear that they would not accede to the gunmen's demands and moreover indicated that if any hostages were killed an equal number of prisoners in Khuzistan would be "summarily tried and executed", while Mr Qotbzadeh on May 1 said that "the British will be held responsible for everything that happens to our diplomats". Negotiations with the armed group failed to resolve the situation over the following few days, during which period several deadlines passed, five hostages were released and the gunmen gradually dropped their original demands and asked only to be flown out of the country. On May 5, however, it was learnt that two hostages had that day been shot dead and members of a British Special Air Service (SAS) team thereupon penetrated the embassy under cover of explosions and, in a hail of gunfire, shot dead five of the six Iranian gunmen. The SAS squad succeeded in bringing out the surviving 19 hostages, two of whom had been wounded (reportedly by the Iranian gunmen) as they stormed the building. The embassy had caught fire during the raid and was gutted. President Bani-Sadr on May 6 sent a message of thanks to the British Government for the rescue of the embassy staff, his initial reaction the previous day having been to praise the "brave resistance of our children at the Iranian embassy in London".

The surviving gunman, named as Mr Fowzi Badari Nejad (23), appeared in court in London for the first time on May 8 when he faced charges of murder, conspiracy to murder and other charges of assault and illegal detention; he was subsequently quoted as saying that he regretted the outcome of the siege and the loss of life. Police were understood to be also seeking a seventh member of the group, a man with an Iraqi address who was thought to have been the leader, and were also enquiring into the possible involvement of both Iraq and Libya in the embassy takeover.

Several foreign newsmen were either expelled or briefly detained in Iran in 1980 on a number of different charges, among them Mr Tony Allaway of *The Times* who, together with a Pakistani journalist, Mr Ralph Joseph, was detained for 17 days in August. (For earlier measures against US and other journalists, see page 30526.)—(Times - Sunday Times - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - Der Tagesspiegel, West Berlin - International Herald Tribune - New York Times - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Economist) (*Prev. rep. Parliamentary Elections 27272 C; Government 30205 A, 30141 A; Internal Security Developments 30141 A, page 30215; Ethnic Minorities 30301 A; US Hostage Crisis 30525 A*)

A. FRANCE — Government Appointments

In government changes announced on Nov. 5, 1980, (i) M. Norbert Ségard, hitherto Secretary of State for Posts and Telecommunications, was appointed to the new post of Minister-Delegate (attached to the Prime Minister) with responsibility for monitoring the application of technological advances in French society; and (ii) M. Pierre Ribes (61), a National Assembly deputy for the Gaullist *Rassemblement pour la république*, was appointed to M. Ségard's previous post. President Giscard d'Estaing's decision to promote M. Ségard (an associated member of the centrist *Union pour la démocratie française*) was reported to have been taken partly in recognition of the latter's courage in recent months in fighting lung cancer. (Le Monde - Times) (*Prev. rep. 30603 A*)

A. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES — 15th, 16th and 17th Sessions of European Council - Agreement on Reduction of Net UK Budget Contribution - Other Proceedings - Designation of New President of European Commission

The 15th, 16th and 17th meetings of the European Council (i.e. of the heads of government of the nine member states of the European Community) were held in Dublin in November 1979, Luxembourg in April 1980 and Venice (Italy) in June 1980 respectively. In accordance with the six-monthly rotation of the Community's presidency, the Dublin meeting was chaired by the then Irish Prime Minister, Mr Jack Lynch, and the Luxembourg and Venice meetings by the then Italian Prime Minister, Signor Francesco Cossiga.

The demand of the UK Government for a reduction of its net contribution to the Community budget constituted a major theme of all three sessions, which also discussed and issued statements on various other political and economic questions.

The UK Budget Contribution Issue - Agreement on Formula providing for Effective Reduction

A demand for a reduction in the net UK contribution to the Community budget had been formally presented to the 14th session of the European Council held in Strasbourg in June 1979 by the UK Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher [see page 30011]. On the basis of proposals presented by the European Commission the question was discussed at the 15th European Council session held in Dublin on Nov. 29-30, 1979, but neither at this meeting nor at the 16th session held in Luxembourg on April 27-28, 1980, was agreement reached, the United Kingdom having rejected various reduction formulas proposed at that stage principally because they contained no guarantees beyond 1980.

However, after further intensive consultations between member states, the Council of (Foreign) Ministers, meeting in Brussels on May 29-30, 1980, reached agreement on a formula under which (i) the United Kingdom would obtain a rebate of about two-thirds of the Commission's estimate of its net contribution of some £2,380 million overall for the two years 1980 and 1981, (ii) the United Kingdom would bear only a portion of any net UK contribution in excess of the Commission's estimates for 1980 and 1981 and (iii) similar arrangements would apply in 1982 if no restructuring of the Community budget had been agreed in the intervening period on the basis of proposals which the Commission was instructed to put forward by the end of June 1981.

In conjunction with the above decision, agreement was also reached on a number of other Community issues the resolution of which had effectively been blocked by the United Kingdom pending a satisfactory settlement of the budget question. Meeting in Brussels on May 28-30, 1980, the Council of (Agriculture) Ministers decided on an average 5 per cent increase in Community agricultural prices for the 1980-81 marketing year (compared with a 6.4 per cent increase for 1979-80 as agreed in June 1979 and with a 2¼ per cent increase for 1978-79 as agreed in May 1978—see page 29517). It also reached agreement on extending common agricultural policy arrangements to the market in sheepmeat (and also goatmeat) on the basis of Commission proposals originally published in March 1978 [see page 29518].

In addition, the May 29-30 Foreign Ministers' session entered into a commitment to take "the decisions necessary to ensure that a common overall fisheries policy is put into effect at the latest on Jan. 1, 1981". [For negotiations on a new Community fisheries policy up to late 1976, see pages 28067-68; implementation of such a policy had subsequently been delayed by serious disagreements between member states centring principally on the extent of national fishery zones and catch quotas.]

The Council of Ministers' agreement on budget contributions was endorsed by the UK Government on June 2 and announced to the House of Commons later the same day. On June 4 and 5 respectively the settlement was also approved by the Governments of West Germany and France, the two other most affected member states in that under the agreement the former would replace Britain as the biggest net contributor to the Community budget, while the latter would move from being a slight net beneficiary to being a substantial net contributor.

Reporting to the UK House of Commons on June 2, Sir Ian Gilmour (Lord Privy Seal and the Government's foreign affairs spokesman in the Lower House) claimed that the agreement represented a satisfactory solution to the problem of Britain's "inequitable budget contribution" and that in the long term "the most important part of the package is the commitment of the Council to review the development of Community policies and the operation of the budget". On the other hand, the opposition Labour Party's foreign affairs spokesman, Mr Peter Shore, called upon the Government to explain its "retreat" from a commitment to achieving broad balance in the UK budget contribution to acceptance of "an agreement to pay out no less than £1,500 million over the next three years to countries that are more prosperous than Britain and for the sole purpose of increasing the already unmanageable food surplus".

The decisions of the Council of Ministers on the budget contribution issue and other matters were formally endorsed by the 17th session of the European Council held in Venice on June 12-13, 1980. Under the provisions of the budget contribution agreement as summarized below, the United Kingdom would receive substantial rebates of original payments on the basis of (i) amendments to the "budgetary correcting mechanism" introduced in 1976 [see pages 28071; 27125-26], and (ii) special supplementary measures under which Community funds would be available to support certain categories of UK public expenditure programmes.

Amount of 1980 and 1981 Reductions. On the basis of the Commission's estimate of a pre-adjustment net UK contribution in 1980 of 1,784 million European units of accounts (EUA), a deduction of 1,175 million EUA would be made, leaving a net UK contribution of 609,000,000 EUA in 1980. (In June 1980 1 EUA = £0.61.) For 1981 the Commission's projection of a pre-adjustment net UK contribution of 2,140 million EUA would be reduced by 1,410 million EUA to 730,000,000 EUA by applying the formula that the revised net UK contribution would be increased by the percentage difference between the pre-adjustment 1980 and 1981 contributions, i.e. 19.9 per cent or 121,000,000 EUA.

On the basis of the above formula the net UK contribution for 1980 and 1981 would be reduced by a total of 2,585 million EUA, or £1,577 million at the June 1980 conversion rate.

If the pre-adjustment net UK contributions for 1980 and 1981 turned out to be higher than the Commission's projections, the difference would be shared between the United Kingdom and the other eight member states. In 1980 the United Kingdom would bear 25 per cent of any difference and the other members 75 per cent, while in 1981 the sharing out would be phased as follows: any excess from 730,000,000 EUA (i.e. the revised net UK contribution calculated on the basis of the Commission's projection of the unrevised contribution) to 750,000,000 EUA would be borne fully by the United Kingdom; from 750,000,000 EUA to 850,000,000 EUA 50 per cent would be borne by the United Kingdom and 50 per cent by the other member states; and over 850,000,000 EUA 25 per cent would be borne by the United Kingdom and 75 per cent by the other member states.

Arrangements for 1982. As regards arrangements for 1982 and succeeding years, the Council of Ministers would seek "to resolve the problem by means of structural changes" in the budgetary system, with the aim of preventing "the recurrence of unacceptable situations" for any member state. To this end the Commission was instructed to submit proposals not later than the end of June 1981, taking account of the development of Community policies but without calling into question the own resources system of financing Community activities or the basic principles of the common agricultural policy. If such a reform of the budgetary system was not achieved in time, the Commission would "make proposals along the lines of the 1980-81 solution" and the Council of Ministers would "act accordingly".

Amended Financial Mechanism. With a view to increasing UK budget refunds, the existing "budgetary correcting mechanism" (which had been set up in 1976 for a seven-year period in an earlier attempt to solve the UK contributions issue) would be amended by the deletion of certain provisions which had severely restricted the size of rebates obtained by Britain hitherto. Under the new arrangements (to be known as the "amended financial mechanism") (i) any excess budget contributions would no longer be divided into tranches attracting varying rates of refund, (ii) rebates would no longer be limited in the event of a member state having a positive balance of payments and (iii) the existing refund ceiling (i.e. 250,000,000 EUA or 3 per cent of total Community expenditure in the relevant year, whichever was the greater) would be removed.

Apart from certain further technical adjustments to take account of intervening developments, the other main provisions of the May 1976 regulation [see page 28071]—including the stipulation that the arrangement would expire at the end of 1982—remained in force. According to Commission calculations, nearly half the agreed reduction in the net UK budget contribution would come through the operation of the amended financial mechanism and the balance from the special supplementary measures.

Special Supplementary Measures. Within the context of the Community's aim of promoting the "convergence" of the economies of member states, Community financial assistance would be granted for the years 1980 and 1981 to UK public investment projects in the following spheres: (i) economic and social infrastructures, especially transport and communications, telecommunications, transmission of energy, water supply and sewerage, industrial sites, factories and subsidized housing; (ii) urban renewal programmes; and (iii) exploitation of coal resources.

The UK Government would submit appropriate programmes to the Commission and approved schemes would be eligible for a Community contribution of up to 70 per cent of total cost; 90 per cent of the Community contribution would be paid in advance (subject to availability of funds) and the balance on certified completion of the relevant scheme. Community assistance for UK programmes would normally be confined to schemes in designated assisted areas and was required to be consistent with the Community's existing regional development fund programme, although exceptions might be made in special circumstances.

Meeting in Luxembourg on Oct. 27, 1980, the Council of (Finance) Ministers adopted two regulations giving legal form to the May 1980 agreement concerning the amended financial mechanism and the special supplementary measures respectively. Although the regulations specified that credits arising from the operation of the two procedures would normally be entered in the Community budget of the year following that to which they applied, both contained provision for the Council of Ministers, on a request from the UK Government, to authorize advance payments.

Conclusions of Dublin European Council Meeting

The "conclusions of the presidency" issued after the November 1979 session of the European Council in Dublin are given below in summary form, together with excerpts from official statements on Iran and Kampuchea (Cambodia).

Economic and Social Situation. The meeting "recognized that despite the progress achieved by the co-ordinated economic approach agreed at the European Council in Bremen [in July 1978—see pages 29510-12], the objectives sought, particularly maintaining growth and combating inflation, had not been achieved in full", although the Community was "expected to achieve at least a moderate rate of growth next year [i.e. in 1981] and may avert acceleration in the rate of inflation". It was decided that "priority must be given to combating inflation", which was seen as "a condition for solving the problems of growth, structural change and hence employment"; that "monetary policy should continue for the time being to support efforts to counter inflation"; that with a view to improving the co-ordination of member states' economic and monetary policies the European Monetary Fund would be set up "in accordance with the timetable envisaged" [i.e. not later than two years after the inauguration of the European monetary system in March 1979—see pages 30010-11]; that the Commission should submit proposals on "specific measures which could be framed to promote more incisive Community action to deal with the unemployment problems"; and that the Council of Ministers should be invited to study Commission proposals concerning a common strategy for the development of data technologies in Europe.

Energy. In view of continuing adverse conditions in the world oil market, the European Council resolved that "efforts must be made both by producing and consuming countries to create greater stability" and that "the Community for its part must now develop a more effective energy policy". Reference was made to the importance of the Community (i) setting national import objectives [for the subsequent final determination of which for the period 1980-85, see 30131 A], (ii) developing indigenous energy resources, "particularly coal, nuclear and hydrocarbons", and (iii) promoting energy research and development "with particular regard to renewable energy sources".

Reports on European Union. In accordance with the practice followed since its consideration of the 1976 Tindemans report on European union [see page 28174; 27957 A], the European Çouncil received annual reports from the Council of (Foreign) Ministers and the Commission on progress made towards union in 1979. The meeting noted three important developments, namely the signature in May 1979 of the accession treaty providing for full Greek membership of the Community as from the beginning of 1981 [see page 30012]; the establishment of the European monetary system in March 1979 [see pages 30010-11]; and the first direct elections to the European Parliament in June 1979 [see 29893 A]. It also "affirmed the importance of these concrete steps in demonstrating the Community's commitment to proceed towards and to create the conditions for further progress towards an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe".

Committee of Wise Men. The meeting received the report of the committee of "three wise men" appointed by the December 1978 session of the European Council to examine the Community's institutional structure, with particular reference to the prospective accession of three new member states [see pages 29515-16]; having considered its "valuable" contents, the meeting referred the report to the Foreign Ministers of the Nine for further consideration. [The report of the "three wise men" recommended inter alia (i) that the European Council (i.e. the heads of government meetings) should be integrated as much as possible "within the normal framework of inter-institutional relations"; (ii) that the European Council should adopt, in collaboration with the Commission, "a master plan of priorities indicating the main tasks and directions for progress for the Community as a whole"; (iii) that the Council of Ministers should attain freedom to concentrate on "the genuinely political issues" by delegating more matters to the Commission and by "giving more room for manoeuvre to the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the lower-level bodies"; (iv) that the "college of Commissioners should be more homogeneous and should act more as a collective body"; and (v) that with a view to reinforcing the authority of the President of the Commission the latter should be chosen by the European Council six months before the renewal of the Commission, be consulted by Governments on the selection of Commissioners and have the "last word" on the allocation of portfolios.]

Iran. As stated on page 30208, the Dublin meeting called for the release of the US hostages held in Iran since early November 1979 "in flagrant breach of international law"; at the same time, it stressed the Community's respect for Iran's independence and right to determine its own future.

Kampuchea. The meeting expressed deep concern at the "tragic situation" in Kampuchea [i.e. the widespread famine and population dislocation which followed the installation of a Vietnamese-backed regime in January 1979—see 29613 A] and expressed support for "an independent and neutral Kampuchea with a genuinely representative government free from any foreign military presence and maintaining friendly relations with all the countries of the region".

Conclusions of Luxembourg European Council Meeting

Apart from the UK budget contribution issue and related matters, the 16th session of the European Council held in Luxembourg in April 1980 also discussed a range of economic and monetary questions and issued a declaration on the international situation.

Economic and Social Situation. The "conclusions of the presidency" issued after the meeting stated that the "struggle against inflation and the correction of external imbalances continue to be basic priorities" and necessitated "vigorous monetary and budgetary policies and price and income trends consistent with such policies". The meeting called for "close co-ordination of interest-rate policies in order to bring interest rates down from their present very high levels once circumstances permit"; considered various factors tending to destabilize the international economic and financial system, in which context it called for greater co-operation between states and in international institutions; and agreed that "the reduction of inflation was an important means of combating unemployment" but that "efforts within the Community to reduce structural unemployment should be stepped up and better co-ordinated".

European Monetary System. The meeting noted that during the first year of its operation the European monetary system had demonstrated "resilience" and that despite various countervailing pressures the currencies participating in the system had "proved to have a greater degree of cohesion than at any time since 1972". Transition to the second stage of the system, involving progress towards the objective of monetary integration, was reaffirmed as a firm Community objective.

Energy. The European Council invited the Council of (Energy) Ministers "to review the energy programmes of the member states so as to ensure co-ordinated attainment of the following objectives": (i) a progressive reduction during the 1980s in the proportion of energy consumption represented by oil and replacement of the latter by alternative sources, especially coal and nuclear energy; (ii) achievement of economic development "with as little reliance as possible on a continued increase in energy consumption"; and (iii) reduction of the use of oil by industry, particularly for electricity generation. The meeting also asserted that "moderation in oil price increases is essential for the economic equilibrium of the world" and declared the Community's readiness for "any constructive dialogue with the oil-producing countries".

Committee of Wise Men. The meeting gave particular attention to the proposals of the committee of "three wise men" [see above] concerning the composition of the Commission and the procedure for choosing its President. It was agreed that "the choice of the President of the Commission should continue to be the responsibility of the European Council and be made at least six months before his term of office begins" and that Greece [due to become the 10th member of the Community on Jan. 1, 1981] would be associated with this procedure.

Brandt Report. The meeting took note of the report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues [the Brandt Commission, whose report was published on Feb. 12, 1980—see

30457 A] and "expressed its appreciation of the contribution which it had made in terms of both analysis and proposals".

Pollution. The meeting noted a French memorandum on the safety of shipping and measures to combat pollution from hydrocarbons transported by sea, particularly in the English Channel, and asked the Community institutions to study it. [For decisions of 10th and 11th European Council sessions on marine pollution following the March 1978 *Amoco Cadiz* disaster, see pages 29510, 29512.] The heads of government also stressed "the importance of undertaking concrete action to clean up the waters of the Rhine". [For the Rhine pollution question, and French involvement therein, see 27910 B.]

International Situation. In a declaration on the international situation the heads of government and their respective Foreign Ministers expressed "grave concern at the trend of recent events, especially in Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East", adding that in this situation Community member states needed "more than ever" to show cohesion. In particular, (i) it was noted "with deep concern that Soviet military forces have not been withdrawn from Afghanistan despite the condemnation of the international community" [see pages 30381-82 for Community sponsorship of Afghan neutrality and other responses]; (ii) the Community's "solidarity with the Government and people of the United States" over the Tehran hostages question was reaffirmed [see also page 30535]; (iii) the participants "reiterated their belief that only a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement can bring true peace to the Middle East" [see below]; and (iv) a demand was made for the cessation of "the acts of violence committed in southern Lebanon against members of UNIFIL" [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, which was deployed in March 1978—see pages 29649-52] so that the Force could carry out its Security Council mandate.

Conclusions of Venice European Council Meeting

In addition to endorsing the Council of (Foreign) Ministers' agreement on the UK budget contribution issue and contingent matters [see above], the June 1980 session of the European Council held in Venice conducted further discussions on the Community's economic and social position and the international economic situation, and also issued declarations concerning the Middle East, the Euro-Arab dialogue, Lebanon and Afghanistan.

Economic and Social Situation. The "conclusions of the presidency" issued after the meeting said that the "keenest concern" had been expressed at "the hardening inflationary pressures" and that the containment of inflation remained the "major short-term objective", to be achieved "by means of appropriate monetary and fiscal policies coupled with measures designed to sustain investment and to cope with the employment situation while keeping external imbalances within acceptable bounds". Stress was laid on "the importance of action to ensure that the risk of a general recession in demand is averted through appropriate international collaboration" and recognition given to the priority need in some member states for short-term employment-creating measures, particularly in respect of young people. The meeting affirmed the Community's commitment to "strengthening the open and multinational international trade system" in the expectation that the decline in growth rates in the industrialized world would be "quite sharp" in 1980.

International Economic Questions. The meeting concluded that the international monetary situation was still "dominated by the problems of the huge balance-of-payments disequilibria stemming from recent oil price increases", the correction of which "can only be effected in the long term by means of stabilization of the terms of trade and the necessary real adjustments to our economies". It was asserted that "no objective grounds existed for increasing the price of crude oil at the present time" and that repeated increases gave rise to "intolerable burdens for the industrialized regions and even more so for the emergent countries". The meeting reaffirmed the Community's commitment to the North-South dialogue between industrialized and developing countries and to "a restructuring of international economic relations".

Middle East. After reaffirming earlier declarations by the Nine on the Middle East (notably the major statement of June 1977—see page 28656), this declaration continued:

"On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

"All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the UN by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including guarantees on the ground.

"A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, who are conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-determination.

"The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], which will have to be associated with the negotiations.

"The Nine recognize the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places.

"The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai [i.e. under the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty—see 29941 A]. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

"Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive setttlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

"The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take."

Euro-Arab Dialogue. The Nine "noted the importance which they attach to the Euro-Arab dialogue [see page 29426] at all levels and the need to develop the advisability of holding a meeting of the two sides at political level" as a contribution to "the development of co-operation and mutual understanding between Europe and the Arab world".

Lebanon. The Nine renewed their "urgent appeal to all the countries and parties concerned to put an end to all acts liable to affect Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the authority of its Government", and pledged their support for "any action or initiative likely to guarantee the return of peace and stability in Lebanon".

Afghanistan. The European Council reiterated its view that a solution to the Afghanistan crisis could be found "in an arrangement which allowed Afghanistan to remain outside the competition among powers and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned state". It accordingly urged that the great powers should "agree to respect the sovereignty and integrity of Afghanistan, to refrain from any interference in its internal affairs and renounce any stationing of troops on its soil or any form of military association with it".

Agreement on New President of European Commission

It was confirmed on July 1, 1980, that M. Gaston Thorn, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister and then chairman of that country's Democratic (Liberal) Party, would succeed Mr Roy Jenkins (United Kingdom) as President of the European Commission on the expiry of the present Commission's mandate at the end of 1980 (when the full composition of the new Commission and distribution of responsibilities would be determined). [For the appointment of the 1977-80 Commission, see pages 28174-75.]

Following discussions at the Venice session of the European Council on June 12-13, M. Thorn had emerged as the candidate favoured by eight of the nine member states, but confirmation of his appointment had been delayed by the French Government, which was understood to have expressed reservations over his commitment to a more supra-national Community. (European Commission, Brussels - Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Le Monde - Economist - Hansard) (*Prev. rep. European Council 30010 A; Commission pages 28174-75*)

A. NOBEL PRIZES — The 1980 Awards

The 1980 Nobel Prizes, each of which was worth 880,000 Swedish kronor (about £88,600), were announced during October 1980 by the Royal Swedish Academies and by the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian *Storting* (Parliament) as follows:

Literature Prize. The Swedish Academy awarded the 1980 Nobel Prize in literature on Oct. 9 to Prof. Czeslaw Milosz, a Polish-language poet now resident in the United States, whom it described as a writer who "with uncompromising clear-sightedness voices man's exposed condition in a world of severe conflicts".

Prof. Milosz (69) was noted for the conceptual and linguistic complexity of his poetry, much of which dwelt on the theme of exile. He was born into the Polish-speaking community of Vilna, Lithuania (which belonged from 1923 to 1939 to Poland), and in 1933 published his first collection of poems while studying law in Vilna. After further study in Paris he moved in 1935 to Warsaw where he worked during the Second World War with the Polish resistance movement. In 1945 he was appointed cultural attaché at the Polish embassies in Washington and then in Paris, but defected from the latter post in 1951, living in Paris and becoming involved with the Instytut Literacki, a Polish émigré publishing organization which printed in 1953 his best-known work *The Captive Mind*, discussing problems of freedom and religion in the Stalinist state. Mr Milosz emigrated to the United States in 1960 to become a lecturer and subsequently a professor in the department of Slavic languages and literature at the University of California at Berkeley, and in 1970 became a naturalized US citizen.

Prof. Milosz, besides his poetry, also published a number of novels (including *Zdobycie Wladzy*—published in an English language edition in 1955 as *The Usurpers*) and a volume of critical essays (published in English in 1977 as *Emperor of the Earth; Modes of Eccentric Vision*), as well as translations into Polish from English, French, Spanish and Hebrew.

Although some of his work was included in an anthology published in 1972, he was largely ignored by the official Polish press after his defection in 1951; his work was, however, distributed unofficially by such underground publishers as Nowa [see 30297 A; 30565 A], whose editor, Mr Miroslaw Chojecki [ibid.], on Oct. 10 expressed a hope that the award would contribute to a loosening of censorship in Poland. The Polish television network gave detailed coverage of the award which, the Swedish Academy stressed, was devoid of all political motives.

Prize for Physiology and Medicine. The Karolinska Institutet in Stockholm awarded the 1980 Nobel Prize for physiology and medicine on Oct. 10 jointly to Dr George Snell, a former staff scientist of the Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor, Maine (United States), to Dr Jean Dausset, professor of immunohaemotology at the University of Paris, and to Dr Baruj Benacerraf, professor of comparative pathology at Harvard Medical School in Boston, for their work on "genetically determined structures on the cell surface which regulate immunological reactions". The three men had made major contributions to medical knowledge on the body's acceptance or rejection of foreign cells and its resistance to infection.

Dr Snell (77), who was born in Haverhill, Massachusetts, established the genetic factors determining the acceptance or rejection of transplanted tissue in mice, and also introduced the concept of histocompatibility antigens (H antigens) which determine inter alia the development of immunity to diseases.

Dr Dausset (64), who was born in Toulouse, proved that H antigens were present in man and, according to the Karolinska Institutet, "elucidated the genetic factors regulating their formation".

Dr Benacerraf (60), who was born in Caracas, Venezuela, but who in 1943 became a US citizen, was cited by the Karolinska Institutet for "showing that genetic factors intimately related to the genes which determine an individual's unique constitution of H antigens actually regulate the interaction among the various cells belonging to the immunological system", and that they were thereby important to the strength of an immunological reaction.

Peace Prize. Sr Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, an Argentinian human rights campaigner and secretary-general of the Peace and Justice Service (Servicio Paz y Justicia—a network of Latin American human rights organizations) was on Oct. 13 awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1980 by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which compared his activities directly with those of Dr Andrei Sakharov (who had received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975—see 27442 A—but who had since Jan. 22, 1980, been confined by the Soviet authorities in internal exile—see 30243 B).

Sr Pérez Esquivel (48), a sculptor and architect by profession, had since the late 1960s been involved in the formation of various groups advocating non-violent resistance in Argentina. He had led the Peace and Justice Service since giving up his position as a professor of architecture in 1974, and had campaigned in particular for the establishment of a Human Rights Commission within the United Nations. He was imprisoned by the Argentinian authorities from April 1977 to June 1978, although the Nobel Committee commented that no adequate grounds for his arrest had been presented.

The Argentinian Government reacted on Oct. 15 to the suggestions of wrongful arrest by issuing a statement claiming that Sr Pérez Esquivel "had had to be arrested" because his activities "were being exploited—against his will—to increase the freedom of action of the members of various terrorist organizations". Sr Pérez Esquivel strongly denied the latter allegation and, accepting the congratulations of the Argentinian President, Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, offered to meet him in order to discuss human rights problems in Argentina.

Dr Sakharov, in an open letter published in Moscow by his wife (Mrs Yelena Bonner Sakharova) on Oct. 22, congratulated Sr Pérez Esquivel on his receipt of the award, speaking of the "extreme seriousness and tragedy" of the problems facing Argentina and Latin America in general and affirming his faith in the moral strength and ultimate success of Sr Pérez Esquivel's policies.

Physics Prize. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences on Oct. 14 awarded the 1980 Nobel Prize for physics jointly to Prof. James Cronin and to Prof. Val Fitch, both United States citizens, "for the discovery of violations of fundamental symmetry principles in the decay of neutral K-mesons".

Prof. Cronin (49), of the University of Chicago, and Prof. Fitch (57), of Princeton University, led a research group investigating the behaviour of elementary particles with the use of a proton accelerator. While examining three basic related principles of symmetry in nature they were able to show that, contrary to the previous assumption, left-right asymmetry was not always compensated for by the transformation of matter into antimatter. Consequently it was possible to distinguish between matter and antimatter, left and right, in an absolute rather than merely relative manner.

The new discovery was regarded as relevant to the so-called "big bang" theory which proposed that the universe had been created in a large and violent explosion, but which had hitherto been unable to explain why, if total left-right symmetry prevailed, all matter and all antimatter had not immediately cancelled each other out at the moment of generation.

Chemistry Prize. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the 1980 Nobel Prize for chemistry, also on Oct. 14, jointly to Prof. Paul Berg of Stanford University (USA), to Prof. Walter Gilbert of Harvard University, and to Prof. Frederick Sanger of the University of Cambridge (Britain), for their work on nucleic acids in the DNA molecule (a substance of central importance to the transmission of genetic information).

Prof. Berg (54), who received half of the prize, developed a technique by means of which fragments of genetic material from one species could be inserted effectively into the genetic material of another in order to produce such natural substances as interferon (increasingly used as an anti-viral drug). Prof. Gilbert (48) and Prof. Sanger (62), working independently from one another, developed different but sensitive methods of establishing the sequence of genes in DNA strands, for which they each received one quarter of the prize. Dr Sanger had also received the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1958 for his investigations of the molecular structure of insulin [see 16523 A].

Economics Prize. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the 1980 Nobel Prize in economic science to Prof. Lawrence Klein of the University of Pennsylvania "for the creation of econometric models and their application to the analysis of economic fluctuations and economic policies".

Prof. Klein (60) had in the past acted as an unofficial economic adviser to President Carter but was regarded as ineligible to join the presidential administration because of his brief membership, in 1946-47, of the Communist Party. Essentially a Keynesian economist, he devised computer-based models of economic and business forecasting using econometric techniques (which combine mathematical and statistical methods); the most well-known of these models was the Wharton Economic Forecasting Model which was used in several countries for predicting the effects on output, consumption, investment, etc., of such factors as taxation or public spending policies. Prof. Klein also produced other models based on a number of foreign economies, and had become in recent years deeply involved in the promotion of the LINK research project, which sought to create an international forecasting model encompassing a wide range of differing economic systems.

The prizes were presented on Dec. 10 in Stockholm (Literature, Physiology and Medicine, Physics, Chemistry and Economics) and Oslo (Peace).—(Times - Financial Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Swedish-International Press Bureau) (*Prev. rep. 1979 Nobel Prizes 30003 A*)